Transcripts For CSPAN2 The 20240703

2023 American Battlefield trust annual conference here in franklin, tennessee. We really appreciate you all coming out here and being a part of this event. And our next speaker is going to talk specifically about the battle here at franklin, which is one of the most famous or infamous battles of the American Civil War, which took place in november of 1864. Many of you will be traveling out to franklin to check out that battlefield site over the next few days. Youll be out there with some great historians, including my boss, gary edelman, as well as Eric Jacobson, who is part of the battle of franklin trust. Eric runs the Historic Sites out there, places like carton, rip avila and of course, the carter house, where really was the epicenter of the battle there at franklin. So were excited to get you out to the battlefield. We know that this is some of your first times to be out here at franklin and at the American Battlefield trust annual conference. And weve done a lot of work with our partners out here. So to hit that 56,000 acre mark, we had to do a lot of work in places like franklin and nashville, parkers, crossroads and beyond. But our next speaker today is dr. Andrew bledsoe and Andrew Bledsoe received his ph. D. In history from Rice University in 2012 and teaches at Lee University in cleveland, tennessee is the author of citizen officers the union and confederate junior officer corps in the American Civil War that was published in 2015. And its a fantastic book. I can say that i have it on my shelf at home. And his latest books, latest book decisions at franklin, the 19 critical decisions that defined the battle is set to publish this may through the university of tennessee press. He has been a fellow at the u. S. Military academy at west point, the Civil War Institute at gettysburg college, the u. S. Army heritage and education center, Ulysses S Grant president ial library, and the Virginia Historical society. Were happy to welcome here him here to the American Battlefield trust 2023 annual conference drew. Well, hello and thank you. Thanks to the battlefield trust. Thanks to all of you for being here. And thanks for allowing an academic historian to serve as a kind of interloper among you and i really appreciate the opportunity. I teach afternoon classes and i understand how difficult it can be to try to stay alert and awake after lunch when you had a long day. So i will try to keep us going and try to keep us engaged a little bit here as we as we talk about the battle of franklin. All right. The night of november 30th and december 1st, 1864, must have seemed endless for the Union Confederate soldiers on the field at franklin, tennessee, with widespread confederate failure to break the union line and with the onset of darkness, the fiercest of the fighting began to wind down by 7 p. M. Sporadic musket fire continued until about 9 p. M. , when the moans and screams of the wounded and dying began to replace the popping of sharpshooters and the crackle of fires. The night turned cold and windy, adding to the misery of the injured on the field. When the eerie sound of music began to echo through the half light within the defensive work, some victorious Union Soldiers began singing the battle cry of freedom, the assault of general john bell, hoods army of tennessee of franklin came at a horrendous cost, including at least 6000 confederate casualties. Among the dead and wounded were some of the best among the union army. Im sorry. The army of tennessees officer corps, including patrick claiborne, john c brown, john adams, Hiram Granbury and others. A huge number of brigade commanders had become casualties as well, and also included among the dead and wounded were 68 fuel officers, including commanders of 55 regiments, 12 of them alone in claiborne division. It remains unclear whether hood comprehended the incredible loss of Senior Commanders in the afternoon assaults along with the obvious damage to his armys command structure. And yet it seems entirely certain that hood in the hours and days and weeks after franklin must have reflected on the sequence of actions and decisions that led his army to this valley of the shadow of death. And the key role that he and others played in charting that course towards ultimate disaster and thinking about the scene. On the night of that battle, the poet walked. Whitman comes to mind and he wrote in leaves of grass, the shadowy forms of men and horses looming large sized, flickering in the sky far, far out of reach, studied breaking out the eternal stars like whitmans anonymous army, huddled between beneath the pitiless stars. Franklins two opposing forces, one bloodied and near the breaking point, the other exhilarated but deeply anxious, awaited at dawn, an uncertainty about their future. These armies in the midst of a desperate effort to shift the momentum of the civil war in the western theater had come to the bloody slopes and dark streets of franklin in consequence of a series of decisions, choices made at various levels of leadership within the armys respective organizations, which were all intended to force a certain outcome in the face of fierce resistance and the complexity and difficulty intrinsic to war. In the 19th century, depending on which historians one chooses to read. The battle of franklin was an epic of heroism, heroism and sacrifice, a lurid tragedy of murderous incompetence, or the final poignant flicker of the confederate confederacy soon to be extinguished, military hopes. The history of the battle is also replete with distortion. Half truths, erroneous assumptions and more than a little postwar myth making all these narratives lend weight to the overall mystique of franklin, but at the cost of obscuring the true nature of the engagement, as well as its factual, actual history. In consequence, franklin invites us to take a crack at unraveling something closer to the essence of the whole episode. Military outcomes usually depend on the decisions and actions of military leaders. War is, after all, organized violence with some political object in mind and the choices and behaviors of the leaders of military organizations dictate the cause and consequences of war. Theres also, i think, important historical value to a thoughtful engagement with ideas like command generalship and the decision sions that inform these things. History is a story, of course, about people in the past only truly becomes legible to us when we start seeing those connections between decision and agency. The people who are making these choices and their experiences as consequence decisions illuminate an idea of contingency, which is a foundational but very complicated historical concept that considers things like options and decisions and outcomes, and certainly i think tries to push back against the idea that the past is predetermined, which i believe certainly that it is not necessarily predetermined. All