Transcripts For CSPAN2 Tonight From Washington 20120331

increases and we might jump the big spending cuts hand in hand to sequester of large and that is a form of insanity to do something like that. .. so it's very hard -- this is why it hmi look at tenure windows because anything beyond that is already highly, highly i'm searching. so on one hand i don't think we should necessarily be saying this will definitely happen. i think our approach should be more thoughts make sure it doesn't happen and have a contingency plan and ensure against that. but at the same time i don't think we should say this is definitely going to be the case that was a mismatch in health care and mismatch on x y and v. >> thank you also much for joining us. thank you european all. you are fantastic. have a great day, everyone. >> next on c-span two come a discussion at the cato institute about how the u.s. should respond to iran's nuclear program. the president also said world where production is high enough to make up for lost iranian supplies. excerpt on our band nuclear weapons national security debated u.s. policy on iran and the possibility of a military strike. from the cato in duty washington, this is three hours. [inaudible conversations] >> already. thank you very much. welcome to the cato institute. i name is christopher preble, the vice president for foreign policy studies here at cato and it is my great pleasure to welcome you to the new auditorium. into the newly redesigned cato institute. so welcome. we are very fortunate to have for this conference, a terrific lineup. it is my privilege to be about to introduce them. i went to think before i forget the plowshares fund for their support this project and really congratulate and thank my colleagues, justin logan who is responsible for organizing that. i think many of you in the audience at the bios, but for those of you watching online, for your benefit -- on c-span. i quickly want to introduce the four pls who will be speaking in the order they will speak and then i'll get out of the way and let them get started. our first day will be michael albert, public policy scholar at those johnstone crescent cover the operating in burma in 1980 and reconstruction of kuwait after the first school for her. and the german capital from berlin. in the mobutu in zaire. michael cover the rating nuclear crisis extensively while in vienna from 2,222,007 and he was reported from tehran, geneva, tripoli and other key cities and is clunky writing a book on the diplomacy of the iranian nuclear crisis. her second speaker today is barbara slavin as she specialized in iran as a nonresident senior at the lancet councilman for public policy scholar at the woodrow wilson and her first colors. she authored bitter friends, and iran's u.s. twisted paths confrontations. she was assistant managing editor for world of national security in the "washington times" 2008, 2009. after that she search all of your sincere diplomatic reporter for yesterday and served key issues such as war and terrorism in iraq and the arab-israeli conflict. she company three secretaries of state official travels and reported seller from iran, libya, israel from egypt, north korea, and syria, all the slots. our third speaker today is alireza nader. alireza is an analyst at the rand corporation and his research focused on iran's political dynamics in the late decision-making and iranian foreign policy. alireza naderalireza coping with israel and i want a dangerous rivalry, the next supreme leaders from succession in the public of a man cometh that you maintain relations with the fall of saddam and many others. the commentaries have appeared in a variety media including foreign-policy.com, global security.org, international tribune co. are times and others and is a frequent guest on television and radio. in the final speaker is my friend and colleague, justin logan, director of foreign-policy studies here at cato and an expert on u.s. growth strategy, international relations theory and american foreign policy and his current research focuses on chicken onto power in asia and formation of u.s. grand strategy under unipolarity. numerous policy studies and articles including u.s.-china policy is coming as russia policy, stabilization and reconstruction operation and policy approaches towards a nuclear iran. his articles have appeared in many policy journals including foreign-policy, national interest and others and he also has appeared on many television and radio networks. but that i look at out of the introduce our first speaker, michael adler. >> at more than all for coming here. good morning. when i first was asked to at the topic here today is can diplomacy work? when i was first asked to do this before the meeting of prime minister netanyahu and president of him in washington de palma could work i thought this would be very thankful pat, but it's amazing how much things have changed over the past month and the month of march. in the first development was that the rush to where we seem to be accelerated, ground to a halt, not a screeching halt, but a halt anyways. there's still some screeching about four, when netanyahu met obama. and what happened there as the president, both gave a kind of statement the united states and eventually use force if necessary, but also that it is time for diplomacy and the israelis have elect to play, bored but that in the day after the meeting -- one a watchman time, the day after the meeting of the two leaders, catherine asked him as the foreign-policy representative for the european union sent a letter to fade shillelagh on the nuclear issue to say that she had accepted talks, which it proposed earlier. now these talks are between six nations, britain, china, france, germany, united states and russia called the p5 plus one and these are the five permanent security council members. plus they have been negotiated since about 2001 and a crisis that began in 2002 when it was revealed that iran was hiding nuclear war for some decades. the talk is not done very well and there have been several side posts along the way. not to go through the whole history, but what brings this up to what is happening now is october 2009 it was a meeting of which the two sides agreed to a swap for iran which swap out most of what it may and return for getting few for a research or in tehran, which makes medical isotopes. the idea behind that and the idea behind attacks in general is that it would be a constant measure. iran would shift out most of it enriched uranium, which makes them less able to break out and make nuclear weapons and at the same time they would've gotten a de facto recognition of continuing arrangement and that would set the stage for serious talks. that deal fell apart. then there were two meetings in geneva in december 2010 and in istanbul in january to 11, at which the two sides try to relaunch the process. it ended badly at a meeting in istanbul after the meeting in geneva for the two sides had. to express their opinions and the iranians had brought out a range of other concerns they had about world peace, the influence of capitalism in the world. the rating scheme for the second meeting and instead of negotiating and the two conditions they basically killed another sanctions against them with a lifted and they would have an unequivocal right to enrich uranium. so this prevented any kind is deal with istanbul. after that pretty much you had a growing march to war, what can i say. there were concerns that israel was about to take action that precursory raise nuclear program is the next essential threat and that was what was stopped at the beginning of this month and now we have a talks coming up again. these talks are not taking place in a hopeless atmosphere, where people are just going through the motions. these talks given new start after there has been a setback from going to war. so i guess the question to ask is what is the chance of success? >> i think certainly the p5+1 and people in the united states are coming to these talks with low expectations. and the success of the talks were probably mean it is a second-round schedule. the second round would occur fairly quickly, just the idea would be to start moving ahead. but this is not a meeting at which there will be a dramatic breakthrough. this is not the meeting for a fuel slapping a major confidence measure. so the main thrust of what is happening is to just start talking again. but once again it isn't an atmosphere as name we have stopped the war. let's release the diplomacy, to work. in the past, there has been pretty much a set piece where i should come up with a suggestion for something better. my suggestion which will never happen if he was a fit down -- the tax of the scheduled for mid-april we don't know it's going to be, probably somewhere in switzerland. when they sit down, i think that p5+1 should say, you know something, let's not really get down until late afternoon. with absentee, tacked to each other. how is your family? what are things like in tehran? because they like this type of approach. to iranians want an informal talk, where everything is played on the table and above all they do not present you with an ultimatum. so i think the best thing the united states can say is how can we -- tell us how we can help you. we are in this together. let's help you out. i do not think that will happen, but there is a real determination at least on the american side to make these talks work. so there will be enough for to do things in a way where the iranians feel there is a forum for them to talk out. another way to measure their success as that there are bilateral talks between the united states and iran. iran fairness wants to talk to the united states. iran feels the united states is a country which is going to deliver goods. at the beginning of this process in 2003 to 2006, the europeans for doing the negotiating and the united states was not at the table and diplomats were talking that it always thought uranian publican of their soldiers to guarantee the types of security guarantees and deliver it to knowledge you could make the deal work. so i think a key sign of success at this meeting would be bilateral talks between reigning representatives and between american representatives. as was said in istanbul in the last time, there were no bilaterals between the american and the iranians. if we get through this first round and if we get to sit around, which will happen fairly quickly, that is where the real part is because much of the confidence building measure. now if this can't be a feel slot, what would be a smaller source of confidence? it might be something called the additional protocol where iran has agreed to by this section of their nuclear facilities. in ip iran agreed to get earlier notification when it is constructing new facilities like now iran's only disclose facility to six months before they are going to introduce the new material. does believe it or not are the small confidence. the larger confidence -- [inaudible] would be iran enriches uranium right now to 3.5% coaches the level needed for nuclear reactor. they also stretch in which 20% because they didn't get fuel from a research area in 20% is very close to the above 90% you need to make nuclear weapons because it is an exponential curve. now the thing is that the first really significant measure is that they stop enriching 20% and shape of the 20% that ready-made would already be a sign that the israelis are looking for, but have to sign of diplomacy is serious. i'm going to wrap a good after this becomes a larger feel slot or they would ship out much if they are going uranium and at that point i think the said they would begin to move towards freezing sanctions. if that happens, we definitely been a significant process. of course the chances of that are low, but the bottom line is that there is hope of a serious process, which was unforeseen two, three months ago and let's see how it develops. thank you very much. [applause] >> good morning. thank you come aikido for inviting me. i basically want to endorse a bunch of michael's analysis. i think that the race has been halted. i think president obama managed that beautifully and he embraced it in close and at the same time he basically read him the riot act considering that going to start a worn-out and you're not going to start a war before my reelection or my hope for reelection. if you look at the remarks made at the aipac conference and when the two of them met afterwards, this is rather clear. at the same time, we have seen interesting signals from tehran and perhaps alireza will talk about that is slow, but not exactly -- i think it's the best way to put it. right after the comments that obama made talking about recurring to the news talk words stressing the diplomacy was his preferred option for dealing with ukrainian nuclear program. ayatollah khamenei elite leader said building nuclear weapons with the great sin, unquote. and he praised obama, which is not something the supreme leader of iran often does for such remarks are good and indicate a step out of dilutions. he also at the same time claimed that economic sanctions that have been close to having absolutely no effect. as some of the sanctions are having a huge effect and i think it's another reason why we might actually have a diplomatic option in front of us. for those of you who haven't been following it, the sanctions around like anything imposed on iran since the 1979 revolution. they had to muster crimean that has been imposed on any government. if you look in terms of the u.n. sanctions combined with the american sanctions and europeans pensions cannot rename things are excommunicated from the international financial system. there were few banks that can do any kind of transactions. iran is resorting to barter increasingly. i refer you to the atlantic council website where we have a number of papers that are task force has done and a couple that deal in particular with iran's reliance on china and on predictions actions. hard-currency can't change hands, so essentially iran is sending the two countries such as in you and china in getting credit and receiving the conservatives from those countries. iranian oil production is going down i think in part because iran realizes it can't tell the oil to be one and get the money that it wants. it is down to 3.3 million barrels a day. that is down from 3.8 million barrels a day just a few months ago in 4.1 million barrels a day to year or so ago. this is truly hurting the iranian economy but the currency has dropped in value by about half against the dollar. inflation is up, unemployment is up and there's a lot of disk tents in the country. so what are the other signals received from iran that it might actually want to deal with the united states and the rest of the p5 plus one? the kinds of things who follow blackhawks if you're interested in iranians internal politics and foreign policy. on march the fifth come iranian supreme court orders the retrial of former u.s. marine and uranian americans sentenced to death for supposedly spying for the cia. on march 13, the u.s. reported that to iran and arms dealer who had been caught in a sting operation in the republic of georgia a few years later. in this country, it was revealed that our treasury department has begun an investigation into the former governor of pennsylvania, at rendell and several others for taking money to promote an organization called the mujahedin from a group of the state department terrorism list that had been trying to get off the terrorism list for years and has been paying very, very well known former u.s. officials great sums of money to advocate getting off the terrorism list. they have not gotten off the list. there were supposed to be a march 26th deadline for the state department to rule. the deadline is gone and i would predict there would be no decision on this issue certainly before the nuclear talks. this is another signal because the rainy government pays this organization. it is the least responsible for assassinating five uranian scientists over the past two years. so that the new tax schedule. i believe april 13, although there sent april 14 question about the exact date in the exact venue. i agree with michael's analysis. i don't think lucy and nature radically increase. but we are looking for is to manage the situation. it will solve the iranian commandos overnight. the idea is to cut the program in some way and do some limit on introducing greater transparency