Transcripts For CSPAN2 Future Of The Army 20170808

Speaking at Westminster College in his speeches one hour. As the proud army guy is gratitude introduce our general perkins. And to be irresponsible every u. S. Are me soldier and as a graduate of the u. S. Military academy of west point general perkins has sold numerous leadership positions. Special assistant to speaker of the house, Battalion Commander leading over 1,000 personnel in macedonia, Brigade Commander leading over 3,000 over the invasion of iraq 2003, executive assistant to the vicechairman of the joint chief of staff meeting over 10,000 personnel with the transition of forces in 2010 from iraq. From 11 through 2014 general perkins commanded u. S. Army education at fort leavenworth. Trade development and support developing u. S. Army doctrine all of which that provides those elements to the u. S. Army and to hold a masters degree in with the strategic studies and the Naval War College please join me to give a round of applause and a warm welcome to general perkins. [applause] and mr. Ambassador things for being a big supporter it is a great chance for me to get out. And given the United States army medic is always great and if we need to change direction down hesitate to tell men looking for to that as much as anything else. To be a proactive citizen in our democracy as i traveled around the world and using that term democracy that responsibility is put on the shoulder of a person. And in this complex world. So with the title of the lecture understanding that we dont make policy we executed. So it is our job to understand so as you can see here with the Army Doctrine command. Because the army loves decorative as we refer to it as tradoc. Maybe you can give division to free of some questions those that i am talking about. Is headed is the tip of the iceberg. That means for the gender in this challenging world so one of the things we do for the army were looking now to the year 2025m building an army that is not too far around the corner. And we love those geopolitical situations and the challenges we will face and what are the things of that once we have all that to decide the army so to lay out that concept and then write the requirements and then basically put together a blueprint this is what we wanted to look like. That is a responsibility. Suspending the day at the recruiting station and you look at the strip mall and we recruit and i think we have some recruiters out there. And with those kids from the audience. And also be run basic training. And with advanced individual training. Between helicopter pilots and to that is a Broad Spectrum and that makes sense to say this is the person and then to recruit those soldiers and officers and i want you to build the army and to constantly improve the army with Lessons Learned to design the army and then we constantly improve the army we have built. Training doctrine command is very large at 16,304 locations around the world we dont hit everyone every year but were doing a number of things with that the new to report back to the board of directors and what i want to focus on is the future and what we are doing about it. Please put up the first slide. When i well as growing up in the army it was the height of the cold war and to be at the height of the cold war and as those for mercer dismembers and though whole army soldier that soviet union and with that great introduction in the early 80s. So we focused our army to defer or defeat the soviet union and the Central Plains of europe. And redesign the army that way and to beat embattled was our doctrine and i am in charge of writing of the followup manual for that and we have a Gold Standard so i refer back to that. And then it would look eerily similar to this. And to describe that environment were operating in so we have a known enemy enemy, we know a lot about it then sent they knew exactly how we would fight the soviet union and we knew what coalition we would fight. That was nato and in that Coalition Tuesday and would be a nato on monday we went for decades ago got in or out of nato. So what we had was a challenge focused on a well known enemy. And we were part of nato. And then to build an army and that with the known problem you by certain kinds of a but it and d train people a certain way. So we did have a known problem so what you will do is take your tank this is your location and then the soviets will come over in the way we will trade you is every 90 days to go up to the scene to the same location and do it again and again and again. And rehearse that over and over. But if that goes up then you just execute. Then did he go a certain time the u. S. Then rehearsing every 90 days. And to rehearse the script from when i came in the army. To save the world is changing. And to describe that environment. And as i come to understand is to predict the future we have the perfect track record to be wrong so lot of people took that into account so well and they say give me a prediction. So what will we do in the peninsula . Than to say i dont know. So that is it . If you will not do anything more about it . But the issue is that is all i need to know. I dont need to predict the future that describe it in predicting it is a level of specificity and it is so specific if you dont of a dozen have been you optimize the army but we are describing the future in a way to