>> if that's accurate that would not surprise me. >> it's been 10% for at least the last five years and that is significantly higher than the average federal agency. >> any time any organization experiences that type of turnover obviously you're dealing with -- it imposes certain challenges. >> give at any the sensitive nature of the mission, the security mission, would it -- should it concern us in your opinion that we have low morale and high turnover and that actually could -- that in theory could affect the performance of the mission. >> i'm not sure what the real causes are. >> putting aside causes, just those facts would that not suggest it could compromise the mission, that we're less than enthusiastic about carrying out the mission or less than caring about it because i don't even like being here. i don't like my boss or i don't like the policies of the agencies. what i'm worried about is in addition to the men and women suffering that low morale what's the impact on the traveling public? >> that would concern mes is a tsa executive. >> i won't ask more but if you wouldn't allow allow plg mclaughlin, mr. sadler to respond. >> without objection. >> first of all, to your comment about training, i'm pleased to let you know that earlier this year we began a training initiative we refer to as tackcome, that's a training all front line employees and their managers in the field will go through which focuses specifically on active listening skills, empathy as well as on communication technique that hopefully will improve that experience. the caveat being airports are very busy and loud places and sometimes it's just hard to balance the need to communicate that's heard without being overheard so to speak. >> there is a difference between police put your hands up, in the machine, versus put your hands up. >> agreed. that's what this training addresses specifically. again, we're on target to get that complete by june of this year and for the entire front line staff by december of this year. the numbers i have for attrition are 6.1% for full-timers, then 18% for part-timers. so while we're concerned about the part-time number, the overall number you have might be skewed somewhat by that data. with regard to what we're doing to improve our standing in the best places to work, i can tell you from personal experience first of all being a employer in the private sector, in public service, having worked with thousands of public employees, i will tell you i'm proud of the dedication of my work force and their commitment to the mission. i think overall their focus on the mission is not consistent with the rating that we received in the best places to work. that being said we've got a number of nish tifrs as we move forward to improve the overall morale. we have national councils, trainings like the ones i described, feedback from officers, things literally one officer described it as a life changing event in terms of her understanding of her role and how she could interact better with customers which has an impact on morale. i would say to someone who comes with the newness of our agency, less than 10 years old or now 10 years old is going to have a different growth curve than a federal agency that has been around for 50, 100 years. >> we'll proceed to another expert in the field. the gentleman from minnesota, former airline pilot, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. expert, i don't know about that. end user, definitely. i have a couple of questions. i thank everybody for coming. i think everybody wants safety of the air. make sure people working with us are happy and do their job efficiently and effectively. thank you for the coast guard and all of the things you men and women do. just like to talk about a couple things. walking through my first level of skufrmt i see spot developing into what we see in amsterdam, israel, going to more pro active challenge refly, taking a look at behavior. i see that developing. right now it's not totally effective tool but let's deal with it now if we may. so we hit spot as we head on to the screening area. go to the screening area and mr. lord, you said 30% are used by ait machines. correct? 30% of the passengers going through? >> it's -- yeah. according to mr. mclaughlin that's correct. >> so 30% of the passengers are going through the newer, more improved ait machines. and would you consider as much as you can within this arena, are the aits 100%? are they fool proof? >> i can't discuss any of the details but in general any technology has limitations. >> we all have limitations. any technology is going to have some type of limitation. through the metal detectors those are less advantageous so, 30% of those people have gone v say, have gone through the first phase of spot, now going through 30%, say they go through an ait machine where the other 70% have gone through metal detectors which are basically less -- not less safe but not as good as the ait machines. then we get to the gate. we've got the gate agent making sure you get on the right aircraft so. we have gone through some security but there is a possibility something could slip through. the sarkt on the tarmac. around the aircraft we have nearly at a million airport workers, working around that aircraft. are credentialed. these credentialed airport workers have direct access to non-public areas and sanitized areas. so they are work ing the shadow of the airplane, could you tell me how these workers, these million workers are credentialed? >> there's -- they all are required to wear secure identification display badges and they are essentially vetted against terrorist watch lists, immigration and criminal records. >> we've