that will contain the israelis. i think the problem is to contain israel, not so much iran right now that will provide confidence that iran is not rushing towards a nuclear weapon. they will also help contain the u.s. congress, which is passing more and more resolution that would attempt to really tie the hands of the obama demonstration in negotiating a solution. there is a resolution that would fervid containment that was making its way through congress until grandpa stood up and said no, this is kind of a back door authorization for war and we can't have it. it was remarkable that we have to rely on grandpa was to prevent congress from passing ridiculous legislation but there you have it. there are a number of good proposals out there to provide this kind of management of the nuclear issue and michael has referred to some of them. most of them center around iran halting enrichment to 20% to 35, which is close to weapons grade. if iran will stop or slow that, if iran will stop enriching at a facility called florida, which is built into the side of amount and very, very difficult for anyone to attack, if it was slow that it's happening in the centrifuges they are, that would be a major step. catherine ashton, the foreign policy chief has said she wants a sustained constructive dialogue with iran. this is her letter back to julie lee. the ways that were sent a letter last october and it took iran until february to respond and finally in march after the meeting between obama and netanyahu ashton said yes the ayatollah khamenei with me. so she went to sustain the dialect, which is not a one-shot deal, not a two-day session in istanbul and nothing after that. so we do need to see their more meetings scheduled and they begin to get into the nitty-gritty of the nuclear but an under not just talking about principles and iran is not simply presenting a litany of grievances against the west which was done in the past. a couple more things that iranians internal politics which are useful. the romance had parliamentary alleging in they were not called for your affair, but the iranian government declared them a great success and 64% of the iranians have participated, which is undoubtedly an inflated figure. there is a joke going around that 80% of the iranian side home television watching 70% of iranians vote on television. so there is something in it that's a little bit off. but nevertheless, this victory in as the supreme leader acting to consolidate his base. he has won his height with the president of iran in case you hadn't noticed the president of iran, ahmadinejad has been fighting with the supreme leader reached up for his former president and appointed him to another five-year term as head of them and called the expediency council, which is a largely toothless group, but it is supposed to mediate conflicts between various branches of the government. rafsanjani and 15 is privatized, someone who is identified with a reach to the west and so this is another signal perhaps that the supreme leader can be a little bit more flexible in these negotiations. the u.s. caught is to prevent iran from developing a nuclear weapon and this is also very useful during the netanyahu obama talks that instead of talking about nuclear weapons capability, which is that the senate resolution discusses and israelis have been harping on for years, the red line now is an actual nuclear weapon and this is a lot easier in terms of presenting a conflict and also easier in terms of negotiations. because a lot of leeway for iranians to maintain an enrichment program, but not a nuclear weapons process. i can definition is going to be key if we are going to be able to achieve some sort of success. there is a very good report from the congressional research service yesterday that talks about the fact that iran of course we know that they've dispersed their nuclear facilities widely across the country, but also the accounts via centrifuges and places that make centrifuges widely dispersed around the country, which means that there is no military solution to the iranian nuclear program. you can bomb the notes i, k-kilo bunch were scientists which are not going to be out to destroy iran's ability to reconstitute its nuclear program and many experts have suggested bombing iran's is the one thing and absolutely has to have a nuclear weapons program in order to deter future attacks. so i think we have seen some clarification and very useful clarification in terms of the goals as u.s. foreign policy in recent weeks. i personally think that if the united states and its allies fail in stopping iran from developing nuclear weapons, containment stops and it contains for 33 years and we can continue to do so. iran is more isolated now that region. at a foot get into the discussion of problems with its neighbors and it's certainly very worried about the decision in syria. it has lost its cachet, its narrative has been a champion of the oppressed and it doesn't wash so well when it's depressing that some people and putting down demonstrations after his two dozen nine elections in supporting the assad regime in syria. so we're in a relatively good place for the real question is whether the government is going to be able to come up with some creative in the rest of the election year and whether obama will have the courage and i'll leave it there. [applause] >> good morning. thanks for inviting me to speak today. i have announced to basically talk about why diplomacy may not work with tehran. but at the challenges? before i get into that, i just want to command people an expert commentators and analysts who emphasize diplomacy because i don't think that a military strike against iran by the united states or israel will involve the crisis and i do believe that would be very good to the u.s. in the middle east. and as barbara mentioned, there are some positive indications that iran is open to compromise her engagement with the p5+1. we just had parliamentary elections in iran. the supreme leader ayatollah khamenei has consolidated power. president mock moot ahmadinejad is not as big of a player and so we can argue that the nuclear program has been streamlined. in 2009 and after that, one of the difficulties in engaging iran and reach a negotiated settlements was the fact that there is so many players involved, players are often domestically opposed to each other. for example, ahmadinejad came under attack from the left in the right of the iranian political system for trying to broker a deal on uranium enrichment. city can argue that ayatollah khamenei is more confident going forward. as barbara mentioned he did threaten president obama for discounting or emphasizing diplomacy that he has kept the less ideological former president expedia council. one of his advisers have stated that iran is open to compromise, et cetera, that area. we can list a number of other positive indications. and the hope here is that sanctions will put enough pressure that he will back down. and we know he is a reasonable man. he makes decisions on calculations, but we have to also look past what is it didn't come meet me meet me, what are his political interests? for his ideological interests as a leader and more importantly, what is his worldview? how does he see the world, the united states in the nuclear program? and when we look, he really believes the islamic republic is engaged in a substantial conflict. khamenei believes the united states has never accepted the islamic resolution in 1979 and will never accept the resolution he doesn't leave the united states is just opposed to iran's specific policies in the nuclear program, for example, that he has stated the united states opposes the very essence of the islamic republic. i'll think this will change as long as khamenei is alive because of the way he thinks about the united states. he participated in the revolution is one of the revolutionary leaders. he helped overthrow the shah and what he believed to be u.s. domination of iran. so his worldview is very much based on his experience. the islamic republic in khamenei may believe the nuclear program is an important military deterrent against the united states, even if iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, the fact that it has the virtual capability to assemble a nuclear weapon and 50 da thinks there is this a valuable deterrent for iran and i run i seem to state overthrow neighboring russian site regime of saddam hussein and the taliban and with relative ease. so the iranian decision-makers know that in the future of the united states may take military action against iran to overthrow the regime. circumstances for that right now are not very good. this is not the u.s.'s intention, but it's a possibility for the future. and the nuclear program is a sign of his regime's success. he sees the nuclear program as a success for the revolution. despite the year sanctions and isolation's iran has faced and the sanctions we talk about right now are nothing new in terms of something strong, they are very trichotomy in. but iran has been under sanctions for more than 30 years and said ken believes the progress show that it's able to resist the united states. when you look into the speeches, this is a constant pain. he emphasizes the scientific progress and it's all about how iran is right number 11 in terms of scientific progress of what he claims, et cetera. of course khamenei's viewpoint is not necessarily shared they'll iranian within the political elite, the leaders of the green movement, the reformists may not see the nuclear program and a similar ideological and political terms. in fact, the isolation a run has faced as sanctions for socioeconomic kitchen to the pragmatic conservatives and reformists who want to liberalize iran's economy and open it up to the road in a political reforms. this is not khamenei finds that. he's very much compared to these other figures in spatially soon as an ideological leader. it's not clear how the iranian republic feels about the nuclear program. we hear there is a sense of national pride. a lot of iranians support the civilian aspect of the nuclear program. there's been a lot of polling done on the issue. we don't know for certain how iranians feel. i would argue to guess the regime has had some success as a matter of national rights, that iranians think well why should israel, pakistan, india, is better, the west have access to technology and why should we not? some iranians probably would argue that iran should have weapons. so the question remains, will hominy give in to pressure? section has undoubtedly hurt the economy. the iranian currency has really divided. they've gone incredibly high india raftery geranium is really suffering in the middle classes. some of the same people that support democracy in iran and this is one of the unfortunate aspects of sanctions, that it does hurt certain u.s. object is what helps firm with amazing. but there is no indication that khamenei fundamentally rethinking iran's position on the nuclear program. he has admitted sanctions are painful, but there are signs he is getting iran and its population ready for the long struggle with the united states. when we look at iran, we have to remember that iran and the regime specifically has survived a lot, had survived the revolution, the longer with iraq coming years of sanctions, insurgencies. how many have survived assassination attempt. he's not a man that could easily band and he has named this year -- at remember the specific name, that the national labor and promoting iranian domestic productivity. he believes in the base of sanctions that iran can become more self-sufficient and then he points out to the nuclear program and other scientific achievements for this. in addition, khamenei selected predecessor of the resolution is not as fomented from the political system. he's pushed aside rafsanjani. these have dinner twice a week and that is not happening anymore. and so khamenei is relying on a very small inter-circle of revolutionary guards officers and people to give him advice. in a lot of ways he is cut off from the world. he believes that the united states is in geopolitical decline and the united states declines in the middle east because what he terms is an islamic awakening. what we call the arab spring come in the regime islamic awakening. khamenei believes that influence in the middle east is on the way because of the overthrow of the american machines in tunisia, egypt, yemen. there's been stability in countries like bahrain, et cetera. he believes is iran stands strong in the face of sanctions that the u.s. also faces huge problems and that time we can argue that he is delusional. he has said that obama exiting from dilution that we can argue she is delusional. but that is what we have on iran. this is the viewpoint of them in making decisions for the entire iranian population. so where does that leave the united states in terms of policy options? i believe the next panel will talk about these options. not a lot of people would argue even within israel that there is a military solution. if there is an attack against iran, iran's can take the iaea regime contract down on opposition. there will be a greater cell of national pride. i don't think iranian necessarily will forgive the regime for a sin because of an attack, but it will put the regime or could very well put the regime in a favorable position, especially as israelis do not manage to really damage iran's nuclear program very much. military strike was a setback to u.s. object does a democracy in iran and could lead to greater instability in the region. diplomacy is solution. barbara mentioned that the goal is really to manage the situation to prevent an armed conflict. but in terms of diplomacy if you're going to rely on diplomacy is the situation can go on and on and on for the next several years and also there has to be a solution, not just to the iranian nuclear program, but a solution to the islamic republic and our relations with the islamic republic. i would argue as long as ayatollah khamenei is in power, we will not solve our problems with iran. he's going to do everything in its power to undermine u.s. interests in the region. the good news is that iran has not decided to recognize this program. the u.s. intelligence community assesses there is no indication that khamenei and the leadership has decided to patronize the program. and given the vulnerabilities the regime faces at home, lack of legitimacy, the willful economic situation in iran, iran's receiving regional influence and could in its travels to syria gives us opportunities to contain the islamic republic and hope for something better to emerge in the future. as if you you look at iran, more so than a lot of countries surrounding it has the real potential for a democratic system and ultimately only a democratic iran will be the solution to the nuclear crisis. thank you. [applause] >> thanks very much. thank you all for coming. thank you for the co-panelists here. when we were originally trying to suspect that this is going to be terrifically difficult case to make that there is some hope for diplomacy and i agree with those on the other side. there is increasing hope that i'm going to try my best to pour cold water on that increasing hope. despite the fact that i'm very, very much a supporter of diplomacy, i think i would support a much more ambitious diplomatic approach than is likely to happen. but i will explain some of the obstacles in terms of american domestic politics and it seems a structural international reasons. i should also reveal that i was doing work on iranian potential proliferation 2006 and 2007. but for the past year or so i've been working on the asia-pacific region. so i'm actually having to pivot back to the middle east as a think the administration is having to pivot back to the middle east. so i will defer many reasons to my co-panelists. you have to say that's a good thing about u.s.