Transcripts For CSPAN2 North Korea Nuclear Program 20170607

And the north korean policy review that President Trump has just completed. So for north korea watchers, twentysomething has certainly been an interesting year. President trump decided to review policy shortly after his inauguration, and he came back with a policy that emphasizes maximum pressure and engagement. There is been some mixed signals of what exactly guide states that be looking for from north korea before entering into negotiations. Software also has a new president. He has expressed interest in talking to the North Koreans south korea under what conditions remains somewhat of an open question. Then of course the north korea weve seen a number of Ballistic Missile test already in 2017 including some new systems. All of this is leading up to the summit that trump will hold in washington, d. C. , later this month. So dont make sense of all of these developments are and where fortunate with us today Michael Elleman and Suzanne Dimaggio. We will start today Michael Elleman, a senior fellow for Missile Defense at the institute for international and strategic studies. He has spent some time at Booz Allen Hamilton the expense of the market and cooperative Threat Reduction programs and of be remiss if i didnt add that elses written several excellent pieces for arms control today which i would encourage you to take a look at. And if obama is available in your program. Then well move on to Suzanne Dimaggio fixes and as a director and senior fellow at the new america foundation, has years of expense working on track to diplomatic initiatives and a range of issues including nonproliferation and interNational Security. With countries like iran, myanmar and north korea. She has been at the asia society and she was most recently in pyongyang in february and she has met with the North Koreans i believe just this past month and attracted ilog. Siebel turned it over to mike to get the discussion started. Great. Thank you, chelsea, thank you to the Arms Control Association for the opportunity to speak today. Im going to try to keep my comments as brief as possible and kelsey is agreed to kick me if i go over my time. It will be good entertainment for tv anyway. So i want to focus on making three essential points instead of kind of rehashing the different systems and such north korea is currently developing and i want to highlight them for recent. I hope this comes at the end clearly. One, weve seen this new pattern of missile testing under the regime of kim jongun. His grandfather, kim ilsung, under his reign for making 84 841994, i know he began before 1984, but they started missile testing in 1984. He conducted a total of i think it was 15 test, want and have missile tests per year kim jongil, under his reign there were 16 or so tests, this includes a few satellite launch attempts but they came in clusters. In 1998, and then in 2006 along with a number of other missiles fired in a single day and then again in 2009 you saw a cluster of testing. In both instances this would be inconsistent with testing to develop new systems even though im to develop the satellite launch as it turned out to be. But it seems the rational for testing was to train troops come to great operational readiness and for political purposes. Especially the july 2006 testing. Under kim jongun weve seen this wrap up of testing, i think he has now done, at last count 78 missile launches. There may have been more that failed, i dont know what i think the number is right around there. Thats 1315 test per year. Thats consistent with the Missile Development program. Compare that to say what iran is doing. I ran on average tests may be three to five are you. They make minor modification and test them out. They use them in wargames. That is far less and it is not enough testing to develop a new capability in a short period of time. When i say short printed time im talking talking three to five years. So its clear to me what weve seen is a number of new systems emerge, and ill talk about that in a moment, but what is clear is north korea is trying to great new capabilities and are going about it in a reasonably technically valid way. The second point i want to make is weve seen more north korea move beyond the scud and new dollar technology. All the missile up until kim jongun came to power were basically powered by either the scud or the nodong engine picked this includes the space launcher which it uses nodong scud technology. You can see the results and a very large system. It could in principle be converted into an icbm comp still have to be tested as an icbm to prove it a as a missile but also to validate the reentry technologies. And warhead survivability. But this would be an immobile missile. It would be launched, prepared and launched from a fixed site that it would be vulnerable to preemption picu would probably have few in number. The preparation time is on the order of days, not ours. In 2016 weve seen the emergence of three new Propulsion Systems and i think this is very important. One, weve seen the moussa don, a very different engine, much worse if than the scud know dont technology. Its derived from the old soviet era are 27 technology. Its a retired system now but