Recommended they not be used . I read reports of that, sir. Okay. You were once an rso, correct . Yes, sir. In your distinguished career, do you ever remember recommending that a service not be used . That being hired over your protest or yourar recommendation . Not in my experience, sir. Okay. But you would have at some point recommended somebody or maybe not recommended anybody . Was it your job to look at the performance of these people tht you were w aware of . When when we have barredded contracts. When we find the contractor is not performing we have variety of ways to deduct money and ultimately find theyre not performing. If theyre found to be lacking and not performing contract they can be terminated. They can be barred if that goes that far. You mentioned. February 17th, martyrs brigade i believe what it was called. We were told that was the host company security. Is that true or not . I, i would hesitate to call that host Country Security, sir. At best it probably had sop control in that area of the city but this is based on what i read from the reports. Is there an individual that would be at the post that would be responsible for insuring that theon 17th brigade was responsible and dependable . Sir, i wasnt there at the time. As a former rso i can probably tell you there were likely limited choices and one of the things that an rso would do at that point if he was faced with limited choices was try to tran them as best he could, to try to make the best of whatever situation he was handed. He would have to train the february brigade . If he found that they were not up to the levels that he wanted, he would engage and assist in the training, making sure they understood the guard orders. Making sure they had capabilities that were necessary. Into okay. Lets say, and they were hired in case there was an attack inside of the compound to respond. Who would have had the Contact Information and who would have been responsible on the poet for contacting the, this protective brigade of martyrs . There were, as i read the report, sir, again, i was not here at the time, there were personnels . On the compound. They hadad telephone communicatn with their own groups. The agent that was in the with their own groups . With other personnel in the group. With other personnel. And there was communication on the part of rso who was in the operations center, lo was making phone calls and there were phone calls that were being made by the annex. Okay. Lets go to the tripwires that mr. Cummings was talking about. The Foreign Affairs handbook defines tripwires as events that activate, initiate or set in motion post plans to prevent harm to the post, its personnel, the u. S. Citizen community or other u. S. National interests. The handbook also notes that when a trip wire event occurs, it requires that an action be taken. Are you familiar with that . Yes, sir. Its my understanding that the tripwires, are preplanned, preapproved measures that should be taken in light after securityrelated incident or threat, is that true . That is true, sir. Has the state department emphasized to post the purpose of having tripwires . Has the state department . Having tripwires . Yes. P when a trip wire is breach, meaning something bad has happened, that breach is the trigger to take specific action, is it not . At a minimum it is a, it is a warning that the post must review what has occurred and then determine whether action needs to be taken, at a minimum. Take action, rather than just requiring that they set around and reevaluate the situation . Mi well, sir, tripwires are written in advance of activities. We try to cover a wide variety of situations that could occur. Predicting the future and exactly what your actions are going to be is very difficult. I think the purpose of tripwires really is to indicate, wait, happened. Has just this could be significant. We need to consider whether or not we need to take action in this case. Okay. As i said previously it was normally a post activity. Now c once a trip wire is tripp, it is looked at both by the post and by the various sections in washington. Would you consider a hole being blown in the perimeter wall of the temporary mission facility, would you consider that a trip wire . I would certainly say that is a good indicator sir, probably crossed the tripwire. That event would have probably, should have caused some action or discussion, correct . Yes, sir. Would an attack on another diplomats coming into benghazi that caused that country to pull out, would that have been a trip wire . I assume youre referring to the attack on the British Ambassador, sir . Ng i am. That is another tripwire, yes. Okay. I certainly think that is an indication of Security Problems and instability. And so those were two tripwires that you would consider significant, would you not . Yes, sir. And what was done with the security after those two tripwires weret, tripped . Sir, as i said, i was not here at that time. I was not in Diplomatic Security. You read reports. I read the reports. Im aware that the rsos were increasing physical security. They were engaged in building safere havens inside of the facility. They had engaged in training with the guards, training routines. They had run drills with the annex. I think they were, from what i read they were doing the types of things that an rso would do when he sees the situation beginning to deteriorate. Thank you for your testimony. Thank all of you for being here. And lets hope we can get some results out of this tragic event. Thank you, gentleman from georgia. The chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. Schiff. Thank you. At the outset, mr. Chairman, i want to thank you for conducting the hearing today and for the way you worked with us to bring together witnesses and followup on the arb recommendations. I greatly appreciate it. I want to ask you gentlemen something that is in a bit after differenti direction than the questions youve had thus far and that is, i also serve on the appropriations subcommittee on state and foreign operations and i have a opportunity to meet with a lot of Foreign Service officers o and here in washingtn and aroundns the world. Many described to me what they consider the benghazi effect on their jobs and by that, they refer to such a heightened concern about security that many of them feel they can not fulfill their mission anymore. That they are confined to a bunker. That theyre not allowed to undertake things they think are necessary, the job responsibilities. And i think this sentiment was best expressed in june by Vice President of the american Foreign Service association, Matthew Asada who wrote, does our collective response to benghazi threaten to the make the Foreign Service less knowledgeable about the world, less effective on the ground and ultimately less influential with the host country and with the u. S. Government itself . Thats a question that ambassador stevens might have asked and wonder if you could share your thoughts on it as we implement the recommendations of the arb and of your panel. How do w we make sure that were not preventing our, people from doing their job . We all acknowledge this is a dangerous thing and, as my colleague pointed out, our facilities have beenen attacked, literally hundreds of times over the last couple of decades. It has happened in the past. It will happen again. We want to protect our people as best we can but we want them to be effective. Thats why theyre there. So if you each could share briefly your thoughts on are we striking the right balance or has the benghazi effect meant that were undermining the ability of our peep to do their work . An kong an man you are going to the heart of Risk Management and how we implement Risk Management. Tell you over many years with the support of congress weve made great stride in building safer and secure facilitagy is o that an attack on a facility that could hurt everybody, in one attack weve, done great things in terms of protect that. If you look at the number of attacks against our facilities and how few are been successful. Most have been driven off with the casualties by our security personnel or others only. We have made Great Strides in that but we cant lock people inside of embassies. The whole point of diplomacy to get out and, i think we need to understand, and a lot of processes that weve been talking about are at our highest threat, highest risk posts we have got the most security and in many cases it will be the most restrictive for our Foreign Service personnel. But weve got to have the security programs in place to get them outside of the wall as well. That means protective security details. It means armored vehicles. It means working with host Country Security services. Every single day that we run motorcade outside of our embassy in kabul or in iraq or sanaa or the ones we ran in tripoli we were taking risks. But every single day we were judging what that risk was versus need to get out and making sure we could balance those risks and we were not running most motorcades or not getting people out for very good reasons. They had to be very important reasons. In lower threat level posts were operating almost normally around the h world. We have physical security at our posts but our people get out every single day. That is the work of diplomacy. Talking with people. Understanding the country, representing the United States and bringing information back and you dont do that without talking to people. So i think all the efforts that weve made in terms of recognizing what are our high threat, highest risk posts, doing Risk Management and making sure were getting people out when we can but understanding if too many people get injured or it is too dangerous we cant operate or if were negligent or were not taking the threat seriously enough we wont be there either. Well close that post if we get too many People Killed or too many people injured or the threat is too high. Those are the types of things that we need to weigh every single day. And we do. I can understand the frustration of Foreign Service officers at our highest threat level posts. No, sir, they can not live out in the open economy. They can not just go to a coffee shop but we are still even in the highest threat locations getting them to meetings they need to get to. I dont think that is the issue for them much as they would like to be accompanied by spouses and go to local coffee shop. What they have expressed to me is not that which they understand but that they cant undertake the meetings they want in places they need to go to have those meetings and have contacts they need to be able to gather the information for our government. To be t able to convey the u. S. Position to people. They cant do their job because they are, theyre confined by, ander hyper conservative point f view perspective back in washington. And, you get that feedback. And are there any situations where you feel the pressure has been such to be so risk avoidant that were not alouing our people to do their job . I think in the immediate aftermath after benghazi there is a deep appreciation of that attack and we may have, the pendulum may have swung the other way for a while. I think today, with the systems that we have put in place, with the Risk Management that we are doing every day, with things like pbvp, the additional sources youre giving us i would not agree with that statement, sir. I think we need to take certain precautions and we do but i talk with ambassador deb jones when we were still in tripoli. I talked with the ambassador in sanaa about whether were getting out enough and doing things were need to be doing and they say yes, we are and it is the right balance. Chairman, let me ask a very different question because i have very limited time. One of the props we have in benghazi was overreliance on willingness, ability, or loyalty of local militias to provide security. Are there any places around the world today where you feel were continuing to place an overreliance on local militias fothr security of our facilitie . You know that was something that, we talked an awful lot about, congressman. The fact when you go into a situation like that you have to be able to evaluate the will and capability of a particular guide force and i think no matter where you go in the world you will always have to come up with that evaluation. If you dont have that will and dont have that capability, no amount of morn any you did not money you pay on the contract will resolve that. Thats why it goes back to the Risk Management. If you dont have the capabilities locally you have to go and bring them in your sell. I cant speak to where they arent, who has them, who doesnt have them where in the world but i really do think, when you look at the reaction of that guard force there, even leading up to that, tripwires that were, that were spotted there, i mean that was a real concern and again i just go back to, there wasnt the will. There might have been the will but there just was not the capability. On either question. Well, i think, first of all, sir, one of our recommendations, to start with as mr. Sullivan pointed out in his Opening Statement, when we first started withl, our panel we thought we were going to look at these tactical issues of building bunkers and building higher walls. We quickly realized that wasnt the answer because that doesnt facilitate diplomacy and we looked at strategic and looked at department and overseas posts and Risk Management. We asked ambassadors, deputy chiefs of missions and Foreign Service officers as we traveled overseas tell us about the state departments Risk Management process. Without exception, each one said there is none and they make it up. Sadly to this day, while they may be making progress, that is still a significant concern. Risk management process, as you indicated, sir the Foreign Service is a dangerous business. We have to be out there. We have to do these things that are National Security priorities but we have to do it under a risk i management process that effective and sustainable and transparent. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I yield back. Well recognize gentleman fromac ohio, mr. Jordan. How many years do you have in the security field . Tl approximately 30 years. How much did you serve in the state department in that area. Almost 23. Did you get good valuations high reviews, strong reviews. Yes, sir. So good in fact, i looked at your resume you were put on security detail to protect the secretary of state, is that accurate. Yes, sir. Secretary Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright. Two recent secretaries. That subpoena anment from the Obama Administration . Yes, sir. You. Trust the agents in the field, mr. Keil. I trust them implicit think. They have the best perspective. They know what is going on. Out of their assessment, their instock exchanges, guys on the ground putting their lives on the line just like you did, when they make a recommendation to the state department, you take that seriously . Yes. I would. And are you familiar with the fact that the twice on the ground in benghazi repeatedly asked for additional security repeatedly denied . Yes, sir. From what we saw. Routinely denied . They said, this thing is out of control. We need some more good guys here. And repeatedly asked for that and repeatedly denied. It was worse than that, mr. Keel . S possibly, sir. What they asked for. We need nor but what they had was actually reduce is that accurate . Yes. Wa we heard yearandahalf ago testimony from colonel wood on in benghazi and he said this, quote we were fighting a losing battle. We couldnt even keep what we had. Mr. Keil, my guess, were the United States of america. We got facilities all over the globe. My guess is every facility the security people would say, we could use a few more folks here. We would like a few more. My guess is that happens. But wasnt the situation in libya and benghazi somewhat unique . Sir, when you look at the intelligence, the threat reporting, the deteriorating security environment, and the numerous incidents, yeah, i would prioritize benghazi that is what im talking about. Ied attacks, assassination attempts on British Ambassador and they said this is as bad as it gets. The state Department Says no, well reduce what you had. If you were agent on the ground, mr. Keil, would you have been lobbying for more help to come to dawes gauze. I would probably do more than lobbying and extremely frustrated and push every button that i could possibly push. Flip it around. Youre guys in washington get requests from guys on the ground with more help, would you have fought to make that request happen. As a matter of fact, sir, my last position way as regional director for ds Regional Bureau vetting requests from the field. Would i have put a significant amount of priority on benghazi requests. So you had that job . Yes. Before the benghazi you had that job . Correct. You would have went to bat for these folks . Yes i would have. Mr. Keil, what is the overseas Security Policy board. Oversease Security Policy board is inneragency board is a genesis from the Beirut Embassy bombings, the Inman Commission, which created the Diplomatic Security service, inman standards. It is inneragency board that creates physical security, technical security, procedural securityvi requirements. So these were standards developed interagency that the state department standards, is that correct. State department leads ospb. This resulted from the Embassy Bombing in beirut, 63 People Killed, 17 americans. Yes, sir. Or and were the standards followed at the benghazi facility . Sir, we saw a memo which authorized the continuing opening of the Benghazi Mission which referred to it as the special Mission Compound and talking with people and based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the standards. So the standards werent followed. No. Now my understanding is there is waiver process you have to follow if in fact youre going to deviate from the standards. Was the waiver process followed. That was one much our recommendations sir. When youre not following the standards you dont have to follow the waiver process either. At didnt follow standards or the waiver . Correct. Mr. Keil, what is your, what is your overall impression of the arb report . Mr. Sullivan and i testified before House Oversight and government Reform Committee. Ambassador pickering referred to the arb as being fiercely independent. In that same hearing admiral mullen admitted to oversight and government reform that here is reporting on arb proceedings to the senior staff of the state department. Outside of the precepts and requirements of being a member of the arb. I dont think that fits anyones definition of being fiercely independent. You dont think it was independent at all. Not based on frankly i share your belief. When the secretary, when secretary clinton gets to appoint the cochairs of the board, when cheryl mills calls them up and asks them to serve, when neither secretary clinton or cheryl mills are interviewed, when they get a draft report before it goes public, in they get to he had it the report before rest of the world gets to see it, as you point out when admiral mullen told the committee, told the committee, i think about this. He has been on the job a few days. As the cochair of the supposedly independent arb, been job a few days he interviews charlene lamb, he discovers, charlene lamb two days later coming in front of the Oversight Committee and realizes she will not be a good witness. What does he do . Just what you reference, mr. Keil. He gets on phone and calls chief of staff to the secretary of state, hey, charlene lamb will not be a good witness. She will not reflect well on the state department. Give as heads up to the very important he is supposed to be investigating. Of course this thing wasnt independent. Think about, we asked mr. Mullen, why do you care . Whether she is good witness or bad witness. Your job is to get to the truth of American People and families of four individuals to that lost their lives not to give headsup to higher ups at stay department. It was not anything but independent. One good thing came out arb in my judgment, one good thing. They created best Practices Panel you and mr. Sullivan sat on, right. Yes. You made a whole bunch of recommendations. Yes. How many recommendations. 40 recommendations. 40 recommendations. Some are more important than others. Yes. The most important is which one. Creation of undersecretary already Diplomatic Security. In our executive summary we said one clear overa arching implementation of the recommendations in this report is the creation of an undersecretary. Is the that first recommendation you listed in your report. Recommendation number one. So recommendation number one. Most of the others hinge on the implementation of that recommendation. Yes, sir. It is designed to give accountability and responsibility to one particular person at the state department, is that correct. To identify those who are something miss brooks talked about, miss brooks talked about in her opening questions. Yes, sir. Designed to give accountability and responsibility to someone at the state department and is this first time that this recommendation has been put forward, mr. Keil . No, sir. Our board, our panel, excuse me was, was a bit surprised to uncover a memo from now 15 years ago, that secretary of state Madeleine Albright signed after the east after dry can Embassy Bombings ordering creation of undersecretary for Diplomatic Security. We have the overseas Security Policy board after americans were killed in beirut. That wasnt followed. We have a recommendation from Madeleine Albright, the lady you protected, that says we need to get an undersecretary after people, americans were killed in east african Embassy Bombings. Yes, sir. And that wasnt followed. Is the state Department Said they will implement this at all . They said it is one of the recommendations theyre not going to implement. Theyre nots. Going to implement it. Theyre not going implement it. My question is, mr. Chairman. What will it take . What will it take for the state department to put in place practices that will save mileperhour lives . They didnt listen to the guys on ground, the pros that know what theyre doing in a situation anyone looks says wow, we need more americans to help. They didnt listen to the guyson on the t ground who put theirs lives on the line. They didnt listen to their own standards developed after the 1983 Embassy Beirut bombings. And now theyre not following the best Practices Panel number recommendation. What is it going to take . The Ranking Member in his opening remarks said this is a transformational moment. Well somebody better tell the state department that. Because, i mean, think of this track record. I hope, i hope the member is right. I hope they get it. If theyre not going to listen to two guys with the experience mr. Keil and mr. Sullivan have one thing we need, one main thing we need this person with accountability. One main thing, that, Everything Else hinges on, i meep, talk about the arrogance the state department . So hopefully one of the things we can, this committee can do at least convince them to follow these guys what they said. At least convince them of that. Mr. Keil, thank you for your service. Amazing record what youve done for our count very. Mr. Sullivan, yours as well. Appreciate the work on best Practices Panel. 42 seconds i yield. Why dont you ask the question of the state department . You can ask them that question. The wayy. This works my time, youre welcome to do it h it, mr. Chairman. You spent a lot of time on mr. Starr. I chose to focus on mr. Keil who has 30 years of experience, appointed by Obama Administration. 