Transcripts For CSPAN2 Post-World 20240705

History at the university of california at los angeles. He specializes in korea and also in northeast asia. He teaches a wide variety of courses u. S. Politics and diplomacy, the cold war, the global cold war, decolonization and dissent. The history of capitalism and much more. Kevin has written numerous essays and articles for some of the leading pop culture and scholarly journals, including diplomatic history, the nation and the village voice, his a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at stanford university. There it is again that stanford university, where hes completing a new book with the tentative title, worlds unseen, Henry Wallace, Herbert Hoover and the making of cold war america. No doubt kevin will be talking on that subject right now. Kevin, all yours. Well, thank you, burt, for the kind introduction. Thank you. Also, too, as everyone else has said to to the Thomas Schwartz for leading this charge into a revision, is am i also like shawn feel the same way about it . Were all revisionists. Its just name calling. After a while, but its a matter of what kind of revision you like. Today. My talk is going to be titled as i have here. Herbert hoover in the long cold war and i hope today in my talk to sort of explain what i mean by this. It comes today from the book project, which burt mentioned, which examines how two Major Political figures, Henry Wallace and Herbert Hoover, although won the title, actually put Herbert Hoover first. It makes sense. He first he sets a lot of the precedents, as youll see anyway how these two figures produce the United States is most influential Foreign Policy alternatives and political movements against u. S. Cold war policy. In the case of wallace, this was the progressive party, a third party that he launched in the cold war. And the case of hoover, this was the Republican Party, particularly its conservative wing, challenging wallace his image as a naive liberal and hoovers as an old reactionary. Im trying to foreground Wallace Hoover and the Many Americans associated with them together. What im arguing they made cold war america a more contested and diverse place than we usually take it to be. But as im standing here at the hoover library, ill be focusing on hoovers side of the story. As my other panelists suggest, theyre really interesting. Talks show thats more than enough for for several talks. My main point is that hoover and the cold war are best understood within a long, cold war. Now, for hoover, as for many people, the cold war, by which we mean if you want to be really specific, the bipolar confrontation between the u. S. And soviet union from 1945 to 1991, you can argue about numbers, but its a pretty good start. Of course, the cold war itself was long, really important, and unique, but the cold war drew from long running issues, problems which preceded it persisted after it, in short, existed beyond the cold war in ways that reflected, but also transcended the cold war problems of war and peace were already greatly affecting the u. S. And worlds politics societies, economies and cultures across a long chronology that defies our tidy periods. We usually used to understand history. And i think my my panelists speak to us. To put it in an overly simple, but i think revealing way. The cold war was part of a longer story, the growing interconnectedness, this yet still instability of the world order since the high noon of Industrial Capital and in the early 20th century across the century, as you see here, time and other magazines put hoover on their cover many times. Usually some major domestic event was the hook. But beneat hvers prominence from his rise to the presidency since world war one, to his revival as a cold war elder statesman, was always his global experiences and prowess is what made hoover influential was his grasp of the centuries issues which played out both at home in the United States and abroad, and often at the same time as few did. Hoover saw and shaped the United States in a world of powerful which were shifting over the century toward a post imperial, a world equally fragile of fledgling International Organizations like the United Nations and states. Few more consequential than the u. S. Itself. If in the end, as we all know well, cold war militarism became the answer. An imperfect, expedient, but frustratingly persistent answer. U. S. Officials, after president truman himself valued military power more than hoover did. But even they shied from its full embrace until the korean war. Hoover, along with my books, other subject, Henry Wallace, fought valiantly against this well told of cold war containment. In hoovers case, this was his enduring vision of what im strategic restraint and ill get into what i mean by that now to. Be clear right from the outset, neither hoover nor anyone associated him or anyone really would have probably a utopian world peace. No one had the golden bullet. All were personally flawed and proposed flawed solutions, rife with all kinds of improbabilities and tensions and contradictions of their own. But hoover pointed to other possibilities, other americas and worlds with different, perhaps enlightened patterns of conflict and cooperation. But short of his full aspiration, which was to revolutionize the u. S. Policy, hoover and his collaborators did achieve modest success, at least changing at times bending u. S. Policy in restraints, direction ultimately, hoovers cold war should alter not just how we look at hoover, but at cold war in america. These were places only superficially dominated, i argue, by cold war consensus. It was a consensus us which marked which masked, diverse ideas, movements and people who were always coursing beneath it today, hoover, who most still associate his supposedly wretched leadership in the great depression, seems an unlikely vehicle for the story of dematha organizing the cold war. But in my view in my long time spent here at the hoover library, i think hes exactly right. He was one of the most challenging voices in a vibrant u. S. Political landscape obscured by official cold war because of his Exceptional Business background, his intellect, and his political connections. Hoovers ideas and personality were unique, powerful in themselves. But even more. Hoover had ways of projecting, of operationalizing his views across the u. S. Government, military and society, helping fuel the process, the Republican Party and conservatism revival with that broad reach straddling, the public and private sectors. Hoovers did make its mark, though in ways he tried but can never fully control now. These maps arent as good a chance. I dont have a i dont have a, you know, professional collaborator. And i cant remember how i made this, i think was my a late night in grad school or something. But it is a world map i made and put efforts to make. And i think its a great place to start to try to understand this story. Now there are three main colors in the map. The blue indicates countries that Henry Wallace, my other main character, traveled exclusively, and hoover and i keep them here, though im here to talk about hoover because it shows something surprising to a lot. Hoovers contemporaries, how welltraveled hoover, was hoover had the edge over wallace and globetrotting liberals of his age. The red indicates countries that hoover went, not wallace and the orange that countries that both went to from these connections. Hoover forge views on empire, the nation, war and Humans Society which i see is fueling his restraint a wt remains stunning. Horatio alger tale. Think every time you read it, its well known, i think, to of you in