right. So how do you arrive and unravel something as complicated as a civil war battle and the decisions that led to it . Well, im glad that you asked, although you didnt ask the way i approached the study and the idea of command decisions in war is through a methodology that is, interestingly enough, part of the methodology applied to a series in which i am publishing. Not coincidentally, the university of tennessees presses command decisions in the civil war series, which is at this point, 15 books and counting all of which apply a certain method methodology where we, as different authors attempt to look at the what happened of a battle in campaign and also why did it happen and what caused it to happen. And these are, i think, deceptively simple questions with very complicated, often answers. But these critical decisions that we try to look at in the series are decisions that had they not been made the way that they were made, or if a different decision had been reached, then the sequence of events of that particular operation, that battle, that Camp Campaign might have unfolded differently, resulting in a very different history, a very different past for us here in 2023. All right. I want to introduce you to my favorite of these books. This one, my. Yes decisions at franklin, which, of course, as chris pointed out, involves an analysis of 19 discrete, critical decisions, of which i promise we will not cover all 19 this afternoon. So fear not if youre starting to worry and look for the doorway out of here in fact, my purpose is not to assess the merits and faults of every possible decision that civil war commanders made in the franklin operation. That would be impossible. There are literally thousands of decisions that go into everyones day, including the days of civil war generals and commanders. Everything from what you had for breakfast this morning and or in the case of the confederates or the unions forces at franklin, where do i deploy this brigade or that division . And at what time and in what sequence . So thats not what we are, i think, here to do. I dont know that thats necessarily the best use of our time and mental energy. Also, i want to also point out and suggest that there can be a temptation, certainly for historians when looking at decisions of past actors to play monday morning quarterback and to engage in a kind of command performance, performance evaluation approach, which i also suggest is potentially problematic. Certainly the decisions that are made under pressure, under time constraints with limited information, 150, 260 years ago are sometimes very different than decisions that we might make with the safety and comfort of our easy chairs and armed with hindsight. So i think that certainly a measure of humility and even a measure of empathy are important when youre starting to do things like analyze critical command decisions in certainly when you begin to critique those decisions. So with that, rather lengthy wind up, youre probably wondering when is this guy going to talk about franklin . Well, lets talk about franklin. Lets jump in to what i humbly submit are just a very, very few, a small fraction of some of the critical decisions that helped shape the battle of franklin. November 30th, 1864. And here we see the first of what i think are these important, critical decisions. Davis retains good in command. All right. On paper at least, john bel hood looked like the right man for the job. Hoods rise to command was nothing short of meteoric, having begun at the regimental level and eventually Division Command in a Major General c in the army of Northern Virginia who had carved out a reputation for physical courage and aggressiveness in battle. Leading his texas brigade in a costly but overwhelming charge at jamess mill in 1862 and guiding his division in pivotal attacks at second, manassas and antietam the very same year he was wounded in the left arm at gettysburg in july 1863, and he returned to the field that september temporarily commanding an entire corps under James Longstreet during the confederate victory at chickamauga, it was at chickamauga that he had received his most devastating injury shot in the right leg. He had the leg amputated just below the hip. He recuperate from the wound in richmond and he was back in the field by the next spring and summer. Its a pretty remarkable turnaround if you think about it. During his recuperation time in the capital, who had struck up a fortuitous relationship of friendship even with the president of the confederacy, jefferson davis, along with Braxton Bragg, now somewhat disgraced, certainly, but now serving as the president s personal military adviser. Davis, who, of course, as you probably know greatly valued loyalty and he seemed to have seen the young hood as a loyal ally and a source of intelligence information. And on matters in the army of tennessee, which, of course, under joe johnson was experiencing some problems and controversies of its own by that time, fort hood, of course, traded very heavily on his reputation as a brave and aggressive combat leader. And one of the rising stars of the confederacy. All right. So these political and personal connections helped to pave the way for hoods promotion to Lieutenant General in 1864. Keep this in mind. Hood was only 32 years old when he returned to the war that spring. With that rank. And this time he was in georgia who had helped, of course, his own prospects for retaining army command by engaging in some, lets just say, extrajudicial politicking with the president while he was commanding a corps under joe johnston in the army of tennessee. Now, while considering hood as a possible replacement for the unpopular, at least in davis, his mind, joe johnston, who had reached out to im sorry, davis reached out to hoods old mentor, robert e lee for an opinion he wanted an assessment of john bel hood. And lee, of course, praised his proteges ability. But he was he did so very carefully and not without some ambiguous duty. And he famously lee famously told davis that, quote, hood is a bold fighter. Im doubtful as to other qualifications necessary, which is not exactly, i think, a ringing endorsement, something i wouldnt want on a letter of reference myself, i dont think. But case, despite these reservations, evans davis eventually is going to remove johnson from command in place, hood in charge and fortunately for the city of atlanta, it was too little, too late. Moreover, once hood was given command, once he assumed command of the army of tennessee, he quickly demonstrated his aggressive ness and attempted to counterpunch against William Sherman. Outside atlanta, at peachtree creek, at ezra church, jonesboro. And by the end of september, he had managed to reduce the army of tennessee greatly to around 40,000, effective at that point, with these losses from combat, from desertion, morale had dropped principally ously among hoods army, and atlanta was firmly