23 years in the statofe department. Viewed so highly hechoc was acty on the protective detail for secretary of state Warren Christopher, secretary ofra stae Madeleine Albright. I chose to use my ten minutes on mr. Kyl. Minority can use ten minutes on y want. R the this hearing they called you can handle however they want to. I yield back mr. Chairman. You, gentleman from ohio. I recognize the gentlelady from california, mr. Sanchez. I thank all the witnesses fr joining us what i hope will be productive and forwardlooking hearing and what can be done and what is currently being done and what we have yet to do in terms of trying to prevent a tragedy from benghazi happening again or at very least minimizing the potential for Something Like that to happen again. Im going to begin my questions, sort of in the same realm where the questioning left off. Talking about the security accountability frail framework within the department of state. The best Practices Panel led by mr. Sullivan determined, quote, clearly defined accountability and responsibility for security at every level i, s fundamental for Effective Security management within an organization. And the panel recommended that the development of an accountability framework, is that correct, mr. Sullivan . Yes,ve maam. In response to that recommendation, the department the department created a security accountability framework that the department explained clearly defines key actors, their roles and responsibilities and governance mechanisms. Mr. Starr, i would like to begin with you. Can you please describe the responsibilities at each of the various leadership levels. I think the First Leadership level starts with the secretary of state. Secretary acknowledges that he is ultimately responsible for the security of our personnel overseas. Beneath that in the accountability framework, the next person that has the direct responsibility for security is me, assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security. And i would have to say that we looked long and hard at the recommendation whether it needed to be an undersecretary position or assistant secretary position. It was a recommendation by the panel. The department looked at this very seriously. Ultimately, weighed all of the points behind it and made a decision that what was probably more important is whether or not i, in my position, had the direct access to the secretary that was necessary. And under bothci the accountability framework and in the fam we have modified it so that i am directly reportable to the secretary for Security Threat information and Security Threats against our people. I doco still report to the you know secretary for management. And we think thats key because isolated and alone, Diplomatic Security would not have some of the capabilities that we have when we work closely with the management bureau, with overseas building operations with irm and others. I just want to put that back on the record. One of the things that the accountability framework does talk about all of us in the department of state are responsible for security but it specifically defines the roles of deputy secretaries and what they do. It defines roles that the undersecretary for Political Affairs and undersecretary for management has. The mostle important thing it ds define roles for other assistant secretaries, the people i work side by side every day, run Regional Bureaus. Nea bureau, weur bureau and assigns security responsibilities to them. In fact their job descriptions have been changed to reflect the security responsibilities. All of this is contained in the accountability framework. And one final thing which i think is critical, we cant do the security that we need to do unlessin every individual forein Service Officer understands that theyon have a role in their own security as well. And it goes to defining that. So those expectations have been communicated then on down the securityll framework, is tht correct . Yes. And state Department Employees have ath clear understanding of what the chain of command so to speak is for, for security decisions and just security decisionmaking . Overseas it was always clear. It ran from the rso and deputy chief of mission to the chief of mission andur that letter of responsibilities that the chief of mission had. So it was always clear overseas. It was a little less clear within the department who had the responsiblities and this document goes a long way it taking information that was already in the fam and putting it tooth into a clearer framework, yes. If i can go back just a second to the number one recommendation about creating a different position that would be in charge of security, explain some of the thoughtmaking process that went into the ultimate decision not to accept that recommendation and to essentially make you responsible for security. First and forever foremost it has to be acknowledges im responsible about assistant secretary or changed to deputy, sorry, undersecretary position. The department looked at this and had to weigh different things. An undersecretary typically has additional responsibilities than one focus on something. If you look at other undersecretaries and range of things that they do, one of the things the department made sure of was that this position, my position, a, had access we need to the secretary and the other leadership, and second, that i wasnt being diverted from the just pure security role by other duties. Undersecretary positions in many cases would care underduties, other duties. My predecessor was the assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security and the chief of overseas foreign missions, the office of overseas foreign missions. One of the things we did in the aftermath of benghazi was to separate those two functions. Now there is an ambassador in charge of overseas foreignmissi. I am not distracted by that role. I t focus exclusively on securi. Okay. I appreciate the answer. I have two other questions i would like to ask and i would like to get to them. Mr. Sullivan, do you think the new framework that the department of state has adopted clearly defines accountability responsibility for security . Congresswoman, we havent bp fully briefed on that. What i heard just now, i mean i think thats a great start but clearly there does have to be accountability. People doul b have to know who n charge of security and also to the point that was made earlier, how the, how all the employees feel around the world. I think that leadership is important to let them know that theyre valued, that theyre supported and that those people that are making decisions will be made accountable for those. Every employee will be made accountable for those decisions theyre making. Thank you. Let me hit on the issue, very quickly, i have very limited time about temporary staffing. Several investigations into the attacks in benghazi found that the temporary staffing of Security Officers was what contributed to poor security at the benghazi facility. The Bipartisan Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Reform Committee found, i will quote from that report, for example, ds agents stationed in benghazi were always on temporary duty assignments, remaining there relatively short periods, often no longer than a month. The independent accountability review board concluded that utilization ofrt temporarily assigned agents in benghazi was problematic. Im quoting from their findings. Theio shortterm transitory nate of benghazi staffing to be another primary driver behind the Inadequate Security platform in benghazi. Staffing at time was woefully insufficient considering the postsecurity posture and highrisk, high threat environment. The end result was lack of Institutional Knowledge and Mission Capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard work alone although the board found ample evidence of both in those who servedge there. So based on one of the arbs recommendation the department set a policy for one year minimum tours at highthreat posts and a minimum of 120 days for temporary duty assignments. Mr. Starr, you held a number of positions during your tenure at the department, including that as Regional Security officer. Why is it valuable for Security Officers to spend longer durations of at posts and what is the benefit of developing an understanding of the local environment if. It is critical. Your first 30 days on the ground in a place you are just trying to figure out where you are, how things are operating, where the s are. We absolutely concure with that recommendation of taking steps to insure that the personnel we put on the ground are there for longer periods of time. And has the department been able to achieve those requirements in its actual practice. Yes, it has. The fact we dont have any temporary facilities at the moment. Ice can give you an example though, that when we just reentered bendinggy, we had mobile security teams of agents on the grounds with u. S. Marines that are there. Those marines will stay much longer period ofh time, probaby days until were sure we have thefo proper security we can thn start replacing them with a permanent personnel that were going to have on the ground. The t 30day rotations as the ab pointed out were not conducive to the security operation. Ares there any other incentives the department can provide or can think to provide for personnel to undertake those longer assignments . I dont think its a question of necessary or additional incentives. Its a question we needed to understand that constantly rotating like that was not in our best interests. I think my agents clearly understand that and i think it really isnt about additional incentives. It is about just knowing thats not the proper procedure and we needed to change it. Not a great practice. Thank you for your forthright answers and i yield back to the chairman. Thank the gentlelady from california. The chair would recognize the gentlelady from the state of alabama, miss roby. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Returning to the questioning by mr. Jordan about the waiver process briefly, mr. Starr, the overseas Security Policy board sets the physical Security Standards that must be met and it is also my understanding that theyre either temporary, interim, orhy permanent, correc . Yes. My and overseas diplomatic facilities can be further classified as residential, r other categories as well . Yes. Okay. And how was benghazi classified in 2012 . My understanding from the reports is that it was the temporary mission facility. Okay. And what, was that classification found in the ospb standards . No. Are there any ospd standards for a temporary Office Facility . Theres not, right . Our outlook on that is that whether it is temporary or interim, or permanent, that we should be applying the same Security Standards that the ospb has put in place and that if we cant, then we need to look closely at what risks we run sorry to i interrupt you the office in residential do not require a higher level of security if they are in that category . Rr office, there are higher levels. When we buildf office, when we build facilities, those have higher level of security than residences do. The benghazi facility was being, used as both . Correct . Yeah, i would say that a accurate portrayal from what i understand. In the dual case where it is being used as residential and office what standards apply . The higher standards, correct. Correct. And so those ospb standards should have applied to the benghazi facility . That is the way that would apply them now. Say i wasnt here, but if we had a i am lar situation, we would be applying the higher standards. Is that, want to make sure this is very clear. Your policy that that anytime a facility is being used for more than one purpose, whatever type of facility has the higher or, highest level of physical Security Standards, those standardpe should be applied . That is correct. Okay. But that didnt happen in benghazi . Gh im not, i would have to s, i cant b answer that question. Looking ahead, when you talk about, in this era of expeditionary diplomacy, is it possible for the state department to open a temporary residential facility . We dont have any at the moment. I cant imagine that we would or that i would approve it. A okay. Lets turn to the Marine Security guard detachments. Were Marine Security guard detachments ever deployed to the benghazi compound . No. The benghazi compound, weve already established, by multiple questions here, it was a temporary facility. And Marine Security guard detachments are never deployed to temporary facility is, correct . Not in my experience. Okay. So the increase in Marine Security guard detachments as a result of the arb recommend 11 would not have helped in benghazi, correct . If its a temporary facility and they cantgh be deployed then it wont help . Just want to make the point. Im not saying that additional personnel on the groundli would not have helped. But, yes, youre correct we would not, in my experience, we would not have put a Marine Security guard detachment into a temporaryr facility. So weve also already established here today currently there are 30 posts considered highrisk, highls threat. How many have benefited, of those 30, from the Marine Security guard personnel . I would have to get back to you with the exact number. I think about 20 we have opened for marine detachments since benghazi at our high threat, highrisk posts. There are still some that do not have Marine Security guard detachments. There are a variety of reasons why they do not. Okay, is it your intent to get to a place where you have these Marine Security detachments at all of the highrisk, high threat location posts . I would like to have Marine Security guard detachments at everyone of our high threat, highrisk posts. There impediments in some cases that can not be overcome. How, at the ones that currently do not have the Marine Security detachment, how exactly does the Department Plan to augment security at these highrisk, highthreat, without highly trained Marine Security guards . In some cases we have made up by using Diplomatic Security agents. Some cases it mix turf Diplomatic Security agents and other security elements that we have within Diplomatic Security. In some cases we have made risk managed decisions where we have taken personnel