the room hoover went from being a quaker orphan, strung across decent relatives and oddjob to a multinational businessman wi orations on everyontinent. He became one of americas mo successful iustrial managers, hailed as the public face of americas emergencas Global Economic power. At the turn of the century. But hoovers budding forneas built on empire. Like Many Americans, hoover worked within the sinews of u. S. , european and japanese empire as a hungry man on the make a far cry from the restraint that hed later show you. Hoover was young and brash, and he sometimes showed it. He sometimes felt that u. S. Imperial power was not aggressive enough for his needs. As a young businessman. And as he told the New York Times. After surviving chinas famed boxer rebellion toward turn of the century with his newlywed wife, lou henry hoover, he sounded like a lot of westerners at the time, saying to the times, quote, diplomacy with an asiatic is of no use to do business. You must talk with a gun in your hand and talk with a gun. He reportedly did. You have to stress the word reportedly right, but he reportedly did to help secure the lucrative chinese mines, which he to help launch his business. There was a softer side to hoover, too, one which would grow in the coming years as he blossomed into a scholar statesman while living nearly two years in china. Hoover took the study of chinese language to aid him in his business dealings as his everyday workings and living alongside workers and his servants and other chinese. I find this to be one of the most honest pictures in american political history, because hoover looks totally dazed and confused as as as no doubt many of us would. Trying to learn a language difficult and different as chinese, i say that myself im korean, but i wasnt born with radiographs in my mouth. His wife, lou, was reportedly much better it. But the moment captured here speaks to something also crucial. I think hoovers commitment to to language to let through learning ideas and words tools of and persuasion which harvard political scientist joseph nye is famously called. Im sure youve heard the term soft power, something which hoover would deploy time again across his long, cold war. Now, world war one cut. Hoover swashbuckling imperialism beneath him, is hard today, i think, remembering how devastating that this original world war was. But it was called the great war the original world war without a one or two to it for a reason. It was, by any measure, a global apocalypse, a conflict which did kill sunder an p millions. Though the Second World War cour surpassed it. The First World War gave birth to the industriallence, the atrocities and the torturous Global Politics which World War Two and the cold war . In a way only continued. More than most hoover came to know the war as the charnel of horrors that you see pictured here in this famous painting by the german artist otto dix. Its a painting which the nazis, ironically banned because it portrayed implied that war was hell. It bad and futile, accomplished nothing, which didnt exactly jive with the nazi agenda as legendary head of allied food relief back in world war one, though, hoover would cross the wars front lines. He would conference with generals and he famine trench warfare and other horrors from this first total war. Now, the way hoover is usually portrayed over this period, i think is a lot of truth. That, of course, is a lot of importance. But its, of course, as great humanitarian who saved the world from starvation. But that that depiction obscures this deeper process of geopolitical thinking that im trying to pay attention, trying to draw attention to that is justly celebrated humanitarian reputation. But hoovers great food mission for the allies which is seen in this official hunger map was keenness in the wars collapsing empires, exactly where mt his risky emerging market ventures were located, including in russia itsel he lost some of his most precious holdings there, and theyre appropriate inay that shaun put so colorfully but accurately in the map. These are the darker regions, the right which after the war became, w tion states out of the rubble of the austriahungary and hungarn, russian and ottoman empires which are colored here in blue, yellow and purple. Now, im not arguing here in some really crude, you know, even marxist way that hoover became a humanitarian and politician because he lost his business before war. Hoover was already pondering a career change. He was already showing signs. He was getting tired of the great that he was doing so well in his only so time. I suppose for some you could live in a really palatial mansion in london and start to pined to live somewhere more simple and small throughout his life. I think after well, after these events could easily return to a lucrative business like a lot of political and military figures did. His Close Investment advisors, even in the cold war, ive found some evidence of often really frustrated at how indifferent hoover was to his own money. But what im arguing here something more subtle that world war i, world wars, cataclysms which he shockingly saw obliterate his business empire, converted hoover into this deeply sincere practitioner of what im calling strategic. Today. Restraint is, a subject of keen debate among scholars and policymakers and for critics ke general mcmaster, pictured here, the left, and advocates colonel bavich on the right, who are both pieces of history. So its why i picked them and, partly why they know a bit of what theyre talking forfor for many in the debate, it has really high stakes you can imagine for advocates, restraint is a promising strategy that eschews the nations traditional globalism for retrenched, but according to them, more focused and effective posture, focusing on our nations geopolitical advantages. You know, its technological and financial prowess. For one, our navy and air power, for our geographic isolation in the western hemisphere, relying on those things, restraint relies on various tactics. You can name a bunch that scholars have used from surprising places from chicago to harvard, offshore balancing deterrence, foreign aid, but all in behalf of a more limited but genuine internationalism. For mcmaster and other critics. However, however wellintentioned restraint might and i overhear might have some good ideas to it. In the end, it poses as a new isolationism, an overly cautious, inward looking approach which erodes u. S. Security, our values and interests, both really as well as that of peoples around the world. Of course, for historians with a chronic sense of deja vu, this debate is very familiar. It echoes several great debates in our nations history from the spanishamerican war. You could go that far, that far back through the both world wars and the cold war. As citizens, we have to be concerned with these debates. But as historians, we must see restraint less as concepts and political positions as important as they are. But as something that is a fluid changing set of ideas and practices best understood closely in the conf their place in time. Now, its one thing to hch a debate today in a postcold war world where u. S. Glob supremacy not as absolute, and the world more multipolar a relatively free. And i do stress the world relatively of conflict. But its another thing to push restraint. Hoover did. When u. S. Power was ascending incredibly so, and the world seemed so threatened by fascism, communism and other foes. But hoover did precisely that philosophy. Hoovers restraint led him to see the wild world was indeed interconnected and promising in that way. It still was marked by profound social, political