Rhetoric. Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you so much for turning out on spring like day in washington. Lets hope it continues. Thanks for cspan for coming along. And just a few tips on how were going to handle this mornings meeting, it is being filmed live so when we come to the q a please state your name clearly so the world knows who you are and your aunts and uncles can refer to the recording. The subject today i think is highly relevant. Iran sanctions and the nuclear deal. Weve heard a lot about iran during the Election Campaign and particularly from the president , but i think there is some confusion as to what the actual policy is given that we have a nuclear deal with iran which no one seems eager at this point in time to tear up, even though the president says its the worst deal ever negotiated. Secondly, we have a major fight with the Islamic State or isis, which the president claims is one of our Top Priorities in Foreign Policy and yet ironically one of the countrys we are going to rely on to beat isis is iran. Iran has an election coming up. There is great pressure on capitol hill for more sanctions against iran not for violations of the nuclear deal, but because of its behavior in the gulf, its support for insurgence and its human rights record. To discuss this, we have an extremely talented duo before us and before we get to the duo, i forgot to announce who i am. Im jeffry camp senior director for programs here at the center for national interests. The first speaker im going to turn to is dennis ross and then im going to turn to mark fits patrick. Dennis ross has a distinguished record in this town having served several president s. Hes a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute. He has written numerous books, the last of which is a must read on the relationship between successive israeli governments and american president s with some interesting background material that i think is quite new to most of us. Mark fitzpatrick has lived for the last 10, 15 years in london working for the National Institute for strategic studies as their chief spokesman, commentat commentator, but he is an american. Before he went to state department doing pretty much what hes doing now. Hes now moved back to washington and is the executive director of iss america and in that capacity he runs the office they have here in town and they hold meetings just like this and they do publications just like we do. But marks real prominence in this town has to do with his extraordinary knowledge of the iran nuclear component, including the status of the iran nuclear deal. So dennis is going to start out by giving a broader picture particularly talking about how we deal with these con none drums that i mentioned, including the israeli am bef lens towards the deal given the hostility towards it while it was being negotiated and mark will talk more about the actual deal itself where it is succeeding, where it has weaknesses and what new sanctions may mean for the iran deal even if theyre not directly earmarked against it. So with that in mind, theyll both have about 12, 13 minutes to open up and then we will be free to question them. Dennis. Thank you, jeff. So i will i want to talk a little bit about what i think the Trump Administration confronts. Im not going to try to explain what their policy is because i think their policy is something thats still being dwoeveloped, but i want to look at it from the standpoint from the kind of things they might do. Let me start by just sort of noting two things to begin with. One is that obviously as jeff said the president of the United States referred to this as the worst deal ever negotiated and that reflects i think not just a view of what the negotiations produce, but an inherent sense that the deal itself has within it or produces a number of vulnerabilities and i want to address am sosome of that. There is a second dimension obviously that since the comprehensive joint plan of action, if you listen to the general votel, he says that iran has become much more aggressive in the region since the joint comprehensive plan of action. If you think about it so the administration is confronting what they see as the vulnerabilities that flow from the deal in the nuclear dimension, but also is dealing with or thinks it must deal with what are the implications in the region itself. So i think the first question to ask is what is the administration do about the joint comprehensive plan of action. The secretary of defense during his confirmation hearings made it very clear that he thought even though it wasnt a good deal, that we had to live up to it. I would suggest that that makes sense. If we were to be the ones to rip it up since the fact is it wasnt a bilateral arrangement, we would make ourselves the issue, not irans bad behavior. If in fact what the administration wants to do is to find a way to leverage the Administration Needs to make it clear that the focus should be on what iran is doing. We shouldnt be making ourselves the issue. In other words, dont isolate the United States, think about how you do more to put the spotlight on irans behavior and whats wrong with irans behavior. Here i think there there is something that can be i think effectively done. One thing that the Obama Administration didnt do effectively and ill come back to this later, in a sense the Obama Administration became very defensive about the issue of iran not getting the economic benefits from the deal and the irania iranians, my colleague who is here, wrote a piece with two other members of the Washington Institute, which i thought which i think very effectively focused on iran having created a narrative about how iran was living up to the deal and we werent. And one of the reasons iran isnt doing nearly as well as it might in terms of the economic benefits from the deal is that iran, when it comes to creating transparency in its Banking System and fulfilling the standards that the Financial Action task force has required with regard to Money Laundering and terrorist financing, iran doesnt meet one of those standards. It therefore becomes very difficult or at least banks are hesitant to do the financing for bigger deals is they worry about the consequences of being slapped with really big fines because they might be dealing with someone who is connected with Money Laundering or terrorist financing. If iran isnt getting a lot of the benefits economically from the deal, thats because iran itself is continuing not to meet the kind of standards that everybody else is supposed to meet, at least with regard to their banking requirements. It would be effective, i think to try to focus on that, but also focus on what iran is doing in the region. When the general says that iran has become more aggressive in the region, well, thats a good thing to remind everyone. And the sanctions that exist that the Obama Administration was always very clear were going to continue to exist on Human Rights Violations or the approach to human rights and on terrorism, they exist because again of irans behavior, not because somehow we are dreaming these things up. So there is a context that i think the administration can draw and should draw on. Now, if i were advising the administration, what else would i advise them to do . Ill say by the way, im not advising the administration, but if i were advising the administration, there would be a number of things that i would focus on and they go back to concerns that i myself had about the joint comprehensive plan of action. One of the Major Concerns i had is that because at the end of 15 years there really arent any limitations on the size or the quality of the Nuclear Infrastructure that the iranians can have, i worried that down the road irans threshold Nuclear Status would be such that the gap between that and being able to have a weapon would be sufficiently small that iran might at some point be tempted to go for a weapon and i always felt that