The honorable james r klapper who will address the issues and challenges that emerged in the Korean Peninsula and National Security. Mr. Klapper is the fourth and the longest tenured u. S. Director of National Intelligence from august 2010 to january, 2017. In this, led the u. S. Intelligence committee and served as the principal intelligence advisor to president barack obama and retired in 1995 after a career in the u. S. Armed forces. It began in 1961 when jim enlisted in the u. S. Marine corps reserves. It culminated as Lieutenant General and the u. S. Air force as the 11th director of the Defense Intelligence agency. Following his retirement, jim worked in industry with superlative distinctions. He returned two days after 9 11 as the third director of the National Agency and served in this capacity for almost five years, transforming it into the National Special intelligence agency, as it is today. His numerous awards include three National Intelligence distinguished service medals, 2 metals, the air force service. Three department of defense and distinguished civilian service awards. The National Security medal and many other u. S. , civilian, military as well as Foreign Government awards and declarations. With that, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor for us to have James Clapper with us here. Lets welcome the honorable klapper. Thank you. Mr. Clapper gracious introduction. I appreciate it. I should preface this, why am i talking about the Korean Peninsula at all . I first served there in the mid1980s. I was the jtwo in director of intelligence and the deputy fair ctwo deputy intelligence chief for the combined forces command. An arrangement that still exists today. I started there from 1985 until 1987. And developed a deep interest in the peninsula and read a lot of books about the war and really enjoyed the tour over there. I thought the air force had banished me to the Korean Peninsula. In those days, that position was an air force position of the the joint staff changed its came to its senses and came and changed it to army, not the air force masquerading as an Army Intelligence officer. I did it for two years. In my next assignment i was director of intelligence for what was then the pacific command. I sustained my interest in the peninsula, of course. Thereafter, for any other jobs i had in the military, to include the last one, just tried to stay current with developments on the peninsula. When it became dni in 2010, people in the white house were aware of my background with the Korean Peninsula and in 2014, we had two citizens, u. S. Citizens incarcerated in north korea. For some reason, the white house decided to send me to retrieve these two citizens. Mark sanger of the New York Times wrote an article about the trip after it was over and tried to explain why he thought i was selected. As a senior u. S. Military spy, to be dispatched on a sensitive Diplomatic Mission to north korea. Sangers explication explanation was cold war perfect for north korea. I always loved that. President obama and i had a laugh about it when it came out. That opened up the possibility of, of course, afforded me the opportunity to have dialogue with Senior North Korean officials. Not himself, but one down below him. My First White House talking point that i was to deliver to the North Koreans was, you must dean allies denuclearize before we negotiate. I was there all of five minutes before i realized that was a nonstarter. It was very clear to me then, and i do not think things have changed in the eight years since. They have no inclination whatsoever to denuclearize. Their behavior has been just the opposite. They have profoundly expanded their Nuclear Capability, or more accurately, the perception of their Nuclear Capability, which is always which is all they need for their purpose of deterrence. I got reminded about, for example, the North Koreans, what happened to more market off he the way he negotiated his weapons of mass destruction, and look what happened to him. The North Koreans, i found in my intense dialogue them, are very much aware of their shortfalls and weaknesses. They understand their economic challenges. They understand the military imbalance they have with the republic of korea, buttressed by the United States. One of the things that really impressed me when i was there was the palpable sense of siege, the siege mentality. The paranoia that exists in north korea. It is pretty clear to me that they are just not going to denuclearize. That made a big impression on me, and of course, i lived through the Obama Administration whose policy was to push for denuclearization, just like administrations before obama. We all pushed the same thing. Republican or democratic, insisting on denuclearization. President trump it. By actually having meetings with kim jongun, which we disdained in the past. I supported on cnn, i thought it was a good idea for him to do that. Provided, which he did not do, that he used the considerable leverage he gained simply by agreeing to meet. That is something the kim family has lusted for going back to kim ilsung. The prestige of a facetoface, oneonone meeting with the president of the United States was a huge deal. Thats what was made clear to me when i was there. However, from president obama, which they really wanted badly. We were not sure whether we were going to get our two citizens back. I held the letter out for a while as leverage, such as it was. What im going to posit tonight is something i realized is heretical and most of you want agree with. As i have thought about this, i wonder whether our continuation of the policy of denuclearization is ever going to work. You know, the