-iran or western iranian diplomacy is there a really good metaphors. there is tons of immunity, closing windows, clocks running it different speeds. it's like a salvador dali painting, nuclear proliferation. so i want to reiterate a favorite diplomacy and probably unrealistically ambitious diplomatic approach, but the very fact the approach is unrealistic causes me to doubt whether or not we will get to where we want to go. as i mentioned, alireza covered the diplomatic resolutions. i want to focus on u.s. domestic politics and onto structural impediments and then suggest we may go from here to prove me wrong. in terms of american domestic politics, the general aphorism i have been trying to get out is what might work can't happen and what might happen can't work. and i think that is a fairly plum assessment and i hope i am wrong about it, but that is what i believe at this point. as barbara mentioned, the congress' attitude has put more pressure on top of existing pressure and promised not to put any more pressure if concessions are made. in fact, it is even stop the last part of not putting any more pressure. the central bank sanctions. the congress did not write an off ramp for iran to say by the way if you fulfill these 57 domains for making, we will remove the sanctions. so if you're every man a look at congress for disturbing but what are the demands here we can fulfill conceivably that would give us a way out of this, congress didn't stop by and large even gesturing at the idea of an offering. that is something of an indication of the role of the congress intends to play. i'm pretty much a partisan of congress cited an institution that did not cover themselves with their participation in u.s. diplomacy towards iran. my read is that the congress is up to us they want to appear very, very concerned to various constituencies about the problem and that's about it. one saving grace who may have is as an institution they are cowardly enough to ignore the grants in article i, section eight of the constitution which indeed grant them power to declare war. we city that is the country, declare war when the congress cited war was appropriate but instead there's lots of handwaving and table pounding which perversely is probably the team. the congress again does send home had things to get its war in the wake of u.s.-iran diplomacy. they have not really provided hope for anything construct is to this diplomatic agenda the administration is following. for the obama administration itself, it put its neck out there on the campaign same as open to diplomacy. in 2009, gesturing to correction of diplomacy but i seek not to much into spending gobs and gobs of political capital on diplomacy with iran up and running in a way that it will be fruitful. i can't entirely blame them for that. it's not clear to me they have enough f., particularly this year to get things rolling in a fruitful direction and obviously we have all noted they have lots of domestic priorities on which they are spending political capital. so i don't envy the position at which the obama administration combines itself. i think the echo with other panelists have said any diplomatic process that has the hope of producing long-term results would be itself a long-term protracted process of meetings after meetings after meeting there would be easy to sort it demagogue as the obama administration selling a to the islamic republic to the campaign commercial is rather write golf. so i think that is a politically perilous thing for the administration to do in for a variety of reasons the ability for two michael adler and hope that he is right. i am not sure that the israelis were as well received to president obama's message. again, i remain open to being persuaded that that is right. but i wonder whether it is. so moving on to sort of the structural international obstacles, i am really indebted to reminding to one of the panelists on the second panel at the forthcoming paperwork mentioned this topic. to start with, the diet is the political science. the relationship between iran on one hand and the united states and the other hand is terrifically and balance in terms of imperial power. iran cannot conquer the united states. the united states if it decided to could conquer iran. i don't support doing so. but in terms of material power, there is simply no comparing the two countries. given that, if you look at instrumentalist perspective, any diplomatic view would involve making lots of substantial security assurances to iran. if you do this, not only will we not -- not only will we do something that we us agree not to do something in the future. the question becomes, how could iran trust assurances provided by a country that has overwhelming power and indeed it unipolar power in the international system. how do you make credible assurances to reread it leave weak state that if it decided to could renege on this assurances at any point. this is the point that is not grasser i don't see evidence that it's free will grasped or the administration or search by the congress. it is just very difficult to matter how genuine the intention to credibly convey that which coming from both sides have been poisonous relations for the past 30 years. this is a very important point to highlight and president obama in a recent interview with jeffrey goldberg of the atlantic pointed to cases for that diplomacy had these good results in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and he pointed of course if south africa and then pointed at libya. well if you are ayatollah khamenei you think you get ourselves the libya deal. it doesn't look like a very good deal because the united states could very easily renege on assurances made if for example there another political crack down, iran is in the united states decide it's had about enough of the regime in tehran cracking down on protesting civilians. so i think getting our heads around how to convey credibly security assurances is maybe my sunday punchier in terms of pouring cold water for long-term diplomatic field. so i want to reiterate just in case someone pierced that would put me out of context. i favor a very robust diplomatic approach to a rand, but i worry again what might happen can't work and what might work can't happen. so in terms of from here in wrapping up and offer a couple of five about how to prove me wrong. we have this peculiar belief in the united states that when we win concessions at the u.n. security council to do another resolution sanctioning iran or what have you that there is a sort of bar else on the other side of that in terms of people that assigned.. so we censure iran for doing the senate should stop. in my mind we are headed or else. girls were forced you to stop. the rest of the world doesn't have an rls on the end of the security council resolutions or any other statement appears that we should get our mind around that. if we decide there is in or else, it will be a possibly a very, very small coalition willing to coin a phrase to try and put teeth into the sanctions militarily should it come to that. particularly conservatives who have particular views about the united nations tending to endorse the idea the security council sanctions could bite important ways. we probably have to make large prohibitively large concessions at the outset to get iranians to believe we are serious about diplomacy. if you look at 1737, 1747, it is unlikely iran is going to spend out right as those indicates and would probably have to do something in terms of the unilateral sanctions from washington or europe in order to convince the iranians we were serious. i also think that's a political nonstarter. if you could get them to do something like 20%, i'd be willing to what that something are doing. not just promise to not do something in addition, the walk back some of the things already to convince them we were serious. it would be a political night there is another thing thing we could do if they agree to stop enhancing the facility that would be terrific and i would take that as a sign that we should be willing to walk back some other things or be doing. this is not a mainstream point of view for the administration or congress anything could be a nightmare. but there again i see that domestic political influences constraining our ability to operate internationally. but the net takeaways if you want diplomacy to work and if you really want -- think that the military action is a terrible idea, you'll have to really bite the bullet so to speak indecent things you really would rather not do in order to get the train rolling in the first place and in the second place and i realize this is going to be a long, agonizing process that will have lots of setbacks and may not in the end work. i hope we get that far, but i fear that we will not. so i think i will leave it there and turn the podium backed crisper questions. thank you are a bunch. [applause] >> thank you all very much. we left a lot of time for q&a. baby before it opened up to the audience come into any if you wish to respond to anything that was said by the other panelists? >> i've got a question. >> all right. very good. we have a rule here. the rule in the new auditorium are the same in the old higher court attorney him is when you ask a question, wait for the microphone everyone can hear you come including those watching online. state your name and affiliation and frame your question in the form of a question. this is a jeopardy rule. no speeches, please. who was first? right there. >> my name is tina ate me with peace action. we were talking a lot about people mention the sanctions that is hurting the people of iran. but no one really talked about whether sanctions even work and i recently read a report that they don't and there was some study done that showed they had never worked. so my question on that is, why are we pursuing a policy that doesn't work, that's very harmful and what he perceived as bowling by the people of iran. and you are talking confidence building measures. that doesn't seem to me to be confidence building measure. >> thank you. so the question is, sanctions don't have a terrific track record. that is different about the sanctions if anything? >> well, they do work in some cases. we have south africa for example where sanctions did help get rid of the apartheid regime that is usually referred to. we have sanctions because it is a substitute for war and for diplomacy. people don't want to declare war in this country and even the congress, even for the gung ho neoconservatives are not anxious to have a war with iran after experience over the last decade so they have to think of something else. they are ready to make major concessions to the islamic republic so you have sanctions and they've taken a moment of the room and this started under the george w. bush of, our treasury department has become one of the most created part of the u.s. government in terms of devising ever more clever ways to destroy the iranian economy. i was at a session with ehud olmert, the farmer president to brag when he was prime minister and his talk with u.s. treasury spectator to come up with the idea of expelling iran for what is called the swift, which is the system that enables banks to do transactions with foreign banks. he said this is an idea they were talking about for years ago. so we're good at it. or obviously not good at diplomacy and we don't want to go to war. >> anyone else? >> i think in a sense we are definitely an estate is taking place this sanctions into covert operations center every pressure short of four. not to defend sanctions, but it's basically to get iran to talk. so you can see the talks coming up as one way in which sanctions succeeded because the question was sanctions if they certainly are causing problems for iran good but the main question is are they sufficient to get iran to strike a deal with us on the nuclear program? so i think the jury is still out on how the policy add-ons and went again the fact we are having these talks, which justin referred to the difficulty of getting forward in getting wrote confessions of a tank to weigh at least the west is approaching it is they want to start very spoleto and there are actually two plans out there for diplomacy. one is the russian plan and the other is the american plan. and interestingly enough the first is the russian plan that the united states would give guarantees to iran and in return they would be a sanction. .. but i think that despite the election and everything going on, if we can get a start to this process, you have a situation in iran where barbara just spoke after the parliamentary elections there's a possibility for consensus in iran which is a very pollyanna should view by the way but a possible but if the consensus such did not exist before the parliamentary elections because if it has effectively registered a lame-duck to these elections come and if there are businessmen, revolutionary guards coming to say look, we are having trouble doing business, can't we do something to get out of this there might be a way in which they would decide if they could get a solution where they keep to get some enrichment where they can go forward with what they say is only a civilian program that would be a way they might want to strike a deal or be in their interest. this is a best case scenario. in that situation he would move three quickly to the sort of thing i was talking about where you would cut to 20% where the average man would be shipped out, and i think you will find that if this first meeting is a success there will be a second meeting, and the second meeting will come very quickly because everybody is afraid of drawing up the process delaying. if that happens and there's a second meeting in the there is a stepping down from 20% enrichment by iran and starting to move towards the swap then we would move towards freezing sanctions which is incredibly different because they're mandated by the u.s. congress. speaking of a nightmare, but would be in of late nightmare. but i think the way to sell it would be to say if you are getting concessions to the iranian side, this is the chance, this is the last chance to reach an agreement, and that is a good way to see the sanctions. >> sanctions are blunt instruments. they do hurt certain objectives, and promoted certain u.s. objectives at the same time. with. it's not the objective should be. sanctions are hurtful and they do hurt. the irony in middle class, the same people that came out into the streets of tehran and other cities in 2009 to protest against the government. sanctions hurt our allies within iran and that is if they would send iran there's been reports that sanctions are hurting, that the community in the united states, canada and sweden, and that doesn't all the united states. in terms of promoting u.s. interest, the sanctions have made the program higher. if iran decides to with a - the program, it has to consider even more damaging sanctions. i do think that the sanctions make iran rethink its policy is quite a bit, and potentially within the iranian government where you have the revolutionary guard officers involved in the economy hurt by sanctions and pressure the supreme leader. also i think the sanctions have contained iran if they develop a nuclear weapons capability it would be much weaker state and wouldn't be able to project power in the middle east as well, and sanctions finally show other countries who are thinking of violating the nonproliferation regime that our cost associated, so if iran decides to go nuclear and saudi arabia thinks we should obtain nuclear weapons it will look at iran and see the costs, so in that way, sanctions are beneficial. i hate to say it but there are benefits to sanctions. >> one quick thing to this discussion there was an article in the post a few weeks ago or a month ago where there was a sort of an unnamed u.s. official talking about the sanctions. what is the goal of the sanctions? i forget the exact quote, it was something like regime change and then people said regime change? knott regime change but to sort of calls pain to the government in iran, etc., and i think that is clearly what is going on here is that there is an effort to create fear in the government that the domestic political situation might be so offended by the sanctions cover causing pain across, not just the sort of on rtc officials or officials involved in the nuclear program. but you get a lot of bang for the buck out of destabilizing the government, and again there was a walk back that came we are not regime changing we are doing everything else. but i think in the maine press of the sanctions clearly is designed to cause iran to fear destabilization, and that fear of destabilization to cause iran to come to the table to attempt to get relief to where it doesn't feel the destabilization as much. >> on this end, and then we will get the other end. >> thank you. peace and group code pink, talking about the situation in compress' i wonder and particularly low and i think why can't we get more