Transcripts For CSPAN2 Today In Washington 20110603

administration talked aboutif there is a trade framework that hopefully the europeans could become a part of that has economic incentives and if we move in the same direction to support the democracies are the partners on these interest and that is the best possible outcome. . . expert here. how much should one warn about the -- >> i think a lot of the coverage there was a sense that these revolutions that's not true. the only secular so far is people were not explicitly raising islamist slogans. the muslim brotherhood ordered its brothers in the square to not say anything remotely islamist. don't do any of that because they knew that that might provoke the arrest and also the regime. and now that they are looking to or three months into the post revolutionary era the muslim brotherhood is the single most powerful tool in egypt and i was just there two weeks ago and met with the top three leaders of the brotherhood a political party. they are pretty confident about the strength. that said, they are not trying to win a majority because they are worried that might worry people too much but they could win a plurality of the vote. i think we ought not to be as worried about the brotherhood organization that has been long been part of the political process but overseeing that it's the islamist parties emerging really almost out of nowhere and you have a group that's trying to form political parties so they are going to enter the electoral ring so you add the muslim brotherhood through the parties and there's also one or two progress of islamist parties. altogether they could work 50% of the seats in parliament. again, i think a lot of the alarm that we have in washington is on found it because again, we are not as radical as we sometimes think they are and in some ways they reflect the sentiment. this is a conservative religious society and we have seen a number of polls the last couple of months where anywhere between 60 to 90% of the egyptians believed that the islamic law should be the name to the command source of legislation were the only source of legislation. and no constituency for what we call the secularism in a place like egypt today, and even the word secular in arabic no one would actually call themselves that publicly. so i think we have to be realistic about where egypt is going, but i think that's why we have to engage in groups like the muslim brotherhood. internal dialogue with them. we've been afraid to even talk to them so now they might become the most powerful force in the parliament and we don't know who to talk to. that's troubling. >> the gentleman in the back over here. they are sending you a microphone. can you state your name and affiliation? >> peter willson. it seems to me the revolution of egypt that we are going to inevitably now go through a very tough time through egypt and its evolution and israel. there's reports in today's financial times the national gas pipeline has been repaired and in the internal political reason isn't the resumption of the gas to israel. and what is the subject of the peace process to exist becomes an important feature of the political dialogue and debate inside egypt. >> we are doing a number of things to try to maintain a good relationship with the political spectrum in egypt and also to facilitate the transition. the package that president obama announced within the international community to bring more to various frankly the next parliamentary election will say a monumental challenge and very difficult to live up to the expectations and aspirations of the people during the fall of mubarak. we are also working on our democracy assistance program to try to help as well as allies believe to mobilize and there will be a gradual process. the last thing we are trying to do is maintain a good relationship with the military which i think as a possibility of being a guardian for the democracy. what is interesting about the way that another three plays in the transition is it's played a buffer between the regime and the people and that a lot of credibility with of the egyptian people and i think that the egyptian military contained a positive role moving forward and this gets to the question about israel look egypt and israel have had a war on peace. there's not a lot of love between the egyptian military and our military for example. the the egyptian military does have a similar interest in maintaining peace with israel but no interest in having age -- and the reason every year to maintain a positive relationship with israel in security assistance we provide which is conditioned upon maintaining the peace agreement with israel so the military in egypt is counter to some of these tendencies but certainly there's with the reconciliation agreement between hamas but if you are going to see any egyptian power that has to be more responsive to the fact that the difficulties in the relationship with israel, and i've seen the reconciliation in iraq as throwing a bone to the street on the issues with israel won all the fundamental strategic question peace agreement is maintained at the highest level of government and in our interactions with the officials when i sat with them on a more than one occasion to include the revolution i think that the elite remain very important in the nejib can remain committed to the peace agreement. >> he's talking a lot of sense to but on the one hand it looks like institutions and politicians that are responsive to the people. and it's not just the extremist groups that are going to be using the conflict between israel and the palestinians to the favor. the people are have a genuine support for the palestinian people and palestinian state would that's not anything that is to end up by al qaeda forces, that is genuine from the people. the institution that is the egyptian military fundamentally is conservative and then any big swings of the egyptians ought to be going forward. >> the gentleman here in the front. >> my name is chris with mission personnel. i wonder if we can just through the digital age perspective talk about what these things mean from a u.s. public diplomacy strategic perspective. should we only be relying on the viral spread of things for the digital age to help us spread and facility changes or do we need to return to a to misinformation agency? how we better strategically and tactically use what we've got in front of us? and a comment from anyone. >> i think part of this goes back to the big intent is to try to change the narrative and the president has done that for the speech and the narrative of al qaeda and the one hand space aspirations it should be on the side of people serving their legitimate space aspirations as much as we can throw out that in the sense that the state department now for example has a party line spokesman and twitter feed and so forth that's a good but the board of governors is to be more. on the internet freedom site, the u.s. government now is spending $30 million a year not on the public diplomacy but on making the different platforms available and training people so they can communicate among themselves and on percolating and about a day after the polls and having seen over the past few years various government agencies for i'm not sure the track record is all that great without ascending, would be a little hesitant to the bureaucratically reform so when it comes to all forms of social media and speeches and everything that we can push out as much as we can and part of this also is the revolving ability to do this to people and the countries themselves and ambassadors and embassy staff and the state department has a sort of opposite model in the military in that sense where the state department and everything has to be clear before you can see it in cairo and running around all over the place of the state department is going to have to be more nimble and move more towards the military model on that one. >> the exchange of information available on the internet with young people even in saudi arabia. >> [inaudible] on down no matter what happened that the hierarchy was there. >> it would get somewhat more information their leaders anymore. >> [inaudible] [inaudible] >> this is becoming problematic because the brotherhood is exploring the possibility of forming the coalition in the group's not because they have an ideological and muslim brothers haven't got along in egypt but the brotherhood is a very pragmatic organization so it is a big set of improvements and allies with far-right groups that's what it will do. so why it's important to look at how we can we find ways to keep the brotherhood in a more central right area of the political spectrum from a u.s. perspective we don't have a lot of power over that, but i do think that starting real substantive dialogue with muslim brotherhood leaders as soon as possible is crucial. we have to reach of to them and have a better understanding of where they are coming from, where their interests are, and that is going to hold down the road. and it will also get a degree of leverage with them. they do care about what the u.s. thinks about them. they are sensitive to international opinions. and that's why, you know, they have been careful about how to proceed with terms of winning a majority and use it today. so i think there is some opportunity there. if we are talking about the brotherhood versus al qaeda, thankfully that is still very much there. al qaeda and the brotherhood pretty much hate each other and i don't see that changing any time soon. so that's something good and that is why in some respects the brother who serves as a counterweight to some of the more extremist groups because if someone joins the muslim brotherhood we might not like their ideology, but at least we are not going to be using violence pitted >> can i ask a follow-up question within the brotherhood it's not a unitary actor and we saw during the demonstrations emerge during the under activists and between the kind. can you talk about how we can engage different parts of the brotherhood were different factions within especially that may be more amenable to the outreach? >> of the brotherhood is a -- >> [inaudible] >> there's a kind of 50% islamic across the spectrum government where the fight among each other were bring the country in the way we don't want it to go. >> the brotherhood is a massive organization and it's in some ways just a giant bureaucracy of the sort. so there are different tendencies within the movement. and there is a division now between some of the muslim brotherhood youth who are cooperating very closely with their liberal and secular counterparts. and the had a different kind of outlook, much more open, very much part of the social media atmosphere and there has been some talk of inspection from the brotherhood and some of these different view of how the organization should go. these are the kind of people that are ready to talk to americans and u.s. officials and, you know, again, we should be doing that and hearing what they have to say and see not how we support what they are doing but the u.n. general how we find a way to support the egypt because right now used were excellent at bringing down the regime and much less effective in the post revolutionary era where they were relatively weak force and having trouble organizing. so, on your question about the muslim brotherhood and islamists and whether they will take the foreign policy and all that i think what i would like to see is a kind of broad national government where you have the muslim brotherhood, and the rest is kind of coming together and finding ways to govern together. the last thing -- i don't think what egypt needs right now is a fully islamist government in to talk to the muslim brotherhood leaders they are aware that egypt isn't ready for that, the u.s. is not ready for that and that is going to cause a lot of alarm on the international stage, so i think that there is a realization on the brotherhood that's not the way to go. >> we have a question from the overflow room since they can't be here to raise their hand eyeglass on their behalf. can the panel discuss the response to the nato campaign, and also the issue of the other reform movement in the arab world seeking military assistance. >> policy covert plans. [laughter] in a written format. >> [inaudible] >> i won't speak to the libya question and my portfolio i think that we have seen outreach by a lot of groups across the region but above one point that i would make is the overwhelming majority of the group across the region that are doing so peacefully, and they are not looking to us for a lot of materialistic things they're looking for political support, for symbolic support. we are doing our best to do that diplomatically. i don't know how the arab spurring or higher awakening or whatever you want to call within the fall or the winter whatever way it is going to go, but the violence in the equation here has largely been initiated by the regime in this equation. it's one of the reasons why i think the violence in the movement could be in trouble because they have been violently resisting and now we see opportunity to work and that could be a pretty close model. >> the levels in libya had been on the ground and spent a lot of time with them but you read a lot of their accounts and agreed journalists on the ground like a partner in crime over there the revolution that is taking place that's expected from him on state actor on the battlefield trying to learn of the biggest decisions in the equipment or fancy weaponry but really in terms of learning how to fight cohesively on the battlefield we are starting to see an evolution and the perspective of somebody that studies these things but i hesitate to speak extensively on that subject without being able to see more on the ground. >> i have a question about whether or not, you're talking a lot about of power and if we see a sort of palestinian nonviolent i'm wondering what is your advice to the panel, the u.s. has to respond because there's one thing to respond between verses syria verses libya but if there's a conflict it response on some of violence, you know, then that could be very interesting for the region. [inaudible] to >> the u.s. is going to be in a very difficult position come autumn and the palestinians will take their case to the u.n. to seek recognition of the state's, and the rest of the world is going to be supporting them in that to different degrees and presumably we will as said in a recent speech. and this fits into a broad question of if there is a full movement that emerges in the palestinian territory how are we going to react and he made a very interesting point about that. that is going to be one of any good will that we are going to bring down because of our response to the arab spring will lose 100 per cent of that if we are seeing with israel against the non-violent palestinian movement. i don't know how you square that circle and i guess i would be interested to hear what colin thinks of this about -- [laughter] >> speaking for the administration -- [laughter] >> does anybody have a third real. [laughter] i can grab onto. [inaudible] [laughter] >> i think of what we see is in the fall [inaudible] i'm not sure i think the clock, there's the near-term clock and the long term glock and that you are going to see the palestinian drive in the general assembly in the fall. i think the president has made clear if we want that outcome we see that as something to emerge