and cultural differences. U. S. Power in his best promoted the global good by strictly defining u. S. And global interests in ways that respected these promoting world order bottom up more so through peace, trade and international society. Not so much the blunter, top down methods of war, power, politics and empire. Now what helped hoover before . World war two, at least, was restraints, broader acceptability. Before that important war. Neither hoover nor anyone explicitly identify with the term restraint, but it cropped up time and again in his most important policy speeches as president. Weve heard the term, too, a couple of times in talk, and i think thats a coincidence. Moreover few could operationalize restraint. Whatever called at such high levels as u. S. Commerce secretary and president. Under hoover and other leading republican u. S. Foreign policy in the twenties strove for restraint in several areas. First, antiimperialism as in the political cartoon over here of a latina. Hoover was calling for a Good Neighbor policy in an era latin americaonsciously, breaking with wilson and his other president s predecessor was more aggressive approaches. You know, the famous do diplomacy that we heard Teddy Roosevelts talk softly, but cabig stick, though, of course, hoover incorporated some of these things to. Second. Hoover pursued an act of peace and this is a term he actually did use and flag emphasize and he did through wellknown things Like International conflict resolution and all sorts of bilateral conflicts, especially in latin america and also the league nations. And this was of an era, when you think about it, such things seem more possible and feasible because it was an era where the league was existing. And you also had things like the colombian pact renouncing war last. And finally, hoover promoted global trade communications and culture. Now, the specifics of hoovers ideas in these areas vary. There are so many, its hard to keep up with them, even though one has the benefit of time. In hindsight, its still often really daunting. But some various ideas, which i found very interesting in my research, that he had an idea to ban air bombing after world war one because he saw how horrible could be the sort of atrocities that could lead to killing civilians in world war one. And he also had an for an International Student exchange program, a lot like the Fulbright Program today to help promote global understanding among nations. Now, regardless of the specifics, the various ideas he came up with and others did what is important, i think we need to underline and think about is hoovers underlying outlook restraint, which he went on to carry across long cold war. Now, where are my stories . Other protagonist, Henry Wallace in the cold war left with decline at home and abroad. The course of the of the cold war. Hoovers right wing and centrist coalition growing success. The same man, president harry truman fdr successor, kicked wallace out, of course, in that famous story and he brought hoover into u. S. Government service after years of humiliation as the alleged villain of the depression, hoover again became an admired public figure. He built new relationships with cold w figes. John mccloy, who is pictured here. He was a top official in occupied germany and the world nk, one of the socalled wise men of the u. S. Establishment in the cold war. And hoovers following would spread from its old wright base the new right. The fellow westerner and future new right darling u. S. Barry goldwater began courting hoover as a mentor in the forties and fifties. Hoovers ties thickened conservative businessmen and media figures, too, which we shouldnt forget. Like the utility executive bill melander here on the bottom left and, the journalist Suzanne Lafollette doing such connections. Hoovers cold war influence would grow through the fifties and sixties. Globally. Hoovers reach was a bit more mixed. I think the picture is. In a world upset by World War Two and the cold war restraint, difficult to impose. Hoover strongest connections were with the republic of chinas Chiang Kai Shek and other conservative and moderate anticommunist elites and citizens. Through his new ties, the u. S. State congress, private lobbies like the china and japan, lobbies. Hoover, though, did work to influence u. S. Policy, as he did in europe during the Marshall Plan negotiations, which he did after his famoutr to postwar europe, which is pictured here in the bottom left. As for the decolonizing th world and the communist world, however, hoover wasodest in then, in his early days, though never entirely as, he endorsed limited aid contact such as food aid to india. The reason for him meeting gandhi here and sometimes he h grander, like his proposal to totally reorganize the United Nations. But importantly, without communist membership as it was for the west and the communist bloc for hoover, the korean war was the key turning point from a but easing cold war primarily in europe, toward a global militarized cold war. Today, korea think its still accurate to say, remains the forgotten war, but at the time, of course, it wasnt. As scholars and observers, it served as a kind of a pearl harbor for the cold war. Shocking the u. S. Out of complacency, sparking narrow and spreading the cold war across asia, africa and the middle east everywhere. It sparked fears and more than one actual public declaration of world war three. Ironic line, as is often the case in history, historians find few actually saw the korean war coming, except those koreans were closest to it. But of course, even them. Who knew . Right after the berlin crisis, europe had seemed one tipping a bit into the wests favor as we now know. Neither stalin nor mao really pushed initiated the war. Of course. Of course. They were in on the initial planning. They came around to supporting the eager north koreans. But for reasons always of their own. In retrospect its not hard to understand the indifference to korea by all sides. Korea was one of many hotbeds of social unrest, revolution and an end and conflict. After decades of empire and war. Understandably, hoover, like most observers, was more focused on france, germany, japan and other major nations. What is harder to understand sometimes is how korea provoked such a vigorous response immediately from the u. S. Government response actually surprised many on both sides of the iron curtain. What is also surprising is how Many Americans, too, and i mean the government outside of elite circles saw this war initially, least not in classic cold terms, but as a more unsung peripheral war. Early polls found half of ordinary americans felt that the war was what historians have been arguing for years. Again, revisionists, right. Weve come around to say as if it were something new, that the korean war was nothing but a civil and colonial war and wasnt invented by revisionists, but something ordinary americans felt initially. And it was pretty spot on. And in many respects. Only 15 bought the official cold war line about communism. Minorities, especially felt the wars third world ness for a lot of reasons can imagine because of their race and their and their marginalization. The unit states, as a columnisthefric american chicago defender, said the, quote right here. Korea seemed the start of gigantic color war by communists and asians who seemed to be seekg a new w order. In this context, a fluidity hoover would make his last stand of restraint trying to shape the war and what was what i see as sort of the climax of his efforts. For hoover, the korean war was shocking, too. Not so much the third world and korea per se, but the