Transcripts For CSPAN2 Forum Focuses On U.S.-Japan Relations 20170808

Want to do our normal safety announcement, for any reason we need to evacuate it is my responsibility to give you instructions and the general rule is we will go out the way you came in and make our way to either the National Geographic which is around the corner or straight down rhode island to saint matthews. Our expectation is that half of the people will go to starbucks but thats the plan. I will be brief because i have an opportunity to share a discussion with our very distinguished japanese and retired american leaders. I want to turn it over to the doctor who is organized this forum to tell you about its intent and purpose and about what they have achieved. Thank you, mike. Thank you very much. Id like to First Express my deepest appreciation to csis and its necessary to doctor Michael Green for cohosting this event with my think tank. I was here exactly at cs i s6 months ago and events like this, exactly like this. The scene is always the same. The us and japan alliance. [inaudible] it was a preview of one year long project with dozens of japanese experts at the think tank. The objective of that project was to identify that geopolitical and Economic Risks to japan and the Usjapan Alliance and the possible ways to deal with it. Today we are here to share some of innovations and take away from the conference which we just held in washington between retired military leaders and active Duty Officers from the us and japan. This is a retreat type and positive discussions and we have this military state forums for four years and doctor Michael Green has been extremely supportive from day one. Very much he now, in an era, radical uncertainty and in particular how in reaction to these new heights of that uncertainties and we are turning our attention to tried and tested values and institutions and methods. In the Usjapan Alliance is among the tried and tested. [inaudible] we have reaffirmed that this tried and tested strategy of values and significance of the Usjapan Alliance. At the same time, we have allies that this alliance has to adapt to radically changing international particularly in asia pacific. One of those areas that we have to evolve the alliance to adapt is in the field of economics. More accurately, the geoeconomics. Increasingly that economic instruments can be utilized to achieve that geopolitical gain objectives in the asiapacific area particularly we are confronted with these challenges. Particularly with china. Whether it is china or russia or japan or the United States or europe the trade policy now is increasingly has become the center part of National Strategy and thats also reflects a represents this new trend of that geoeconomics policy and politics how the Us Japan Alliance should deal with them, its a challenging feet. It also employs some countries to modify or revise and even undercut the liberal order and they just dont like the rules, the rulebased order. Cyberspace is increasingly exploited and even manipulated, not only to undercut, compromise that free and fair trade and services but also to damage and undermine the necrotic rules, process and institutions, democracy itself, and we are now also in the prodigal technology of evolution based on ai, dictator and so on. Its implication for that National Security and resilience is enormous. Those strategic challenges that we have to deal with and. [inaudible] just cannot talk about everything that we did, cyber security, geoeconomics, in north korea and the others. We get support from other active Duty Officers and the incumbent government officials is indispensable to enrich the conversation and make the discussions at an saf irrelevant and meaningful and we are fortunate we have members of the joint chief of staff, department of defense and National Security council from the United States. Japanese side we have members from. [inaudible] and minister of defense and the Prime Minister and today we have four members of the military state and we have two cochair and mike mullen former chairman of joint chief of staff and general, former chief of staff of Defense Forces and all of you know there is a former commander and dni chief and the chairman of the board. [inaudible] and the general former chief of staff of Defense Forces. We are extremely lucky and privileged to have all of them to share to share in suggestions with all of you today. I would like again to express my gratitude, to Michael Green for chairing this and moderating this. I hope you really enjoy that discussion. Thank you very much. [applause] thank you. People have a discussion of your onstage and take it over to the audience to ask questions including i hope some of the participants in the those who are not on stage right now. If you know, in classic form, come up with the right idea at the right time and theres never been any complaints like this military forum, in part because the japanese side there has been a former chief of defense the authority that these gentlemen have in there was an opportunity to create this opportunity given the broad not only joint but policy experience of the officers coming out of the top of the Defense Forces but theres also more of a demand for this kind of dialogue. The threat environment as was just said is extremely complex and us and alliance was an alliance we managed for real contingencies particularly on that free and what we were getting ready for that now it is on the front lines. The north korean threat you heard about another Missile Launch put japan on the front lines potentially with the north korean threat. The maritime challenges in the East China Sea and South China Sea from china are also right in japan front yard so this is no longer an alliance that is primarily an alliance but its on the front lines. That has changed japanese politics and policy and Strategic Thinking and it means that we, on the us side, have really a responsibility to understand how the product looks and the threat looks up close in japan and japan is also one of our most important Global Partners and the alliance for decades we talked about as a Global Alliance that i can tell you from my Time Beginning a decade ago when we go into the g7 or meetings were more aligned with japan than any other country. Its more complex and more comprehensive and we have less relative money to spend in japan is on the front line. Need to share Strategic Investments and former chief of Defense Forces and commanders and so forth perfect to contribute to that dialogue. Most importantly, msf, military statements has established itself in washington as a legitimate interNational Security because it has a tla, three letter acronyms. Msf, as you know, plays an Important Role going forward. Let me ask questions from our panel and have them dialogue appear and then will open it up. This was an off the record discussion to have permission from the organizers to ask about the discussion. I wanted to ask each of the admirals and generals on stage what their major take away was. In general, over the four years of dialogue, particularly for this meeting, what is the conclusion, the surprise, the imperative thing we must do. I will start done on this end. Then will do reverse order for the next question back when you are called a statesman thats another word for old guy and i will take a little bit advantage of that to give perspective on us military relationship in my time. When i was a commander of the guided missile destroyer in the mid 1980s when we were operating with the Japanese Maritime selfdefense air force we were required to leave port separately to make sure we didnt mitigate with the japanese ship until work beyond helicopter range of the coast of japan because a press helicopter not would not see us together and communicating. That was the state of the alliance in the 1980s. In the mid 19 90s i was involved in some joint planning with the japanese selfDefense Forces and i was required to put on a suit, grow my hair longer, get rid of my shiny black shoes and go in a small delegation into the basement of the old Japanese Defense Agency Building in order to do some secret conversations with counterparts in the japanese selfDefense Forces and even our greatest fear was again, leak of these operations. To be able to sit in an open forum with cameras and audience and talk about important issues of the Usjapan Alliance is such a maturing of the alliance that we seen in recent years that i dont think we should lose sight of the progress that has been made. And just in time, to, because the security situation in northeast asia and overall in the world has become much more pressing and compensated than it ever has been in the interest of