at this point in enemy hands, who had somehow, through all this, managed to convince himself that it was the army of tennessees fault, that the army itself lacked nerve, particularly as he thought, when confronted with a wellentrenched enemy force behind bruce works. Although i would have wanted to ask him what army would not be intimidated by the situation in the civil war. Your case by september of 1864, who had had enough fumbles under his belt to sow some seeds of doubt, even in his staunchest allies mind . President davis, as well as engendering fierce criticism among the southern press, something that i think its important to remember is that the southern media, like the northern media, was critiquing constantly the performance of their generals in the field. And so media consideration are something that generals had to account for eventually, davis and hood held several conferences, one of them in particular in palmetto, georgia, planning next steps after the fall of atlanta and hoping, of course, to try to reverse the confederacys decline in fortunes. Davis in particular, had to consider every possible option that fall, including possibly even relieving hood of command and replacing him with yet another general. So its not just president lincoln who has trouble with his generals. Certainly, davis had tremendous difficulty, as we know, with the army of tennessee, who had had, of course, done exactly as expected, in fact, exactly as asked. That is behaving aggressively, focusing his energy upon attacking, upon trying to regain the initiative and seize the offensive. Back from sherman and the union army outside atlanta. But the problem was that this offensive mindedness, while it was consistent with his experience as a protege of lee and of Stonewall Jackson to a degree that had cost the army tremendously in heavy, heavily in men and materiel, and it had not achieved really any significant success. So any additional defeats of that kind from the fall of 64 on would likely be unsourced, attainable, and certainly losses would be largely irreplaceable given the confederacys inability to do so. So during this conference at palmetto, which took place in the late summer, early fall of 1864, hood proposed a new plan who had had an idea that he wanted to cut off shermans lines of communication into atlanta and try to switch over to what he thought of as an offensive, defensive posture rather than a merely defensive one. This appealed to davis in particular because it kept the possibility of recovering atlanta, at least alive. Theoretically, or at least promised that shermans own plans to continue invading into the confederate heartland might be disrupted. So the question that davis faced was whether hood was the man for the job. Now there are the here are some several options facing davis at the time. Obviously, the first and probably the most obvious one is that davis could retain hood in command of the army of tennessee. Just stay the course and hope that things turned around. Of course, davis and hood alike had to think about their critics, particularly their critics in the press and so they also needed to think about the best way forward that would indicate that they were concerned and aware of the problems that that came along with a guy like john bell who had in command one of the proposals that davis apparently broached to it was in putting a more senior general in place, a man like joe johnston, which, of course, to hood was at this point probably out of the question, but also pgti beauregard, who of course, a very Senior Commander with a great deal of experience, who could be given a role as a theater commander or a kind of babysitter or a supervisor, if you will, who could oversee operations in georgia and alabama and tennessee and could be drawn on for advice and for counsel, perhaps under this arrangement, hood would retain field command and execute his campaigns as he saw fit, while the theater commander, whoever that would be for. As you can see from the slide, we know who thats going to be here. The theater commander could advise and assist and help. Now, the problem, of course, is there are as twofold. There were very few candidates for that senior supervisory position available. Johnston was probably out of the question who had had just replaced him. The most senior Corps Commander in hoods army at the time was william hardy. Unfortunately, hardy and hood despised each other, who had adamantly said it cannot be hardy, i wont have that. And so hardy was transferred out of the army that left potentially robert e lee lees said, thank you know, im happy youre in virginia, although i dont know how happy he was at the time either. But certainly he did not want to go to georgia. Lee did not, and that left really beauregard as the most senior available potential commander. Problem was, beauregard was on davis, his naughty list already. These two men did not like each other at all. And beauregard, by 64, was apparently pretty desperate. Redeem himself. He wanted anything, anything the president might be willing to give him any scrap. And beauregard was willing, i think, to jump on that opportunity. And so it would be beauregard beauregard to be given command of a new department called the department of the west, which encompassed territory in five states, including territory across the Mississippi River, as well as hoods army of tennessee. Now, the department of the west sounds very impressive. Its a paper department. Theres really not much to it. Its a title. And thats about all the extent of of beauregard authority. Except beauregard was apparently given permission to visit the army of tennessee and if he felt necessary, assumed command at the time, which of course, he never actually did. Now, the palmetto conference is, as were going to see, began to resolve the question of what to do next. But certainly what comes out of that conference and that decision and on the part of president davis to retain hud, is that would be good in the saddle for the rest of it turns out 1864 and potentially even beyond depending on what happened next in hoods thinking, his earlier philosophy of offensive operations against the union army was actually sound. He felt he had made all the right choices after atlanta, despite losing atlanta and a good portion of his army. What was the problem then . In hoods mind, execution and particularly poor execution as he thought on the part of his officers and the men in the army of tennessee, which did not, at least in hoods mind, compare to the men of the army of Northern Virginia. In any case, it will be hood whos driving driving the you dont really drive a train, do you . But hes on the train and hes behind the controls and it will be heard. He was directing things, going for it. Okay. Now the organizing principle of hoods thinking between the fall of atlanta and the palmetto conference. Davis later in september of 1864, was rooted in finding a way