from the negotiation of the party not being imposed by the international community through the u.n.. i don't know, you know, there's obviously the debate about whether the president leaning forward on seating some of the principles we all knew created in washington last week that there's a lot of in those statements, too of the two states would be 67. and that would look weak interpreting that but i don't know whether we will have enough on the international community which there should be that the negotiated outcome imposed or how the palestinians would but i think it will create a challenge for the government. the longer-term challenge is the demographic one. [inaudible] and asked to vote. the response to that is no, and we are going to drift towards a state viewed as undemocratic by a number of states around the world in which case the zionist dream of a space and jewish israel goes away so that is a demographic reality that's coming down. it's for that reason the president did lean forward and it took both sides. there are those outcomes are suboptimal and i will return to the point at the outset which is one of the good things of the eda spring is it's not about us and it's not about israel but it will become, at least in part about israel wants elections start happening in these places and it will be partly about israel as to divert attention to not pose that so long and syria and i think israel has an interest in getting out ahead of that. >> can my push you on this comment for a second because this is from the senior obama officials it's not about them it's about us your support and many of these regimes with billions of dollars for five decades how was it not about us? it's almost the since we are pretending to be this innocent bystander watching this and supporting that for the arab people when we were never mutual in this and in fact fighting with the wrong side and it's been a perspective of our people. >> who continue to -- >> pure is bahrain on the table right now wanting to negotiate with their own people. where is it going to be actively quietly doing something, overtly doing something or -- >> i've got it. [laughter] >> it's not about us. the people protesting in the streets aren't protesting about the relationship between the regime and the united states. and a way in which for example of violence in iraq was in response to our presence in iraq as well as secretary of divisions and other things but we were at the center of unrest and violence and the aftermath of saddam hussein. we were not in the center, not at the center in any of these other places that the revolution or the unrest, the turmoil is driven by a popular response to a set of economic and political structural challenges and inequalities and justice perceived that has been around for decades and have now it's been a nonlinear shift in the environment. people said my gosh it could happen. and so, that we are relevant to the equation. our relationship to the regimes are relevant. it's not the driving factor which is why i think he tried to position ourselves and make clear the set of principles and with the narrative is and that is why the president spoke so eloquently about that ten days ago in bahrain. on march 12, today's before they crossed into bahrain and that was interpreted that we were giving a green light for the saudi as to the contrary. we were there to push the national dialogue and did the government to move forward to the right and in fact leader the investor and merest affairs isn't going to get the national dialogue started and a violent set of protests providing the excuse or the rationale for the forces to coming in. during that initial period don't confuse being publicly quiet with behind the scenes of the government and the partners for the legitimate concerns about security and legitimate concerns about law and order and about iran in the circumstances here, but there is ultimately no security solution. there's only the political and you have to get back to that. with a listing of the state emergency yesterday, and some of the other steps talked about, but may be getting back on the right track. but i will say the president has pretty strong words about bahrain and the speech. not that we've been quiet. it's just bezoar talks and questions and executing them in a pragmatic way. >> on that note, we are going to have to close unfortunately, pragmatically. so please come join me and thinking the panel. [applause] and i believe all of you have earned a copy is their right, mike? between and we appreciatet standard this conference is so very successful but we your deeply honored to have with us today at least an avatar former lt. general david rot rodriguez as the speaker of our annual conference. general rodriguez assumes command of the international security assistance for the joint command ijc in october 2009 and is joining today from fort lewis, washington, where he's a lieutenant general core get ready to assume operational responsibilities for the mission in afghanistan leader this year. .. >> good morning, everybody. and john, thank you for the kind introduction and the invitation to speak before this distinguished audience. i apologize for not being there in person as you said it currently and that washington state enjoyed these clueless bookwork kentucky trading to prepare ichor and the afghan -- i'm sorry, the european rapid reaction corps for their upcoming deployment to afghanistan. and my friend, lieutenant general scott bradley will take my place. we have done this at brigade commands, division command, and i feel sorry, but he keeps getting stuck with the mess that i leave but i know he'll do a great job. i'd also like to recognize members of the cf team. john kerry thank you for inviting me. you've been a practical server and commentator on this mission can see now cnas. afghanistan for pakistan in iraq for the marines and thanks to you also for your leadership. you clearly understand challenges we face in afghanistan. lieutenant general retired classmate and close friend, the first officer of the coalition command in afghanistan back in 2003. thank you for charging of course in afghanistan that has opened the door and courting myself. the former army ranger search of both iraq and afghanistan. you know the ground situation, what goes on there. it is great year here and in short the cnas team is definitely afghanistan strong. okay, this path goes this morning. i will give you a short overview of the operational plan from now until 2014 and discuss in more detail where we are currently in that plan. i'll tell you what i think is going well and what worries me. i went with a brief comment on what they think the future is regard to transition, driving down 2014 and beyond. so first, what does the campaign the click? well, our object has remained the same. to deny al qaeda sanctuaries and prevent the taliban from retaking afghanistan. and by the way, the death of osama bin laden has not changed that ashamed and we have not seen any effect to his death on the ground to date in afghanistan. next slide, please. the unique foundation of this plan is threefold. on key areas, prioritization of multiple lines of operation, an approach that very much assembles with the activity. with regard to the focus on critical terrain, the population centers, commerce was a matter of necessity an operation that had never been lavishly resourced. i remind everyone to peek at troop deployment in the p. cost of operations in afghanistan was two thirds of the troops deployed in iraq and 100 -- two thirds the cost of iraq operations for a country 1.5 times the size of iraq. now the effect this focus has had on key terrain was that we are largely able to focus the majority of coalition and international efforts really need them and when we need them. and when we get this, our resources are sufficient and i can't over emphasize what a idea that the vent to our effort. since the peace operations decade of the 1990s, we have long talked about the importance of the idea for, where there is no form a unity command and the progress in this regard has exceeded expectations. we have managed to take the afghan security forces to focus in the right place and we have gained support of many of the civilian neck turns to direct their terrific people and programs where they need to hold key terrain that has been cleared. by making a big deal about key terrain can we have given specifics to anchor on. in this focus, we have made explicit the building block of the district. this is where the people see their government, and action or not in action. they are important as they party said. this does not apply to the province or kabul are not important, but this is a row insert the good of the challenges lined the village and the first line of assistance for the villagers is the different government. now, there are those who think we do too much when we focus on defense. but there is no real alternative for the reason i just said. this key terrain construct is perfect? well, of course not, but nothing ever is. with regard to sequencing and prioritizing length of operation, the plaintiff made very explicit plans and attempted to correct some challenges from the past. some practices actually made the situation worse. as you know, we have incredible developments all over the place and want more children out of school at more reasonable, the security situation declaimed. then we have more troops and resources and cleared areas much more days, only to have to clear over and over again. now we are much better off. we spend the bulk of our military effort on to creating or insurgent infrastructures to include the leadership, but we also ensure the planning for the security and good governance begins early enough to be inserted and follow on this unit conditions allow. we have made real progress with their civilian counterparts, both in the afghan government and international community to sequence and synchronize these efforts. thanks a lot. finally, underpinning the execution of this plan is the recognition that absence of sweeping political settlement, the best chance of stabilizing afghanistan is to mobilize people to demand the fulfillment of their modest requirements. now this is dependent on the connection of the good government to the reliable security forces and to the people. and when all three legs of that school for the trinity work together, from the bottom, with a little help from the top, we will squeeze out enough of the enemy of the afghan people to build sufficient stability for afghanistan in the future. now you can see from the weight of the air is on the chart what people need from kabul is indeed minimal. their destiny to be a small reliable steady flow of funding for national to local levels to fund operating costs and minimal basic services. what this also means and execution of the plan is there a young commanders on the ground have to make decisions every day about how to allocate their precious resources of time and effort. they must ensure the proper weighting between taking the fight to the enemy and strengthening communities by building capacity in connection of the good government reliable security forces and to the people. this trinity result in a spiral of popular mobilization and it works. so how has the campaign unfolded and how will it unfold? in a moment, i will highlight the gains we expect to achieve and i will tell you that unequivocally where we have focused our efforts in accordance with our plan, we have achieved progress every time. so if you ask me if i am hopeful that we can achieve sufficient security across the country, i am indeed. of course operational and tactical successes will take us only so far given the time constraints we believe we will be under. i will talk about more of this later. i do believe that given enough time, the tactical and ground up approach will prevail, just as it did in iran country a couple hundred years ago. now these next three slides show you the expected results of executing the plan. in other words, expanding the areas should be stable by winters and 2014. and by 2014, we will have fully executed operational plan and all the places that matter most. next slide. now you can see where we want to be by spring of 2012. it is important to understand what the spring brings to us because it is after a violent season in the stomach of these through the fall and in the wintertime there is a huge opportunity to continue to go the afghan capacity while the violence tapers off a little bit. and you can see they are what we want to do a six in that area down into the central helmand river valley in kandahar in the south and southwest and it continues to build a security zone outside kabul to the east and to the south. next slide. you can see on the next slide how that would expand over time. it is expanding everywhere throughout the country, expanding more and more to mark the afghan population and needy production centers and commerce routes. next slide. you can see in 2014 how it really starts to expand to other places the half and and us believe will create enough stability to stabilize the entire country of afghanistan and it does not have to be everywhere as you can be. you can see we will fight on in the east and frankly the east will be the toughest part of the tough neighborhood that will be afghanistan for a long time. i won't go in detail in the plan of 2014 right now if this is the purview of furniture commanders and could change. as we are all fond of saying come in the has about and nowhere is that more true than in afghanistan, given the volatile region in which it resides. i will talk about where we are in operation only. and by the way, let me know hope is not a vested, popped in to senator has been a setback. the name of the plan was hope and i assure you that the afghans have seen the plan not because it is dependent on the lettuce prayer and hope, although my experiences that never. but because the plan will result in greater hope in the heads and hearts of the afghan people, hope for a better future that is more akin to what they observe happening in the rest of the world. and believe me, they do know what is going on outside the boundaries of afghanistan. now we started in the central helmand river valley, number 100 as it was the nexus of the narcotics industry that feels insurgency and the insurgency is strongest hold. our pakistani part is called the taliban central. that was last year. this year after a very successful when you campaign, we see the central river valley near stable but the insurgents ability and capability drastically reduced and pushed a small pocket on the edges of the central helmand river valley and in the northern helmand river valley. this year our main effort is in kandahar and connect in kandahar and it's a magnet to the central helmand river valley, which is linked between one and two. and i will talk about carbonara as an example of what is happening in around kandahar as well as the central helmand valley. it is outside of kandahar that has been a attack places the first in the coalition went in and state. in july 2009, are good and was a taliban stronghold and people could not move around without fear. in early january 2011, the district governor was killed. the district police chief was wounded by an ied so he couldn't continue to serve in his payment. there were no government officials present except the district governor and a tea maker and the police were not present among the people. the