our two countries are exactly aligned in terms of our vision of what we think east asia should look like from the security, economic governance, values, point of view and that is imperative enabled us to talk much more openly and honestly and freely about how we can pull our resources and we can pull our efforts in order to Work Together towards that kind of asia. What i have seen in the military statesman forum is an unprecedented level of frank discussion. The japanese are famous for their politeness. The americans are nate famous for their directive and that has resulted in the past with a lack of serious medication to talk about the differences that needed to be worked around an understanding of points of conversion that should be emphasized. I would say that in the four years of this military statesman forum we actually get down to honest appreciations of the constraints on both sides and the ambitions on both sides and working towards common solutions. In the past four years we have noticed, frankly acknowledged, areas of the virgins that us and japan share, it objectives but were not the same country and we dont live in exactly the same locations and so we dont have exactly the same priorities. There are differences in these were discussed and will talk about those later in this discussion. We dont see russia quite the same way and we in the past have had different interests with china and there are Economic Issues which are different between the United States and china and between the United States in japan and our relations with china and inevitably a Major Economic major security approaches overlap. There have been those differences but rather than being joked over or papered over they are addressed in this forum and we been able to, i think, come up with ways to go forward that gets passed back to the job that we used to have. One of our rules is to be helpful to those the job that we used to have rather than making their life more difficult and i think we been successful in that area. Let me stop there as far as the overall progress and we will discuss the specific issues later. I would comment that this is the third forum for me, two of them here, one in tokyo last year. I would reemphasize what admiral blair said in terms of justintime. Ive also experienced the same evolution that admiral blair has over time in terms of our overall relationship, always allies but certainly constrained and what i really admire about what Prime Minister is doing now is looking for a way to have japan represented in the 21st century security environment. And to move in that direction and then to empower his retire Senior Officers to have some of that discussion and very specifically that he and i were in the same job at the same time and in particular during the fukushima tamagotchi disaster and it was validation, i think, of the alliance, the way that we were able to support instantly support, not just the selfDefense Forces but the people of japan. By virtue of that experience, the friendship and respect that we develop for each other this forum came along a couple years later. It was very easy to commit to it. Admiral blair talked about the issues we have discussed in broad detail and im sure will come to some of those but ive also watched the discussion mature. Its very similar to the relationship. One of the individuals in the audience today is general sharp and he was the commander of the forces in south korea when i was chairman, as well. Starting last year in the end of this year weve worked to try to create some version of a trilateral with rock views as well as japan and the United States and this year we had a former chief of defense there, a general, treated greatly. From my perspective when i try to understand the problem i really do want to try to listen to the prospective of i am with, what are your concerns, how do you hear the defense and this is a form that has afforded us a great opportunity to listen to our good friends so that we can understand the challenges and try to move forward together. Its been more robust this year than last year and the year before that. I think it will continue to be and what most of us, in his room, would understand or believe that its an extra ordinary time right now of uncertainty, geopolitical uncertainty, deal Economic Uncertainty and in that uncertainty one of my beliefs is that you need good friends and we have one in japan. Thank you. The generals are going to speak japanese so you might want to get your ear for. I dont know which channel is english, channel two is english. Three is russian. [laughter] let me turn to the general and parenthetically add. The other interesting thing about the forum is it comes or began at a time when japan selfDefense Forces in Public Opinion polls in japan emerged as the most trusted institution in japan, for japan is remarkable. The role of senior military statesman and in japan the idea of military statesman is very new. They have a role in helping frame the debate is new and timely. [speaking in native tongue] translator thank you for that introduction. We are switching from english to japanese and this is not a weakness from japanese but not learning english but we do have a very strong alliance. I want to say that. We concluded our forum and we been attending this from the first forum between the United States and japan. We rotate the location for tokyo in washington dc and that means last year we hosted one forum in tokyo. This is talked about earlier so when i was in active duty we had a similar job in similar timing and since then we have been working on opinion exchanges and also on trans analysis, so with him i expand that information but now we are coming here as representative so we had communication but we expand there was a gap and something we need to address and and first forum we are developing good communication and information sharing and we are becoming good in our communication. For our fourth forum i want to say my personal impressions. First off, in the South China Sea and various Security Issues are there but our topic was about deal economic and what kind of economy applications are there to Security Issues and doctor green talks about north korea and there are not only military options let me back up here. There are certain things that we would want from china for the relationship and russia and also the including sanctions and those are perspective that we talked about and also one belt, one Road Initiative in china so when we look at that initiative the indian ocean is very much integrated here and also the role for that ocean. When we look at the indian ocean in terms of. [inaudible] there is a economy implication to security and that is something that i learned from express that we had. Overall we had really good communication. Thank you. [speaking in native tongue] translator to that same question, i think this is our fourth forum and we have went through many of the topics already and these panelists are opinionated so thats why i dont have much to talk about anymore. I think that my participation is about 3. 5 times not fully four and not fully three and my participation was in the first forum in tokyo but i was in active duty so i could not fully attend to that first one so thats what i meant by half of the time participation. After that, i really am appreciative of this forum. Since i was a selfdefense for force, i am from. [inaudible] i had a cheap joined the staff and looking back to those times i spoke to my counterparts in the United States but when i was in active duty i felt that there was a gap in communication between the japan side in the United States. When i felt that i reached out to walter green. When you came to japan i was able to talk to you to gain more perspective and also talk to you about the need for more active discussion. [inaudible] there are differences in the two countries but this is the fourthround. We have been discussing a lot of discussions about wideranging issues in the discussion connected here will be submitted to the government and the us forces and i think the goal is to give those institutions and. [inaudible] thank you. One of the major topics and focus was north korea and is in the news again this morning, as i mentioned. Its one of the drivers of change in our alliance. Two years ago japan was still largely in the rear area and today there are so many threats to japan directly from north korea, missiles, cyber, so forth. And now directed towards the american homeland. That creates the necessity of joint preparedness and we are okay. It also creates potential forfeitures and different assessments of the threat. I like to turn to north korea and we want to address, particularly for our