On efforts to modernize the army was the focus of discussion covering concerns about increasing Global Threats to military readiness. This is an hour. All right. Thank you everyone for sticking around while we made our transition. As i mentioned, were going to roll into the second half of the event where were going to focus on Army Modernization. And today rolling out a report on Army Modernization. Called the Army Modernization imperative. A new big five for Army Modernization. I want to begin thanking the sponsors of that study because without sponsors we dont get to do studies. This was sponsored by a combination of support from general dynamics, d. R. S. Technologies, part ofley nardo and l3, as well. So we want to thank them for their support. Im going to briefly walk through the chief findings and recommendations of the report. Its about 80ish pages but a pretty quick read with a lot of pictures. I urge you to read the whole thing. Ill hit the highlights and well bring up our distinguished panel to give us the real scoop on Army Modernization, how we should think about it and what we should do with it. I want to start by saying with this study weve always every time we talk about it we start by saying this is not a critique of Army Acquisition but a look at, if you start with a premises the army needs to modernize, how does it develop a strategy for doing that, which it can clearly and forcefully communicate within the army, within the department of defense, and with the congress in order to get the resources to actually carry that out. So, thats the focus of this study. Its less procedural and more of a strategic overview. In terms of our findings because we wanted to set the scene in doing this study to say what is the state of Army Modernization today. And we came back with a finding that the armys experiencing a modernization triple whammy. Ill get into more detail what we mean by that in a couple of minutes. The Army Modernization is below its historic level both on average and during periods when the army is seeking to modernize because the army like most services go through phases of modernization that are represent peaks and valleys as is the case with the overall Defense Budget. Theres little relief on the way, both in terms of the budget control act discussed heavily by senator cotton and the limits it puts on defense suspending and aerl spending by imindication. And in terms of the issues the army is confronting such as readiness that the senator referred to. Even if the army had a robust budget for Army Modernization the army has very limited options as of today because the Technology Effort has been more focused on the early stages and given the level of funding available thats probably appropriate but there hasnt been a lot of Platform Development or System Development in the army budget in recent years which we could then seek to modernize the army in a rapid basis. The army was through the drawdown period thought to minimize harm and i think they did a pretty good job on that. Again our study is not a critique of the tough decisions made under sequestration to try to salvage some sort of form of Army Modernization but we believe its clear that they dont leave the army in a position with a ready and obvious path forward and so work needs to be done to develop that and weve taken a crack at that. And then lastly one of our findings is that we think there is not a consensus on priorities for Army Modernization and will talk about why we think thats the case. Let me just talk about this idea of the triple whammy, which we coined a little bit i think last year and has been picked up in some circles, what do we mean about that . This is not the first time this drawdown that happened because of the bud jet control act and sequestration and end of wars in iraq and afghanistan, not the first time the army has drawn down. It happened in the past. We looked at how does the current drawdown compare to previous ones. There are definite similarities but some notable differences. The first difference, the first leg of the triple whammy, that this drawdown is larger than previous drawdowns. If you look on the righthand column under total modernization, total Army Modernization, the drawdown was 74 . This is in contract obligation dollar terms. That exceeding relatively robustly previous drawdowns. The second leg of the triple whammy, though, is where most of that extra drawdown, if youll concede me that point, came from. Because if you look at the procurement column on our chart youre not seeing what im seeing on my paper. Excuse me. There it is. Okay. So, that righthand column has total Army Modernization, 74 during this drawdown in excess of previous drawdowns by 10 to 15 . But, the source of most of that excess drawdown if i may call it that in the r d accounts. The decline in procurement was relatively consistent with previous drawdowns but the r dawn was 52 . If you look at the first two drawdowns you average them, an average drawdown in the r d kw accounts of 23 . In this drawdown, the reduction in r d is almost twice the average of the previous two, more than twice the average of the previous two drawdowns. The last element of the triple whammy on the bottom of this chart, the state the army entered this drawdown n. In previous drawdowns most notably after the cold war the army was in a substantial process of modernization in the 1980s to which our report title refers were basically all procured or in the process of completing procurement when the last drawdown happened. However when this drawdown went into effect the army was coming off some regrettable program collapses, future combat