provide enough clarity how you start putting those peace is in place so i said that is what were going to do. So when we published last october and it does exactly the same thing. And come up with the exact same product. Only that was completely different and im sure you know, that. Is the Army Operating concept to say it is completely the same the only completely different. So with those Naval Academy graduates so i describe this one has an operating concepts to describe that environment. But is the unknown and unknowable and constantly changing. That is like the heisenberg principle. If he knows something about it and you know, what will happen then it will not have been. Because we did a lot to prepare for it. But it never happened. So this describes the future and so does this. The Central Plains of europe began to nato . So both of these describes the future in general terms in describing an unknown problem family have to know one thing about the future. That is all i need to know. Were not predicting net or what is happening in the middle east known or unknown because then you know, the type of army if you decide the future is of unknown in you come up with a Different Army and capabilities. Septuplet in perspective i was the army general i want to be in the country that has that air force. Very good and well thought out maybe two stealth these kind of things to be very specific. That is good because i want that kind of needy. As a future guy ford the army and what they really wanted me to do. Sometimes you army guys are shortsighted. Seven basically predicting the future of what would happen in. And they have done some stuff. And then it would respond with the negative question. So i want you to predict the future is that the question to be asked . To buy me some time . I dont think that is possible. Lets assume i was here 50 years ago. Without lovell of specificity so lets assume it was 50 years ago and youre asking me this question. Fifty years ago the World Trade Center was not even built. So what will happen . I dont know so then we will build to the tip of manhattan and then why is he talking about these buildings . Let him go. So as i predict they dont exist now but we will build them. Then what happens with a very large attack . And the result is that it causes more depth than pearl harbor for girl m1 of the and the results is too Tall Buildings that dont exist. And then they will come crumbling down. We dont have any building shut United States will undergo attack and then these two little buildings adjoining this will come crumbling down. So as to say it will undergo an attack worse than pearl harbor. What will the enemy be armed with . What about the debt to raise or neutron bombs . Then what about pearl harbor what is the difference . A box cutter. So they would cause more deaths and pearl harbor . Yes. By now i am thinking this guy is in left field. I am sure therell be a worldwide control mechanism there must me hundreds of thousands somehow they will descend upon new york. What is the commandandcontrol lot apparatus to synchronize these un known box cutters . It will be radicalized die from afghanistan so you are telling me some guy in a cave in afghanistan will coordinate people with box cutters to create more casualties than pearl harbor . What is the United States . And then have more death m. Pearl harbor . End then to say he has been a happy hour but i would be pretty close. Who would believe me 50 years ago . That is the problem when you try to predict the future you cannot get a right. There are so many nuances or twisted is impossible to do so that is a prediction if you know, what is going to go one that is why we said we will not go down that road. Because and i am betting 50 years from now we could not understand i am convinced we wrote down what we think that will happen but once you come to that conclusion then you go down a different path because if you think you know, the future if you think he will not been you expand those options available to keep as many options opened to withstand uts test of time. Generally that is not a material solution. That is the road that we went down this is a very linear approach. With a very specific path with a very specific enemy. The with the cyberand the air and the land it with those special Operations Forces and then to pull this together in a way to do that more than anybody else. To be innovative and adaptive. And then to renovate a the quickest in to buy equipment and then to develop leaders that can think. In with that leadership for the future. And before you know, what kind of leaders to make any will develop a different kind of leader. So this is the of Mission Command philosophy that gets to be the type of leader we want to develop based on the description of the future. For what we thought we knew was the problem in the Central Plains of europe and the reverse that scenario and so in the future we cannot do that with the tenant perkins of the day. So will he go to the balkans or the baltics . We have no idea who the enemy is. We have no idea of the caveat is. The coalition was nato. That was it. So we dont know any of those things. He will not recur on every 90 days. So high d develop that . And with a different philosophy. And then to change the philosophy of leadership. And with command and control and to ensure compliance with the