Transcripts For CSPAN2 Today In Washington 20110914

operation forces and their extraordinary capabilities. the nation is safer because of their work and because of the many actions taken by the broad range of federal state and local elements concerned with our security. we've seen ten years of determined effort by all in the fight and the men and women of the intelligence community stood with our partners every day to ensure success. we have great reason to take pride, but it would be an error to conclude that we have reason to gloat, reason to soften our focus, or reason to relax our efforts. the stark fact is we remain threatened, and the information conveyed over the weekend is an exemplar of that. as terrorists still wish to do us harm, destroy our institutions, and kill americans without conscious. in seeking to counterterrorism in all its forms, the success of the intelligence community, i'm convinced has been and will continue to be rooted in three critical factors. the most important is the dedication and skill of our people. the past ten years, we've developed an exceptional work force equipped with unique capabilities. it'll be imperative to preserve and enhance the expertise, remarkable talents, and high levels of income tense in the intelligence community. the other factors determining the success of the community and countering terrorism is the activities and the expansion of responsible information sharing. the intelligence community has made substantial progress integrating efforts since 9/11. we've taken steps to improve our counterterrorism posture including sharing of more counterterrorism information. for example, like the rest of the community, a central intelligence agency has pleased emphasis on the prevention of another attack on the homeland and the defeat of terrorists abroad. cia has a highly integrated partnership of analysts and operator who team with u.s. forces, other agencies, and foreign partners to preempt terrorists abroad. of course, director petraeus will speak in more detail about the cia. the fbi transformed from the concern of law enforcement to an intelligence driven organization effectively cooperating with intelligence community partners and state and local officials to identify and prevent terrorist threats to the homeland. this transformation includes the fbi led and inner agency joint task forces now based in 104 cities nationwide as chairman feinstein mentioned. the national security agency has continued to devote significant resources against high priority threats. as terrorists operational security practices have become increasingly sophisticated, nsa is adapting to address use of the latest technologies while taking great care to protect the civil lib ireties of americans. the department of homeland security established a component and strengthened ties to state, local, and tribal authorities to ensure they can identify vulnerabilities and respond to threats. the defense intelligence agency established the joint task force combating terrorism to better protect the force protection requirements of the department of defense and the war fighting combat and commands. the national geospace intelligence agency worked to embed analysts and capabilities with its counterterrorism mission partners in the field and in the national community. i want particularly to note the role of the national counterterrorism center, serving as the center for integration of all counterterrorism intelligence except intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism. 234 this role, they bring intelligence and homeland security elements together daily to exchange information and integrate actions as was done in the current threat stream. all other intelligence community components are contributing to this comprehensive mission as well according to their unique capabilities. the treasury department's intelligence professionals, for for example, work closely with partners to identify terrorist financing sources and disresult them through -- disrupt them through official designations. there's reporting from overseas. there is, of course, no better example of the importance and the power of intelligence integration than the operation against bin laden. as president obama stated at the time, the success of that mission, "marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation's effort to defeat al-qaeda." such success was the direct result of the persistent collection and exhaustive analysis of all available information by intelligence community partners across a number of agencies and, of course, the superb operation conducted by the u.s. navy seals. the progress achieved was made possible by the support of the congress and by the work and interest of the intelligence and oversight committees. over the past ten years, the congress through legislation and oversight has worked to ensure the intelligence community elements function effectively and efficiently and have the tools we need. the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act, for example, in addition to establishing the office of the director of national intelligence to lead the community provided a foundation to improve information sharing and the integration of intelligence activities. the congress has also taken action to strengthen capabilities most notably in the patriot act and amendments to the foreign act which will continue to be essential tools for the intelligence community. terrorism, the intelligence community is called on to provide critical support to protect the nation in many other contexts. proproliferation, regional crisis, reports from cyber, threats to space, and counterintelligence to name a few. i cite these not to detract from today's hearing, but put in to perspective what the intelligence community is called upon to do. to build on the progress made since the attacks of 9/11, i offer two suggestions. first -- the first is i think there's room to improve the management of the national intelligence program providing the resources for the communities' capabilities. specifically, managing this program is a coherent whole improves transparency and accountability. the second area will continue to seek improvement in intelligence integration and information sharing. sensible security and responsible sharing are the watch words here. before closing, i emphasize we in the intelligence community recognize that in all of our work, we must exemplify america's values, carry out the missions in a manner that sustains the trust of the american people. the nature of our work and the trust placed in us demand we have the highest respect for the rue of law and the protection of civil liberties and privacy. finally, i believe the work of the intelligence community over the past ten years has criminal intented greatly -- contributed greatly to the safety of americans, but as you eluded, the very nature of terrorism makes it impossible to guarantee that every planned attack will be avoided and every plot disrupted. we know that the character and the resilience of the united states as a people will prevail despite efforts of those who wish to instill fear in us and alter our way of life. this nation rose to every challenge in history, and we'll do so with this one. all of us are committed to protecting americans and defeating the scourge of terrorism. i assure you we will be relentless in that cause. thank you for your attention and for the opportunity to appear today, and i'll now turn to director petraeus. >> thank you, director clapper. welcome, you look good in the suit. i make one suggestion, when i put my army uniform aside six months later, it didn't fit. i don't know what that's about, but that's the only caution i give you, sir, director petraeus. >> well, thank you very much, chairman, vice chairman, ranking member, members of both committees, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this joint session of our intelligence oversight committees, and on behalf of my agency and, indeed, of my predecessor, thank you for the strong bipartisan backing and effective oversight in significant part because of your support, the intelligence agency is better able to protect our country and our citizens from al-qaeda and other terrorist groups. simply put,s agency is a stronger, more agile institution before 9/11 because of your assistance over the last decade that's critical in making that possible. i'd also like to recognize the enormous contributions of leon panetta, my predecessor. he's a principled, passionate leader overseeing the accomplishments of the great tasks in the agency, and now secretary panetta will be a close partner for the agency in the new role at the department of defense. i wanted to note as well i'm committed to continue along the bath director panetta embarked with other members. this has been strengthened over the years, and i will endeavor as emphasized in the confirmation hearings and meetings with you since then to strengthen it further. it's a pleasure to be here with the director of national intelligence, good friend of years, jim clapper. he's a true intelligence professional and a great sur vaunt. we worked closely over the years in a number of posts, and i look forward to forge a better effective intelligence community. i welcome the opportunity to present the central intelligence agency's view the threat a decade later after the attacks. one week into the job, but over a decade in the fight against terror, i have expected to find the agency to be a true national asset comprised the selfless, committed, highly intelligent americans demonstrating impressive knowledge, skill, i think newty, and initiative. i'm proud to lead the agency and represent the outstanding work force. i note humbly in the eight days as director in the testimony i'm giving this morning represents the analysis of the outstanding work force. as a bottom line up front, the cia assesses that ten years after the 9/11 attacks, the united states continues to face a serious threat from al-qaeda and its worldwide network of affiliates and sympathizers. of significance, though, heavy losses to senior leadership appeared to create an important window of vulnerability for the core al-qaeda organization in afghanistan and pakistan. this requires a sustained focused effort. moreover, as al-qaeda's core is weakened, the initiative is shifting somewhat to the affiliates and sympathizers outside south asia. our nation faces a serious threat from these groups, particularly from those based in yemen, home to al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula, and there's other affiliates presenting threats as well. in my statement, i'll describe the pressure on the core al-qaeda organization, then discuss the danger that al-qaeda and the affiliates pose, and outline keys to further progress against this enemy including some of the steps we take with our partners throughout the u.s. government and with our friends overseas. for more than a decade, al-qaeda's senior leadership and core organization in pakistan and afghanistan have been capable of planning and executing dangerous plots targeting the west. today, as a result of sustained counterterrorism efforts, a substantial number with our partners in pakistan and afghanistan, the core part of al-qaeda's organization is much weaker and less capable than when it attacked us on 9/11. bin laden's death in may dealt a stunning blow to al-qaeda. bin laden was, of course, an iconic figure, the group's only leader since its founding. we know now he was deeply involved in the end while directing the strategy, more deeply involved, in fact, than many assessed before we, able to exploit materials found with him. his long time deputy ayman al-zawahiri succeeded him in jew, but they find him last compelling as a leader. we thus assess he'll have more difficulty than bin laden had in maintaining the group's collective motivation in the face of continued pressure. the layer of top lieutenants under bin laden and ayman al-zawahiri, the group responsible for day-to-day management of al-qaeda in its operations sustained significant losses in recent years as well. these losses have been especially severe among terrorist plotters, commanders, trainers, and bomb makers. recently, pakistan announced the capture with u.s. assistance of unis who planned attacks against the interest of the united states and other countries. last month, al-qaeda lost its second in command, senior operational coordinator. that followed the death in june of senior operational commander, and the organization is struggling to find qualified replacements. these set backs have shaken al-qaeda's sense of security in pakistan's tribal areas driving the remaining leaders underground to various degrees and shifting a good bit of attention from terrorist plotting to security and survival. in fact, some mid level leaders and file members seek safe haven across the border in afghanistan or decide to leave south asia. some other senior leaders may assess it is riskier to move and remain in pakistan's tribal areas where trusted facilitators offer limited freedom of movement, but where their security will still be threatened. the upshot is it's more difficult for al-qaeda to atrack jew hads wanting -- jihads wanting to travel to pakistan. this gives a window of opportunity for us and our allies. we must maintain the pressure and exploit this opportunity. even with its core leadership having sustained significant losses, however, al-qaeda and its affiliates pose a real threat requiring energy, creativity, and dedication. al-qaeda's operatives are committed to attacks against u.s. citizens at home and overseas both in the wake of bin laden's death and continue the pursuit of their goals, forcing the united states and a number of our allies to retreat from the world stage. the leaders continue to believe this would clear the way for overthrowing governments in the islamic world and the destruction of israel. moreover, despite being less able to coordinate large scale attacks, al-qaeda and the sympathizers comet to train and deploy operatives in small numbers for overseas plots. many 6 them have nationalities and backgrounds well suited for targeting the united states and europe. increasingly, in fact, we see signs of al-qaeda's efforts to carry out relatively small attacks that would nonetheless generate fear and create the need for costly security improvements. indeed, we should not forget that one of al-qaeda's goals 1 to force the u.s. and our allies to adopt additional expensive security safeguards that would further burden or economies. in short, though, we have made real progress in the campaign 20 disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-qaeda. we need to recognize the need to be in this for the long haul. as i mentioned earlier, the extremist initiative is to some degree smifting to al-qaeda's affiliates outside south asia. while linked, they have the structures, resource bases, and operational agendas operating aton mousily. working with our partners to cooperate against the affidavits is crucial to the success of our efforts to disresult, dismantle, and defeat the network. al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula emerged as the most dangerous regional note in the global jihad. since december 2009, the group attempted two attacks on the united states, one to blow up a u.s. airliner as it approached detroit in 2009, and an effort to send bombs hidden in computer printers on two cargo aircraft in 2010. they continue to plot strikes against the nation, u.s. interests worldwide, and our allies. since may, they launched an offensive against the many government parts of southern yemen expelling many government forces from the region and increasing aqap's freedom of movement. political unrest in yemen helped aqap co-op local tribe and extend its influence. despite this, counterterrorism cooperation with yemen has, in fact, improved in the past few months. that's very important as we clearly have to intensify the collaboration and deny aqap the safe haven it seeks to establish. state failure in the expansion of extremist networks over the past two decades have made southern somalia one of the world's most significant havens for terrorists. al-qaeda's affiliates there is large, well funded compared to most groups and they have attracted and trained thousands of fighters including scores of americans and others from western countries. the suicide bombings in uganda last year demonstrated the group's ability to operate beyond somalia. sustained pressure on the relatively small fighters driving the terrorists' plotting and outreach to al-qaeda could persuade them to turn from global jihad. the top operative in east africa, were killed this year. his protege was killed two years early leaving them under pressure by afghan union troops. we have to continue the work to reduce capabilities. the aqim targeted western interests throughout northern and western africa while continuing to battle the security forces of nigeria. they conducted a double suicide bombing. we with working with the regional partners in france to counter aqim and those efforts helped to prevent a significant attack by aqim on western interests since late 2007. in nigeria, the latest group conducted a car bombing in late august against the u.n. building marking the first known leal operation against westerners. they stepped up efforts against the group in the last several months. we work closely with the partners on this threat, and we'll seek to intensify our support. al-qaeda in iraq or aqi sustained significant losses since the surge in 2007, and it is much further than it was in 2007 from realizing its goal of overthrowing the government of baghdad or controlling some portion of iraq. nonetheless, aqi remaining capable of carrying out attacks as it showed in mid-august, and they will remain capable of inflicting casualties in government forces and others throughout the next few years. they share the desire to expand global jihad which could lead them to attempt attacks outside iraq. the number of al-qaeda operatives in southeast asia has been significantly reduced over the last decade thanks to aggressive counterterrorism measures by regional governments. the group responsible for the bali attacks in 2002 and 2005 has, for example, suffered major losses and largely focused now on rebuilding. the terrorist leaders in southeast asia are now dead such as one who planned the july 2009 hotel bombings or in jail, and the spiritual leader of extremism in southeast asia. the global campaign against al-qaeda and i felts requires offensive and defensive measures and need to be sustained over a long period in order to be effective. we target terrorist leaders, for example, to deny them the resources and breathing space needed to plot operations against us and our allies. we cooperate with the foreign partners wherever possible and often better to have them carry out operations than for us to do it. nonetheless, we do agent unilaterally when we must. our officers work hard to interpret operatives before they attack like they did to avoid smuggling explosives into transatlantic flight in 2006. in a similar fashion, we worked closely with friendly services in the middle east to help stop aqap's printer bombs before they detonated. we owe the successes to trades craft of the fusion of intelligence disciplines to tight integration with others, to sharing intelligence with foreign partner, and to the committees' support. we assess that the agency in its elements are better at each of the actions now than we were before 9/11, but al-qaeda and its affiliates are resilient. we must never underestimate our enemies, and we have to continue to refind our tactics, techniques, and procedures. intelligence collectors, analysts, and experts forged closer relationships leading to now flows of vital information and more importantly new insights into how and where terrorists operate. that integration of analysis and operations each feeding the other has been at the heart of our most important successes. in fact, our relationships with others in the intelligence community and with law enforcement agencies are closer and more cooperative than ever. improvements in the watch listing program and other upper agency reporting meths allow us to quickly decimate actions with state and local agencies at the lower possible classification levels. we continue to work with the dni and national counterterrorism center to enhance this process and improve the application of community resources. the cia's close collaboration with the military and our intelligence community partners in taking down bin laden reflected advances our government made towards achieving a more unified counterterrorism effort. that was, indeed, as the dni noted, a success born of inner agency collaboration and cooperation. our counterterrorism cooperation with governments in europe, the middle east, south asia, and elsewhere around the world is also very strong. working with our allies and partners, we've disrupted dozens of plots and arrested key operatives and facilitators. all of this must and will continue. indeed the intelligence community has to continue to be a learning organization, and the cia will do all that it can to contribute to that effort. in sum, the structures and processes put in place since the 9/11 attacks have made our government more capable and more effective in carrying out our critical counterterrorism mission and in protecting our fellow citizens. the key in the central intelligence agency has, of course, been its people. the swings who at our -- individuals who at our head quarters, stations, and bases around the world have quietly, selflessly, and expertly defended americans from the constant threat of terrorism. they, our people, have been the key. in so doing, they and their families have made great sacrifices, and we can never thank them enough for that. it is my privilege to serve with them, to be their director, and indeed to be their advocate. thank you very much. >> thank you, director petraeus, and for sharing the questions, senator feinstein. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. director petraeus, i think your remarks were a ten. thank you so much. i think you gave us an excellent and well-rounded view of what is happening. i wanted to talk to you about afghanistan. we were out in the waiting room, and we were speaking of the bombing that just took place at our embassy in kabul, and whether it was taliban or chairman haqqani. the question that raises in my mind because 2014 suspect too far away is what would be the implications for the security of the west if the taliban with its connections to haqqani were to return to rule afghanistan, and in particular, what would it mean for women? >> well, thanks very much, madam chairman, and first of all, as i mentioned to you in the waiting room, i taked to ambassador moments ago, and he was my great diplomatic partner in baghdad during the surge. he reported that all emerged embassy members aring thed for, no injuries to any embassy members. there were four afghan citizens who were injured when an rpg hit the old chancery building and three of those very lightly -- one small girl -- they were all waiting for visas, needed to go to the hospital across the road in the compound. apparently, the situation is a handful of individuals, five or so, perhaps wearing suicide vests were able to move into a building that's under construction several hundred meters from the embassy and then to launch small arms and rpg's into the area of the embassy. at least one of those, as i said, hitting, but, again, no damage -- no injuries to any of our embassy officials. .. and perhaps some of the other movements that make up to the syndicate as it is sometimes called insurgents and extremists. i think what we would see would be the return to what we saw before. we have seen this before. we know that women's rights are tremendously limited under such a regime. the fact is under the taliban there were very few girls in school at all if any they were in hidden schools at great risk to them and to their teachers and there were less than a million students all told in school. there are now over 8 million, the education minister estimated 8.2 or 8.3 overall and some percent of those are girls. i don't think that would continue to be the case were the taliban to return. beyond that of course the central issue for the western security in the whole reason that we were engaged in in this effort is to ensure afghanistan is never again a sanctuary for al qaeda or other transnational extremists as it was when the taliban did control the bulk of afghanistan prior to 9/11 and when the attacks were planned on the afghan soil. and again, the prospect remains real in any concern and is why we are working so hard to enable our afghan partners to be able to secure and govern themselves so that we can continue the orderly process of transitioning security tasks to them and i might note on that account that even in kabul although there have been sensational attacks periodically generally the frequency of those has been reduced and in fact it is afghan forces who are completely in charge of security in the capitol and in talking about the entire province, not just the last one district the province of kabul as well as the municipality, and indeed it is afghan forces who are in the lead for even the night raids and the targeted operations which we often enable but do not do for them and in fact it is the afghan forces who are this afternoon now this evening in afghanistan clearing the building from which the small arms and our pg attack took place. there are very good afghan forces that have demonstrated the ability to do this and they are indeed again doing it right now. >> my time is up. i would note the clocks are set for five minute rounds and i would hope we would keep them so everybody has an opportunity. chairman rogers? >> thank you, madame chair. appreciate the opportunity to read to of your predecessors, admiral mcconnell and blair recommended a complement of the authorities and admiral villere was suggesting that some of the authorities moved to the white house. two-part question you also refer to some bureaucratic impediments that remain among them the 16 members that prevent you from being as effective as you would like to be. can you talk about both of those cases here today? >> i'm not sure i understood the first part of your question about the previous director said. >> he said some of the authority has moved to the white house and that has been a bit of an impediment to function properly in the role of overseeing the intelligence agency. >> i have not focused of us to be the case. if you are specifically referring to the position that john brennan occupies, i think that he performs a crucial function in the white house and for the president as a residence coordinator for counter terrorism and intelligence and law enforcement, and john is a great colleague, somebody i've known and worked with for many years and so i have not found that to be the case. john if anyone is i think very sensitive and the differential to the authorities and responsibilities of the director of national intelligence are. i think the observation has been in the last 13 plus months that i've been in this job that this is 18 operation, there is intense interest and support for the white house particularly in the national security staff and national security adviser the cia is an interpol part of that and i'm confident that is going to continue. so i have not found that to be an issue. on a diluted in my testimony to one area that i think could be improved which is how to manage the national intelligence program as an integral whole as opposed to the fragmented manner in which it is now managed. so that's one area. >> can you give an example of how you might do that? >> right now the national service program is spread across six cabinet departments. 90% is an the department of the defense program, and the other five cabinet departments are reflected if i were king which i'm not and i would hasten the this is neither not speaking on behalf of the administration and certainly not on behalf of the congress because this would require me to get in into an area that is more hazardous than terrorism which is congressional jurisdiction, but i think that if it were managed as a unitary whole it would promote accountability come crème transparency, efficiency, agility and all those kind of things. i have not found -- >> you're suggesting the military intelligence program and the national intelligence program be merged in some way? >> i'm not suggesting that at all. military intelligence program is entirely separate. i was the person executive for the intelligence program for over three years. i do not believe that that should be a part of the national intelligence program particularly as the share of that 90% are those intelligence resources that have betted on each one of the services to include tactical intelligence resources that are organic to the tactical operations. i believe that should continue to be the province of the secretary defense. the arrangement that we made, this was undersecretary gates and then myself and my prior capacity was to designate the under secretary defense for intelligence who was the management for the military intelligence program as the director of the defense as a dni position. he's dual headed that way. so, increasingly we are working together to ensure coherence and cooperation and coordination between those programs. we recently completed a two yearlong effort to rationalize the rules of the road for what should be in the nit and as we approach the impending budget cuts, we have already begun to work closely together so that we are attentive to the dependencies so if we cut the one program we haven't done unintended harm to the other. but i do not think that it should be built in but i do think the mechanisms that we have developed for the appropriate oversight and insight into the military intelligence permanent conversely my successor at the u.s. dis and site to the national intelligence program. the other part of your question, i have to see that in my 13 plus months now in this job, and it feels like it's, i have not noted very much pushback from the intelligence community particularly on the thing i'm pushing on integration and collaboration. >> thank you very much, chairman rogers. vice chairman chambliss? >> gentlemen, there are still several important provisions in the foreign intelligence surveillance act and the u.s. a patriot act subject to sunset even the director has testified about the need for the permanent authorities and there's absolutely no evidence that any abuse of these authorities i'm concerned each time we debate of these the intelligence community tells us that they can, "live with the suggested changes yet i never hear anyone say those changes will help you do your job better. first of all, how do you short-term extensions affect the ability to operate and second, when you are asked if you can live with certain changes will you commit to getting us the full story about how the changes may harm your collection to devotees as well? director clapper? >> thank you. it's disruptive i think when we are constantly on the cusp of having these very important tools expire on us. so particularly when we are dealing with commercial segments to help us do this it is disruptive and unsettling to them and in terms of their long-term commitment to committing to cooperate with us. and so i think from that standpoint, it's not healthy to have these constant short-term extensions. having said that though it is extremely important to us that obviously we must have the support of the congress representing the american people. and obviously the issue here that is of concern is civil liberties and privacy, and i assure you have been personal witness to this in the last 13 or so months that we go to extraordinary lengths to the repetitive checks and balances over the actual execution and administration of these authorities, which we all understand have the potential for rendering the civil liberties and privacy. as to the specifics of what we can live with i guess i would like to perhaps offline we can discuss what those provisions as you understand them are and then i could perhaps give you a more explicit answer on a case by case basis. >> certainly. >> and vice chairman, obviously these are domestic issues but nonetheless concern to us because we work with partners who employed the authorities that fees' provide to them as we all work together as we did for example this past weekend with the credible but still unconfirmed threat. at the bottom line is the short term extensions meet the long term planning and program more difficult than the long term extensions. it's pretty simple and straightforward. beyond that i will commit to providing the full story again as there is something specific we would welcome the opportunity to provide reaction to that. >> you've both expressed concerns about the rising recidivism rate among the gitmo detainee's which is tighter than the last released figure of 25%. yet the administration is sticking with its policy to close guantanamo and refused to send the newly captured terrorists. does it really makes sense to ferc was the option of bringing the terrorist when the prohibitions on bringing the gitmo detainee's to the united states and on transferring detainee's to yemen make it impossible to close gitmo any time in the near future and what can the intelligence community be doing to stop the recidivism rate from going up? >> as you know, the administration policy and the executive order by president obama signed almost immediately after taking office was to close guantanamo not the least of which is the symbol guantanamo has become so that the administration policy. i think what we try to do or the administration tried to do is to treat each case on a case by case basis depending on the circumstances to capture the importance of it and was there evidence for the prosecution, etc.. in the answer, this is really not in intelligence issue. i think our concern is and the determination from these detainee's regardless whether they are incarcerated and regardless whether they are attended throop through a military commission or the civil courts system. so our interest, my interest and whether the art mirandized or not is getting the intelligence from them. rather than where they are incarcerated. you are right about the recidivism rate on the order of the 27%. there are i think some 161 that have been 599 detainee's that have been repatriated from guantanamo, some 61 of them either confirmed or suspected to be recidivists. i should point out many of them have been taken off the battlefield through the kinetic encounters if you will. so that is a concern as to what the intelligence community can do to stem what of recidivist rate since one is one too many is to ensure that in the interagency deliberations that are conducted to make judgments about whether or not to repatriate some one and whether to ensure that we have provided the maximum information on the potential threat posed by such repatriations. >> i would second of the director's comment on gitmo but i will note as well as the centcom commander even before the administration took office based on my sense of the situation in the area of responsibility dhaka called for the, quote, response of the support for the responsible closure of gitmo as you will in previous days that is proving difficult to do that over time i know to the executive and legislative branches are seeking to come to grips with and with respect to their recidivism rate careful analysis has to be done on this attrition and the country to which detainee's might be returned and i can assure you the agency will provide a very forthright assessment of the situations and of the ability of the country to carry out the responsibilities to safely inhumanely keep these individuals behind bars if that's the requirement or to oversee their conduct if they happen to be released for some reason. >> vice-chairman? >> director clapper, i'm going to give you to issues to stay within the five minutes and my first will be about space. the national security depends on the performance in space. we are the most powerful country in the world because in my opinion one of the main issues we have control 40 period of time and space deals with a lot of issues. unconcerned our nation lacks overreaching plans for space and launch. the problem associated with the cancellation of the consolation program have rivaled through the industry especially the industrial base and the good news is the corporate sector has responded with competitive ideas. you've heard and i've said many times our current capabilities also extremely reliable are too expensive. i have big concerns about the program. one of the largest u.s. commercial satellite operators had a conversation they are not using u.s. services and the reason the sanibel of the increased cost secondly the program is not maintained a reliable schedule i know personally the program i followed for years that's important to the security of the country it took them one year after it was ready to go to the launch and that is unacceptable. the -- we need to stimulate the commercial industry and ensure there are no barriers to competition. the same major u.s. manufacturer , they used the launch program facilities with france, russia and india, not in the united states because of the schedule. so the first issue is when we are dealing with russia where we have to launch another country especially russia and i believe a lot of the countries including china going to the moon what are we going to ensure we have no barriers to the competition. the cost of the launch and the system itself. the second thing i'm going to throw out and then i will stop coming people last in the intelligence committee we all know when the committee that we hear things all over the ball rolled what keeps you up at night. the areas that concern me most of the weapons of mass destruction and where we are to protect the country from cyber attacks. basically in my opinion people have a catastrophic cyberattack. the same thing happened in south tree with north korea attacking the system. we need to do more and it needs to start at the top and i feel we need what a person, the cyber sar we have an individual right now who's not doing a bad job, doesn't have the authority of the power were the stuff it's important we create a whole system that includes education to the public on y cyberattack sar important and serious. nsa is doing their job and they're as good as anybody in the world with general like alexandre so that's the second, where do you feel we are with respect to cyber, what would you recommend in your role to make sure that we are stronger and we have a better system to protect from cyberattack triet >> jury quickly, congressman, first, i agree about the importance of space and protecting and preserving and advancing the industrial base, having the alternative source of the launch is critical and as soon as we can get a second or an alternative launch capability we are confident that we can certify i am all for that from the intelligence perspective. is it ever crucial particularly as we look to some of the other threats that we confront the nation states the extensive denied areas to us. with respect to the second concern on the cyber, you and i have many discussions about what keeps me but might the things we don't know and certainly the nexus the nexus of the wmd and terrorism is a huge concern. with respect to cyber i think the responsible the into the intelligence committee is to provide the threats to whomever needs it and of course the key among that but not exclusively is the national security agency as you alluded to the homeland security is an important role to play as the interlocutor with the civilian infrastructure engaging them, helping to educate them and involving them in solutions and again i believe the intelligence committee responsibility is to ensure the data to include moving to a conversation i had before that was meeting with the chairman feinstein making as much of this available to an unclassified basis as we possibly can. >> thank you very much. i think that mr. conaway and mr. conrad - we are alternating sides so the next one would be senator blunt, and then we will go to member schakowsky petraeus connect thank you chairman. i'm glad to be back in the room with my colleagues i've served with on the house and many of them on the house intelligence committee for my comments for the record, director corporate director petraeus i'm going to say that i think there's been a real progress that to me at least has appeared in the last year to be significant in terms of coordinating the committee. i will say that i wondered a number of times over the handful of years between the time that we created the dni coming and you are taking this position the year-ago whether this was a system who is going to work or not but it does seem to me that after lots of effort has come together and i listened carefully to the chairman rogers questions and comments about how we can make that happen, and even more significant ways certainly the coordination shows what can happen when the intelligence community and the defense department work together. the efforts of the national geospatial intelligence agency which has a big presence and the special forces have worked together and this community is becoming what we all hoped it would become to whenever the job was created one of the things i want to ask about and i think i will ask and have an answer on this leader you, director clapper, is one of the things that the intelligence reform and terrorism act did was a lot of dni procurement authority for all enterprise architecture i.t. and it's a complicated issue but one line very interested and and if you can briefly respond to that and in more detail later are we looking at a unified location somewhere that would be a backup location outside of washington i know that was on the process for a long time but seems to be waning right now, and just a quick answer there and then i have one or two other questions. >> senator, thank you very much, and i appreciate the mention of the nba and the honor of serving as this director for five years and the campus about to open up almost completely the next couple of weeks important contingent remains and the two locations in missouri. as we approach, i will just add a word on i.t.. as we approach the inevitability of the budget cuts in the intelligence community, i think this is the area of the greatest potential for the efficiencies and a reduction in the amount of the funding that we now spend on i.t.. and so, we are very deeply engaged the approach to the more unitary architecture across the intelligence community. and frankly, it's something that we talked about as in nevada for years but now we are running out of money so we must be in sync mode. i think that is serving as the stimulus if he will to do some more creative thinking. and i think that this would do wonders in terms of saving efficiency and promoting integration. estimate i do, too and let's go to the topic and since you brought it up, since we are talking about the budget cuts everywhere, i would like you and the director petraeus to very quickly discuss how that's going to impact you and how you would prioritize those things and maybe you just gave part of the answer, mr. clapper, on the trying to do things that produce a better results with less money. but some of the things we can't do with less money and i would be pleased for both of you to respond to that topic. >> let me start and then i'm sure dr. petraeus will have some commentary, too. i was around in the early 90's to serve as the director of the defense intelligence agency when we were to reach a peace dividend. and so that caused us to go on a seven year down slope in the intelligence resources. and of course which came to a screeching halt on 9/11 and then we went on a sudden up slope so now we are on a cycle of reduction. the first comment i would make, and this gets to the why the dni. in the last ten years whether it was the bci or the dni, we had to do is presided over handing out more money and more people every year. and that in your period basically encompassed the entire existence of the office of the director of national intelligence. now we are in a different mode, and i view this as a litmus test for this office to preside over these inevitable cuts that we are going to have to make but profit from the experience of the early 90's and not do some of the things we did then. everything we do in intelligence first of all is not of equal marriage. some things are more valuable than others particularly as we look to the future. i think it's important to protect that most valuable resource we have, which is our people. we must continue some way of hiring every year which we didn't do in many cases during that hiatus. we must try to sustain healthy r&d for the future, and i think we have to be rather cold hearted and objective