systems, comance, crusader, a list i wont go into all in detail but you did not see the substantial buildup of a new systems in the army, that preceded certainly the cold war drawdown. We call that the triple whammy. You started behind, had a drawdown larger than in the past and in particular your r d accounts drawn down much more substantially than had been done previously. We then wanted to get a sense of where is Army Modernization today in the context of broader Army Modernization . So we went back and looked at Army Modernization going back to the end of world war ii, sort of in the modern era and developed, if you see the two dotted lines on your chart, the lower line is the historic average level of Army Modernization across that entire postworld war ii period. The higher line is the average level of Army Modernization during periods when the army was actually modernizing. In those upcycles seeking to replenish or regenerate technology you had that higher level up at around 35 billion and the historical average about 30 billion. Thats in constant fy 17 dollars. You see where we are today, which is about 5 billion below the historical average of Army Modernization, about 10 billion below the level during periods when the army was actually engaging in aggressive modernization. That suggests if the army is seeking to modernize technology today, it is gonna probably require additional funding to actually make that happen. Lets talk a bit about this issue of the priorities. In order to get funding for Army Modernization you got to be able to go to the congress and also to the leadership of d. O. D. And say this is why we need this funding that means setting some priorities about what it that needs to be modernized. What we are showing here, a list or some of the example also of modernization priorities expressed in recent documents or testimony by the army to congress. And the gist of this is that every list is theres slaths similarities across list but different and have different points of emphasis and have different starting points what they are talking about. Aviation as a priority is an important area for prioritization but doesnt convey a lot how you will pursue in the aviation world. We think there is a lack of a clear message on priorities. Now, well talk a bit about the geostrategic position a big focus of the senators remarks and title of our event today on the implications of the russia challenge for the treaty and Army Modernization. And, you know, interestingly enough when we started this report, it was prior to, you know, the election controversies and attack on the election system. But, pretty quickly when you look at questions of Army Modernization, you do find as i know the chief has testified that russia is a pacing threat not necessarily because we expect to go to war with russia in europe or elsewhere, but russian systems are the core systems for most of the adversaries we contemplate potentially getting into Armed Conflict with. So the rapid advance of Russian Technology in recent years as they have invested back when they were investing heavily when oil was high, have gone into systems that are not just russian systems but are proliferated to others, as well. Iran is certainly in that group. And theyve particularly gone after an a2 ad concept. Certainly the technology the senator focused on is a big piece of that but sort of keeping the u. S. , allies and systems away from the defended areas the russian systems are defending. Of course in the case of russia, thats russian territory. And its a sophisticated, layered redundant approach, longrange artillery, cruise missiles, radars, tanks, its a real suite of capabilities they have developed and deployed and shared with others the u. S. Army is likely to face if it gets drawn into highintensity conflicts somewhere in the world particularly focus on lelectronc warfare and cyber they have focused on probably more so than the United States has as weve been evolved in the coin challenge in the middle east. So, ill move now to kind of our recommendations and what we talked about, a new big five for the 21 sst krncentury. How do you invest and develop a Modernization Program that delivers on those priorities . And one of the one of the tricky i think slightly subtle arguments we make in the report is that its much better to talk about this in terms of capabilities than in terms of platforms. The previous big five was a list of platforms the abrams tanks, bradley, patriots, handful couple of others, the black box and apache so five platforms that were going to meet the threat of that day. In todays world, i think you are better off talking about capabilities. The reason why is platforms take depending on who you ask, 10 to 20 years, maybe more to develop. And so, going to the congress in 2017 and saying, we have an urgent problem i want you to join me in a new Platform Development that in 20 years will give us the answer. Thats a tough case to make. If on the other hand what youre asking for is you know we have a significant deficit in Electronic Warfare and Investment Plan to increase our capabilities to meet that, you can actually show progress on that priority relatively quickly while, also, developing a longterm plan. And these are the five that we have recommended. I would say we had two workshops and talked to a lot of experts. We think these are the right five but, of course, the army will ultimately come up with its own and i know theyve been working hard on that. But, this idea that thinking of it in terms of capabilities rather than platforms we think is very important enlisting the support the army will need to do its Modernization