command. And then with Mission Command in a row we want to see happen to and then to explain that initiative. In then where to begin in any given point that might be the position of a vintage with the taliban or Hurricane Sandy bird dealing with those locations or whatever your mission it is a special place and a geographical place with a Coalition Building but that is a relative advantage because the future is unknown and constantly changing. That is why you dont always see that initiative but you exploit that. You cannot be content thinking what would happen. Below is position yourself to be in the right place for what could happen down the road when i was growing up it was commandandcontrol. And that assumes you knew what to command somebody to do. And then you dont control that initiative. End to understand the problem and then talking about those two ruth under state and that all the soldiers need to understand the world therein understand the caveat is and the culture and all the relationships. Indeed to visualize how you take those resources to have available based on your understanding of the of problem with a position of the vantage than once you visualize in those members of the coalition and then with that, and understanding of the problem. So do you to describe that visualization use still give direction but generally this is the most difficult part. So what we have to do today is trained them to a understand just to comply with the act of control is not adequate they pretty much wanted me to comply and succumb to them that the death control but now that is no longer possible because you dont have any level of specificity but we describe the visualization and empower them to exploit the initiative. That is the difficult way to run an army because it requires a Huge Investment and spend a lot of time with people so first of all, the even know how to understand those complexities so within your organization which and you may know well to influence people theyre not even in your organization. Seven if you are the 101st airborne and to deal with the ebola. And then describe what you are doing to them. And also with the second squad. Youre going to have to build teams within organizations and outside and get to figure out how you inform them as to what youre doing and how youre going to influence people. So this is a very tough way to run an organization especially United States army, 1. 2 billion people in over 160 countries over the world. You can only attempt this if you have a very well trained well disciplined and well led organization. Because if you dont have a welltrained, well that and well disciplined organization, you dont empower that. What do you do with an ill trained, porter led to, ill disciplined organization . You control it. I spent a lot of time traveling around the world. What you find is the less professional the army, the more they focus on control. The more professional the organization the more they focus on empowerment. I could even tell within the United States army a as a go frm unit to unit to unit, units whose primary method of getting something done is extreme amount of control is generally a less well led unit. Units that are very much about empowering subordinates generally is better trained, better disciplined and better lead. So i grade leader thought of how much control they have but how much they empower people. I can figure that out in about five minutes. Just talking to them seeing how they interact with people. Because you cant fake it. You cant think that because it takes a huge amount of effort, time and investment to make that happen. Dont want to be rude but i want to work her, so what do we have . Where good . What id like to do so i could kind of finish up with one think him if i go to questions us have a bit of time of time to wrap up with one thing . Are we kind of set up to do that before i go to the last slide . Okay. While resetting up for questions so i dont run over but i do want to sequence that, so again recapping this, talk about the leadership aspect, this is been a deliberate process the army has gone through. Its pretty revolutionary for the army even those in the army dont realize it. One of the recent is our first field manual, our first doctrinal manual was written in 1904. From 1904 until last october, just about every piece of Army Doctrine was written to do with known problems. This manual was specifically written to deal with an unknown world. That sort of a gamble we are making. Were putting all our bets on the fact the work is unknown and will constantly change. If, in fact, the world 20 so does exactly as any of you predicted today, doesnt change, this is the wrong book. This does not optimize an army to deal with no problems. We are banking on that the world will become more unknown and change more quickly. As i go around to organizations and do a lot of Leader Development stuff in the army, try to get ideas, a lot of people in organizations have never come to the conclusion it. They are developing their leaders but they dont know what for. They are taking the latest book, and so theres some organizations where you may develop your leaders are different than others because it depends on what the organization before. People never forget what they are for. They take the latest leadership book and think its one size fits all. I would argue its not. Are