about the contribution of the systems so that's kind of the approach we are going to take and this has to be a corporate but i'm reasonably confident that we can come through this without a great deal of harm and i don't want to be under the mistaken impression the we are going to stand capabilities we have today because we are not. >> leggitt r. dee also pleased to see you here today in this job. >> thanks very much, senator. first to pile on if you will your comment about the coordination, the coordination is better within the agency itself and its better within the greater intelligence community. it is better within the government for its large with the military and law enforcement agencies, and i think frankly that there is even a better approach in terms of sharing and supporting your efforts to provide the oversight is also an important function as well in all of this. with respect to the budget cuts the key is protecting the core capabilities to read in the center intelligence agency, we are working very hard to stay absolutely riveted on the counter terrorist fight but also to balance that and not lose sight of the global coverage mission. we have been able to reestablish a number of the different stages and bases in the coverage mission and we have to evaluate very carefully the future in that regard. we have as the director mentioned had ten years of steady increases. now we have to tighten our belts. there are areas that we've identified which we think that we can achieve some efficiency and savings and so forth. but as the dni said, we cannot return to this kind of period that we had during the peace dividend days where we were not hiring or we were cutting, we have to protect our most important resources, our people. we need to continue to hire throughout this time as well so that there is a continued addition to the workforce and the use is continue to be brought in as it has been over the last ten years and we have to continue to invest and make our work meaningful and importance of the best and brightest not only seek to join the agency but also to stay with it. thanks. >> think you very much, senator. so everyone will know, we are going to go in order of a rifle. it's too confusing the other way. so next will be conaway followed by schakowsky, shift, lobiondo and thompson. mr. conaway? >> thanks for coming this morning playing off of your comment about the two spheres of emphasis on the testimony you talked about the management of the intelligence community. part and parcel of all of that is senator blunt started down this a little bit is the management systems, information systems and internal controls day in and day out to give decisionmakers accurate and data this is gathered as efficiently as we can general clapper, what is the expectation that he communicated to the 15 agencies yet to be able to obtain audited financial statements and by the way on the financial statements your office will not cross the border, give your thoughts on that and general petraeus, if you would a little early in the tenure but you have to give me your thoughts and hopefully commitment that are included among your top priorities and communicated to your team is the report of getting this system in place to talk about being audited, but that is just a catch phrase it's really about the day in and day of work that has to be done for the data at the right time to read >> welcome a first of all, sir, right now, our stated objective i think is to be a fully audited by 2016. what would really help us though would be we need legislation on the treasury fund balance provision which enables intelligence components to deal directly with the treasury, and then and thereby making us less reliant on the surgeon systems that are not audible and there is language right now in the house appropriations committee bill that would preclude that and their fear is that somehow that is a part of my conspiracy or plot to separate and they are separate and distinct endeavors with regards to how it is managed if we are going to achieve what ability and do it in a way that is expeditious and quickly is to have the treasury fund enacted into law. >> it is early in my time on this topic but my understanding is what i've been briefed on as we are doing reasonably well and on the right trajectory and you certainly have my commitment to getting the systems in place. >> i appreciate that. you know, on the department of defense side as well when leon panetta left to the department of defense which still maintain the same kind of emphasis over there that we have here, so i appreciate both of your commitment to do that can you help us understand as you shrink resources and resources are less available that the resources needed to make this happen and the follow on to general clapper to break the tie among those who love the legacy systems and or they would prefer a different architecture system, so can you put a team in place that does that, somebody has to break the tie you have that authority to say it goes this way, right, wrong or different? >> i do, sir. so far nobody is questioning it so i act like i do. but i believe we have assembled the right group and prime among them is the cia and the nsa to lead the effort to come up with a more integrated enterprise architecture for across-the-board in the intelligence community. i think that the potential for the savings here are huge. >> i would just pylon and say that the agency perspective there is no question that the dni is in the lead on this that he has put together a good team and the cia has provided the isasi deputy director who's quite good in this area would be part of that effort to work together as a team. >> finishing up, one of my early hearings as the team brought over the charts these were like 10-foot tall charts of paper that have countries around the world listed in a variety of initiatives across there and they have it all very colored nicely within the lines so as to come up with how it would be spent across the deal. that's the front end of it. can you tell us afterwards if that is what happened and they dropped their head and said we really can't do that, so my vision is one of the benefits of the system per say is not only on the front and we plan to spend in a variety of areas but after that is done we know that is actually what happened. so getting your commitment is appreciated. >> as a program manager twice, i can attest even at the program manager level it's a challenge to watch execution and a lot of it is because we simply don't have the tools in order to watch how the money is actually being spent after it's been program, so that's another object if here and that's why i very much support. >> thank you mrs. schakowsky? >> i want to thank both of the chairman and the ranking member for this open hearing. i think that we can see all pretty how useful these open hearings are particularly this 1i think it's good for our security and our democracy. i want to associate myself also with the chairman feinstein's comments and concerns that you raised about contractors, and at this moment i want to congratulate president obama for his leadership and the intelligence community for its careful work and our navy seals for their goods and making sure that osama bin laden will never threaten our country again. here is the nature of my question. the president's new counterterrorism strategy stresses adherence to the u.s. core values such as respecting human rights balancing, security and transparency in upholding the rule of law. i'm going to ask a series of questions and hope to do that quickly so you can answer them. in view of the u.s. engagement in enhanced interrogation techniques, electronic surveillance of u.s. persons and similar practices did the u.s. violate its core values in the aftermath of 9/11? the "los angeles times" recently published an article entitled the key september 11th legacy, more domestic surveillance, the article reports concerns by both public and private sector of servers that the approach of using electronic surveillance in the u.s. to find patterns that lead to evidence of terrorism is the opposite of the legal tradition to start with the suspect before conducting such surveillance. do you agree that one of legacy of 9/11 as the increase of the domestic surveillance and ten years later do you believe that this level of surveillance in the u.s. is just a fight? the media recently reported that the cia and new york police department have worked closely together, so closely together in monitoring muslim american neighborhoods for terrorism activities a blur the line the to domestic and foreign spying without commenting specifically on the new york situation do you believe the domestic activity by the federal intelligence agencies particularly the cia has crossed the line and finally do you believe that the intelligence community relies too heavily on the counterterrorism cooperation of foreign nations that violates american values and principles? thank you if director petraeus will have a comment as well. i appreciate your perspective. i guess i wouldn't characterize it quite as you have that this is an egregious violation of american values it would seem some of things that are done in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and i think that in itself is a very important fact to remember what was the atmosphere and the conditions then that led to certain of these actions? i do not believe that there is, quote, too much domestic surveillance. you have to remember that the lion's share of the world's internet is carried through transmitted through this country we go to extraordinary lengths whether it is the patriot act or whatever to oversee to ensure there are not violations of american civil liberties for privacy i care deeply about these values and these privacies and my own celebrities something i take very seriously. as far i asked general petraeus to speak to this, the cia involvement in the new york city police department there has been held given their and there has been an embedded analyst, not everyone from the cia who was out on the streets collecting and it's my personal view that's not a good optic to have the cia involved in any city level police department but the cia is going to address that. the acting director before director petraeus arrived ask for the ig investigation to look into the specifically the propriety of that. >> first all if i could start with the contractors because we are working very hard in fact to look at that as indeed one of the areas we are going to achieve the contractors sit alongside of our officers and that they are not just as we say blue badgers represented by the gold stars on the wall on the entry to the cia headquarters but also contractors who have given as abraham lincoln in the last measure for the country. you will recall congresswoman because we've had discussions about this before that in fact i published a memo titled living our values as the commander in iraq i have done subsequent actions elsewhere the same year we published the counterinsurgency field manual less known was that we also oversaw the development and publication of the army field manual that lays out what is acceptable and interrogation techniques no one has overseen detainees at least in recent decades that i have commanding both in afghanistan and iraq and in central command. we believe in that field manual. we believe that it is appropriate and that it is in line with the geneva convention and also the techniques that work. my thought on that. i would second, however with the dni set the context in the immediate wake of my 11th for what it's worth my sense is that it's now time to take the rear view mirror of the bus to look forward to practice what we have learned works and what we believe is right and move on in this regard. with respect to the cia support for the nypd indeed there is an adviser who is and tries to ensure that there is a sharing of information as that is the central and advisable noting that we are very sensitive to the civil liberties and privacy and indeed that there is an ig investigation that is requested by the acting director and for the position of the director but will continue to follow on just to ensure that we are doing the right thing if you well in that particular case. >> thank you, madam chairman. we tend to focus oftentimes on iraq, afghanistan and where we spent the last ten years trip to petraeus and clapper however it seems oftentimes in the media we fail to pay attention to the problems that are very close to home. be it from california we are facing ever-growing challenges with the violence at the border especially with criminal gang activity. you only been on the job of weeks i will hold you accountable for this but i would like to get both of your thoughts as to the ever escalating violence that we are watching across strictly across the border from last if there's anything this committee should be doing to ensure our borders are safe and that nothing bad happens, which i think the more unrest there is at the border the more likely to miss shift can occur by not just the mexican drug cartels but possibly would invite folks from other parts of the world to participate in the mistress and i would like to get your thoughts on that. >> first, you alluded to -- let me start here but you a limited to something that is a great and a growing concern to all of us in the intelligence community and particularly in the ct domain if you will, which is of the homegrown variety of the extremists fed by and motivated by engaging on line with al qaeda and other extremist forms. the reason that is such a critical challenge for us is the home grown very often doesn't use signatures if you will, beatles signatures that are detectable like the classical intelligence means that also i think and endorsement of the need for the involvement for the state and local officials notably state and local police officials i have one of my few remaining advisory groups as a homeland defense and law enforcement group which consists of a number of a very distinguished law enforcement officials from all over the country, and i will be in chicago next month to speak to part of these international associations of the chiefs of police for the 15 major metropolitan areas, and it is in my second year as an initiative i need to push harder which is an outreach to the state and local. the other issue that you raise which is of great concern is what we are doing with mexico as partners there are a number of intelligence initiatives working with the mexican government which would probably be best discussed in the closed session. but believe me, we are as concerned as they are about the effect on the national security of both of the country's. >> director petraeus? >> if i could augment that a bit. really what your question speaks to, congressman, is the issue again of the global coverage. again, rightly we should be absolutely riveted on the counter terrorist mission. we must continue to prosecute that very aggressively. it's the most immediate threat if you will but while we are doing that we can't be like little kids and a soccer game and play magnate paul with that and lose sight of the rest of the field and this is part of the rest of the field and that is the part that is coming enormous concern and the proximity of the country and of course we are talking not just about mexico with other countries in central and south america where some of this emanates from the first place. there is a good whole of government approach in this regard not just the intelligence community but in deed other elements of the interagency and certainly the military for the northern command and southern command recently to become reasonably familiar but this isn't an area that is going to get much more in deed over time as an overseas travel convinces the will be high on the list of the places to visit given the serious concern that mexico has in addition to the concerns that we have. >> i just want to reflect similar comments that you've heard from other folks here on the panel but thank you both for your service to the country and congratulations, director petraeus on your role. i yield back madame chair. >> mr. schiff? >> thank you madam chair and gentlemen both for your extraordinary lifetime of service grateful to you. general petraeus, the 9/11 commission recommended that the lead responsibility for the paramilitary conducted operations whether covert or clandestine should transfer from the intelligence community to the defense department. that hasn't happened. i would be interested to know and you are in a unique position to comment on this whether you think that should happen and clearly there are some pros and cons to that. is that something you push for in your prior occupation of our current occupation or do you think that the recommendations of the commission also sound of the time has been overtaken by events and improved cooperation between the cia and the defense department from and general clapper, let me try to get this question in if we have time. the air of a spring that it has been the most significant development since the war in afghanistan. the military efforts there and in pakistan have done more to provide a military body to the command and control of al qaeda than anything else, but the end of spring has been a body blow to the philosophical and all ideological underpinnings of al qaeda. how will our intelligence approach change in light of this really phenomenal opportunity to undermine the whole reason for being for al qaeda indy 500 i'm very familiar with the issue of the title tenet title l we have the forces that carry it out in the counter terrorist operations and then also having provided title ten forces to the title 50 to the agency to conduct the title 50 operations on a number of occasions. i'm very clear on which is which at any given time i was very comfortable with the geographic combatant commanders the central command in addition to when i was the commander in the war in iraq and afghanistan with the respective roles of the agency and of conventional regular soft wheat and the so-called special mission units that were under my operational control in those different situations. i think it's worth noting the special operations commander, the most recent one testified he didn't think there was a need for all of these operations to be under the military. when i've been in charge of these different operations again in iraq and afghanistan and more broadly in central command there's more than enough work to go around and we have a very good cooperation and coordination and that has improved substantially on their way that the courses with this i think but there have been others as well model of which have been publicized which is appropriate given the title 50 operations that are covert. so again, i really quite comfortable with of the way that this has evolved since the recommendations were made to assure that level and i can assure you with secretary leon panetta and admiral craven with of the new jsoc commander and where i am with other commissions to the to positions this is going to be very much a team effort and the coordination of cooperation has been the essential to some of the past successes and would be augmented and improved in the months and years ahead. >> i would simply add to that that i think that there is a great strength in having both capability resident in both places simply to give the president the commander chief as many in his quiver as possible with the arnove spurring we have done a lot of introspection on that. i have some pretty direct guidance from the president on that as a matter of fact, and i think that what it has shown as you mentioned it has served as messy as it is marginalized the al qaeda missiles come al qaeda is in the position of trying to catch the train after it's already left the station was up in the nineveh spring isn't consistent with al qaeda as has been advocated how will it change us? i think what it is reinforced something we knew it is the importance of being attention to the social media and what a barometer that can be for the sentiment for the people in the street it is not the panacea but yet is another and the intelligence arsenal to understand what's going on but will not enable us to predict future events. there is a certain amount of i like to point out at least i think it's a good thing to remember the distinction between the mysteries of secrets and they're kind of noble and mysteries are not and too often people will hold us in the intelligence community to the same standard for the defining both and we cannot. >> mr. lobiondo? >> mr. thompson? >> thank you madame share and general. >> excuse me, i made a mistake. senator udall next. >> madame chair, i am happy to yield to the congressman lobiondo if my time remains intact. >> for mr. thompson out of deference to my former colleagues. if i could follow up, congressman. >> you have been gracious. cynics before senator udall. general, thank you both for being here today and for your service to our country. i'd like to know, general clapper, how we are doing in regard to the guidelines that you have set forth in regard to the gao of the government accountability office working with the intelligence community when that's appropriate. as you know, when this committee and congress has taken a very keen interest in making sure that we have this corporation, you had some experience with this in regard to the reform efforts on the security clearance issue i'd like to know how we are doing in that regard what sort of progress we are making and since you issue the guidelines were we stand. >> we do have some intense but i think professional discussions with the general accounting office and i think that we did a ride out what i believe is a good compromise document which is fairly general as those things tend to be what at least in my mind is let's try this out and develop a body of law and see if we have issues we can't work out. and to this point, we have not had any issues. i had a lot of experience with the general accounting office, the investigations and studies in the previous incarnations. most notably, as you elude it to in the clearance reform and where i believe the gao performed a very useful service by keeping after last and keeping us honest sustaining the amendment and the pressure to bring about clarence reform which is still ongoing. there is a case we have made huge head ways and progress but there's more to be done. so in answer to your question, i would -- since the directive is only about two