u. S. And how unrestrained u. S. Power seemed to be coming and how it needed to be tamed and channeled in sounder directions directions. From his days as a mining engineer in korea and americans and koreans, we kept revolving through his waldorf suite hoover new korea. His view of korea like that of many was that was that of an immature unstable place and people having gained a divided cold war nationhood, as did many nations through the centuries, overeager geopolitics. His response had three phases. Its lot to unfurl in the time remaining. Ill sketch them, but im happy to say more about this and other things in which i look forward to in phase one. As americans, were looking a the end of World War Two. The warasnd they began thinking about the world would look like after thatar whoever proposedn e book pictured here problems of lasting peace, a gradual, dentlized approach to korea and other small and large nations. Anhenew. He just imagined. And it wasnt hard. It was right there. When you looked at what happened aftewod war one with the collapsing empires, the nations as i mentioned a, precipitating that period of turmoil and. He thought that it wouldnt be wise to meately set up a formal United Nations, which would immediately have to guarantee. When you think it borders and sovereignty and all sorts of things which maybe were better left out to the to the transition period which he and ambassador gibson proposed and said they called it a period, a period in which the United States and other leading powers, including pointedly the soviet union, would instead oversee loosely a transition period where if you had to really get past the pc ness of the title, various local local populations such as in poland, would be left to settle their own scores and settle the worlds borders. Before united could come into being and rule what was there to govern. For . Hoover lessons of world war one. Were very much on his mind. He was he was had seen what selfdetermination as a slogan and the and the league of nations universalism had done its good and its bad after that war showing. His emphasis though on great Power Cooperation and sort of all out reform and war, especially in areas marginal to the u. S. Like korea. Hoover had a specific for korea, too. Toward the end of the war, which shawn mentioned, i think he told president truman three months before the atomic bombing of japan. So you have to think about the exact time this is happening. This is may 1945. This is before the soviet union has entered the war although everyones imagining its going to happen, perhaps at this exact juncture when when truman first reaches out to hoover in a grand gesture, really political compromise and conciliation, as roosevelt said, always shut the door on hoover. In this first meeting, or one of the first meetings with truman, hoover had a specific about japan and what he told was, let japan keep korea, which was a colony, of course, for decades. Let japan keep formosa or taiwan and as its now called, such things would be short of the Unconditional Surrender which the Truman Administration saw it. But the merits were that it could end the war sooner. It could endear japan, a future ally, and it could help a globally overcommitted u. S. Counter soviet power in asia. Now, theres a lot to unpack there. And hoover spelled out a lot of his logic, the conversations in the memos there. Countering the soviets, though i think, to hoover and to many was course partly in anticipation of post potentially cold war possibility. But as he also knew, this was always japans traditional role in asia to help counter russian and then soviet power in the region and also british power. Right. Of course, we always have to remember there were always in the room than the United States and the soviets in many places, including korea. Five years later and phase two of koreas of hoovers korean restraint after what seemed a lifetime of famous cold war events, we can rattle them off one after another. Hoover did publicly approve of swift dispatch of u. S. Troops to korea after theor the south in june 1950. But privately, he was critical, and he was very clear d ndid abouthis. To those who listened, to those who were closest to him. Hoover sided with politicians, military figures, citizens who felt that the u. S. Should not have relied so immediately on manpower, u. S. Manpower, but an air and power. Native korean troops, which, of course, we had south korean troops. The south korean army was not insignificant. And some u. N. Diplomacy see in the first and not in the first instance, u. S. Manpower finally faced three. In many ways, the most famous one for a lot of reasons. After the u. S. Expanded the war, after defeating the north in the south and deciding to roll back and to move and try to conquer the north as well. And they were racing to the to the yalu river border, which, of course, was china. Manchuria, of course. Important area as weve learned. This was, of course, general macarthurs famed no substitute for victory offensive. And during this these events, hoover tried to restrain truman and his former aide, douas macarthur, after the peoples republic of china. China entered the war. At this juncture in a stunni, surprising offensive against u. S. Troops beforand this is a key point mysteriously retreating as quick as they came. Now, we now know the outcome of what happened. And later, after some hesitation, macarthur and truman advanced. And i think its important to say both macarthur and truman, we could talk more about that later in response to that new advance of the u. S. Army. The prc this time poured again decisively and for the long haul, and the cold war metastasized and into the seemingly inevitable dark conflict that we know so well from movies like the manchurian candidate or dr. Strangelove. The u. S. And prc would cut off contact for decades, no recognition. Mccarthyism took over u. S. Society and culture and fears of world war three. Of course were heard again and amplified and a Global Global rearmament drive gripped the world. Times garish cover here of mao zedong, the leader of the prc gives us some sense of the atmosphere as does the famed u. S. Strategic document, nsc 68 on the right, which, of ur, was a blueint circulating in the u. S. Bureaucracy and was calling a ogram just like this, but gained trumans approval. Hectually hit it in a safe because he thoughit was too extreme, but it finally gained approval after this. Prc u. S. Confrontation in korea. Against this in his last famous. Im sorry that i wait. I think i want to. Off to. There we go. In his last famous speech calling, the u. S. , the gibraltar of western civilization, hoover offered, his final vision of restraint in the speech, hoover outlined a new National Strategy instead of containment based on air and navy power, a streamlined geography, avoiding peripheries like korea and greater efforts from allies. It caused an earthquake in u. S. And public opinion. It sparked a new great debate, the first major one since World War Two. In congress the media, town halls and living rooms across the country, americans sided with hoover and the many voices amplifying his cause. It made mccarthyfamous homecoming pictured reportedly new york citys largest parad eventual. The uproar took the truman wh house down and with it, two s ofocratic party rule. Now historians have interpreted this public backlash which ended with the newly declared republican and war hero, dwight eisenhower. Of course, in our white house, theyve interpreted as driven by partizan and public rancor. Thats usually been the interpretation classically speaking. And of course such feelings were their partizanship