one of the key things that i wanted the Obama Administration to do that they didnt do and that the Trump Administration actually could do was to bolster deterrence. Theres a number of things the administration could do to bolster deterrence. The irans make a commitment never to seek or acquire or Development Nuclear weapons. If we see them doing that, they should understand given the infrastructure they are allowed to develop it would be too late to impose new sanctions. They need to understand if we see them moving towards a weapon, not withstanding the commitments they made, we will use force to deal with it, not sanctions. Secondly, after 15 years the iranians theres nothing in this arrangement that prevents the iranians from being able to produce highly enriched uranium after year 15. Thats the something the administration could establish as a principal if they do that, that would be a trigger. The third thing, something i was i favored for a while, the Obama Administration was able to restrain its enthusiasm over this proposal, but i was in favor of at some point giving the israelis the massive ordnance penetrator. We developed the 30,000 bomb which is a conventional device that could actually deal with the one enrichment site built into a mountain, we should give that to the israelis and lease the b2 because the israelis dont have a plane that could carry it and the reason would be twofold. One if we change our declaratory policy, maybe the iranians wouldnt believe if was for real, but if the israelis had this capability they would likely believe the israelis would move on it if they were moving towards a weapon and we are prepared to be the supportive of the israelis under those circumstances. The fourth thing i would like to see happen, the one of the concerns i had is that the iranians were almost bound to cheat. At least along the margins. And if for no on the reason to test how good the verification provisions were within the joint comprehensive plan of action. I felt that again if youre going to bolster deterrence, you have to establish that for every tra tra transgresh there is a price. There should still be a price. There is the joint commission is something that obviously brings together the five plus one who negotiated it, but weve already seen the iranians have more heavy water than they were supposed to and weve already seen the iranians have as i understand it theyve had excess low enrichment materials below what they were supposed to. The procurement channel that was established for the purpose of ensuring we have a clear picture into dual use capabilities that the iranians were requiring, the iranians have only made five requests through this procurement channel which is another way of saying theyre really not using the procurement channel. We know from the germans that they have engaged in elicit behavior trying to acquire material. The point is that we should have some understandings at least with the europeans that rather than being in a situation where in the joint commission we flag things that the iranians are doing that they shouldnt do, they should see theres a consequence, theres a price for them doing the things they shouldnt do. You establish, as i said, a pattern over time that when you transgress or violate theres a consequence so it becomes clear if theres a big violation, then the consequence is going to be severe. Thats as i said, a way to bolst bolster deterrence. A fifth area where i would like to see deterrence bolstered and i think the new administration could do something useful, would be to track and see are the iranians providing more material assistance to the malitias than they were before. This could be a place where we could increase the price to them. One of the things i think the Obama Administration was hesitant to do some of these things was because there was a fear if they did them it would play into the hands of the hard liners. There was a kind of analysis that the Obama Administration did which was that one of the important things that was potentially changing in iran is you could empower the more pragmatic constituency within the iranian hierarchy and whenever you did anything that would seen as provocative it would hurt them. That was the opposite of the logic that was used in the first term in approaching the iranians on the nuclear issue. There the approach was to build the pressure on the iranians, but leave them a way out. Thats still a logic that i think should apply. If you really want to bolster deterrence, if you want to enhance the strength of the more pragmatic tiypes, you want to show what the head of the forces costs iran. It doesnt benefit iran. If you want the iranians to see that engaging malitias to weaken regimes throughout the region works there should be a price for it. Should we be doing more to interdict arms that theyre not supposed to be providing anyway to hezbollah or the huh tis . Yes. Should we look to raise the costs . Yes. One of the things that the iranians have been shy about, theyve been very clear that the nuclear deal doesnt prevent them from doing anything they want to do in the rest of the region. I dont know why we cant respond in kind. Maybe ill wrap up by simply saying the following. If you raise the issue of the iranian elections, look, i grant that its, you know, a how you think about the iranian elections and whats going to happen and how we might affect it is not a simple thing. But there were many people who thought rohani would win the last time. Its about as good as thinking you could predict what was going to happen in our elections. We should be pretty humbled about thinking that were going to be able to affect the iranian elections. Right now, its pretty clear, i think, that the iranians at this point, whatever the criticisms of rohani, the fact is there seems to be a kind of posture toward the Trump Administration in no small part because theyre not quite sure what the Trump Administration is going to do, and they also see potentially that they can create some divisions between us and the other members of the 5plus1. We shouldnt be overly preoccupied with trying to regain the iranian election, we should be doing what we think is the right thing to do. And i would simply remind everybody here, the iranians said to us that as long as they were under sanctions, they were not going to negotiate on the nuclear issue. We increased the sanctions at that time in the first term. And they came and they did negotiate. Now, im not arguing for a big increase in sanctions, what i am arguing for is increase the sanctions we do have, dont be shy designating where theres a need to designate. We should have done what we did, what the white house did with the missiles. The calls on the iranians not to test Ballistic Missiles. Since they dont intend to have Nuclear Weapons, anything they test by definition isnt subject to that. Well, look at what the Ballistic Missiles, look at the range they have, look at the payload they can carry. By the way, they could carry Nuclear Weapons. And because in fact theyre called on not to do it, theres no reason the administration shouldnt be going to the other members of the 5plus1. But theyre doing it anyway. We should be implementing the sanctions that we have. We should be where there are where iranian behavior justifies doing more, we should do more. Especially with the other members of the 5plus1. We should look for ways to have an agreement, if they violate, what the price will be at least with the europeans. And we should look for ways to raise the cost of the iranians for what theyre doing in the region. Because the basic logic should be also applied, i think, on their regional behavior. Thank you very much, dennis. Very clear, very provocative. And raises a lot of interesting questions we will discuss hopefully. After marcus made his mark. Thank you very much, jeff. Pleasure to be here. I think we all agree iran presents problems in several areas. But one area they dont