republicans that are friends of yours that kato and the libertarian side to join with some of the progressives in congress like barbara lee that put forward these bills for diplomacy? it seems like we get walter jones and maybe ron paul, but that's about it. so what can we do to strengthen some alternative to this call for the war in congress? >> i guess that's targeted at me. i don't know is the answer. their are too few libertarians in congress, so i would loudly endorse the sentiment. no, i think look, if you are looking at it from the congressional standpoint, there are lots of reasons why you would want to sign on to another sanctions bill and there's lots of reasons why you wouldn't want to sign on to the jones legal and lots of them are political reasons. secreting the countervailing pressure i think is probably the most fruitful thing to do in that regard although it is a tough hill to climb. >> on this side? >> david eisenberg, the question is addressed to mr. logan, it is the only viable alternative in the military attacks and nonstarter for reasons that won't work. but i would ask you to assess -- it would seem to constraint on effective diplomacy's and part restrained by domestic political opposition, and i would ask you for your assessment of how seriously how much of an impediment as the current political opposition from the neoconservative and other elements to the administration and note in the news this morning it seems mitt romney is setting the terms to the obama administration and focus its critique of foreign policy. challenging mike tyson but i would appreciate your assessment. barbara? >> sure. it's to the apec convention where he pointed out the only way you can actually get a country to not build nuclear weapons decide not to build nuclear weapons if there is no other permanent way to start nuclear proliferation that is a key point. he's basically saying we have sanctions, we have other tools but ultimately it's going to have to be a decision of the government. he was saying in effect there is no military solution to the nuclear program even while he showed all options remain on the table. that's very useful, but we have seen mitt romney and others apart from ron paul from beating the drum for an even more aggressive posture toward iran to that of the obama administration. i think it's going to be very hard to get anything accomplished before the election in terms of something the would require u.s. concessions. i think that is just a fact. the best we can hope for is to start the process, and if the iranians can simply slow the program at this point cannot continue to do more and more provocative things, one of the problems we have had is they keep sticking a finger in our life with an announcement after another. was in january they announced they were starting to enrich uranium to 20%. and this is already crossed the red line to be honest. this is what israel fears most. so if the iranians can be sensitive enough to the u.s. politics, which is a big leap, but if they can be and if they can simply restrain themselves so that the next report is not so alarming, i think we will buy enough time with talks to get through our elections. i would hope your be able to be more proactive on this. stomach first there's an article in the foreign policy and the last issue y carvel brooch and ed gillespie that said don't believe all this business not carrying about the foreign policy in this election, they should really go all in on the foreign policy critique of obama. i would be very werries about taking political advice about how to use foreign policy. it looked pretty good in 2004 and it didn't look so good after that. so there was a lot of discussion about this article, and i think that mitt romney appears to be taking the advice to try to get the foreign policy critique going. what's interesting is obama tried to go back by saying all these people are complaining about what i'm doing. why don't you tell me what you plan to do. if you want to have a war with iran and i think that he's thinking on my idea there is a little bit of the syndrome floating about. they don't like iran, they don't like the idea of iran having the bomb but if it comes to define the elected president i promise we will have a war with iran, that is a different political calculation so there's lots of handweaving and table pounding and apologizing for america and all the sort of atmospheric stuff but obama appears to want to do is have the precise policy discussion. so though war. and that is how she can carry you back. whether that will work i don't know but that is the order of battle as i see it. >> right there and then i will get some in the back. it's harder to see in the auditorium because the lights are really bright. >> milton at the international center for terrorism studies to read in going for a diplomatic solution, how do you deal with the iaea's persistent demand for answers to its questions about the military dimensions of iran's program. >> can you take that one? >> right now the iaea is seeking to get action on the military site where they think in this container which is in a shack that iran may have addressed to the trigger for the nuclear weapon and may have used uranium in doing it so you have a kind of line in the sand being drawn to, you have a confrontation which could play big in the june report. that said i don't think any of this will impact the process and i've been told that for many people in the p5 plus one and the reason for that is the first of all it's not news that iran is not cooperating, it's not new that iran is hiding the nuclear work in the iaea, and i think there is a divorce between the diplomatic process, which itself is so attentive, and the investigation. so the short answer to the question is what ever happens at the iaea unless they happened to discover that iran is actively working on a bomb somewhere, it will not affect the diplomatic process and the effort. >> in the middle. please leave for the microphone. >> ayaan ray mcgovern from the veteran intelligence professionals for sanity. >> please speak up. >> i see a kind of surreal aspect to this discussion. there are two elephants in the room that are either referred to by euphemisms one is the euphemism domestic political considerations what is meant by that is the lobby as the president's intention to march. member to are the facts and this is my question. it is widely recognized not only by the u.s. intelligence committee but by the israeli community intelligence community, and by both defense ministers that iran is not working on a nuclear weapon. though its phrase is iran has not yet decided to work on a weapon. so english tells me that says they are not working on a nuclear weapon and now we have all this rhetoric we have to stop them from doing coming and if they are not working on a nuclear weapon how we stop them from not working on a nuclear weapon? the last thing here is the defense minister of israel gave an interview on the 18th of january she was asked do you agree with the american assessment that iran has not yet decided to give a nuclear weapon he said yes, next question, how soon could they get it and he said it doesn't matter. it doesn't matter because the but have to throw the iata out, and when they do that come back and ask and i will make an assessment. what are we doing here? foot is the premise on the nuclear weapon? we have to stop them from not working on the nuclear weapon. >> i wanted to pick up this is something i mounted ask about because i think you raised it. hauer significant is it that at the time of the impact convention, president obama clarified the objection of u.s. policy is to prevent a weapon as opposed to the weapons capability and how significant is it also, again, this plants to the point of the congress's language and other sanctions and other measures is very different. what is going on here? >> for the questioner i don't think obama is marching in lockstep, and i think this distinction that he made is crucial. iran already has a nuclear weapons capability that it has scientists how to build a bomb and the enough enriched uranium to make me be four or five nuclear weapons if they decided to do so it could make a device put it in a suitcase. it's a meaningless term to talk but nuclear weapons capability even that is the term that they've been throwing around and apec has been turning around for years and congress continues to grow around in the current resolution and what obama said that apec netanyahu picked up the same language afterwards and refer to the nuclear weapon, not the nuclear weapons capabilities of that's the victory in terms of clarity as long as it doesn't build a nuclear weapon and it doesn't have to face the threat of military action from the united states. there's a distinction the tricky but the and the weapon is absolutely crucial and it's a big difference between the united states and israel iran is developing what they are not ready to break out and nuclear weapon. they don't want to make one weapon. iran was discovered in 2003 hiding two decades of the secret much rework and especially before 2003 a whole range of activities it big as the question why are they doing these things, and when iran was both unable to answer those questions and the more activities came up, that's when the investigation began. and iran hasn't cooperated with the investigation, so there is no smoking gun iran seeks in the nuclear weapon and the united states says they haven't made the decision to make a weapon, and they may have stopped the weaponization work in 2003 that iran has never held up to the work they were doing before 2003 in which they feel they were doing after 2003. so there are legitimate questions about iran's intentions. the capability that they are able to amass is legal under the non-proliferation treaty. the great concern of israel is they will advance on several fronts with enrichment, with technology for missiles, technology for possibly weapon rising, and it's at that point they put all their ducks in a row and that they would do this so called breakout and would be too late to stop them. so that's the difference. one thing to note about obama, president bush were always say it is unacceptable to have a nuclear weapon. the is very deliberately changed that language to say they will prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon. so you have a shifting field where it's hard to define what's going on. the administration staked out a position that's more forceful than the bush administration. the israelis are very uncomfortable with the definition of what to do and we have to see how it develops. sprigg i think the difference is portrayed as the nuclear program. israel has a small country in a very tough neighborhood surrounded by the allies including hezbollah and hamas become potentially even one nuclear weapon or even here on's ki devotees produce that as seen by a lot of the israelis as an existential threat. there are israelis who don't believe is an existential threat so even within israel, there are a lot of differences. the iranian nuclear question, but the top leadership including the prime minister netanyahu and the defense minister ehud barak have this vision that the n have this vision that the nuclear iran is very dangerous. whereas i would argue all of these now want even an iranian nuclear weapons capability that is better able. its interests are not as at stake as the israeli interests on the issue. and president obama has stated that the containment is not his policy, but he is also going for the reelection and the policies change after we are elected so there's a possibility even that the united states could move towards the containment in iran, and i don't think this is something the israelis want, and not just israel use the the other allies in the least, especially the arab countries and the persian gulf. >> time for two more questions. on this side i have two folks right there. keep your hand up high. there you go. arms control association. i agree with the assessment of the skill of obama's handling of the pressure in march but you ended up making a clear promise that if iran moved to acquire nuclear weapons he would respond with military action which is in essence a full throated endorsement of george w. bush, tussauds into military doctrine that prevented the attack. my question is how is that heard in tehran, does it make a difference and confirm what they always thought or does it make them think that they better get organized and moved to the nuclear weapons as a deterrent? >> one of the arguments is that we have to present a realistic military option to work in iran that if there is no military threat that iran would not come to the table. i think actually looking at the iranian nuclear program despite the security and fear of the united states to the mother terrie capabilities. so, i don't think that it's about attacking the facilities by the united states or israel is productive. you can argue that that threat actually may compel iran to weapon is the program and the future even i think sanctions we don't entirely know if they will have the effect from ebonizing. it could get to the point if the regime feels that it's in peril it could see the nuclear weapons capability as a solution, so the threats when it comes to iran has a limited effect. they are already under the impression that it's by the united states and israel i think we are reiterating that constantly does not necessarily productive. >> last question. do you have a question? time for one must question their. >> from the government for presentation today in the united states. mauney question is particularly directed at the sanctions and further squeeze on iran would do you see here on doing particularly in iran specifically to pushback? do you see iran taking it out on the u.s. and we're iran becomes a battlefield and a proxy war happens. >> how would iran react to the sanctions regionally? >> iran is reacting to the policy overall in the region not just specifically on sanctions we've to the entire policy towards iran, iran is influential in iraq and it's helping the u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan without maintaining a permanent presence in afghanistan. iran is very much against any sort of status of forces agreement between the united states and the afghan government and its exerting a lot of pressure in afghanistan including arming the taliban so there are ways that iran can exercise its power and there have been reports recently that iran is helping rebels in yemen in the north and potentially al qaeda, and this is just not meant for the united states. it's also signaled to saudia arabia supporting the u.s. sanctions regime against iran. and again, looking at the sanctions and the drawbacks, one of the drawbacks there are things iran can do in the region to counter u.s. interest when it is faced by sanctions and a military attack and despite the loss of influence of the very powerful actor and the region the fact that iran has threatened to close the strait of hormuz and is in itself an act of deterrence and retaliation oil prices have gone up and this is iran's we have saying if the united states hertz ireton's economy, iran can also hurt the u.s. economy. and of course it's not on the same scale. the economy is being hurt much more with there are things iran can do to retaliate and that is why the military option is not really a solution because the potential conflict in the middle east with iran would be very messy and could take years to come to an end basically. >> i think that particularly the regime and syria goes down that iraq and afghanistan will both become major battlegrounds between the united states and iran between saudi arabia and iran. iraq is not in a good state. nobody really talks about it but there's still bombs going off and so on. and iraq and afghanistan are the easiest places obviously for iran to play because of their long borders. so this is a reason against the military option to get something we should be aware of as we go forward. islamic please think me in attending our panelists. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> four >> freakin' please feel free to take seats in the event there is anybody outside that is not aware there are seats, there are. please feel free to come and take them. better to watch it live than on tv even if it is and hd. for those of you that are just getting here, i perish the thought he would have missed the first panel but i'm just in logan, the director of the foreign policy studies here a cato and we are very pleased to have our second panel on the choices facing the united states and indeed the world. should diplomacy fail in the medium-term and long-term or otherwise to prevent a nuclear arising iran. we have a very diverse panel. we pride ourselves on trying to get people who vigorously disagree, several leavitt interestingly, together and i think we will fulfil that mandate today. as chris did with the first panel, i'm going to just introduced the speakers in the order in which they will speak and then taking place in the audience and sit back and watch the fireworks. to begin with the first speaker and assistant professor of government at georgetown university and nuclear security fellow at the council on foreign relations. he's worked as a strategist and a word of the office of secretary defence award for outstanding achievement on his work on deterring terrorism. he's the author of exporting the bomb technology transfer and spread of nuclear weapons, for which we had an agent last year if i remember correctly. it was very good, and a number of other books including a handbook of national legislatures, the global survey and he is the co-editor i should say of the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. his articles have been published in the american political science review, compared of strategy. you may have heard there was a piece of foreign affairs committee or international organization, journal's conflict resolution, perspectives on politics and a bunch of new republic come small street journal's, etc. tuck triet security studies as well. commentary has been a feature on many broadcast outlets. our second speaker is nuno monteiro, the assistant professor of political science at yale university, a research fellow at the whitney and betty mcclellan study for international and area studies and a member of the scientific cowslip the portuguese international relations institute. .. >> in addition to his position heading up the fpi, he is a member of the double i double at. he is a member of the council on foreign relations. he is a writer for several periodicals as well. last, but not least, is josh rover. he is associate professor of strategy and policy at the u.s. naval war college and a review editor for the journal of strategic studies. he previously taught at clark university, holy cross, and williams college. he is an author about national security and the politics of intelligence. he also contributed an essay after proliferation about merging nuclear powers to a book titled power, ambition, and the ultimate weapon. he has written about politics and strategy, proliferation and deterrence. he also completed a post- doctorate fellowship at williams college. that establishes and bona fides everyone on the panel to discuss military options, containment options, squared off against nuclear arising i ran. i will turn the podium over. >> thank you very much for the introduction. it is a pleasure to be here at cato institute. i was just here a year ago talking bout my last book, and it was in the old auditorium. this is really a beautiful auditorium. as justin said, we are here to talk about iran's nuclear program. it is one agreement that runs program poses the greatest national security challenge united states, and deciding on how to deal it is the most important issue facing the government today. as i see it, there are only three ways that this issue is going to be resolved. first, we could get some kind of settlement with iran. second, we could ask for [inaudible], and third come up we could take action to prevent them from acquiring military weapons. the settlement would be ideal if we can get it. there is good reason to believe that we cannot. in fact, it is really hard to imagine any overlap with iran's supreme leader on the regiment program, and we will simultaneous assurer washington and the community that iran is no longer a threat. as we all know, the u.s. and iran are returning to the negotiating table. iran has said publicly that they are unwilling to discuss the nuclear enrichment program. when asked about the prospects for diplomatic settlement, the only hope he could provide was maybe miracles happen. so if diplomacy fails, as i think it is likely to, that means the united states is going to face this difficult decision between taking action on iran. iran poses a threat to the united states, but there would still be many threats that would be difficult to address. a nuclear iran would lead to further proliferation in the region. i run itself would become a nuclear supplier, transfer, and enrichment supplier to adversaries around the globe. a nuclear iran would be aggressive. right now they restrain their foreign policy because it prevents military action from the u.s. or israel. we may have to push further -- and if i run as throwing its weight around more in the region, the middle east could be more crisis drawn with a nuclear iran. if you have a nuclear iran, a nuclear israel and other states, any one of these crises could spiral out of control and result in a nuclear exchange. i don't think iran would intentionally launch a war, given a nuclear polar environment, i think that there are a lot of possibilities for accidental exchange. given the small size of israel, a nuclear exchange involving israel could very well mean the end of the state of israel. once iran has this was capable of reaching the east coast of the united states, which experts estimate could be in five years, one of these crises could result in an exchange on the united states. these are serious threats that the united states would have to deal with. as long as i run existed as a student had nuclear weapons, and this could be years, decades or longer. as president obama said, a nuclear iran is acceptable. that leaves us with one option, the military option. it is not an attractive one, and there are many downside risks, but it is better than the alternative. a u.s. military strike could almost certain to store them. this could set iran's program back. it is difficult to estimate with certainty, but i estimate it would set the program back between three and 10 years. this would create a lot of time for something to happen where i run ends up without nuclear weapons. there is an upside to a strike. there are also downsides to military action. but i think that these risks are often exaggerated and are not quite as severe as many people believe. the u.s. will put in the strategy to mitigate the risks. the most obvious cost of military action would be iranian retaliation. but it is important to understand that iran doesn't have a strong conventional military. rather then develop asymmetric military options, iran's military options after a strike is to support terrorists and proxy attacks, to launch listed missiles, and to cause problems in the persian gulf up to and including harassment. we have to think what would iran do? we have to understand that they would have their own strategic dilemma after a strike. on one hand, they would want to strike back, on the other hand, the primary goal is to continue to exist. they are not going to want to pick a fight with the united states, the one country on earth that could very well start a conflict that would lead to the end of the iranian military, the and of the regime. iran is certainly going to go for a calibrated response. if they don't strike back hard enough, they will lose their head. i think that the united states can play on those fears of iran. the united states can put in place a clear deterrent strategy and communicate to iran before, during, and after that we are only interested in the key nuclear facilities. we are not interested in overthrowing the regime. i think by making that clear, we can prevent iran from crossing certain red lines, such as conducting major terrorist attacks in the united states are using chemical and biological weapons. and make it clear to iran that we would be willing to engage in a bigger fight, but if they stop short of that, we would be happy to trade the nuclear program for a kind of retaliation. in sum, if diplomacy and sanctions fail, and if the united states finds itself choosing between a strike, the point if we have to make that decision, if iran begins in reaching above the 20% is enriching now and will start enriching towards 90% it will need for nuclear weapons, if the united states finds itself in that position, i think we should work to build an international coalition, conduct a surgical strike on the facilities, will back and absorb iranian retaliation, and quickly de- escalate the crisis. again, it is not an attractive option, but it is better than the alternative of living with the dangers of a nuclear iran for decades. thank you. >> [applause] >> thank you. i will take the opposite position, as you may imagine. i'm going to talk about three things. the first is what are the possible and things of all these situations with chiron. and what would be the results of us attacking run. what would be the results of attacking them? i think there is a little bit of difference between my view and matthew. i agree with him that the sentiments of grand bargain are unlikely, but i don't think that the other two options are strike or else. their other persuasive powers for them not to have a weapons. it makes this ending less likely. the more that we antagonize chiron, the less likely they will be too be persuaded sufficiently. the more likely they will weapon eyes india. on the consequences of not attacking iran, there are three consequences that matt mentioned. one is emboldened and about what they would do if they get the weapons. the second one is a nuclear cascade in the middle east. the final one is the likelihood of accidental exchange to expiration to the nuclear level of a future crisis in the middle east. the first one, emboldening, it is important to note first of all that it depends on the weaponization of the iranian nuclear program. emboldened would have been if iran weapon eyes the nuclear capability. it is hard to figure out how they would be emboldened internationally. even if access is a weapon, the key question to ask, and i haven't seen a good answer yet, what are the actions the iranians would like to take that would currently be thrilling that we would no longer be able to enter if they acquire nuclear weapons? what is it that iran wants to do today but they could do in the future if they had weapons? i have not seen a good answer to this question. does it point to more advanced weapons to hezbollah? does it point to attacks on the u.s. homeland? all of these actions would threaten when they possessed the weapons. the argument could be made if they particularly had nuclear weapons. we are not in the habit of attacking or launching attacks on non-nuclear states. if i run consists on weapon i think, it is possible that they would suffer a devastating nuclear strike i don't think if the weapons will change the regimes ability to survive and i run to ability to prevail at against in israel and u.s. coalition. i don't know which of the actions that iran would like to take. i don't know which of those it would take in the future as a result of having nuclear weapons that would, in fact, create serious trouble for israel and the u.s., while at the same time not risking the survival of the iranian regime. this question of emboldened, i would like to know what i think is internal contradiction. which is if we strike i run preventively, we can expect them to be particularly restrained in their response. we can tell them we are only going after the nuclear program, so don't go overboard in your reactions. matt expect them to react with grated strength. there is a magic potion affect in which they become unrestrained will. it changes their preferences in a way in which they become a grave threat to international stability, where if we attack them, they will actually be okay with it and will take a strike on the crown jewel of their regime with aplomb and without going overboard. you have to have it one way or the other, you can't have it both ways. trying to have it both ways -- the possibility of having it both ways means that an attack cannot be limited because the iranians would retaliate in mass, or it is not necessary. if the iranians are restrained that they would not retaliate against an attack, they are likely to also be restrained once they possessed nuclear weapons. it is unlikely that it is possible to have both a strike and an unnecessary strike. the second point i would like to talk about in terms of consequences of a nuclear iran, is it could get a nuclear cascade. this is in the three effects of not striking a run. the one that is more likely to obtain, even at the run acquires the latest capabilities. even if iran only has limited capabilities, it would be that likely other states would follow suit. we are talking about iraq, saudi arabia, and turkey. the cascade up liberation. i would like to note a couple things. first, the u.s. has existing security assurances visiting the states based on current capabilities without the need to spend more money than we are already spending. that we give these allied legal incentive to neutralize. i was looking at the history of the nuclear era. there is no example of a u.s. ally on which the u.s. exerted significant pressure against weaponizing. the u.s. has been successful in preventing its allies from proliferating. the u.s. was not consistently putting pressure on pakistan much to the contrary. egypt and saudi arabia are among the greatest recipients of u.s. military support. turkey is the second-largest and is under the u.s. a bell of security. they are under the grill of security. >> it is unlikely, in my view, that even i run and weaponization would result in a nuclear cascade. the rocket look is that the u.s. is consistent and making sure they don't acquire nuclear weapons. the third point that matt makes would be the possibility of accidental escalation. as in the case with emboldening, this would require weaponization. we have to figure out how that would lead to escalation in the context of the crime because you actually need weapons to escalate the crisis. even if you have one, the argument that matt makes is that iran and the u.s. and iran and israel lacked the comedic asian channels and assurances that the u.s. and soviet union had in the cold war that allows us to ask weight. i would like to know, for instance, that during the cold war it was before we had robust communication channels with the soviets. it was before the soviets had a long experience managing large arsenals. they had a large arsenal during the crisis. it is unclear whether they had retaliation capabilities, still, they backed down. we have actually -- we can use history to make the opposite point. i'd like to argue that there is no historical evidence that would lead you to believe that escalation is a likely then. even in relations between pakistan and india, we have never seen a crisis or seen them escalate to nuclear weapons. let me talk a little more briefly about what would happen if we attack iran. i have four points to make that differ from what proponents believe. the first point is that an attack would be costly far more than it was expected. the second point is that it would not be comparable with syria, this is an analogy that makes no sense. we were talking a couple of weeks of attacks. in fact, if you look in the press, it it is an attack that is likely to stretch is really capabilities. well, israel is not a weak country, conventionally. we are not talking about one strike him one day. we are talking about a couple weeks or months of bombing, which is far more costly and far more likely to generate a reaction from iran. the second point is that the result of attacking iran, an attack would not end a program. it would not delay program. we disagree on the assessments for how many years, but we agree with the assessment that the program would not be ended. based on historical experience we have, if we know anything that came out from iraq, he was redoubled in his efforts to gain nuclear weapons. containment, the sanctions regime, would be the aftermath of an attack. we would need to continue effort to persuade iran not to weapon eyes so an attack is not the end point. at the same time, an attack would decrease the likelihood that we would be able to assemble the national coalition that would be able to put