american palace, the role of military instruments of power within our strategy is often said by experts that the military option is not realistic. General dunford has been asked this week and said its not on the table. That is important for japan, of course, but i like to ask our american palace about that. It will be interesting to hear about their progress on trilateral operations korea particularly the japan korea aspect of that. And where we need to be to deal with contingencies emanating from north korea including, not only attack but collapsed, or provocation. There is a range of threats that we now have to think about. Im going to direct certain questions. Generally, youre thinking about north korea but specifically im interested in your view on the japan korea piece of this and how ready is japan. Clearly, not enough but what areas japan have to make more efforts to be prepared for this growing challenge. Translator thank you very much. There is good timing with that question. When you consider the dpl k that in 1998 the sky over japan there was a slight and postal launch over japan but in any case the rain of 2000 kilometers something was launched by north korea. Prior to that we had a lot of different information and for the Ballistic Missiles needed and thats what they claimed there was a time that japanese people in general do not accept that. In 1998, there was a plastic missile that flew over japan but after that there was a much better misunderstanding. The assistance shouldve been deployed earlier but since then the differences we had and diplomatic relations havent come possible. As a result, i think our system is quite ready. Naturally, in order to cope with the north korea or pnd situation around japan in a specific fleet is deployed and therefore with. [inaudible] exchange of data and share information together in order to step up our preparedness. Doctor green, naturally, when we think about. His response not only the Ballistic Missile but when the conflict happens the results are okay. We cannot go anywhere and its very difficult to take any major measures regarding north korea. Maybe your perception is japan korea relations has relations are not favorable but politically, officially, that is true. It was said of the relations between japan and north korea but i have been working at the sts became chief of staff. During that period the air, sea, ground of south korea has had good relations military and political relations sometimes is different. In terms of that personal exchange, blue house, is representative if they turn down a request. Military members of north korea cannot come in we cannot visit them. However, they have been good collaboration within japanese and Korean Forces. [inaudible] we came to close conclusion between japan and south korea and has been put in place in the exercise and the success is not high but Maritime Exercise and recently the pmd trilateral Information Exchange, training was carried out. Trilateral relations abound and developed from that. For the first time in this conference, of course, response to north korea we have had a lot of Information Exchange between japan and the United States. General sharp has been involved recently and for this year we invited the general from north korea and korean side perception has been provided from him and, i believe, that is a valuable opportunity for the grand view. As having his views, he returned to south korea yesterday japan with japan us relations will be further strengthened as a resu result. Translator the started in 2009, at the end of march, i became the print staff and over japan reached and i still remember that night. That was ten days after i took office and i have come from the army, the ground of defense and therefore ive made my best effort and for the. [inaudible] the vote was destroyed by north korea and so many different incidences that took place during that year. As mentioned, japan has already become the player of the frontline. I should say that japan has been on the frontline for a long time. [inaudible] in terms of range, they cant reach japan and what we have to think or what we should have food for them that the rocket used and now because of the mobile launcher we dont know where north korea would launch. There are so many upgrading capability of north korea and icbm should be taken into our consideration and along the range is achieved. We have had to deal with this. The threat has existed and i think in this respect we should be more sensitive but now the threat has been even higher. Between japan and the. [inaudible] there is optimism within japan. The Prime Minister ape and president has asked for meetings and there should be a future in the area of security of joint statements issued to look at the future and for the security we had optimism with the japan. With military matters they are influenced by political situations, of course, the military comes under the political situation. [inaudible] there is work to create a School Together and the Korean Forces Work Together on the same side. They used a truck and went the truck and the members so we Work Together on the same side. That type of relations because it strengthens and reinforces we are able to reach that state, the trilateral relations even strengthened. I am already retired but we continue to make progress. In particular, your previous job, i think it be interesting to hear your thoughts on the role of military options, instruments, and the north korea strategy. A lot of the academics today have talked about preemptively bombing them or you engage in a dialogue and give them lots of stuff. As you well know, its a whole range of options and contingencies and so forth. It be helpful if you could also frame for us the role of the military power in dealing with north korea problem going forward. Admiral blair and i talked about this in terms of the possibility coming up and i volunteer him to at least take a lead. Ill fill in behind. [laughter] if you were to listen to our discussion and if you were to read about the current north korean as if its a standoff between the dpr k and the United States with the other countries of northeast asia being the backdrop against which visitors. If you listen to our discussions within the conference over the last three days you realize that this is an alliance problem for the United States, its two allies, japan and north korea what we have to face. I think that puts a little different light on it. We need to evaluate our options in dealing with north korea in terms of their effect on our alliances. We want to emerge at the end of whatever happens, with our alliance with japan and our alliance with north korea and their relationships with each other being stronger than they were, not weaken, much less completely dissolved by them. We have to keep i was reminded our discussion that this is a complex alliance a challenge, not just a mono e mono between kim jongun and donald trump. Thats an important thing. As i discussed the specific issues, i think we had insights which might be useful. When i was this civic commander and the temperature went up on the peninsula it was pretty much a peninsula problem. General sharps predecessor, commander of the fine forces of command, would put his command on the higher alert, a series of well understood measures focused on the peninsula would happen and we were on our toes, leaning forward in the peninsula. Now, if there is an elevated level of tension and potential for military action, whether by north korea or we are considering military options in the United States, that affects a wide range of defense preparations in korea, in japan and in the United States. Not only are they missiledefense preparations, for example, they are cyber preparations that both countries have to make. They are much more extensive maritime and air defense preparations and so the part of any military operation that comes up in that region has to be a very careful part of preparations by all countries to defend their citizens and interest in case north korea decides to take aggressive action. That can only be done by not minutes of notification but weeks of prep and consultation and planning. What you would hear from the military professionals is that whatever you will do militarily in dealing with korea, all the countries have to be involved. There has to be time for them to be ready to deal with full range of possible reactions. Two other sets of insights we gained on some of the nonmilitary tools which we are dealing with with north korea. First, the sanctions. To make a generalization, we have been pretty much using simple straight stick sanctions to deal with north korea. They havent had the intensity of exquisite