district center was described by many as jesse combat out post because all it did was defend itself. i was just a recently and the change has been incredible. there were more than 16 government employees working within the district governor. there was a new police chief whose police force was visible, present among the people and responsive to those people. and there is a local sheriff that represents the people and holds their governments accountable to those people. and the locals on a friday afternoon afghan family time i routes enabled to pick nick temirkanov river valley. a significant change from 18 months ago. now the activities occurring are examples of what are happening across the country where we are focusing our efforts. kabul city, number three on the mount, home to one fifth of the afghan population is one of the safest places in afghanistan. the afghan security forces are in the league for security throughout the city, proving their afghan security part cursor up to the challenge of increasing not only quantity, but quality. now we are continuing to expand the kabul security zone for the east in the south and in the east we have seen gains in discrete areas in jalalabad, kandahar which is four on the map as well as send word back, just south of kabul city. these contain the most difficult human terrain and many of you know, gc cannot just transferred authority for the region that the first division. where jc was able to do what dan is the ipod is truly incredible. the afghans the same you can carry 200 notes in one hand. i believe we are attempting to do just that and it's pretty remarkable. still we have a way to go in the east and nowhere will the afghan security forces be challenged more. next slide. up in the north, just last week we lost an influential afghan leader, regional police chief general david as well as the provincial chief of police in several coalition force members. these are friends in the picture on the screen. our regional commander, marcus tonight was wounded and is recovering at home in germany and will return soon. we expect this kind of attacks to continue. the taliban cannot expect to regain territory. so right now they are attempting to degrade to trust the coalition and afghan sending each other through insider attacks as well as to intimidate the people in hopes of making them believe that their government cannot detect them. but so far, the partnerships remain strong and in many places, the people are eyeing the fact that the government cannot protect them. and regional command north, determined team was back very publicly coming meeting with general present another afghan security force leadership two days after the her thick attack. in kandahar several weeks ago, after the same type of horrific attack, the very next day after the simultaneous won't roll in effect to the tax. , the residents resumed their normal activity. next slide. now, our security activities in the north have focused on the kunduz carter, number five on your map. this area is an intensely populated section that includes two main commerce routes. we have focused our efforts on expanding a secure area around the intersection and increasing the freedom of movement in that area. number six on the map is also very important because that is the last place to be completed on the ring road. as a result of regional command west, spring operations are making progress there. we have paid significant security gains enough area that will allow this to be completed in the future. arrived, number seven on the map as a city largely free and ready to initiate the transition process their afghan leadership this summer. yes, there was an attack this past week, but the afghan security forces did not allow the enemy to reach their intended target and this is a trend that we are seeing more in her across tree. the increasing desire and ability of the police and army to take their own security challenges, rendering the insurgent attacks increasingly enough that this. now last year was the implementation of a plan for synchronization and the neocons of understanding of the required approach. we have proven that where we, the coalition in the afghan, the coalition in the afghan, the coalition in the afghan, the coalition in the afghan. next slide. so where are we? progress in achieving our objectives, making afghanistan a place inhospitable to terrorists is indisputable there remains fragile. there is no doubt the afghan security forces have grown in quantity and quality. growth remains and a schedule with more than 284,000 afghan security forces across the country. since 2009, there has been a 50% increase in the number of afghans security forces and today in key areas across the country, the vast majority of the afghan security forces are partnered closely with isaf and there is no doubt they can and will fight in their operational effectiveness and destroying the enemy and protect people. our partnership has given afghan leaders like general carini, chief of the general staff pictured on the mac side and his leaders at every level and his units at every level the courage to confidently use ghost beard he had been developed new ones. next slide. that's general carini addressing some of his afghan soldiers. if you can see the look of confidence in his afghan soldiers icily tax across the country, you couldn't help but be impressed. and i always fan. next slide. there's also no doubt that the government presents physics and being. there is no doubt that afghanistan contains the required elements and irreversible progress. but if human capacity to meet the afghan needs, an immense source of income for natural resources in regional transit. afghan national security forces are on track to assume the lead and largely the right government initiatives in place. i want to return for a moment to me first point on the subject. the single most encouraging factor throughout my time in afghanistan has been the human capacity of the afghan people. their resiliency after more than 30 years of conflict is remarkable. over the years, i have met many inspiring leaders in people. they are tough and determined and have a sense of humor and graciousness to those who respect them. i am not ashamed to say that i generally write and respect many afghan people. while we are not there to make friends, it's hard to believe the most important resources and a country, organization or nation had a sound in a country to which we have devoted many of our most precious resources. next slide. as is often the case, the greatest strengths can quickly turn to weaknesses in the resilience of the people more to his survival attitude that is not healthy. the people have formed habits to keep them alive in the face of terror and this often means they won't stand against members of the taliban for whom they have very little affinity. now there were other things that worry me. i am concerned about a chart on that is not totally aligned with trying afghan capabilities. was so rapid can you please make mistakes or temporary relief caps. while not critical in and of themselves make the people's shaky confidence waver and their survival instincts rose to the forefront. now if this happens, the taliban can regain a foothold among a fearful population. i am also concerned about support for the insurgency that continues to flow mostly from the every species of pakistan. the worse the problem becomes fair, the stronger we have to build the afghan national security forces and the communities people living. this may take more time than we have. finally, i am worried about the parochial interests of minority formally informed the leaders across afghanistan, whether they are representing their own families accumulation of wealth, there groups were in the morpheus ever shifting combination of interests have forsaken alienate the afghan citizen, this is unacceptable. the afghans together with the coalition have to start addressing these challenges were effectively. a corollary to that is we have not yet managed to strike the right balance between respecting afghan sovereignty and demanding adherence to the non-negotiable response abilities that company that poverty. essential among those responsibilities include factions to stop the leaders who steal money, opportunity and respect from the afghan citizens. in my mind, absolutely paramount is the demand the afghan government stop formal and informal powerbrokers who were directly harming troopers. in further support of the enemy, they don't stop and we should do that through whatever means necessary. now i will talk recently about the major movements the future brings. no answers but a description of things were grappling with. transition. transition will be conditioned based progress with one caveat will recognize the court's afghan politics will sometimes put on the ground from time to time. the afghan leadership will have a need to balance across a victim powerbroker lines. the first tranche has been select it and these are the easy ones, promises and municipalities that have been in good shape for years. transition tougher areas will involve thinning out of coalition forces from secure areas to be deployed. they started this top with operations to emphasize we will not choose transition. there is no faster way to dilute our efforts that we worked so hard to focus for the last several years and then do and continue to execute a plan that the afghans have developed with this is a natural outcome of the transition. the second tranche should be selected by afghan leadership in august and it is on track and it blew the plane to get the afghans in need for security by 2014 is achievable. i'm drawdown, jennifer truss calls himself a four-star action for this issue. therefore am not at liberty to discuss details and also they are not yet determined. at my level, i am emphasizing to the field commanders we've got to push afghan partners to start reading more and more. we have to start taking more risks in this regard and have more than none. we know as the platoon and company level, the afghans are largely capable of conducting operations with the assistance could we will win out from the bottom-up, focusing on building headquarters and eventually leaving in place critical enablers such as medical evacuation, access to joint the facts and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets. finally, 314 and beyond. i spoke briefly about how i see the campaign unfolded from now until 2014. before 2014, we should have a strategic agreement in place that will offer a sharing to vote the afghan people in the enemy. no other details need to be worked out, but it is critical we transition our relationship from one of wartime, expedia footing to one of normalization. next slide. now this about wraps it up. i have not discussed reintegration at the afghan local police programs posed accelerants and a part of growing confidence on the part of the afghan will. and now i am happy take questions on these topics with others who are interested in. thank you for coming today in thank you for your interest in afghanistan. >> thank you richard burr rodriquez. i will take the liberty of asking the first question i'm going to pick up just for you left out. you describe the class take counterinsurgency necessary but insufficient. can you talk to the reconciliation reintegration efforts many people think are going to ultimately be decisive. >> yeah, i really focus my answer on reintegration. and where we have had success and where the afghan security forces and the afghan government has continued to grow in their capacity to lead their nation, where the afghan people have become mobilized because of improving security and improving government capacity, the afghan people are ready to reintegrate and the afghan foot soldiers have been a big part are ready to reintegrate and become part of the communities. that has occurred across the areas we've been successful in just under 2004 what programs and the same number are on the verge of entering the program. so the success continues to grow in security and governance and develop it would have been more and more. as we continue to reintegrate more and more these foot soldiers into society, it's going to put a lot more pressure on the reconciliation efforts and also give us a better position from which to negotiate room. now, it is interesting when this was mentioned to president karzai, he is convinced if we can reintegrate all the local people, we won't have to be worried about reconciliation. again, that is opinion and we'll have to see how it goes in the future. it is a huge accelerants. and i started and continues to grow every month and we believe it will be huge accelerants are building momentum here and we have to be able to do that based on the growing security and governance that keeps improving throughout the country. thank you. >> thank you, sir. other questions? writer in the blue shirt. he sat up and identify yourself. >> i'm jake filiberto, marina 2001 and iraq 2003. thank you for your service. i am a freelance pundit in a spirit a coalition called veterans for rethinking afghanistan. so i may be a little bit different. the question is i was in afghanistan a little bit ago when i talk to minister asked graham who is in charge of the taliban and reintegration program from the afghan side and the yediot not spoken with military commanders are state department officials, which is critical. have we made appropriate steps in your opinion to connect with them, work with them and partner from the afghan side, not just the military insurgent type. >> in response to your question committee answer in the reintegration of the net is absolutely yes. we work every single day with the afghan reintegration leadership in kabul. we also work every day with our military part errors and afghan security partners at the provincial level, where they have a provincial reintegration council and we absolutely do that although we have been down. on the reintegration issue, i am not in charge of the reconciliation effort. you have to ask the state department and other leadership level, definitely. thank you. >> i'm going to pass on a question that has been treated. last year general mike flynn wrote a paper called intel, which is very critical of the intelligence system in afghanistan. in particular, the afghan forces and the afghan people need a number of sessions in the paper. have any of those been implemented and are you seeing results from a different focus on intelligence clicks >> absolutely i see great results in that area. we built the whole igc around organization called the information dominant center that caught information across a broad spec to the things that are important to a counterinsurgency strategy and information needed to be able to adapt plans and operations to conditions on the ground. the depth and breadth of what is understood in the information dominant center that supports on the fire after it is truly incredible and i think if we brought mike flynn back there to look at that, he would be astounded at the incredible difference the situation provides us and provides the afghan leadership that enables a more effective use of resources we have. thank you. >> i can also let the enemy is no general is on the ground with all these efforts here. >> thank you for your service in afghanistan. i'm time i turn national emergency. the question going to your assessment of the enemies both this season, and the brutality and campaign right now appears to be focusing