Program. Just wrapping up my piece there need to do its Modernization Program. So just wrapping up my piece here and then well do the discuss, our recommendations developed a clear, articulated, focused modernization strategy. Make modernization a priority. It is on the chief list of priorities. But there is this competition with spending on personnel and spending on readiness. Those are important priorities as well. But the army has to really think hard about how to make modernization a higher priority. Focus on capabilities not platforms. Making Army Acquisition more agile by focusing on evolutionary innovation. So as i mentioned being able to deliver improvements and capabilities rapidly even as you move towards longer term innovations along the road. Making room within your Modernization Program to address emerging opportunities and challenges. Then aligning Human Capital with this modernization strategy and some of our panelist have civilizational ideas about what youd have to do to make this approach work. Without for ado i will call them up to the stage and we can hear from them. Thank you for joining us today. Im going to introduce the panel and then well turn and get their thoughts. To my right is heidi shu, the former assistant secretary of the army for acquisition logistics and technology. She is currently serve as chairman of the board. Is formally chairman of the air force. To her right is colonel dan roper. Hes director of National Security studies at the association of United States army. Former managing director of Strategic Solutions and the author of global counterinsurgency. To his right is doug bush. Former colleague of mine. From House Armed Services staff. Professional staff member. A former National Security analyst and former army officer. Heidi, i want to start with you. If you could maybe start us out. You obviously have thought a lot about this the strategy for Army Modernization. If you can give us your thoughts on the strategic approach that you think is most likely to be effective. Absolutely. I think you guys have did a great job in terms of covering the impact of the bca in 2011. I do want to emphasize, i want to second what you have said. When i looked at the army toa from fy 10 to 15 the army budget declined by 15 , the top line. The rda pot decreased by 33 . Army modernization cant happen when your budget is cut that significantly. During the last five years, i want to emphasize one other thing. The annual cr create even bigger turmoil than people realize. Because if you cant get the budget on october 1st, youre sitting there waiting. You cant spend, you cant start new programs. You cant wrap up ramp up production, right . Tremendous turmoil on programs. Okay . And during the sequestration, plus, the annual cr, what the army had to do was stretch out programs, right . Restructure them, reduce the procurement quantity down to the minimum sustainable rate without breaking any multiyear contracts. And we didnt start programs that was planned or we terminated it. There was significant turmoil within our basically across every single one of our portfolios. So we think the declining budget environment, seconding what you said, i actually drew a pyramid to talk about lets divest the old equipment because we need to save the ons cost. We have to reset the equipment so were ready to fight in the next contingency. We will modernize our existing platforms, we will choose carefully what new capability is developed to increase our mobility, lethality, and survivability. Well invest in our s t to enable the next generation capability. Thats our strategy in a declining budget environment. Looking ahead, it was a great dialogue this morning, i really appreciate being here. I will give you my personal perspective. Based upon what i see are the threats that the army will face and i what i deem the modernization effort has to focus on. Okay . Well obviously see cyberattacks and disinformation on social media. That will never stop. Okay . Well see jamming of our gps, our radar and our communications system. Weve seen that and it will continue. So what are the modernization effort thats required . We have to ensure operation in contested environment. That means we need assured pnt position, navigation, timing. We need to operate beyond just ew. Ew is absolutely critical. But we need to be operating in the intersection of an integrated ew and io. Because of the agility of the threats. You dont have to time to be stove pipe system any more. And we need assured communications. Okay . The other type, you guys talked about this morning, is the tremendous proliferation of weapons systems. Okay . With increased sophistication. We see the rpg, we see much longer range missiles and rockets, cruise missiles, advance theater ballistic missile. We see an exponential growth in uavs, performing surveillance and reconnaissance systems, think about the nextgeneration which will perform attack. What do we need to do . I will expand upon what you will talk about in integrated Missile Defense. Layered integrated active and passive iamd to enable Missile Defense offense. Okay . Its layer in the sense we have started this program its called fic. That is for base protection against rockets, armors, missiles, uavs, cruise missiles. We need to continue that program, push that forward. The next layer of protection that we have is really plug and play. Our existing stovepipe system into a which our legacy system, into a common fire control network. So the integrated battle command system is going to be critical. Ibcs. That is absolutely critical. Another leg under that umbrella thats absolutely critical is