we ready for official questions . Now we can start asking questions. I will save a little time at the end to wrap up a couple of things. Right here. [inaudible] so this command unit that you are in charge of, didnt exist before the second invasion of iraq . And if so, did it have influence . And then, what was that input . You probably were not there then but maybe i was Brigade Commander during the invasion. Youre talking about what we call yeah, so tradoc existed and it was formed in 1973. Interesting story about tradoc came to be. So it was pulled together, it was up in 1973. So where was the army in 1973 . Coming out of vietnam, right . And so the army as whos coming out of vietnam at that point was sort of pivoting back to central europe. The army leaders took a look at the army and they go you know what, the army we have is probably not the army we want to deal with the soviet union to guess as were coming out of vietnam, although we had unbelievable heroic activity and great courage on the battlefield, we had a consumed our noncommissioned officer corps, consumed them and did not pick we did not have a culture of training. We did not have a modernization program. We had drug problems, race problems. Our leadership said i need to change the army. We need to change it from what we had in vietnam to something to do with the soviet union. They formed training and doctrine command to drive change. So as we went back into iraq in 2003, that time youre talking about . I was a Brigade Commander at the time. I tend to reserve all criticism for myself and or the organization i am associated with. I was then armored brigade command at the time and, with the lead force that invaded it. I would tell you probably one of the problems we had as a look back on it now is, is we thought we knew what we were dealing with. I was pretty sure i had good intelligence. I had satellite photograph. I had various things like that. So i had a false sense of understanding of what it was. I will leave it at that level where i was, as a colonel. What that does is you start developing a battle plan based on your sort a false understanding and your sort of level of assurance. One of the reasons you get to that is you take previous experience in you artificially set on top of your current experience. Thats a common problem. You should look back in history to become informed but not the captive to it. I would say at my level of lease, i will leave at that level we were probably captive to the experience of desert storm. Which was a very different situation. And interesting enough, so i am not a desert storm veteran but i saw on cnn like everybody else. I was an instructor at west point at the tiger i have never been to combat before ann phillips Brigade Commander so that was my first time crossing the line of departure. My Battalion Commanders had been. My subordinates. I was Brigade Commanders in desert storm. In desert storm, it lasted only 100 hours. I think this is only 100 hours and we did this and this. There was this human nature you going to template your last experience on this one because everything seemed kind of the same. Its in the desert, the same part of the world, the same guy, et cetera. What a lot of us feel to do is understand but a lot of things have changed. This is a little bit different, if youre pushing somebody out of the country versus going in. Certain assumptions were made, and at least at my level probably not adequately question the red team battles we call it. What we found that early in that invasion is, in fact, it wasnt going to be like last time. Somethings were dramatically different. Medellin, the Republican Guard and folks like that. The good thing is, our soldiers were very good at adapting and innovating and dealing with the pretty quickly. They are making the best of a bad situation. But if you make a couple of fatal assumptions, you then really are having to quickly kind of make up for that and get head of the power curve. One of the reasons weve written our new concept now is informed both in iraq and afghanistan. We had not written new concept like this before 2003. In fact, quite honestly i went into iraq with basically doctrine summer to the battles of formations we had which were basically to deal more or less with sort of a known situation. This is an outcome of that but we tried not to come as we write the new concept, to say we will do the 2003 invasion better or to this invasion better. We are saying their first order principles that come out of it, and if you sternly at the future as it you cannot predict it, you focus on different things. You focus on indications of change versus confirming something that you think is a certain activity out there. So when we do our intelligence, preparation of the battlefield we tend to layout a template and say xyz come this way everything is. Then we cross to intelligence to confirm what we think is the known answer. I offered to you that sort of the world i grew up in pic you try to put all the pieces in. You think you have it right and then what youre doing is crosscutting intelligence, to confirm or deny that your set piece is right. Thats what i tell people one f the common mistakes is, its such as military mistake, you are trying to confirm the value of a variable, because we like no things. Human behavior, psychologist, the human brain doesnt like to do with