out. And lowered our presence. Some cases their families are not there or lowered the number of employees to minimum numbers. In many cases we make representations with the host governments and now we analyze whether or not the host government has both capability and the will to provide the necessary level of protections. If wste find that we dont have those types of protections or we think that the risks are too high, then we wont be there. Okay. If an ambassador at highrisk, hightheft post picks up the phone and calls the seventh floor of the state department and askss for physical securit, personnel, who ultimately makes the decision to grant or deny that o request, mr. Starr . The last person in the chain would be me. The request would probably not go to the seventh floor. Probably go to me on the sixth floor or go through the rso or to our personnel. But i can tell you that today i have available mobile security teams to deploy. We work very closely ultimately im asking, who makes that decision . Te it can be approved at lower levels. What is the lowest level it can be a approved. I think lowest level would be the regional director of Diplomatic Security. And if an ambassador sends a t be the same, rather than picking up the phone, would be exactly the same. Okay. And would it, would the decisionmaking process change if it were not a highrisk, high threat post . No, it would not. Okay. Was benghazi considered highrisk, high threat or critical threat . Pardon me. I actually dont know what the rating was of benghazi. We did no have the 30 identify ied high risk, highthreat posts. Who denied the additional security in benghazi by those working and living there in tripoli . Who was the person that denied that. Iaz will have to refer you to the results of arb. I came back five months after the attack. What im trying to get at that same person was also responsible for. Insuring physical security in benghazi, is that the same person that is vested with that responsibility today . I think the board pointed out that there were lapses in judgment on the part of the director and several others, including the director for international programs. Okay, but ds agents at the post writes back to headquarters, requesting additional physical security upgrades or increased personnel, performing security duties. Who is responsible for making the decision to deny or grant that request from a ds agent . I think the first thing that would happen is that the discussion would go on, is this an individual request from ds . Has it been vetted through the Emergency Action committee at theh post . Is this a post request . Okay. Is it affected by whether you categorized this as highrisk, highthreat . We pay more attention to our highthreat, highriskte posts n daily basis. I would tell you any ask for additional Security Resources for any of our posts overseas will be met with immediate action. We would make decisions on how we can best pull fill those requirements. So to get to the point, even if a post is not highrisk, highthreat, we know in certain parts of the world things are very volatile and can unravel in a moments time. Despite threat assessment or not and what im getting at is, is the department now, today, in light of what happened in benghazi, prepared to pay better attention when the folks on the ground are saying, we need help and, which was not what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the attack in benghazi . My answer to you unequivocally yes. That is what i have been spending my time since february 1st, of 2013n on. Making sure that we have the resources, the programs, the knowledge, the capabilities, to respond quickly and effectively to any cry for help. Moreover, not just respond to the cries for help, but to try tof better place ourselves befoe those come in and make sure were ready for these things. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you gentle woman from alabama. The chair would recognize the gentlewoman from illinois. Miss duckworth. Thank you, mr. Chairman. As member of the oversight and government Reform Committee and Armed Services committee i spent a great deal of time working on all of the, working my way through all of the reports on the attacks in benghazi and as the committee begins our work here today i think the most appropriate way we can honor the brave americans who lost their lives in benghazi to make sure we learn from those past mistakes and never ever make them again. And i heard that from the family members as well. Lets never let their buddies down the way we let their family members down. And so, i want to go back to this, the discussion on the security and interagency cooperation. But first, you know, mr. Keil, i was there the day admiral mullen testified. I have to disagree with you of you may question his professional integrity but when admiral mullen, a man who served vietnam, 43 years of military service defending this great nation and comes before our committee swears an oath of office and says, testifies he was fiercely independent in the would tend to believe him. And in fact the arb was incredibly scathing of the state department in its report. And i want to go to that report. Mr. Starr, i want to follow up a little bit on what my colleague the gentlelady from alabama, her line of questioning about the Marine Security guard details. So if you dont have, if you have a post that does not have a detail, because theyre not at a temporary facility, for example, can you talk about other details that can be there . Are there other military options that can be at assigned to thoe temporary details . You talk about the mobile security teams. Marine augmentation units. Are thered other options if thee are,ut if the marines cant actually be assigned there full time . Yes. There are other options. We currently are trying to expand 35 more detachments. But i should be noted at the moment we have 270, we have more than 275 diplomatic facilities counting the embassies, consulates and consulate generals. We have only 173 Marine Security guard detachments. We never had enough marines, nor will we ever to cover every single posts. In many of our posts around the world, ifd we put a Marine Security guard detachment in, we would probably have more marines than Foreign Service officers in some of these places. We look carefully where we need to use this scarce resource. We have had excellent cooperation from the marine corps augmenting different units, getting more detachments. We have opened 17 more detachments since benghazi on our way to opening 35 totally. We should be done by end of next year. Additionally the marines created Marine Security augmentation units where we send additional marines under the rubric of the Marine Security Guard Program that helps us where we have different situations. But the thrust of your question was, what do we do in places where we dont have marines or we dont have permission to send marines. We have different capabilities. We have Diplomatic Security agents, high threat, highrisk trained. High level mobile security operators. We have the ability to request from the department of defense and they have never let us down, for things like fast teams to come in and protect our embassies and consulates when we need that. We have a Robust Program where we have security contractors. Many cases theyre americans, many cases theyre third country contractors. We have used contractors many years. There are downsides to that and some countries wont allow them. And we learned very painful lessons over the years about contractors. We have to incredible amounts of oversight and make sure were using them properly but it is still a tool. We have local guard forces and local protective elements we hire directly from the country were in. I would tell you some of these units in places around the world, evenem unarmed have done amazing acts of heroism, protecting our people. Then ultimately we have Host Country Services we evaluate for whether they have the cape abs to protect us or the will to protect us. And those cases where they may not have the best capabilities or we may think were challenged one of the things that the additional funding that congress has given us is the ability to start a program where we can train those host country forces whether it be police or National Guard directly around the embassies and increase their capabilities. Number of different possibles. You had said, mr. Starr, that the state department has always engaged in the process of Risk Management and is wellexperienced at it. I have to say i was disappointed with the Risk Management process that was undertaken leading up to the benghazi attacks and, i would hope that that risk, Risk Assessment and mitigation process. Has become more robust. I want to speak specifically to interagency cooperation between dod and department of state. You said that dod has never let you down. On that night, the arb in various reports, including Armed Services committee has stated that there was no way that those f16s, that those military, u. S. Military forces could have made it there in time to, to save our americans lives. What have we done since to make sure that in the future they can be present in time to save american list . Are these special dates, come up, september 11th, anniversaries as you hear more chatter going on and you think there might be potential for greater risk, what tripwires are in place, what processes in place for you to call the dod to say, hey, maybe you need to help us and reposition some forces if we do have another benghazi we can call and those teams can be there in time in the future so we dont lose american lives . What process is happening between dod and department of state at this point . Department of defense has put together a program that they essentially refer to as the new normal. We looked closely what capabilities dod can bring for defensive use of american embassies ande consulates overseas. There has to be realization that we dont have bases everywhere in the world. In many cases, while we would like to be able to say that the department of defense could respond to any one of our embassies within four hours, physical distances, just, the amount of distance between where our military is stationed and where our kip low mat fake silts diplomatic facilities make it impossible. If theyta could respond in certn amount of time, this idea were magically going to get paratroopers coming out of back of r planes and they will land n the roof of the American Embassy is still not realistic. We have to go through airports. We hav oe permission from host countries to give them in. Transport them from the airport to the embassy somehow. In the midst of a crisis this is not realistic what is going to happen. What we worked with dod on making sure were better prepared to predict what is going to happen, looking at instability, and as dod often said, we would rather be on the ground in advance of something happening than trying to react after something happens. Now it doesnt mean in certain cases that they havent been on a very close leash with us. I can give you the example of tripoli recently where we had in many cases, special forces and helicopters and marines on, less than one hour notice to respond to the embassy. In high, highthreat, critical threat situations those are types of things were working with dod on to make sure they have very close at hand response capabilities. But i can tell you that with 275 locations around the world, we cant do that often. We cant do that every place. Dod is seeking increased basing options. Of i would highly recommend discussion with dod on this about where theyre going in terms of basing closer and more closely to u. S. Embassies and facilities. They have excellent plans. Theyre working closely with the state department on this but ultimatelyel weve got to do a better job making sure we have the right preparations on the ground in advance. In those situations that are absolutely critical, well have dod very close to us and they have worked tremendously with us in places like tripoli and sanaa and other places. So, i just have to tell you i have the utmost respect for the way thatip the department of defense, u. S. Marine corps and army and air force and navy responded to our needs. In the last minute i have left, what level of state department does the request to dod have to make place . For example in the case of tripolior you said they had them on aac onehour leash to respon, can that come from you or lower . If an ambassador determines through his risk analysis assessment through the Diplomatic Security team there that he needs this, how far does he have to go before you have Something Like a f. A. S. T. Team