i hope you'll take that apology. i'll go through some slides to give you a flavor for the capability of the phased adaptive approach. let me begin by jumping off where michael ended his comments. in my view, missile defense is becoming technically feasible. we are at the very early stages of exploring this technology and building systems that are beginning to work. there are still some challenges. it is not a perfect system. this technology, in my mind, is good technology. this is not star wars. this is not like the sdi. this is very concrete, potentially quite effective technology. in fact, the hit-to-kill interceptors. they work by maneuvering and colliding with their target. that actually was developed out of the star wars program. there was an experiment called the homing overlay experiment in 1984 which was part of the star wars or strategic defense initiative where it was demonstrated where you could physically collide and have the accuracy to collide with a target in outer space. that experiment has spawned the entire set of interceptor based missile defense assets we have today. i'll focus on europe. as michael said the phased adaptive approach applies to any region, northeast asia in particular, but europe. most of the discussion these days are europe. i'll focus on that as well. one usually starts with a sense of a threat. and for europe, we focus on iran. iran has a fairly active missile program. largely consisting of liquid missiles. they are doing some interesting experiments on solid propelants. today, they have scud cs. they have about 1,300 kilometer range. this is the north korean missile. they recently tested a solid propelant missile with a range up to 2,500 kilometers. some people are suggesting we may see a liquid missile in the range of 3,000 kilometers in the not too distant future. today, the threat from iran is localized to the middle east. israel is concerned about it. turkey could be concerned about it, but turkey is a friend of iran. that is one reason why they resisted nato attempts to join the missile defense effort until very recently. they agreed to deploy a radar on the future maps that you will see. in the next say several years, five years, the missile ranges are encroaching on southeastern europe or southern russia or other regions. the saudis are concerned about the iranian missile ability. in the outyears, let's say within a decade or so, iran probably could have the capability to launch missiles that cover the entire european contine continent. in my view, they got the order backwar backwards. it is the medium change that are proliferating widely. how far? how long will it take before iran gets them? who knows? on the order of a decade, maybe two. so this is the threat that animates the european phase. they could be a political threat. we saw conventionally-armed missiles launched in the middle east and gulf war. in my mind, without some sort of weapons of mass destruction, particularly a warhead, these missiles are not particularly -- i would not spend billions of dollars to defeat them. iran does have a suspect nuclear weapons program. you have been reading a lot about that in the newspaper recently. the concern is, again we don't know the time frame, but they can build a nuclear device to stick on top of a ballistic missile with ranges like this and potentially threaten europe. that is what is anamating the european threat. larger raid sizes. they use this language, emphasis on proven technology. that system is a fairly mature theater missile defense system. we used to call theater missile defense systems. the language has changed a bit. the standard missile three is a naval system which is quite mature. the ground based interceptor that is up in alaska is the least reliable of the hit-to-kill interceptors that we have. that is failing in several test flights for a host of reasons. not only is it less reliable, it is more expensive on the order of $70 million per interceptor. whereas these are the ones down in the $6 million or $10 million in the standard missile. these more mature will be less expensive. most people talk about the interceptors. that is what captures the public's imagination. the most important technology behind missile defense is the sensors and architecture and the control system. the sensors are radars. the spy one radar on the cruiser and the forward based ex-band radar or the tpy-2. this is the radar that is associated with the missile defense system. both of these radars are mature. tpy-2 is sophisticated and effective radar. there are optical sensors that are maturing quite rapidly. these have figured into the phased adaptive approach. not only these types of sensors, but they will all be supposedly a large number of them and they will all be netted together. the data from any one sensor can be shared with any interceptor. that is important and i'll show you that later. there are four phases as michael mentioned. they are based on different variances on the standard three. that is phase one. that timetable was met. the block-1 b has the same interceptor, but a different kill vehicle on the end of it. that is under going flight tests right now. that is supposed to be deployed on ships and romania. that is the base that michael mentioned was negotiated. phase three is the block 2 a interceptor. it was jointly developed between the united states and japan. the japanese are cooperating on this venture as well. this is a jointly-designed system. that is supposed to be deployed in poland. then finally the block 2-b which was a more advanced version on ships and on land around europe in 2020. funding for this missile was just cut, recently, in the 2012 budget because congress was concerned that there are too many concurrent development projects under way. they axed the funding for this. the netted sensor architecture. net 1 and spy-1. navy radars. if you get into the discussion of russian cooperation, there are russian radars tied into the system. infrared tracking. airborne or space based. then to tie all this together. any shooter can launch off of any particular sensor data track. here is the evolution of the standard missile. launched off the vertical launch tube s and cruisers. this is the radar phase here. this is the top of the cruiser. you can't quite see it very well. it is just this radar phase here. this is a picture of the radar face down here. here is the power ban and cooling equipment and other things. this is a moveable radar. a high powered radar. if you look at europe and i start placing these various radars, there is one located in israel today. the one in kurecik is here. this