it appears that north korea was able to import the engines at least if not more technology took all this technology by the way comes in either design bureaus. The engines are think almost every missile. They had a very close working relationship. Until a few months ago i thought that was the primary Virtual Network for north korea. With this new engine that we see in the moussa don even though that missile still a number of times i think its out of six to eight launches its at one apparent success and one partial success. It uses a different type of Higher Energy fuel, a much more sophisticated engine. With that type of technology you can now build in principle a road mobile icbm. And, in fact, the presumption has been that the engines would be the main power plant for the kn08 or the k in 14 at not yet been tested that they have been paraded by the North Koreans. Weve seen, and this is very puzzling to me dick i still havent quite been able to figure out exactly what new engine this is. In september of last year they did a ground test of what they called an 80ton thrust engine. The statements i came out after the test were it was destined for use on a satellite launcher and then earlier this year i think it was in march, they tested the same engine at the attached steering or when your agencies that operate in parallel. And they suggested that this would be use for a new capability. They basically said be prepared and lo and behold, two weeks ago they tested an intermediate range system. It flew to a very High Altitude of i think 22, 2100 kilometers but only about 500 kilometers range. If flown on a standard trajectory dismissal could reach ranges of 4000, 4500 km. In other words, is a is a real intermediaterange missile. Its not clear if that was the first test launch of this particular missile. There may been one or two that occurred before that failed. Its uncertain at this point. Mostly because the intelligence agencies around the world have been less than forthcoming for soul to rely on open source literature. Ill talk about why this new missile is really important along with the moussa don but i wanted to know we have seen north korea employed solid propellant motors. This is a submarine launched missile and that this new land mobile system that they launched out of a canister on a track vehicle. I think there in the first steps of mastering the production of solid propellant. I believe this is being indigenously produced it was probably designed locally. It is not a copy of any known system although it shares the central features of all firstgeneration summary launch missiles. That is its two stages, about one and half meters in, about nine meters long. There are technical reasons why you come to that Design Solutions i dont think they copied this from anyone. But its a worrying trend that if they masterfully the solid propellant technologies, they can make any missile of any size in any range that you want in the future. It will just take a lot of time and ill discuss that a bit on comments on timelines for icbm. This hs 12, the engine that powers it its a little unclear to me. Its certainly not from the bureau. It appears to be consistent with the rd 250 engine developed. As another russian concern. It is now called the premier engine manufacturer for space launch vehicles in russia. This engine was used for a number of medium lift space launch vehicles, but also for the r36, i think we called it the ss nine icbm, which was produced in of all places ukraine back when they were part of the soviet union. This means that north korea probably has an expanded network for illicit procurement. This is really worrying to me for two reasons. One, this engine in particular could be the basis for an icbm, but we now know that they probably have expanded their procurement capacity beyond, therefore we dont know how large it is anymore. We dont know what else they might have. So predicting what system they could develop in the near term to midterm is down complicated by this diversification of sources of technology. The other thing i would note, because hs 12 is a new system and its important, the outrage that we always associate with any missile launch, i think that we need to stop, or start looking at those launches which are most consequential versus those that are just kind of stand and politically oriented. I dont worry if the test a new scud, a scud or nodong type type system. I do worry to do think its important when the test moussa don or the h2o. I would preserve my Political Capital to express sanctions or other punitive measures of preventive measures and reserve those for the missiles that matter like hs12, like moussa don. Those are far more important than even satellite launches in my view. I think we should rethink how we express our concerns about what north korea is doing here i want to wrap up with timelines for icbm because thats what if one seems to be interested in these days. Its always challenging to forecast the future. A lot of things can change, but if they wanted a nearterm solution, meaning something that would be operationally viable at the end of 20182019, they could try to transform the satellite launcher into an icbm. It would have to replace the upper stages was something