present any immediate problem is in the nuclear area. Because theyre no longer marching ahead fast toward having a cape ability to produce Nuclear Weapons in a short period of time. Jcpoa blocked them from having that. Because theyre not marching toward that breakout capability, were not talking about going to war over the issue. So the region is more peaceful than it might have been otherwise. But iran continues to enrage and in many ways its problematic. I would agree with the proposition that the United States should be willing to sanction iran for these other areas in the nonnuclear field when warranted. Lets talk a minute about what when warranted means. One is, when sanctions can be more effective policy tools in changing the behavior in question. You know, sanctions tend to be the policy of first choice. But its not the only the hammer isnt the only tool in our toolbox. When warranted also means that applying sanctions in other areas doesnt violate u. S. Obligations under the jcpoa, whether intentionally or ina inadvertent inadvertently. And undermining the sanctions relief that iran was promised under the deal, would violate it. I agree, Patrick Clawson and his colleagues said the washington wrote some interesting notes. The United States should not appear to be suspending the sanctions relief that was promised by the jcpoa. The United States should avoid rhetoric, such as talking about the, quote, chilling impact sanctions could have on investment in iran, or the uncertainty new sanctions would introduce. You know, as dennis mentioned, there are many reasons why Foreign Companies are disinterested in engaging in investing in iran. We shouldnt reinforce the iranian narrative that the United States is to blame for this lack of interest. A third recommendation by the Washington Institute was that the United States should avoid discussing the jcpoa all together when referencinreferen example, the Iran Security Council Resolutions on weapons exports. I want to say a main point is that the United States needs to prioritize its objectives. I would say that preserving a deal that blocks all iranian paths to a Nuclear Weapon is a first order objective. Because only with Nuclear Weapons would iran pose a direct National Security threat to the United States. In pairing irans Ballistic Missile program, i would say is a second order objective. Its important, but its not on par with stopping Nuclear Weapons development. And then i would say that stopping iranians arms shipment is a third order problem. The real issue in yemen is the internal political solution thats needed. So when warranted also means when sanctions can be effective. My judgment is that more sanctions wont cause iran to buckle under and renegotiate a jcpoa under u. S. Terms, as some who want to scrap the deal have argued. And its important to realize that sanctions alone werent responsible for the jcpoa. They were very important in bringing iran to the negotiating table in 2013. But it was only when the Obama Administration agreed on a major concession to allow some enrichment that they allowed them to accept the interests of inspections under the Additional Protocol. It was incentives and disincentives. Some say that obamas decision to allow some enrichment was the original sin. I guess, without sex, negotiations werent going to give birth to a deal. There wasnt going to be a virgin birth. There wasnt going to be a unicorn deal that only benefited the United States. I would also judge that sanctions on irans Missile Program mpt going to get iran to stop the Missile Program. Its too important to their national defense. Their air force is so decrepit, that they rely on Ballistic Missiles for their defense. That doesnt mean sanctions are irreleva irrelevant. Sanctions can help slow it down, they can damage and undermine the programs efficacy. But if we really want to achieve a solution to the missile issue, its going to require, i think a broader arms control agreement that involves other players. I just dont see iran accepting missile limits that only apply to itself. But if they apply to others maybe through a multinational deal, or maybe separate bilateral deals, then i think we have a possibility. Meanwhile, there are other deals to deal with the Missile Program. The tools include integrated Missile Defense in our gulf state partners. Enhanced export controls. You know, use the procurement channel wisely and well to stop the iranian procurements. By the way, the german report about procurements, it wasnt very specific as to whether irans ongoing procurement was in the nuclear or missile field, it kind of mixed those two together. I think its probably mostly in the missile field, and we should do what we can to try to stop it through export controls. And Civil Defense measures are another tool you can use to deal with the missile threat. So lets look at the criteria, then, that nonnuclear sanctions shouldnt undermine the jcpoa. Some of the iran sanctions bills under consideration in the congress seem to be drafted explicitly for that purpose of undermining the jcpoa. And just to pick one example, hr566 named the terrorfree skies act seeks to delist the iran nationals by the u. S. Treasury. That would make it unlikely that any of the planes would be licensed, which would be an explicit violation of the jcpoa. This and other sanctions bills, also, some of them seem designed to goad iran into being the one that kills the jcpoa. Some advocates are clear that thats their objective. In talking with iranians, i dont think theyre going to be easily goaded. I think they are going to take a lot that were going to dish out to them. Because they dont want to be the one to be seen as the party responsible for killing the deal. And right now, iran probably has Global Opinion on its side. As Ilan Goldenberg wrote last week, even though the trump team maintained they would abide by the deal, the global narrative is setting that the Trump Administration is the actor. My deals with europeans and others suggest that is the narrative, that means our partners are not going to join us in reimposing any sanctions if the deal collapses. One other example of an idea thats put out there of a new sanction, designating the iran air corps as a terrorist organization. It seems designed to warn foreign firms against doing any business with iran, given the pervasive role that the Enterprises Play in the iranian economy. But that would be another violation of the spirit if not the letter of the jcpoa, if that was the purpose of designating the irgc. And theres no purpose, because they already fall under enough other sanctions, that there wouldnt be any other impact. Iran is already designated as a country, as a state sponsor of terrorism for good reason. And that designation covers the irgc. But if the irgc is to be designated, and i think thats probably coming, i think it would be wise to wait until west mosul falls. Because irgc supported militia are involved in the attack on isis in western mosul. And it would be counterproductive to sanction their sponsor. It would create a difficulty in continuing to press that battle. And it would create danger for u. S. Forces in iraq, if were suddenly designating one of the partners de facto partners as a terrorist group. Designating the irgc would also make it very difficult to involve them in any potential Diplomatic Solutions to regional issues in which they are involved as a problem, if theyre going to be part of the solution. It will be difficult if theyre a terrorist group. And labeling the irgc group would be tantamount to a declaration of war on iran. Now, he exage rates. But i think theres probably a lot of iranians that would see it that way. So we could create this emotional response in iran that i dont think it would be warranted. You have to ask whether more pressure on iran, which might otherwise seem to be a good idea would turn the population against the government. And yes, it could see rohani losing his bid for