on as many writers have offered to us from inside afghanistan and the folk scene on the confidence of the afghan people in their security forces and police forces. as you alluded to since january, there've been three prominent police chief killed by afghan infiltrators. of course infiltration attack that was her school students as well as a couple others on recruiting stations. it's a timeline or tactic for insurgents, but there's a number of writers that say this is undermining the coalition strategy and is causing afghan people to question whether the security services can protect themselves, much less the afghans. what do you in your camassia's trajectory of this campaign of the taliban and how do you account -- the forces to be to protect themselves? >> again, first of all, that is going to be the exact tax the enemy takes because again they can't control and regain control to people they had before. they will continue to attack and control the people, which is why they're going after leaders and national security forces and after the elders who are leading communities to a better future. we will have to lead our way through some tough challenges. the afghan national security forces have done very, very well and many of the situations and in other situations of course they need to do better. that is going to be what we all have to do together daring. government better control their people. now on the other thing that is important about this is to actually watch and see what goes on for those attacks have occurred in the real important part is how fast or how far does the afghan community returned to the census normalcy. despite that has continued to respond that way. we are going to have to really focus our efforts to prevent these horrific attacks from ever changing the confidence and trust the afghan people have increasingly thrown in areas. >> my question has to do with the way things are evolving and how things are going to be different going forward. what kinds of different skill sets or roles of the afghan security forces be taking non-and if there are new responsibilities and skill sets needed, what kind of training do you envision taking place? >> yes, as we look forward, this goes double take the longest to the afghan national security forces to develop a sophisticated command and control requirements, the ability to integrate intelligence very broad range of intelligence system, the ability to bring joint effects to support efforts. -- too bad i started and i will take a little longer from observers that will be needed in the future. and again, that's why and how we will thin out our forces that will be taken away first to forces who were directly in the fight. temperature soldiers and police are directly in the fight will move this out first keep headquarters and skill sets i just discussed in the various little bit longer as we shall doubt or capacity of the national security forces to properly secure their country. >> i've got one last question, which also was treated to us. general, can you talk to whether and how the taliban strategy is changed in the past year and whether you think those changes are permanent or temporary and reversible. >> the taliban strategy has changed for a couple reasons. one is they no longer control the support bases in the populations, the main one they had both an essential helmand river valley and kandahar city as well as many other examples. they are coming in without the huge support they had before. they have adjusted tactics like was mentioned earlier about focusing on things eliminating ability to control the afghan people. and those are the afghan national security forces, afghan government and afghan leadership that is not the focus of targets. so the way they are going to purchase the shares just like we said thus far is going to go after sensational attacks and leadership in the half to go after the inside and the trust and confidence in the afghan national security forces and the isaf forces and they're going to try to shape the trust and confidence that i've been developing in the afghan people. >> sera, we're going to to lechee back for the responsibilities they are about to assume and were going to hand over your west point classmates comment dave barno who will talk more about the regional strategy. on behalf of everyone here for american security and frankly all of us in the united states, i'd like to thank you for the sacrifices they are making on our >> now, a discussion of packets and, afghanistan, al qaeda and how taliban may be affected by the death of osama bin laden. and include former assistant secretary of defense commit in the west, who has traveled with u.s. troops in afghanistan. this is an hour. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> okay, here we go. tavernier may now? good morning. those of you going after coffee in the back and make your way back. those coming in, take your seats, please. last event before lunch. this is a panel that really needs to know which reduction if you don't know what the four distinguished individuals are up here with me are perhaps you are in are in the wrong bothering this morning. to the far right, lieutenant general retry or barno who is a senior fellow at cnas. in 2003 demanded 23,000 u.s. forces in afghanistan and from 2006 to 2010 served as director of the center. his time in kabul, which we've all had a close partnership is widely regarded as a gold standard in afghanistan. to my immediate left, steve hall, a former boss of mine spent 20 years as a foreign correspondent and senior editor at the post. such an amazing poet there was really amazing and served as managing editor. nobody multitasked as he does. to my immediate right, and patterson served as our ambassador in islamabad in july 2007 throughout over 2010, prior to assignment in pakistan, served as the assistant secretary for the ino bureau as the department of state. the tireless work in pakistan a third relax of a next posting. last month president upon the united states ambassador to egypt. into the fire left, the west. where to begin with being. the most recent book is called the long war. rick strategy in the way of afghanistan is also the author of seven books including the village she claims a portrait in one vietnamese hamlet that is a must-read for soldiers and marines. he served as secretary for international security affairs. when he is in afghanistan, as he is much of the time now, he's just one of the guys. on patrol he's right up at the lance corporal walking point. just a couple of toy landed and helmand just after he left. i asked what it was like having them around. without a pause, he said that guy has brass. we are going to forgo the usual opening statement to get right to discussion. we will take it open to questions. i'm going to skip to set up. accpac amount paid in nine years after 9/11. we all know the setup. we went to hear what these guys have to say. let's begin with the most significant development this year and for some years now in the broader fight against terrorism and its impact on the future of al qaeda. let's put aside for a moment the al qaeda affiliate elsewhere and particularly in yemen on the wiki seems to be genuine danger expanding influence in the print because of the turmoil developed in that nation. and like to on packers and into a lesser extent afghanistan. with bin laden out, having spent much of its time since 9/11, the friction in the top think that the organization of the cia's campaign haven't eliminated the bubble commanders come with new offers to restrict the duopoly some allies from the afghan taliban exploring ever so haltingly the idea of peace talks with the government. if al qaeda is that forest? >> no, but the state centered question suggests that they have never known before a nap i challenge them substantially. it was a core organization that has 20 plus years under the same until may. it is also a network of like-minded groups but occasionally collaborate with the series of franchises and diverse parts of the muslim world. it is also a kindness fundraising mechanism, a position in the minds of followers who may never meet an al qaeda leader. so in that way, but are the aspects of osama's disappearing. i think i would mention a couple of them. al qaeda was founded as an organization in a series of houses in universe these in 1998. it's had the same ever since. now test the new one. and the circumstances of the succession progress will be very difficult because everyone who is a contender isn't hating. you can't have a series of human resources interviews and write out a job description that's going to have to be done under enormous pressure. i don't think anyone on the horizon can easily replace a symbolic role that bin laden held. and someone who narrated the war from a position of credibility among its followers and his credibility was booted in 9/11 to some extent. and he also had a hitch for building a strategy of bringing people to him. i don't see anyone who could carry out the kind of global symbolic role that he played. so why if al qaeda is valuable to those who take it on as a forest? the organization transfers tat takes and does a lot of things, but mainly it is useful because it helps raise funds and attract recruits. in that sense, there's a brand that attracts a certain kind of young person. there is a question about al qaeda sprinting and its role in fund-raising and recruiting. with this brand ever more like martha stewart located as a single individual, or was it more like a smoosh the cool people wanted to be around in a certain violence? and a tuesday that will be able to watch the value that al qaeda creates for others over the next couple of years, the extent to which people adopt the terminology or the extent to which they run away because it's poisonous unlikely to get you on part. and i think you're going to see more disillusionment. two other quick points. al qaeda and south asia is blending increasingly with sections of important pakistan routed groups from the punjab. this is the most dangerous. i think the migration of lashkar-e-taiba, asaba, individuals often from those groups coming up to the frontier, connecting with international trainers and volunteers, some of whom call themselves al qaeda and waged revolutionary violence to the state of afghanistan. whether al qaeda exists or continues to strengthen the organization and whether weekends and havoc in the region. one less reason why think it matters. >> there is an incipient process to determine whether sections of the taliban leadership, particularly for sure around with omar might be going to engage constructively in negotiations with the united states and parties to the conflict are not. in the united states has made quite clear that it would not consider such negotiations in a serious way unless at some stage in a verifiable and meaningful way the taliban broke with al qaeda. so what does osama's death mean quite a bit as true as secretary defense gates said this week that mullah omar and osama bin laden did have a close personal relationship, the absence of which might create the taliban to create decisions that he did not take in earlier eras. mullah omar had a house that you may have visited the special forces after december 2001, that is, built for him in downtown kandahar. he's where personal allegiance to mullah omar when the taliban fell in 2001, iraqi police under construction in downtown kandahar had a sign that said something to the effect is coming soon, kandahar is shopping mall brought to you by mullah omar under construction. in 2002 that was the nature of their relationship to cover business, fundraising and religion. however, mullah omar has had a need for virginity in circumstances where is much more rational to do so thin now and he is still to do it at every intersection. and by critical accounts of inter-taliban discussions about why this taliban has refused to break with al qaeda. the relationship with osama bin laden as a factor out of mullah omar's lips, but also has deep-seated theological direction and does pertain here. >> i want to come back to a couple things including the stew of other like minded groups. i will bring in ambassador patterson here and a little bit towards the impact of all of this. in the reports that cns is voting today, let me quote a little bit from it. among the authors is general barno. it's deeply conflicted and pervasively anti-american is sometimes contrary to the u.s. interest. it's demonstrable that should heavily influenced to remain committed to the pakistan to the long-term. the most promising policy choice in a field littered poor options. do you agree with that offense meant? assuming you do, how should the obama in frustration pursue that commitment? what is the balance between embracing that the strategic partner and accountability and a host of issues, corruption, writes casas support for afghan surgeons. the pentagon crafts in the relationship is cultivated with general kayani, including rascal and late-night cigar smoking. but those are fundamental differences not confronted enough. in other words, having a close relationship more than what the relationship actually delivered. last week's visit by secretary clinton fare that well. the pakistani military is more focused on a check team trainers and complementing offense and waziristan. what are the next steps that the administration faces on providing aid and security cooperation? how should washington reset the relationship impact and? >> let me talk about the overall national interest that pakistan. as steve pointed out, they have a raging domestic insurgency and what is increasingly a witches brew of terrorist to threaten the states. they have enormous social and demographic challenges, perhaps more than any country on the planet and there on the client has to be the fifth was used in the road. we need to reflect on the long-term view of our relationship with pakistan. let me say that i think the report was excellent and have a lot of good ideas. pakistan is a countrywide with contradictions that simply tries americans to enormous frustration. though we have no choice but to continue on the path we're on, which is to engage with pakistan to try and make the civilian government stronger and the obama administration has doubled down on most of the assistance tripled in one year between the reimbursements in standard deleterious distance running about $2.5 billion a year. in my view, we had no choice but to continue those projects and continue to engage the pakistani leadership. i would take issue with your statement for opposition to military relationship has not went through because i think what pakistan is again a country of immense frustration, they've also been our partner in the counterterrorism more than many unhealthy excesses. i'd like to make one final point about the way forward with pakistan because i think americans underestimate how much influence india has on pakistan and on its relationship with us in on its with afghanistan. it is hard to underestimate the economic cloud and particularly its international prestige of affected pakistan. one reason our relationship source of complex right now is the css having to run them over for the prettier girl next door. so i would particularly endorse the last recommendation in the cnas report that we should rocher confidence building recommendations and confident building measures between pakistan and india because i think the benefits for the u.s. practice and