half humorous definition of insanity where you keep doing the same thing over and over expecting a different outcome. I wonder if we shouldnt at least consider a different approach with north korea with respect to their Nuclear Capability. A lot of people are not real comfortable with the fact the likes of india and pakistan have new their weapons. Well, the fact is they have them. The fact is they have been responsible stewards of their Nuclear Weapons. This recent incident involving misfiring of missiles by the indians against the pakistanis are the case in point. The indians reacted very quickly because of their awareness and sensitivity about potential nuclear confrontation. I have raised this question, which has fallen on deaf ears, and i am certain it will with this group as well but i will nevertheless share it with you. I wonder if we shouldnt think about changing our approach with the North Koreans and think about recognizing what is already de facto as the North Koreans badly want to be recognized as a member of the nuclear cults. The perception of being the member of a nuclear club. One of the 10 Nations Armed with Nuclear Weapons. If we think through how to extract some concessions on our part and acknowledge that and what might accrue from that. What you would want to do, if anyone seriously consider that, which i think politically for either party is too hard to change, would be what inducements, how could we reduce the North Koreans to behave responsibly in the same way the indians and the pakistanis do . And other new their nations do. That is the basic approach. My intense encounter with the North Koreans eight years ago, and again i do not think they will change, does not change that view. I think we would be better served to have the equivalent of what we had in havana for decades. A u. S. Intersection, a diplomatic presence in pyongyang that would facilitate communication and dialogue. Rather than depending on other nations, sweden for example, to represent our interest on their behalf. We can in turn, would have to allow the North Koreans a presence in washington. As a way of promoting dialogue. Funny as this sounds, this would reassure the North Koreans that we are not going to bomb pyongyang if we have official american presence there. That sounds a little hokey, but they believe that. At least, when i dialogue with them. Now, so, what i am getting at here is eventually would be to persuade the North Koreans into some kind of arms control agreement where, allowed russia and the u. S. , they have Nuclear Weapons but we have an agreement on their limits and inspection regime. At least up until recently. I do not know if that is possible. I do think that the rubric of korea would almost have to be very prominent in any such dialogue because what the North Koreans most worry about is an invasion by the south and an overthrow of their regime. Only the republic can reassure and persuade the North Koreans that they wouldnt do that. Again, that is the notion in a nutshell. I do not have a big long treatise to explain it. I would just suggest the policy of denuclearization has not works. If anything, it has been counterproductive. We have been imposing sanctions on the North Koreans forever. We were doing it when i was a j2 in the 1980s. They almost succeeded. I would be much more in favor of a more broad and at least a modest diplomatic presence in each others capitals. When i arrived in north korea, i was the first cabinet level official since Madeleine Albright had visited there in the year 2000. They had huge expectations. About my visit. They were bitterly, bitterly disappointed when i was not there to foster, or be a catalyst, the started a new age, a new era in the relationship between the United States and north korea, and north korea and south korea. They were bitterly disappointed at that. As i found out. They got quite threatening. The second day i was there, i was informed by a north korean that the population of pyongyang had learned of my presence and their they could no longer guarantee my safety or security, or that of my small delegation. That is the proposal i have been public about in the past. I have written about it. I had a debate with as many of you know. A great friend and colleague. We did it in a semipublic forum. It sure didnt persuade anybody and probably wont tonight. I just think in the context of perhaps rethinking our approach, because the one we have been pushing has not been very successful. I will stop there and open it up for questions. And rebuttals, i am sure. Thank you. Let me make a brief comment. Icas is not a government. There is no foreign funds involved in icas activities. Mr. Clapper im glad to know that now. [laughter] general, you do posit a very controversial concept for sure. It seems to be slightly incomplete. If youre really going to accept north korea as a nuclear power, youve got this youve got to think about south korea and japan come our allies who might also want to be in that category. Mr. Clapper that is true. There are all kinds of downsides to this. Another one, which bothers me, is that this is essentially a reward for bad behavior. Thats the way the North Koreans would take it. I get that. In the end, i am trying to be pragmatic. What can be done to better influence, or have hope of influencing north korean behavior . The policy we have followed doesnt seem to be doing that. You point out a serious concern, but i hasten to repeat what i said, which is that diff factor that is the situation. The perception of the region has that probably has engendered the discussion, particularly during the late Prime Minister abes time about pursuing Nuclear Weapons