reelection on may 19th. I agree with dennis that u. S. Policy, we get it wrong so often, we cant determine whos going to be the winner or loser in iran. And theres probably nothing we could do that could be certain to help rohani. But i have a feeling theres a lot we could do to hurt him, that would benefit a hardliner if solohani turns out to be a candidate of the hardliners. I think you have to admit rohani would be a much better partner. If the objective of the exercise is to prolong enmity between iran and the United States for another generation, we should keep doing things that get the goat of the iranian people. Like forbidding all of them, all of them to enter the United States under the terms of the visa ban. You know, such acts spur iranians to rally around the flag. They reinforce the conservative narratives that the United States cant be trusted. Last point, giving a talk on north korea later this week so ive been thinking about parallels. We saw in the north korean case how abandoning a diplomatic deal that limited north Koreas Nuclear program, abandoning it has contributed very much to what seems now to be an insurmountable problem. The 1994 agreed framework with north korea wasnt perfect. The North Koreans cheated, yes, they did, but the deal did significantly roll back their Weapons Program for a significant period of time. So i say similarly in the iranian case, its far better to taylor an incomplete but effective agreement than scrap it in hopes of achieving a best outcome but getting the worst. Thank you. Two evocative presentations. Well momentarily open this up for discussion. I just have two quick questions for the speakers. Dennis, could you say a little about how you think the netanyahu government now sees the nuclear deal. Because my judgment, reading between the lines, is that while they never liked it and they probably still do not like it, theyre no longer in a lets tear it up mode, but more in a lets make sure it works mode. If that is the case, then presumably that will have great resonance on the Trump Administration. And mark, you sort of alluded to the upcoming elections, and you mentioned the ban on travelers from the seven countries. And i know Barbara Slaven has some interesting ideas on this. But it does seem to me this was a case of us hitting ourselves in the face. Particularly given the fact that the iranians that are banned, or were banned, i have no idea where it stands right now, are all ones we know and like. And probably a couple we dont like. Thats probably right. Okay. So dennis, just on netanyahu. Look, i think that within israel, there was a view within the security establishment that the deal bottom lined. And that there were flaws in the deal. There were concerns about the deal. But the deal bought time. And rather than scrapping it, the smart thing to do was to ensure it was in force, and number two, figure out ways to take advantage of the time. If youre buying, depending on how you viewed it, ive heard from different voices within the israeli dispense establishment, some view it as 8 to 15 years that youre buying. The reason some say as little as eight years, which means seven years, they feel the prospect of the iranians walking away after year eight goes up, because thats the point at which the sanctions are actually terminated as opposed to suspended. So then their impulse to walk away might increase. Others thing that, no, its they worry more about when the iranians can start putting the advanced centrifuges stashting in year ten, but in any case, the basic view was, youre buying time. What can you do within the region, what can you do with the United States to take it to maximize the impact of that time. And netanyahus view was similar except in one area. He has been really all along on the end point. And the concern that iran is being legitimized as a nuclear state. And his big concern was, find a way to extend the 15year period, because hes convinced that under the guise of the deal, iran will find a way to become a Nuclear Weapons state by year 15, or year 16 or Something Like that. So my i think that in the conversations with the Trump Administration, yes, there will be a focus on serious enforcement, but i think there will probably be some push to see if there is a way to try to renegotiate that. And i suspect that maybe some will make the argument to the administration that showing that you wont scrap the deal, but that youre open to being tougher on the iranians might get other members of the 5plus1 to feel that, okay, lets keep the Trump Administration to stay on the reservation, and then we can go back and talk to the iranians. I dont think theres much other interest in renegotiating the deal. Im sure theres no interest on the part of the iranians in renegotiating the deal. I think thats the conversation that will take place. Okay. The travel ban was one of the dumbest ideas thats come out of the white house in the last month. It applies disproportionately to iran. Because iran has the largest population of the seven countries. It probably has more population than all the other six combined. And its a rather welleducated middleclass population. So much more likely to be opined for visas to visit their 1 million relatives in the United States. It really hits the iranians hardest. And theres no prospect for iran to get out of the box, because theres no government relations. They cant provide easily the kind of assurances that would be required under the deal to ascertain that the travelers in question werent terrorists. So it was a bad idea. Okay. Well, with that in mind, lets open it up for questions. Barbara, im going to start with you over here. Barbara slaven. Youve got mikes in every direction here. Thank you. Barbara slaven, i run a program on iran at the atlantic council. I think what has been missing, although mark touched on it a little bit, is what is the context for iran policy . I think Madelyn Albright put it its more like pool. When you hit a ball in one direction, it may hit a number of other balls before it winds up wherever it goes. So id like both dennis and mark to talk about, what is the context for this . If you put more pressure on iran, and as dennis suggested, how is that going to impact our policy in dealing with isis, how will it impact syria, how will it impact yemen . Should we be encouraging the saudis to be even more aggressive in yemen, even less willing to sit down and talk to the iranians about conflict resolution in the region . What is the broader context, and do you think that Trump White House even has a clue now about how to put that together . Thanks. Look, theres a lot of moving parts, to be sure. Let me take the second part of your question first and then ill address the first part of your question. I think the policy is obviously being formulated. But you have a secretary of defense who came out of centcom. You now have general mcmaster who also has a lot of experience. Both of them have experience and i think one of the things you should be its worth keeping in mind, they have a lot of experience with losing american soldiers to shia militias in iraq, shia militias that were armed, financed, trained by the quuts forces and the iranians. That weighs heavily on them. So i do think its going to inform the way they approach iran in the region. I do think theres a focus on iran in the region. In some ways, theres a focus on iran in the region not only because their own experience, what they see from our traditional partners in the region, and the fears they have, but in an interesting way, because its easier to deal with than the jcpoa. If youre not going to tear up the jcpoa, which i think they conclude you shouldnt tear it up, for the reasons at least what i said and they understand from talking to the europeans and others, then it becomes natural to focus more on what the iranians are doing in the region. Now you get back to the question of, the priority on isis. It can cut a couple of ways