intelligence focused cooperation with the private sector, understanding of the network that korea has developed in order to take advantage of that market and not understanding the Corresponding Organization within china which is taking advantage of korean desires to import illegal goods and to make money and cooperate with north korea. We meet need a much more tighter, focused effort involving the intelligence agencies, and in many cases, the commercial authorities in the United States, japan, korea and china. I think china can be far more effective if we do not, at this point, say up to you china but that we involve the chinese authorities who have taken aggressive tools for dealing with corruption which is a huge feature in trade with korea and were dealing with counterfeiting which is a huge feature of the North Koreans not only counterfeiting dollars but they are counterfeiting in dealing with drugs in a way that is affecting those who live west and east and the idea that those in intensifying and nationalizing in a detailed way sanctions regime on north korea is, i think, an important insight that we can improve. The final one that we all worked out with north korea for a long time is that we have not done nearly as well as he could in terms of pushing information into north korea so that both the elite who are around the kim regime and more general citizens can understand how that they have it and it can understand they are not, in fact, the subject of an Aggressive Campaign from outside. A fifth of the korean now have access to a cell phone estimate say and thats a great way to get information into north korea. Although there have been sporadic attempts by the republic of korea and to a lesser extent the United States to push information we can ramp that up, as well. Those are the main insights that we have on north korea in terms of both being a better military posture and increasing the information flow into the country and working with china in a way that has all of us working on the sanctions rather than simply waving our finger. So, what to do. Anyone who has follow this, whoever is talking about it will say that there is no good options. There really are no good options. One of the things that i was struck with in our discussions which is a little obvious but ive been concerned broadly about this but when you look at the number of missile tests that kim jongun them has generated in his relatively brief time is an extraordinarily high number compared to his predecessors. In fact, theres a view we talked about this in the forum that while his dad and granddad may have had a more calculating purpose of the launches his purpose, very clearly, is to get a Nuclear Weapon on top of an icbm as soon as possible. If you read, in the media, certainly of late, there is a pretty strong belief that will happen sooner than we predicted. As recently as six months ago. You combine that with the fact that he has eliminated not just his uncle but his halfbrother and look at the numbers of people that he has eliminated in his regime at a pace that far exceeds his predecessors. So, given not just what he is doing but the piece he has executed and says what are we going to do so you asked about the military options. There are no good military options. To sustain being in charge in that country. So the idea that he would actually launch one of these weapons on south korea, japan or on the u. S. Is again would be, that would be suicidal for him and his regime. I still believe, ngc discussion now, about, first of all, well see what what our president has said here in the United States which has been very strong, what general dunford said i think last week at aspen, which was focused on not taking military options off the table, that theres clearly, were going to pressure him as hard as we can to a point where he possibly makes the decision this isnt worth it. Thats one path. It may or may not work. Another path is through china. Everybody up here, ginny and i and our successors have all worked of this patient one time or another. The answer isnt absolutely through beijing. But beijing doesnt for my perspective doesnt, shouldnt, cant get a free pass on this. Its too dangerous for them as well. So moving in that direction in support of figuring out how to put pressure on this guy to make sure that there is not a disaster i think is key. But again its not, its been ground that is president plaut and its been unsuccessful. And so what are the chinese interests here . And how do we match up our interests with our allies interests, with chinese interests, and figure out where the overlap might be so we can prevent this disaster. And i just reemphasize what admiral blair said. This isnt just about the United States and north korea. This is about two great friends, to great alliances, and it is in the breadbasket of the world, four of the five biggest economies in the world are centered out there and in one part of the discussion even have we posture what might happen in terms of preparation the First Response from someone was the Financial Markets are going south immediately, and we all talk about that. We know that its, in outbreak there would have a huge economic, Financial Impact globally. But to hear somebody say it as part of it, yes, we would expect and have a plan for this was a little bit jarring and probably a little bit more real given whats going on as recently as today with another test. You actually ended up taking a harder half of the question. Well, i mean thank you. Before we offer the audience a chance to weigh in, i want to ask about something i dont think you did address, and that is the significance of u. S. Forward military presence in the western pacific. I want to get a japanese and u. S. Perspective, anyone or everyone, the polling, Public Opinion polling in support of u. S. Forces in japan is pretty good in both countries, generally, but there are voices arguing, for example, in the u. S. That its a mistake to some of our best military assets within the missile range envelope at some of our potential adversaries. And you have in japan, in okinawa, the challenging political situation not getting worse but not getting much better perhaps. Id be interested in anyones a view of how you see or how you would characterize the importance of our forward present in japan. In light of some the changes that are causing some people to argue we should rethink it. You want to start . Share. When i was at sent back in 2000 or so, i had a little Bumper Sticker west is best. Its much better to have your forces up there where the trouble might start and thereby keep it from starting and if it does start you can apply them more quickly. All the talk about vulnerability and so on, with the recent memories of pearl harbor and when we moved the American Fleet from the west coast to the United States to hawaii and then it was vulnerable is useful to think about, but the degree of intelligence warning that we have come at the of the political situation makes me think that we will not be, our forces will not be caught in their hangers come at the pier, some kind of surprise attack and that ought to be there so they can then shape the environment rather than simply react to it. I think its much better to have our troops there. Another important function they serve is that the coin of rome in terms of commitment, forces there and those in japan and those in korea who face threats and a much shorter range and we in washington or Washington State face, i know there are american troops there. And they are all in it together. I think both for the reassurance point and for the war fighting. Forward is better, less is best. Just quickly to thoughts. One is, and i think it was president xi in china, if it wasnt it may have been his predecessor. But at one point the chinese leader said thi this is a big o, the pacific. You just take the eastern half, we will take the western half. And my response to i that is we are not going anywhere. Weve enjoyed a level of stability in that part of the world since 1953. And it hasnt just happened. Its been a lot of work as these alliances are a part of that. Our presence is a big part of that. So it is i think incredibly important for us to be there across the board. And im reminded, i want to remind those listening, its 28,500 troops in south korea. We have 54,000 troops in japan, and rightfully so. The other thing, from the war fighting standpoint i want my best foot forward. I want my forces, i want my best forces there. They understand the vulnerabilities. They understand the weaknesses. They spent a lot of time mitigating those challenges. And i want anybody that is there to understand, they are our best forces and that they are