that is ready to come in or something along those lines . How high up through the state department bureaucracy does he have to go . In an emergency the ambassador will call commander of nearest combatant command. They meet all the time. They talk with each other. In an emergency situation he can pull the string immediately. In a last than emergency situation, in a way were looking to pry to reposition ourselves we may make a request to say that you need this we work throughg the offices executive secretaries. Can instigate it. The ambassador can instigate it. The assistant secretary of Regional Bureau can instigate it. Most cases were talking with each other or were having phone conversations. But in the most extreme cases the ambassador can go directly to the Combatant Commander closest to him and request support and even notify us afterwards. Thank you. I yield back, mr. Chairman. Thank you, from the gentlelady from illinois. The chair would recognize the gentleman from illinois, mr. Roskam. I thank the chairman and panelists testimony today. Mr. Keil what is special Mission Compound. Sir i like to take two seconds. Clarify a pint miss duckworth made. I was not making judgment on mullen. I was saying simple fact. You can not discuss proceedings outside of arb. Admiral mullen admitted he did that. Is it is statement of fact. In legal terms that is ex parte communication. I didnt go to law school. What is a special Mission Compound . I dont know. To be honest, when our review undersecretary kennedy in authorizing that, made up that term in order to avoid the ospb secured standards. Interesting thing, yesterday in our office we did a nexus lexus search of special Mission Compound, nots. Benghazi. Now there may be other ways to search. There may be other ways to look out over the landscape. The result of looking for that term yielded nothing. Throughout all those data files, all across the fruited plain, absolutely nothing. So what does it mean if something isth simply then redefined . What does it mean if something is said, well, were just going to declare this as something other than that which is to be regulated . That means you have no regulations, isnt that right. Correct, sir. Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned in your Opening Statement one of thave regrets that you have as a member about panel is that the department of state didnt adopt your recommendations as it relates to waivers. What is your recommendation as it relates to waivers . We think, we believe waivers are, waivers are needed and we want tyoo see those waivers because when you have a waiver, what that will do and set in motion standards and people all recognize that once you have those standards you have to meet those standards. What we saw in this particular instance was since there were no standards,yo there was no waive, there really were no standards set, and i think somebody brought up the fact before a lot of people coming in. Fact before that there were a lot of people coming in tdy, and some very dedicated people, some very hard working people, and some extremely wellintentioned people and dedicated people. However, these were people that were extremely inexperienced and they were coming in for 30day periods. And they would come in for 30 days. They would identify vulnerabilities, take care of that vulnerability. The next person would come in and that process would continue. So, youre saying you need an orderly process by which things are waived, not declarations on the part of the department of state, that its all waived, is that right . Right. It goes back to what we talked about before, Risk Management. Risk management is all about identifying the threat, identifying the vulnerability and then coming up with the secretary starr, question, you said earlier in answer to congressman smith that on benghazi they didnt get the threat information. Now, i understand that threat information may be term of art, but to mr. Westmoreland point earlier, certainly a bomb blowing up on the side of a wall, the whole litany of events that took place beginning arch 18, 2012, after the first time there was a comedic asian from ambassador stevens, isnt that enough information . So youre not saying nobody was aware of the nature of the threat. Is the threat a term of art a . Congressman, and defer the question. I think the distinction is, what i was trying to make, there was no specific threat information that have been developed by the Intelligence Community. In other words, people are coming over the hilltop at this moment in time. Correct. We dont normally get there. I think your point to write a number to do things going on, i think people were unaware of the overall level of instability. Heres my point. The Senate Intelligence committee report, they reported on june 6 of 2012 ambassador stevens recommended the creation of teams and so forth. The team was never greater in benghazi despite the ambassadors recommendation. There were other events subsequent to that. Then ambassador stevens reaches out again, since a cable to the state Department Headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 temporary duty personnel and the state department never fulfilled his request, and headquarters never responded to the request with a cable. They followup on august 16, 2012, 1 month before these events. Again a cable to the states headquarters. Stevens raised additional concerns, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Now, go to the arb. The arb says one thing to times about ambassador stevens, and its worth noting. They said this about him. His status as the leading u. S. Government advocate on libya policy and his expertise on benghazi in particular cause washington to give unusual deference to his judgment. They said that on page six of the report. They cut and pasted, they liked it so much they put on page 34 of the report. And yet ignore the ambassador who, by their own admission, is the expert in the area, and ignoring his request for support, thats not getting unusual deference to his judgments, is it, mr. Secretary . Difficult question, congressman. No. Its very straightforward. No, i dont think it is. I think its a difficult question. I think that Chris Stevens was a tremendous ambassador with a tremendous look, theres no question he was tremendous. Theres a question he was a hero. He made specific requests of the department. The department in the arb said this person is uniquely qualified, secretary, and he was ignored. And i think this is why the arb recommendations are what they are. This is why the arb recommendations and the panel say, you ca you cant have thisf waiver authority. When ms. Roby asked you to question, are there any plans for tempered facilities in the future, you were pretty clever in how you responded. You said, we dont have any plans for it, and im not likely and im paraphrasing now are not likely to approve the. You know what that tells me . That tells me you can do it all again. That tells me you can take a special Mission Compound, you can call it something else, you can call it a temporary consular facility. You can take two adjectives and put it in front of a noun and call it some other thing, and do it all again. So heres the question. Is Madeline Albright signed off on certain recommendations, if the best Practices Panel make certain recommendations, why is it that the state department is clinging to this legacy of power that has failed . Why are you grasping on it so much . Why not walk away from it . And nobody is criticizing a very tough job. But the nature of the job, mr. Secretary, means that is, to mr. Cummings point, needs to be a transformational moment. Why not be the transmission moment to say, would not just going to choose to redefine things and we will revisit how we do these waivers, and were going to do everything we can in cooperation with congress to honor Chris Stevens legacy, to honor the legacy of those who suffered, you start with and you know, but why cling to this whole thing that just isnt working . Are you the only one that doesnt see it . Congressman, i think i have a distinctive view having served 29 years with the state department, four years with United Nations, and im back again. I think that in accepting all of the recommendations of the accountability review board, i think in accepting 38 out of 40 recommendations made by the best Practices Panel, i think the department has made tremendous progress and efforts in the time that ive been back and but the opportunity you want to knock it out of the park right now. Not every recommendation is gold. Every recommendation needs to be looked at from the recommendation standpoint, but then from the organization as well. Take your argument, a couple of minutes ago you made this point as relates to the responsibility of th a Foreign Service officer. That they have a responsibility to be mindful of their own security. That was in response to ms. Sanchez. Every Foreign Service officer must understand they had a role in their own security. I agree with that wholeheartedly. And yet when ambassador stevens played a role in his own security on cable number one, cable number two, and cable number three, that responsibility was not absorbed or reflected in the state department. And youre not offering anything as relates to fundamental change because a somewhat the rules are right now, mr. Secretary, you have the authority, you have the capacity and you have the flexibility to do the benghazi structure again. Am i wrong . The rules have been changed. Who is responsible is clearly defined. Who is responsible is fourth down on the food chain, and by your own i would disagree with that. I am responsible. But im telling you the latest example, when we are trying to open a facility in southern turkey, we had a request to put personnel in on the ground for start operations, for humanitarian operations. They are in their tty. We need a facility. We are in the process of leasing a facility. We know where its going to be. A request came to me from the people on the ground saying, can we use it in advance of the security upgrades being done, been accomplished. By answer, no. Okay, thats beautiful. And in light of mr. Cummings response and his admonition to us that were here for a season, you are going to be there for season. And then another season someone will succeed you. And in the new season when someone with your judgment and your deference doesnt have that level of capacity and they dont have your kind of stick and your background, they will be under tremendous pressure and theyre going to say yes. I yield back. The chair thanks the gentleman from illinois and recognizes himself. It strikes me that there are at least two issues at play, two major issues. No one is the efficacy of the arb process itself. Whether or not it is in our best interest to allow any entity to essentially grade its own papers. We dont do that in any other category of life. Well get to send ourselves we were in court. We dont get to grade our own papers in the classroom. The other aspect, the efficacy of the arb is to be interviewed and who they didnt interview, whether or not they have to accept recommendations are dont have to accept recommendations. Thats a separate issue to me as whether not the arb process works, whether or not it is shortcomings. The second issue is lets assume our innuendo that the arb works. Lets make that assumption for the sake of argument. Is anyone following the recommendations of arb . Mr. Secretary, i want to read something to you. We are disturbed at the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks. We are disturbed at the relative low priority accorded security concerns, and we praise the ambassador for seeking security enhancements long before the attack. Do you know what that comes from, mr. Secretary, what i just read . I believe its part of the accountability review board report. From 1999. That was nairobi, correct . That was the arb from 1999, and you can lay it almost perfectly over what happened in benghazi. And one of the point, the 1999 arb made it really clear. They went out of their way to make it clear. They were disappointed that the recommendations that came after the bombings in beirut were not being implemented. Something called the Inman Commission. So the 99 arb criticizes existing state Department Employees for not following the Inman Commission from 14 years that is a quarter centurys worth of recommendations. And yet here we sit. So what i want to do because honestly, i commend mr. Schiff. This was a wonderful idea and i think each of you for coming. But giving the inescapable interconnectivity between recommendations made after beirut after Eastern Africa and now after