to frustrate or defeat the union army in atlanta. Thats really the primary focus that John Bellwood had in september of 64. But over time, as davis allowed hood a looser kind of leash, allowed him a little bit more rope. What John Bell Hood began to discover in the army of tennessee learned very quickly is that William Sherman did not want to play their game. So what hood wanted to do was to try to attack sherman and his supply lines, particullyis lines of supply and counation that led from atnta int chattanooga. You can see here all the way up th line here in the western atntic railroad. To that end, what hood attempted to do into the fall of 1864 was to try to cut those supply lines, which, agai i snd military thinking. And its, i think, the proper course of action, given the litations of hoods army and the circumstances at play at that particular moment. Now, adam, aa nimum, wld hope that by seizing the initiative from sherman, he could at lea pvent further damage to the confederate cause in the west and potentially at let protect and husband. The strength of his army for a decisive and victoris ttle. Now, the problem, of course, is that a capable enemy and she was a capable enemy, that a capable enemy usually not do what you eecof them, you know, they dont necessarily do what you want them to do. Inther words, in sherman was not going to dwhat who had wanted now for a bit of time sherman did playlo. He attempted to chase herd through georgia and even into alabama at times. But finallyon he realized, i think what who had had in mind, sherman simply refused to play the game. So what sherman to do then is to call offhase and instead begin making preparations in the fall of 64 for targeting savannah and the confederate heartland. In his famous march to the sea, which we all know about so meanwhile, sherman thinking about the possibility of cutting from atlanta and even from his lines of supply and heading east towards the atlantic, had to worry about the problem of hoods army in his rear. And that is, of course, a threat you dont want an enemy Army Operating unfettered in the rear, and certainly you dont know what hood wants to do. So what sherman decided to do was to assign the defense of the region, particularly the defense of tennessee, to george h. Thomas, Major General, the rock of chickamauga turned out to be a very wise decision. I think, on shermans part. So with thomas eventually headquartered in nashville, serving as the states primary defender, sherman was then free to shift his attention towards the confederate heartland, but it also meant that hood was free to invade tennessee, which is something again, he had raised possibility of with president davis earlier that fall. So who decides to invade . But the problem, of course, that he had had was really twofold. First, supply shortages. The army of tennessee was short of everything but weapons and many of the men were running short on clothing on shoes. Certainly food was in short supply. The livestock the horses, the wagon trains and so forth. The animals tended to be very undernourished and therefore their range and their endurance was much less. And as a consequence of that, hood immediately had logistical issues. And what complicated it even more, i think, was the rickety nature of the confederate logistical system by 1864, relying on basically one Railroad Line in a handful of wagon roads to try to keep hoods army fed and supplied and alive in the field. Now, this is where beauregard was supposed to step in and fix the problem. Beauregard, despite his, of course flaws, was a very capable administrator and organizer, very well schooled logistics man. And certainly beauregard understood that hood was a battlefield commander, but not much, at least in his mind, of an administrator. So beauregard very quickly attempted to try to get enough stuff together to to fulfill hoods wish, which is at this point going to be to invade tennessee. Beauregard and hood never seemed to get along very well, while on the surface the relationships fairly cordial. Beauregard was constantly frustrated by hoods unwillingness to communicate his unwillingness to confer, and at times, beauregard couldnt even tell where hoods headquarters was. He had to go hunting through the countryside, simply to find hood, to talk to the two. The general who was at least on paper, under his command. In any case, finally, by early november, would decided it was time to launch his long awaited invasion of tennessee. Now a little side note here in military operations generally, i would submit its not a great idea to broadcast your intentions to the enemy. Unfortunately, for john bel hood, almost immediately after the palmetto conference with the president , davis had gone on a kind of whistle stop tour all the way home, giving public speeches, explaining heard was about to invade tennessee, and it made it into all the papers. So infosec, as they call it these days, that information, security and that sort of thing was a real problem as well. And thats not a problem. Certainly the confederates needed it at the time. In any case, hood attempted to find a crossing of the Tennessee River, which you can see here with a laser pointer. This is the main water obstacle between alabama and middle tennessee hoods apparent goal in this campaign was to act swiftly to move rapidly into the central partf the state of tennessee, bound for nashville. His plan, at least we think, at least according to hims post war memoir, was to move upon nashville to izthe city, to storm it. Think is one of the ways that he pu it to rescue the mountains of union splies that he knew that were waiting there. And cehat was accomplished, that to rally his forces to recruit men from tneee if there were any left. I dont know that there were at this point. Most of them were gone or hiding at this point. D then hopefully head north into kentucky. The idea then was to push on into ktuy to turn a border state, a union state, into a confederate state. I guess no one told him that Braxton Bragg ha tried this in 1862, and it didnt work then eier. But in any case, head into kentucky, head for thehi river and either attack cincinnati and keep going. I guess, or maybe go to the cumb gap and head for robert e lee and join lee in virginia and smashra there. Now, does this plan have much of a chance of coming to fruition . Probably not. Its grandiose, however, its bold. It is very john bel hood. It is. And that is what they hired to do. This is why word is is in this position. Well, beauregard is skeptical. Beauregard doesnt think this is going to work. Beauregard tells hood a number of times. General, this will not work, given the supplies and the circumstances were under. Hood ignores him. And finally, beauregard realizes, i think, that if he doesnt go along with this plan, he has no future. This is the last chance for pg. Beauregard so by november 17th, beauregard gave in and he fully endorsed hoods plan to