obviously. At the end of the day, if youre going to defeat isis, you also have to have a plan for what comes after isis. You know, i would suggest that and mark, you raised the rule of the shia militias which is more outside of mosul than in mosul, but the experience of some of the shia militias in iraq, when they have liberated places like ramadi or fallujah, most of the young sunni males disappear. And that deepens sectarianism. It doesnt make the prospect of ensuring you dont face son of isis later on less likely. Part of the challenge is, if youre going to have if youre going to have a strategy for dealing with isis, its not only militarily defeating it, its also trying to discredit it. Its having a plan for reconstruction. Its having a plan for sunni inclusion. Its having a plan for governance. And its not clear exactly how the iranians help in that regard. I mean, some of the patterns, if you look at the story in iraq, they havent exactly been helpful in that regard. So here you get into, if youre really going to approach the region in terms of isis, then you need the su in is with you. Now, today, trying to drew the sunnis in with you to play a bigger role in terms of dealing with isis, if it looks like youre going to partner with the iranians, its made less likely. Again, using your pool analogy, the cue ball can hit the 15 ball which hits the 8 ball and they can careen in different directions. Fundamentally, i would say youre going to need the sunnis with you. Now, the question becomes, is there a way to bring the sunnis with you if you dont have a strategy that looks like you also are going to counter iran. The irony is if you have a strategy that looks like youre going to counterwhat iran is doing in the region, does that then also put you in a better position to then say to some of the sunni states, you know what, were countering iran, so maybe you dont have to do as much. I mean, its the look, when president obama gave the interview with jeff goldberg, and he basically said, look, the saudis need to learn to share the region with the iranians, and he said this before he went to the gcc summit, that didnt exactly endear him to them when he came. You may recall that he was the one foreign leader that the king chose not to meet at the airport. There was an article written the day after the summit by rasheed who said the president had come and asked the leaders to acquiesce in irans dominance in the region. Obviously he didnt come and ask that. But thats what they heard. And so apropos of your question, its a complicated region. If youre going to have a strategy toward i sis and you need the sunnis, you have to have a strategy against the iranians that will counter them. Mark, where you and i may different is, my basic approach to the iranians is, build the pressure on them but leave them a way out. Dont corner them. Leave a way out. Im afraid that if you dont build the pressure on them, and if dont sew what sulamani can come across, their more active use of shia militias i think deepens sectarianism. So now, david . Thank you. Im dave pollack from the Washington Institute. I want to ask about both speakers about the possibility of some small scale but direct military skirmish between iranian and u. S. Forces somewhere, maybe off the coast of yemen, maybe inside iraq, i dont know, in the gulf. How likely do you think that is . What do you think would happen . And what do you think would be the effect of that, if any, on the Nuclear Agreement . Thats a good question. Either one of you. Yes, i hope that the iranians are paying attention, and hearing what Administration Officials are saying about precisely this kind of thing, about the harassment of u. S. Ships, and the next time it happens the gun boats will be sank. I suspect they would be. Heres a case where the United States has put out a rhetorical position, and i think it will add to the deterrence of such activity. But if it happens anyway, which it might, and you cant be certain that an irgc maritime boat wont have gotten a word, or will take action into its own hands, and there will be a flare flareup. Then the question is, do the Communication Channels that existed in the Obama Administration work to overcome the flareup . And i think those Communication Channels are still working at the lower levels, but probably not yet well, theres nobody answering the phone in the state department yet. But i would hope that rouhani would see to it that it didnt flare up into a conflict. Because he knows hed lose. He can read the writing on the wall, the United States ready to press the case. Well, yeah, thats true. Hes not in charge of the original operation. But he can have an impact on the de newmont of it. Its a its obviously a tough issue for a lot of different reasons. If you look at the iranian behavior right now, like i said, they look to me to be somewhat more cautious. And, you know, its interesting, when Michael Flynn said were putting the iranians on notice, and the president backs it up with a tweet, i found that not the equivalent of the obama red line per se, but when you say put on notice, youve just raised the expectations about what youre going to do. Does put on notice mean more designations . Does put on notice mean youre going to act militarily . If youre on the iranian side, my guess is, you probably should be more cautious. One of the reasons i mean, i think that the potential for the very thing you identified in your question is higher than it was, is not because i think the iranians didnt take notice of it. I think they did. But if we look at the history of the irgc back during the iran iraq war, frequently they acted quite independently of what the central Decision Makers were saying. So is there the risk that we could have, you know, that kind of an incident . Yeah, i think its pretty high. And again, you look at the secretary of defense with his experience, i think the potential of a reaction of us destroying such a boat is pretty high. The question then is, what do the iranians do about it . My guess is, their response is more rhetorical than not. But i you know, again, if i was doing what i used to do, i think we might see it express itself in places like iraq. So, you know, i think the heres where i actually think, like mad elaines analogy of pool, when you make policy, you actually have to be a chess player and not a checkers player. You have to be thinking three, four moves ahead. Do i think because the essence of your question is not what is the immediate implication as it relates to not so much vertical escalation, but a horizontal escalation, and i do think theres some risk of that. I think its less likely to affect the nuclear issue. Let me just go through what i have noticed, and to tell you i dont know all your names so youll have to announce them. The lady here. The gentleman in the white. And the lady next to david up there. Okay. So thats four. Any more up there . Stephen . Okay. Yes . Im kelly tor renson. Just briefly on the travel ban, it seemed especially silly. I would guess a lot of the iranians who wanted to come to america are coming friendlier than most. What i wanted to ask, mr. Fitzpatrick, i might i think the idea that rouhani is a moderate is certainly debatable. I might agree with you that he is someone we would rather deal with than sul i manny. Is it true, though, that sul oh manny doesnt have influence, and do we think, talking about affecting the iranian elections, do we really think whoever is president of iran is really the thats where the buck stops and thats who were really dealing with, and thats who has to sign off on any deal we make on any issue . Well, clearly iran is not led by the president. The Supreme Leader has far more power. But irans political nature is one of sort of consensus based Decision Making among var groups in the elite. Rouhani is not unimportant. Thats the only election they have is for the president at this point, until the premier dies and they have another election. I