and rancor were always part of politics. Its part of everyday life. I find. But hoover and conservative publicans who orchestrated this backlash lot more than we realize. Ive been finding in the archives they also had high motives for what they were doing for their public and their private forms of diplomacy. It was noisy. It was ugly. But it was a successful operation. In many ways, again, using soft power, using the u. S. Public sentiment to restrain u. S. Foreign policy and a u. S. State led by democrats for two really profound decades. Mccarthyism which really did reach its height because of korea wasnt just about rooting out spies or whipping public hysteria. Although of course spies were a key part of it. And it was something hoover supported. It was about many ways killing cold war liberalism. Liberals knew it, and they were beside themselves about it. As one of the gops few respectable conservative international figures, hoover gives us a really valuable vantage into this story. Now, the u. S. And world, of course, moved beyond korea in what was a new cold war since the fifties and into the fifties and the sixties. Hoovers a strain, as it does become less active. Its felt, publicly speaking, hardly at all. It seemed by youthful new rights led by one of hoovers admired newest admirers, barry goldwater. But as always, appearance belies realities as historns are finding today, hawkish echoes of mccarthy is no substitute for victory did no entirely define new right. Conservati. So too, im finding that ss sensationalized voices reinventingesaint in the late cold war age of chronic interventionism. Hoover was, of course, a beloved Republican Party figure until his death in 1964. He was constantly being asked to give the keynote at rnc, Republican National conventions, but he never offered restraint or. Any other doctrine as a defining aspect of his career. True to his engineering spirit, hoover wasnt one for doctrinaire purity, although i guess we could argue debate about that, sunshine said. Or just as said, its a really important thing to have a doctrine. But he adjusted, too. He got accommodated for some close to him who were the most privy and sympathetic to efforts behind the scenes as well as in the limelight. Sometimes it was too much. This was the opinion of of his former world war one aide, bill melander. But hoover was too kind, compromising and an understanding, while hoover was as disappointed, as landau was in the refusal, some cold war era conservatives to to cut down the gigantic cold war state, which hollander and many sources dating back to the new deal. Hoover was more philosophical about about that the failure of most conservatives and most americans to see the problems, to diagnose the painful solutions. Landau regretted this too, to another third party and told him that this is what hoover said. This is in the sixties and early sixties. A year or two before hoover passed away, hoover told landau there were too few people who knew as much and seen as much as he and marlon dawsons. One can imagine a world where one an earlier over such a long time, and the implication being its hard for others to really understand all these issues were talking about. One might imagine hoover in early years of americas vietnam war involvement, staring across his long cold war towards all these overseas issues and threats weve been talking about today as well as americas own response since the 1900s, as that exchange suggests for hoover. As for Many Americans made cold war, america and the world, its consensus was never static or satisfactory. Beneath the surface of official policy and rhetoric coursed paths not taken. Moving events inaythat weve yet to understand and rather focusing as we usually do on simplistic definitions of success and failure headlines and the outward outcomes. Of course, those things all matter. But hoover story challenges us to view those things in u. S. Foreign policy as contingent, not inevitable, and as complex and diverse and. Not monolithic. Second, hoovers restraint is a reminder that domestic u. S. Political history really matters. If we are to understand global history, but only if we break with old myths, embrace new methods, new questions, new actors, be beyond u. S. Officialdom, rather than take cold war Foreign Policy as a given. We must see u. S. Power as multi vocal questioning, constantly being made and remade. The question behind hoovers restraint, of course, the same every nations Foreign Policy. What shaped what a nations power take in the world . How did domestic and International Politics overlap and conflict, especially in the case remote superpower like the United States. Whose power was overwhelming. Yet distant not only from foreign lands, but sometimes from americans in whose name it was exercised. Finally, hoovers story emphasizes the tangled connections between the u. S. And an world. As a cold war historian, attorney west had said, the cold war was about how america became the third worlds problem. But as turned that phrase over its head and say while the third that the that also became the third world also became americas problem. Neither for u. S. Nor the third world or anyone for that matter. Did two world wars save the world from war or empire . But to tell the story, we should look not only at the world, which is incredibly important, but also at americans again, like hoover, who imagined and used our nations power ways that we have yet to fully understand. Thank you. Okay. Well, last card, three speakers to come up to the stage. The stage and will do q a. There must be question if we can get the are we going to put it . Oh, aaron, is going to get the event slide up there. Yeah, actually we can, we can move these out. Okay. Right. Here. Okay. So were going to open it up to questions and im actually going to exercise the moderators prerogative and ask the first question. And its actually for, um, for two of the speakers is for justice and sean and its inspired by the something sean said at the very beginning of his talk and that is the sort of the contest between Herbert Hoover as president and fdr whos who wants his job. The controversy about whether to grant diplomatic recognition to the ussr. And as sean says, whoever is against. But as soon as he leaves the white house, the way is cleared for us formal diplomatic recognition of the ussr and i immediately thought i remembered that is in 1934. Am i right, sean that the soviets actually entered the league of nations . And thats related, of course, to be you know, maybe we dont call it collective security as them, but security has to be in some way to what happened in germ the year before. So 1933, the nazis stormed to power. And thats a big change. Its a big look, new look here. And i just wonder for you know, because im also thinking that the the the manchuria crisis still playing out. And i wonder our justice if it ridges if it shows up as an influence toward the end of that debate and sean whether it figured into the recognition question. I dont think it really played that much of a role because by 1933, the focus the nation was elsewhere on mateship remained curious. Basically taken over by the japanese and well, thats about all i have to say on that. Fair. Well, as far as the election i wouldnt say i did a real deep dive into how important the issue was. The election campaign. It figured at times my my reading is it was certainly not a prominent Campaign Issue its an important part of my i suppose that i tell the broader story. U. S. Foreign policy vis a vis the soviet union in the far japan figures in maybe just in the broader sense that some of the advocates of recognize the