invade middle tennessee and to end head nashville. The army of tennessee had for some time struggled to get across that river union forces that decatur had stymied this effort. He had tried a number of times, had had to find a suitable crossing of the river that was safe enough to get his forces across. And its not until. November 20th that hoods army is fully across the Tennessee River and able to head north across the alabama line, headed up the pulaski, columbia, franklin nashville axis. Thats the route and thats the road that he chose to take right now. Whats the problem with this, the problem is hoods timetable was destroyed. His his his entire premise, the entire thinking behind this operation depended on speed. It depended haste. It depended on the enemy not knowing where he was, what he wanted to do, and when he was going to do it, what had he done now for four weeks on the banks of the Tennessee River set their gathering supplies. Yes, gathering rations, waiting for Nathan Bedford forrest cavalry, which was on a big raid at that point to come back and tell them what was going on. But that is delay and delay and delay that hood simply could not afford to do. Meanwhile, whats the union army doing for four weeks . They are preparing. George thomas is getting the chess pieces in place on the board. George thomas has forces at pulaski. He has forces at chaanga sugar. Hes got big forces at nashville. Hes got reinforcements rushing from across the Mississippi River under general named smith thas is getting the pieces in place and he has a month now that he ordinarily mhtot have had, certainly had he had acted with more speed and more secrecy. All right. Now, this is not a history of the battle of franklin, as far as you can tell. Im jumping around. I think thats okay. At least i thats okay with you all. Lets talk about the union side a little bit. I mean, a lot of hood and hood certainly matters a lot to this this battle. But lets not discount the importance of the decisions of union commanders, particularly commanders like John Mcallister scofield, one of George Thomas top subordinates at the time. Now, the initial burden of turning back or slowing hoods invasion would on scofield books we find scofield steamboats pardon guys there is there is on the left on the right is jacob d cox, who is one of the Corps Commanders under under scofield. Now, while he was uncertain about hoods plans, general thomas still recognized the importance of that. Pelham, pulaski, columbia, franklin axis of advance that seemed the most likely course, the most likely path that hood would take from alabama in the middle, tennessee. And as a consequence of that, thomas very logically ordered the 23rd corps under scofield there on the left to reinforce Major General David Stanleys fourth corps, which was pulaski, tennessee, as well, and scofield as the senior general would assume, command upon arrival. Now, scofield had at his disposal about 18,000 infantry, about four brigades of cavalry, which is about 23,000 troops. Thats not many as hood had. He had had about 28,000, give or take over the next several days after the crossing of the tennessee line, scofields makeshift army experienced a series of sharp clashes on narrow escapes. Famously, of course, the miraculous neardeath experience at spring hill, which you may know about, and hood attempted over and over to do what any good 19th century west point trained civil war general would have done. That is to steal a march and to turn the union forces out of their position. In fact, what hood did. And we tend to forget this given the disaster of the battle of franklin. But what hoods did from november 20th to november 30th, about a ten day period from crossing into the tennessee territory and the battle of franklin itself, hood acted like a textbook general. In fact, i would submit that hoods operational concept is sound, and certainly well within the the thinking of some of the best generals of the civil war stealing marches and turning the enemy out of their position by going around their flank. Its exactly what was taught at west point, but it hadnt paid off, certainly. Scofield again, who probably doesnt get as much credit as he may deserve, had very cautiously, but had, of course, very decisively managed to get out of the way of hoods flanking movements over and over again until he almost failed to do so at spring hill. And its only, of course, through a series of real errors on the part of the Confederate Army. Very frustrating, of course, the hood that that scofield managed to get his forces out of spring hill at all. But certainly by the morning of november 30th, with dawn still a couple of hours away, the union army was on the way here to the at the time small village of franklin. And it was a little village. Rex was that little, i suppose at the time i think it had a population of about 2000 and it was situated as we know, on a bend of the harp of the river and the harp it represented the final major geographic obstacle that the union army and scofields forces had to negotiate before they hit the road to nashville and the open terrain and the clear shot to safety, or at least that they were hoping was there. So, scofield, that early dawn pressed on ahead and he overtook cox. Here is one of his Corps Commanders forces which was in the lead along the columbia pike, which is now the columbia avenue. Now, after scofield, old and cox paused to converse in the dark. Scofield, who at this point had been awake, probably at least 4 hours straight, if not longer, was exhausted and decided at that point to turn the disposition of the marching forces over to cox. Scofield had bigger problems on his hand. It turns out, than simply figuring out where these troops ought to go. Once they arrived in the town of franklin, the biggest problem on scofields mind that morning was how to get across the harper river before the hammer fell. Now, this is an older map. Its perhaps, maybe a little hard to see, but hopefully you can see the arrangement here. This is the city or the village of franklin. Here is the columbia pike, the main road leading into the town. This would be the avenue of the confederate entry into the position. Here is the harper river, which flows here and here you can see the Union Position as it was arrayed by the afternoon. Of november 30th. Now, during the march from spring hill into franklin, which had taken all night before scofield had been out of communication with. George thomas in nashville. No telegraph lines were there available at the time. He was more, i think, concerned with getting his forces out of destruction and certainly into safety. So scofield had hopes that once he arrived at franklin and reestablish communications with thomas that he would have some good news waiting for him. In particular, whats scofield was hoping . Was that a force under aj smith, which had been hastily brought over to reinforce him, would be near enough to