new, test it and invalidate the design as well as the reentry technologies. So you could see something for what i call an emergency use, probably 2019 or so. A more practical approach would be to use either the hwasong 12. They need to continue testing and more fully develop the intermediate range capability but with a few more successful successful flights of hwasong 12. I think they could from a technical perspective move towards icbm attesting. When they could create that capacity and opera glacial lies it really depends on what the requirements north korea imposes on their systems, how reliable does it need to be, 50 , 75 , 99 like u. S. And chinese systems, or russian systems. Thats an open question and thats why its difficult to project a timeline within real fidelity but assuming they want something that is at least as reliable as successful most of the time you can define most as you wish, but i think youd see at least a dozen flight tests with 75 of them being support successful then they would be operationally viable in my view, granted it would be under a more relaxed criteria. That could occur in 2020 at the very earliest, 2021 is more likely date, assuming everything went well for them. It could stretch out even further but it might be good for emergency use, say if they are being attacked by 2020. The third option they have was to use this to solid propellant technology. Its one thing to make solid rocket motors the size that you see in the k and 11 and kagan 15. But its quite another thing to build a 25, 30ton rocket motor for a first stage of an icbm. Typically it takes countries five to 12 years to move from the size you see in the k in 11 to icbm size. So its a longterm project that north korea would have to embark upon to create an icbm based on solid technologies. Therefore i would be very surprised if had something that was operational by 2025. 2025. I think the more likely date would be 2030. It will result in a lot of embarrassing mistakes. Thats just the nature Missile Development. So i think that would be a longterm project, the most likely and viable system they could develop would be based on either the moussa don or the hs12 technology pic as a set again we can see that as the next president takes office after 2020, if its not trumped it someone else. So i will conclude and leave room for questions, comments, outrage, whatever. [laughing] great. Thank you, mike. For those of you in suspense i did not have to kick in. He stayed on time. So now to talk bu but i might be able to address the rising tension and to think about some of the options or engagement with north korea Going Forward im going to turn over to suzanne. [inaudible] ill try not first let me extend my thanks to the Arms Control Association, to daryl, its such an Important Organization at this moment, maybe more important than ever. If you are not already supporting them, i urge you to do so. Thats my pitch. Let me focus, i want to focus first mostly on the policy options for the u. S. As kelsey said the administration now has completed its policy review, and for all intents and purposes it seems like it was a fairly cohesive interagency review. It declared at the end of strategic patience is over. I think an actual funeral was held in washington, and that a policy of maximum pressure and engagement was replacing it. Frankly to me it still seems very unclear if this new policy is really much different from the old policy or if its just they been given a new wardrobe. That being said there appears to be several key elements to the policy as far as i can see. What is it puts back on the table all options including military action, more aggressive action. For example, just today we know that there are naval maneuvers happening in the area of north korea, and for the first time in two decades an increase to u. S. Aircraft carriers. Also the joint roku. S. Military exercises, that just happen in april included nav navy seals, special teams that reportedly was focused on socalled decapitation exercises. So this does seem like a little bit of a ratcheting up on that side of the equation. And then during his visit to the region in march, secretary tillersons statements hinted at the possibility of a preemptive strike to destroy nuclear capabilities. He also stated that all options are on the table when questioned about a military option, opening a door to the idea of repenting worker the problem with this approach as we rely upon it exclusively is that when you threaten, you have to be prepared to use it. Its a major risk. The fact that we do not know at the North Koreans would retaliate, we would imagine that they would respond in one way, shape, or form, and that could escalate. It could inflict mass casualties, Severe Damage to our allies, south korea as well as to our other ally, japan and potentially to u. S. Forces that are based in the region. This leaves out the question how would beijing react, lead to a regional war, fullscale war . We all know that there is really no military solution to the north korea issue, and i feel very strongly about that. The second element i see is a greater reliance on china to mount more pressure against north korea. At least rhetorically. China of course is killing gangs