soviet union are who are advising roosevelt think this might be a way of of exercising some influence on japan, that is to say, pressuring japan on on manchuria. They had a lot comes comes out from that. Your other question, though, about league of nations is i think an interesting in the way that it plays out in 33 and 34, theres not perfect symmetry. You know, the u. S. Does not unrecognized nazi germany when she recognizes soviets. However, nazi germany effectively withdraws from the league of nations. And then on the strength of u. S. Recognition in some french lobbying because the french have concerns about about hitler after he comes to power the soviets are brought in and and certainly soviets hope they dont something out of that whether from the u. S. Or from france is. The only other interesting sidelight id add from four is the johnson act, and that is when, you know, effectively although it does limit roosevelts ability to extend loans to either or the british, because the british were in default by then as well, we shouldnt forget that. That also to some extent ices. I think the financial question at least for the time being this this is the act which forbids u. S. Banks from loaning money to countries in default. And by then britain was in default too. And that actually plays a large role in this story to come. Anyway, it was that was litvinov brought in in 34 and a major way to oversee this i think thats i think thats right. Let me turn that shown for a second to what degree this wrecking nation of what degree to market play as far as recognition and otherwise if we recognize the soviet the marvelous world of prosperity will be over, perhaps reopen to us, because such eager buyers. Well that the roosevelt argument thats what he seemed to believe and its interesting it actually plays in a recent movie i dont know how many people have seen mr. Jones and once seen it get very poorly timed this production it came out of the pandemic here which pretty much killed off moviegoing but whats amazing about this movie is it actually treats the holodomor in the ukrainian seriously. It tells the story of gareth jones, the welsh who along with Malcolm Muggeridge first broke the story and they really go overboard almost in pushing this idea that walter durante, the famous New York Times journalist who would whitewash the famine and his reports and even really lied about it quite egregiously, that he did a play a role. This part, the movie does get right. He played a role in also supporting recognize mission and the way the movie portrays both him and roosevelt viewing this is that yes, the soviets need America Capital and this is whats going to open the floodgates. In fact, i dont think it really does play much of a role because, i mean, after all, investment money will go where it goes and the lack of recognition had not really prevented any of the western firms from investing in the soviet. I mean, perhaps that gave them a bit more confidence that the soviets wouldnt default, but not necessarily the soviets defaulted on many occasions. Theyd even against some of the german firms involved in the apollo business. They were not exactly known for financial probity. Okay, were going to open it up. We have microphone cards on each side. If you have a question, if you want to just walk right up to that, be brave and walk right to that microphone. I think. Well, actually, its for the tv audience as well. Smile now. Question for dr. And yellow two can pipe in lets bring it is current times with russias aggression in ukraine if president was still with us what would say and his reaction thereof. Yes actually if i can just repeat that question and for future i was supposed to remind to put put your face right up to that microphone. The question is, russias invasion of ukraine, what might in a question directed at kevin kim, what might Herbert Hoovers reaction to this have been . Thats a great question. And when i realized i started by thinking about especially this book comes to completion, i certainly will have a better answer. But i think my my first instinct would be because theres so much theres so much thats involved in that in what seems to be a simple question, but is really profound, like why putin is even doing what hes doing and all that intervening events that have occur to make putin do what he did in the united in the intervening periods the end of the cold war to the to the president of ukraine. But at least to take it at its simplest take, i think there would be things about it that he would approve of. I think that at least the fact i think he was not this is why i dont call him purely a realist, although or an antiinterventionist, but which which are real which are really good terms that justus and others have used and i will ought to do research. Hoover was for the case of active collective security acts of war intervention if it could be done in ways which to what they see as a broader way to understand, he didnt positive dynamic action on behalf of western values and security and i likens the fact that ukrainias were spearheading him pushing this effort. I think he would be no friend of putin. He would see a long lineage there both on russian and u. S. Sides and so i think he would have an ironic appreciation for the fine line that the germans and the americans and biden are trying to thread there. That would be my initial reaction to it. He had an interesting complicated relationship with jfk because he was in a close relationship with his dad and he wasnt as partisan as hoover was that he came from a nonpartisan background. He could appreciate, the metropolitan is one thing but i think he would see and appreciate the general approach towe that. I think thats what i would say. My guess is he would be for Financial Aid and perhaps military aid. No ground troops. His reaction to what was proposed inve february of 1941 s give the british a billion dollar loan. It could lead to convoys and convoys could lead to war. Idth like to think they migt have approached the ukraine crisis and i would go back to 2014 if not earlier with some level of restraint and skepticism for the ferocious deaths of you and u. S. Involvement in the country and thee revolution where we had ambassadors and senators out parading in the streets with activists boasting about spending 5 billion on various ngos and other organizations with that hot mic moment at all the rest of it. E u. S. Interventionism help rede the tragedy and perhaps a might have been more thoughtful and lesse bombastic version you migt say then that someone like trump who may have tried to articulate a critique of u. S. Policy visavis ukraine and russia. They did think much like after pearl harbor he probably would have responded to the invasion to separate the 2022 by expressing his firm support of ukraine in the also proving financially but ild also agree e would have would exercise far more restraint than the Current Administration in all kinds of ways and all kinds of things one thought to be redlined in the u. S. That has crossed aggressively and blatantly and some of us and i know a unpopular as is to say this we should be grateful for putins restraint in not responding to 20 provocations last february. We could be in a worse situation than we are. It one final thing i would add today the events from the last week or two would be very focused on the food issue in the coming crisis. That would have been huge for Herbert Hoover. And another question here peaked step right up to that microphone hi. I know present hoover, his presidency was between the two world wars. This question kind of stems off of the previous question actually. I wanted