franklin to provide him with support. But upon arrival, scofield got some bad news. Thomas had telegraphed and told him that smith would not be there in time, that he was just getting off the boats and there was no way that he would arrive at franklin in time to help. Furthermore, as general thomas added, schofields orders were to make strong efforts to cover your wagon trains, protect them against the enemy, and reach franklin and get into position there. I can imagine scofield as saying duh, right . I mean, what have i been trying to do for the last three or four days . But certainly worse news would follow. Earlier, on november 28th, scofield had sent a message to thomas begging thomas to send pontoon bridges, temporary floating bridges, to help him get his forces across the harbor. The river at franklin, those pontoon had not arrived. They were not there. In fact, the only way to get across the harbor, it was through two old bridges. One of them was a wagon bridge. One of them was a narrow railroad bridge. The wagon bridge had been pretty much demolished. The only thing left, really, were the pilings in the support posts. And the railroad bridge was a railroad bridge. Its only suitable really for foot traffic trying to roll wagons along a railroad bridge would have been disastrous, potentially. So the exhausted unit infantry might have been able get across the harbor by forwarding it. It would have been potentially difficult, but crossing an entire army across with a confederate force nipping at your heels is a very hazardous might even say suicidal proposition. And certainly the 200 or more wagons or more actually wagons that had to be gotten across the river almost immediately would have to take priority. That was where the supplies that was were the ammunition, the wounded, all the most vulnerable, important assets that the army had were in those wagons, in those trains, along with the the artillery. So scofield found himself under tremendous pressure. He had just escaped destruction at spring hill. He is at the end of his rope. He is exhausted. He is panicked. He is concerned nothing is going right. And scofield had a decision to make. So what did scofield decide to do . Well, he met with cox. And cox, it turns out, was the right man for that particular encounter. Jacob d cox, a very capable, very aggressive, very, i think probably cool headed, sort of general, was very confident in the position at Franklin Franklin had been the site of a previous battle. Were fortifications already there, uncompleted but still present the position itself according cox, was one of the best that he had seen in his experience. Well talk about that perhaps in just a bit. And coxs advice to scofield was, general, we can we can make a stand here. This is, in fact, what we have been hoping for. This is a good defensive position. And if hood tries to attack us here, hes going to fail. Scofield on the other hand, said, i dont know about that. Think about the tactical situation at franklin. What is that . The union armys rear the heart with river. Now, is it smart militarily speaking . Do you think you had to fit a battle with a river immediately at your rear . What happens if disaster strikes . Hodo you escape . And there was no way across the river . Well, its very hazardous, risky. And so certainly scofield was concerned about this George Thomas head counseled scofield earlier. Defend it, franklin. But make sure that river is in front you, not behind you. But at this point, by early morning, midmorning, the union army is not even in fully in in the town. Some are streaming in, some are trickling in. Some of them are flooding in. But the army is not ready. And certainly theyre not going to be in a position probably to cross the river along with the wagons. Scofield basically had the choice do i save my artillery . Am wagons . Do i send my army across and sacrifice my artillery or do i do Something Else . So what did scofield ultimately do . Scofield followed suggestion. Look, if i can find him, stand by. Sorry. Coxs suggestion was general. Let me handle the defense. You look after the wagons, you look after the artillery. Thats good. It suited scofield just fine. Scofield agreed. He decided to go ahead and begin planning for the evacuation of the trains across the river, which he began early, early in that kind of midday period. And by around 2 p. M. , most of the wagons were across the harbor with most of the artillery was across there on the road to nashville and headed towards safety. Meanwhile jacob cox had ordered the union army to dig in and dig in. They did digging in along this very defensible position of high ground just on the edge of town, cox made his headquarters, of course, at the carter house here, roughly in the almost center of the position there, and using artillery thats very well sited and looking at the approach of the confederates, thinking this is the chance that we really wanted. And so scofield made the right choice. It turns out now you might say, well, didnt did he have any other option . Could he have done anything otherwise . Well, certainly he could have. He could have panicked. It looked like at one point he might have been on the verge of potentially panicking. Certainly he did not want to fight it. Franklin but scofield, i think to his credit, did what he had to do, which is make a stand, hope for the best and get what he could get out of there, hopefully saving the army. Okay. Now back to hood. Hoods decision, of course, i can find the slide. Perhaps its on. Here we go. Whose decision to order the attack at franklin is probably the first one that came to your mind. I would imagine. Certainly, if you think about the battle of franklin, that is probably the decision that most people argue about and talk about more than potentially any other one. And its certainly the decision, i think thats the most controversial of the battle. Why did John Bell Hood attack at franklin . What was this guy thinking now . Context the same morning that scofield and the union army are fleeing, heading to franklin and making their decision of whether to stand and whether to to leave. That same morning hood is also not a happy man. He is having a breakfast conference with his chief subordinates at rupert villa, which is a house just outside spring hill at this conference. Benjamin franklin cheatham and nathan forest were likely president stephen lee, ap stewart, patrick claiborne, several other top commanders werent. They were trying to get their forces on the road and in position morning. But certainly at that conference, which we dont have a verbatim record of, but certainly we have impressions of who had seemed very upset. He had expressed displeasure. The armys performance at spring hill, he blamed it seem mostly cheatham. I happen to agree with him. I think cheatham took a lot of deserves some of the blame for this. He also, i think rather unfairly blamed the absent claiborne hood