Transcripts For CSPAN3 Discussion Focuses On The Future Of North Korea 20170607

Thanks everybody very much for coming to this event for a discussion of north korea boom or bust. Youll note the clever play of words there. It can mean various things. Normally we have sort of a 30 dropout rate for those who signal attendance. I think today we had a 30 increase in those who are participating. Its a tribute i think to our speakers but also to the issue at hand which is certainly one of the top Security Issues facing not just the United States but the world. And particularly the region. So this event, this event is part of the iiss americas preshangrila dialogue series where now the third such event we seek to address shed light on the issues that come up at the shangrila dialogue which will be held this weekend in singapore for the 16th year. The shangrila dialogue is a gathering of defense ministers around the region and many of their counterparts in other countries. Theres one asian defense minister who not be there. Thats the north korean. I tried many times to get the North Koreans to come to shangrila dialogue and its been one of the failures every time i have my annual review, i get that checked off as an area to improve on. So lets get serious about north korea. We have four Renowned Experts to address aspects of the north korean issue. Starting with victor cha on my far right who is a Senior Adviser and the inaugural holder of the korea chair at csis. Thats another think tank in town. Hes also director of Asian Studies and holds the ds song chair in the department of government and school of Foreign Service at georgetown university. From 2004 to seven, he served as director for Asian Affairs at the white house on the National Security council. Hes a longtime iiss member and contributor. Sue mi terry is asias managing director for korea. From 2009 to 2010, she was at Deputy National Intelligence Officer for each asia at the National Intelligence council. Before that, she be served as director for korea, japan and Oceanic Affairs at the National Security council. Earlier, she worked as a Senior Analyst on Korean Affairs at the ci a. I met sue three years ago at a conference in philadelphia where i was very impressed with her presentation. Ever since ive wanted her to join us. Thanks for coming at this time. 234 is a professor at the university of seoul. Currently hes on a year long visiting Research Scholar at the Catholic University of america. He served in several advisory positions in the korean government including the president ial committee for unification, preparation, the ministry of Foreign Affairs and ministry of unification. We met eight years ago in hanoi and our paths have croed several times since then. Finally, is michael elleman, iiss senior fellow fort miff defense based here in washington. Before i hired mike in 2009, he spent five years at bu zell and hamilton where he supported the implementation of cooperative Threat Reduction programs in the former soviet union. Previous to that, he spent 1 months at the United Nations as a missile expert for weapons inspections missions in iraq. He writes and speaks extensively about north korea missile development. The fully event will run for an hour and a half following remarks by each of the panelists. Well have a discussion portion and ill turn it over to questions for you. This event is on the record. Its being broadcast by cspan 1 and cspan radio. Additionally, a video will be posted on the iiss website. Because of the cspan broadcast, we have extra lights here which adds to the heat in the room. And unfortunately, today, the air conditioning chose to go out for the entire building. And the room is packed with people. So im going to encourage everyone to feel free to take off one layer of clothing. I encourage the panelists to do that, as well. Well all been miked up in our suit. So were not going to be able to be have that luxury. If you see us sweating its not just because were worried about north korea. So victor, lets start off with some thoughts from you, please. Thank you. Thank you, mark. Its a pleasure to be here in this toasty room with all of you this morning. Mark neglected to mention how we first met. You probably dont remember how we first met. I remember. You do remember. I was doing my ph. D. Disissertation and i was doing my Field Research as a full bright scholar in japan and korea. And looking for people to interview for my thesis, and you know, when youre a p. H. D. Students just roaming the streets of tokyo and seoul trying to get a Government Official to talk to you, youre grateful and remember the ones who actually said yes. Mark was one of the two people at the u. S. Embassy who said yes at the time. The other was bill mckinney. He was the Defense Attache at the time. Im always grateful for that. Thank you, mark. In terms of north korea, great title boom or bust. The if any of you have even been mildly paying attention to the news, you have noticed an uptick in coverage of north korea largely because of the missile testing activity they have been undertaking. Some of you may look at this and think, well, you know, weve seen the North Koreans do this before. This is just cyclical coverage of every time they decide to test another missile or do another nuclear test. But i would put to you that there was a qualitative difference today in terms of what is happening versus what has happened in the past. If we start with some of the basic metrics, between 1994 and 2000 and the end of 2007, so for about 17 