to ask about the election of 1912 and leading right into world war i. My understanding is that of course Woodrow Wilson was elected that year. I am a democrat and he was not really interested in having the u. S. Fight in europe so much. And so my understanding has had Teddy Roosevelt, speaking of the paths not taken, my question is about how world war ii could have never happened. Had Teddy Roosevelt won the election of 1912 you had to carry a big stick and speak softly. So the flareup in europe that started world war i, Teddy Roosevelt had he been president would have within a couple of years sent u. S. Troops over and put out all the fires over there. And the lingering problems that caused world war ii would have never really happened. So i see parallels of today as i do at that time. You have a strong carry a big stick speaks speak softly new york or whether its Teddy Roosevelt or trump were putin doesnt do anything because hes afraid and so of course now you have it democrat of Woodrow Wilson and joe biden. So you have similarities from the beginning of world war i to whats happening now. Onso my question is in your opinion had Teddy Roosevelt won the 1912 election if he was president from 1912 to 1914 or 1916 rather, do you think that world war ii would have never happened . We have panelists who love to leap into the counterfactual territory. [laughter] let me say this about t. R. He became increasingly outraged about the german invasion of belgium and the way the belgians were treated. At first he said it was politics and he saw himself as very much a real politics man. I think we would have entered the war much sooner under t. R. s leadership particularly after the lusitania incident. He goes and calls Woodrow Wilson pretty much a coward and this is the reason why woodrow and part of the reason why Woodrow Wilson did not prepare permit him to do what he always wanted to lead the division in europe. There was a very interesting comment he said i told the president i would stake my life to lead a division and he said did you make that clear . I have written a lot about the First World War. Thats not a counterfactual i particularly entertain very fervently. I suppose in partt b because i d it hard to see a scenario where roosevelt wins the 1926 election. Its an interesting idea that the country gets into war sooner ratherin than later although im somewhat wellknown for being skeptical about the usual arguments about truman. Theres a more interesting counterfactual to me that happens in the winter 1916 in 1917 after the next election and thats is when wilson effectivey is elected and is its something bottle used to like to talk about, hes not the last democrat in the century. It might have kept the seventh award or from entering the war but it happens again in 1940 roosevelt to some extent arguably and 64 with johnson but the interesting moment they are and heres why i disagree a little bit aboutut the idea that u. S. Military power could play a decisive role in 1914 or even after lusitania in 1950. 1950 was not a good year for the western ally. The germans made huge gains on the Eastern Front of me were an extremely strong position and they got bogged down in the darter mail wars going on in france. Morrell weiss of u. S. Intervention might help a little bit but it took the u. S. Almost a year to get boots on the ground and though the u. S. Finally did anything. By the time the u. S. Finally goes and all it does is prolong the war. As wilson says we will make the world a safer democracy and by knocking out German Imperial power in Eastern Europe we make it safer. Thats effectively what happens when the germans go under. I have some british historians who dont like the idea that the u. S. Was quite so decisive. Effectively whatct that does bolshevik hit he dispersed your power was propped up by the german powered Army Companies in the door so we should always bear in mind the unintended consequences. Wilson said this war should be safe for democracy and he didnt say we should impose democracy. True. We have time for another question in here he comes. Right up to the microphone. Hello. My question is for professor kim or dr. Came and its about the other subject of your book Henry Wallace and its the counterfactual of sorts he might have an idea where this is going. So as you know in 1944 at the Democratic Convention Henry Wallace was moved from the ticket a sitting Vice President and replaced with harry truman. If Henry Wallace had not been abandoned by the Democratic Party and president roosevelt and 44 and he had been renominated and lets say roosevelt still died in 1945 and wallace became president , how different do you think history would have been in the cold war and like pretty much everything that happened to cousin the wallace for my understanding was arguably one might say pro soviet or at leased probe conciliation with the soviet union. He visited and he had good things to say about it though he dashes my understanding. For one island and imagined he would not have dropped the atomic bombs on japan so i will let you answer that and also in i imagine his reaction probably would have been different if he were still present at that time like truman wasnt if he were reelected in 48 say and yeah would there even have been a cold war if wallace had been president instead of truman collects thank you for that question. Theres a reason we are historians and not scientists. We can predict the past a lot greater than the future. Its equally hard in privacy and skills and i think about that a lot. There are two big things you do think about wallace or anyone is president what it would haved done. On the one hand you have the think domestically and yet to think what would Henry Wallaces ability be to remain in control of the very powerful u. S. Were stayed at that point and when considering all the bureaucrats and Political Forces within the government whoe actually knew ad also congress and also Civil Society as well which often comes of the story is a sleeper but as i try to show it can be decisive at that time. When you think about that its harder, it becomes more difficult to think how could wallace do want to prevent the cold war because there are a lot of domestic capitalists. Edcould he have lasted . I think he could have enough to definitely pursue as you mentioned the conciliatory of conciliatory policy and theres no question he would have done that but what that would have looked like isnt exactly what we might imagine so it wasnt at the air policy as one panelist suggested and if you studied wallace carefully. He was trying his best and no one completely follow fdr because he was the master of deception to his own family. He promised i will do this. Wallace did his best to follow his foreignpolicy and a little that roosevelt wrote it for the turn in siberia for temple and he wasnt generally parent. What would that have meant . With the Marshall Plan that would have made a difference but i think he would have pushed harder for it. R it was a necessity for economic aid and who wouldnt but he would have done it in a way which bite this might have been more considerate of the soviets but with the atomic bomb naturally wallace was attempting to think that he would have taken a stronger moral standing on things like that. The best evidence we have about that is wallaces own words and he said when he was asked about this in an oral history what do think about it . You knew was there in the atomia bomb was in the bureaucracy and would you not have used it when asked usually are and wallace i think honestly said im not sure i would not have used it. By that point we were so numb to all the