months old, i would suggest we watch how this unfolds and see what comes up in the way of the studies and investigations the gao wants to do, and i've pledged to them privately and i will publicly that we will cooperate to the maximum extent possible. >> thank you. director petraeus and colleagues that outlined them and i think that you did also. we have tremendous tactical intelligence success in this fight against terrorism. i am interested in the strategic intelligence successes and whether or not we are devoting enough resources and we have the information that we need to strategically go after to this issue, and do we know -- and we have the resources and diverting the resources necessary for the motivations and the goals of the folks who are trying to do less harm and if not what do we need to be doing differently and how do we need to redistribute those resources in order to get to that? i think that's a very important part of the overall fight against terrorism. .. >> the root causes, understanding what the goals are, what motivates individuals to do this is very, very important. we have put a lot of effort into that in the intelligence community. we think we have reasonable understanding that some of these, of course, are greater problems of society, of lack of rule of law, lack of education, lack of opportunity, jobs, and so forth, and, indeed, they require, you know, if you will, whole of government responses. that's, of course, what the state department is engaged in. there's a new initiative, by the way, that you will have seen announced just in the past few days by the state department in this broader area of information that has potential, but, again, this takes -- this is not something that can just be handled with public affairs efforts, but it requires in many cases real reforms within societies so that extremists are discredited. i think it's very important to note as the dni did a moment ago that the fact that the arab spring has resulted in changes to these long tenured regimes, and that it came about because of the people, because of popular movements, not because of the violence in extremism that bin laden said was necessary to change the regimes. in that sense, that narrative has been discredited, but, indeed, there are other elements of the nationtive that still -- narrative that still with some individuals they are found to ring true, and that is a big problem, and one that we have to continue, not only to study, but then to try to figure out how do you help the governments of these countries to address the root causes of the problems. >> thank you, mr. thompson. senator udall? >> thank you, chairman. two comments, and then a couple questions i have. i've been in and out of the hearing this morning, but i want to acknowledge the tremendous work that went into assuring that the events all over the country on sunday came off without a hitch, and i think that's a tribute to the intelligence communication that's been expanded since the terrible events of ten years ago. at the same time, i think we all acknowledge that we have to be right every time. our enemies only have to be right one time. secondly, general petraeus, great to see you here in your new role. you and i had conversations about enhanced integration. >> right. >> i don't want to continue that conversation today, 3wu i want to go -- but i want to go on the record i'm a strong opponent of investigation, and i base that on constituents and others. if -- it undercuts our capacity to do so. >> let me respond then because that's pretty important they are imp kateed that i'm for i.t., and i'm not. i've been clear, again, earlier, it was on my watch that we dwoched the army field manual based under executive order governs how interrogations are conducted. i've overseen them, we adhere to the manual and before we had that as division commander, we said we'll follow the geneva convention period, and not go beyond that, beyond that, the army manuals work. there's no implication and our values direction to the troopers as variety dimes as ale, and also, of course, the agency doesn't do interrogations at this point anyway. >> that's fair. your point is sterling in this regard, you've been a leader, and i thank you for that. >> thank you. >> let me ask a simple questions, ten years passed since the years of 9/11, do you believe al die da exists ten years from now as well as other violent groups as well. general clapper, turning to you to kick it off. >> i don't believe al-qaeda ten years from now will necessarily exist in the form today or what it was ten years ago, but what i do see is the so-called franchises we talked about i think will probably be a threat to us so the aqaps, aqis, aqim's erst, there could be other chapters of those. i think we achieved dramatic successes in taking down and damaging core al-qaeda, but the whole notion of franchises or variance thereof will be with us for some time. >> i would agree with that. i moreover say extremist groups at large will exist, not all of them necessarily motivated by something rooted in misreading of the islamic faith, but perhaps some as they are now. not all is extremist groups or are islamic extremist groups. there's a variety of others if you look at the designation of the state department. there will be, unfortunately, movements out there motivated by a variety of different objectives that will carry out extremist activities. >> i think that speaks to congressman thompson's point with the strategic view as well and superempowered small groups. >> exactly. >> let me jump around with the time i have remaining. the country has the privacy and civil liberties oversight board as you two know, and i know most agencies, if not all, have their own privacy officers. can you describe the interagency process where civil liberty concerns are reviewed by the board i mentioned and brought to your attention and that the others. general clapper, i don't know if that's more directed towards you given general petraeus' 8th day on the job. >> and counting. >> and counting. >> i would first, closer to home, something i am very familiar with is the function of the civil liberties and privacy officer by law is required as a part of the office of director of national intelligence. that function i have learned in my tenure as dni is extremely important, and i attempt to engage alex joel, who's known to many on both committees, who is a superb intelligence officer, but very, very mindful of the importance of civil liberties and privacy. i endeavor to engage him as much as i possibly can along with the general council assigned to as a part of my office in these very, very important endeavors. we have many overseers in addition in this respect. nobly the president's intelligence advisory board, oversight board, and, of course, you all here provide, i think, very detailed and multilayered -- which is important -- oversight over the protection of civil liberties and privacy. one of the functions of this office is to do outreach with the constituent groups, aclu and groups like that. it's very important to maintain an open and complete dialogue with such organizations. we don't always necessary all agree, but we dialogue and try to be as transz parent on these -- transparent on these things as we possibly can to anyone in a legitimate position of oversight. >> thank you for that, and i count on you to continue to be really focused in this, and i'll end with this note. franklin said famously a society exchanging essential liberties for short term security deserves neither. easy to say, challenge to implement. this is really, really crucial, and i'm counting on you two gentlemen to help us keep faith with franklin. thank you. >> thank you. senator wyden? >> thank you, madam chair and chair rogers as well for this important session today. yes mep, i want to ask a couple questions about intelligence reform. let me start with you director petraeus because you've had a chance to look at intelligence reform both as a senior military officer and now in your current capacity as cia directer. my question, i think, to start, director petraeus, have there been instances where you have said thank god there is a director of national intelligence or thank god there's a national counterterrorism center? can you give us a couple examples since you've had both of these experiences where you looked at specific up stances and said this is a place where intell reform has made a big difference. >> well, in fact, this past weekend, in fact, as we were working through to confirm various threat streams and as i mentioned earlier, this -- there was a credible threat, and it was an important one, not just because of 9/11, but because of all the pieces that seemed to be coming together. it started with information gathered by agency individuals, and, indeed, we've very quickly, the ctc, the counterterrorism center within the cia which also has interagency reps, but began piecing all this together and opened up very quickly the dialogue with the nctc, and that's how, indeed, you get it into the law enforcement agencies and share it throughout the rest of the interagencies. i didn't -- i can't honestly say that i blurted out loud thank god, but i was appreciative of the role of nctc and the olson and his team and what they did in cooperation with the cictc and variety of other elements, fbi and others in seeking to get to the bottom of this to follow leads, to take various actions to alert law enforcement at the local state and national level, so i think that's a very, you know, topical example of that. beyond that, if i could go all the way back to where i was on 9/11, i happened to be in bosnia at the time. i was a one star general as the assistant chief of operations for the nato command there, but i was dual hatted as deputy commander of a special unit engaged in the war criminal hunt, and we had at that time, the largest special mission deployment in the world, and in the wake of 9/11, we started doing counterterrorist operations. it turned out bosnia was a conduit into europe for extremists coming from pakistan, and, indeed, that there were residual elements and ngo's and others facilitating this activity. we developed very good coordination there. we literally established a joint interagency force for counterterrorism and found the information left that that entered a stove pipe. there was an fbi stove pipe, a cia stove pipe, and then dia, nga, and all of the other military intelligence agencies remitted there as well -- represented there as well. what was very good coordination at tactical level broke down as it went back to washington. since that time, i think in part, in large part because of intelligence reform, the establishment of the dni position, and, indeed, aggressive oversight by these two committees, those stove pipes have been broken down. there are still some out there, some even within my agency itself, and we're working to do that. we talk about -- this is not just the need to share. you have to share responsibly, so that we don't have exposure of material to individuals who don't have it a need to know in that case, but it needs to be accessible to those who do have a need to know and have a deed to share and to share responsibly. it's still not there, but it's been improved. >> those are good examples. maybe i can get you in the second question i wanted to ask. director clapper, you were very visible advocate for intelligence reform. you mentioned positive examples. maybe as i wrap up, can you give me a sense of what the big challenges are that remain to be tackled in intelligence reform, and if you and director petraeus because i think it almost picks up where director petraeus left off. give me a sense of what the big charges are in your view remains with intelligence reform. >> well, we are going to have a big challenge here in managing the cuts to intelligence funding, so how we do that and still attend to the intelligence community will be a huge challenge. my own personal agenda, if you will, now is to focus much more on the domestic realm. we've made a lot of progress in opening up the cooperation and flow of information both to state, local, tribal, and private sectors, and the other way. there needs to be more focus on that and one of the things i'm going to focus on is the intelligence enterprise as it applies to domestic arena. they will be working closely with the department of homeland security, but this is an area where i need to place more emphasis. that whole realm if you will is not as mature because we have not been doing it as long. that's a profound change occurring over the last 10 years. i was around before that, and, as you well know, sure, there's a fire wall between foreign and domestic, and now we have to figure out -- we're working on ways to break that fire wall down and ensure that appropriate legitimate information is shared sensibly and responsibly with our domestic partners. >> thank you. madam chair? >> if i can pile on quickly because i think the big challenge in my view is to make the existing structure processes, organizations, and systems work and work well. work effectively, quickly, and smoothly, and that can only be done by working together. everybody has to work as a team. we have to make way together. team work is not optional in this important area. >> thank you. congressman roon ey? >> [inaudible] >> excuse me. congressman? >> thank you, both, director clapper and director petraeus. director petraeus on your new role in the cia. you'll do a great job, every place you've been, you flourish. we appreciate all you've done over the last decade for this country and look forward to watching you progress in the next few weeks and months. i do have a question about our foreign lang capabilities, and, you know, one of the united states greatest weaknesses is collecting intelligence around the world because we have a small group of intelligence officials with enough foreign language capability and specific areas of expertise to access denied areas and blend in like locals, we just don't have enough people who have that expertise, but congress has supported programs like ncep, the boren psychological lores and -- scholars and fellows, and my question is what has the intelligence community learned about penetrating terrorist groups over the past decade? have we made sufficient strides in develops foreign language capability, and have we seen any improvement in our ability to collect intelligence as a result? >> well, i think the short answer is, yes, we have. i think there have been tremendous strides made in penetration in general. i think, though, that details on that probably best left to closed session, but there have been many successes, many new techniques that did not exist ten years ago that we have developed and refined. language will continue to be a challenge for us. the cia is -- obviously, director petraeus will want to speak to that, has been leader there. director panetta set a pretty high bar for language training and the requirements for progression within the agency. across the board, and this applies as well to the military. it has been a challenge developing native level fluenty among americans with these exotic langs we find in the middle east that we must find proefficiency in. it was easier for us to raise and have a kodre of linguists in russian and east european languages which comes to our people much more naturally than do the middle east languages. this is going to be a challenge. it's something we're working at, and we'll continue to do so, but we're probably not where we want to be. >> director petraeus? >> well, foreign language capabilities are critical. they are the point of the realm for some of our operators and officers in the field needless to say. director panetta established ambitious goals by 2015. the agency is generally on project ri to achieve those with recruiting and so forth. we do need to do more. i'll provide for the record what the goals are and how we're doing in terms of meeting them and what kind of slope we're on. there's improvement, but, again, we need to do more. diversity in the work force in terms of recruits a absolutely essential. we are working to have people who can, again, operate in countries, cultures, languages that are very different from our own and to do so successfully, and so that's another important component of this. as the dni mentioned, there have been important improvements in terms of penetration of various groups, and, again, happy to provide that in a closed session as well. >> okay. thank you, both, very much. i yield back. >> thank you very much. congressman heck? >> thank you for being here and for your service of selflessness to our nation. we heard about information sharing. this morning, and area of prime concern is working as emergency planner at the state and local level and working the joint interagency piece. director clapper in the opinion piece, you talked about changing the ic culture of one to need to know to a responsibility to cher. wiehle theyive proved, there's the growth of fusion centers and local high profile failures including the kris mall day bombings, and it's clear the information did not get outside the cylinder of excellence. now, we're teen years post-9/11. what more is needed to achieve that seamless information sharing that we try to attain in the intelligence community, and in light of the persistence of difficulties in information sharing, how do you say the odni is seen as value added at not just another layer of bureaucracy? >> well, excellent question, sir, and very relevant and pertinent, and it's the center of what i worry about in this job. i think, though, in the minds of many, there is -- it is though it was a simple formula to be applied so that on a matter of automa tisty we can collect automatically without due regard the messages. there's a -- classic balance we have to achieve with sharing on one hand -- responsible sharing, and then security on the other. i think -- and this is a case of developing kind of a body of law here and practice, and i think we're getting better and better at it. the fusion centers, which i think are a great step forward, something that didn't exist ten years ago, and there are now some 72 of them, and very candidly, some are much better than others. i visited some that i think are extremely capable. there is a federal an nexus to ensure that preparely designated information is shared quickly with state and local officials, and, again, as i mentioned earlier as something i want to work on the second year of my tenure is improving that domestic intelligence enterprise. i've had that request made by many state and local officials at international chiefs association and others that said we need this, and so i'm going to take that on, and in that see what we can do to improve, but i don't -- on sharing, butno silver bullet. it's just something we have to work at. obviously, wikileaks exposure and revelations there, there's been a wakeup call on in the minds of many on too much sharing, too much desemination of information of people who don't need it, and so we're instituting corrections there particularly in terms of auditing and monitoring what people are downloading and all this sort of thing, and this is 5 part of the balance effort between the two, but i assure you if this was a simple proposition of a mathematical formula, we would have applied it a long time ago, but it's much more complex than that. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much, first of all, i want to welcome general petraeus, now director petraeus, and thank you for your great service, and both of you i've had a chance to work with directly over the years. now, one of the -- one of the hard things in intelligence is sometimes we have the information, but we don't act upon it, or it doesn't get to the right people. this may have been asked. i apologize if it has already, but i'd like to go to this question. while the nctc improved counterterrorism coordination, there have been recent high profile failures. for example, various segments of the intelligence communities such as the fbi, the department of defense, people at walter reed knew about nidal malik hasan before he opened on a base in fort hood in november. similar failures existed with the attempted attack by umar farouk abdulmutallab that would be the underwear bomber before he boarded a plane in detroit on december 25th, 2009. the information known about these individuals did not get to the right people to prevent the attacks, and how do we improve that? i mean, i know -- i don't expect us to be perfection, but if -- there's always frustrating -- like 9/11, we had information about these people being trained. it came to the fbi, the fbi did not act upon it. can you tell me what you're trying -- you know, director clapper, what you're trying to do to make sure when we have the information it gets to the counterterrorism center and somebody acting on it. >> well, sir, there's the old saw that you learn in intelligence school early on. you know, there's just two conditions in life, intelligence failure or operational policy success. i would say that in the intelligence community like the adversaries has to be, and i believe is, a learning organization, and so in the case of the christmas bomber, for example, the intelligence committee did an outstanding piece of critique for us which, you know, lessons learned from that experience, and what we need to do to improve. one of the things that has been done to hopefully preclude a similar experience has been the availability of more information that could possibly shed light on potential terrorist travel, so travel records, immigration records, these kind of things that were not previously freely available to the nctc now are, and so we have -- thanks to former director mike leiter who led enhancements, whereby the analysts can spend less time, you know, listening and lining up material and can spend more time on analysis, so we've tried to go to school on -- as we always do -- on how to improve from a potential problem, and clearly, you know, luck plays 5 part here, so we need to learn from those experiences. i can tell you we'll endeavor to continue to be a learning organization, and not only try to profit from past experience, but to use that to anticipate what are other scenarios we might have to take on. >> general petraeus? >> well, chairman, it's great to see you again. i think this comes down to integration, sharing, and comes down to actually ensuring the information gets to the right people as best organizations k and, of course, the ctc at the central intelligence agency where you have this integration of operators and animal cysts which is hugely important, and the various fusion centers out there, the advent of increasingly larger data bases with applications also helps, but i think at the end of the day it comes down to people, and it comes down to people like the leader of our ctc, for example, who has been at this for a number of years, the leaders on the di and then national service side in that center, for example, who have been doing this for years, one of whom has turned down three promotions over the years and was critical on piecing all the -- connecting all the dots that led to the success of the intelligence that was provided for the raid, and at the end of the day, that's why we have to take care of the people even in con -- fiscally constrained times, continue to investment them, continue to attract the best and brightest, and provide meaningful jobs and activities for them. >> the two greatest attacks on the united states, pearl harbor and 9/11. we had information in both cases, so i think that this is an ongoing challenge is to make sure that people act upon the information. i don't mind having this exercise we went through this weekend. i think that's totally appropriate. if we have good information that's relatively good, we have to act on it, and i'd rather do that four or five times and prevent things from happening than not act when we know what the consequences can be. thank you. >> thank you. >> may i ask one more question? >> of course, mr. chairman. >> thank you. you know, one of the major problems here has been your predecessors, mr. clapper, only served for a very short time, and finally i think you and leon panetta were able to work out a relationship. i think this is very important that the dni, the role for the dni be accepted, you know, the relationship with the white house, director petraeus, you're going to play a role in this that we've got to make this relationship work, and i think it's fundamental to the entire intelligence community, and i just urge you both to put aside petty, you know, politics or organizational competition and make this relationship work. it's very important for the country in my judgment. thank you. >> thank you. >> let me take that just very briefly if i could, chairman dicks. >> of course. >> the bottom line is first of all, director clapper and i have known each other for years and years in a variety of positions for each of us, worked together closely, cooperatively, and smoothly. secondly, before my confirmation hearing, i went out, sat with the dni, and we talked through some of the issues that emerged as friction appointments with previous individuals in positions, and i watched this at various times, first as a central command commander at principles committee meetings and so forth, and then, of course, from afar in afghanistan, and we talked through those, and i like this think on both sides there's pragmatic approaches to this. as i mentioned in response to an earlier question here today, i think the time has come now, the focus should be on making what intelligence reform has brought about in terms of organizations, processes, and various elements work, and the only way to do that, again, is to work together and for everyone to cooperate in this very important endeavor in which we're engaged. >> thank you very much, mr. dicks. on that note, i'd like to thank our two witnesses. i think it's been an excellent hearing. i'd like to thank the members and turn it back to the chairman. >> thank you very much, senator feinstein. thanks to everyone in the senate and house, vice chairs on both sides, i think it's important that we do this occasionally again to let the public understand what is a difficult and -- because of its classifications, so thank you for taking the time to have that public dialogue, and we appreciate it, and we also look forward to a robust dialogue in closed session, and, again, to both of you, thank you, and thank you for your service, and with that, the committee [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> the hearing will come to order. good morning, and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses, secretary napolitano, and robert mueller, and first time confirmed, happy to welcome the new director of the national counterterrorism center, matthew olson. this past weekend in ceremonies and vigils across the nation, we stopped to remember the nearly 3,000 people killed ten years ago in the attacks of september 11, 2001, and to appreciate the acts of heroism and service by countless americans on that day and every day since to protect our homeland and defeat the violent islamic extremists who attacked us on 9/11 and drew us into the war that we are in. the 9th anniversary of 9/11 last year didn't get, obviously, the same degree of attention, and either will the 11th anniversary next year, and in some sense, that's why we're here this morning. this annual status of the threat against our homeland hearing with the heads of these three critically important agencies has become a tradition of our committee, and senator collins and i wanted very much to hold it after 9/11 to look back a little bit, but really to look forward and to make the point that our work goes on, our work to protect the homeland goes on. even though we had fresh warnings that alerted us over the past few days, over this weekend of comeme ration of a specific confirmed threat, there's already evidence that in a quite natural reaction, the people are beginning to forget how real the threat of islamic extremism continues to be. there was a gallop poll taken last year that showed terrorism ranked at the bottom of six concerns, six choices that people had to make in this country, understandably probably because of the intensity of the economic concerns that we had. ranked behind economy, jobs, federal corruption, spending, and health care. and in a different way last week a study published by the cato institute calling for an abolition of the homeland security returning us to where we were pre-9/11. we may be the victims of the success that has been achieved in protecting the homeland since there's obviously not been another mass casualty terrorist attack on american soil since 9/11, something a reality nobody would have predicted on that day. some have taken this lack of another large scale attack as further evidence to them, anyway, that the u.s. government exaggerated the danger posed by islamic extremism and overreacted in the wake of 9/11. i believe this is a profoundly mistaken and ultimately irresponsible conclusion. we have weakened our enemies, and we have protected our homeland, but our enemies are not vanquished, and that's why our vigilance has to be constant and not limited to the understandable public attention given to a particular anniversary. as the senate committee on homeland security, it's our responsibility to make sure our national focus is not distracted from the threat for our witnesses and the thousands, tens of thousands of people who work with them. it is their constant responsibility 24/7/365 days 5 year to protect our homeland, so we welcome them to this annual threat hearing, and we thank them for the service and for all that their respective agencies have had to do with the fact that we have not had another major terrorist attack against our homeland in the past ten years, but the violence islamic extremist ideology that motivated the attacks of 9/11 remains a poe tent force though weakened flout the world and increasingly though, of course, seems to have an effect in the radicalization of home grown terrorists incoming lone wolves. today, we've asked our three witnesses to help us answer at least three big questions. one is to take a quick look back to the extent with the u.s. government and what their agencies have done since 9/11 to, of course, the focus of this hearing is to discuss the current threat, the status of the threat of islamist terrorism to our homeland, and then the third is to discuss what our government current sly doing to -- currently 1 -- is doing to counter that threat, so for me the question today is not are we safer than we were on 9/11. i think it's self-evidently clear that we are safer. the question is what are we doing and what we should be doing to ensure that safety continues to be what it is and be greater in the face of the threat that we continue to face. the ten year anniversary of 9/11 has passed. the media and public attention will naturally fade, but this congress and future congresses, and this administration and future administrations must stay focused on the threat and its ever evolving tactics until the ideology is truly vanquished and gone. senator collins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the state of of maine became forever linked to the attacks of september 11th, 2001 when two of the hijackers, including the ring leader, mohamed atta, boarded and early morning flight to boston at the portland, maine jet port. from logan airport, they set in motion the worst terrorist attack in our nation's history by seizing control of the american airlines flight 11. that evening, members of congress gathered together on the steps of the capitol to express unity. a day that had begun in shock and anger ended with unity and resolve. we resolve to ensure that our country had the tools to detect and detour future plots as well as to identify those who would do us harm. when chairman libberman and i awe -- lieberman and i authored the reform of prevention of terrorism agent in 2004, our government was to create a strong leader to coordinate the 17 separate agencies of the intelligence community and to change their culture from need to know to need to share so that next time the dots would be connected in time to stop and attack. the operation that killed bin laden reasonable represented the kind of successful collaboration of intelligence and operations that we envisioned, information is now being shared more effectively, both across the federal government and among federal agencies and their state, local, and tribal part nors. -- partners. just last week, dhs and the fbi announced a specific, credible, but unconfirmed threat related to the 9/11 anniversary. thed administration is taking 24 -- this threat seriously and appropriately so. it has shared information and intelligence with state and local law enforcement officials at the targeted locations and others across the country. thankfully, there was not an incident over the weekend, but we must consider whether this particular threat has truly passed or whether the terrorists have just gone to ground. we must evaluate for how long should we remain on heightened alert. this threat demonstrates yet again that the terrorists have not abandoned their quest to harm our country and our people. they continue to probe for vulnerabilities. much has changed in the past decade. we have vastly improved the sharing of information across the agencies at the federal level and with state and local emergency and law enforcement professionals. america's chemical facilities and sea ports were especially vulnerable a decade ago, and we took important steps to safeguard them. in the case of last week's terrorist threat, the decision to publicize the threat put millions of eyes and ears on the lookout for suspicious behavior on the eve of the september 11th commemoration. we continue to expand our see something, say something law. the legislation that we've introduced would provide further protections against lawsuits for citizens who report suspicious activity indicating potential terrorist threats. when it comes to our homeland security, however, we truly are only as strong as our weakest link. as we saw in 2009 with the christmas day bomber and major hasad's attack years later when warning signals are ignored or overlooked, our security is placed at risk. the tsa has strengthened airline passenger screening. nevertheless, a young man was recently able to fly across country without a valid government issued id and with an expired border pass that did not even bear his name. similarly, the department of homeland security has bolstered the security of americans' borders and identification documents led to refugees with ties to al-qaeda were arrested in kentucky to help allegedly carry out attacks against our troops. how a known bomb maker whose fingerprints we had had for years was able to enter our country on humanitarian grounds remains an unanswered and troubling question. it appears, however, that this case may reflect the kinds of lack of imagination that the 9/11 commission found to be a persistent failure. while the fbi's announces iring's ed's collected in iraq and afghanistan has up doubtedly helped u.s. war fighters, the forensic information collected from these devices should also be used to screen those trying to enter our country, and we must ensure that the fbi has the resources necessary to do that job. we must ask this question -- are there other iraqi nationals granted asylum involved in attacking our troops? i know that the administration is reviewing the files of more than 51,000 iraqis admitted under this refugee program, but it's deeply troubling that we're still awaiting clear answers from the administration. home grown terrorism is another challenge and evolving threat. this committee first sounded the alarm about home based terrorism five years ago and has held more than a dozen hearings on this topic. over the past two years, 31 arrests have been made in home grown plots by american citizens or legal, permanent residents, and enormous increase compared to the previous seven years dating back to 2001. yet, the administration's strategy for countering violent islamic extremism is insufficient to meet the threat. we shall never forget those whom we lost on september 11, 2001. as has been noted often, the terrorists only have to get it right once. we have to be right every time or suffer the consequences of an attack. we are surely much safer than we were a decade ago, but we must be relentless in anticipating the changing tactics of terrorists. as a successful long decade search for osama bin laden proved, america's resolve is our most powerful weapon against those who seek to destroy our way of life. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator collins. secretary napolitano is first, but before she testifies, the department of homeland security held a departmental commemoration of 9/11, and i was able to attend outside on the plaza of the reagan building here in downtown washington, and the department showed a video made by people within the department about its history, particularly on that day, and i thought it was very impressive, and for me, moving, and i asked the secretary if she'd bring it today, so i'm sorry not everybody in the room can see it -- maybe that screen over there, but whoever's in charge of the machine at this point, please turn on the video. it's only about two or three minutes. ♪ >> ten years ago, our nation suffered the worst terrorist attack in our history. we all remember the great sense of shock and sadness we felt that day. >> all of us remember where we were on that morning of september the 11, 2001. >> some of us lost family members, friends, colleagues, loved ones, and people we admired. >> nearly 3,000 lives were lost including citizens of more than 90 countries and of many faiths and backgrounds. >> that day changed us as americans, as a people. >> it brought our society together with a remarkable theory of unity and changed how we look at threats from terrorists and led to major changes in government and led to the creation of this department, the department of homeland security. >> this september 11th, we remember those we lost, and we celebrate their lives. >> and we we commit to the -- recommit to the ideals of service and sacrifice. >> and support for the lives changed that day. >> america's stronger than we were a decade ago. we bounced back from the worst attack on our soil. >> we built a culture of resilience and will protect ourselves. >> our experience over the last ten years has also made us smarter about the threats we face and how best to deal with them. we used knowledge to make us resilient, not just with terrorist attacks, but threats and disasters of all kinds. >> the thanks goes to you. >> the men and women who work at the department of homeland security. >> every day you rise to the challenges that have been placed on us. >> dhs is there. you are there. rain or shine, day or night. >> in the washington area -- >> in the field or in one of more than 75 countries around the world. >> we're all part of the same team working tirelessly working to protect america. >> protecting our hometowns, communities, and neighbors. >> one dedicated group of individuals. >> we are -- >> proudly one dhs. >> as we mark the anniversary of one of the most tragic days -- >> we note to the great accomplishments. >> of the young department. >> i want to express my deep appreciation. >> and my gratitude what you do every day to keep the country safe. >> and so say to every one of you, thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> well, i thought that was great. i hope my colleagues on the committee did. it really -- there's such a powerful statement of the unity. i thought it was wonderful to include secretary's ridge and chertoff in it and all the sense of unities and resolve. i appreciate it very much, and with that, please proceed, secretary, with your testimony. >> well, thank you. thank you, chairman lieberman and senator collins, and members of the committee. i obviously appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the department of homeland security's efforts to keep our nation safe against ever evolving threats. this weekend, our nation observed the 10th anniversary of 9/11, and we honored nearly the 3,000 innocent victims as well as their friends, their colleagues, and their families. we saluted the many first responders and law enforcement officials who responded with such courage and conviction on that tragic day and in the days that followed. while these past few days remind us that we must remain individual lent and prepared as threats against our country remain, the recent anniversary of 9/11 is also a time to consider the progress we've made. as chairman lieberman noted, america is a stronger and more secure nation today. we bounced back from the worst attack on our soil, and we have made progress on every front to better protect ourselves. we used our experience to become more resilient, not only to terrorist attacks, but to threats and disasters of all kinds. following 9/11, the federal government income -- including many members on this committee moverred -- moved quickly to develop a security framework to protect the country from attacks from abroad while balancing capabilities to prepare for, recover, and respond to attacks here at home. a key element of the new security frame work included the creation of department of homeland security, and over the past ten years, dhs and its many partners across the federal government, across public and private sectors strengthened the homeland security enterprise to better mitigate and defend against every present and ever evolving threats. perhaps the best way to illustrate the progress we've made is to apply today's security architecture to what existed when the terrorist attacks of 9/11 occurred. the 9/11 plot, like many terrorist plots, began overseas which means our security layers must be beginning 24 as well. with respect to intelligence, planning for 9/11 began several years before the actual attacks. bin laden's summoned operatives to afghanistan and discussed using commercial aircraft as weapons. we strengthened the depth intelligence enterprise to get the information to where the operation may occur. with respect to visa security, all the 9/11 hijackers applied for visas overseas. today, the dhs visa security program deploys trained special agents to high risk posts around the world to conduct targeted in-depth reviews of visas before they reach the united states. .. serious agreements and more are under way. after 9/11 the federal government discovered that information exist about the hijackers well before and after they came to the united states but disinformation had not been coordinated, shared and analyzed. since 9/11, the federal government along with its state, local, tribal private sector partners has made significant improvements to enhance information sharing and analysis with respect to targeting the federal government and dhs in particular has become more effective at analyzing travel related data to better understand and anticipate the travel patterns of known or suspected terrorists. this analysis has been an essential in identifying targeting and interdicting known and suspected terrorists and prompting additional screening before these individuals travel to the united states. we've established 72 fusion centers with a service focal points for the receipt and of discovering and sharing of threat related information among the federal, state, local cultural territorial partners. today the intelligence community is able to identify the common threads that can tie a seemingly minor crime to the larger threat picture and all but a few of the fusion centers are now connected to the hs d m which is a secret level real-time data system shane zearing data across the country. once the 9/11 hijackers made it to the united states, they still required access to aircraft. with respect to flight schools part of 9/11 the hijackers in the world of the flight schools and conducted cross-country surveillance flights. today the tsa screens all foreign students seeking flight training against terrorist criminal history and immigration databases. with respect to passenger screening, ten years ago the nine alleged hijackers were able to purchase tickets and boarding planes carrying weapons. today, through the secure flight program, dhs prescreens 100 per cent of the 14 million passengers flying weekly to, from command within the united states against the government watch lists and senator collins i think i can elaborate that that would have if it had been deployed prevented the situation that you refer to with of a boarding pass. moreover, transportation security officers at more than 450 airports now screen all checked and carry-on baggage for explosives, weapons and other threats using cutting edge technologies and with respect to be if your detention, even though some of the 9/11 hijackers were randomly selected for additional screening and a