the forces reintegrate with in japan and with Korean Forces. We practice it all the time, and one of the things we did talk about in this forum was the readiness. And they are ready. They are ready. They are forward. They know it. They are the best weve ever had in a very confident in them. General oriki . [speaking in native tongue] translator maybe my perspective is different. Strategically speaking, if there is a unit with the drawing and also rotating out to a different location, there are different perspectives in terms of operation and also mission. In terms of operation, if we are to move a base, that sends a big signal to other countries. And so lets say relationships between korea and the United States and japan and the United States, if we are to move a base, that means a big distraction between those relationships and that sends a big signal to the rest of the world. And i think that we are in a preparation phase of a planning phase that we should be in deep consideration to consider what kind of presence that we are in need of right now. Lets say the japanese and u. S. Relationship, we will need a significant Strategic Dialogue or meeting with a forum. We should review what kind of roles and responsibilities each country should have or will have. Without that kind of careful consultation between the two countries, and to think were going to make a big mistake. I think the three panelists already talked about many of my opinions. I dont have very much to say, but if we are to realign or replace the United States forces from japan, or from asia, i think that this is the signal that we are taking a weaker position to the rest of the world. For example, the United States goes to korea and goes to japan, as armed forces we have alliances and also treaties and agreements. And to think the most important thing is training and also exercises. So if we have a Long Distance between two countries, that means that we need to have a one or two big exercises once in a while so coordination becomes less and less. So by having actual u. S. Forces physically in our territory, that means we can communicate closely, and also that technical transfer becomes more often and also more active. So thats why having physical presence in japan is really critical and important to us. And so five years ago there was a meeting with a hole of air defense commands. You might not know about this command, but this one has a goal fighting capability mean the aircraft fighters and also packs three and some other war fighting functions. And so we have 50,000 air but half of it belongs to this command. And so this command takes up command in japan, meaning that we have a warning leader function and also a maritime aegis ship is actually belongs to this command itself. So theres a liaison kind of function here. So we had different commands between kind of the United States, but we moved this error command because of water to have the same physical base sharing together. Meaning that the United States command and also the japanese command, they can share the same information who makes decisions. I think this Shows Progress between japan and United States allies. Also integration. And that the recent Missile Launches from north korea, so we are ready to monitor those launches and testing from north korea together with the United States. And i think that moving a base is not a life decision to make. Thank you. I appreciate that from all four of you because i think from time to time went to recharge his batteries and make this argument and explain at a different context and i agree with what all of you said. Actually, the environment we face and the limited resources we have make this forward presence even more important. And for it to be effective in terms of deterrence and dissuasion, shaping environment, we will have to be more joint combined, interoperable in our bilateral alliances and our bilateral alliances will have to be better able to operate together as some of you said and certain scenarios. I think one of the North Koreans targets in terms of the center of gravity with its missile program, one of the reasons theyre doing it is to try to split our alliances, to try to get decoupling by threatening the u. S. , stress the bilateral alliance with japan and korea. He had to do that is we become more joint, more committed. And in a very different way, and in chinas coal over the longer term and that tell of the sort of indicator that was xi jinping speaking 2014 which said future mission should have no blocks. I think in a longer sort of less immediate threatening way but nevertheless, in a longterm what i think Chinas Center of gravity is gradually see our alliances get weaker. If we want to motivate china more on north korea we have to demonstrate that north koreas actions are making our alliances more joint coming together. So both to be able to fight tonight, is that what youre saying in korea . To be ready but also for the larger geopolitical game weve got to be more forward, more capable, more joint as you all sit and i think thats important. Let me open it to the audience. I didnt ask about genesi genesa concise you did ask about china. Or not. A lot of issues on the table and a lot of issues that were discussed including cyber and others. Mr. Nelson. We have microphones. Thanks so much. Chris nelson. Thanks as always for terrific discussion. The nelson report. In my old age i have become respectably or on a fellow at the peace foundation, so thank you for that. Theres hope for us all. From a military standpoint there is a political issue potentially looming. At some point in your prior position should be asked, she we negotiate a freeze with these guys . Should we negotiate a peace treaty that inherently accepts them as Nuclear Powers . From your military standpoint what would that mean . What would be the downsides of the upsides to it . You can see what we might be coming to that, if its true, as the general said. Its too late to stop these guys except by military means, which is unacceptable. As our friend scott snyder said for years, i know see a happy ending you. You can see where we are facing this now with the icbm crisis. Whats your response to the dilemma that im putting out . If you are asked what is known to response to freezes, to peace treaties, to accepting these guys as nuclear power, what would you say . To open the audience and some of our panelists from japan, you asking about a u. S. Dprk peace treaty or phrase . Especially given the context of the silica discussion. This is an alliance problem. If we are running around making an individual treaty with the nordics, our friends in seoul and in tokyo but something say about it. Thanks very much. We will start with one of you two gentlemen. There are a lot of freeze proposals in the air right now. There was an interesting chinese proposal in which they said that if north korea would freeze its missile and nuclear program, the United States and the republic of korea should freeze their exercise program. As far as i can tell, the only benefit to that arrangement would be to china, which makes a lot of sense because it was china that proposed it. He would not only degrade the military capability of the United States and the western pacific but they would, they would also slow down the north Korean Nuclear development, which they dont much like any other so the chinese freeze is i think transparently selfserving and is something that we ought to reject. I think before you go into negotiations with the North Koreans, you should do a little bit of your history work. And many friends of mine, many acquaintances, many predecessors of mine have been involved in negotiations with the North Koreans, and their record for negotiating in good faith, the record for carrying out their commitments once theyve actually signed them and agree to them is abysmal. Its perfect. Perfectly abysmal. So i just think that it remind you of that american cartoon of Charlie Brown kicking the football with lucy holds a place for and she just pulls away every single time and he falls flat on his back every single time. Im just a little jaded on the negotiation method unless there is some reality behind it in terms of an approved a military situation, something that would lead you to believe that north korea was now more serious. I tend to discount those. I think we should examine each one, look at the surrounding additions to see if something has changed that would encourage us to do that, but i am basically deeply skeptical about almost all of them. I would only add to thoughts. One is, no matter what would happen and given the batting record for negotiating directly with the north, as you know, a perfect zero, zero, zero, that