relationship and frankly benefits for the region as a whole, both economically and politically is known. >> i do care what the elements of the view of the region that a closer u.s. relationship with india is seen as a threat in islamabad and vice versa? >> you've got to start somewhere. they start from the zero-sum give on this and holbrooke was eloquent when he would talk to leaders. but you have to start in my view with some of the smaller disputes. i understand i'm talking about the glacier right now. there are a number of other issues. the economic good of the region are simply enormous. and the business communities in pakistan, which is the bright spot in pakistan should engage more actively on that because it is in everybody's interest. .. alliance of the of pakistani and establishment still see extremist groups in afghanistan as part of the nation's strategic depth with regard to india and what role should others plea in the process specifically iran, china and india. >> that's a fundamental question and i spent a week in january and got to interact with many of the senior military intelligence officials as well as academics tribal areas a little bit. in one of the takeaways from that visit which is surprising is that it was clear that pakistan wants to see this conflict maxtor result and it's equally clear that they were extraordinarily concerned they would be left with a mess on their doorstep that would be a redheaded stepchild where they would have to care for for the next decade or more after the united states left so i think one of the important things the u.s. needs to do as soon as possible and president obama's speech next month in july is to dispel some of the uncertainty about the future u.s. role in the region. i think one of the great tragedies in a sense in the last two years in terms of understanding with the u.s. is planning to do is perhaps misinterpreted or someone argued correctly interpreted. one line out of president obama's west point speech as the u.s. force would begin withdrawing from afghanistan in july, 2011. the was the only line remembered from that speech, did important speech, but the message in the region was the americans are leaving. the americans are living for the exit as all of us know everyone is spring loaded to expect the outcome any way because that's what history has told us. yet we still been very opaque about what our long-term goals are in the region and what we expect a long-term presence there's a one of the things we argue in this report we just released as well as december is the united states needs a long-term military presence in this part of the world that sends an unmistakable message we are going to remain committed. right now pakistan is are hedging their bets they are always maintaining a plan b because history has told them that they need to make sure their best postured for the day after the americans are gone because that's going to come at some point in time and their geography is not going to change, there's always going to be afghanistan's meter indonesia's neighbor. they have to hedge against the prospect of us being there longer and i can first of all we need to dispel that notion that we do have an end game that's departing the region wholesale and that we have a plan to have presence there. the other regional players but again the lack of certainty about what the united states expects, where it's going, what it wants to do causes them to have hedging plans that work around our interest and finally against what we want to accomplish. that's the most important thing. >> in an environment where the levels will be headed down starting in july, how big are the u.s. presence? does there seem to be post 2014? the strategic framework that is currently been negotiated between kabul lead deily to need to sort of spell out the necessary incentives in their view of to get both the taliban actors as well as the pakistani government to see that a u.s. presence is significant and enduring enough. what will that have to be? >> in december the number should be between 25,000 to 35,000 americans and that was premised on two things. one is that part of that or a substantial part of it would continue to have to fight the counterterrorism battle against al qaeda and its associated groups across the region, and he would need some significant u.s. special operations capable the to do that. another was premised on a continuing to have to fight the taliban. that might no longer be the case two or three or four years on the road. we hope that's the direction. so that could be a small u.s. force that the answer which appears to be zero american troops is not the right answer, and we think that there is an opportunity here as the year continues to strike a bargain with the afghan government to actively wants americans to remain in afghanistan who is very concerned about what the impact is if the u.s. does leave and from both a security standpoint and economic standpoint very much wants to stay connected to some u.s. security powers. and our premise on this in one way is this is not about the island of afghanistan, it's about the region and that the u.s. has long term vital national security interests in this region that require at least a small u.s. military presence to protect those. i think it's important that we work hard this year to get that out there and the public square and negotiate some type effect the agreement in afghanistan to do that. that will have a calming effect on the region as a whole. >> with this drawdown coupled with some very tough to swallow statistics that all of us know very well, 1500 americans now having died in afghanistan since we started the war a price tag this year that will exceed $113 billion plans to spend more than 100 billion next year on the presence in afghanistan. this has many people searching the sustainable mission that cost both in dollars and lives and to say we need to fight a smaller war but to cut back on the on successful missions of population protection and space nation building and shift to a smaller footprint nation on special operations raids and advising afghan security forces skeptical that the process of a peace deal with the taliban. tell us how to get to a smaller mission without seeing the hard-fought gains. if our military were engaged in the development but let's be honest to talk about a civilian search there hasn't been that many civilians proportionately speaking sat down to the district level in afghanistan. so, if the military isn't giving it, who is? and if nobody is is it just focus on killing the bad guys and train the afghan security forces what is to ignore the country from slipping back to the old cycle that helped fuel the conflict in the first place? >> what do we care? i mean, i like the fact that this conference is called risk reward because when you are a country you have to begin to considered risk versus reward. the reason we tried nation-building in afghanistan was because of our hubris on the one hand and because we thought we were so rich we could do anything. and so we spent ten years with ninth century tribes on a bunch of rocks trying to set a social contract is the way we will do business as a military. our united states military years ago said that they had a new doctrine and said from now on the soldiers and marines have to be nation builders as well as warriors and that is nuts because what was succeeded in doing in afghanistan and this isn't just karzai it's all the way down, we have created a culture of entitlement and came just what the general was saying he said every one of our commanders has to balance what he does for governance with security. why does he have to do that? why we have to undertake those missions? so we have driven the afghans after ten years to expect when we look at the americans' use the dollar sign and when we have $1.5 billion we call emergency response programs just the 65 battalions that means every battalion commander is walking around with millions of dollars he has to spend, so we have trained just like lyndon baines johnson believed you could have a long party in great society and cause chaos by doing so we said we do everything for you. therefore if you get the risk/reward. the general is proposing that he has a plan for the next three and a half years, three and a half more years at $100 billion a year from 100,000, 80,000, can we do all that? sure, we can. the issue becomes risk reward do we want to do that? are there other strategies and i think that we will see interesting month next month when the president versus the amount of money we have and the treasurer and soldiers and marines and asks is this the only way to go, and the alternative i think is quite clear we bear a very heavy adviser force which is recommended, and i say that for two reasons. the taliban aren't that great a track we are trying to keep them from taking over the country, fine. how do you take a free country? how do you take over the country? they had a lot of help from pakistan in terms of logistics. to dillinger in big city you don't go on a few motorcycle's you could be out in the area is forever but once you start moving you have to mass, and that means somebody has to provide you with many vehicles and a logistics system. i guarantee you the pakistanis are not going to do that. in fact, i think the pakistanis are doing as a great favor because the arms that the taliban have nickel lamb. they don't have anything that's serious and i am absolutely convinced that's because pakistanis somehow crammed down so they don't get them. let me give you an example. we have 60 blimps now over the outposts watching the area 24 hours a day. you can see them right up there, not any of them can be touched buy any taliban because they don't have the logistics base. the other thing we have is remarkable aerial surveillance i never believed i would see in my lifetime, and every single patrol you are out with their somebody up their watching. weekend and now ranks dramatically as the general was saying and leave behind some people who are the advisers to have these kind of equipment and let the afghans to their own fighting and their own civil war and you get to the risk reward are we taking more risk than last doing everything for them for the next three and a half years? yes you are taking a rest. but i think that the state of our own economy and having worn down our forests and the steady casualties we take i would argue for taking this risk and that is going in the forefront for another three and a half years of this war coming and i do not believe the taliban would end up in control and afghanistan. but it's a risk that you're going to have to take. >> i would ask all of you this, how messy can afghanistan get without it fundamentally compromising the clear u.s. national security interest? general mcchrystal submitted his report in 2009 so if he defined the young state in afghanistan as one in which the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the central state income. you heard division described by lt. general rodriguez embraced by general eikenberry and others in the u.s. government's that calls for very active start at the sub national level the district delivery program the embassy of kabul have to give a call when the district disaster program and getting the ministry representatives down to district levels. what is -- what should that level be going forward and how mincy can we tolerate, and i would like to hear from the rest of you in terms of how mincy can afghanistan get with regard to trying to ensure that al qaeda doesn't come back and that it doesn't fundamentally destabilize pakistan. let me start with you. >> i will start with i used to go to northern kunar. we are of the now. we were posted. the fundamentally just pushed us out. so can you have a mess and still continue on? yes. our issue should have been do we want transnational terrorists who can strike from afghanistan against other countries? and i don't believe that will occur. it's a risk but i don't believe it and you can have a mess in the countryside. yemen is a mess. pakistan is a mess. these insurgencies as far as i'm concerned as long as they aren't telling us. so, i would restrict the mentioned to are you telling me there is a threat such that used to exist in kandahar when mullah omar was planning everything no, i'm not giving any sanctuary like that than that's enough. >> al qaeda was 20, 30,000 u.s. forces and special operators at the cost of doing business in afghanistan is greater than the fata they won't seek to come back in significant numbers. what did afghanistan look like and how did that impact the rational terrorism? >> let me first register my disagreement and the kind of resource trends in afghanistan, the size of american investments and the amount of money we spend has had an effect on every aspect of the afghan political economy and should be our goal to reduce the size of our presence and troops and the distorting effect we have on the political economy but to do it in a responsible way. i'm not suggesting this is quite what they were saying that it would be unwise i think to have a policy goal of inducing a civil war and the men and women who sacrificed from the united states military today. so why yet transition? it should be the goal of the transition successfully, and as to in the state's yes i do think that is a vital u.s. interest. i think there are specifics that capacity regardless of whether or not we are successful in preventing a civil war or large great civil war in afghanistan during this transition that residual capacity would line up with u.s. interest. so i think one is the capacity to carry out counterterrorism action against the current international terrorists including such as the one carried out against the side of the mountain. that gives an afghanistan that can host bases and max capacity that is relevant to the centrist. i think there's a second that is a little more in direct but easy enough for us to agree on which is something i hope pakistan increases thinking about and the next transition which is if afghanistan were to become a sanctuary for antipakistani islamist revolution, revolutionaries that exhilarated the potential of the pakistani taliban into a force that threatened the pakistani state, that would be disastrous for the united states because of the strategic asset the pakistanis hold and part of the problem thinking about how much you could imagine uncontested territory afghanistan becoming such even if the afghan government supported by the international community help don to cities and sort of mistakes we is to visit. >> i would like to make a couple points. i disagree with mr. west i agree but over three and a half years in pakistan, i saw many threats, actually less against us and our allies, and i don't think there's any reason to believe that with the varying degrees that would move right back into afghanistan, so i think that would be the first issue. the second is the one that steve points out that this would be inherently destabilizing to pakistan. i think there's a mixed perception that pakistan wants the taliban back in power. nothing can be further from the truth. the one the taliban back because they have seen how the public stand can destabilize and hook up with them and this is a two-way street. they don't want the northern alliance to align either, so they have very conflicted approach to afghanistan. and then finally, it is a degree of messiness or lack of american commitment in