years, almost 1 years, north korea did 17 Ballistic Missile tests and one nuclear test between 1994 and 2000, december of 2007. Since january of 2008 till today, they have done i think the number is if we count this past weekend, 73 or 74 ballistic miff tests and four nuclear tests. So there has been a there has been a sea change in the amount of testing that they have been doing. In the past, there was a theory bandied about in the pos community in washington, d. C. And in academic halls around universities that one of the purposes of north koreas testing was that it was essentially a desire to have negotiations with the outside world and in particular the United States. North korea is a poor small isolated country. It has the largest country on the world on its border. Its got russia on its border across the sea. Sea of japan, east sea, whichever you prefer is japan, the United States military is in the south. And directly across the border in south korea is a very successful korea, not a very unsuccessful korea. For all these reasons, the north korean regime did these tests as essentially a way to try to draw the outside world into negotiations to get them credibility, to get them legitimacy because it was the only currency they had. They had no other currency with which to trade with the outside world. I think its pretty safe to say that theyre not that many there may be a few still but there are not that many in policy community that still believe that is the purpose of this testing. The pace of testing clearly suggests that this is a military testing program. It is not simply a cry for help or a provocation disguised as an olive branch. This is a military testing program. So what is the purpose of this program . Well, clearly one purpose is survival, right . Every regime seeks survival. And dictatorships in particular are quite often very much focused on their survival. But i would put to you that a regime that over the past 25 years has devoted a disproportionate amount of its National Resources to a wmd program is doing this not simply for reasons of survival. North korea is demonstrating and actively trying to test the capability that can reach the United States about a nuclear tipped icbm. We can certainly talk about and im sure michael can talk about some of the obstacles that still remain from them from doing that. Thats clearly the objective of all of this testing. The purpose of being able to reach the United States with an icbm, the west coast of the United States and to be able to threaten all of japan and south korea, the military objective of all this is in my view, they want to try to undercut the credibility of u. S. Extended deterrence guarantees to south korea. In their own minds in their own minds, im not saying u. S. But in north korean minds they believe that if they can threaten the United States if they can threaten los angeles or San Francisco with a nuclear attack, it will create hesitation on the part of the United States if they were called on defending south korea. They can threaten all u. S. Installations and cities in japan, including tokyo, they will create in their own minds some hesitation on the part of japan to allow the United States to flow forces through japanese logistics nodes in defense of the Korean Peninsula. You have to remember that in north korea had, the world for north korea is very small. Its about survival, of course. But North Koreans dont really care about climate change. They dont really care about global governance. They dont really care about responsible overseas development, assistance policies in africa. Right . They dont really care about fragile and conflict afflicted states. They dont really care. The only thing they care about is their survival and dominance of the Korean Peninsula. Those are the only two things that they care about. So while this idea, this theory im putting forward may seem farfetched to some of you, if you look at it from a north koreian mindset this is all that matters because once they can create some sense of hesitation or doubt in issian minds that the United States or japan would be there in the case ive conflict, then they will feel they have affected the strategic balance on the peninsula. 25 years ago, the north korean regime realized they were never going to be able to match south korea dollar for dollar, right . Company for company. Tank for tank. Soldier for soldier. So they chose an asymmetric strategy focused on Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missiles and cyber as a way to try to matches a symmetrically try to match what is happening on the other side of the peninsula. That is essentially the strategy that theyve been following. In terms of, i dont know, mark, how long do you want me to speak for . Should be no more than ten. Youre getting toward the conclusion i think. Okay. I think let me make some comments about the new government in south korea. As you know, new government was elected in south korea what was it, last week, a couple of weeks ago. And i think there was a lot of noise in the press about how you know, this is the first progressive government in south korea in a decade. That theyre going to take a very different view of policy towards north korea and create a rift in the alliance between the United States and south korea. I think what weve seen thus far actually has shown the opposite. Which is that president moon appears to have taken a pretty measured position when it comes to engagement with north korea reinvigorating the socalled sunshine policy. Of course, the