didnt say rouhani is a moderate, but i think hes far better than a hardliner, solimani. Barbaras question about context. The context under obama was that, jcpoa was a transactional deal, and it was hoped it would be transformative, that iran other time would change in ways that would are better for all the areas where we have concerns about iran. And that hope is still out there. It hasnt materialized at all so far. But given the demographics of iran, i think its fair to hope that it some day can. And we can affect how that evolves by negatively or positively. We certainly cant finetune any election outcome. But continuing to chastise iranians, i dont think works to our benefit, in changing haerlts and minds in iran. What do you think about, you know, the Obama Administrations refusing to take a stand on, say, the Green Movement . Im curious, youre talking about the demo grarvgs of iran changing. Do you think the United States needs to be more supportive of dissidents and freer movements in iran . I dont think the Green Movement has much standing right now in iran. Its kind of a moot question really. Okay. Yes, sir . Im mahmoud with reuters. Dennis, a question for you. You talked about the importance of showing the iranians that theres a price to pay for transgressions. What is the appropriate price for the iranians to pay if they end up having 130. 1 metric tons of heavy water . In a practical sense what would you have wanted to see an administration do in that circumstance . More broadly, its not to raise the question of i dont mean to raise a trivial question, but if youre going to make them pay, what do they pay for something as small as that might seem . Second, can you explain in more granular details the kinds of ways in which you would try to raise the pressure on the iranians, if you do see them doing things that you dont want to see them . And in a way, this goes back to barbaras question, but how do you do that . Is it a blizzard of designations actually going to change their behavior in certain circumstances or not . And how do you do that when they continue to punish you in so many sort of horizontal theaters . Whether its yemen or syria or iraq . Look, what i would its not a simple answer to your question. Where if they are if theres a kind of if theyre exceeding by a small amount of heavy water, what should be the price. The point i had in mind was, you sit and talk with the europeans, in particular, and say, lets come up with what our proportional consequences, or penalties for their engaging in what would be small amounts of violations or infractions. The idea that they can, you know, they can engage in behaviors that arent consistent with the deal, but all you ever do is just call attention to what they do, doesnt make sense to me if what you want to do is get them used to the idea that for a transgression or violation theres going to be a price. You know, there are there can be limited kinds of penalties imposed. But that ought to be something you discuss with the europeans and work out in advance. Thats the point i was getting at. As for the idea that, because they can hurt you in a number of ways, you should be selfdeterred, well, that becomes the you know, they can read that, too. And its not like theyre constraining themselves in terms of what theyre doing in the region right now. You look at the weapons that are going to the hutis. Its not like theyre holding back. You look at the weapons that continue to go to hezbollah. Its not like theyre holding back. So, you know, would i try to do more to interdict their delivery of weapons . Yes. I would try to do that. Theyre not supposed to be doing it, you know, under the terms of the Security Council resolution as it is. Its not like were in the wrong. So i think they you know, its true, you have to think through every move you make. That was the point i was making before. But its also true that if you if every time youre afraid that when they engage in behaviors they shouldnt be engaging in, that you cant do anything, that message is pretty clear to them, too. And, you know, the its not like their involvement in some of the places in the region are so popular with the iranian public. You know, the fact that they spent a lot of money on the outside is not something that is so welcome at home. I would do a lot more to shine a spotlight on that and also expose it, so their public would be aware of that. That, you know, when i say raise the price, theres different ways to raise the price. Including, by the way, shining a spotlight on it. Shining spotlights, one might add that iran has one of the worst environmental crises in the greater middle east. Thanks to water shortages and mismanagement. And that is really hurting a lot of people. So, next, governor gilmore . Former governor of virginia. First of all, a quick observation. Sounds to me like the panel believes that weve already improved our ability to deter iran by the statement of the president through general flynn. So actually, our Foreign Policy has improved already. But heres my question. Everything that we said today is all about handling iran. Handling the Nuclear Program, handling export controls, shining a spotlight, how to handle it. I dont mean to be naive with this question, but can i get a clear statement of what you think the iranians are trying to do . Are they trying to dominate the middle east . Are they trying to create a shiite caliphate . Are they trying to simply protect their own regime by creating deterrence . What is it that were trying to stop them from doing in the first place . Dennis . Do you want to start . Well, first of all, let me say that i more of a Nuclear Specialist than a iranian regional specialist. So when i try to offer a suggestion what the iranians are trying to do, i may be a hundred percent wrong. But most of the states in which iran is involved are states hon its periphery, and its and they involve many of them shiite populations that they see themselves as a natural leader of. So theres a probably part of it is protection of the state by defending neighboring states. And part of it is defending a coreologicist. Im sure thats a shallow answer. Dennis can do better. Look, i think the iranians have a selfimage. Theyre the dominant culture. And they have a tendency to look down on many of their neighbors. And i think that they feel that by rights they should be able to dominate the region. And i think they have offensive and defensive reasons for that. Offensive, because i think they think they have the right, and defensive because they think its also a way to protect the regime. So they you know, ill use the term, they think they should be the dominant power within the region. Its true that they theres a periphery, but theres also lebanon. You look at the effort theyve made, the investment theyve made to back us up. You know, the argument theyd like to have a corridor basically from iran through iraq through syria to the mediterranean i think is probably not wrong. Now, they can rationalize that, as i said, in defensive terms, but others obviously see it in offensive terms. The fact that they clearly were interested at one point in trying to open up a spot on the gol a hon heights in syria. I know how the israelis see that. The fact that theyve given hezbollah, you know, over 100,000 rockets. Right . You can certainly, again, they have a huge stake hezbollah is the one place where they in effect successfully exported the revolution. So they have a huge stake in that. And that also helps to explain the level of investment theyve made in syria. One last point on this. One of the things that the that their use of hezbollah in particular, hezbollah more than the other shia militias, theyve been like the shock troops in lebanon. The reason that the theres been an importation of the shia militias is that there are very large numbers there, is because the actual numbers of forces available to the assad regime have declined as much as they