biggest trading partner pyongyang biggest trading partner. About 90 of the total trade came from, was china including most of north koreas food and energy supply. So it is a very unique position. I think today the u. N. Security council is considering a resolution, additional sanctions while japan, south korea and the u. S. Are pushing for more pressure, more sanctions, it seems china is resisting and is instead pushing for dialogue at an emergency meeting of the u. N. Sc. Its containing today. President trump recently tweeted quote that china is trying hard, unquote to rein in north korea and u. S. Ambassador to u. N. Nikki haley recently stated that beijing is using a back channel to try to stop the dprk from testing. This is worrisome to me because it indicates to the not have direct channels . Weve heard of rumors of worsening relationship between, the fact that kim jongun since has gained power has not visited beijing. He has not met xi jinping pics we really have to question whether or not a reliance on china to help solve this issue is a wise approach. Im very skeptical about it and, of course, chinas National Interests are not necessarily aligned with hours when it comes to north korea. We can go through a whole litany of things, everything from a fear that the regime downfall could lead to a refugee influx, a collapse would allow u. S. Troops to have direct access to the chinese border and, of course, the recent supplementation of that is starting to the chinese. The third element of this new policy i see is an emphasis on more sanctions. Of course president obama, his administration, also focus on sanctions as well so its not necessarily new. The fact is that this approach hasnt worked so far. In fact, i would argue as is outlined in the previous presentation, as we layered on more sanctions against north korea, we see them steadily accelerating the progress on the nuclear and Missiles Program in face of increased sanctions. There was a study done by researchers recently at mit that found u. S. Sanctions imposed against north korea have been largely unsuccessful at curbing the country alyssa procurement because in part North Koreans been able to adapt. Theres growing capacity to work around sanctions. So could sanctions and pressure on north korea alone resolve the Nuclear Issue . Is very unlikely. I think even if we look at the case of iran, extensive sanctions on their own didnt bring the iranians to the table. There were other factors. We can talk about them. This is even less likely in the case of north korea because pyongyang is not as reliant on the Global Financial system as iran. In this new policy also leaves room for engagement. Thats the fourth element that i see. My thinking on this is with the new u. S. Administration comes in opportunity to try to forge diplomatic path especially when it is clear the current approach is not working. Relying on a pressure only approach is dangerous because it is inherently an approach of escalation that either leads to conflict or backing down by one side, and not necessarily to a potential political agreement, political solution. We risk of falling into a cycle of titfortat escalation with real potential for conflict either by design or may be more so by accident. So we need an offramp. The Trump Administration has left open room for engagement. Still remains to be seen if that will be pursued. President trump warned in an interview in late april that a major, major conflict with the north was possible. He also said he would prefer diplomatic outcome to the dispute. Although the u. S. Has explicitly rolled out talks with pyongyang and let the government took verifiable action to freeze its weapons program. The president then said he would be honored to meet with north koreas leader kim jongun under the right circumstances. I think these are very mixed signals, mixed messages that urgently need to be clarified. That being said its interesting that following that, Senior North Korean diplomat, also the lead nuclear negotiator, recently said that the dprk is open to dialogue with the u. S. Under the right conditions. South korean president moon has said something similar. So i think the task now at hand is to find out what those right conditions are in the best way to do this of course, the only way to do is to dialogue. So what is needed now is what i would call aggressive diplomacy. Backed up by all the leverage that the maximum pressure that i just talked about brings. Now, when we talk with a diplomatic approach, i do think there are some lessons to be learned from the iran deal that might be worth considering for negotiating with north korea. Of course both cases are completely different. I have traveled to both countries have experienced this first hand, the biggest differences of course north korea has Nuclear Weapons, iran has never possessed a Nuclear Weapon and, of course, i ran is a member of the npt. The differences go on and on and on. So im not advocating that the jcpoa is a model for north korea. Its technically quite different but it do think the process of diplomacy that the u. S. Pursued with iran could offer some insights on how to begin engagement with a very strong adversary whose leadership is extremely distrustful of the