is the picture of the radar fan could see. the volume it could see across the cross section. this is a fairly small cross section, but it is representative of what might be coming off iranian ballistic missiles. this shows the spy-1 radar coverage. the spy-1 radar has four phases. this is a ship in the mediterranean. this is not quite the exact location. the phase one is in the eastern mediterranean. this ship moves around here. could be deployed down here to help protect israel in the case of conflict. now there has been some debate about whether this is a land-based site. as i said spy-1 and sm-3 are naval-based assets. the question is, well, operating ships 24/7 is fairly expensive. they talked about putting it on land to try to reduce costs. what is the radar that goes with this? i show it here with a spy-1 radar. as you can see, the range of the radar is fairly small. probably not the best radar. there have been other people that talked about using different systems. to some extent, the jury is still out on the system. the radar coverage is fairly small. this is the airborne infrared system. this is a drone. here is the sensor ball down here. this is the drone being used in afghanistan. the idea is use the sensor ball and use it to track the systems. this is the off the shelf system that you can use right away. that configuration is not what you exact for missile defense, but it is a beginning. and, in fact, if you designed a better airborne infrared system than the picture i just showed you, this shows the area of space looking down on the earth that an infrared system could see. if you are familiar with infrared systems, it depends on the temperature of the object you are looking at. these detect a black body radiation. heat coming off the object. for warmer objects, 300 kelvin, you can see that. for colder objects, 250 kelvin. that is minus 50 degrees or so. the detection range is not quite as good. you can see three orbits in and around europe. you get substantial coverage. why is that important? if i go back to the radar picture. here is a notional intermediate range heading out of iran and into europe. here are the pictures. the forward-based radar. the trajectory flies through that. the egis radars, the target overflies the radar. the target doesn't see them. this is the main role for the infrared system. if i overlay a kelvin contour and put this in the black sea off the coast of romania, i get good three dimensional coverage over europe. it is this sensor that provides this track for information for me to consummate my engagements. okay. let me talk a bit about the defended area. this is one way to look at if the system is effective or not. can you defend an area as large as europe with the handful of interceptor sites. these are calculations i did at stanford some months back. i want to introduce three concepts which are important to the phased adaptive system. it is rarely talked about in the newspaper. it is quite easy to misunderstand it. there are several modes. one is stand alone operation where the radar that is associated with the interceptor carries out all of the tracking, guidance and communicates to the interceptor. stand alone operation. launch on remote is a mode where -- actually, i can show you here. i'll show you some maps of how wide an area a standard missile three light system. it is a notion standard system. i have a couple of speeds. i'll show you the area you can defend. here is stand alone operation. here is looking at the vessel. here is the radar fans associated with the spy-1 radar. assuming it is spy-1. here is the forward-based turkish radar picks it up. it looks around this region of the radar coverage because you will see something coming in. it cues this radar where to look. it scans the sky and detects it and launches and carries out the intercept before the object falls too deep into the atmosphere for the interceptor to work properly. when i operate in that mode, i can defend an area on the ground that looks like the yellow patch you can barely see here. it is a small defended area. it is behind the interceptor site. this is a standard mode of operations. it is ineffective for protecting large areas. launch on remote is where i use track data from some other sensor. it tracks this object. i send that track information from the interceptor here. i launch it from this track. i consummate from this field of radar. it has to watch the target and tell how close it is getting. that is launch on remote. you launch it on remote track data. this mode of operation has been tested out in the field and they had success so far. but if you can see this is europe here. the defended area is certainly growing compared to stand alone. it is still not that large. the most effective mode of operation and the one that the european phased adaptive approach is heading toward is called engage on remote. engage on remote. i have some forward sensor. it picks up a track. i launch my interceptor based on this track information and i consummate the engagement, that is to say some other sensor, in this case, the airborne infrared. tracks this and tracks the interceptor missile. the only thing the radar, in this case, the spy-1 is a communication link to communicate to the interceptor and say, okay, the abir data tells me this is where it is heading. adjust your track until you have an engagement. this is called engage on remote. you launch on remote. you consummate the engagement based on another sensor and you essentially remove the radar in this case which is located with the interceptor site. that is the most effective mode of operation. let me turn to defense of europe. phase one. this is what the defended area looked like. i assume launch on remote would work. we have one ship in the eastern mediterranean. here is the shahab 3. it moves up around greece. you could provide some localized defense in the middle east and the eastern mediterranean. you probably need two or three ships if there was a real war that broke out, maybe some down here defending other assets. but defending other assets, but that's what the defense picture looks like. we have a forward based one in turkey and a handful of ships using the block 1-a interceptor that is out in the field today. phase 2, three years from now. largely the same picture. now, we have the standard missile 1-b, an improved interceptor on land, and also in the eastern med. maybe you'll have a couple of the ships here. by now, three years from now, the range of missile threats might extend out to 2,000 kilometers. something like that. so again fairly localized defense of southeastern europe