unknowns. We like to put things in bins and have templates and i know this and know that. We come up with a template that we try to confirm it. In the kind of world we wouldve been better served in 2003 and say you know what, instead of confirming a template of what i know, what i focus on is the relationship of the variables. When asked goes up, why goes down. I dont care what the value of the variable is. I care about the relationship. If this is happening with regime what is happening with your, republican caucuses, what happens there . And so that kind of thinking did not perceive that 2003 activity, but we are trying to sort of take the first order Lessons Learned from that. Serve. [inaudible] no. In fact, we are working this concept very much with the air force and navy and marine corps. Our next version of this is multidomain battle. We have the army, marine corps, multidomain battle task force we ar working with this, and we just, briefed my chief of staff, secretary of the army, the combat of the marine corps to recycle together. We are working this very much as a joint nature because of course one of the things i point out here is, if you take a look at this, the world sort of that i grew up in, this is really pretty much army stuff. Theres only armistice on you. If you take a look at this we got semper fi activity going on here, we have navy here, air force of their, special operations, et cetera. The thing thats missing is a bunch of army stuff. In fact, it is mainly other stuff, ngos, unhcr, none of that stuff is on the other one. We are very much approaching this as kind of a joint what we call combined aspect. I was over in europe last week talking about this stuff as we work with her allies as were trying to look towards the future to look, we need to have a different vision of how the world is going to unfold than the one we grew up with. [inaudible] i will let the mic folks decide. I think we have one right down here. Given those more jointly operating situations you are describing, can you speak to working with nato and such as the efforts in poland right now . Yes. Poland is my old unit. I saw them on the super bowl. And so thats very much in conjunction with this, is as we rotating units over support division. Polling one of our great nato allies. Were trying to provide options both for nato as well as a deterrent to competitors in that area. When i was coming in the army as a lieutenant and captain, we had forces primary station in europe and so they were fixed in europe and there were fixed locations and i had a fixed location that await you. Even if its in poland right now, a division, they are from fort carson colorado. I will be there tomorrow. We rotate the units and we move them around so that then up in the baltics, data poland, romania, other places like that. What its doing is is providing lots of different options, depending upon whatever we think the main threat would be. What that requires for the army is we have to have a much more agile army. When i was going up your station here and you would fight in one location. You were kind of a set piece. Our army is smaller now than when i was lieutenant, but quite honestly our requirements are larger than i was lieutenant. We have to be able to be much more agile with our army. It has to have many more capabilities than when i was lieutenant. I tell folks no more one trick ponies. These are called icons, a unit icon. I cant have units or icons that can only do one thing. They have two be able to do multiple things because im not sure what im going to do with them. Its a no. They have to be comfortable with lots of different things. I cant be over specialized and have to be able to operate in many parts of the world and move back and forth very quickly. Because our requirements in some ways are greater than they were when i was growing up. If you take a look at this, you can see this is a much more static, linear formation, much more easy to command and control. This one thing is very spread out, very spread out. You got all the domains, cyber, space, et cetera. One of the challenges we have is how do you connect that altogether . What is the network that brings that together, both the Technical Network with regards to cyber and all that as well as the physical connectivity. Are these soldiers that are here, do they know how to work with the United Nations High Commission on refugees . Do they even know what to do . Are they comfortable talking with them . Do the work with ngos, special Operation Forces . So theres a human networking that much greater requirement then when i was lieutenant and theres a Technical Networking much greater than this. We thought this was hard. This was complicated. This is complex. Big difference. Complicated systems have a lot of moving pieces. It kind of gets back to the thing i talked about knowing either the value of a variable or the relationship of a variable. In a complicated system theres a lot of moving pieces. Its kind of like if he took the back office swiss watch, if you did the back office swiss watch and look at you think is a very complicated. Complicated piece of machinery. You are looking at it and you have little dials, springs and gears, but in a complicated system relationship with the variables never changes. And you can figure it out. So if youre looking at a swiss watch you are like okay, this