we need to move forward in consultation with our allies specifically and then it gets me back to if theres any possibility here, i think it is creating opportunities with china to then have all of us moved to something with north korea that is almost sewn up ahead of time by everybody, what we agree on, then the discussions, and with china not sitting in the second row but leading at the table to generate possible peaceful outcomes. Thats what we all want, and what the specifics of that would be im not sure. That is sorely one path, but i tend to agree with the denny on this. Going in one direction is true based on Empirical Data that is out there. General oriki . [speaking in native tongue] translator i did not understand the question that well, unfortunately, but so far with regard to north korea, well, although we actually provided the development has continued. Although the was a crisis with sixparty talks and other things took place, but in terms of the result, there was no result and they continue to develop Nuclear Weapons. So that should be the lesson that we learned out the far experiences. The safety of the country and the revival of the regime, i think that is maximum requirement for them. In america they say yes, and in exchange for that is conditions, that denuclearization is important. But that has not been successful, the dilemma has continued. So one side must compromise can otherwise there is no solution and, therefore, an ideal world, the u. S. North korea agreement would be very difficult. I dont know whether i answered the question perfectly, but thats my view. I think my view is very similar, but if i might miss understand, if you look at the world, there are countries which are not trustworthy and so if you look at the track record of north korea, even though there is a a promise, the promise is likely to be broken with north korea. In some way or the other they try to earn time or they try to accumulate their funds, and they attempt to take action. In order to happen, make the promise irreversible condition should be defined clearly in order to move ahead. In any case, for north korea, for Ballistic Missiles and the nuclear, the purpose of the development is the survival of the regime. And the survival of the regime, china may need that but i think their final goal is with the United States. And since that is the ultimate purpose and for that reason a want to be a Nuclear Country or the launching of the icbm. And so the purpose of the north korea and the reversible conditions, i think those should be kept in our mind in order to deal with that. You dont rule out the diplomatic option. But you on the other hand, dont invest in that diplomatic option of everything, because you dont put everything on that because we know from experience it almost certainly will not work and the design of this is to weaken our deterrence. Is that a fair summation . Yes, sir. I agree with the gentleman. A wonderful overview. On extraordinary times require extraordinary measures. So what im about raises question, clarity will be extraordinary but dont take that as a defense to a japanese friends. Its clear from just what you said and what one reads that there are no easy nor good, they are all bad poetry options. And if you assume as we read over and over again and i havent heard anything different here, that the North Koreans objective is to secure a Nuclear Capability that will enable them to secure maximum leverage for its threat of use. Thats what they want. And nothing seems to deter it. And if you look at it from the perspective and buy it, why would they . Why would negotiations or threat . They seem to have sufficient military capability to threaten south korea particularly, that that makes that a difficult military, and why would they initiate the convention of military operation . Because worstcase, that could bring a nuclear retaliation. Im not sure it is accurate. You are probably would know what i understand fred camp has come up with a recent book that says that kennedy in the early 60s was confronted with a possibility, probability of soviet encirclement of our allies and made the decision to use our Nuclear Capability calculating a loss of 1 million on either side. It was an extraordinary measure, extraordinary times, and im sure that in the bowels the pentagon and other calculations they are looking at tradeoffs like that. But isnt it going to be necessary among these bad options to prevent north korea from achieving its objectives at some point wax because its not going to get any easier. Now back to the extraordinary measure. In this calculation it seems at the moment at least china has the greatest leverage and is a wanted to use. May in minor ways, counterfeit corruption, but its not going to affect the overall calculation. But if this were a possibility to bring pressure on china, given all these historic restraints for stork reasons, would japan consider developing a Nuclear Capability . Because clearly thats going to signal to china this could have complications for us. Thats my question. So this is what Charles Krauthammer argued idea or two ago in the Washington Post that the only way out of this is to encourage japan at a think you also added the republic of korea to develop lethal weapons and a recall hearing on the campaign trail as well as 1. Come is a very ask you to respond . Why not . You face more Difficult Missions in the past. [laughing] really . [speaking in native tongue] translator let me answer the question. First, with north korea, icbm or nuclear, the elements has been developed. Because they did not have any trust in the other countries, and they are armed with Nuclear Capability here they do not feel assured. I think it seems be a motivation. And also of course the development of the nuclear arms is very problematic, but if you look at the world situation or if you look at the relation of north korea with the rest of the world, the Nuclear Proliferation or technical proliferation we are leaving this briefing to go to the senate for a pro forma session. No legislative business is expected the presiding officer the senate will come to order. The presiding officer the clerk will read a communication to the senate. The clerk washington, d. C. , august 8, 2017. To the senate under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable john cornyn, a senator from the state of texas, to perform the duties of the chair. Signed orrin g. Hatch, president pro tempore. The presiding officer under the previous order, the Senate Stands adjourned until 3 30 p. M. Stands adjourned until 3 30 p. M. Lawmakers are meeting every three Business Days to prevent recess appointments. This would be happening now until labor day. If you look at the national sentiment, i would rather them go into the Nuclear Alliance with the United States is simpler, other types of deterrence seems to be called for by japan. And so maybe i think that is more clever option. Military statesman really means [inaudible] thank you. Two others want to wait in . I just think we should remember that this is not a new dilemma that has been faced. In the battle of cold war years when the United States had a huge military, the huge nuclear arsenal, soviet union had one, the countries that were caught in between adopted different forms of their own Nuclear Deterrent or reassurance. France and the uk decided that they wanted to have their own systems, and they develo develod them. Germany, turkey, norway, of the countries decided that they would rely on the american deterrent, but it wasnt simply a declarative reliance. There were techniques such as thdual capable aircraft in which american weapons could be delivered aircraft flown by german or turkish or danish pilots. There was a stationing of american short arraigned systems for work. So theres a whole range of things that have been developed in order to reassure an ally that the United States Nuclear Umbrella extends over them without them developing weapons. And we actively had discussion with, in official channels with japan and the republic of korea. So i think your principle of our allies having nuclear reassurance is absolutely correct. And then i think its up to the allies to decide where along the spectrum from having their own arsenal to a series of in measures, simply rely on american declarative policy, and as korea, north korea develops its capabilities and its delivery capability and weapons, i think this conversation will take place. Agreement will be reached and the countries will still be secure. I want to make sure, try not to get in trouble when i say this, but i think and he goes back to what admiral blair said earlier, which is often times and certainly lately this is for trade is