containment or containment regime in place. but if we attack, and makes it harder to contain iraq, and therefore, less likely that iran would i run would be persuaded to not weapon eyes its nuclear program. at the same time, it would be -- and this is the third point, it's result would be boosted by an attack. the perception that it requires a nuclear capability to defend itself from what it is -- what is a very concrete stretch because they have just been attacked. it would be even less likely that we would be able to persuade them not to weapon weaponize. i >> the final consequence of an attack is that the likely end game would become weaponization. it is less likely that we would be able to pursue and persuade iran not to attack. i would like to conclude and say very quickly that we should heed the lessons of north korea and nuclear station here. the u.s. was greatly concerned with the aftermath of a north korean bomb, but we haven't seen emboldened and. we certainly have not seen a nuclear cascade. the u.s. has been able to maintain assurances to japan, south korea preventing a cascade. we have not seen an escalation since a couple years ago. we haven't seen any escalation in north korea. the effects are modeled to look at that template than the possibility of a strike. thank you. >> [applause] >> i want to thank cato institute for inviting me. i often collaborate on a variety of issues, so i appreciate being able to air a diverse set of viewpoints. i want to say up front that i am in a opposition because i have been on at least one other panel with matt. i agree with certain aspects of his argument. i find myself agreeing with monteiro nuno, and my other colleagues on some aspects too. i think we need to remember that this is not something that just comes upon the national scene because of a problem that has been a slow motion train wreck unfolding in front of our eyes and over more than the last decade. i have seen six years at the u.n. security council has been dealing with by ron nuclear file. if you look come as the previous panel discussed, i think it is fairly clear that engagement, the diplomatic approach is not working. we will have another meeting in further weeks, but i don't have high hopes that we will come to terms with iranian negotiators. i don't think sanctions have had the desired impact. they have not changed the regime's stance on its nuclear program. thus, i end up where matters. but we need to consider military options. let me just say up front, i think one thing, we have a range of viewpoints being presented but let's not fool ourselves. even when the obama administration staked out its position, the obama administration r&d narrowed its set of options. president obama has said clearly in its policy. i think it is going to be difficult for him. i don't think he has any interest in shifting the approach even if it comes to that decision that he needs to make if he is reelected to take a military option. where i differ with matt is that i don't think a limited strike is the answer. the reason is -- and this is also why i have concerns about containment, because i think we are overlooking the fact it is the nature of the regime that we are facing right now. it is not just the nuclear activity, it is a broader set of issues. even if we could get to the point of some serious discussion with the current regime in iran, it would be very difficult to take anything seriously that they agree to and believe that we could trust them, given their past about their nuclear activities. just to remind everyone, this is bom3 p$ seprogrlroga!ea aplatt >> north korea has proliferated their technology. it has been an extensive polar crater of missile technology. these are all things we would need to be concerned about if we had an iranian regime with nuclear weapons. getting beyond the containment discussion, when you look at the military option, it certainly is not a good option. if we were truly serious about taking military action, the time to strike was probably a number of years ago when the program was much smaller, less spread out, and would have been easier to destroy with a limited strike that matt advocates. also, i agree with monteiro nuno, it is a very different program from iraq's program in the 1980s or the syrian program that the israelis destroyed good today i read a bloomberg news article about a new crs report about a variety of centrifuge workshops. where the component parts are produced and how they are dispersed. we don't know the locations of all of those facilities. it would be very difficult to take out in a limited strike. what i advocate is a limited -- a more enhanced strike. any u.s. military option would involve taking out air defense capabilities. it would probably go after some missile strikes and naval facilities to help prevent an attack. if this operation is being carried out and will last several weeks, why not extend the target to go after command and control elements, to go after elements of regime oppression that have been used against the iranian people, and basically try to create a face for the opposition to raise up. it ramps up the more expensive version of what we did in libya, in hopes that we can help move the country towards some kind of regime change. regime change would honestly be it occurred from within. i think that is the hope of a lot of us, but i think the problem is that iran's political -- internal political development, -- odyssey we do not have enough time for way to the iranians to change the regime. i will end by saying that the downside of containment is clear. the cost are incredibly significant of containment. i think the costs outweigh those of any military strike. i do think a limited strike has some serious downsides. i think if we go down the path in considering military option, we need to remember that it is the regime that is the issue, not just the nuclear program [applause] >> thank you very much. i would like to thank justin logan for organizing and applaud him for his impeccable sense of timing. there is a strong likelihood that israel will strike iran in april, may, or june. here we are on march 30. >> if israel strikes, we have a a lot of important questions to ask. how might i run respond, which could help or hinder u.s. efforts to deter iran in the future. the bottom line is that deterring a nuclear iran is a relatively straight forward proposition. but to do so after it has been hit with a delayed strike, especially from israel, will make it much harder in the future. it is the reason why bombing is a bad idea. a little bit theory is necessary to explain my argument. iran is the latest example of a long-standing problem that has had to deal with an emerging nuclear power. scholars and observers have worried a lot about nuclear powers for a number of reasons. they had incomplete and in mature security protocols. we are not sure they can be reliable custodians. they have uncertain command and control arrangements. new nuclear powers are usually flushed with nationalism. achieving the threshold is a moment of intense pride. nationalism can be a dangerous animal. nuclear powers tend to overestimate the benefits of having a nuclear arsenal. they think, wow, we can do a lot of things with these newfound strengths. actually, they cannot do that much with nuclear weapons. these weapons have very little use beyond basic deterrence, and it takes nuclear powers to sometimes learn that. but the learning process can be dangerous. this is one of the reasons why we worry about them. up to now, the debate about how to deter an emerging power is whether or not they are rational. deterrence theorists say you have to do say it's an irrational adversaries who outweighs benefit costs. as jamie was saying, it is such that it does not weigh cost and benefits that we wait costs and benefits. it is motivated by ideology, religious extremism, and they might be able and willing to take extraordinary risks and that is not rational. i think this is an important question of rationality. if you really want to think about how to deter a country like iran, you have to ask what exactly are you trying to deter? what kinds of threatening action are we really troubled by? there were four. first, we would like to deter a rapid expansion of the nuclear program. if iran achieves some modest nuclear arsenal, we would not be happy with that, but we would not want it to go and exacerbate all of the concerns that i just mentioned. we would be especially concerned if they did it covertly. best case scenario is if they were to expand slowly and transparently. that we could live with, if they do it quickly and opaquely. we would be very nervous. second, the transfer to third parties. in the case of iran, we are concerned with the transfer of nuclear materials to terrorist groups, hezbollah. we would like to deter the use of nuclear weapons for cover of conventional weapons. the notion that iran would be emboldened by having nuclear weapons, it would be more likely to take conventional risks because it would be confident that we would not intervene. they would be emboldened to act out convention mainly or increase their support. finally, we would like to deter iran from the using nuclear weapons for war. this is the easy thing to deter because this is the only thing we can credibly threaten them with our own nuclear arsenal. no one would believe us if we say we are threatening to nuke you if you do something conventionally. it just would not be credible at all. but we can credibly threaten to respond in time in response to a nuclear attack. on the other hand, some observers worry that the run is simply not rational. they are not motivated by old fashion cold war calculation and benefit. in the summer 2006, for instance, or nard lewis wrote in "the wall street journal", that according to his reading of islamic text, and i quote here, august 27, 2006, might well be deemed an appropriate date for the dick and being of israel and, the world he went back to the tax and said this might be the end of the world. it could have an apocalyptic notion. it did not happen. we made it to august 23, 2006. but the sense of this regime is not rational, it continues to linger. they are insensitive to our deterrent threats. i think this is wrong. i think that we can deter a nuclear iran. i think we can deter all of the threatening actions that i laid out earlier. it will take time, patience, it will take a lot of hard not in hard work, but it is a relatively straightforward problem. we have done in deterrence in the past. we can do it again with iran today. we can deter iran from rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities. some iranian leaders, like president tran one, exceeded rhetoric. but other iranian leaders treat others with disdain. a lot of leaders are worried about respect. if we carefully and continually promised them that rapid expansion of their nuclear efforts won't lead to international opprobrium, they might slow down. in fact, i think it is likely that they will slow down. second, we can deter transfer to terrorists. one way we can do this is by just disabusing iran's weapons. we can convince them that they can't do it. if a nuclear blast went off in israel over the united states, who would we immediately looked at? without question, without hesitation, iran would be number one if not number two -- pakistan would be number two. we have actually made some pretty substantial development in nuclear forensics. that is the ability to trace the material back to its origin. they are is the date of and debate among physicists. planting a seed of doubt in their minds to dispel the notion that they can anonymously provide. third, we can be confident about covering conventional aggression. one, iran's capabilities are pathetic. they have no power projection capabilities of any kind. they have decaying conventional capabilities, the reliance on 1970s hardware that they purchased under the former regime. they basically sacrifice spending on their air force because they know they can't keep up. their service is not very capable at all. iran can cause some problems. they can lash out a little bit, but they can't want anything like a sustained operation. especially not against israel or the united states. i think that we exaggerate this concern to what about the danger that they increase their support for proxy actions? i think that this concern is overblown. as a lot of observers have pointed out, iran's history with proxy has been tepid at times. when they feel heat from the international community, they pull back from them. i do not know why that would change just because they had a new arsenal of weapons. they would still respond to heat, i think. there is no obvious reason why not. finally comes the united states -- this is the one case where we can make a serious and not ambiguous threat of surprise will. unfortunately, deterrence is not only possible, but it is likely. it will get a lot harder it is relaunches and the in the attack. >> in the aftermath of a strike on a nuclear complex, iran will have gigantic capabilities to expand its program. they will basically mimic iraq after 1981. this will become more covert and hard to deal with. i run my believe that to reduce its vulnerability, better to take this step to haslett. the aftermath of the strike will be harder to deter as cover, civilly because it will be harder to maintain an international coalition to block iranian expansion. especially among the regional action. they will face significant pressure to move away from the united states, not towards them. finally, and most worrisome, it will be harder to deter the use of nuclear weapons in war. deterring the use of weapons will require two things. it requires surprising them and assurance. there has to be an assurance that if you restrain yourself, we are not going to hate you anyway. you will not be targeted as long as you subdue yourself. it will be almost impossible to issue anything like credible assurance in the wake of a strike. i run would have no reason to believe us. i disagree with matt kroenig on this. iran would also face a serious use it or lose a problem. this is a problem that has been worked on for decades it was worried that it would suddenly lose this program, this crown jewel of its regime. crises would be very unstable. let me just finish with a couple of thoughts. we have been containing a run for a long time. we will continue to contain them whether or not our politicians face publicly. deterrence will also proceed a pace. we will continue to deter iran, and this is straightforward. the only thing we can do to undermine the quality is to attack now. i yield [applause] thank you all for your contributions. matt, you let yourself some time. i want to pile on if i can. i will be the imperial moderator. that is all right. i want to clear up -- you mentioned -- i don't member how you phrased it, during your talk you mentioned that you do not think it was time to strike iran today, if some future threshold or cost, it would be. is it your position that we should strike today or when at some theoretical point in the future. particular to jamie, if it is the regime, would you savor bonding and if it had no program whatsoever? will start over there and mix it up with questions. >> thank you for the question, justin. as i said in my introductory remarks, i think that if we get to the point of a strike, at that point we should have a strike. the question is when you get to that point? is was said in the opening remarks, we could have a negotiated table. i hope some of you would join me. i do not think that is likely. when do we reach the point of decision? there are certain rituals that run across the would indicate they are going towards nuclear weapons. if we don't ask at that point, we would be forbidding our last chance. the first would be if they enriched to higher levels. right now they are enriching to 20% in order to construct nuclear weapons, they would need to enrich up to 90%. if i run enriches up to 90%, iran will have a nuclear weapon. the would be is if iran kicked out international inspectors. inspectors are on the ground inspecting facilities every week and reporting reports every few weeks. if they take out the inspectors, that would be evidence that they were up to no good. it would be another red line that they crossed and we should take military action. some other things that i think that would cause me concern, let me back up. right now experts estimate that up or run made the decision