is really complicated, but i can figure out why. Because its applications replicate incensed over and over again. Use after a while i see every time that secondhand turns one revolution, then made and clicks one. Now you see that when this spring tightens, this gear moves and every time i why did the same thing happens. Thats a complicated watch here it you had a complex watch, the problem with a complex watch is you open it up and you cant figure it out. The reason you cant figure it out is because the relationship with the variables always changes. On the complicated watch every time the secondhand has one revolution, the minute hand moves one. On a complex watch one time the hand goes around, the minute hand moves one. And extend and it makes one revolution it was 20 minutes. You are like whats going on . The relationship with the variables, because it never replicates itself twice. Thats why have to decide if the world youre dealing with a company get a problem or a complex problems . If its a couple get a problem you can take previous activity and template it on their and that gets to your question. If you think is a couple get a problem you look at the last time we did it and you put the template on and you say i know how to solve this problem. Because when the second goes around it will go once. A complex problem you cant template it. I see a ten. I either ten minutes left or is at my grade . Can you talk about how the army is planning for, preparing for Climate Change . So on any number of things, whether its Climate Change, what we do is we kind of look longterm like 50 years and try to see are occurring, climate, demographic, et cetera come like that. And theres a number thinks out the Climate Change, i mean, i know theres huge discussion on it but we take a look at the same way we do other environmental factors. Another thing were seeing happening is increase weight of urbanization. So more and more published of the world are living and larger and larger urban areas, megacities, et cetera come like that. What we do as an army is we cant change that. We are not going to change the demographic trend of the world to become urbanized. We are not go to change what happens with the climate. What we do is say how do i build a capability to deal with that come operate in an apartment, we dont set policy, we execute policy. We have to try to describe what are the things are happening in the future and how can operate in that world that has now changed. So when you take a look at Climate Change, we always have what we call sort of most dangerous most likely courses of action etc. You say what are going to be some of the challenges that could precipitate itself . Water shortages, food shortages. Look at that precipitate . That could precipitate conflict or what other parts of what i could participate conflict in . What are parts of the world what youre seeing family and trout . Those are parts of world where you could at conflict. What other requirements of the army to operate in those parts of the world . What people are asked to go in there and do a human can kind of thing, ebola thing or Something Like that. To have the capability, the language capability . Can we sustain ourselves medically . So again this world was we are only going to operate in one part of the world. We are only can operate in one part of the world with one mission. This again, operate ever one of the things is what kinds of networks do you establish if youre going to operate in those parts of the world where you may have conflict due to famine and god or something . What other networks that are already there . What level information is there . To the have rail lines . Is an isolated . Is a landlocked . So again the armies challenge is not to solve those problems. Its make sure we anticipate the possibility of that and we can operate in that a private it it came to. Up here. My question is what examples is tradoc doing to help leaders shifshipped from this inward mit of commandandcontrol to it at what of being able to unify leadership to influence others and recruit partners in this world . We are not abandoning people but dignifying with them. Its almost easier for me to answer what were not doing. We have rewritten all our doctrine. So all the schools, every school in the army now teaches it. We own all the echelon above training in the army. We set up these scenarios and we run people through it and we make them become critical thinkers. We have enough multiple tasks to success, not one path to success. From the very beginning we have culturing them in the world. We cant say im going to wait and to go to the United States army war college. Im going to give you an elective on critical thinking. We start from very early on when you come into the army. Thats one of things tradoc does is it in culture rates not only High School Graduates in the army. One example used is how that is changing and how we try to get people to think broadly about stuff. It happened early on. When i was a young person come in the army i went out to the rifle range the first time. And my recollection of marksmanship at the rifle range is there were two trucks parked in the parking lot. One truck is a truck you got on if you qualified your rifle. The of the truck you got on if you didnt qualify. All i really need to know was im getting on that truck. I think that truck is