u. S. And north korea. And it has taken on a particular intensity because of the icbm potential, which is now much more real. But we focus on that, and what everybody sometimes we forget that south korea and japan are already under the threat envelope in terms of missile capability. There is sort of development of nuclear warhead, and that from an alliance standpoint we have a responsibility to include them in these discussions, and not almost de facto isolate them from the because were getting into this debate about us and north korea. We have responsibility. Ive recognize that now that its u. S. Citizens that could be under the threat here very, very soon, but i think its responsible for all leaders, american leaders in particular to speak to our requirements, visavis the alliance. And a forum like this for three and half days is a fresh reminder of the importance of that alliance, and i think michael said earlier that even after something really bad happens, that alliance is stronger. Its not broken up. Because what we did or didnt do. Sometimes we have to not make that kind of consideration given sort of the shortterm nature of right now. Japanese people, south Korean People are already well under a threat envelope that theyve been due to with quite frankly for some time, not nuclear but on the conventional side very, very dangerous and lethal. And we shouldnt forget that as a part of how we move forward as this gets more difficult. Thats a critical point. I cant resist but quick three reason why to really bad idea. A decade ago as a senior agent in the Bush Administration and very, very senior people just of the president himself wanted to use this gambit upward in japan with nuclear. That idea first because we more than enough to curb our celtic we dont need it to deter or if necessary destroy a north korea. Number two, if the north korean aim and in the longer term the chinese aim is to weaken our alliances why would we introduce into the narrative the idea that we dont trust japan, a dont trust our Nuclear Umbrella . It goes completely against the tool we have to start dealing with this which is greater cooperation, greater alliance. And number three china will not go with us. We can going to tell china and they will make their own judgment. Theyve been living alongside japan and north korea for a lot longer we have. They will not listen to us. My failure is u. S. Alliances really in trouble because the americans are talking about japan Going Nuclear or u. S. North korean alliances really in trouble. Thats the signal we send. Now, if there is doubt about the credibility of our extended deterrent because were not under threat, then as admiral mullen put very well, that we need to deepen the dialogue think how we restore a greater measure of credibility, but thats a far different thing i think. Just add one more point, mike. I Nuclear Attack on either the republic of korea or japan would kill lots of americans. So an icbm reaching los angeles would kill more americans, but we are already subject to north Korean Nuclear threats equally, that many of our citizens bearing equal exposure and vulnerability as our japanese and korean allies. And i think that is one of the strongest parts of the deterrent equation that exists. Its a provocative question but it is a good discussion. Yes, in the front. Thank you for coming. I am japan native, u. S. Citizen. I have a couple questions. Can you, to max . Yeah. Thanks. Since we have the generals here, how can we defend soul . Are we ready to defend . Because it doesnt take Nuclear Weapons to destroy seoul. More importantly, how can we defend okinawa where theres a bunch of u. S. Basis of there . How can we do that . A military equation. Thanks. And the mic to that guy right there, three seats over. General sharp. So the defense of seoul counts upon the combined forces of the republic of korea and the United States, and what korea has along the border thats organized their to do counter battery fire, the air forces that are there both in in the republic of korea and from the United States, today, north korea started immediately pulling the lanyards and artillery rounds started coming in, that would be great damage insole. But we would relatively quickly in seoul destroy that artillery through ground, air and naval fire. I dont want to minimize up with a very solid plans, very solid capabilities to be able to quickly react to any sort of attack from artillery come into seoul that are very well rehearsed many, many times. So it would be the end of kim jongun i if you start that. Im absolutely convinced because we would not stop there. For those watching podcasts are dont know general skip chartreuse commander of all force on the korean peninsula. At all of the Korean Forces. Thank you. You want to do the tokyo one . Actually did say general, not admiral. [laughing] theres a little bit of revenge going on here. I told general sharp is going to get put on the spot, sevigny hands the mic to me. Thank you. The defensive okinawa would be the same as the defense of the mainland, air and Ballistic Missile defense, Cruise Missile defense using the full weight of u. S. And japanese forces. More and more is bland. Theres already a battalion sized unit more or less going in. Japanese forces are already down. The poshard getting stronger all the time. Unless theres some miraculous parting of the skies in the situation gets better, our allies is going to get stronger to defend the territory, the interest and the lives of our japanese allies. Its a very, very big thing to attack United States of america or a treaty ally. Thats a huge, huge thing. The public discussion wickedness but we need remember what a huge think that is and the consequences that any adversary would think about. This is that some ambiguous gray zone we are talking about. Its two of our most important treaty allies and Economic Partners and likeminded democracies. We have one more in the front. Steve winters, independent researcher. Just sort of envelope on the question that was just addressed. I did go to a talk by one expert on north korea who suggested that even if the regime were destroyed and the artillery was taken care of, that actually the plan of the North Koreans would be to go even with, even in a decapitated state to go to a massive gorilla and partisan war using their whole population, and that this would not resolve itself in months. It would go on for years, talking a libyan situation perhaps. So as anybody else addressing that issue . The assumption seems to be the military option is terrible, maybe 1 Million People will be killed or how many million . But that it would be over in some sense, horrible as it is, but this suggestion was it wont be over. Would you hand the mic over to that god . [laughing] to that guy . As is talked about, i think that it is therefore the ability getting information into the people of north korea about what potentially could be the future of what human rights is about, how the government is treating them come mainly by human rights is about to look at from their eyes, from the perspective of north Korean People. Without going into the classified planter anything, those, how do we come if something happened and we had to go north, there was an stability, we to go north, how do we make sure that the people first off are secured . How are they taken care of, and how do we get this word to them as quickly as possible about the truth about what we really about . Its not easy. Much more work needs to be done on it. It is part of the plans that we do that. I think that with a more cell phones, the more and more b6 again to north korea, number ways to communicate across. Again, its not going to be easy but it is necessary because if we dont, and south korea doesnt edit japan doesnt do it and we dont work this, the scenario you were just discarding of insurgencies and going to the hills and fighting for a long time i do fear is really going to happen because what north korea people have been told, and i believe what they truly believe today. General sharp nose well and helped make possible, we plan for this with our korean alice. It is imperfect. We are not perfectly aligned but we plan for. We try to talk to the chinese about it. Thats very difficult but its important for japan as well what happens if the north collapses or becomes unstable. I dont think we do enough official and unofficial dialogue with our japanese allies about with this scenario would mean for japan. I would like general oriki to weigh in on the japanese perspectives. These panels are different from normal panels because the panels can order it each other de son seniority. It was just a suggestion. [speaking in native tongue] translator my