get a patriot aesa. Compared to what we currently have today. Aesa will significantly extend the target range enable resolution. Those are thing we have today or we need to get going on. Bu but we also need to add the passive capabilities. When i say that, is because, active means youre radiating. Somebody could jam you. Passive youre not radiating. Okay . We need to integrate both of them together. Give us a layered integrated active passive capacity. Then i will focus on because of the proliferation of threats, we have to increase survivability. So tantamount to what we need to focus on funding and pushing forward is an integrated active passive aircraft survivability program. To enable to us to detect, identify and countering of the threat. It needs to be integrated system because theres no single sensor on of kingle countermeasure that will counter all threats. On the ground, this is you see the focus is shifting towards a active Protection System for combat vehicles. But beyond just these two systems, we have to think about how we need to see the target further and resolve it better. This is why we need the Third Generation forwardlooking ir system. Third generation flare. The other aspect what we need to focus on is degraded visual environment. We have to be able to enable operation in all environment. Whether its whiteout, brownout, you name it. Fog, smoke, we got to operate in that environment. Okay . Increasi increasing lethality. We need longer range missiles enabling our apache to be further standoff to be able to shoot. All the way up to Weapon System for longer range precision fires. And this is something our commander had asked for, for years now. This is really the replacement that were talking about. Then increasing our mobility. Itep engine, the improved Engine Turbine Program its important for blackhawk and apaches. We have a 2,000horsepower engine. The itep engine is building 3,000 horsepower. It will enable us to fly high and hot temperature. The risk is a mobility program. One thing that i didnt see people talk about, i think its very important also, is improving our sense and war. Especially in light of the fact, we will see adversary that will use chemical and biological weapons. Therefore, we should not put our soldiers in harms way this is exactly what robotics come in. Burning sensors on robotics. Let the robotics roam ahead of you. To able to sense and warn. So i went through a lot. I dont want to hog all the time. But i think the other thing you talk about in terms of logistics this is where robotics can once again play a huge role in terms of reducing the logistics burden on soldiers today. I will wrap up with some other comments later. Thank you. Dan, youre next. With this idea of a modernization strategy, i always think strategy ends ways, means. Youve had history of both dealing and opining on all of those. I let you take your pick and give us your thoughts. Absolutely. Small question too, thanks. This report does a good job of framing the context because the risk in developing a strategy is not understanding your operational environment. What youve done is lay out by assessing the geostrategic environment and the way that we do modernization, where some critical gaps are. And now, youre essentially proposing a change in the ways where the ways as opposed to having the big five, the abrams, stryker and so forth. Things that exist and very familiar with them now. Youre proposing we characterize these capabilities. Intellectually that makes sense. Were too narrow when we start, well missing the changing dynamics that were facing however, as i thought through the capabilities and reading the report, its a little harder to get excited about a capability even though its essential you have to dig into it and understand the capability gap and say i need to address Electronic Warfare or i need to address air an Missile Defense. But underneath that, there are systems that people sell, that people advocate, that people attach the their identity to that are very important. Going back to the senators comments this morning, and the report also brings it up. I dont think we have a problem with analytics. I dont think we have a problem with the science. We know as much as we can know and we have good plans to address some of those gaps. I think the biggest challenge is the communication on what needs to be done, when, and what resources do we need to expend on it and how do we help the senators and congressmen make the necessary tradeoffs with other very important things . I think the armys challenge is more diverse and more complicated than saying, i need another aircraft carrier. Not that thats an insignificant thing and wed like to have more. But its extremely simple to see the oneonone level of the argument. Its incredibly complex to articulate a story that encapsulations everything you just said because that was a tour deforce of all the things that need to be done. How does person receiving that ultimately signing the check or committing getting a program going, act upon that. The more i like at strategy, the more i find it its essential. Its about Strategic Communication and nothing to do with io or public affairs. Its communicating priorities to people that have to act on it, from the lowest level to the highest level. Thats the little strategy take on this. This is an enabler. And the army does need to update its strategy. I guess the one thing id say on that is shifting to the means, okay, you recommend increased prioritization on modernization. Which sounds good talking in the form of modernization. The chief of staff in the army recently testified and he said this many