benghazi, we are going to look at some of those past arb recommendations. And ill give you one, mr. Secretary. For diplomatic buildings abroad not meeting in the dashing in mending again a root bombing not meeting him understands, physical upgrade should be made immediately. That was the recommendation of the 1999 arb. Mr. Secretary, i will read you another one. This goes to mr. Cummings but which i thought was a wonderful point. A dramatic addition should be made to all governments with whom we have relations to remind them of their obligation to provide security for our embassy. Who in libya were we to call . Who . Mr. Cummings point is a wonderful point but it was so good, the 1999 arbs recommendation made the point. Who did we call in libya . Question, sir speak with when i pause, thats an indication of waiting for you to answer but i will make it more clear in the future. I think this is the heart of the question. There are times when, for the National Interest of the United States, we are going to have to have limits, commission programs, rule of law programs and other things in places where the host country is mr. Secretary . Does not have a government. In those cases we must take lessons from the arb was a with the government in libya for us to contact . Not at that time. So we were not able to do. Lets move to one perhaps we were able to do. This is also from the 1999 arb. And begin the arb is present to us as a panacea. Thats the evolution of what happens is theres an attack, a blueribbon panel, going to study, make recommendations and this is never going to happen again. Back to 1999. The secretary of state should personally review the security situation of diplomatic facilities closing those which are highly vulnerable and threatened. Why did you think the 1999 arb went out of its way to use the word personally . No comment, sir. Is the answer privileged . I mean, thats a recommendation from the 99 arb. The secretary of state in 1999 arb. The second issue should personal review. We were not going to get to the word review. We got to get past the word that modifies review, personally. Why did they think was important the secretary of state himself or herself personally review . I think ultimately the secretary, who bears the responsibility for the security, has to be brought the information that is necessary for him to make decisions. That is my job. Okay. I have gone to the secretary of state on different occasions, and we talk specifically about the security of different places. Tripoli was one of them in particular since i have been back. Weve also looked at some the. We talked about sana, other locations as well. Riot concerns about the safety and security of our personnel and if i believe are not doing the things that we need to do, then it is my responsibility to bring it to the secretarys i appreciate that. Wasnt done on september 10 of 2012 . Was done prior to benghazi . This recommendation has existed for more than 10 years. I was not there at that time. Im sorry, i cannot tell you. Well, your answer is, mayors mirrors what the 1999 arb further said, which is first and foremost the secretary of state should take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of u. S. Diplomatic personnel. Is that being done now . And was being done prior to your tenure . In the time that i was here, and i served under multiple secretaries of state, i have heard every secretary talk about the importance of security. I have heard every second a state to personnel departments that security is their personal security has to be their function. That goes for Madeleine Albright, that goes through secretary clinton, secretary rice, and with secretary kerry who i was also made the statemes and has made statements that the safety and security of our personnel is absolutely one of our highest priorities. I appreciate that but again i think words have consequences and the meaning and most people use words intentionally. In 1999 arb intentionally used the word personally and active. That to me does not mean talking about something. A personal review is not simply talking about it. Is the personal review ongoing . Is that arb recommendations still excepted, i guess, is my question . Does the state Department Still accept these recommendations from the 1999 arb . And is it being done to . Yes. I think the best and clearest example that i can give you today is in the process of the we put into place. The vp due process, but vital presence validation process, where we, again, look at what are our vital National Interest, why should we be in these high threat high locations. We put this process up and goes all the way to the secretary. That is a great point which leads very nice into next point i was going to make her ask you about. What is it about that recommendation that is so passionate could have been made prior to the attack in benghazi . I think the department of state has practiced Risk Management from the days but the Risk Management being we, we will weigh the risk of being somewhere. We know the risk. Can you tell us what our policy was in libya that overcame those risks . In other words, why were we there . These questions i think have been fundamental to the department for over 30 years. It is the reason why in many places we have evacuated or we have shut down operations or weve taken our families out. Or weve gone down to essential personnel only, or weve asked former rains to come in and support as while we are there. And my point being none of that was done in benghazi. We know the risk in benghazi. My colleagues and you and others have done a wonderful job of highlighting some of the tripwires i think is a diplomatic term. What policy where we in libya that was a great that it overcame all of the tripwires and all of the risks . Not being here at the time, sir, i cannot answer that question for you. I do believe personally from my time at United Nations that many of us understood that if we lost the eastern half of libya, that if we lost the confidence of the people after the revolution in libya, that were going to pay a terrible price. And i dont want to put words into Chris Stevens mouth. I think he was, and immensely talented diplomat and i was not here at that time. But i think it was clear in chriss mind what he needed to go to benghazi and what he was trying to accomplish. I think today we have more formalized processes to make sure that those decisions are documented, the vp2 process makes us go through a process by dont think was there prior to benghazi. I think the results of the accountability review board, the best Practices Panel and the recommendations that weve excepted ensure that as we go forward weve got a more clear, more precise, more mandated process for Risk Management. But i would tell you, sir, that every single day for the years that i was with the department of state we were weighing the safety and security of our personnel versus what our National Security priorities were. I think thats a fundamental tenet that you will find everybody within the department agrees with. I appreciate you bringing a hearing towards its conclusion back to Chris Stevens and back to the other four who lost their lives. But mr. Stevens was equally clear that he needed help. He was equally clear that the situation was getting worse in benghazi. He was equally clear in asking the people who sent him there to represent us, to provide adequate security, and none was forthcoming. With that i would recognize the Ranking Member for his closing remarks. I want to thank you all for being here today. I thank all of you. One thing i want to remind all of us is that we are americans. Everybody trying to do the best they can to protect our people. When we look at what happened in benghazi, there are a lot of lessons to be learned. The question is, not only have we learned them, but then how do we address them . And, you know, quarterbacking what do they call it, monday morning order backing, i think when you look back on things a lot of time you realize the things you could have done differently here that probably wouldve made things better, but, you know, we cannot bring back the past. But i think we can make a difference right now. Its clear that our diplomats are in some very dangerous situations. I think we all agree on that. And so now weve got to figure out how we go about protecting them even better than we have in the past. And so thats why, secretary starr, i ask you about coming back to us and letting us know exactly, you know, what you are working on those things that you still have to do, and reporting back. It is so important, because after, when all the dust settles, the question is, is what do we accomplish . You know, ive been here 17 years and ive seen a lot of arguments back and forth, but i think we must concentrate on being effective and efficient in getting something done. The arguments that have been made, and the frustration you hear from both sides, trying to figure out what happened. I believe everybody is acting in an honorable way with great intentions, but i want you all to understand we are just try to figure out what happened so that we make sure if there were things that went wrong or could have done better, that it doesnt happen again. Thats what its all about. So, mr. Chairman, again i want to thank you for this hearing, and i want to ask you to do something for me. I want to bring mr. Starr back in either december or january. Hes already told us that in 45 days or less he can tell us about what hes working on and give us some kind of timetable. But i want him to come back and tell us what has been achieved. And thats very, very important for me. And im sure for the whole committee. And, mr. Chairman, if you will, thats your call, but i think it would be unfortunate if when all of this, this committee ends, that we have not addressed these recommendations and addressed them in a way that would please the families of the deceased. And that brings me back to them. For great americans 4 great americans who lost their lives, and i think we all made a commitment in one way or another to them, that we would do everything in our power to find out what happened. And at the same time, to make sure we did the best we could to protect our folks overseas, to tighten up security if its appropriate, and weve got to do that. And so with that, mr. Chairman, i want to thank you. I want to thank the gentleman from maryland for all of his help and, frankly, getting ready for this hearing, and the cooperative nature with which he has always worked with me. And i think its an excellent idea. We will work with the secretary i dont want to pick a date that is inconvenient with his schedule. December suits me better than january. I would rather do it sooner rather than later we will work with the secretary and i will work with you on the nature of whether or not that well be hearing with all of our colleagues, whether or not that will be with just you and me. We work all that out but i will pledge to you it will be done and it will be done in december if it suits his schedule. And also i just want to say this. We were given to different tasks. And i say we. The house voted for us to be in existence. Find out everything that happened before, during, and after the attack in benghazi, and then do everything to the speaker has been very clear in my conversations with him about this. Do everything you can to make sure that it never happens again. And part of that is taking recommendations that have been made in the past and asking whether or not they have been implemented. The other part of that, frankly, frankly, is anticipating things that might possibly happen. We do not have to wait on a tragedy to make recommendations. I noted, mr. Cummings, during the secretarys Opening Statement, im not minimizing this at all. If it comes across as mean minimizing it, i am not. He mentioned there partnering with the new york fire department. Thats a great idea but it does necessarily lead some of us to conclude, why could that not have been done previously . Fire has been around a long time. Its been a weapon for a long time. Why now . And its not fair for me to ask him, which is why i didnt ask him, but the notion that we have to wait on something bad to happen before we can act to do something that all 12 of us agree to be done. So again, i think all of my colleagues. I want to thank mr. Schiff again for giving me this idea. I hope hell sure some others with me. And again as we adjourned i want to adjourn in memory of Chris Stevens, sean smith, ty woods and glen doherty, and pledge a process that is worthy of their memory and one that our fellow citizens can respect, regardless of their political ideations. And