United States and, of course, vice versa there are three elements of diplomacy with iran that i think we should be looking at. First is initiate and lowkey diplomatic channel authorized at the highest level. Prior to the start of official negotiations with the iranians, both diplomats of both countries engaged in a series of meetings that were held secretly. There were 12 such meetings convened in geneva, and new york over a period of about 15 months. This eventually led to the multilateral pie 1 talk and an indian or greeting a called jcpoa in november 2013. I think given the levels of mistrust between john yang and washington, i think it would be a good first step to try to have a dialogue without preconditions to find out what is possible. We can call them talks about talks to help clarify what those conditions that would be acceptable, what are they, how can we identify them, how to meet or overcome them, what are the nonnegotiable and then go ahead with the negotiation with our allies and others. I think this work before the negotiations begin at american diplomats and iranian diplomats engaged in really helped pave the way to not only successful interim agreement but into the jcpoa which by the way is an agreement that is working. The second element of diplomacy with iran i think that should be considered is to focus on a limited set of realistic objectives, not a grand bargain. The u. S. Iran discussions were limited to what both sides deemed to be very specific, manageable set of items in the nuclear field. And, of course, the u. S. Priority was placed on preventing iran from obtaining a Nuclear Weapon. The iranian priority was an exchange sanctions would be lifted. So now the u. S. Really must decide on its highest priority with north korea at this time. Back into the country and when we look at the jcpoa one of the things thats remarkable is the extensive verification, monitoring requirements that come along with it and thats certainly something to emulate. So suspension of testing, of course, is in interim steps. Probably in we seat a goal of nuclearfree Korean Peninsula as the end goal, this could be an interim set. Its not a solution. Is the United States National Security really strengthen if a 33yearold dictator with executing enemies deliver strikes to tokyo, we know the answer. Its an important interim step but not the final solution. Should be seen as part of a phase process. The third is pursuing a winwin approach. The u. S. And the iranian in early talks both agreed that they needed a winwin outcome where at the end of the day each of them could come forward and say they succeeded in filling their goals. This is the understanding that they would make compromises along the way so both sides can claim victory. Looking forward to what the approach will be and makes great deal of sense starting with negotiations on Nuclear Freeze, missile freeze, setting the stage for interim agreement that would freeze nuclear and Missile Developments and end proliferation and followed by further negotiations over next steps with benchmarks over time. Potential end goal would be a comprehensive regional strategy which i know is something that tom and mark have been helping on. That could take years. , to conclude, i was on a panel recently and one of the experts on the panel was, i think, very much oppose today what i was proposing and the reason was, is that that we have tried this, we have tried diplomacy with North Koreans, its too hard, they cheat, they cant be trusted. You know, i heard the same arguments with iran for years. In fact, during the 35 years before the jcpoa there were countless failed attempts, missed opportunities and now we have an agreement that is working. As Nelson Mandela put it, it always seems impossible until its done and i would apply it in that case. Because we failed in the pass it doesnt mean we shouldnt attempt that again. We should learn from failed attempts and move forward and try it, test it, that being said, theres no question the difficulties, obstacles of such an approach, the mutual demonization, lack of interaction over years, lack of relations, lack of exchange, both on both the governmental level but both on a societal level makes it all the harder. So i would just end on this note, if the administration decides to go down the path can any success, it should follow what president obama did with the iran team, put together an ateam of diplomats, scientists, experts to carry this out. This is not something you farm out to your soninlaw, if i may say that. So this is required filling key staff positions, senior positions, a real negotiating team like we had with the iran talks and also means filling ambassadorial positions. This would be a major undertaking of diplomacy, diplomacy is hard specially with adversary but as the iran deal show, its not impossible. Great, thank you so much, susan. [applause] im not going to open it up to questions, please introduce yourself, im going to ask everyone that their holding the microphones close given the fact that we are trying to pick this up for the cspan audience. We will start over there with paul. Great event. Peace action. Its my understanding that some several thousand remains of u. S. Soldiers that are still