afghanistan. they would to a possibly perilous and extend. so there's a lot of things that could go wrong with pakistan from a messy situation given the strategic interests in pakistan i think it would be a very high risk to run. >> in terms of the afghan state that is not the total disengagement. let them do get out themselves, but it's something more sustainable than the scope of the signal point effort that is being sort of a deployed if as significant parts of the country right now. >> that is going to be the challenge the next three and a half years is designing that structure in a way that gets you to in afghanistan but stable because in my view and i think each of the panelists in one way or another afghanistan in a sense is the keystone to the stability if you have an unstable afghanistan it is likely which starts bleeding into pakistan that would press on the subcontinent where we have the two nuclear-armed countries facing off with the each of the last 40 years this is an extraordinarily dangerous part of the world in afghanistan is going to, you know, make it much more dangerous place, so i think we are going to have to find a way in the next three and a half years to take our vast aid dollars that several of us have described and neck that down without collapsing the afghan economy which is very reliant upon right now and helping to design something that gets to what some are calling afghan could lead off to a steady state afghanistan that stable. i hope it is seasoned by a small military presence and that has got a long-term commitment to think that is achievable but i'm not sure that we crystallized the realization we have to start designing that outcome. >> they are not going to do it for themselves. >> as i indicated i believe we would make progress. but until we see the afghans fighting the afghans, until we see them standing up for themselves, we just pushed back the tide and it's just a question of when that transition will start and i just like to see it start earlier. there may be a civil war over there i define it as a civil war right now going on in pakistan and afghanistan they've always wanted afghanistan. all those things are going to go on the next ten, 20, 30 years. >> i was having a coffee yesterday with a state department representative who's just back on home leave and has been there for now almost 20 months. he was noting that this is after about four years of u.s. pushback on the counterinsurgency operations that began in the summer of 2008 that the police now it's taken three years and he believes it's going to take many more months of the continued international presence. how do you bring that about in a world where the troop levels are going to be fundamentally coming down, and you want to continue on the path of the stability, but in most of the areas you start to see some real positive developments with the queen effort there seems to be in the words of general rodriguez and general petraeus and others for in this seems hard to imagine that you're going to be unable even at the end of this year where they're going to be able to take significant numbers and move them to the east to deal with the issues that are taking place elsewhere. so how do you square that? >> i would say it's exactly right that it's time to get the afghans deeper into this fight to get them informed with american and lasers and you have an enormously large afghan security force that's been built the last several years. the army is by almost all estimations an extraordinarily effective force by regional standards. it can, the soldiers are of that tree inclined to fighting. one of my allied counterparts say that it's in their dna to be warriors. we've been very reluctant to let them be in the lead in these fights and i've heard anecdotally from friends in the region that the afghans are ready to do more than we are it's time to move forward i think. >> let's go back to you guys. there are folks with microphones walking around you want to raise your hand just keep the question of short in terms of a question please and you can address a specific member or the panel as a whole. >> ambassador patterson, you are involved in a what is the most successful effort the united states has done in colombia, spent a lot of time there and i was involved when you read the ambassador and there we've done that with no more than 800 guys on the ground and probably spent a total of about a month of what it cost in afghanistan and obviously different places but i wonder if he might comment on the similarities or differences what we might learn of what we did successfully. islamic of whittier was a longstanding relationship over the many decades and the one of the key differences is the engagement in pakistan said the so-called lost generation of the military officers that have no contact with the united states and we are going to be paying that for years to come but it's in many respects an entirely different kind conflict because it wasn't fuelled by this religious in many cases in pakistan and then pakistan is a country that columbia is a country that has civilian institutions controlled by civilians for decades and didn't have the demographic problems and pakistan conference those with a much easier environment in which to make progress. >> i'm struck when every time 2014 is mentioned in regard to the u.s. job i think we forget there's a presidential election that year. how will need to ending the mission their affect the international community's ability to ensure that they are [inaudible] than for those that are in favor of continued military presence how will that not be a casualty to the afghan politics? >> having been there for the first half in the presidential election in 2000 for which i think i could argue was the best of the two we had so far. [laughter] a couple thoughts. number one, the constitution in afghanistan right now prevents the president from running a third term. president karzai was the interim president and afghanistan and serve a full five-year term and is now in the second five-year term. there's indications he's clear to serve a third five-year term. so, one of the things we are going to have to look at in that is investor crocker is going to have to be involved in his ensuring that there is the prospect of the constitutional succession in afghanistan that starts in 2014. how they come to the floor in the political where there's no political parties mix that problematic. i don't think that the nato transition which right now is scheduled to essentially concluded the end of 2014 there will be no military presence after that, even nato is to the fact that they are going to have long-term commitments beyond that. so i don't think we should view that as a an end of game the west is no longer engaged, and one of the key tasks that as you suggest needs to occur before that transition gets to december 14 this to help actually set the conditions for a successful presidential election in 2014. i think we utterly failed to do that on the last presidential election and it's even viewed as part of the isf mission. i hope we won't make that mistake again. >> could i just add one thing? it's a good question because the political side no matter what the piece of troop withdrawal or the military strategy it's going to be vulnerable to capture by the sections by president karzai or his advisers who made this an unconstitutional third term, and it's going to be a lot of pressure on the international community to stand firm around the principle that there should be a constitutional transition and to stand firm on behalf of the small but important and emerging source of constructive diverse political the activity in the country primarily in the parliament. the embassies in kabul that are a great job in stand debt to president karzai's efforts to keep the parliament from being seated but i'm not sure that anybody is paying much attention to that kind of struggle. it's often too easy to stay with the incumbent we know them to take a hard risks building some more sustainable left and politics. we talk about switzerland to recognize that there are enormously diverse members of credible afghan leaders who want to participate in the peaceful constructive politics and it ought to be a high priority of the transition to give them this base to represent their communities. >> madame ambassador, i represent veterans for rethinking afghanistan. if you have made a comment and said that if we leave afghanistan and began troop withdrawal that perhaps we may have these adverse effect destabilizing afghanistan, clarification, anymore than we are already doing now with the drawn strikes and -- >> one of the things i'm concerned about this month pakistan think tank released a report saying there are 600 known al qaeda militants that the pakistani jails are releasing back to population because they don't have the proper governance and justice assets to keep them there if you can help me understand some of that. >> let me say this began to the house audience it has been a runaway success and the first responsibly as american officials in the military and intelligence leaders to protect the united states and again i think our intelligence program is in that respect have been successful. but i think the question was about there is no question about the degree of messiness and afghanistan. the problem with pakistan is to hedge their bets and they have a better idea what's going to happen in afghanistan and the situation becomes a little more unstable every day afghanistan and that is the scary thing. the long-term prospect are frightening. it's the groups coming together with an attack on pakistan in 2009 and its three different groups to tell each other their services and until pakistani leaders have a better perspective and more confidence was going to happen in afghanistan i don't think they are going to take the steps the country needs to stabilize their own situation. >> if i could add to that, in the january 1 of the things that surprised me in all of my encounters was the degree of fear among the elites of the disability of the country, and the leading fear was the economic year. i heard that even from the senior military officers that the economy was going to eventually get to the point of collapse but that's something that the u.s. has to look at and perhaps do a bit more than we have been doing their and traveling well down on that list was there were certainly internal instabilities, the radicalization of the population about the fourth place was india which i found quite striking compared to the previous so there is an internal recognition that they have some very serious problems. one of the things i applaud the administration for giving in congress is helping move this direction as well as to reinforce programs aimed at the civilian government of pakistan. and we suggest the u.s. needs to continue to bolster the programs to exploit success to make sure the money gets spent effectively and getting the bang for the buck we know the money is going and it's more transparent and i see the whole moving in that direction. >> with regard to pakistan and al qaeda >> at the moment it is a trial going on in chicago, and testified which is the trigger was a group responsible for the attack that saved 166 people including six americans. he said the number of the of the isi provided assistance that included financial military support and to what degree should it be a focus of the counterterrorism activities? is it a hard enough line against them and pushing the pakistani government part on the hockley network and the telegram deutsch we'd lose a degree of leverage on the other affiliated groups that are out there causing significant trouble? >> i think it's an important group and complicated one and one of its sort of aspects has been a little bit itself to hold onto its position as a word of the pakistani state and not jeopardize the assets it controls inside of pakistan schools, hospitals, bank accounts, networks and volunteers it's a complicated hezbollah organization where there is a good degree of religious and social work blended in with violent means and young men who want to participate in international jihad. so there has been a pattern in which the younger volunteers have been kind of setting their identity cards of the home office and then going out to the frontier to participate in the al qaeda affiliated and express itself in the international ambition where it's even more dangerous and complicated is where it seems to serve as a proxy or partial proxy of the elements they want to weaken india by carrying out of violent attacks so for the mumbai attacks acknowledge and planning the attack go and the officials with us uniquely about mumbai they have that question about a whole series of attacks that trace back to a certain author ship that includes retired elements in the pakistani state but they cannot sort of hold the state accountable for that activity and one reason why the relations are so frenzied right now and it's debilitating across the region including in afghanistan as because the pakistan-based eight is not accountable as a stage for what i think the indians regard as pretty convincing body of evidence that they would like to see coming through. now whether the pakistan-based it has the capacity to do everything of course these are serious problems. >> the same is true with us and the fact that there had to be some sort of collusion for osama to be there and other people like haqqani and al qaeda. >> physically i don't think the fight is about the organization that was set up by pakistan's intelligence agency to engage in asymmetric warfare. and this has happened repeatedly and not just with let but other groups inside pakistan so they don't exercise control over this. i sat and the rest members in afghanistan and again, this is spreading and morphing into the groups are working with each other to essentials the threat in the pakistani state now. and i for one don't think they are entirely in control of the let. i think they still have contact with a lot of acts and yes it is particularly true of the groups in southern to john who have been out there for decades that are now also more radicalized and more energized by the defense. >> the model of creating a terrorist groups to do your bidding as a regular warfare component of your security strategy has been broken down and now we are seeing these groups this is dangerous to the united states troops are in some cases taking on the transnational objectives which we have never seen until the last two or three years that makes us a complex problem than simply al qaeda version one point cero which is what we were after the 9/11 attacks. and in the first presence in the region we have to be cognizant of the threat from these other groups who are outside the media al qaeda logo becoming a standard as to the united states as al qaeda has been in the past and that appears to be growing which i think is troubling. >> on the regional engagement the first is what should we do with india to get them to help get afghanistan? and i may want to protect to get them to perhaps pull back a little that potentially to diffuse concerns and islamabad and the second question from twitter to speak to iran and afghanistan. >> they can get the battalions to come over and set up shop in the kunar province i think we would get the entire pakistani army to suddenly be on -- [laughter] >> it's a very good question and pakistan is just incredibly sensitive