with that we are adjourned. [inaudible conversations] the senate convenes in a few moments come than they were recessed shortly to attend a joint meeting of congress as lawmakers hear from the president of ukraine. When members reconvened they will start over four hours of debate on the resolution to fund the government until december 11 to attach to that measure as a house amendment authorizing an a to point to equip and train Syrian Opposition forces. The house passed that amendment yesterday 273156. Live coverage of the senate on cspan2. The presiding officer the senate will come to order. The chaplain, dr. Barry black, will lead the senate in prayer. The chaplain let us pray. Eternal god, who restores peace in human hearts, thank you for your many blessings. Guide our lawmakers so that they will discern your purposes and become instruments of your providence. Today, help them to speak words that will leave them without regret. May they play their part in this moment awes times so that their labors will withstand the scrutiny of history and the judgment of posterity. May your spirit rule in our lives, teaching us to sacrifice our comforts for the good of others. Use us today as ambassadors of your will. We pray in your majestic name amen. The president pro tempore please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance i pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. Mr. Reid mr. President . The president pro tempore the majority leader. Mr. Reid sorry that i got a little ahead of myself and everybody else. I now move to proceed to calendar number 409 s. 2432. The president pro tempore the clerk will report. The clerk motion to proceed to calendar number 409, s. 2432, a bill to amend the Higher Education act of 1965, and so forth and for other purposes. Mr. Reid mr. President , following my remarks the senate will be in recess subject to the call of the chair for the joint meeting with the president of ukraine. When the Senate Reconvenes it will be in a period of morning business until 1 00 p. M. With the time equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees. The republicans will control the first half, the majority the final half. At 1 00 p. M. The senate will proceed to consideration of h. J. Res. 124, the continuing resolution. There will be up to four and a half hours of debate prior to a series of roll call votes followed by several voice votes on executive nominations. The senate should expect votes to begin around 5 00 p. M. Mr. President , in ancient greece the keeping of history was considered so important that cleo, the daughter of zeus was believed for recording all that occurred in everything. In the United States senate, we dont have greek gods. Could we have order, mr. President . In the United States senate we dont have greek gods in charge of keeping the record but we rely on super human efforts of a group of official reporters who tribe every word that who transcribe every word we have wee say. It is a hard, hard job. The reporters have to accustom their ears to all kinds of accents, find ways to spell newly invented words, try to listen to what i dont say very loudly and all the other issues that they have to deal with. They have to suffer there talking filibusters. In fact, they may be the only people to dislike filibusters more than i do. Today i recognize just one of those hardworking official reporters. Chief reporter of the United States Senate Debates jerry linnell is retiring at the end of this month. For 32ies jerry has been a staple here in the senate ensuring the words of past and present are recorded for the American People. While here he witnessed many different things. Five different president s he has seen occupy the white house, worked with eight different majority leaders, transcribed speeches from everything on the berlin wall to senator byrds history of the senate. I wish him well in his retirement. I have no doubt he and his wife will keep busy spending time with their children and grandchildren. Of course jerry will have his Washington Nationals to follow. It has been a pleasant respite for me, mr. President , to spend time with jerry talking baseball. He takes trips around the country that im so envious watching different teams in different stadiums. I think hes watched a baseball game at every Major League Baseball game in america. The senate is a better place because of jerrys 32 years here. I along with every other member of this body thank jerry for his many years of service. Mr. President , yesterday the house of representatives passed a continuing resolution to keep our government from shutting down for the next three months. In addition to keeping the government operating, this measure includes provisions important to our National Security such as funding for the combat isis, this evil organization, by training and equipping vetted Syrian Opposition forces and aid to fight the spread of ebola. It is not perfect, thats for sure, but no legislation is. But in this era of radical ideologies and endless obstruction the funding resolution before us is infinitely better than the alternatives another shutdown of our government. Mr. President , i think it speaks volumes. Speaker boehner, leader pelosi, the republican leader and i are supporting this legislation. That should say a lot to the American People. As every senator knows the funding bill we approve must first pass the house of representatives, and it did that, breaking up the legislation that the house sent us is not an alternative. We need to pleat our work complete our work on the resolution as soon as possible. P mr. President , with the cooperation of senators we can vote even earlier than 5 30 this evening. One final unanimous consent request. I ask unanimous consent that the president of the senate be authorized to appoint a committee on the part of the senate to join with the Like Committee on the part of the house of representatives to escort his excellency Petro Poroshenko into the house for a joint committee today. The presiding officer without objection. Mr. Mcconnell mr. President ,. The presiding officer the republican leader. Mr. Mcconnell it frequently happens as we head into recess we have to say a reluctant farewell to some member of the Senate Family. I would like to say thanks to jerry linnell who has been a fixture here for more than three decades as a chief reporter of debates and as a somewhat hidden fixture as chief reporter. It is a tough job having to listen to the rest of us drone on every day and as chief reporter, jerry has the unenviable task of reviewing every single word we say. In his trademark suspenders, jerry is a friendly and unmistakable presence up on the fourth floor guiding his team through their diely rounds and maintaining a daily rounds and maintaining a level of integrity that has always been a key characteristic of the office. It is a proud group. In the 1930s senator huey long is said to have donated his personal bible to the office so they would have a handy reference when he quoted for it. It quickly became a tradition for new reporters to sign it when they got hired and then once they leave. In a sign of how dedicated these reporters are, only 35 names have been entered in the bible over the past 80 years. So its a very venerable fraternity, one that has its roots in article 1 of the constitution, and we thank jerry for his many, many years of dedicated honorable service. I know jerry looks forward to spending more time with jane, their four children and their many grandchildren. After listening to us for all those years, i think he deserves it. Youve done your time. Youve done it well. The entire Senate Family thanks you. Jerry, all the best. I yield the floor. The presiding officer under the previous order leadership time is reserved. Under the previous order, the Senate Stands in recess subject Senate Stands in recess subject the senate is in recess now to join house in a joint meeting today from the president of ukraine. When members return they will start over four hours of debate on a resolution to fund the government until december 11. Attached to the measure as an amended authorizing a military plan to equip and train Syrian Opposition forces. The house passed that yesterday 273156. The hill has posted this article about todays debate. Majority whip dick durbin, second Ranking Member democratic leader said tuesday that house legislation authorizing president obama to train and equip Syrian Rebels is too vague. Durbin was the chairman of the Senate Defense appropriations subcommittee said he would like to make changes to the measure drafted by the house Armed Services Committee Chairman buck mckeon. Durbin says quote id like to suggest a few changes to that. Its not written as clearly as it should be. We are talking about going to see at this point which is a dogs breakfast of violence and terrorism. On tuesday defense secretary chuck hagel and joint chiefs chair Martin Dempsey went before the senate Armed Services committee to talk about president s i suspect you heres a portion of the hearing and we begin with secretary kerry secretary hagel outline the military plan. Describe how were implement in this whole of government approach. First, in closed coordination with a new Iraqi Government we are broadening our air campaign to conduct systematic airstrikes against isil targets. Protect americans threatened by isils advances and to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. U. S. Military has already conducted more than 160 Successful Air strikes which have killed isil find, destroy weapons and equipment and enabled iraqi and Kurdish Forces to get back on the offensive and security territory and critical infrastructure. Including these actions have disrupted isil tactically and that helped to buy time for the Iraqi Government to begin forming an inclusive and broadbased governing Coalition Led by the new prime minister. That was one of president obamas essential preconditions for taking further action against isil. Because the iraqi people, iraqi people must be united in their opposition against isil in order to defeat, this will require a united an inclusive government. This is ultimately their fight. The new broader air campaign will include strikes against all isil targets and enable the iraqi secret forces, including Kurdish Forces, to continue to stay on the offensive and recapture territory from isil and hold. Because isil operates freely across the iraqi syrian border, it maintains a safe haven in syria. Our actions will not be restrained by a border. In name only. As the president said last week, you threaten america, youll find no safe haven. The president of the United States has the constitutional and Statutory Authority to use military force against isil in syria as well as in iraq. Centcom is finalizing those plans which general austin will brief the president tomorrow in tampa. This plan includes targeted actions against isils safe havens in syria, including its command and control of logistics capabilities and infrastructure. General dempsey and i both reviewed and approved cent, plans. The second element of the strategy is to increase our support for forces fighting isil on the ground. The iraqi incursion forces and the moderate Syrian Opposition. To support iraqi and Kurdish Forces, the president announced he would appoint an additional 475 american troops to arrive. Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and support personnel to supplement forces already in iraq, conducting assessments of Iraqi Security forces. This assessment is now transitioning to an advise and assist mission with more than 15 games and betting with Iraqi Security forces at the Headquarters Level to provide strategic and operational advice and assistance. The rest of the additional 475 troops include one and 25 personnel to support intelligence, surveillance and Reconnaissance Missions out of a irbil. 