going to go to dinner. I dont know what that truck is going but in thinking its not pleasant. Thats about all i remember about rifle marksmanship when a community the army. Make sure get of the truck is going to go to dinner. Dont get on the truck with the people he did not qualify the weapons. Recently i was down at a basic training location at fort jackson we do a lot of basic thing for the army and i sat down with these new recruits so they been in the army for three weeks. In their mind they are not new anymore. The guys who came in last night were new. Theyve been in the army three weeks. But they are still young privates in the arms that in mess hall at the table and a sit down and the first, theyre just doing at me. I said, it was similar to the christmas commercial with the imminent succumb rent and santa claus comes out of the gym and theyre just daring like hes real. Thatll likely part of these mythical figures called generals. Ive just never seen one before. It are standing. Okay, guys. Any questions . One breaks the ice and ill start talking. They were not afraid of me. You are afraid of the drill sergeant. They thought they would get in trouble. I talked to one soldier and i said what do you like best so far about the army . We went out on the rifle range. Great. Ive never shot a rifle before and i was exciting. I said, we just qualified a couple days ago. How did it go . He said well, not as good as i wanted it to. I said what did you make with the practice to fighting pretty good but when we actually went out in the rifle range i fired, shot at the target, a couple hundred meters deadweight and then i drill sergeant took me out, went down to the target and at simple chicken some bullets your like that. My drill sergeant said what you think is wrong . Well, drill sergeant, you know, i know have the trajectory of the round goes like this. So spread out i probably did nt have good breathing. I have to fix my breathing and this and this. Ill change it is. He had been taught, this was the ballistics of the rifle. Its how ebola travels. If this is what effect is, this is what you did wrong, this is how you corrected. He had all that background behind it and so the drill sergeant asked this by we going to do . How are you going to fix it . Not like listen to what i tell you come to this and this. Private, theres a problem. How will you solve it . Not, that somehow i remember, its like it on this truck of that truck. I had no idea about the ballistics of life or anything like that. Its not that weeks when everything to detail to the privates but were getting into the mold you need understand a stuff works. You need understand what the relationship of the variables are. You have to understand what you can change to make things happen and then within the scope of your responsibility we would give you a authority change it. We start very early on. Not your grandfathers basic training. The First Official last questi question. General milley with his speech talked about and described about the battlefield causally change, dynamic, lethal turkey also talked about units having to move possibly every two hours to survive. My question involves equipping peace which is we dont always wrap everything around but to allow was to add that mobility, whats the thought press in modularizing thought process of putting these separate systems we have together so they are easily to be deployed quickly . Yes. So theres two big challenges as we look at what we are call multidomain battle in this pink dispersal case moving quickly. The first thing is keeping it all connected network wise, the technology. What we want is we want dispersed units yet mutually supportive. We dont want 15 separate mogadishu is going on at the same time. Its not just about dispersion. Its about being mutually supportive. Thats the difficult part. Its easy, i can dispersed anybody. Its making sure they are mutually supported and cannot be isolated. Thats the difficult piece. The big pole in the can on that is how to connect them all network wise. Then how to develop weapons system that had the ranges to mutually support very dispersed locations. In the second thing is, sustaining them. How do you provide logistics to them. How do you provide medical evacuation if someone is wounded . If you dont have secure light communication, how do you get out . Maybe have to treat casualties closer to the front with more extreme measures. Maybe you have surgical robots that can do surgery on folks so you dont have to bring the back. The two big challenges we have two operating in this dispersed environment is maintain mutual support. Its not getting there. This is this understanding about deploying. Thats not the big challenge. Big challenge is quite honestly how do i maintain mutual support while dispersed and how do i provide sustainment to all that. Hey, folks, i think that was the official last question. One thing i want to wrap up on before we go out, so you can take down the slides. As i said im coming to you as the board of directors of our army, unite, United States armys just talking to some young recruiters and cadets and things like that. One of things i always remind them, remind you of as well, again we are your army. But to put in perspective as to the service and sacrifice that these young men and women to wear the uniform and those that have made it, and a