was certainly displeased and i think we can probably give him a pass for that. At least i can understand and to be upset about what had happened, certainly his demeanor villa was far from sunny, according to later accounts, some of them years later. In fact, at least one of his generals may have left at that meeting rather shaken hood. Fact at hoods anger. This is where we get the infamous wrath as a rattlesnake. Quote that some of you have heard about hoods attitude that morning. But the truth is, as a historian, we rely on evidence. And if the evidence isnt there, then we probably should be careful about the conclusions we draw. Right . We shouldnt make those conclusions and the evidence is really thin as to what really took place. Certainly, i think its fair to say hood was no doubt angry, but there isnt as far as i have seen, as far as many, i think other good historians have who have looked into this, have seen i dont think there is any compelling evidence that hood was either out of control or acting irrationally, that morning. He was mad, but he wasnt crazy. And i think theres an important distinction between those two two ideas. Certainly what do know is that hood made it emphatically clear that he wanted to maintain the pursuit aggressive of scofield, something that his army had actually achieved fairly well and in fairly effective leader at this point. Again, we tend to forget that things had gone not that badly up to this point, and it looked as if maybe the next step would be a victory, or certainly a decisive confrontation that was only really part, i think, the pursuit of hoods purpose. That morning, though, he also wanted to deliver a final, certainly a heavy blow to scofields forces before they could escape and into the hood. Escape for scofield meant escape into nashville. Thomas was already there with tremendous force, behind tremendous fortifications and hood knew that this might be one of, if not the last opportunities he might have to bring. Scofield forces to beg before they could slip away. And so for hood that morning of november 30, time was absolutely of the essence. All right. So sometimes after about 1 p. M. , one in the afternoon, the first of the main body of the army of tennessee, cheatham score and stewarts corps began arriving just outside the town. The approach to franklin, which you can see a relatively close and time photograph of some of the countryside surrounding near franklin presented some real tactical problems immediately. First, the hpe riverwhh you can see here, was near the city or near tn itself, was swold largely impassable. There were fordst varus points along the stream, but they were sort of outside the town and not near necessar the unmys position. The harper river also, although we cant quite see it on this p, converges in an angle which to hoods mind, at least any nferate approach would have to negotiate this bend in the river, which meant that forces, particar on the right of the confederate assault, if it were to take place here, would be funneledand more towards the middle of the position. As they got nearer and nearer to thr, which meant that they would potentially collide with Confederate Forces here centerh would force them to shift to the left and so on. So youre looking potential a some real issues that had to be dealt with. Also on the approach sort of off couple of important hills,a winstead and breezy hills, which are not small hills. And they wouldto also be dealt with as the Confederate Army began to deploy. Now, again, the obvious problem once these these tactical issues were worked through, was the approach to franklin about, two miles of rolling much, much of it open farmland, which presented a real challenge facing enemy forces in such a commanding sweep of a position, union forces were in franklin, ben cheatham and Pat Claiborne. Of course, claiborne, known for his immense physical courage, apparently went forward and evaluated the Union Position that afternoon. And looking at it through spyglass passes and i think even through a rifle scope, renounced it as a well fortified and strong position. And claiborne said its very formidable. Now when, Pat Claiborne says something is very formidable. You can probably be pretty confident. Its very formidable. And he i think, understood the hazard of this could, knew all of this, in fact, could was present during all of this, who had also had an earlier encounter with his, shall we say, colorful cavalry commander nathan forest in forest, apparently briefly conferred, and according to his postwar biographer, forrest said the position was, quote, exceedingly formidable. Theres that word again. And in his opinion, force said it could not be by a direct assault except by great and unnecessary loss of life, would apparently did not agree. He said, i dont think the federals are going to stand strong. And he thinks that that theyre not willing to take a stand there. And he had apparently im sorry. Forrest then responded by by basically begging for permission to lead a flank maneuver. Good. Im forrest wanted to take his cavalry potentially reinforced with an Infantry Division and ford the harp of below or above the city and hopefully get in the rear of the Union Position presumably before nightfall and cut the road to nashville. That was something that forest strongly pushed for, who had rejected it out of hand. This apparently led to a tantrum on the part of forest which may or may not have included some profanity. Knowing forest, it probably did. And forest apparently stormed off in a huff, upset about this, according to again, forest biographer, he told her, if you will give me one Strong Division of infantry with my cavalry, i will agree to flank the federals from there works within 2 hours time. Well, well see. But certainly it didnt happen now. Forest proposed, flank maneuver was exactly what scofield was terrified of. In fact, had forrest been given the green light, who knows what might have happened . We dont know. But this is certainly something that scofield was very worried about. But it was not to be heard, decided to make his charge now really quickly, as were getting close to the end of time here, there is, again, famously a a narrative that hood made the decision to attack it franklin out of a fit of rage to punish his men or as some have said, out of a drunken drug, fury or haze. Supposedly hood was a lord no man addict. And i guess you guys have all probably heard that before. Well, let me just say this. I have found no compelling evidence that hood was even taking laudanum, much less influenced by laudanum. In november of 1864, his medical records, which you guys probably know have been unearthed rather recently, indicate that while he had taken laudanum in treatment of his chickamauga wound. He was probably not taking any laudanum, certainly not that we know of by that point. I dont know if it makes it worse or better, but certainly hood, i think, was