about the activity inside pakistan. they will not hesitate to provide on every indian consulate and how many members are posted inside afghanistan. i think india has been very helpful to the state of afghanistan and has done a considerable amount of state building and nation building over the last ten years especially in the network and the afghan and the indian government have good relations far better than the afghan and pakistani government by and large, so i think the u.s. needs to make a quiet dialogue about its activities and as we get into a cloture phase of potentially negotiating the taliban and talking to pakistan about how to settle and resolve the conflict we have to keep the dialogue going quietly as well. >> i was just going to say i don't think the united states months to suggest this is the should not be imprisoned by the paranoia in afghanistan as a transition. india has to be part of the solution. it's part of the context in which this lacertid proxy war kitfield has been going on for 35 years. and the strong relations that the general pointed out exists between president karzai and the indian government mulhern are stronger at the moment in the u.s. relations in kabul in some respects there's more confidence and the indians can help construct the political transition we were talking about earlier, and the pakistanis fear the indian presence in afghanistan completely unjustified just because you're paranoid doesn't mean from the perspective, but the consulate's in the separatism and so forth is overdrawn, and there are problems in the international support for the antipakistani groups which operate sometimes in the sanctuary as well as afghanistan but they're simply not on the skill to justify the paranoia and the argument. what about iran? >> one of the traffic runs in afghanistan today is the highway, the indians through the area that go through the border and the indians see this as to the iranians as an alternative might collapse the arabian seas, and yet washington is such that obviously dealing with them as much more you know, could they be in a more constructive way to provide sort of leverage over the pakistanis and with regard to the afghans in this process to you think? >> pakistan may be asking on the -- i think a couple of aspects. one is the u.s. took to the afghan government about a long-term small u.s. troop footprint there. the u.s. needs to do that with a view towards some cities have to work in afghanistan but certainly in the western part of afghanistan. iran has an economic impact all across western afghanistan. the power that drives comes from iran. all of the trade that generates comes from iran. they are closer in many ways to iran the and in kabul and that's not true of the whole western corner of afghanistan so i think the u.s. has to be thoughtful of the iranian interest out there and the troop presence. the second final point would be one of the things we recommend in every part is that the u.s. were to open up trade and transit across the region the route you just described is an example of a success story that the united states is ambivalent about right now who we have at best mixed relationships with, so that is an area where we can do work to open up the time is and maybe perhaps even using the relations with iran to gain some advantages as we try to sort out what the and state in afghanistan is going to look like. >> i don't think that iran has much of their role in pakistan consideration. the lawyer agree with everything steve said about the relation in afghanistan. in baluchistan ascent real but i think maybe we haven't talked enough about this. the way through this is a political settlement, and certainly everyone in the administration. the only solution in afghanistan is some kind of political settlement, and iran and others have to move on to that at some point in pakistan there has to be a broader settlement associate. >> last question here. >> right over here. >> with respect to eastern afghanistan and the groups to operate in the relationships with al qaeda, how critical to the overall mission is it that u.s. and coalition get after the troops in the east and a second front like we saw in the south and if we don't what the consequences in terms of president obama's objectives stated specifically with respect to al qaeda? islamic in terms of geography so the mountain on the pakistani side and on the afghan side is just another mountain and that's where they are right now on both sides because we are no longer in there. and the generals charts he had no intention of going back up into those areas. so for the extent they are up 10,000 feet, 7,000 from 8,000 feet and that's where they are. >> one thing about we're fighting a war might ended the war might and the question is how big we have to fight in which to deal with materials, and the one thing i see as being in terms of fighting this as an titer of this is i don't see the taliban, haqqani or the others the kind of material to make them if you will immaterial danger so they can be a pain in the neck and a lot of ways but wanted up in the mountains but getting that momentum to really move i don't see them getting. that is separate from them remaning as terrorists. >> i would like to add to that i don't think the connection to get between al qaeda and the haqqani network is the primary driver. particularly in eastern afghanistan. my take is that the network was probably the most dangerous insurgent group the u.s. forces are dealing with today. it's going to require from inside of pakistan to neutralize the capabilities more so than fighting berkeley in eastern afghanistan. there are some initial indications it might be moving in that direction. i am moderately optimistic in the six months we're going to see some actions by the haqqani network and overt the and perhaps in some other arenas as well. >> i would like to thank the panel for the remarks here to investor patterson, steve, thank you very much for joining us today. [applause]ñ?ñ >> the committee will come to order. the oversight committee exists to secure two fundamental principles. first, americans have a right to know that the money washington takes from them is well spent. and, second, americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. our duty on the oversight and government reform committee is to protect these rights. our solemn respondent is to -- responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right the know what they get from their government. we work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver facts to the american people and bring genuine reform to the federal bureaucracy. this is our mission. this morning we will review the enormous task confronted in the gulf as a result of the bp oil spill and the obama administration's choices made then and to this day. it is clear that this was a manmade disaster, that 11 people died in what should not have happened. but it's the choices after an initial event that we will focus on today. that is not to take away bp's ultimate responsibility. but this committee reviews government actions both prospectively and retrospectively. we cannot expect to do a better job next time if we do not focus on what was done right and what was done wrong in this disaster. the government made several decisions under its authority. one of them was not to use stafford act. and, in fact, to leave the very entity that created this pollution in a position of authority and lead. there are many reasons this may have happened, but we have to ask; should it happen again? congress has the clear power and authority to change the rules of the road. we should not have to choose between holding a polluter responsible and 'em pouring -- empowering leaders at the federal, state and local level to do what they are responsible to do on behalf of their citizens. the reimbursement for actions directly and indirectly belongs to british petroleum. they have said they will meet that challenge, and we will hold them to it. but as the days and weeks went on after an initial spill 40 some miles out at sea, it became obvious that we lacked the resources in place to do the job that was coming. the response was slow and chaotic. additionally, we will hear from testimony today that the secondary damage turned out to be, in many cases, far worse than the little or no oil that came to the shores of communities: that is part of what we have to deal with here today. oil spills and other events are inevitable. in my hometown of cleveland, more than 60 years ago a liquefied natural gas container went bad, and many died. it has not stopped us from resourcing and using natural gas here in america. three mile island is still in the memory of people my age. it has not stopped us from using nuclear fuel as a primary source for baseload. coal miners, to our dismay, continue to die trying to harvest that fuel around the world. it is a necessary part of our society that dangerous jobs are done by people who choose to do them and have a right to be protected in thats process. in that process. but this hearing is not about the riskiness of any of these fuel sources. it is, in fact, about whether the federal government knows better time than they did before this event. additionally, it is important for us to understand that just as hurricane katrina told us that fema had problems working with states, fema was not necessarily ready for a loss of vast areas of response. we now know that even when all the response capabilities were in place, even when it was a single event of a company that did not do their job and did not play properly by the rules, we find secondary events throughout the area. we find oil coming ashore and not being responded to for a number of reasons. we additionally find a loss of revenue in unrelated areas. we will hear from our second panel and from our first that the loss of tourism was needless and extreme in areas in which the water was clean, the shore was pristine and, in fact, people were scared away. we need to make sure that does not happen again, we need to make sure that governors and local officials are empowered to do what is in the best interest of their people, and that the american people get a fair understanding of the scope of any problem or spill. lastly, we will hear today that as a result of one reckless action we find countless billions of dollars of revenue lost. good hard working meshes out of -- americans out of work. resources necessary to make us less oil reliant on countries that often are not friendly to us leaving to the very countries that, in fact, will now produce the oil that we are forced to buy. in america today both sides of the aisle talk about jobs. i, for one, am not an economist, but i can understand that if $400 billion worth of purchased oil were produced here in america, there would be countless millions of direct and indirect jobs available to americans. there are many things that we are not competitive on here in america. certainly, one we are competitive on is natural resource extraction from our coastal waters and onshore locations. i look forward to hearing from my old friend and the considerably well known figure to all of us, governor barbour, and with that, i recognize the gentleman from maryland for his opening statement. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and good morning. let me first welcome governor barbour, and i thank you very much for being with us today. i also want to take a moment to recognize dick gregory who is a person who has fought hard for so many people for so long in our audience. thank you, mr. gregory, for being a part of this hearing today. governor barbour, your state has been through a tremendous amount of difficulty, and i sincerely look forward to your testimony. let me also welcome michael bromwich from the department of interior. mr. bromwich, you agreed to be here with incredibly short notice, so we thank you very much for your testimony and for your expertise. finally, let me welcome the residents of the gulf who have traveled here today to share their views with the committee. earlier this year the national commission on the bp deepwater horizon oil spill issued a comprehensive report on the causes of the spill. the report found that this disaster was avoidable and that it resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by bp, halliburton and transocean. and by government officials. these were extremely difficult lessons to learn. now, more than a year later, officials in both the oil industry and our government appear to be heeding these lessons and retooling the way they do business. first, we must never, ever forget that 11 individuals lost their lives in an explosion on april 20th. to address deficiencies that contributed to these deaths, the interior department issued an improved workplace safety rule that many, including industry, believe will significantly enhance worker safety. the department also completely reorganized the minerals management service. mms had been criticized because it oversaw the safety of drilling, the environmental impacts caused by drilling, and the revenue generated from drilling. according to the national commission, mms had a built-in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its mandate to insure safe drilling and environmental protection. the department also implemented a number of critical safety measures to insure that a blowout like this would never happen again. for example, a new drilling safety rule would strengthen standard for well control procedures. drilling equipment and well design, and it required independent and third party inspections. finally, the department issued a notice to lease sees to require oil companies to demonstrate they can actually cap a well, they can actually cap a well and handle a deepwater blowout before any new drilling permits were issued. these were responsible steps taken after it became clear to the nation, after 87 days that bp simply did not have the technology available, in other words, the technology was far outdistancing our ability to control it. mr. chairman, i have to say that i am disappointed by your actions today. you stated that the committee investigations -- investigates have interviewed more than 50 government officials, scores of residents, business owners and whistleblowers as part of this investigation. that is news to everyone on this side of the aisle because you completely excluded us from that effort. and you have not explained why. unfortunately, this is the definition of partisanship, and it undermines the integrity of this committee. and by the way, this report that's being submitted this morning was submitted to the press before we even saw it. nevertheless, moving forward, it is our obligation as members of the united states congress to develop constructive ways to help people in the gulf rebuild their lives and their livelihoods. in my former capacity as chairman of the subcommittee on coast guard and marry time transportation, i visited the gulf twice while oil was flowing. i saw how the spill affected small businesses that rely on tourism, fishing and other industries. i've offered several measures to provide real solutions to gulf residents. last congress i offer add provision that cut in half from 90 days to 45 days the amount of time responsible parties had to settle claims arising from the spill. i also worked on provisions with chairman overstar to strengthen the coast guard's oversight of oil spill response plans. this year, just recently, i offered