today to enrich the 90%, they could have enough material in about four months for its first weapon. they have to increase their centrifuges, increase their stockpiles. as birds indicate -- experts indicate that the time line might shrink by one month. at some point, though sonogram will take the military option off the table. i think there are some other advantages. the difficulty there is that the united states would do it very different than israel what if they took military action. i don't think the united states would do that. i think he would work to build an international law to build an international coalition. i think it is easier to sell these kind of clear, bright red lines. especially to an international audience. >> on the question of whether the u.s. should strike now, i think i said in my remarks. this all would've been easier and the options would've been better if this would've been done years ago. the longer we wait, the more difficult the military option becomes. having said that, i do think that it is worth seeing what happens during this next round of talks in mid april. i said in my remarks that i don't have a lot of high hopes. i don't think the iranian regime is in a situation where they were willing to accept the most basic offers. but i do think that that probably need to play itself out. i am also in favor of having any additional sanctions as much as possible in the coming months. i do think the obama administration believes this is an issue for 2013, not for 2012 and i have some fundamental concerns with how they are going about making that assessment. i think that the u.s. intelligence community has over learned lessons of the intelligence debacle. they are overly cautious in their assessments. this whole notion that obama administration officials have laid out in the public domain that they are willing to let iran get to the nuclear threshold and then just wait for them to make that final political decision before action would be taken as very dangerous. i don't know that the intelligence community in the u.s. would ever know that the supreme leather has given the go-ahead. the various elements of iran's capabilities. we're talking about some accounts in a matter of months if that decision was made. that is a very dangerous situation to get into. one thing i will say in conclusion about an israeli strike, i do not think it is ideal from the u.s. perspective. i do have some concerns that israel feels if they feel that they do not have enough assurance from this administration, the united states will likely get dragon. if it comes down to the fact that israel will take action in the coming months, i would much rather see the united states take action rather than israel. i do think that we are going to see less -- we will deal less with the consequences and actions. i do think israel is not -- if they were not a player in this situation, we could wait longer. i do think the ability might encourage the u.s. >> i want to jump in and address a couple of points that jamie made about the proliferation cascade. i was pleased to see that you agree that we can debate that emboldened and is likely the effect. your major concern is a nuclear cascade. the first point was that the u.s. would be unwilling -- willing to extend the umbra lot to soldering to at this point we don't need to extend that assurance to our allies in order to deter the nuclear station and supplies to the level that we have done in the past the supply of arms is traditionally reassuring. that is enough for our allies to nuclear rice -- i just don't see any evidence that the north koreans have since acquired nuclear weapons. i also don't think the iranian regime -- but the question is have they become emboldened. one more point, and i will conclude on this. it is striking to realize -- it is interesting to realize that the states we fear that will nuclear -- nuclear, they can count on your support over iran. they did not against this day, that is far more threatening for them then i run i run. >> the microphone is available for all. please ask your shortest, smartest question. gentleman with his hand up, yes, that was you. >> fundamental to any formulation and strategy in connection between ends and means, your advocacy of a strike has been clear, but you seem to put it as creating space in the future for something to happen. which doesn't seem a very concrete goal. you don't go to war for war for that. how do you respond to that? >> is a good question. i think the connection means it is pretty clear there are four facilities that they are operating that we are getting them to shut down. if they are unwilling to shut it down if we bomb those facilities, they will be shut down. that is the ends and means calculation. if what you are getting at is that there is no guarantee that iran will never develop nuclear weapons, that is not right. if we sit back while they build weapons, we will be guaranteed that they have weapons. a strike at a minimum imposes a significant delay. i think there are a lot of reasons to believe that this delay could become permanent. iran might give up. most people assume that they will be back on friday rebuilding the program. that is possible. i think it is also possible that they would give up. are we going to go through another decade of rebuilding this expensive nuclear infrastructure only to invite a future attack we met maybe they would decide not to. i think the time is valuable in and of itself. we need to face all these threats, i think most people on the panel agreed. i would much rather face them in 10 years the next year. third, i think that there is a lot -- there is a lot that can happen in that three to 10 year window. it is possible to create further diplomacy, a new government might have a different policy to create space for this government to give up the program. fourth, and finally, it changes the bargaining space. in some ways i think a strike could make diplomacy harder. in other ways, it could make it easier. if i was the supreme leader, i would be much more willing to trade away the program then one that was in months ready to deliver a nuclear weapon. >> could the united states restrain israel if israel is determined to abort iran's nuclear program, if so, could that possibly be used as a bargaining chip in american negotiations with them? >> no and no. >> anyone else care to get in on this? >> all right, we will go to next western. >> let's go back there. >> allright. >> john mueller. i have lived long enough to see spats with other countries. i would like to ask them to suggest any kind of careless. one of them with a parallel with china in 1964. then to debate they were trying to debate and determined they were not doing that. they did get their weapons. what has happened since that time is that they built fewer than they could. they had a no first use policy and not much of anything. my question is, what experience in the past makes you think proliferation would be dangerous when it seems to have been allegedly a dangerous of our? >> would they strangle a baby in the cradle? .. nuclear exchange, and we did come very close a number of times, and i think it's just like eve to think that if we keep claiming this over and over again more countries getting nuclear weapons and dangerous regions with real military conflict that these weapons will never be used just because they haven't been used for 50 years i think is probably wrong. >> on this point i disagree. i'm struck that we've had this discussion in the 1940's and the 1950's and 60's and 70's, we hear this again and again. that history isn't a useful precedent for understanding of the dilemmas of the times because eventually at some point it's going to go wrong. that's very fatalistic. i don't think it's right. and i do think we have a good track record with knowing how the powers behave. i will agree that in the first few years they can be unstable because they don't know the limits of their own arsenals. but over time and they realize it isn't that valuable. it doesn't get you that much coercive leverage in international negotiations or the ability to tell your rivals or anything else. so, i am not willing to toss off the standard simply because some hypothetical nightmare scenario might happen in the future. >> one thing i just want to pick up on what john said that is being overlooked by colleagues who are kind of argument in favor of deterrence, i think you can really only make that argument if the middle east does not go nuclear because i would argue that the sort of deterrent would be required in this case, if you had four or five nuclear powers in the middle east would really be groundbreaking. i just don't -- i don't think we've been through that situation before. i don't quite know how we would work and the united states and other countries in the west could really help ensure that there wouldn't be even an accidental the escalation. i mean, if you look at what is happening right now in the middle east on the conventional side, you see a series of proxy battles going on in iran and countries like saudi area throughout the region currently in syria weighing in on different sides of the conflict unfolding. so i do not know if you have multiple nuclear powers involved how traditional deterrence would actually work in that case and i don't think we want to go down that path, so there would be my main concern with the argument in this case. >> i think they would work because states would be fearing extinction. what's happening between saudi arabia and iran is a sort of low-grade nasty nibbling at the edges cold war. they don't like each other very much. they are trying to undermine one another. but if the danger is national extension, then i think the behavior will so free up. it is a clarifying logic extinction. i don't think this is unique to the west or any particular region, and it is in the middle east as an anywhere else. but again, i just point out all of these policies are based on a sequence of a nightmare scenarios. the first is that iran is not satisfied with a virtual arsenal, and i feel right now that is pretty much it's after. then it goes full nuclear. saudi arabia in the face of that commitment says we don't care. we are going to get an yoakley weapon ourselves. but in response to that, egypt will also go nuclear. there be an automatic cascade. there are a lot of skiffs in the sentence. and i am very hesitant about supporting military action on a series of ifs. >> two points, one is a general point, and i am aware of the fact for once i can't make many general pointed have to make a point. but they're seems to be the two uses of history. you can use history to say there's ten cases that went this way, so it's more likely the 11th case will go this way or you considers ten cases that went this week at this time it's different. and i think there will that is helpful this debate today are studying this and then there for the should be telling us what it is in the records and the theories we have to indicate. in all these cases including very particularly in the scholarly work they indicate it wouldn't be such a big problem. the second point i would like to make is a nuclear middle east or nuclear iran is worse than the non-nuclear middle east or iran the those are not the two scenarios that we are contemplating. the two scenarios we are contemplating are whether a strike is a better idea than acquiescing to the utilization or not. it is where the middle east is better after a strike against iran without the strike of nuclear iran with a possibility that iran will local nuclear. and i think the mechanism that jamie mentioned that derived from the nuclear iran in the middle east would be exponentially greater if we would strike. >> the cambron mission jacket in the blue shirt. >> i'm a graduate student. thank you for taking the time to speak to us today. in the previous panel you mentioned iran had the capability to currently produce for nuclear weapons, and mr. kroenig, i believe that you inferred they don't yet have the capability to produce any nuclear weapon yet but they are getting in the first one so if someone could clarify that and if this was to go forward, this was touched on before, but rather the chances that israel would go with this alone and really kind of go out and iranian strike in the face of the u.s. saying that they are not absolutely in line with supporting them? thanks. >> so where is iran today, how far away is iran and will israel go? >> according to the last quarterly report, which is very interesting and a lot of ways, iran has on the order of 109 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride which has been enriched to 19.75%. if you took another step at enriching that up to 90% which is how we judge weapons-grade, you are looking at the lower balance of one bomb, about 15 kilograms. so if they took that step, it's probably somewhere between six months and a year. i should to get that one weapon. it where the number comes from is iran has a much larger amount of lower enriched uranium which they would have to subsequently go up to 20% and then go up to 90%, and then you could do math and see how they get the weapons out of that, but i would be tough to do. the other point about weaponization is if iran wanted to break out quickly it isn't simply a matter of deciding to go to 90%. you have to do the enrichment of to 90%. you have to convert the gas back into metal which is not an easy process. you have to machine that it basically the you would need for the explosive device and presumably you would want to test it. this is not something in some case or else it's a an idle threat that we have this thing. maybe you do, maybe we don't. we didn't start caring until they tested it. so you have to go through all these steps just to get the divide. that's not something you are going to do between the iaea. that means kicking the inspectors out, leaving the npt. and there would be something that we would see our intelligence capabilities notwithstanding. there would be pretty remarkable. so, iran's behavior up until now seems to be a country that wants to be in the scientific place where they can break out if they choose in the future, but i don't think they've made that choice. they want to have that capability. you're second question was about is israel in the united states. >> i will take both of those in my colleague over here has raised this a number of times that iran is going to stop at a virtual arsenal and we can wish that were the case. i don't see any reason to believe that is the case. iran has been clear that its primary strategic goals are to continue to exist which they think that means being able to deter a major u.s. or israeli military attack, and the second goal and the strategy documents are to be the most dominant stake in the middle east. michael links think they will stop this kind of model where you have a lot of the ability to enrich the i don't think the model was going to deter the attack. i don't think the model mix to the most dominant stake in the region those our strategic goals and i take them at their word they need weapons. so i think playing it smart in terms of the way they move forward they might stop short for a while, but i think that eventually they are going to weapon nice. there's very little reason to believe they will stop at this capability. in terms of the decision, this is something that maybe didn't come out enough in the talks with the option and the u.s. options are very different. the major difference being the united states has a greater capability and much greater ability to inflict lasting damage on iran's nuclear program, so i think on balance the military option is not a good one, and not an advocate in the strike. i am an advocate of a u.s. strike because it think of the greater damage we can inflict on the balance and the benefits of we the cost. whether israel would go, the problem they face is the winner for the effective military action is rapidly closing because they have less ability to hit the underground facilities and as iran follows through on plans to do more and more, israel seized the window for effective action so i think it is likely that in the next six months or so if we don't get a deal and israel is an absolutely convinced the united states will take action if necessary leader on the trading is going to be very hard case to make that israel will take action. so i think that it's difficult to say but there's a high probability there'll be a conflict