all seen with all of the -- we've seen drugs being smuggled on board aircraft. we've seen numerous theft rings that have been working in and around the aircraft. and it would be safe to say there are also holes in this program as well. would you be correct on that? >> there is vulnerabilities in the layers based on the work we completed to date. >> so we have a potential going to the aircraft, passengers being screened, even having a very good possibility of getting through spot, and also screening techniques. we have just as equal opportunity for the potential of isysttems put on the aircraft through credentialed workers, so my question to you, and i'm going to give you a very good one if you don't mind, sir, i say this with all due respect. so with the potential of having a person that has malintent coming on board the aircraft, linking up with a device that is on board the aircraft through a credentialed person in the shadow of that aircraft, that aircraft gets under way and is in the air, what are the line of defenses capable in the air at that time? who is the last line of defense? and don't say the cockpit door. >> with the multiple layers in place, there are on a number of flights we have federal air marshals. the layer of security that sin place, that is an important layer and we talk about it from time to time and we know when we fly is the actual passenger. that individual that learned as many lessons on 9/11 as the rest of us have learned. >> true. no truer words spoken. if i may indulge, but a professional terrorist has done this routine 100 times. they know when the cockpit door is going to be open, when it's going to be closed. they know a lot of things about the aircraft, that the average traveling public does not know so. my question to you, sir, is there's not that many fans available per flight. that's a classified number. why in god's green earth would we cut in half a volunteer program that protects the aircraft for $15 a flight? why would we do that? >> i can't really discuss that topic because it's outside mif area of responsibility at tsa. i can reinforce some of the other layers on the ground including the work we do in and around the errant and we can take that for the record in terms of -- >> i would appreciate that. the federal flight deck officer program is being cut in half a. $15 per flight program that was the last line of defense for many potential terrorists willing to take that aircraft and use it as a weapon of mass destruction. so with that, sir, i would appreciate your information thune. with that, sir, i thank the chair's inactual against. >> we'll recognize the gentleman from tennessee, mr. cohen. >> thank you. i'd like to all of the nice things said about tsa personnel, in my commuter but also in voters have all been courteous. they have a tough job trying to do a monotonous gig and they are not the most popular to see. it's not like customs at check point charlie but is something you don't look forward and relish. the other is about the twic card, i reiterate the concerns. they are important but seems like there can be a better way to allow the people that receive them to pick them up rather than have to do it personally. they could be done through the mail like driver's licenses and other licenses are. improvement in that system would be helpful to my community. who is the expert on the process we go through at the airport? >> the airport would be myself. >> let me ask you this. today for the first time i was asked to take off my watch. why? >> while i clearly wasn't there with you it's possible that our officer, the individual who is working to facilitate the travel of customers, might have felt it would alarm and you would have an easier experience but you are not required to remove your watch. >> they made it like everybody was. announcing take off your watch. and just like with the very flawed systems that they have for onboor diagnostics and the check engine light and folks being able to get their car inspektded. if the lights's on even if your car doesn't admit any type of carbon, vapors over and above, they won't pass you. they say well, it will save you problems in the future. that's not epa's job nor is it your job to make it less likely. i don't get it. it made no sense to me. she said you've got to take it off. just like the rules need to be consistent. for a while we didn't do shoes, then the guy had the shoe, and some had shoes and some didn't. now i notice that shoes must not be in a bin but laid flat on the conveyor belt s. that a uniform rule? >> that is not a rule in place today. at one point we actually changed our procedure with shoes, and have subsequently some time alow changed that to be place onld the bin or a belt. >> in memphis they have a sign that says they must be placed flat. which is not a big deal but sometimes they get crushed between bags. if you care about your shoes that's not wonderful. the watch thing, it's the inconsistency. i'm comfortable in my handhood so the guy was fine, didn't have a problem, but you know, i got out and he wanted to pat me down, he patted down my chest. you know t same soap i use every day. never been patted down before on my chest. the machine must have messed up is all i can figure. >> again, i can't speak to your specific situation but i can look into it for you. >> i'm not terribly concerned just seem there is should be consistency. this machine may be set at different levels or something. they wanted to hook at your arm or this or that. i'm not bionic man. i wouldn't, well, whatever. i don't have any parts that are new or metallic. >> so our goal is to be uniform and consistent. at the same time we also want to be random