North Koreans have helped in creating this measured response because theyve already done two miff tests since the new south korean president was elected. And i think from a u. S. Perspective, in principle, i think the United States doesnt have a problem with engagement with north korea. But it has to be done at the right time. It has to be coordinated and done at the right time. Which is what the South Koreans want, as well. The South Koreans dont want to throw money down a black hole if theyre going to invest in engagement, they want it to be effective. Its not going to be effective if its not coordinated with the United States and other members who are involved in trying to denuclearize north korea. Thus far, i think the media speculation was a little bit speculative. Of course, they have to sell newspapers so thats a better story when you say the u. S. And south korea are going in opposite directions but thus far, i think if you just look at president moons statements they seem to have been quite measured reflecting realities on the ground rather than some you know ideaologically blue sky view of what engagement can do with a regime that as i said since january of 2009 has january of 2008 has clearly been on a testing warpath. So why dont i stop there. Thanks very much, victor, for laying out the situation and some views about the new south korean government which dr dr. Hwang is also going to comment on. Sue, youve been looking at the north korean case for quite a number of years. Tell us some of your insights please. So when i used to work at the cia, i spend about a decade looking at north korean internal situation. Ill tell you most definitive lili the hard part to get a clear understanding on is leadership dynamics, region intentions what the leaders are going to do. This is something thats really hard to get clarity on. Very, very difficult. But as victor said, eventually weve got a handle on the kim jongun leadership, the Decision Making. And what victor referred to we got a handle on this bringsmanship, tactics policy we called it a pattern, a cycle. Provoke, pyongyangs playbook. We had cute names for it which was basically north korea would do something provocative and you know, theres an international condemnation. They would up the ante and pivot to some sort of peace offensive and offramp which would lead to dialogue and negotiation and some sort of concessions made by washington or seoul to north korea. This is not as note exactly the pattern under the kim jong leader smp. Hes not following this exact pattern. He seems to be bent on really perfecting and completing the nuclear program. He staked his entire legitimacy on perfecting this Nuclear Arsenal that his father and grandfather have power pursued and millions of lives and a cost of billions of dollars. Hes bent on completing it because he sees achieving this capability to be able to hit the United States, washington, d. C. Or new york with nucleartipped icbm as final deterrent, final guarantee. So what really concerns me is we didnt get to talk a lot about policy but maybe well get to that is that and weather youre for maximum pressure or engagement and i happen to be for pressure. I happen to be thats my preference in terms of match mum amount of sanctions additional sanctions. You know, youre going after the secondary sanctions if necessary and other measures to try to get the regime to change its calculus, but what really concerns me since were going to be frank here is that i have none of these measures were will likely achieve might not achieve the desire we want to achieve, the goal we want to achieve which is to get north korea to give up newark year weapons, give up its Nuclear Arsenal. What will we do . We sooner or later i think sooner rather than later, we will probably get there and north korea will achieve that capability. Then the two i have many concerns obviously once north korea achieves that capability. But the two main concerns that i have are first and i think victor has also referred to this many times is miscalculation. Really will go up by the kim regime once he believes he has this capability that you can hold u. S. Cities as hostage basically hold it as hostage. That his Decision Making or mindset could be he thinks now he has this ability to deter us which then will lead to it could be more conventional acts of coercion, that will lead to unintended escalation that will lead to more obviously a problem. So thats one concern i have. Second concern and i know a lot of the folks share this concern is that nuclear deit earns has worked thus far. It worked with north korea deterrence worked. Deterrence and containment policy worked but again im not as confident on this leadership that Nuclear Deterrence and continued policy will necessarily work with kim jongun. I have less confidence that it would work. People like Jeffrey Lewis wrote a very scary Foreign Policy piece how north korea might even be developing offensive nuclear doctrine. Im not sure if i would go as far as that, but there is an argument that people are making that you know, that there is a possibility that kim jong u. N. Could do that, could use Even Nuclear Weapons in an effort to really recoil u. S. And south korea in case he think to stop us from invading or going after north korea because when he saw cases like iraq and libya with Saddam Hussein and gadhafi, obviously conventional forces did not work. We cannot rule out that possibility. Obviously that is a very scary scenario. Its been six minutes, wow. So the Trump Administration