an amendment to h.r. swz 1229 to require all oil and gas exploration and production activities in the gulf to be conducted by u.s. flag vessels. talking about jobs, that's jobs. this, which would have immediately stimulated the gulf economy. unfortunately, the rules committee did not allow a vote on my amendment. my basic point is this: we have a tremendous opportunity in this committee to really help people, people who are undergone extreme hardship. as the goal of today's hearing, if we can focus on identifying even one positive, proactive solution that we can agree on, i think the hearing will be a success. >> i thank you. i ask for one minute to respond. without objection. to my ranking member, just for your edification, this investigation began under your predecessor, chairman towns. we went down jointly and separately. he authorized minority trips when i was in the minority, in addition to the joint trips we did including members of both parties. when i took the chair, we continued that investigation. we have had joint trips in addition to we have authorized minority trips down there. as a matter of fact, we've never turned down a request by the minority to go on staff fact-finding. every request that's been asked for has been granted. it is true that both your side and my side under both the majority and minority have gone both together and independently, but i certainly think that i don't, i will not belittle any effort that your side made to get independent facts. i hope you were not intending to do so by saying you were surprised we'd made 50 trips when some of them were made together. >> mr. chairman, may i have a minute? >> of course. >> let me say this, mr., actually, from the very beginning my number one concern is helping the american people. and it is about the integrity of this committee. i do not belittle for one second the findings and the things that the majority has done. what i'm saying is that we want to be a true partner in all of that. i have said to you privately and openly that we, too, care about government operating prop beerily. we -- properly. we, too, care about making sure that every agency of government does what it is supposed to do. we, too, want to make sure there's no agency caught up in a culture of mediocrity. so i look forward going forward, like i said, want to move on, but i want to make it clear that we, too, are partners. we, too, were elected per district, so we want to make sure our voices are heard too. >> i thank the gentleman. with that, we are prepared to introduce our first panel. i'm going to deny myself the honor of introducing governor barbour and instead go to congressman steven blaz sew, for his introduction of his governor. and i understand your governor when you were in the statehouse. the gentleman is recognized for an introduction. >> good morning. thank you, chairman issa, ranking member couple us and members for the privilege of letting me introduce his leadership firsthand after the devastation of hurricane katrina and more recently the deepwater horizon oil spill. indeed, no other governor has been as frequently challenged to rise to the occasion of leading a state during a time of crisis, whether manmade or natural. and each time governor barbour shouldered the burden in a manner that calmed tempers and resulted in credible, efficient outcomes. to accomplish this, he met each event with a balanced regimen of compassion and order, allaying fears and the sense of loss with hope and the prospect of swift recovery. i vividly remember the many times the governor and his beautiful wife marsha walked hand in hand with the victims in the aftermath of it all, assured them that everything was going to be all right. more recently, he continues to guide our state through historical floods and a severe tornado season. he has not only led mississippi through the country's worst natural manmade disaster, but he challenged us to build back bigger and better. he is a great leader in every sense of the word, and of course i'm talking about mississippi's 63rd governor, haley barbour. mr. chairman, as someone who represents a district devastated by the oil spill, i appreciate you directing the committee to assess the recovery efforts of bp and the obama administration. i would like to briefly mention that as someone who has worked offshore on drilling platforms, i have a particular concern on how the administration came to the decision to institute a moratorium without conducting a study of how it will impact the gulf coast economy. we know now that this thoughtless decision would decleese oil production for the next two years. a loss of production of this magnitude will continue to have a negative impact on the gulf coast economy for years to come. studies conducted by louisiana state university put potential estimated job loss by the moratorium and subsequent perm tore yum on the gulf coast region at around 24,000. the ripple effect of these lost jobs and high energy prices hurts our national economy. the majority of the jobs lost in mississippi are from the fourth congressional district of mississippi, the district i represent. i've worked offshore, i know the value of the jobs that the offshore drilling industry provides. i look forward into further investigation into the economic impact of the administration's decisions and motivations. i applaud the committee for the extensive work on this critical issue, and i look forward to hearing the testimony by the witnesses and the outcome of this important hearing. and thank you again, chairman issa, and the members for allowing me the honor of introducing governor haley barbour. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. pursuant to the rules of the committee, governor, would you rise to take the oath? governor, do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? >> i do. >> let the record reflect that the governor answer inside the affirmative. governor, you know this routine, you've seen it for years. your entire statement will be placed in the record. we will not hold you to an exact five minutes, but come as close as you can. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> gentleman's recognized. >> and to the ranking member and all the members of the committee, thank you very much for having me here. i am going to not read my statement. let me start off by saying that this disaster is very different from other disasters. when representative palazzo talks about katrina, we had obliteration, it looked like the hand of god had just wiped away the gulf coast for blocks, and in some places for miles. we had hurricane-force winds 40 miles inland. and to get people to where they got confident that the coast was going to come back, where they had hope for their families and their communities, where they were willing to return home was an enormous part of the job. in this case, keeping people calm. you know, you had an oil well blow out 100-plus miles away from be our coast. and i should say at this point this experience for us was a little different than for louisiana. louisiana was closer to the well, they got wet, brown oil into some of their areas. we didn't. we were about 108 miles from the well head to the city of gulfport, and by the time oil got to us, a, it had been a long time since the well blew out; b, what got to us you would not recognize as oil. there was this orange mixture of water and the remnant of oil that the oil people call mousse. and then there were what we call tarballs and tar patties. when i was a kid, we used to go to the beach, we used to throw 'em at each other, tarballs, because the gulf of mexico seeps out somewhere as much as a million, 400,000 barrels a year according to the usgis every year through the floor. so, you know, we were used to tarballs. but when this happened, people were, obviously, very, very concerned. and one of the big jobs was to keep people calm, to keep people, understand that we're going to prepare, we're going to have a good plan, we're going to execute the plan, we're going to protect the coast, particularly the habitat, particularly the coastal lands where the shrimp and other important wildlife actually are born and start to grow. and we had to do that with a different set of rules. and the first point i want to make is the stafford act. the decision was made that this disaster would be managed under the oil pollution act. not the stafford act. as has been said to the committee by others, the disadvantage of that for us is we're used to the stafford act. florida, alabama, mississippi, louisiana, texas, we've managed disasters under the stafford act because that's what hurricanes are managed under. that's what tornadoes are managed under. that's what floods like we have in mississippi today. so, a, it was a, it was something we knew. but very important from a governor's point of view, the stafford act expressly says that the federal government will supplement the work of the state, not supplant it. one of the problems we had under the oil pollution act early on, lasted for several weeks, the coast guard who headed unified command -- and we're accustomed to unified command, we have unified command under stafford act disasters -- they took the position that the national guard worked for them. and this became a real issue, which i'll talk about in a minute. but under the stafford act it's very clear, the national guard works for the governor unless the president federalizes the national guard. we're not mad at anybody about it, but it didn't work well when they tried to assume command over the national guard. and i should say president bush after katrina talked about federalizing the response. and i very loudly and publicly said, no, that we don't want the army coming into mississippi or the marines coming into mississippi. they're not trained for that, they don't know the terrain, they don't know the people. so stafford act, whether -- and the stafford act, by the way, has a lot of improvement that it needs. but the oil pollution act ought to be changed to say flatly, like the stafford act, it's supplemental to the states, and it doesn't usurp the state's authority. where this came into play was in our plan to defend the state's shoreline against oil. we developed a layered defense plan beginning outside the barrier islands, using the barrier islands to protect us, protecting the gaps between the barrier islands. the oil that got through to the sound, that would be our principle place to try to pick it up, steer it toward beaches, keep it out of marshlands. as it turned out, the coast guard approved that plan, never understood how to execute it. and after the second time that oil got to our barrier islands completely undetected, much less contested. undetected. we demanded that we be put in charge of this. and the coast guard agreed, and we worked out a system that worked. i will just tell you, before that there was no command and control. in fact, unified command could not even speak to the hundreds of vessels of opportunity that we had gotten bp to hire to form picket lines to spot the oil as far out where we could try to steer it and collect it. they didn't have any means of talking to 'em. so we had to step that up to get command and control as it should be. two other points i want to make. and i'll be glad to -- i'm trying not to get into too much detail. for us this turned out to be primarily an economic disaster. now, it may be that there is something lurking beneath the sea or that is going to develop that becomes ecologically dangerous. and we're all over that. and not just mississippi, all the states, the federal government, all kind of scientists. but thus far the environmental damage for us, again, we're different from louisiana, has been very manageable. we have on the coastline of mississippi we have 80 miles of coastline. we never closed one mile of beach except for one time in the whole experience. we had one 2-mile section of beach that we closed overnight because we had a high tide after a hurricane where some oil got across the highway, and we couldn't clean it all up. otherwise we cleaned up the oil that got to the beaches every day the day it got there. so our environmental damage -- unless there is something to come -- is not our issue. our issue is a gigantic economic loss. the talked about tourism. our tourism industry was clobbered. our season starts when our schools get out which are earlier than in the north. our schools get out the middle of may. so that's when the tourist season starts. of course, this happened late april. so people saw on tv the same brown pelican coated with looked like 3 inches of oil, i mean, looked like a chocolate pelican. and they showed it every hour, every day, 24 hours a day for weeks and weeks and weeks. and the news media, particularly 24-hour cable tv, gave citizens the impression the whole gulf coast was coated in oil. people deduced from that that it was unsafe, unpleasant, don't want to go there. they canceled their reservations, they canceled their contracts to buy condominium and not just in mississippi, but all across the gulf coast. the president, to his credit, actually it got so bad that the president came to mississippi, alabama and florida and held news conferences on the beach to say, look, the beaches are clean, the water is clear, it's beautiful down here, come on down here. but that one news day can't compete with what was being seen every day, every hour for weeks. huge economic problem and loss there. and then, of course, in the fishing side on seafood, huge losses because they closed our waters. and i should say to you right now we have not, since this oil spill, had one sample of seafood in mississippi waters that was tested that had not passed the test and meet every standard. the same is true for the federal government. finish we haven't had one, one sample of seafood that failed, yet we have people that won't buy seafood from the gulf coast in new york and san francisco, in chicago because of what they saw on television. so the fishermen have some mitigation of their losses because they got hired to be vessels of opportunity. the processers were slammed. so seafood, a huge problem. the oil and gas industry, the moratorium for which there was no reason, in fact, the government appointed a panel to look at this, and the panel disagreed with the announcement that was made that you got the impression it was the panel's recommendation to have a moratorium. .. >> in the last year the number of -- the number of permits for new deepwater drilling has decreased 85%. and that's a huge problem. let me close by saying this. for those of y'all that want to help the states that were hurt, understanding that this was an economic problem for us, and again, louisiana as a little different from the rest of us, this was an economic problem. remember, the natural resources, damage assessments and the payments that can be made under that were largely limited to environmental. and while there is some loss of use, rooms there, largely the states cannot be compensated from the economic loss, except by getting part of the civil fines that are going to be assessed against bp and the responsible parties. and i would ask you to consider as members of congress looking at this and understanding that this is the best way to help these states recover, because it is economic recovery that they have to get, unless something really changes on the embargo. i apologize i went over, mr. chairman. >> no

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