and unpredictable at times because we find that's helpful in terms of our work and security. but we are looking for uniform consistent experience for travelers as they come through. as i said i'm happy to follow up on that. >> i agree that there probably should be some type of system you have your most likely people that you know are frequent flyers and safe, one day there was this lady there who's got the richest husband in town almost. and she's got a place in aspen and a place in france and they were going through all of -- anybody wants to stay alive it's her. she's got it all. and they were going through all of her stuff. when they saw all of that they should realize this woman wants to live. so sometimes it's common sense. how much do the puffers cost us, the whole puffer process? >> so the puffers predate my time at tsa. we talked early quer about the disposal fee. >> they're history, i know that. here in washington, one line had a puffer and one didn't. if you were a terrorist you would go through a line that didn't have the puffer. the fact it doesn't work they could have chosen either ryan. extra security was given on the other line if you -- they looked at you closer. what if they looked at you closer on the other line why didn't they on the puffer line. all the dsa people are great, had a tough job. i field back the balance. >> thank you. the staff informs me that the puffers were around $30 million. if that's incorrect let us know. i think the same situation exists today. i bly home sometimes on american, sometimes on united. if you're going to united you go through full body scanner. if you go on american you go through a metal detector. doesn't take rocket scientists to figure out there is a potential issue. >> we'll recognize the gentleman from north carolina. >> i apologize i had a conflicting schedule. maybe these questions may have been pursued. mr. sadler, what has been the total cost of the twic program to the federal government and the private sector? >> it's to date the program costs are approximately $374 million. and that would include 100 million in prongses and in user fees for individuals who paid for the card. >> and the federal government and the private sector both? >> yes, sir. that's the appropriated money to start the money. the 100 million. and 274 million was the user fee when you get a card issued to you. >> what is the amount of money that you allocate for twic administration each year? >> ours is minimal, we have expended about two million. mostly commercial off the shelf. >> that's 2 million annually? >> to date. that does not include the day-to-day expenses of our personnel that do a number of missions. but that's parts of our mission already. >> how many coast guard personnel are dedicated to oversight of the program. >> they're not dedicated solely to twic. they are looking at everything from what infrastructure is in place and those exist at all of our ports throughout u.s. and one people of that is we recently shut down a facility in miami because it didn't have the appropriate safeguards. unrelated to twic. there were holes in the fenceline that would allow people with no business to enter into those a facilities. >> how long has twic been on line? >> twic was implemented in 2009 when 2700 facilities were required to have twic, on that date all facilities were in compliance. the twic reader is going to be critical as we go forward. that will be the next enabling mek nifrm because the chip is what provides the next level of security beyond the visual recognition. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. seeing no one else on the other side i will go to mrs. blackburn from tennessee for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i thank the committee for allowing me to participate today. this is an issue, tsa and their participation and their conduct is something that is important to my constituents, and mr. lord and mr. mclaughlin have both mc have both mentioned constituent satisfaction, customer satisfaction as a goal. i would just commend to you looking at the economist magazines online poll, which they have upright now the question they're asking are if changes done to airport security have done more harm than good. 8 % of readers agree that changes of airport secure have done more harm than good. gentlemen, i would contend that we are not doing our best at customer service. i think mr. cobly, my colleague from the other side of the aisle spoke well to that. i want to talk to you about the viper teams. on october 20th, 2011, my home state of tennessee became the first state in the country to deploy viper teams simultaneously at five weigh stations and two bus stations. the teams included your tsos, bdos, explosive detection, canine teams, my office was inform bid tsa that the point of operation buzz for tsa agents to recruit truck drivers into the first observer highway security program. the tsos and the bdos involved in the operation were only supposed to be handing out recruitment brochures since neither position has actual federal law enforcement training. however, i've got a couple of posters here. you can see back here if you look at these posters, i'll call that one exhibit a. if you were watching the video of this transaction, you would see that this individual who is designated as a tsa employee is walking around and inspecting the truck. so if they were supposed to be handing out brochures what were they doing inspecting the drugs? and what type training do they receive to detect abnormalities or potential threats in semitrucks? >> first the viper that you reference in the state of tennessee was a joint training exercise with 23 different agencies