clear minded when he made his decision to attack. Now, why did hood order this assault . Well, by his own admission, he had lost confidence in the armys ability to assault, prepare positions. He thought his opportunity was slipping away. And here is and ill leave on this note, i think the most important factor, why hood attack which he will do of course he will order the attack they will go in about pm. Hood was running out of time. They were hit the line i would say about 4 p. M. In 1864, november 30th. You can check the astrodome data if you like, which i have done. Civil twilight, which is the time when it is almost to start making out objects that. A distance was at 5 02 p. M. This is november late november nights or days are short nights or long. He was running out of daylight. He had maybe two or 3 hours to get the job done. Darkness fell and command and control became impossible. So think again. More than anything else. Hoods aggressive nature plus this kind of desperate idea that im out of time. This is my last chance that in fact, informed this decision the consequences. Of course, as we know, disaster for the confederates, 6000 casualties for the confederate its the gutting of their leadership, their officer corps. They would go on within the next few weeks to complete disaster outside nashville with roughly half army destroyed and the confederate in the west by the end of that year were largely dashed. Thank you. I think we have time for some questions. Drew. Thank you so much before we take questions, your new book comes out next month. It should be at the end of hopefully the end of this month. Perfect. I believe so. You didnt cover this, but go back to that diagram you showed with the union army and the i believe cox says about regiment out front, yes, theres the one earlier on that. Could you that was a decision. It was it is. What was that all about . In fact, that that is a decision that is in my book. I just didnt have time to talk about. I think were about here. Wagners advanced position, a division under general wagner, who at the time of the franklins set up that day that morning was serving as the union armys rear guard wagner, who had several brigades, was the rear of the union retreat, hoping to hold back the confederates and slow them down a little bit. His affirmative orders from stanley, who was, i think his Corps Commander at the time, were to try to hold back the union. Im sorry, the Confederate Forces serve as our rear guard. He had largely executed that, i think very well in a textbook kind of way. But after a complicated orders, fiascos and some frustration on the part of wagner, wagner is going to decide kind of at the last minute hes seeing the Confederate Army approach to take a position here in, advance of the defensive line. Now, we dont quite i tnk, have all of the story here. Its very complicated and there are lots of recriminations after. But wagner will take this advanced position one of his brigadiers, of course, a very famous officer named colonel emerson updike of ohio. Well will refuse to comply. He says youre mad, youre crazy. And updike is going to disobey and take his forces here and park them right behind the union main position at the lotus near the lotus house. Wagner will get overwhelmed. Youll steamrolled, as everyone thought that he would. I think even worse, wagners retreating forces served as human shields to as they stormed in. And in fact, partly because of wagner misjudgment, there will be a breach in the union line near the carter house and Confederate Forces will penetrate at least 50 yards and potentially even break the Union Position and a timely counterattack. Updike rileys division and some others artillery are going to seal that breach and prevent disaster from taking place. So this is not a cakewalk for the union army. And in fact, it was very nearly what happened to wagner. Well, what do you think happened to him after this . He lost his job. You got he got canned . Yeah. Thank you for a great presentation. Was that part of the reason, though, that force was not approved to do a flanking maneuver was because of wilson on the other side of the river . Well, potentially, yes. Wilson and i think Woods Division as well. Scofield had, i think, been very concerned about, potential of being outflanked, particularly on this side of the town, east of the town. And so he had sent wilson out to to try to guard the flanks, and hed also detach woods here to try to ensure that there was a kind of rhetoric action force, if you will. There. Now, i will say that schofield was pretty heated in his critique of wilson. He did not seem to have a very high opinion of james h. Wilson and his efforts to try to stymie forest. Of course, schofield seem to have a high opinion of too many people than schofield, but thats schofield for you. I happen to like i think wilson did probably what could, but certainly i think one of the reasons that this potentially might not have worked again, one of the decisions thats in my book that we didnt have time to talk about was schofield decision to try to secure his flank, had forest his wish had he gotten some reinforcements had he tried to forward at one of the several fords and would he have done it in time . I dont know. I think he very likely might have gotten caught in the act by would and by wilson and might have been a disaster for the confederates at that point. Certainly i dont think within two or 3 hours of day of of nightfall that that forest would have done much had he even gotten across dark, doesnt know where he is. Who knows . He certainly before the battle, what was the closest distance between the Confederate Union lines . Because it almost defies you can move an entire army and escape, you know, even under cover darkness, you figure horses, wagons. Moving confederates somehow should have heard something and been alerted. Howard, how is schofield able to pull this off . Its spring hill. Yeah, yeah, i dont know that. I dont know that. I could tell you the exact distance. Im sure Eric Jacobson could do it like that. I know that the union troops, you talked about i wrote about it later, said that they could see the campfires right off there, right in that case, right off the road. And they were under strict orders to be as quiet as possible, to whisper, to not let anything rattle. They were literally tiptoe ing along the road and the confederates were certainly within earshot. They could hear camps of the confederates talking, coughing, rattling, laughing who knows . But it was close enough to where had the union forces been found out and had the confederates gotten their act together, it could have been a disaster. No doubt about it. Extremely close. A miracle, even the fact. Drew, thank you very much. Thank. It is an honor to introduce our speaker today. He was born in the bluegrass state but moved to the greenest state in the land of the free. As soon as he could. And it was here at the