this year. >> that covers most of the points i was going to make but going back to one of the earlier questions whether the united states can prevent israel from striking in the coming months. i mean, what -- part of it is whether the israelis trust this president or a newly elected republican president to take action. but at least with this administration as much as it looks like this administration might be reelected it's going to be difficult for the current government to have a lot of confidence in president barack obama's willingness of the chips are down if they feel it's necessary command because they do have this reference the minister defense has called the zone of immunity they're worried about entering because they're limited in the military capabilities i do think there's a likelihood they will strike in the coming months. and i don't know that this administration can do more than it's already done over the recent years or the previous administrations have done to convince other wise just because i do think the assessment which seems similar to our assessment is that iran is getting increasingly close to at least have the capacity to make a final push towards nuclear weapon if it so decides. >> two quick points. one is i don't think the capability is a highly likely outcome. i think it is a low probability to which we should work and i think it is a probability that is if we strike iran. the most likely outcome is by iranian nuclear is asian. i think we can contain that. the second plant is i think israel has not only for operational reasons to strike before the summer because the window closes to success for the strike is also politically is very interesting time for them to do so because one thing that is worse for israel than in obama administration for the leadership at the end of the administration is the second term obama administration and the strike on iran during the summer puts president obama in quite a tight corner because if you support the strike and the u.s. will be dragged in one way or another. if you support the strike use those on the left and those of the center it's a very problematic situation on the point of view of the president. >> very quickly on this point, i don't know how much coercive leverage we have over israel. but just one thing to bear in mind, it's not all about president obama. president obama can change the tone or substance of his rhetoric but congress controls aid. so there is a point to remember that the president is somewhat inhibited by taking a firm stand against israel. the money is going to flow. >> more questions. let's see. somewhere in the back corner over there. yes, gentlemen. >> hi, joe storm, for market dillinger now working in corporate finance. a quick question for the interventionist -- >> a little bit louder. >> quick question for the left side of the table, intervention. [laughter] >> left, right -- >> how can we be certain that we will not be dragged into another iraq afghanistan scenario after getting involved in iraq after a strike? >> so tell me how this in this question. >> i'm certainly only advocating the campaign i think the united states military would alter the plan if it is pursuing a limited strike. so, yes, that could lead to the regime collapse and it's probably why i'm advocating it said there could be chaos and a lot of uncertainty in the aftermath. now, that does not mean that the united states would be able to be completely hands-off as we have in the case of libya for instance and never putting deutsch on the ground or there would be no international force to help to ensure some kind of stability. but i don't think that anyone -- i haven't read any argument that anybody advocating a ground invasion of iran, so i don't know how we would get dragged into an iraq or afghanistan style operation because he would consciously needed to rethink the after getting there would be a large occupying force which is certainly not what i'm advocating. >> can i ask a question -- i certainly understand the iraq and nullity. but, you know, there was a professor of oxford university who wrote a great book 15 years or so ago, 15 amol ortiz of war and he said the reason they buy on the foreign policy, what are the lessons of vietnam, what are the lessons of iraq? and here deutsch was almost always a mistake to do so because people seized on the superficial similarities and missed the underlining cases that is important. so many people use the analogy to understand iran and if you get is misleading to do so. and understand the superficial similarities there are important differences. iran is much closer to a nuclear weapon now than saddam hussein was in 2003, and we know that because the international inspectors are on the ground writing detailed reports every three months about what iran has come and again, according to the experts, according to david albright, respected nuclear expert in town about four months from having enough material for its first bomb if it makes the decision to do so. so much closer than saddam hussein must. second, the operation we are talking about is different and this is what jamie got to. the reason iraq was so expensive and so costly in the blood and treasure is because we put 100,000 troops in state for ten years. no one is talking about that kind of operation in iran, the kind of rationing talking about is bombing a kung fu key facilities and where you would need to get for those facilities so it is a limited strike depending on the retaliation could be over in days or week and not a decade long ground war. is to make a quick follow-up on what regime change but actually look like and where we would do in the aftermath. >> i'm very dubious of the regime change. the last decade has caused me to be dubious because you are talking about undoing an existing political order. no matter how odious it is and rotten, it is in place and in charge and we have procedures for doing things like making and storing fissile material. in the event of the change, those procedures would be in doubt. in that case it strikes me you can't just be happy with regime change because they have done all of this enrichment up until now and they've done all this nuclear work, that is still going to be there in the event of the regime change. would you be in favor of sending some force to say guard the key site? what is the next step after the regime collapses? >> i would think the international atomic energy agency would need to be involved. the have already have such access to certain elements of the program. i do think that when it comes to counter proliferation, this administration has taken some risks i would certainly not a dedicated in libya and we have seen a proliferation the result mostly conventional locally because it turns out the remainder of the c. w. stockpile which they have lied about to the organization for the chemical weapons was not transferred anywhere that we know of. we are going to face a challenge in syria in the coming months over the next year if there is a regime that collapses because syria's wmd capabilities are much more extensive than those of libya. and i think you are concerned about counter proliferation company to consider whether it is some sort of international force or whether it is u.s. and allied forces but yes, i think there would need to be some effort to secure sites. we can't have sites that are left open for tourists to go in and get a variety of materials. in the case of syria, the administration has not seemed willing to at least publicly talk about their options. there has been a press report or two about jordan providing troops. my guess is the scale of the problem in iran with its nuclear site and nuclear material and as well as its chemical weapons arsenal would necessitate the reactions. i don't think this would be the sort of thing where the united states alone would be the only country concerned about the aftermath of the regime change would look like it's the sort of problem we to deal with whether this is a regime change brought about because of some sort of external reaction or from within. we have the political instability in iran which is likely in the coming years and the regime falls and we don't know who's in control we will have the same concerns and the u.s. and its allies are calling to be watching the sites very closely i'm sure at least from afar monitoring what's going on and there will be proposals about sending teams to secure them even if it is a regime change from within, so this isn't something that is i think treacly related to the external military action. >> just a quick comment. there are all sorts of reasons for wishing, hoping, praying for come out looking for the regime change in iran. one of them -- that a bit of the nuclear program. the program started in 1976 with five shah, the staunchest region. so the strategic interest in having a nuclear capability doesn't end with the end of the regime. >> let's take i think to or questions and then we will clean the whole table and start with the gentleman here and then go in the back corner over there. >> on was born in tehran and i present the global bridge toward humanity. stat louder? like this? >> why was here at the first panel and i've heard the second panel and this panel and i've heard those gentlemen more than once. the more i listen to our experts, it seems the united states cannot even do a little country with 75 million people which we claim they don't know anything. they don't know how to do this, they don't know how to do that. and then the only option that we are promoting is to bomb them so there are 75 million people. and you want to bomb all of them? parts of them? selective groups of them? what kind of day what we have after the bombs have fallen on the people of iran which is 75 million. >> let's take the ever won in the back corner and then we will go all the way around. >> thank you so much. from the cato institute thank you for the fantastic discussion. is their anything to the obligations of the iranian influence in latin america and the home grown sort of sleeper cells? we have heard this the in the dugout, and it whips' up the national hysteria with of the united states. is their anything with these allegations? >> i guess that would relate mostly to iran's ability to hit back and then the first question was mostly about how to stop things the day after etc. so should we start with nuno and then back down. >> on the question of whether the u.s. is powerless to do something, the work i'm doing, a colleague alexander debs, the work we are doing, what it indicates is that there is a pattern of proliferation the states that the nuclear weapons are already significantly powerful before they acquire the nuclear weapons which is the reason we don't strike him because either the soviet union couldn't do it with the chinese, couldn't do it. martha triet, couldn't do it. before the acquired nuclear weapons. there is the u.s. power that's very great but it's limited dealing with these things because the costs of terminating the program would be very high which is also why i don't think the difference we would have as a result of the nuclear acquisition is very great because they already have to agree to extend the capability to be detour. >> i was struck with the comment that the impotent to do anything else except bombing. i don't think they are the impotent at all. there is the longstanding u.s. policy of the region has been stability and security in the middle east. and the free flow of oil to market. they can do that. it's been doing it a long time. there's no reason we can't continue. iran simply doesn't have the wherewithal to close the street. it can cause trouble but it cannot interrupt the flow of oil the wouldn't affect the market. the u.s. navy is very good at reopening the street if it ever has to face the problem. i think that the sort of implicit debate between matt and jamie is interesting whether this should be a limited strike only against nuclear program or if we should think about regime change more broadly. strangely i disagree with both but in a weird way. i don't think there is any scenario in which the leaders would feel a limited strike as a prelude to an unlimited strike. the u.s. behavior over the last decade has been about the regime change. they've seen this. we did it in iraq, and we hope to do it in libya despite the fact the it made deals with ghadaffi so, i think there is an argument for the regime change, but if you are going to make that argument, you have to think very seriously about the long-term consequences to the addition of the whole argument is premised on the fact that iran has a large sprawling aggressive nuclear program that would seem to be called for a large substantial stand occupation force. we have to be willing to pay that price and take that risk if we want to get in the regime change business again. one last comment -- i do think it is good we are thinking long term. most of the questions up until now have them as i said earlier the long term immediate operational questions. it's worth thinking about the long term looks like. suppose we can pull off a limited strike against the nuclear program. i think what we are left with in that case is an ugly unstable stalemate - kuran would work harder to rebuild its facilities to deal with the united states it would also lose our international partners we've done a terrific job compiling up until now. if they don't act was the future look like? and unpleasant but lovable seal might. >> you have any closing thoughts? >> first i would disagree with josh's point the limited strike would be a prelude to the regime change. you put yourself in the shoes of the leader, your primary goal is to protect the regime and make sure they continue to exist and you wake up one morning in your nuclear facilities are destroyed them of a tree is intact, i don't think your instinct is to say let's go ahead and pick a fight with of the united states and commit national suicide. i do think it is very likely a limited strike would result in the retaliation that the united states could absorb and would be less dangerous than living with the nuclear-armed iran. on the question of the influence on america, iran has been trying to increase its influence and it's been developing relationships with a to a chavez and venezuela and also in bolivia. and iran has already signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with both countries so this gets to the risk of the technology transfer the i talked about before. it is entirely conceivable that iran could save venezuela is a country in good standing and the npt has a right to the nuclear technology. you helped them with that we are going to transfer the uranium trans tautology to the nuclear program, and i think this could be a problem for the united states and the non-proliferation policy. all of the issues we've been dealing with it on the past decade would be in our own backyard and venezuela come and we would be dealing with that. so i think there is a risk. my colleague said we can detour iran from doing all these things including the nuclear technology transfers by don't think that's the case if you're on announces it is when to transfer the technology to venezuela. are we going to use military force to stop them from doing that? we've been unwilling to use military force after we found that pakistan was transferring nuclear technology and korea was transferring nuclear technologies we haven't done it in the past made in this scenario the of nuclear weapons so we are going to fight a war because the transfer technology. after we were unwilling to go to war with iran and it didn't have the nuclear weapons so that's one of the problems with this containment option. if we are unwilling to go to the war within on nuclear iran nobody is going to be the fuss that we would be willing to use the force against iran and the allies in the region within to believe as and iran wouldn't believe us. >> i want to respond to the gentleman in the front's point about the iranian people as it relates to the point spieler made about the aftermath of the regime change. i'm not advocating and i don't think anybody is advocating bombing the iranian people out of existence just as i don't think you could argue they were bombing the libyan people or the serbian people in the 1990's. the iranian people do not support the current regime. my understanding and the opposition in the figures i've spok

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