there from the korean war and that actually north korea would like to give those back and thats a touch point in which, i think, you could get even bipartisan support in congress, no member of congress has not been elected for not bashing north korea so far. Its my understanding that the Obama Administration didnt do so on that specific issue and maybe you can get support, bipartisan support by the republicans for bringing the remains of our servicemen home . Susan. Im not so sure that the Obama Administration didnt approach that. I think maybe they had tried but im not certain. I cant verify that. I think thats the fact that the North Koreans have indicated a willingness to talk about an issue like that, of course, should be perceived. I think what i had proposed, a quiet channel, secrets channel, i think it would be very hard to keep it secret but a very quiet channel would be a way to begin discussions on these issues. The fact is that given the high level of mistrust, any effort that can be made to build confidence wins along the way, that could help do that, gestures by both sides that could help do that. We are in desperate need of that. Greg, here in the front. Board of directors. Susan, i very much agree with the objective of seeking interim freeze on nuclear and Missile Developments in north korea. One of the things that im wondering about and the question for mike, is there also a value in pursuing as interim a limit on the kind of testing of system that you were most alarmed by, that is to say, would it be worth presenting to north korea a proposal to ban any test of missiles above shortrange, for example, or even allowing space launch vehicles as a bone to throw to kim jong un, wouldnt that give us a very viable security advantage for testing that youre most alarmed by . Thank you, greg, that was a nice softball you threw me. We talked about this before. I think it would be an interesting subject to explore with north korea, that is a flight test ban on missile that is fly over have the capacity to fly some given range that would be the subject of part of the negotiations what it might be, but it would certainly include internet immediate range systems, anything that flies more than 2500 or 3,000 kill kilometers. Why would that be important . Well, in order to develop the missile, you have to test it and thats why we see north korea testing missiles and if you dont test it and you look back, you know, from a Systems Engineering approach or you look at kind of Historical Data from other countries that have developed intermediate or longrange missiles, over the course of the first five to ten launches, the failure rate is greater than 50 with few exceptions. Sometimes its even much greater than much greater than 50 fail. And thats just the nature of creating new technologies and new capabilities. So if theyre not allowed to test, they can develop or create a system but theyll have no confidence that it works and to field it, they would have to accept great risk that is the system wouldnt work. If its a systematic failure, its likely that all of them will fail. If its something with which each launch, you know, then they have 50 50 chance of getting 50 of them might actually reach destination. Now, what would you ask what would they ask for in return, i think, something logical would be allowing space launch activities, you know, perhaps even providing system technological assistance, but you would have to have certain restrictions on what they could use and what they couldnt use. I would say it would be limited to using lowperformance, would necessarily result in very large launchers, very large cumbersome icbms or long missile ifs they tried to convert it at some later time. I would if they want to use solid strapon boosters, i would have limitations there. You could provide them with technology which would be left suitable for Missile System which has to work rather rapidly, 24 7. Theres a range of things you can do. And in fact, theres a small effort going on trying to establish what those requirements might be. You would also need transparency which would provide us with better inside as to how they think, what they are doing and i believe it would be worthwhile. Now, this approach is not without risk. There is a risk that things would be diverted from experiences in developing satellite launchers that they could apply later but those risks are much less than what we have now where theyre allowed to launch whatever they want and learn specific lessons and develop specific technologies that are destined for longrange missiles. Yeah, i think this is something worth pursuing. It would be outside of the nuclear track, so you could get get by with not addressing the nuclear topic while addressing something strategy i would lead to confidence building, greater insights, et cetera, so in my view this would be worth a risk worth taking, but one has to understand that its not a riskfree venture. The woman in the middle table. Thank you. Kathy robinson, thank you very much to both panelists. My question is about the thaad Missile Defense that we are delivering and deploying in shanghai composite and the concerns created in china but also faced a lot of civil protests from grassroots and south korea