times, readiness is number one and its going the stay number one until we reach our interim readiness objectives, which expects to take about four years. Thats based on the assumption that theres some level of coherent consistent funding which is an assumption that fails every single year. When you trade off readiness versus forestructure versus modernization, this audience or this community of interest just saying, lets try harder is not going to move the ball down the field. Because there are other incredibly important tensions. That doesnt offer an answer. But maybe the Strategic Communication thats enabled by talking kpa talking capabilities helps us bring in the joint discussion because we dont develop Army Capabilities for the army. We do them to provide the joint commander and the Coalition Commander and then thinking a little more imaginatively alluded to in earlier comments. How are we enabling allied and partner capabilities . How can they close the gap in areas were legally or financially we cant do it. But industry can do that. But industry gets a little hamstrung at our processes maybe through fms in some capacity. We deliberately close that gap. Its a little bit of the end ways and means that come out of reading these reports and those great comments. Doug . I dont have a lot to add with heidi and dan said on the particulars of modernization. I would offer two notes of political context. One, in this, i see it putting a restraining hand on the army in terms of a big push in modernization. The army is in a war now. The war in greater middle east has a lot of soldiers in it. Thats something that Army Leadership cant take their eye off for potential of escalation there. I think thats part of why the chief is so focused on readiness. Theyre staring in the face potential war on short notice in korea. Again, thats kind of thing chief has to balance out. To be fair to the army about their readiness emphasis. With specific to modernization, i thought for one additional thing. Thats the army pulled in many directions because of diversity of its missions that it has under different plans, different requirements. The armys defense, one reason its difficult to focus is a lack of Political Leadership. Giving them priorities. So in the absence of that, from administrations that havent paid a lot of attention to the army, really, the army has to try to do everything. Thats very difficult. It makes it very difficult to do what youre talking about. More Political Leadership across the board to tell the army what to focus on and where to take risk i think would be a big factor in helping the army achieve more coherence in its modernization plans. Last thing i want to mention, i think those capability areas are good ones. I was sitting here look at it, though, thinking about where the money is going to come from. The money is spoken for and its not in those things, largely. If you look at the palm, ground vehicles eat up a lot of money. Aviation platforms eat up a lot of money. The army is going to need its going to be a big lift, doable. Theyre going to have to move money out of those things absent the 10 billion shortfall being fulfilled which would make it easier for the army. Its something that requires the chief and leadership and secretary mattis working with congress to achieve doable. Members across the board support the army broader broadly. The army has had challenges when it comes to specific programs as you talked about. The ndaa just passed house. It set out an approach to funding the department of defense in particular but in general, the army in particular. Well above the bca caps. And yet the bca caps are still law. Is there an end game here . My crystal ball doesnt show me one where we get to a change in the caps or is it realistic . So i think we can probably all sit here and say if the army was told you need 10 billion a year more for modernization but you get no more to your top line that is an undoable task i think for any reasonable person. Therefore, somewhere probably there needs to be some uptick to get there. Are we on a path towards an increase . I mean, the house bill passage is in a lot of ways encouraging. But its not clear if it gets us to the end state or what end state its getting us to. Ill be very careful unlike senator cotton. Im not elected. I think a lot of members support some. You saw it in the house vote. Some Additional Resources for defense. But that doesnt answer the question about the other things that senator cotton mentioned, the other people at the table. And im hopeful. Ive been hopeful for several years, a new kind of a new version of what weve seen in the past, where if we cant get rid of the budget control acts we can defer its effects for a little longer this time, a twoyear deal perhaps. I believe if you look at the public statements, lot of members want that. I think my boss, Ranking Member smith and the chairman had thoughtful exchanges on the floor about that. Thats really lays out well intention. I think theres support for it. But its all to be determined in the end game this fall. Well see. I want to ask for the whole panel, also feel free to talk about funding if you like, a question about timing. One of the key things that drove us towards the conclusions that we reached was the fact that due to some of the challenges that we discussed today, we think the army really needs to do some modernization quickly to regain an advantage that has been eroding. And certainly in specific technology areas, thats true, in particular. And so, that was one of the things that kind of informed our approach of capabilities over new platforms because new platforms are