200 personnel to increase headquarters elements in both baghdad and verbal. Helping us better coordinate military activities across iraq. For the time all these forces arrived will be approximately 1600 u. S. Personnel in iraq responding to the isil threat. But as the president said last week, American Forces will not have a combat mission. Instead uses visors are supporting iraqi and Kurdish Forces and supporting the governments plan to stand up iraqi National Guard units to help sunni communities defeat a isil. The best counterweight to isil our local forces and the people of the area. And as you know in june the president asked congress the Necessary Authority for dod to train and equip modern Syrian Opposition forces, and 500 million to fund this program. Weve now secured support from saudi arabia to host the Training Programs for this mission. And saudi arabia has offered financial and other support as well. 500 million requests the president made in june for his train and equip program reflects the centcoms estimate of the cost to train, equip and resupply more than 5000 Opposition Forces over one year. The package of assistance we initially provide would consist of small arms, vehicles and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and strategic training. As these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield, well be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted commanders and capable forces. Because dod does not only have the authority to conduct a train and equip mission, the administration has asked congress to provide the authority in the continuing resolution he is currently now considering. A rigorous vetting process will be critical to the success of this program. Dod will work closely with the state department, the Intelligence Community and our partners in the region to screen and that forces we train and equip. We will monitor them closely to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of radical elements of the opposition. Isil, pursuing regime, or other extremist groups. There will always be risks, there will always be risks in a program like this, but we believe that risk is justified by the imperatives of destroying isil. The necessity of having capable partners on the ground in syria. As we pursue this program the United States will continue to press for a political resolution to the syrian conflict, resulting in the end of the assad regime. Assad has lost all legitimacy to govern. And has created the conditions that allow the isil and other terrorist groups to gain ground and terrorize and slaughter the syrian population. The United States will not coordinate or cooperate with the assad regime. We will also continue to counter assad through diplomatic and economic measures. The third element of the president s strategy is an allinclusive approach to prevent attacks from isil against the homeland of the United States and our allies. In concert with International Partners, the United States will draw on intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic and economic tools to cut off the isils funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen homeland defense, and stem the flow of foreign fighters in and out of the region. The department of justice and the department of Homeland Security have launched an initiative to partner with local communities to counter extremist recruiting, and the department of treasurys office of terrorism and Financial Intelligence is working to disrupt isils financing and exposed their activities. The final element of the president strategies to continue providing humanitarian assistance through innocent civilians displaced or threatened by isil. Alongside the government of iraq, the united kingdom, canada, australia and france, u. S. Troops have already delivered lifesaving aid to thousands of threatened iraqi civilians on mount sinjar and then the iraqi town. And total views military inducted 3 32 air drops of food and supplies, providing over eight 18,000 pounds of aid including nearly 80,000 gallons of water and nearly 120,000 meals ready to eat in these operations. In addition to this assistance last week the state department announced an additional 48 million in aid for civilian organizations to meet the urgent needs of iraqis displaced by isil. Are totally managing assistance to displaced iraqis is now more than 186 million. For fiscal year 2014. The United States is also the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the millions of syrians affected by the civil war. Last week secretary announced an additional 519 humanitarian assistance. Since the start of the syrian conflict the United States has not committed almost 3 billion in humanitarian assistance to those affected by the civil war. All four elements of this strategy require a significant commitment of resources on the part of United States and our Coalition Partners. Mr. Chairman, i think everyone on this committee understand fully this will not be an easy or a brief effort. It is complicated. We are at war with isil as we are with alqaeda. But destroying isil will require more than military effort a little but it will require political progress in the region and effective partners on the ground in iraq and syria. As the congress and the Administration Work together, we know this effort will take time. The president has outlined it clear that comprehensive and workable strategy to achieve our goals and protect our interests. Mr. Chairman, senator in a, thank you for your continued support and that of this committee and your partnership. Thank you. Thank you very much, secretary hagel. [shouting] thank you. Would you please leave . Would you please leave the room now . Were asking you nicely. We are asking you nicely to leave the room. [shouting] we are asking nicely, would you please leave the rim . Thank you. Well ask you the last time. Thank you very much. [shouting] thank you for leaving. Thank you. Now general dempsey come as soon as the noise we would ask all of you to avoid these kind of outburst. They are not doing anybody any good, including hearing what this testimony is and they are not doing you and whatever your cause is any good either. Thank you very much. Would you please [shouting] and im asking you nicely to please leave the room. We are asking you again. Would you please remove this gentleman. Thank you very much. Goodbye, thank you. [shouting] general dempsey. [shouting] general general dempsey [shouting] spent thank you, chairman and Ranking Member inhofe, members of the committee. I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning. Secretary hagel as described in detail the element of our strategy against isil, the role of the United States military is in my judgment appropriate. This is iraqs first strategy but not an iraq only. Job one is empowering the Iraqi Ground Forces to go on the offensive which they are already beginning to demonstrate. This requires a partnership with a credible Iraqi Government which is also showing positive signs of becoming inclusive of all of its population. Within his partnership our advisors are intended to help the iraqis develop a mindset for the the offensive and to take actions consistent with offenses. Our military adviser to help the iraqis conduct campaign planning, range for a neighbor and Logistic Support and coordinate our coalition activities. If we reach a point where i believe our advisors should accompany iraqi troops on attacks against specific isil targets, i wil would recommend t to the president. As long as isil enjoys a safe haven in syria it will remain a Formidable Force and the threat. So while this work in iraq is taking place we will simultaneously pressure isil in syria with Coalition Partners and contributions we will begin building a force of trained moderate sunnis to take on isil industry. We will work to ensure that they have a string chain of command and report to a moderate political authority. This fourth work initially at the local and Committee Love unhelpful together city and the most felt the harsh hand of the isil. In conjunction with a longterm effort will be prepared to strike isil targets in syria that degrade their capabilities. This will not look like a shock and awe campaign because that isnt enough how isil is organized, but it will be a persistent and sustainable campaign. I want to emphasize that military actions must be part of the whole of government effort that works to disrupt isil financing, interdict the movement of foreign fighters across borders, and undermined the isil message. Given a coalition of capable willing and International Partners i believe we can destroy the isil in iraq, destroyed the iran, correction the iraq syria border and disrupt isil ensure you. This will will be defeated when the cloak of religious legitimacy is stripped away in the population on which they have imposed themselves reject them to our actions are intended to move in that direction. This will require a sustained effort over an extended period of time. Its a generational problem and we should expect better enemies will adapt their tactics as we adjust our approach. As the situation in the middle east evolves and continues to demand our attention were bouncing of the challenges in other regions. Ebola been the most recent. Along with reassuring our european allies against russian aggression continue our mission in afghanistan. But our young men and women in uniform are doing so much more. They conduct hundreds of exercises, activities and engagements every day. Actions that deter conflict. They are performing magnificently. But i am growing increase the uncomfortable that the will to fight it means does not match the will to pursue end. The sector and i are doing will begin inside the department to bridge that gap but we will need your help. If we do not depart from our present path, over time i will have fewer military options to offer to the secretary and to the president , and thats not a position in which i want to find myself. Thank you. Thank you very much, general dempsey. Well have a six minute first round. Of a lot of sure we all want to have an opportunity and then if we go around once and have reasonable and our facing us will try to have a very short second round but we just wont know that until we get to it. General dempsey, let me start by asking you for your professional military opinion of the military strategy which was announced by the president last week. You personally support a strategy . I do, chairman. Tell us why. Because the nature of the threat is such that, as i mentioned, it will only be defeated when moderate arab and Muslim Population in the region reject it. And, therefore, the way forward seems to me to run clearly through a coalition of arab and muslim partners, and not through the ownership of the United States in this issue. And so the strategy does that. It seeks to build a coalition, encourage an inclusive government to address the grievances that of causes in the first place. It applies u. S. Military power where we have unique capability to do so. And over time it allows those populations to reject isil. And in terms of utilizing on the ground the forces that are suited in iraq rather than western forces, is that part of the thinking at this time as well to avoid a western ground force in an arab or muslim country, the same reason you just gave . Well, i do think that the approach to build the coalition and enable and to enable it leads me to leverage our unique capabilities which tend to be as i mentioned, the ability to train and plan and provide intelligence and provide air power. As i said in my statement, however, might you at this point is that this coalition is the appropriate way forward. I believe that will prove true. But if it fails to be true and if there are threats to the United States, and i of course would go back to the president and make a recommendation that may include the use of u. S. Motor ground forces. Secretary hagel, how important is it, you made reference to this, id like you to elaborate, that the coalition have very strong, visible participation by arab and Muslim States . Mr. Chairman, as you just reflected in your question to general dempsey on the point, and i would pick up where general dempsey left off. This is not a west versus east issue. This is not a u. S. European coalition against muslim countries, or a muslim region. Its important that the world see, especially the people in the middle east see, that the threat that is confronting them first, and all of us, needs to be addressed by the people of the region as well as all nations and all people in the world. To have arab muslim nations be present and public about their efforts in this coalition helps that, and its critically important to the ultimate success of winning against all extremist factors and factions in the middle east, specifically isil. In that same approach of having the force, the people of these countries basically purge the strand of islam that is so poisonous that is trying to take over in their countries leads, i gather, to one argument for using Indigenous National forces on the ground rather than outside and particularly western forces. Yes. I said in my statement, mr. Chairman, matt the most significant powerful force against extremism in the middle east are the people themselves who will not accept this kind of barbarity and brutality. The muslims of the world know that what isil represents in no way is what their religion, what their ethnicity, but that background represents