have. And so they actually need the shia militia to basically hold territories. And anyway, just the one last observation on this. I for a long time before the conflict in syria began, i always looked at hezbollah as being a Lebanese Organization first, and basically an instrument of the iranian second. Given the way they were employed in syria, in a way that was not in hezbollahs lebanese interests, it became very clear to me that they are basically an instrument of the of iran. Would you say iran regards itself as an exceptional power . Yes, it does. Absolutely. Absolutely. Aberdeen . My question is to dennis. Dennis, the Obama Administration did not have a Good Relationship with the gcc. Especially with saudi arabia. And the emirates. Now, with the Trump Administration in power, how does the Trump Administration, or what does the Trump Administration want from the gcc on iran, on isis, and finally, on that of the israeli issue . Because when netanyahu came, he says he sees a change. Id like your analysis on that. Well, i dont represent the Trump Administration, and so i dont want to be in a position where i would be asked to try to say i know what their policy is going to be. Because i might not express it very well. But i think what we at least drawing from the press conference, it does seem that the that the president at least has an interest in broadening the circle, creating a regional approach, at least on the arabisraeli issue, which is not a simple thing to do. And i do think that and you would know this as well as anybody that both the saudis and emirates at this point are hopeful about the Trump Administration. They viewed fairly or not that the Obama Administration saw the iranians as part of a solution to the problems in the region, not the source of the problems in the region, and therefore, they became deeply distrustful of the administration. When the administration put iran on notice, i think they liked that. I think the language towards iran generally is reassuring to them at this point. But i think, you know, theyre obviously going to have to see what the policies are going to be. Its not just its not just what is being said, its actually what is being done. Mattis is someone they know very well. So i think thats probably also a source of some reassurance, at least to the saudis and to the emirates. And i think theres probably an expectation that there will be within the region, again, one of the interesting things about the saudis and emirates, theyre not keen on having the jcpoa ripped up either. But their focus this has always been a distinction between the israelis and the key gulf states in particular, the israeli view of iran was through the nuclear lens, which they read in existential terms. The saudi view of iran is what iran is doing on the ground in the region in existential terms. They were more concerned about obama doing a deal on the nuclear issue, because they saw that as a suggestion that the deal would come at their expense. And they were worried that basically, if iran could cause all sorts of problems when they were under sanctions, imagine the kind of problems they could cause when they were no longer under sanctions and they had access to more materials. That was kind of the perception of the certainly of the gulf states. And i think they have an expectation of what the Trump Administration will do, but, you know, it remains to be seen what that means in practice. Okay. The lady next to David Pollack . Could you say your name, please . Im ann garen, reporter for the washington post. I guess i would put this to both of you. We used to hear a lot about americans held in iran and what role they played in potential diplomacy, or deal making or sanctions involving the United States and iran. And really, since the release of jason ryan and the nuclear deal, seems to me weve heard a lot less about that. And yet there are at least two, probably more that im not aware of, americans held there. Do you expect that to return as an issue between the United States and iran, as sort of a front burner issue . And if so, how . And do you think the travel ban will influence iranian thinking or behavior with regard to the americans that already hold, or in likelihood to take more . Thank you. Thats a very good question. Tomorrow marks the oneyear anniversary of the hostage taking of the elder mr. Numosi. Very much that should be on our minds. How we deal with it, and whether the sanctions, or what tools can be used, its a very tricky set of issues. And the answer, im afraid, to your question about whether this will continue as an issue, i think is yes. Because its one of the ways that the revolutionary guards can hit back in the nonnuclear area. You know, they dont want to be the ones to kill the nuclear deal, so theyll sanction the United States in you understand what i mean. Sanction the United States for what . But i think there are various ways the iranians can hit back. And taking iranianamerican dual citizens or iraniancanadian there are more british dual citizens in jail right now than americans, is one of the tools that they have. I dont know how to help. Dennis . Look, one person whose name never seems to get mentioned is robert levittson, who has been held for a very long time, who the iranians have not been straightforward on in terms of his status. They seemingly have used his status at different points to try to affect the administration. I do agree with mark that this has been a practice of the iranians. And heres where you actually do see the inner play of the elite forces, and the competition within the regime as well. I know from my own time in the Obama Administration that when we were trying to get the hiprits back, we clearly got indications of, you know, there would be times when it looked like it was more promising and suddenly it all changed, and this was clearly a function of the judiciaries entering into this. So, you know, its i see it also in terms of kind of the competition within the elite, and kind of the interplay of those forces. It should be on the agenda. Just because of, you know, the fundamental, you know, humanity of it. So, you know, again, it gets back to, were in the early stages of an administration whose policy really has not been articulated yet. And i think we need to have a better sense of what that articulation is going to be, so we understand more of what the priorities of the administration visavis iran really are. Okay. Three more on the list. And then we will call it a day. Steve, up there. Steve radamaker. So, you know, president obama and his ngr said after about year 13 under the jcpoa, irans breakout time would reduce to about zero. So thats always been the fundamental flaw of the agreement. Its not that it doesnt provide some protections between now and year 10, 12, 13. Its what happens in the long term. And where do we find ourselves in the future. And the reality is, that under the agreement, were basically agreeing today that lots of things that were sanctioned, and sanctionable and prohibited by the u. N. Security Council Rules in the past because they were too dangerous, would become permissible, and we would agree with what iran can do in year ten. So dennis, you put your finger on that. You have one area of particular of the uranium, and how much, and to what level iran can produce highly enriched uranium which is the key component to producing a Nuclear Weapon. And really, the critical if you want to worry about breakout time, the more highly enriched uranium they have, the quicker they can produce not just one, but perhaps many, many Nuclear Weapons very quickly. And so dennis, you throw out the suggestion, which i fully support, that as a declaratory policy, we just tell the iranians, if they exercise this right, that president obama and others agreed that they should have beginning after year ten, well use military force to take out their capability. Its a fine idea. The lawyer in me, though, says that basically, what