bombings a that were happening. You think about the firebombing tokyo and germany. It was dwarfed in what happened in russia with quantity and quality of scale. Enough was happening that im not sure i would have. So what i think that speaks to us globally he made a push for more conciliatory policies. Probably domestically probably globally. He would have found that impossible to uphold purely a. So how long would he have lasted with the American People and would he change his tune slightly . I think probably you would have two lasts long enough to findt out. Again i would stalin and maui react to wallace and thats an interesting part of the story because stalin and maui are really buy the argument until 47 or 48 is penetrating and trying to spread elsewhere especially in the west in Eastern Europe but hes interested in wallace e and whats going on with mao d they are hopeful is wallaces rise improbable as it might be be who knows. We would have had some w kind of cold war and they would have been somewhere as i was saying but it could have been a different pattern. But to spell it out for you until you if it was better worse than what we got thats where maybe my fellow panelists can answer. He was a visionary and incredibly politically naive. Someone said i dont know peace going to. She a sermon or i cant follow that. And we dont want to end on that note lets go to our host tom schwartz to ask a question. We know hoover was very acleareyed about communism and centralized government and weaknesses. We also know during world war i his successful efforts beating noncombatants and occupied areas and after the war fighting to feed civilian populations where western powers disagreed with the government. I mean france, britain, wilson wanted to punish germany for the waran and hoover said you dont take that out on the civilian population. In push to get food there. And then even the russian famine, as much as he disliked the bolsheviks he was willing to feed a population. To that extent was this idea and world war ii to beat poland and finland and then in a postal war world where truman reached out and pulled them back i mean it would seem that it was hoovers reputation to carry the most weight with the civilian populations to in Eastern Europe and other areas. So to what extent do we weigh that against the harsh realities of people like stalin and mao that are coldblooded creatures . Ive commented. I think its useful to be reminded that his plan to occupy europe in 1939 in 1940 was with the british and its important to be reminded of that and of britains role in helping and encouraging into war. Frankly if even look at the origins of the oss effectively was a british operation. A lot of their greatest concoctions of famous map showing if theres planned to conquer the western atmosphere drawn up by a couple of british spies. Its an utter fabrication. He struck these notes in his own book and i think its important to be reminded its one of the reasons why to such an important book. We do need to reconsider these things that the software say get and its not popular to question the second relationship. I often annoy people when i do so but its important to reconsider and revisit all of these things. And i think coopers approach weather was strategic restraint are focusing on humanitarian interest theres a great story that i relate to wild bill donovan and the founder of the oss. Effectively he was supposedly orworking for roosevelt and the British Secret service and the british navy and air force flew him around the mediterranean and theres a whole story but he alludes to it where he goes to greece and goes to yugoslavia and more less brings yugoslavia into the war with these big promises that at some point the u. S. Will look favorably on you if you stand up to now. And of course the german troops are nextdoor and theres a coup basically engineered by the british and americans in yugoslavia gets crushed. I think countries like i talked to a number of polls at the National Press club with two years ago to some extent i felt bad because they had the sacred causes theyal were hours talking about the first to bite the first to resist my pointed out that the admirable that you have outhe honor and the courage. Sometimes leadership requires different kinds of skepticism and you shouldnt look for the colder eye of the they were promising britain and what they were willing to do for it. I think hoover would have exercised far more restraint. The comment was he wants to get permission to visit france than the french ambassador would gladly start out in france and this is when france had the government and the u. S. Had relations with france. They denied him a visa once theyd heard that he was willing to starve every last french man woman and child or the interest of the u. S. Strategy. Hoover always kept those things in mind. Thats an underrated quality in the statesman. The real and the potential consequences and making promises to faraway countries that you dont have the capacity where ukraine is unfortunately tragic case. After the paris conference hoover is the only person with an enhanced reputation. Hoover realized one thing and that is how important food isnt preventing the spread of full service him. You had to be very careful in the allocation of food. The bolsheviks when they were thinking of taking over austria the food shipments would depend on the democratic government. Part of your question dealing with the occupied europe it was something that had domestic as well as Global Dimensions for hoover. Mm fdr immediately rejected the idea. Of course they would reach the britishng blockade of germany which was their main strategy but from fdrs point if hoovers idea happens and it works it elevates us and makes the rest of us look hawkish orr noncaring. Machiavellian types. The hoover argument was that lease that you can replicate what happened in world war i and belgian and elsewhere and if you put enough control on the ground that germans would get some of the food the least they had a belief they could somehow repeat what they did in world war i as far as the friending some german generals and getting them to admit sometimes there own atrocities were caused by humanitarianism. I think its another interesting counter official. Could germany and world war ii thats not the same era in germany in the 1910s. This is where i think its a sincere effort by hoover may have had results but its important to try to remember and think about how feasible it is an i try to think will hoover has credited for being a naive politician. Someone told me once even in the biggest arguments hooper is a creature of washington and it understands how the as he works in the understand how policy work so when is pushing for causes he always has and i on the battle public opinion. Sometimes you think how sincere is he but i think he is sincere enough. I do see sometimes a machiavellian side to what hooverl. Does. Ive note and it will be an end note. Poland and finland and also greece in 1942 greece is occupied by germany and starvation looms and a group of oxford professors get together and they began to discuss with the british can dod about this and they form what we call oxfam the Oxford Committee for famine relief in their inspiration and impart their models for this relief in belgium hoopers cmpd. We are going to end and i think you all for hanging in and i thank our panelists, please. [applause] we are awaiting the other team, the other side of the chamber to come forward with a number that we can agree upon. Leader mcconnell and i will figure out the best way to get this done quickly. Neither mcconnell or i want to shut down