with two or three, maybe four sites. something like that. things get interesting at phase 3, 2018. now we're supposed to have the block 2-a interceptor. and it's supposed to be deployed on land in poland. this is where the interceptor site is going to be. one of the issues one gets into there's not a lot of information in the public doe main. all the charts are based on public domain information. we don't know how fast the 2-a intercepter flies and speed matters in this business. i know a family of curves from 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 kilometers a second representing the kind of coverage you get from poland of europe varying the interceptor speed. and again, maybe the missile threats would extend all throughout europe, but who knows. i have shown the maximum range. importantly, this assumes engage on remote. so you have to have the air borne sensors to provide all the track data to operate. now you get huge defended areas. you can practically defend all of europe at the higher interceptor speeds. engage on remote will be implemented down at the vesilou. dp again, maybe the romanian site will remain with a slower interceptor. maybe a faster one, who knows. if i put these two together by 2015 let's assume that the speed is four kilometers a second and i have engage on remote. i have two land-based sites alone. and with engage on remote, i can cover the entire continent of europe. in fact, i could get shots from both of these sites for any missile headed into the center of europe. i didn't point this out, but it's clear here on this chart, this radar in turkey, the turks only agreed to put a radar there. no intercepters. unfortunately it's outside the defended area for most of the other assets. if i went back i could show you. aegis has a hard time defending it. romania has a hard time defending it. this asset is an extremely important radar location. if i put a thad battery there, after all the radar is the radar that goes with the thad system. if i put it there instead of the radar, that's the kind of defended area that you'll get. if i don't have engage on remote and all i have is launch on remote, this is what the picture looks like. here's the polish site, the romanian site. i didn't put any naval interceptor around there. if we don't get engage on remote, the broad area of defense of europe is virtually impossible unless you start proliferating sites all over the place. that highlights the important of that particular aspect of the defense. i was talking earlier with harold with the issue of russia. i want to at least touch on a little bit of why the russians are concerned. but phase 4 of the european phase adaptive approach is really designed to defend the united states, not europe. up through phase 3 that's defense of europe. here i put interceptors in poland. this is circa 2020. i assume engage on remote and i engage block 2-b of different spee speeds. this shows the defended footprint against the icbm. this is the maximum range of the icbm i have assumed here. slicing through the united states. in the interceptor speed is 4 1/2 kilometers a second which is very fast for defending europe, this is the defended area in here. you really cannot protect the united states. if i increase that speed to five kilometers a second, now i can do a good job of defending the eastern part of the united states, but the west coast is a little bit out of the footprint. i haven't shown you the capability of the ft. greely up here. so five kill miters a second, the forward base site could help defend the east coast. ft. greely the west coast. but if you want to cover the entire continental united states from poland, your interceptor speed has to be up around 5 1/2 kilometers a second. much faster -- at least a kilometer second faster. now, why are the russians concerned? this chart shows you the footprint, the defended area for russian icbms launched from all the known launch locations in russia. it is high for any of the sm-3 interceptors currently being talked about. so if i put that sm-3 block 2-b in poland, which has been the source of most of russia's concerns, you really can't protect the united states. here's maine. only the ss 27s and ss 19s, you might catch them going to maine but the rest of the united states and alaska and hawaii you cannot intercept those icbm's's. to threaten russia's icbms, the launch site has to be up above five kilometers a second, closer to six or something like that. so just to summarize, the kinds of observations i'd like to draw from this, engage on remote is essential. the battle management system to tie all those assets together is key to the system. if you don't have it, the system doesn't work. phase 1, two ships, three ships, decent coverage with launch on remote. same with phase 2. phase 3 is where things get interesting where supposedly engage on remote capability is available. two sites covers all of europe. turkey is outside that defended area. especially that radar. so you need to deploy thad there so that's the follow on discussions is how about accepting a few interceptors. phase 4 defense of the united states. you really have to be above five kilometers a second to protect the united states from a european launched location. if you do get above 5, 5 1/2, 6 kilometers is better still, then you can do a nice job of defending the united states. the problem is now you pose a threat to russia. so you can't have your cake and eat it too. you can't defend the united states from europe against iranian icbms without potentially encroaching on russian capability. though in my mind you don't encroach on it very much. in fact, i think most of the russian concerns are more political in nature than the sort of military technical. sensor issues are key. airborne infrared, space-based infrared. good sensors. you need more than just one or two to keep your radars. and the french are developing radars. the germans and others. hopefully they'll contribute to the system. multiple radars. and that rapid command and control system. i think that's it. yeah. so that's the kind of capability the system could have and there are several key pillars that are required to really make this thing work fairly well, which i believe it could. thanks. >> thank you, dean. that was very helpful. i personally am left with the question of if given defense, every benefit of the doubt, you know, everything worked as you said, and yet it doesn't threaten the russians very much until phase 4. so i tend to come down where you come down, that the russian objections are much more political than technical. now, that flash of brilliance i