and a lot of tension around costs and so forth with the new president ial regime. And im just curious if theres any value in changing the policy, if that would help in any way in moving forward with diplomacy and engagement with china and if at this point any changes are even possible . Great, thank you, kathy. Maybe we will start on that question first. Mike, if you could just tell us a little bit about what thaad can do and how thaad fits into the diplomacy. Okay. First i want to separate regional Missile Defenses like thaad, aegis, patriot from national Missile Defense here in the u. S. Which is the groundbased interceptors, the system that was tested successfully a couple of days ago. Regional Missile Defenses are primarily aimed after blocking conventionally armed missiles. Its much like air defense. Youre trying to limit what your opponent can inflict upon you using aircraft or missiles. When you combine Something Like thaad with patriot you create a layered defense. This improves capacity to block, say, 50, 50 missiles over a given period of time. What we presume to be the capabilities of patriot which is demonstrated and what thaad is currently tested in demonstrated in the design criteria, you could have 90 confidence that you could block 50 out of 50. Maybe one gets through or two get through but that would allow you to sustain military operations an keep facilities and things of that nature. This would be a great improvement over a single layered based on patriot. Thats why its being introduced into south korea in my view. You know, theres a possibility that something gets through. Its not an you umbrella. No Missile Defense provides you with a perfect defense. And we need to recognize that specially when making decisions over potential actions. Its important to remember, 50 50kiloton device will kill and if youre looking at a threat from north korea, that makes sense in preserving probably military capabilities and protecting some critical assets within the republican of korea. It is expensive, yes, i think they probably need two thaad batteries, by the way, maybe three to really create a layer defense across the peninsula and protect against sub submarine launch missile. Its not the answer to all their questions. As to the threat to china, bad does not thaad does not pose a threat to Chinas Nuclear forces. Theres a limited set of circumstances where radar can detect and track an icbm thats headed to the west coast primarily of the u. S. From three launch sites in china. The information that would be gained is really minimal because you already have so many other sensors positioned around the world and in space. So i dont know why china is so concerned with the deployment of this particular system. I think its a political maneuver by china. What theyre concerned about is what comes next. Are they going to be is there going to be a ring of bad radars as part of large architecture aimed at china. Thats why i think theyve been protesting and using some really craft tactics, if you will, in boycotting industries and things of that nature. , for that reason, i think its difficult for shanghai composite now to back away from the deal because it would appear whether its done that for that reason or not, its caving to the chinese. I cant say what they should do in this circumstances, im not sure it would lead to a more cooperative china in terms of solving this particular problem. So i would be incline today leave it. Thats just a personal view and i think we also have to keep in mind that china cannot solve north korea problem but the north korea problem cannot be solved without chinas cooperation and i think we are getting some, remember, chinas priorities are no instability, no war and then no Nuclear Weapons in north korea. So its going to be a difficult task. Susan. Just briefly i would disagree. I think it would be okay to back out of thaad now but of course, president mon is coming to washington and we will see if President Trump continues to insist that the south koreans pay for it, that might have an impact on their decision. Also i also agree that the chinese have overstated the case, so i think for now i would agree to leave it at this stage but i think the process by which we move forward with it and now with the new administration we can do better to communicate with them on what they want and how they see it and working with them in cooperation. I think there was a question way in the back. Professor from the university of southern california. A depressing topic to some extent but we have good news, next generation sitting from the Southern University of california. [applause] my other comment here is from my experience with respect to the issues with north korea, congress cooperation and involvement in this process is critical. As we look forward to new moves, maybe if you look at it with glass half full, punt intended, the current political galaxy in washington with the Congress Control and republicans in white house, theres an opportunity to engage republicans in congress as we strategize and take steps forward and given the divide between the congressman and the white house that produces an interesting dynamic as well. Am i dreaming, are we going to get ahead and incorporate