a very hard thing to do quickly. Id be interested in the panels thoughts about time frame. Leaving aside for momentarily, although you can bring it in if you want, is it realistic if youll get enough money quickly enough for modernization. Do you see the need for it. How would you pursue doing something quickly if youre king of the world and had that choice . Heidi you want to start . Sure. You know, this is a discussion i had with general merrill before. When i was still in the pentagon. He asked me why does acquisition take so long . Its not that we dont know how to do things faster. But all the statutes and regulations put shackles on you. Youre asking to run an ultramarathon, you sprint it but youve got shackles on. So you cant move fast. But heres several ways that can help us move faster. Our partner nations also has the Defense Budget and they develop capability that could complement ours. We ought to be leveraging our partner nations capabilities and products. We have tendency to design, develop, deliver everything ourselves. All right . Not invented here sin drop. So we can expedite things a lot quicker by doing that. The other thing is, instead of setting a golden bar for requirements, waiting for the requirements to be finalized, which takes forever, right . And you cant get consensus on the requirements, one method of doing it is, this is a capability i would like to have. Were exploring it. Industry, tell me what is it that you have in this area. Bring it. Let us see what you have. Let us test it out and use it. Provide User Feedback as to is this good enough for what i want to do . Or here are the knobs i want instead. So after you do that, then inform you what your requirements ought to be, right . But get the users feedback into the requirements up front rather than lobbying over the requirements and start from scratch trying to scratch your head and how to meet it. So i think that would be very valuable. And the third thing that could help very tremendously is dont try to buy the entire product for the entire army before you upgrade. Look at global hawk. Global hawk have multiple lot. Each lot from lot to lot was not identical. It improved every single lot. Okay . Army should leverage the same methodology. So what if the entire army doesnt have it. Maybe just x number of brigades have lot one and you build a better product in lot two. Why a number of brigades have that. Right . Thats a way you can bring the latest technology into the hand of war fighter far faster than the current acquisition process. Those are just three ideas, okay . Id offer there is a high sense of urgency and maybe some of the things that appear they could go better, like your chart with the different terminologies and different toplevel documents or statements that seem to not be at cross purposes with each other but not totally consistent and understandable thats because i think the army fully recognizes that its got some ground to make up and its not due to negligence to many different regions and it kind of gets pummelled about certain highprofile systems that didnt make it. Im sure there is plenty of responsibility to go around. Its actively trying to do it. As articulated in your document and others, things like Rapid Capabilities is a way to get things on a smaller scale. Not a massive scale. Its filling those gaps that fit into the capability umbrella than the single magic platform. So its having enough of that fenced, so theres some freedom of intellectual maneuver and freedom of doing the prototypes and getting the people to using it and providing some input now not seven years from now when its too late to really change it. I think that commitment is there. The army communicating internally to the community so it doesnt take all the regulations that are there and then some cases making them harder, making compliance even harder, which doesnt do which is really not the intent of the legislation in the first place. So we got to do some internal learning to kind of grease the gears internal to the army as well as ask for relief outside where it makes sense. I think congress has shown some willingness to support rapid experimentation pro typing fielding when it is convinced the body of some urgency of the threat. There is a lot of leeway given when that urgency is communicated well. The army done that recently with regards to russia active Protection System in particular, stryker 30 millimeter. So it can happen. One note of caution, the army can get itself in difficult situation if it resorts to in an effort to speed up not doing competitions, at least of some kind at is right point and not doing enough testing. Hopefully acquisition reform does not devolve into just those two things. Because the army could despite best of intentions if it does those things have a big failure and that would undermine the broader effort theyre trying to achieve. I think theres a willingness, especially with the regard to the russian threat these days for congress to support efforts to go faster. As long as its done with some thought and they can make a sale. I want to open up questions from the audience. Raise your hand. Well have someone bring a microphone. Well have sydney up front. Hi, referencing the chart of the armys top 25 to 30 priorities and the need for the army to figure out its own course, clear leadership course. Course, clear leadership course. One of the things is, what are we for fundamentally . What is our primary mission . We had a Clear Mission. That drove the big five, for example. We had a Clear Mission with counterinsurgency for a while. Now we are juggling russia, syria, afghanistan. To what degree