roast of suspicion of gate agents they still need to launch a plan. tsa's behavior detection officers today work to identify potentially high risk passengers who exhibit behavior is that indicate they may be a threat to aviation security and refer them for additional screenings. the last line of defense against the aviation security is on the plane itself. with respect to the airplane security today, all commercial aircraft have hardened the cockpit doors and federal air marshals are deployed across the aviation system based on risk. with respect to emergency communication, limitations and communication and interoperable the iman air-traffic control operators, military personnel and first responders hinder the response on 9/11. our nation has since made significant investment and training and technical assistance to improve emergency communications capabilities to read each of these lawyers come by and creates a stronger security architecture that did not exist on 9/11 and that helped keep our nation, our transportation system, and the american people safe over the past ten years. we would not be where we are today without the direct involvement and support of the congress and particularly this committee. i want to thank you for your support from your guidance and you're continued oversight. we continue to engage the broader homeland security enterprise in the nation's protection. we've made great progress but more remains to be done. thank you. >> thank you, said it in public. i particularly appreciate the pre-9/11 comparison to today because of documents in a very tangible way the progress we've made, and it in 62 vindicates the conclusion that i've come to over the years and it's a very painful one which was that 9/11, 2001 could have been prevented and should have been prevented, and that is if it was tried today it would be prevented and that's a very important thing to be al jazeera. director's mueller, thanks for being here. talk about change as compared to the department of homeland security didn't exist on 9/11 as the american institution it has gone through a dramatic transformation in the last ten years under your leadership to become our domestic counterterrorism agency had really first-rate at that and also we thank you for agreeing to stay on for two more years as i shall also thank your life for allowing you to stay on. [laughter] please proceed with your testimony. >> thank you. good morning mr. chairman and senator collins, members of the committee, i think you for the opportunity to appear here today before you. as it has been pointed out since september 11th, the threat from terrorism has evolved in ways that present new challenges for the fbi and our partners and today the threat environment is far more complex and diverse than ever before and in response to the fbi has undergone on president of information over the past ten years as mr. sherman, you pointed out. we have developed new intelligence capabilities necessary to address terrorist and criminal threats. we have created the of the ministry different technological structure to meet our mission as a national security agency, and we have made these changes while continuing to safeguard american civil liberties. let me begin by focusing on the most serious threats we face and then discuss how the fbi has changed since september 11th to counter these threats. al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and its leader anwar al-awlaki have shown a commitment not only to attack the united states but also to inspire act of terrorism for overseas or from overseas. the past two years it's taken a tax directly targeting the homeland. we saw this with a failed attempt sent package bombs to the united states on cargo planes and in the attempted bombing on christmas day the year before. anwar al-awlaki and the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to this attack. they also continue to emphasize operations in the west and have sought to radicalize individuals over the internet to carry all the attacks here and in europe and despite the recent counterterrorism success abroad, and there have been many, cord al qaeda also remains committed to the high-profile attacks directed at the west. we saw this with the 2009 plot by a zazi in the subway and we confirmed this from the material seized on osama bin laden's compound last spring. as you know we continue to track the current streams from al qaeda, threat streams that became public last week and pakistan such as ttp have similarly shunned an attempt to target the united states to release all this when they claimed responsibility for the times square at him to the bombing. and we remain concerned that all of these groups encourage radicalized westerners particularly u.s. citizens to travel to east africa for the training with the potential to return to the united states to conduct attacks. of course the threat from home from violent extremists is among the most serious terrorism threats today. individuals may be reckless over the internet even if they do not receive direct guidance or training from a terrorist group. these individuals may have diverse backgrounds and life experiences as well as different motives. increasingly, many acting alone and for these reasons, and violent extremists are harder to detect and to disrupt. and the fbi along with the partners in ctc, department of homeland security and the other law enforcement and intelligence communities are focused on these threats more than perhaps eight, nine, ten years ago. and force the fbi remains concerned about the domestic terrorist threat as well. economic and political issues could motivate white supremacists and militia extremists to violence and as you know, domestic terrorists connaughton operate as the defenders were small cells which are difficult to detect. over all the threat environment has evolved significantly since september 11th and is more complex and diverse than ever before. this requires the bureau and partners to change and not constantly to address these threats to the as you pointed out, mr. chairman, the fbi has undergone an unprecedented change in the years since september 11th. today the fbi is a stronger organization as a result, and we continue to focus on the national security threats as our highest priority. after september 11th, the deutsch boesh of the 2,000 agents from criminal investigations to the national security matters. over the years that follow we centralize management of counterterrorism and intelligence operations headquarters to avoid the stovepiping of information. structurally we created the national security branch in 2005 to consolidate and integrate the tero's overall national security mission and engage senior executives the authority to accelerate the integration of intelligence and to the national security operations. we established the director of intelligence at the headquarters to manage our intelligence programs nationwide and create field intelligence groups to prioritize and each of the field offices to prioritize intelligence collection in each of the field offices and we hired and trained thousands of new analysts and agents on the capabilities to read the following september 11th, the fbi agreed the increased the number of joint terrorism task forces and the task force is operating around the nation and we now have more than 100 of those task forces. the task force's bring together the expertise from our federal, state, local partners and this cooperative effort has led to numerous successes and disrupting terrorist plots and threats since september 11th. after september 11, the fbi also recognized the need to recruit, hire and train the intelligence analyst condra necessary to meet the requirements of the national security mission. in 2001 the bureau had one doesn't, approximately 1,000 intelligence analysts and fewer than 30 analysts to read to the bureau was triple the number of intelligence analysts to more than 3,000 we have more than 270 supervisory analysts. let me as an aside emphasize the fbi role of countering cyber attacks. one of the most significant complex threats facing the nation. the intelligence law enforcement capabilities the bureau is positioned to investigate and disrupt cyber intrusions' and our need to counter the cyber tax cuts across all of our programs including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and the criminal programs. beginning in 2007 we worked with our partners to establish the national cyber investigative joint task force which now includes 24 turtle and intelligence community agencies. through these partnerships the bureau has identified investigated and prosecuted an unprecedented number of intrusion cases and these intrusions of and directed the military, other government agencies, the financial and communications sectors and other critical infrastructures. addressing this cyber threat will be among the fbi's highest priorities now and in the years to come. let me conclude by thanking the committee for the continued support of the men and women of the fbi and support for our mission as it has evolved to read this is essential to our transformation and our ability to meet today's diverse threats. as the psychiatry said i would be happy to answer any questions that he might have to read some of thank you very much, director. we look for to the question period if you. welcome. obviously counter to the conventional counterterrorism centers on of the most significant new entities created in the government to put it simplistically to make sure the botts are connected but obviously does much more than that so this is the first appearance before of but confirmation and we welcome you. estimates before. german lieberman, ranking member, some members of the committee, good morning. as we begin with me thank you for taking the time to meet with me during my confirmation. i appreciate your counsel and support. i'm honored that my first hearing of the director of the national counterterrorism center is before the committee that authored the legislation creating in ctc. i welcome this opportunity to discuss the evolution of the terrorist threat and the collective efforts to address that threat. i am also pleased to be transitory napolitano and director mueller this morning and it's appropriate we continue to reflect on the data that the nation suffers the worst terrorist attack in the history. after a few weeks as the director of the nctc i can report the center is a national asset and its conquest of dedicated and talented intelligence professionals representing a wide array of perspectives experiences. i'm also proud to leave the center continuing the work of andrew, mike leiter and my testimony today reflects the thoughtful and a rigorous analysis of the expert work force at nctc. today's hearing asks the question to years after 9/11 our receiver and chairman lieberman as you said the bottom line is we are safer than we were ten years ago. but al qaeda and its allies and affiliate's continue to pose a significant threat facing the school and the hard work of the thousands of men and women and intelligence of the homeland security, diplomatic of law enforcement communities as well as the men and women in uniform who made significant progress in the fight against terrorism with the support and guidance of this committee in congress we've built an enduring counterterrorism framework. the framework that includes the establishment of the dhs, the transformation of the fbi and the creation of the montreal to the commercial center to replace pressure on the leadership, denied the group safe haven, resources and as a result, kallur al qaeda is weekend but a decade after the september 11 attacks we remain at war with al qaeda to read it's a resilience and active adversary and we continue to face any fault for this director mueller mengin from its affiliate and endurance. in the balance of my remarks i will briefly describe that terrorist threat and then discuss a bit about the role of the nctc and the challenges we face. first al qaeda's core capability to conduct attacks has been significantly diminished. again, chairman lieberman in your words weakened but not a question the group remains the ideological leader of the global extremist movement. it continues to influence others through propaganda. al qaeda as senior leadership has advanced several unsuccessful small-scale western faults in the past two years and these highlight and its ability to continue attack preparations while understand counterterrorism pressure and just the past week we acted in response to the unconfirmed intelligence possible threat the group was planning attacks in the united states. we remain concerned that al qaeda may be plotting to strike against the united states at home or overseas. further since el pais relocation to pakistan has encouraged its militant allies to expand the operational edge and as to include u.s. and western targets both within the region and overseas. for example, faisal shahzad's attended bombing is a stark reminder that the allies continue to threaten the u.s. interest in afghanistan and pakistan region. additionally ten years after 9/11 we face a much more diverse and i used the threat from the group's affiliated with al qaeda to read these affiliate's has increased the scope of the operations seeking to strike some u.s. and western targets with inside and outside of the respective regions to be the single most capable of fully it is al qaeda and the arabian peninsula or aqap. the recent gains in the government alleges increase our concerns about the group's capability to conduct attacks. for the propaganda efforts are designed to expire like-minded western extremists to conduct attacks in their home countries. aqap's attacks against the homeland, the head of the airliner attack in december, 2009 and its attempt to down the cargo planes in 2010 showed that the group is a determined and capable enemy that is able to adjust the dhaka. the evolution of the threat since 9/11 is the advent of the homegrown extremists as you mentioned ranking member collins to read these individuals are inspired by al qaeda as agenda and the past three years we seen an increase in the violent extremist english content online. this has fostered greater cohesion among the homegrown violent extremists. propes destructive in the last year appear to be unrelated operationally but may share a common cause rallying independent extremists to attack the homeland. the key feature has been the development of the narrative that addresses the unique concerns of the u.s.-based extremist. the narrative includes a blend of al qaeda's inspiration, perceived victimization and the glorification of homeland plotting. the independent attacks with no direction in side of the united states or overseas are difficult to detect and disrupt and could advance plotting with no warning. now turning to the rolph nctc. as the terrorist redefault of the past decade so has the government's ability to counter that threat. nctc has proven to be a vital element of the government-wide effort to counter terrorism. first as you know nctc is unique responsibility to examine all international terrorism issues to risk and geographic boundaries so that we can analyze intelligence regardless of whether it is correct inside or outside of the united states. nctc has access to the fall catalog of the reporting both foreign and domestic on terrorism issues. last year nctc had the pursuit group to develop tactical needs and pursue the terrorism threats, pursued group analyst with connections among the less obvious details to help ensure the terrorist threats are fully examined. nctc continues to implement important reforms in the watch listing process. this includes better processing and sharing of the information or watch listing experts within the pursuit group or the fbi and with the department of homeland security to expedite the sharing of information and to build more complete terrorist identity. nctc also conducts strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities. in this role nctc looks beyond the individual department and agency missions to the development of a single unified counterterrorism effort across the federal government. we did the plans to help translate high-level strategies of policy direction in to the coordinated activities. finally, as the committee is well aware the center continues to be the home to the interagency threat assessment and coordination group to read the group is led by the dhs and in partnership with fbi and brings together federal and ma federal intelligence law enforcement first responder communities to bridge the intelligence information gap between the traditional intelligence agencies on the one hand and state and local and private sector partners on the other. i would like to close today by identifying the most important resource and that is our people. as we redouble the effort to meet the terrorist threat, our progress depends on maintaining and developing our talented and diverse work force. we bring together professionals from across the government to focus on the single mission, counterterrorism and we must strive to work collaboratively to share information and to integrate our efforts. finally come of direct these must be consistent with our core values and the protection of privacy and civil liberties and everything we do nctc must retain the trust of the american people as it fulfills it's critically important responsibilities. chairman lieberman, a ranking member collins and members of the committee to for the opportunity to testify today. as you know perfection is no more possible and counterterrorism than it is in any other endeavor and we always strive to improve the leadership's support and direction have been in valuable helping us move for to carry out the mission and to work with results to protect the nation. thank you. >> thank you, director very much. we will go to the questions now and start with a first-round of seven minutes for each senator. let me begin by bring to the threat stream that alerted everyone in the government and the nation last week as we approached the tenth anniversary. it was described as specific credible but unconfirmed court and corroborated. let me ask you first what is the status of the review of the threat now? do we consider to be an ongoing threat from sector napolitano, director mueller, whichever? >> chairman lieberman, i will refer to director mueller but yes, we consider it an ongoing threat. we continue to lean forward into conforming that threat. >> it has not been resolved and until it is resolved, it is an outstanding threat that we are following up on even though september 11 has now passed we do not believe that that necessarily means that we should back down and consequently the department of homeland security and the intelligence agencies are pursuing that as heavily as we have in the last several days and we will continue to do so until that is resolved. >> sifry free here you treacly it remains confirmed by the intelligence stream was specific and credible enough that you are not prepared to dismiss it? >> no. >> do not add anything to that? >> i share the views of the director and secretary. we are not prepared to see that it's been resolved and we continue to work to analyze it and share information about it. >> i would like to add one thing if i might that is since we first got word of that threat we have conducted hundreds of interviews. we've been pursuing a number of leads, and consequently, as a result of that, we have been able to eliminate some aspects where we thought we ought to be looking in order to determine whether it was indeed a valid threat but there is still work to be done. >> that's reassuring for my perspective. i was struck and i know there were plans already well in place to be it federal, state and local to be prepared to defend against another terrorist attack on attempting and with regard to the home grown radicals but others as well. i was impressed by the extent to which so many of the assets that our government has now in regard to homeland security counterterrorism were brought into action on this threat that we really i don't think would have been able to do ten years ago. one of these things that the 9/11 commission said is when they asked the question who is in charge of counterterrorism or the particular response to the terrorist threat they didn't have an answer. so, from my perspective it looked like you were all really working together very well, but i'm interested in who was in charge because at some point somebody has to be overseeing all of this. so who would you say is in charge? >> you have on the one hand of the intelligence agencies, the domestic agencies operational, dhs, fbi and the like all of whom we have been through this before. any number of times, and the relationships and the organizations come together very quickly given our history but i would say in the white house and the office of the national security adviser it makes certain that everything has been taken care of generally through nctc as the operational support arm but there is no question about the source of the leadership and the coronation and that's why we have been over the years effective in terms of coming together and sharing information, understanding our differing roles and complementing each other to make certain the job gets done to resolve the particular threats. >> that's very interesting. so the deputy national security advisor mr. brennan is involved in counterterrorism and homeland security acting on behalf of the president in charge of fuel and coordinating our assets but that the nctc plays an operational role on his behalf to you to comment on that mr. olson? >> yes, sir. i would say as you put it, john brennan put the coordinating role on behalf of the president in the last few days in response to this threat and our role at nctc is to be the place where information comes together because some of the information is coming from the cia, as coming from fpi. lots of information coming from dhs. we play a central clearing house world where we take all of that information come analyze it and share what we are seeing from the analytical standpoint. >> secretary, you want to add to that, does this sound right to you? >> it is an amazing coordination that might seem and i don't think would have been able to accomplish ten years ago. it is ultimately coordinated out of the white house. we all understand how we fit together. sometimes it's difficult to articulate and know it when you see it, but it does seem to increase our ability not only to share information among ourselves, but it's important that we get information to the country and receive information back, and that also is a difference between now and ten years ago and i can say that ten years ago when i was the attorney general of arizona, and it was very difficult to get information as to what was coming on with the attacks and what decisions were going to be made with respect to the air safety from airports, borders and all the rest. now that dislocation doesn't occur. >> i want to ask you one additional question and probably the most visible part of the change in the homeland security since 9/11 for most americans has been the presence of tsa at the airports and i think that they have done a great job. as you know, it is an annoyance to people but they put up with that, and before this committee mr. pistole indicated the department would like to move away from the one-size-fits-all approach to a more risk-based aviation security strategy to really wanted to ask you what the department is doing to implement the risk-based strategy and whether the moves would be made soon in that regard. >> i was fortunate to take director mueller's number to move him over to tsa commesso thank you i owe you -- with respect to the tsa, we do want to live and are moving to a more risk-based approach of the screening passengers to try to streamline procedures for those passengers who are low risk which enhances the ability to focus on the passengers who we either don't know or who are at high risk. we are piloting several programs to achieve these goals like now. one of them is the expansion of the global gentry, which is essentially a program to facilitate international travel. it's a prescreening of a passenger and those who have just a million passengers a couple weeks ago releases of petites coming in and out and crossing borders. we have been pleading also programs to deal with children under the age of 12 with respect to not only taking off their shoes but also pat-down procedures and we hope over the coming weeks and months we will be able to begin rolling that out. it does require additional training of all the thousands of the tsa officers and that's under way. we are obviously looking at some of the other things, procedures passengers need to make to streamline the process through the lines. there will always be some unpredictability in the system and there will always be random checks even for groups that we are looking at differently such as children under the age of 12, but i think the traveling public will begin to see how some of these changes really in the coming months. >> that's good to see. in the foreseeable future if i hear you correctly we may be moving to a system where children under 12 would not normally be subject to pat-down and the light to respond to devotee additional training for the different pat-down procedures for them and then also again, allowing them to leave their shoes on. islamic excellent. that's good news. senator collins. >> madame secretary, i want to go back to the bowling green case which was very troubling to many of us on this committee. as i look at the overall statistic, the dhs interviews more than 101,000 iraqi refugee applicants and approved more than 84,000 for resettlement in this country. there is an approval rate that exceeds 80% and i was surprised at the scope of this program. 