journey [inaudible] thats the problem. Im senior, well, once the north korea collapses, then what happens . I think this is my personal view, that if the internal conflict continues their, thats one possibility. Whats the cost of collapse . I think thats the question we have to ask and thats the most important thing. Kim jongun was assassinated or died of illness, i think we could think of all kinds of different reasons. And it there was no control, including in the military, whats the cause for fight or combat . So that all kinds of different factors we need to think about. So whether it becomes a guerrilla war, there still certainty. I think we think about the smooth transition or a very idiotic transition right after the war in japan, u. S. Estimate was that i think japan would fight until the end and there will be a battle on the mainland. However, it didnt happen and it ended. In case of iraq, Saddam Hussein fell and then the internal conflict. I think it all depends on culture and history and also any given country. Of those are elements need to be considered but i think we have to keep studying all kinds of possibilities. [speaking in native tongue] translator im from the defense college. When i was freshman, majority was senior. If there was a one year difference you are treated like dirt. [laughing] so senior was gone, so in front of before i speak i think i would be scolded later, so i always ask the senior, ask senior to speak first with lots of respect. And with regard to the north korea, my view is very similar to mr. Oriki i think it depends on how it collapses. For example, its alida was assassinated or it might, collapse, and then gradually get [inaudible] since that would happen in korean peninsula, so the threats to us is if the internal conflict took place, its possible a lot of spies might come to japan. And then if it was moderate collapse, then once that north korea is unified with south korea, when the unification happened in germany, germany, the west germany had lots of economic power, and then east germany within eastern bloc had lots of economic power. However, when they got unified, that caused economic pressures. [speaking in native tongue] translator so north korea, we will have a massive refugee problem if north korea would fall. And thinking about those refugees, they might make the way to china or russia. They may take the ship to japan. So we would need to be prepared to accept or handle those refugees. And, of course, the United States would take initiative or spearhead some of the activities, and Japanese Selfdefense force is not going, would not going to be the major, primary role, but we will have definitely a Logistical Support to the United States. Yes, maam, in the back. [speaking in native tongue] translator i like to ask the question. This is unusual because i usually cannot ask a question in japanese. Thank you for mentioning oconomowoc, dr. Greenhalgh okinawa, dr doctor. Earlier mr. Oriki and mr. Iwasaki was talk about moving military power sends a signal that alliance is a weekend. So when you talk about move or realignment, what kind of skill are you talking about . For example, marines and okinawa or one unit in oconomowoc . What kind are you talk about . If you could clarify that that would be great. And also defense of okinawa. Historically speaking, prior to world war ii the Imperial Japanese army or forces there was air facility was built and currently the air facilities now used by the u. S. Forces. What kind of evocations of what kind of impressions do you have about the transition in terms of history . [speaking in native tongue] translator as im speaking before mr. Oriki, thank you for the question. So currently a replacement is being discussed. I mentioned earlier about moving base should not be a light decision im not seeing either or fully over any type of skill. Of what japan is going through is part of a bigger scheme, bigger planning. For example, moving a unit, if its done in an abrupt manner, i think that shows weakness. And, of course, in order to move the unit from United States side or from japan side theres going to be a long and careful consultation and planning. So thats whats needed for careful realignment. Regarding okinawa, thats my second hometown because i was staffed in oconomowoc as my first posting and i spent years there. And so okinawa on people went through very hardship during world war ii. So for my personal understanding i think i have the understanding here so i think that really brings deeply among okinawan people, meaning that okinawans or overall japan should not accept any foreign forces. I think theres a message there, its i think the defense of okinawa is coming from that kind of Historical Context as well. Mr. Iwasaki, i agree with him. Doctor green talked about the realignment of u. S. Unit. My comment was not specific to okinawa or any other basis in japan or the United States. I just want to mention in a generic term and also about strategy. There are many defense strategies, or maybe we should have a bigger scheme to consider one specific strategy. Regarding a realignment of a unit from okinawa, i think mr. Iwasaki spoke it really well. For the defense of okinawa this is not only for the United States challenge but for us, Japanese Selfdefense force. So lets say that in 1970s there was some kind of innovation or a threat to invasion because there was a vacuum between, from the United States withdrawal and also maybe a big movement from the russian army. So i am just speaking as a hypothetical. It was talked about this, and there are some movement and also some actions according to the plan undergoing, and theres 500 km between the islands or maybe a bigger distance. We do not have a unit, a military unit there, something that theres a military vacuum. So we wanted to plug that in militarily. So having that unit, that really translates to deterrence. Not only to protect one specific island, but overall there should be sort of like a zone defense type of okinawa islands and also multiple islands defense by placing a unit. So were getting to the end of this seminar. I wanted to ask admiral blair in the few minutes we have to explain some of the thinking about the china question. We spent a lot of time on immediate military threat, appropriately, north korea. Editing before the end we should hear from one of the panelists, id like to ask admiral blair. Some crystallization of what the views were on the longer term, bigger challenge we are doing. I just sat in on our discussion with china, i think youd be a bit surprised if we did not spent most of our time talking about carrier battle groups and putting coast guard units moving forward in the South China Sea. We felt that the military posture of the alliance was sufficient to make aggression against islands in that part of the world pretty unattractive to come pretty high risk. What we discussed more with the sort of longterm geoeconomic competition that china has undertaken with the rest of the world as shown in the very ambitious one belt one road infrastructure building plan across asia. And particularly in the ambitions to be dominant in the ten most important areas of technology in the future as is laid out quite explicitly in the chinese document made in china 2025 which lays out the area of artificial intelligence, highspeed computing, robotics, the 21st century dominant technologies and china placing it will use all of the consider tools at its disposal to be dominant in those sectors by 2025. Is what is really going to make a difference in asia from United States, japan and the republic of korea needed to get on with being out front on it. So, you know, Winston Churchill has this famous quip, worse than fighting with allies deciding without them. He and roosevelt and truman were very wise and lucky to have general eisenhower in europe. If you had a famous general war fighter like patton, and i wouldnt have functioned. Weve been fortunate in recent history to have generals doing our military strategy, who have a very similar way of inking about alliance is as a coalition and especially our allies, japan in particular. And we are all lucky today to have what none on the stage and participants in the nss. So, lets conclude. I want you to join us for a reception if you have time. It is raining, so you may want to. Lets start by thanking our participants for their service. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] President Trump plans to discuss the Opioid Crisis in the United States. He treated this morning that he would participate in a briefing this afternoon about the epidemic with health and Human Services secretary tom price during his working vacation and his new jersey golf club