apparently told the south korean delegation theres a four point strategy, one not recognizes north korea as a nuclear state, two imposing all available sanctions not seeking regime change and four ultimately resolving the issue with dialogue. This sounds goods but i do think that we have to be somewhat realistic. We have to be prepared for this scenario that none of these measures are going to work and what is our longterm policy and goal . I dont know if we have that. And i know some people are always talking about unification and so on. We say regime change is off the table because its not fashionable to say that. But where is our end state . Because if you if this is credible, its not going to change, youre not going to go anywhere with this particular regime. I mean, this is something we do have to think about. Just two points since im out of time i want to talk about. On the elites. The sanctions mentioned all this. Its not only north korea. It does help in terms of undermining the current regime. If you are seeking for sort of your youre hoping to create instability or jooep change scenario in north korea, sanctions trying to really because youre taking money away for kim jongs ability to underwrite the lifestyle of the elites. I do think this information penetration campaign that we often talk about is very important but i just want to make this final point that it shouldnt only be targeted towards the public. The populace of getting information into north korea. We should definitely try to again target the elites because were trying to get two messages across to the elites which is that this current course of trying to attain Nuclear Weapons is not going to guarantee your survival and livelihood. Secondly, if you are able to get out of north korea that there will be maybe some sort of amnesty or some sort of lifestyle that could be guaranteed. Fundamentally, because its the elite support thats keeping the region going. You ended on a very good place. That reminds me of what my friend talks about. It would be great if we can get him to washington, too. So professor hwang, from south korea not representing south korea, or course. Thank you for having me here. Im Ji Juan Hwang Research Scholar at the Catholic University. So i think the i was wondering why the mark decide on the tight of this seminar, the north korea boom or bust. Im sure that its now boom because there are so many people here. So you are very interested in the north korean issues. He actually asking me to talk about the south korean perspective on the north Korean Nuclear issues, but unfortunately, im not a Government Official. But anyway, i know a lot of people inside of korean government. I have. Friends inside the new south koreian government. Moon jaein. So i think i think very well about the new south korean government and new york policy. Basically, i think that i believe that as most of us do that moon jaein the government north korea policy is you know somewhat different from the those of the previous back and park you know hey because the moon jaein government, basically emphasize the importance or interkorean relation including the economic comp ration and also the social and the cultural exchanges between the two koreas. So i think the moon government will start with the north korean policy. The cultural or the social approach rather than the political or the military one. But seems to me that however, i think that its very difficult to say the new government moon jay government, the real north korea policy would be the completely and fundamentally different from the previous government. I would say the three different variables are to explain the north korea policy, the first one is south korea domestic politics and the second one is action reaction dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and the third one is the alliance of politics of course, the alliance between the u. S. And south korea. The first regarding the korean domestic policy, you know because we have now the new, the progressive, the president in south korea its natural to expect the new south korea policy by the south korean government. So moons policy will definitely reflect the former or kim day young and which is widely only known as the sunshine policy. So many people predict that the president moons policy would be the moon shine policy maybe. Maybe. But so in this sense, recently the south korean government especially the ministry of unification approved the south koreas south koreas ngos. The humanitarian aid to north korea maybe two days ago. The new foreign minister maybe you know her, who used to work for the u. N. And maybe the u. N. Secretarygeneral was told that it is necessary to continue the humanitarian aid towards north korea in any case and she also said that this is u. N. s basic principle. So maybe most of you know the professor moon at the university. Now hes your president noon moon jaeins special security adviser, hes you know, the strong support of sunshine policy. He has a book on sunshine policy published in 2013. And the title is the sunshine policy in defense of engage. As a path to peace in korea. And also, the professor who now the president of nash security and also the professor at the university, he was here in the washington, d. C. To explain moon jaein the government, the north korea policy on Foreign Policy. Maybe several months ago. Hes also a strong supporter of the sunshine policy on the the sunshine policy on the Korean Peninsula. Captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2008