youre threatening to do there is use military force to rewrite the agreement. And the iranians will have a completely wellfounded claim. Were reneging on the deal. That they would have unfettered ability to produce as much highly enriched uranium at whatever level they want it. In the future. And youre saying, no, if you do that, were going to bomb you. I think thats essentially what i heard you say. I guess my first question to you is, if you think that the United States or Trump Administration takes that position, it will get any support from other countries . And if not, do you think it will actually be seen credible by the iranians . And id like to go on and ask mark, you know, whether you agree with that suggestion, that dennis had, and if you dont, whats your solution beginning year 13, if iran lets be clear. They could come up with legally plausible explanations for producing lots and lots of highly enriched uranium. They could say, weve got all these cancer patients, we need lots of highly enriched uranium to treat cancer in our country. Or they could say, we decided we need a nuclear navy. And you americans use highly enriched uranium for your navy. So we anticipate the day we have one. It might be completely phony explanation, but i think as a legal matter, that they could put it forward. So if they do that, whats your proposal . I heard you say we could relax because the iranians are really out of the Nuclear Weapons business. What should we do if you dont agree with dennis proposal, to just bomb them. Bomb them if they exercise the rights that president obama agreed that they will have in the future. Two terrific questions. I just wanted to follow up directly on that point. As i understand it, this right is a right that iran has ten years from now, under the agreement. No, the deal for 15 years, theyre limited to 3. 67 enrichment. After year 15 theres no limitation on the level of enrichment. Sorry. So 15 years. My point is that the Trump Administration may be in office for four years, it may be in office for eight years. Its not likely to be in office for 15. So to what extent does a position like this taken by an Administration Today have credibility . So three questions for both of you. And were running short. So speed it up. All right. Quick and to the point. Look, and this responds to both of you. The way i would do this, steve, is, i wouldnt just announce this right now. I mean, obviously i have, but i wouldnt announce it. What i would like to see the Trump Administration do is go to the other members of the 5plus1 and say, we should at a minimum agree among ourselves that they should not be allowed to produce highly enriched uranium. The Energy Secretary moniz in the last administration came out and said at the time that the jpoa was concluded, they would have no justifiable reason for producing heu. But they didnt take it further than that. And i would like to go to the other members of the 5plus1 and say lets have an agreement among us that we will communicate to them that this is not acceptable. That we will read that as an indication of them in fact wanting to put themselves in that position to have a Nuclear Weapon. And at least try in private to see if others will accept it. And if its not accepted by the others, still be prepared to communicate it to the iranians, at least in private to begin with. And at some point, say it publicly. Thats true, it doesnt necessarily bind any future administration. But part of what youre doing, like when i say i want to change our declaratory policies, you want to begin to condition the environment, to get everybody used to the idea that, look, they shouldnt, and the iranians should understand that they shouldnt be tempted to move in that direction. My big fear, precisely, what you were also noting is i am very w that they think we have deferred having a weapon but we havent given up the option. I think we need to think about the things we can do to make it less likely that they would be tempted. So the proposition is after 15 years if iran abides by the limits and the inspections dont turn up violations is that iran would have a Nuclear Program that is a socalled normal to follow the same limits that apply to others. And the ability to enrich as much uranium as they want would be a right but there are also other limits that exporting countries can push through Nuclear Suppliers group or other norms or political restrictions. Countries can decide that we dont want anybody to have agu that is not legitimate for any purpose especially if it had a past dalliance with Nuclear Weapons development. So i dont belong to the idea of saying that we are going to bomb them. I think declared policy is a reasonable one. How iran is judged to be a normal Nuclear Country is through the inspection process of if they abide by all the rules and there are no outstanding questions about their Nuclear Program then they will be eligible under the Additional Protocol to get socalled broader conclusion of all Nuclear Material for peaceful purposes. If there are reasons for suspicion im pretty sure that the Trump Administration would make that known and wouldnt draw that conclusion that all activities are for peaceful purposes. And if after year eight iran hasnt been able to reach the standard required for the Additional Protocol then i think the countrys concern about iran would probably want to renegotiate the deal at that point because they would have legitimate concerns that something is still a miss. We dont want all those limits to come off in year 15. That would be my approach. Thank you very much. With the center for nonproliferation studies. I want to go back to different points that dennis ross made. The first is the idea of providing as part of the deterrent strategy the that would be quite something. It is a Delivery System intended for use of Nuclear Weapons. It would raise a number of issues above and beyond the ability to attack a single site. You are seeing this problem emerging with other countries where and offer Nuclear Weapon platforms. I would note that the procurement channel i dont find it that the fact that the iranians havent used it i dont find it to be quite such a troubling aspect. They have so many unused centrifuges that offer to keep existing level going so they goent need to go into the market place for that purpose. The reactor, they are still in the design phases. It is not a surprise that they arent in the market looking for replacement parts. We have been using for conventional purposes. Anything . So the last person i had on the list was talking right now. So maybe are you still on my list, madame . Okay. My question is about sanctions on the irgc. And what that would mean internationally. If sanctions are imposed on irgc how would they be received by europe, by russia and china given the broader state of turbulent relations with the Trump Administration . Is there a way to structure a sanctions bill that would make it more effective in terms of convincing p 5 plus 1 partners to go along . Does it have something to do with structuring of ownership stakes and to be transparent about what level. I dont today see much appetite in europe for such a designation. But if the irgc had been involved in activity that was of particular interest to europeans like Human Rights Violations then they would be more willing to be going off such a designation . The purpose seems to be the idea is to inflict punishment. So the sanctions should be smart, should be directed at haver that is egregious and they shouldnt violate and we should be certain that the sanctions, the sanctions are more faeseffee in changing the behavior than other possible tools. I basically agree with him on the designation. I dont think you actually require that. Thank you both very, very much. Thank you for being an enlightened and provocative audience. Thank you cspan and we wish you a good day. Thank you. [ applause ]
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