both federal, state and local where tsa was invited to participate and by all accounts the two or three-day exercise went off very well. it was an important opportunity for us to build relationships, to ensure that in the event of a real national security emergency we have the types of relationships -- >> sir, you're using my time. but i would just ask what type training do they have to actually do these inspections and to detect the abnormalities that would be there on our nations highways? they have no federal law enforcement training, correct? >> during this exercise the officers did not conduct any screenings of any vehicles nor -- >> let me put up poster number two. then why did they ask to open the top of -- open this truck and look at this -- was there a specific threat to tennessee highways on october 20th, 2011, and was there any intelligence suggesting that a suspected terrorist may be driving a semitruck across tennessee? and were there specific threats that were deterred by conducting this operation? >> i can't talk about threats that were deterred, i can tell you this was a training exercise not on exercise based on active intelligence in the state. >> mr. sadler, kuf anything to add to that? >> no, ma'am. there again, i want to go back to the specific question, what kind of specific training do they have to be on the nation's highways to conduct these kind of searches? >> they do not receive specific training with screening vehicles in the highway mode of transportation. the canine team although it's from a distance, appears to be a multimodal dog that is trained in that mode of transportation. >> even though tsos have no federal law enforcement training you are pleased they are participating many this type exercises. >> the viper program is set up to provide a deterrent and work with all mozambique op transportation. part of that is to build a relationship in terms of an exercise. >> the tsos who have been reclassified from being screeners and processors and given no federal law enforcement training are going to be out on our nation's highways and sea ports and participating in -- in this type of activity? >> i'm not sure i understood that as a question. >> let me ask you this, base ds as a performance that you have seen with the viper teams. and their ability to prevent specific terrorist threats, what kind of grade would you give them? >> i think our viper teams do a very good job in a mode of transportation where we have very limited resources. i think our viper teams working in conjunction with state and local agencies do a very good job of providing a visible deterrent to people that might attempt to do something bad. >> a to f, what kind of grade would you give them? >> i don't know if i have the experience to say specifically. based on the experience i do have i would give them the grade in the range of b plus to a minus. that largely based on the length of time the program has been in place. it's only five years old in totality. >> i would remind you that your agency has agreed that perform asbestos measures need to be developed for the viper teams so there can be some measured results and some quantifiable dataened. >>. and we will follow that as we move forward. one last question that i would have for you. have the viper teams ever pulled over cars, s.u.v.'s or vans? >> i'm not aware of a tsa asset on a viper team pulling over a car or van. but i can take that question for the record. >> i would love to have that answer. to my knowledge there is no interest who has ever driven a semitruck. so we find it very curious the method that was being employed with the viper teams and their presence. you can go look at this. other examples were cars and s.u.v.'s they were not semitrucks. i yield back. >> thank you very much. we'll now start our second round of questioning. i'll give it a go for five minutes and then we'll go to mr. cummings. >> as we talk about the spot program for a minute, if a bdo spot agent were able to see something that they considered to be suspicious behavior, what -- what's the follow up there? what can they do? can they engage the person in conversation? what's the procedure when a spot agent detects something? is there something they can do, and if so, can you tell me what that is? >> in our spot program officers are trained to observe behavior and engage in casual conversation with individuals. if the circumstances warrant they can engage further law enforcement for further follow up. >> if they detected something suspicious can they stop them from boarding the plane? >> if you're asking can they physically detain an individual, spot officers are not trained nor do we want them to physically detain an individual. >> i september a spot officer off for some reason and i can just walk on and get on my plane. they can't stop me. >> i misunderstood your question. a spot officer if they have reason to believe that you are suspicious can engage a local law enforcement officer who will interview you and either send you on your way or ask you additional questions. >> has a spot officer ever stopped somebody from boarding a plane? >> not to my knowledge. >> again, there are times when a spot officer whether engage in conversation, but i cannot -- i don't know of a time when a spot officer has stopped someone to get on an airplane. >> how much do we pay these guys to chat up passengers? >> they're paid the same range as federal officers somewhere between $37,000 and $50,000. >> last year in tsa oversight part one hearing by the ogr committee, the chairman asked some panels about the effectiveness of the full body scanners and whether or not they could detect body cavity inserts or surgically