legacy that they are upholding and sort of the responsibility we put in their rucksack and on the back, i always my people this june were coming up to the 242nd birthday of the United States army. The birthday of the United States army is 14 june 1775, is when the United States army was established. The birthday of the United States is fourth july 1776. That means United States army is older than the United States of america. In other words, this country was founded on the back of the nested army and its soldiers, whether minutemen at bunker hill, valley forge, et cetera, et cetera, like that. This army that these men and women serving and we recruit people in, so the army our soldiers serve in is older than the republic they defend. I think its important to understand as our board of directors, this special institution yet that is older than the country you are a citizen of, and quite honestly is responsible for even the existence of the country you are a citizen of and all the many great benefits we have and so again putting a prospective why i do appreciate the chance to come out and speak to our board of directors is one of the leaders of the Oldest Institution in the United States, in fact, older than the nation itself. So thanks a lot for support and god bless you all. Thanks. [applause] ladies and gentlemen, i just want to be able to share a small token of our appreciation to general perkins, and honestly thank him for the service as many of you in the audience had given as well. Thank you for your time and dedication to the United States of america. [applause] thanks. Thanks for all your help. Tonight on cspan, author David Horwitz form Intelligence Officer malcolm nance and others talk about the situation in the middle east and the policies of the bush, obama and trump administration. Heres a preview. The one thing that is been missing for decades, ive written three books about it, going after the ideology of the pope of isis and al qaeda. The art and occul are called bee it taken the peaceful religion, corrupted to me they are the executor of god, to bring about the end of times. And the greatest ally by those people in this country and in the west who say its the muslims who are the problems. No. They are not. I know what the 1. 6 billion muslims want. A 2017 toyota corolla. [laughing] what they dont need is to have a small fraction of a fraction of a fraction of a percent of a cold, this call by way that existed throughout history, and have them afraid of people do not follow the quran, who pretend like their muslims and not rely on guys like me in the Intelligence Community to come and tell you straight that the guy who sitting to my right is a muslim, a special forces soldier that is to my left is a muslim, and that since 9 11 we have been fighting in the defense of islam, not just her own defense. You can watch the entire program tonight at 8 p. M. Eastern on cspan. Saturday night on booktv beginning at 9 p. M. Eastern, former marine Corps Officer tracy crowe and jerry bell former naval officer talked about the history of women in the military in their book, its my country, to. For so long womens stories, womens military stories have just been discounted, or appropriated by others. And so she just felt like the timing was right. It is time to give these women a voice. We are not a social experiment. We were soldiers. We were sailors and we ended up in iraq and afghanistan doing the same jobs in many cases as the men, and coming home to a country that did not recognize many of us as veterans but with the same physical and moral injuries as the men. At 10 p. M. Afterwards, arizona senator jeff like calls for return to core conservative principles in his book conscience of a conservative. Is interviewed by New York Daily News columnist. How do you make the case writing i think that the health of conservatism is an urgent matter that has real world application . I guess you can split to think. You can win elections and if you do and that just for the sake of winning elections, then we can do that. But if we as conservatives want to enact conservative policy, then you have to treat an election like how do we set this up for governing and way so we can move forward with our agenda . That at 11 p. M. Robert oneal who participate in the killing of Osama Bin Laden on his military career and his participation in 400 other missions in his book the operator, firing the shots that killed Osama Bin Laden and my years as a seal team warrior. We didnt have a set line of whos going where but the guys it into the bring it up to the bedroom told inside he said dont take this wrong way, im going, im going. But if we know we are going to die, why are we going . Which is legit. I said we are not going for fame and were not going for provider. Were going for the single mom who drops their kids off at school on a to the market for five minutes she jumps to death out of a skyscraper. Watch saturday night beginning with tracy crowe and jerry bell at 9 p. M. Followed by afterwards with senator jeff flake at 10 p. M. Eastern, and robert oneal at 11 p. M. On cspan2s booktv. Cspan, where history unfold the daily. In 1979, cspan was created as a Public Service by americas cabletelevision companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. Now we take you to a u. N. Security Council Meeting where the unanimously voted approval of n