congress as talked about strategic and tactics move forward or is this a lost cause . Im asking for optimism, thank you. [laughter] well, not the load the answer ahead of time, but well, unfortunately i think when you look at theres so few issues where theres bipartisan agreement these days. Unfortunately one of them is north korea getting tougher on north korea, iran would be the other. Its certainly worth trying. You know, i also think congress is part of the problem when we look at this because in the case of iran, specially republicans, of course, this would lead, if i was a north korean considering engaging the u. S. Entering discussions into the agreement, interim agreement and so forth, i would really question whether or not the United States is prepared to fulfill that agreement given the issues that are being placed against and, yes, we should always engage dmong these discussions, but at the same time we also have to be cautious about them playing the role to have spoiler as well. When you look at the recent hearings on the hill, there was one hearing recently where among dozen or more senators who spoke, there was only one that mentioned the word diplomatic engagement which shocked me. I would urge some caution, is what i would be afraid of is the more hawkish people in the congress opposing any attempt to maybe work out a new Nuclear Freeze as a first step, you know, tie the hands of the administration and not allow them to negotiate in interim steps. That would be dangerous and unwelcomed in my view. So in terms of what congress its more about what congress shouldnt do than what they should do. So i will leave it at that. We have just a few minutes left so i will take a question there from the middle table. Right in front of you, yes. Michael claire, on the board of association. I have a question for mike. You spoke about north koreas Missile Development. Could you say a few words about north koreas Nuclear Weapons development because part and parcel of the process is are they able to develop a war head that would fit in the icbm . Anything about the timeline for that process, how thats proceeded . The longest answer is no, i dont. The Nuclear Program is much more opaque than the Missile Program because you have to test missiles, you can track them and you can get a sense of what their performance parameters are quite easily. Even the photographs that they provide in video, it offers many insights into what theyre doing. My presumption right now is that they could probably create Nuclear War Head that could be fitted upon the largerdiameter systems. 1. 25 meters. Its unclear if that would also apply to the stud, smaller diameter of. 88 meters. I think its a safe assumption that they can shrink it. I think the larger question is would it be rugged enough and it has to be rugged, you know, theyll be a lot of vibrations associated with launching and reentry. What they havent clearly done is developed a reentry technology for longrange missile and im speaking specifically to icbm. I think that would be developed in parallel but would have to be tested to prove it right, so i think thats about as far as i can go because we just dont have the knowledge and its the reason why, i think, the suggestion that the iaea, we should negotiate their reentry into the country would be so important because you learn so much of just talking to people on the ground. Yeah. I agree with mike that they certainly are likely to be be able to fit a war head on some of the missl systems but Missile Systems and the satellite imagery is that theres activity tat reprocessing facility. So very likely that north korea is continuing to produce missile material that expands the size of nuclear arsenal. Very quickly at tend. I wonder if you might say a few words of u. S. Summit, a positive outcome . I think clarity on what their approaches are. I think obviously in order to move forward with the diplomatic approach, they have to be on the same page. As i said, we heard some mixed messages from our administration and the president mun administration thats fairly knew. A joint statement that says what theyre going to do would be quite important at this time. Mike, anything that you would like to see . What i would most like to see is very coherent collaboration and agreement between the u. S. , rok and japanese allies in the region that whatever we decide as policy is everyone concurs and everyone understands the full risks because this notion that we can apply more and more pressure and talk about, you know, left of launch solutions for missiles, destroying them in launch pad, if our allies are not completely on board, that could result in some real surprises or disastrous results. So i just want i want to hear them make offer a very coherent strategy that everyone agrees upon. Okay, i guess we will see in a few weeks what happens. After you join me in thanking our speakers if you could all stay seated for a few quick announcements from darrell and thank you very much for being here. [applause] the u. S. Senate today is taking up legislation calling for sanctions on people and entities involved with iran Ballistic Missile program. The bill would also authorize the president to sanction people involved with human rights