armys problem not merely articulating and communicating but actually itself not being sure what its for . Not being clear on its mission. Which therefore means it cant be clear on what it needs to prioritize . What id offer on that is many of you probably have seen it. Rosa brooks has a book out recently on how everything became war and the military became everything of everything. One of the premises is, the distinction of between what is war and what is not is smaller than its ever been. The military is getting called in to fulfill things that arent what you would call traditional core, oldschool military missions like invade normandy. Its not that simple to articulate. With People Living on the ground inevitably, someone got to do something for the u. S. Government, at a soldier has become the default mechanisms. Doesnt mean for everything. Obviously, we need to total integration of the whole Interagency Team and ngo partners and allies and so forth. If theres a gap that the u. S. Needs to fill, it generally winds up being some level of boots on the ground, military or civilian and we get pulled into things. And that bleeds away at the core things that the chief is trying to prepare for such as a threat from a near peer competitor. I think the leaderships attention they know what they have to do. But their time and attention and energy gets pulled to fill that gap that we dont have the civilian capacity and sometimes the political willingness to use other tools that we have at our disposal within the United States and the United States government. I would just maybe build on that or add to that by saying with the original big five, there was a concept of operations that went along with that, it was air, land, battle. That two fit together. That was a big reinforcing function for what made a compelling case to congress. So then the question arises for our new big five or any big five, what would the operational concept be . One discussed referenced earlier, i think by tom, multi domain battle concept. Personally i like it. Im not sure i fully understand it yet. What i have heard about it, with joint Service Discussions it does seem to me very compelling. There may be a diversity of views on the panel about multidomain battle. What does it mean to you . Does it seem like its a compelling case that the army can build and construct a Modernization Program. Doug, you look like you want to say something. Ill turn to you. Intellectually its a good effort by the army. The challenge it has when it needs contact with congress is its not location specific. Its amorphous. Well have multidomain battle somewhere against somebody. Were going to do all this different stuff with other services. Some of them talk about more about the other services than it does the army. So while is it a very important thing for the army to think through deeply, how to better integrate itself across itself. I think at this point its not formed in a way that can make turn the dial dramatically. However, if you put it in a place, eastern europe, it gets a lot of members attention. I think one thing the army can build on is deputy secretary his effort, a lot of that was about restoring conventional deterrence in a place that members care about. I think if the army can find a way to connect what it wants to do to a political context that members care. Which is preserving peace in europe, deterring russia better by being able to fight them more effectually, thats a big part of getting support for whatever they want to do. Its a thing that the army lacks. Its pulled in so many different directions, different places in world where it has to be ready to fight. Right now i think the best advocate, armys best advocate for multidomain battle is commander in chief of the Pacific Command who has said thats the way he has to fight in his theater. With the support of obviously the entire joint team. So its providing a place. And id agree, europe just hasnt fit into that dialogue, that conversation that much. If its just the army talking about multidomain battle because it makes more sense to us and its just an internally focused argument, it may provide better technical proficiency but when it makes contact with people that have to support it politically, financially, and otherwise, thats thats the challenge i think weve got light now. When you got to get into it, it makes sense. Theres no such thing as a 30 second commercial that conveys it to the Senior Leader busy with 15 other important things. This little niche of it, i got to jump behind it. We still have some work to do on that area, i think. That sounds like a great project. Other questions . Sydney you get to go again. Hes coming. I can be really loud. T half of todays event, hefi missiles. I mean, the chinese and the russians sitting aside the inf treaty and im generally confused by what a lot of those treaties do. But setting aside the inf treaty, chinese and the russians have a lot of landbased conventional missiles of increasing precision that are a major part of their fire power. Does the army need to invest in a missile corps or a rocket Artillery Force of that kind . And would it be helpful to have no inf treaty in order to do that . Along range of fires is one step in this direction. But even so its confined to 499 kilometers because of the treaty. I think the army is starting to shift focus there. We have a rocket artillery corps. We had rock artillery units for a long time. I think some of what the chief has talked about in testimony is potentially investing more there both in terms of structure and capability. In european context, 499 is less limiting. It depends on the army