58,810 iraqi refugees have been resettled here and are living here. now, i know from the previous dhs testimony and from my conversations with the director that there is the review of those that are here to make sure that we have not missed fingerprints or other data or intelligence the would indicate that eighth mistake was made in granting them the right to resettle in this country. but that leaves 25,625 who have been approved for resettlement but have not yet been resettled in this country. so my question is is there a hold on that population until they can be more stringently vetted to ensure we are not flooding into the country people who would do less harm? >> let me if i might answer in two parts. first with respect to the 56, 57,000 who were resettled pursuant to the original results and program. they have not been reveted against all of the dhs databases, all of the nctc databases and the department of defense biometric databases, and so that work has now been done and focused. >> completed? >> that is completed. moving forward, no one will be resettled without going through the same sort of debt. i don't know whether that equates to a cold as you say but i can say that having done already resettled population moving forward, they will all be reviewed against those kind of data bases. >> director mueller, it is reassuring to hear that those 58,000 individuals had been vetted against the existing database but in fact due to a lack of resources and the fact that this is not an easy task to do the matching and the lifting of the leading fingerprints don't you have a considerable backlog of fingerprints that have yet to be uploaded in to these databases? >> as we discussed there is a prioritization in terms of the explosive devices that we look at, and with that prioritization there's a substantial grouping of devices that haven't been looked at. we are taking the precautions of assuring that we maintain the capability of looking at it down the road and in other words assuring if there are fingerprints they can be recaptured down the road. but as you pointed out before it's a question of resources and we do have to prioritize. if we do get an indication of the name of a person who there's a question about we can do that much thorough review in going into this third tier to determine whether that person's fingerprints appear on any ied but requires a triggering of information in order to go to that ' to read and it's not just a small grouping as i think you understand it is substantial. and so, regardless of whether the resources should be given and what resources we can do more, nonetheless, there would be a ultimately the grouping that we just cannot applaud for a variety of reasons. >> but what concerns me is in the case of one of the individuals arrested in bowling green, his fingerprints were in those low were pretty ied parts; correct? >> correct. we have to go back and identify where it was sent to the additional research and i have done that and will continue to do that. >> but that depends on you getting the lead or the name of an individual where you can try to map out where that individual was as opposed to the dhs being able to run the fingerprints against the complete database; correct? >> they can run the fingerprints against the database but the database will not have that information from the third tier that hasn't been uploaded because of the vast amounts of the devices we have and the necessity to prioritize. >> and that third tier again happened to be where the fingerprint of the individual from kentucky were located. madam secretary, i want to talk to you about the fusion center. i have been a supporter of the fusion centers i visited one of them in a large urban area and one in a rural state and i have seen the information sharing that they do and i've been impressed but my enthusiasm is not shared by everyone. there are individuals on both sides of the ogle that argue that the fusion centers are duplicative of the joint terrorism task force to read why do we need them when we already have this multi agency task force particularly in a time of budget constraint. senator warner's essentials letter in june on that issue, senator coburn's subcommittee is looking at the effectiveness of the fusion centers, and i know that the dhs has conducted a study to identify baseline keep the peace that every fusion center should have. so tell me why we should have fusion centers. >> i can speak both as a former u.s. attorney general and governor has to the utility of the fusion centers. they do not duplicate. they complement. their portals of entry where we can share information, and as i mentioned in my opening comments all but three we are now connected at the secret level and get information back as the director mentioned and then director mueller, of the phenomena we are dealing with now was the growth of the homegrown terrorists and the so-called loan actor were lone wolf. we need more on is on the ground and the federal government itself can supply. the training and ability to share information about tactics and techniques, early trips that should be looked for can be very, very helpful, and it's not just sharing information, senator that is important with respect to the fusion centers, its sharing analytical and expanding analytical capability to the different levels of government. so we now have the 72 fusion centers. we've moved our own analysts into the fusion centers themselves so that they can help my only the gathering and the receipt of information but the analysis of information and that itself is helpful and if you look at zazi and faisal shahzad connected with jihadi jane and all of those cases you'd see the fusion center activity that is very helpful and indeed this past three days with the ongoing threat has been described to you fusion centers are active in that as well. >> thank you. >> thanks, senator collins for the information and senators will be called in order of arrival as follows. senator brown, carper, johnson, pryor and mccain. senator brown. 64 mr. chairman. >> here is a three part question. several of the reason that the terrorist attacks against the u.s. have been carried out by were inspired by aqap. how would you assess the threat to the homeland, would you put them at top of the list of the threats by terrorist organizations and then as a follow-up is yemen on its way to becoming another afghanistan safe haven for aqap to plot a tax and to we have a sufficient strategy in place for yemen? >> thank you putative reports to that question, the first is that aqap is certainly among the biggest concerns from the counterterrorism perspective. it has shown itself to be to have both the intent and the capability of carrying out attacks against the united states and the homeland. i mentioned the two examples of that in christmas day 2009 and in 2010. beyond the actual attempted attacks one of the biggest concerns we have about aqap is its propaganda efforts. anwar al-awlaki, dual u.s. citizen has transpired magazine sought to inspire western request westerners. the actual issues of inspired magazines have included step by step on making instructions. >> that is my next question. how do they get away with that? how do you get away with putting the bomb instructions in the magazine to be disseminated by? can you tell me that and mr. mueller, the same with you. >> it's not something that in other words, that information is put out in an online magazine over the internet and -- >> there's no control over anything like that? >> certainly some of that information is not necessarily unique to aqap at one of the biggest concerns of the nature of the information is that it's quite basic. it's easy to follow. it doesn't require something to be sophisticated to follow those instructions. in your question, yes come aqap is the top of the list and one of the biggest concerns we have. whether yemen is a safe haven we are very concerned about the ability of the young men who government at this point to sustain the strong counterterrorism efforts given the government's challenge is that it faces. so aqap has had the opportunity to recruit in sight yemen and to plan and a plot to incite young men in a way that we put extreme pressure on the senior leadership it's more difficult to put that same pressure on aqap leaders in yemen. spinet on the inspire magazine in particular -- >> we are not without tools. but the fact of the matter is once you upload something or want to applaud something on the internet, it is exceptionally difficult to try to eradicate it and in fact i would say impossible. so while we do have the tools, the likelihood, the possibility of erratic eating from the internet understanding it's not just the united states with every country around the world it is virtually impossible and to the extent that we have some capabilities to address that is probably something we should talk about not necessarily in an open session. >> madam secretary, in your testimony you said, and i've heard you many times talking about the nation's borders and protecting us from the legal entry especially your neck of the woods where you are from i know it is of great concern to senator mccain a lot of the other border states and quite frankly i couldn't agree with you more. in massachusetts alone there are several tragic cases of residents been killed by persons in this country illegally and free were never heard from, but it really has to stop, and thus secure communities program is something i believe -- i don't want to miss state but you are in favor of and you've worked words and you would like to see it implemented. how do you deal with states for example my state where you have the governor or others who don't support it? is there a way to convince them or control them or incentivize them to really get with the programs to speak? >> welcome senator brown itunes support secure communities. i think it is the key tool in the immigration enforcement efforts to identify those in the country illegally who are also committing other crimes and some existing warrants are multiple illegal entrants are the security concerns, in other words, we have to be able to find them and going to the jail and prison of the country is a logical first place to start and so we -- >> you can't do your job if you don't have the quote pollution from the individual states are people in charge. how do you do it? >> there was some initial misinformation about the community's plan fact of the matter is is the interoperability between the dhs and the fbi so that when someone is booked and their fingerprints are run through the fbi, there is also a connection to run them against our information database so that i.c.e. can flag and a rest before the release back to the community. it doesn't require the specific agreement of the state or locality in order to deploy secure communities. now it's helpful when we have that and so i'm using my power of persuasion to speak with the governors are the makers or other officials who have been troubled by the program. >> it just doesn't make sense when you are having -- we are all americans first and we are trying to -- especially when we work together and we solve or tackle the problem together -- we usually prevails. so i'm encouraging others that i know back home in massachusetts and throughout the country remember we are americans first and we will work together on these very real terrorist threats and concerns, and by providing -- if someone is here illegally than it is basic murder and mayhem we should be able to get them out and do it with the cooperation of all government entities. >> secure communities was begun under my predecessor. we have actually deployed it now throughout the country i think we have in 1200 some sites and we will have it in every jurisdiction by if 113. islamic mr. chairman can i just ask you a question? mr. mueller also pointed out and you have folks who are american citizens going over and being trained and then using their knowledge to come back. what is the status on -- i know the terrorist expatriate sharnak to you and ausley and senator collins and others found what is the status are we going to refine all that or -- >> i would be happy to refile that. i think it continues to be a problem. >> i just mentioned very briefly in terms of what do you do about the extremist material like inspire magazine or the other things on the internet, and what director mueller said of the authors what this is true on the federal government, but what we've discovered and we've gone over this, senator brown, is that some of the major sites that google owns youtube and weld lager and the operation obviously if individual citizens complain to them about a particular site having brought up material -- >> we'll have standards. people whose job it is to review complaints like that and on many occasions -- >> let me say that i have not least one staff member who exercises his individual citizen rights when he is not in the office to complain about these come and google, youtube, facebook, they take down those jihad web sites. it's quite remarkable. now of course the problem it's the glory and the problem of the internet, they can pop up somewhere else and then you have to go at it all over again. but there is that a devotee by the individual citizens. estimate as the president in charge as people to call us having encouraged citizens if they feel compelled and move to contact those entities to do just that. >> it's pretty easy to do if you go on those website. thank you. senator carper? >> to the witness is welcome, governor, nice to see. directors mueller, think you for your willingness to sign on for a longer tour of duty. we are grateful for that. it's nice to see you as well. my colleagues have heard me tell this story before but it's worth repeating, going to take this question in a little different direction. about two months ago having a shooting in the finance committee, the subject of the cheering was deficit-reduction and one of the witnesses was alan blinder who used to be the vice chairman of the federal reserve when alan greenspan was the chairman, and the church of the testimony and said unless we are serious about the recent health care costs in this country, medicare, medicaid, and finding addressing the of care cost said we are not really going to get a handle on the deficit all the witnesses finish this is the money during the q&a like this, and came to me and said you said earlier if we don't do anything about health care costs that's the 800-pound gorilla in the room and we are playing around the edges and he said that's right. what will be your advice, what should we do? he said on not helping congress. he teaches at princeton. he says here's my advice i would urge you to find out what works. do more of that. that's all he said. find out what works. do more of that. so i guess to correlate to that would be to find out what does not work and do less of that. i think the same is true across the government as we deal with the budget deficit we are happy it's down. it's going to be $1.3 trillion i think by the end of the year, but everything we do we have to look through it as a way to get a better result for the same amount of money and i would just ask of you today to talk about some of the things though we are doing that are working and maybe some things where we are spending money but not a whole lot to our security. secretary, would you go first? it's been a pretty good job as i recall. >> thank you. yes, we did have the balanced budget every year. first of all, i would resist the notion that some redundancy is wasteful. in the areas with which we deal, some redundancies helpful because there is always the possibility that someone or something will get through one of the many layers that we have. so, you have to evaluate redundancy differently. in this arena than i think in some others. segment, we always have to plan for some to monitor in the universe with which i deal with which is who or what can get into the country and how we know who or what is in the country? so one of the major improvements that we've been able to accomplish in the last several years is to merge more and more data bases that are very robust so that we can look at the abnormal travel patterns and the like and share that information. that's the kind of information we can share with the fbi, with the nctc when we are pulling a tough read of a threat. so that is an improvement that we want to continue to make more robust and linked up as i sit with the fbi, nctc and other agencies around town. >> directors mueller? >> i would like to have from two perspectives, first internally everyone of us are looking at where we can make savings and contractors cutting down in a variety of ways we have to continue to do for the foreseeable future. more importantly is prioritization. not everything can be a priority. and for us it is programs we have, the particular crimes and threats we see out there and prioritizing our efforts to address those threats and assure that as we do that there is a metric for success as opposed to just indictments and the like but how is that your efforts to address -- >> we are pretty good measuring the process. we are not all that good in the government and measuring the outcomes and results. >> more generally in the federal government and in our line of work the ability for information technology to provide us not only the information we need to sort through the information and bring out that which we really need is something we are all undergoing as a part of having a kid with the visa you can do searches across a variety of databases both internally and externally and by doing that and developing the information technology capability we will save a tremendous amount of money but particularly we share the information across the agencies and have the ability for our analysts to do the kind of search that doesn't require them to go to when did this come and make a search and come out and do another one and that is one of the keys in my mind to both information sharing of the future but also doing it in a financially responsible way. >> dewaal to add anything? >> yes, first let me say that we're looking at ways to be more efficient in how we are using our resources, but i would make two points. the first that follows a one director mueller, and that is that at nctc we are seeking to create what we call the counterterrorism data and that is to take in all of the data we can from the dhs, the fbi, from other agencies and to be able to get into japan advances in information technology to be able to search across the data as collector mueller says the advances in technology makes it a way to actually save money. instead of doing the search is manually where you log into one system and then into a separate system having all that information available so you can search across a variety of databases and make those connections you wouldn't otherwise be able to make. the other initiatives that i would identify that i think is no resource expenditure and that is we set up as i mentioned in my opening statement pursuit groups which are analysts looking for tactical at the tactical level in the connections that might not be obvious, and then taking the information, those connections and handing goes off to the fbi and to the dhs as leads to follow upon. that's an area where we are focusing particularly in the aftermath of the christmas day attack in 2009. >> let me just conclude by recalling the words as the football season recalling the words of the party who used to say you're not keeping score, you're just practicing. another way to say that is what we measure we manage and the idea of looking through the federal government to see what's working and what's working well, how can we invest more money there and what's not, and a little less money they're considering napolitano there are two departments in the federal government where i think the government is operating without the financials. one is the department of defense, secretary leon panetta said to me that he's going to try to get there by 2017. he's going to push his people as hard as he can and i think that's great. we need to help him. your department is making great progress. and i don't understand, this is something you would put a priority on and i urge you to keep doing that. the guy sitting here on my left i've been pushing the idea you had a tool as governor veto we think the president ought to have the tool and we tried for your test rightfully constitutional. devotee sitting in this room except maybe one person has co-sponsored that and we have about 40 co-sponsors to push that. i call a four year test drive with the veto. i think that could be part of the solution. not all of it but in the day that we are looking for good solid reasons, we are looking for silver bullets it's not a bad one. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator johnson? .. it very far complication. i can go through component by component and say look, when the department was created, we've had as an border patrol agents coming out with 21,000. they are on the field. i can go to and say we started the department, the tsa didn't really exist and that all has almost had to be built from scratch with the company personnel, training and technology e. and i would recommend and be happy to sit with you and go through that and see where we are. we are trying to keep the administrative are missing as possible given what we are asked to manage and how we are asked to manage it. but the goal is come as i said earlier, senator, is to do that with asp in a layer of management as possible to enable and empower business deal to do their jobs. >> one thing i would appreciate it if you could look at the headcount of the agencies consolidated and then i could work up in terms of may at 230,000 employees in the department. 63 at the tsa. in earlier testimony, direct or mueller, we are concerned about how many fbi agents were in the task. i kind of want to ask your opinion. do you have frustrations in terms of the lease says to your activities versus web resources are necessarily spent in department overhead clinics >> i had one of the consultants come in several years ago to look at our structure. we are very flatline structured. we at 56 field offices they really do work around the country. persons from the business community all report to one individual basically, that you have got a real problem in terms of coverage. they come away, they say we're thin in terms of management. to me chex organization. they will call the counterterrorism person back at headquarters. we have more agents on the street now than out in the various investigations. what we find returner terrorism terrorism -- the cases are not just domestically and in concert with the caa, nsa, others looking at the cases internationally, which is required to build up the capability at headquarters that we did not have before. that's frustrating. everybody organization blake to be in the field. in order to be effect is, we have to build a capability to coordinate our actions. in this paper area, traditionally crimes have been in bank robberies or white collar crimes in a particular division. in the cyberarena, you can affect persons from all 50 states. you don't know where they are. in order to address cyberintrusion, for instance, it takes a headquarter managed oversight in order to do it. that is working day in you hs, nsa, cia and other compartments. we try to stay as flat as we can be, but given the threats come with how to develop new organizational structures to address. >> in hindsight what that information, would it have been more efficient model utilizing the terrorism center for that effort? >> the counterterrorism center is analytical. will we provide is the immediate response to lead anyplace in the country. the threats such as last week, we agents following up on aspects that lead in every one of the states in the country. it's a combination of the analytical capability along with the ability of the operational ability to go and pursue that lead, interview peoplecome into wires where appropriate and court orders, to do surveillance is around the country, to do the forensic work, which provides you the intelligence, which is absolutely essential to bring to bear. nctc has none of those capabilities. >> obviously one of the tasks of the department is response to a terrorism attack. you can take a look at the earthquake here in d.c. as somewhat of a dress rehearsal. i wasn't here, but i was told the cell phones did not work for hours. there was a mess out of town is not a good evacuation plan. have you taken a look at that instance and kind of evaluated how prepared we ended the department performed away with it expected to? >> yes, we look at all those instances. when you have a disaster that is is kind of the private cellphone cell phone capability is often overwhelmed in the first instance. everybody's trying to call out. a key question i asked was, what about the responders? were they able to be in touch with each other and to have interoperability? as far as i know, the answer is yes. the second question is evacuation of the capital chain. we've had that issue as snowstorms. we had it with this recent earthquake. we have been working. first it capital region group involves virginia, maryland, the district and our department, working with the office of personnel management quite frankly in terms of how do you affect an orderly evacuation of the district? you don't have enough for her coverage to it very well and that is the plain fact of it. but it can be done better in that group is an ongoing sessions looking at how they can at least improve evacuation procedures, particularly if the federal government will go into shutdown. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator moran. >> mr. chairman, thank you. i'd like to express my appreciation for the three witnesses and more importantly for their efforts to make americans more safe and secure. i express gratitude on behalf of all kansans for what you do. not in secretary, she got us to see some intention, but less than what we normally talk about in safety and security. we often talk about transportation, airports, memos, those kinds of things. there's been this genuine concern. in fact, the green talents weapons of mass destruction talked about aggro bioscience from the threat that comes from animal disease and unfortunately gave us and asked in a report on our preparation for that occurrence. there is in my view a real threat exists in our ability to deter, detect, quarantine the introduction of any kind of disease into our food supply. we have a hearing this afternoon on this topic, and which one of your officials from your department will testify, but i would like to know your 10 years later after 9/11. i think in fact slightly before 9/11, the president of kansas state university, john we felt testified in front of emerging threats hearing here in washington d.c. about this issue wasn't something a lot of us thought about. i'd like to have you bring me up to date on where you think we are in regard to that threat. >> i think that threat is one of many evolving threats we continue to confront good one of the challenges, senator, that we have been working on these last few years is to actually improve and replace our laboratory and diagnostic capability because one of the problems with these threats is exactly that. this diagnostic, quarantine and decisions need to be made on a very rapid pace is. if one of the forces of our food supplies is beginning to be in fact did. we have been working with campus on the in-depth, one of quite frankly the concerns i had this in the fy 12 budget, we asked -- someone will correct me if i'm wrong i'm sure, but the department asked for 150 million for fy 12. the house mark was 75. the senate mark was zero. i hope that can be exploited perhaps in the conference between the house and the senate we can rectify that. that facility is i think necessary for really the next generation. not just for now, but also the future. we need to think not only what is happening now, but what we could be confronting 10 years from now. >> in addition and i certainly appreciate your comments in regard to the scientific aspect of this. in addition, any sense of how prepared are better prepared, less prepared to respond to the introduction of some contaminant? >> i would say overall beer better prepared and obviously involves more departments better than just dhs, but there's been a lot of cross departmental work. some exercises has been done. and also, importantly customs and border protection with respect to inspecting what can come into the country have studied a lot of work in this arena. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the witnesses for their service in director mueller, thank you for your willingness to continue to serve. none in secretary, are you aware of the government accountability officereport of september 12, the trustee chairman levin and me and the subject observations on the cost and benefit of an increased department of defense will in helping to secure the southwest land border? >> i'm not sure i'm familiar with that particular report, senator. >> well, i would refer to you for your reading in the report it says in addition, agency officials identified a number of broader issues and concerns surrounding expansion of dod's assistant in securing the southwest u.s. land border, specifically they include dod officials expressed concern about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for southwest border security and the result of challenges to identify and plan a dod role. are you aware of the department of defense concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for southwest border security? neck as i said, i don't know that report, but i will say i spoke with secretary gates and secretary panetta about the fact that we do have a comprehensive border strategy, what it is and what goes dod template to assist a spare. >> so you disagree with the dod officials expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for southwest border security? >> vehemently. >> i'd be glad to hear about your strategy because i fail to see one yet as the residents of a state. >> we been trying to find a date to come brief you over the last several months am i just haven't been able to write that one. but in more than happy to come in and sit down with you and go through it's happening. >> been secretary, i'd be glad to receive that. we have one meeting that's highly unsatisfied jury and you might want to broadcast your strategy to the residents of the southwest who also, certainly the governors and senators agreed there is no comprehensive strategy, along with dod officials expressed concern. i am sure you are familiar, not in secretary with operation fast and furious. given the high level information sharing between the departments, were you made aware of the operation that was underway? >> no. >> let me be very clear for the record. you are under the family with operation fast and furiously the operation was underway? what weapons are being transported from the southwest and the state of arizona to mexico, without so yes we know serous last in the operation. you're not aware of it? when the first times you are someone within dhs is made aware of the operation click >> senator, i would have to go back and check, but it was a think around the time of the death of our agent in southern arizona. >> what action did you take at that time? once you are important. >> first of all, what to make make sure the investigation into the cause of his death in prosecution list pursued vigorously and that was being done. i did meet with the fbi agent in charge in arizona at the time. at the tremendous toll doj was referring the entire matter to the inspector general so we have reserved judgment of the report found. >> when were you made aware that guns, which were allowed to walk during fasting for his were used in the murder border patrol agent frank terry? >> sometime thereafter. i don't buy specific date, senator. >> may be despised for the record. we'd be interested. have you come to any conclusions , director mueller as to who was responsible for this operation? you're doing investigation, right? >> senator, we do the investigation of the killing on the border patrol agent and that has been pursued, but there have been submissions meaning court pursuant to the investigation. the investigation with regard to the operation itself is being connect it by the attorney general, but the inspector general's office at the department of justice. >> have you reaching a conclusion so far? >> i am not very to let the inspector general's investigation has shown at this juncture. i was concerned that they would be in terms of the extent to which there is fbi involvement in a reached a conclusion to believe it was none fbi involvement in that particular operation. >> see her conclusion is who was involved? >> well, the fact of the matter is atf, which was the principal agency involved. if you're asking about ruby on ats and agents on the ground or the others in a supervisory lan card that is being investigated by the inspector general's office and i am not privy to their findings today. >> simulators out to the inspector general as to their conclusions? u.s. director don't have any role? >> well, we do not have a role in that particular aspect of the investigation. we have an important role in bringing to justice those persons responsible for the death of the agent. >> year we can inspector general's report? >> that i'm not. we are pursuing who is responsible, what weapons were used in the killings of the border patrol agent -- >> what conclusions have you read that? >> and believed they were submissions made in court. i got to get back to you in terms of where bergeson charging somebody. >> well, it was nice for you to get back to me, though we have a dead border patrol agent. we have a situation which for a period of time is out of control. it's been no a number of weeks since this happened and you would be glad to get back to me? >> well, i don't know specifics of what charges have brought in arizona with regard to that particular shooting. >> you sure that's what with us what information you have? >> we have information relating to individuals who repair. we've got individuals identified as result of interviews we conducted ably done forensics come identified weapons. we are pursuing a weapons. >> and when the wealth of information been made privy to the american people? >> it's an ongoing criminal investigation. that information will be made available in the criminal proceedings back against the individuals responsible for the killing. >> i thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator mccain. thanks to senator akaka. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i join all americans across the world in mourning the loss of the thousands who died as a result of the terrorist attacks a decade ago. as we commemorate the solemn anniversary, we must acknowledge the tremendous progress over the past decade to secure our nation against terrorist attacks. i want to commend those administrations resolve and successful strategy to prevent another attack. we must also commend the men and women who have served bravely in the military, as well as the federal state and local workers and homeland security, not enforce an intelligence and other fields who has made substantial contributions to combating the terrorist strikes. this anniversary is an opportunity to reflect and all the attacks still affect an assault today. we must remain vigilant to the privacy and civil liberties are not sacrificed in the name of security. as we reaffirm that which we will never forget, those who died 10 years ago, let us resolve to continue to take steps to ensure that such a tragedy would never happen again and to strengthen the principles upon which our nation was founded. the former chairman of the 9/11 commission just released a report listing nine of their recommendations that remain unfinished. included in the absence of a functioning privacy and civil liberties oversight board. in april i joined senators lieberman and collins in a letter to the president, asking that he nominate a the full slate of members said the board could operate. and i'd like to ask these questions to the panel. and if any of you can comment, fine. otherwise provide it for the record, that will be fine, too. so my question is, what is the status of the board being formed in our counterterrorism efforts reviewed? this is the important part for privacy and civil liberty concerns, given that the board is dormant? >> not an secretary. >> senator akaka, i will stare. i don't know the status of the board itself. i can say at the department we have a presidentially appointed privacy officer to rent a privacy office. they are integrated into all of our program planning, particularly with respect to information sharing and how that is done, and making sure, for example, that when we entered into and the at the nctc in exchange for information that we include within those limitations on uses and users, on a training and also with respect to u.s. persons put some special limitations on tying the retention of certain types of records so that those kinds of privacy concerns we think about before we move forward. they are important to protect. >> senator, we have three ways. firstly the attorney general guidelines. we've had them for a number of years that guide or investigative activities. secondly, we do also have an individual responsible for overseeing our particular initiatives from the dead impact on privacy and civil liberties. and thirdly, again when we have some form of initiative that is being undertaken, we have a panel review of that initiative, which has, certainly from our legal counsel's office, also the department of justice oversees that particular undertaking is being reviewed in the panel -- by the panel. >> senator, i do not know the status of the board, but i would say that i nctc, we have utterly consider three layers of oversight and consider our activities have a civil liberties and private activities for his spurs. internally we have a privacy officer assigned to nctc with his rule to review activities from that perspective. we have attorneys in the tni who can do the same activities with respect to our work. separately, all of handling is done pursuant to attorney general guidelines. as well when we handle information on that surveillance act, the fisa court has a role in overseeing that activity. finally, i would mention we're subject to robust congressional oversight of the house and senate intelligence committees. >> thank you. secretary napolitano, as you know, the age at pacific cooperation leaders meetings will be held in honolulu, hawaii in november. this high profile event raised concerns that hawaii could be a target of a terrorist attack. local residents have also expressed concerns about the island of oahu be in lockdown as a result of security measures. how are the u.s. secret service the lead security plans progressing? how old they inform the public about areas to avoid businesses impact did they security measures? >> well, thank you, senator. has been designated as the nss even. meaning the secret service will provide lead organizational responsibilities, but we will work very closely and are integrated with hawaii officials in hawaii and local law enforcement. they are an integral part of cleaning and execution at any nsse event. as it gets closer, there'll be a publication event to make the public aware of what areas will be closed down and the lake. one thing i would say to reassure the presidentresidence of oahu, where conscience of the fat people live in the cities and still need to get to work and school and so forth. and for example, next week we will have the u.n. general assembly convened in will have many, many national leaders in new york city and still come in new york city will work and people will be able and have been able to get to where they need to go for the most part. so we are very sensitive to that. i just used general assembly as an example of something that is perhaps even more complex than the one in a while who to say we have some experience and we will deploy our best efforts in hawaii. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> senator paul. >> thank you to the panel for coming today hesitations. secretary napolitano, pete admitted about 7000 iraqis are the past years, two of which senator collins brought up were arrested in bowling green under accusations of conspiring to be involved with terrorism. you know, i can understand refugee status after we lost the war in vietnam, the communists took over and people are cited as our would be executed. we won the war in iraq and redmond and 70,000 iraqis. when we win the war there's a democracy, what reason do we have to admit so many in continue to admit so many innocent not a danger to our country and overwhelming massive numbers of folks that have to be screened? and appearance sometimes not screen properly? >> well, senator, we have now gone back and we screened the iraqi population who were admitted as refugees against all the dhs databases, the nctc databases, department of defense biometric databases and any future refugees we will continue to do the same. if there are particular has their particular concerns on individuals, we are for them sometimes to the fbi to do further investigation or checking. >> is their position on the ending so many people and continue to miss so many people? >> the refugee program is under the prior administration and many individuals who have been rechecked were admitted then. with respect to the current time, people qua

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