getting guidance on where to focus its efforts. Challenge i mentioned earlier, thats going to compete with all those other modernization priorities, absent a dramatic change in the armys top line. But i think the army is putting a lot of emphasis there. Theres a lot of potential under 499 to make what the army has much better. Thats what the army is focused on now. Leaving the big political question to others. Ill add to that, if i may. So when this discussion occurred, i was still in the pentagon. And it comes down to every discussion comes down, how much money do i have to build the capability that we need . Does have the to so literally came down to is it just a replacement to give you greater range or do you literally need more capability than just greater change . Range. Because you want to counter targets that may maneuver in state. It is a totally different type of missile than a dumb missile that can flight ballistically to counter someone else. So a lot of discussion was being debated. And aoa was in process when i left. I dont know the end result of the aoa analysis. It was purely driven by the budget decision unfortunately. Goes back to what doug said, need more money if you want greater capability. I do want to add one more thing. The patriot battalion is really stressed out to the max. You know, so if anything, we need more manpower, another battalion, additional battalion to help alleviate the stress on the manpower. I think theres a chance. The army gets more strength. It might not. Just by more vcts, it might invest in air and Missile Defense and rocket artillery, for example which would be along the lines of what youre recommending. Well see. On your earlier point, what if the answer to your question of do we just need more range or do we need a fundamentally different capability, what if the answer is yes . Yes on both. Im thinking of the when the navy was doing its aoa for the drone coming off the carriers is a strike asset, was it going to be an asset that provided fuel. And i think we have have been in that exercise for at least five years now. Figuring out and the answer to all of them is probably yes. So you talked earlier, heidi, about doing a process of requirements that would allow you to make progress without necessarily having the 20year answer in hand when you start. Do you see that is there an application of that same idea to this question about integrated fires as well . Is there hope that we can do that . Boy. Is there hope . I think whats tough for the army is because its portfolio is far broader than the navy and the air force, okay, we have two to three times more products. So as a result, you have so many demands on the dollar on the modernization, everybodys portfolio is important. So as a result, without increasing the top line enough, everything is driven by do i have enough budget to do that . And then what happens is you just marginally upgrade systems, it its driven by budget, okay . The reality is like i talked about, to counter these threat and see where the threats are evolving too, these are the capability we will need. Will army get enough money to do this . I dont know. All right . Because if the focus is going to been on readiness and manpower youre not going to have enough modernization budget. Your top line cant accommodate it. I can always hope. Its a related problem and been talked about a lot. The consistency and predictability and confidence over years. Because these things dont come overnight. To an certain extent Army Modernization program is under nourished person thats been undernourished for eight years, ten years. Not because we are ma levelance or evil when these hart decisions were made. Its been exacerbated by budget control act and ongoing continued resolutions. If there was some mystical giant pot. Money became available, which isnt, the thought experiment, if we had all the money we needed to buy all the stuff we identified in any of those modernization strategies there is only a certain capacity and its going to take time to regain a viability Modernization Program thats adaptable to those changing threats. So its its going to take as long to get out of this as it did to get into it. Its like the flames are coming down to the ground and its turning it around but to get back up its going to take as much effort as it took to get down here. Well, dan, i think youre going to get the last word. So i want to thank our audience for joining us. Its been a great discussion. I hope you all find the report and read the report. It is online. For those in person, we have copies as well. Join me in thanking our panel for a great discussion. [ applause ]. Cspans washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. And coming up wednesday morning well continue our conversation on the federal budget. Tom reid will join us to talk about that and efforts to boost u. S. Manufacturing. Ohio democratic congressman tim ryan on the future of the democratic party. Also william maulden to look at the future of nafta and the work to renegotiate the agreement. Watch cspans washington journal live at 7 00 eastern wednesday morning. Join the discussion. The House Budget Committee meets this week to mark up the house budget blueprint for fiscal year 2018. Thats live wednesday sta easte cspan3. You can also watch online on www. Cspan. Org or listen on the free cspan radio app. Next we turn to the National GovernorsAssociation Summer meeting that happened over the weekend in providence, rhode island, day looked at Disaster Preparedness and science education. Together they run about two hours and 15 minutes. Good morning. Im sorry, we are starting a little bit late