capabilities in japan. It would have all kinds of implications that would have to be sorted out, no question. There are, unquestionably, downsides to doing that, just as there are downsides to what we are doing now. If youre going to give up on the denuclearization, how about asking in return that they close the gulags and you make progress on human rights . Mr. Clapper absolutely. What things would we want to extract from them . In return for acknowledging. That is exactly the thing to do. I have not thought of everything, but that certainly is one thing. Getting them to open up. Which they fear, by the way. Thats another thing, promote a change in their human rights approach. Absolutely. Thank you. Jasper, go ahead. Thanks a lot. It is very interesting. I had some other comments i was going to ask you about, but this is too interesting. I am in support of you. I have been arguing for years not to accept the nucleoside, but to table it. Put it on the side and talk about other things. What i like to talk about is economic reform. I like trumps idea very much, i liked his summits, but i thought that our side, be pushed the idea of investment or opening up north korea. To me, that scares them. They would be afraid of coming in there. What i have argued for years, and even more now, is that we need to help them reform their economy. Open up their economy internally. They have such huge money problems inside the country. They are using dollars and yuan, it is crazy economics inside their country. I thought for years that at a more technical level, not a seniorlevel i mean, the seniorlevel would help. The president ial level i thought would help, now it didnt. I still think that at a more technical level, american experts going in and talking with north korea about complicated things like how you manage a dollar economy. Well, we kind of know how to do that. North koreans have a lot of trouble with that. I am thinking there are all kinds of technical level issues that really aim to open them up, to get human rights improvements. A lot of the things that we want to north korea, that would basically make their Nuclear Program prohibitively expensive. If they couldnt afford it. I appreciate what you are saying. Mr. Clapper either way, great to see you again. I agree with you. This would have to be premised, in order to get to that stage of dialogue, North Koreans would have to be persuaded that we, meaning the United States principally, are not going to foment a coup. We are not going to invade. Anything, that would be a nono. They would have to agree to some mechanism for verifying that. They meant not want to do that. I do not know. We do not have any conditions that reimpose this that we impose to govern the indian Nuclear Program. So, the likelihood the North Koreans is slim. Go ahead. Just to go back to joes question, what about south korea, japan, taiwan and others going to clear . Would that be of concern to you . It would. I am going to relate two potentially unrelated things with respect to japan and a reason for that, which has depended on us for a nuclear serial nuclear shield for decades. What this points out to me, and i think the only convincing argument we can make to them not to acquire their own Nuclear Weapons would be to say, we are going to modernize our Nuclear Capability and part of that modernization will be an enhancement of our nuclear shield. And that we would recommend you not adopt or acquire Nuclear Weapons. That is a separate issue. With some controversy attached, because the hallway wisdom, which i am not sure is accurate, is that democrats are not for modernizing our Nuclear Arsenal over using Nuclear Weapons and republicans are. That has all kinds of internal domestic, political considerations. If i working, which i am not, i would press on with our nuclear modernization. I think we know the outlines of it. Be 21 for the air force. New submarines and a commitment to build. And clearly and most importantly, modernization of our groundbased icbm force. That, the argument i would try to make to the likes of japan and the republic of korea, taiwan and others, that we will enhance our nuclear shield that has protected you for decades. So theres no need for you to do that and if you did that, it would actually be more destabilizing. Thank you. [indiscernible] yes. Well, i would just say a couple things about this concept. One, using the indiapakistan model, i would point out once india went nuclear, there was nothing in this world that was going to restrain pakistan, its people and its military, from having a Nuclear Weapon because of the historic animosity. I think it is totally unrealistic to think people in japan would accept an American Nuclear umbrella if they knew there was a north Korea Nuclear bomb. I think taiwan would be dragged into it. The other concern i have is, you would have six Nuclear Powers in northeast asia, if you count russia. We are now in an era where northeast asia is the center of vera lind knapp fiber lint like we saw in europe in the 20th century. The chinese, like they way it like the way they went after nancy pelosi, that is just only one example. You have vera lind nationalism in russia as you have seen in ukraine. It north korea you have it, you even see elements of that in our allies in south korea and japan. You have nationalistic feelings. We presumed that the turn of the 20th century that economics, trade that economics would maintain peace. But the arms race and the virulent nationalism in europe created a world war. If north korea went nuclear, you can sweettalk in tokyo all you want, theres no way the japanese would ever feel comfortable depending on the u. S. Against a north Korea Nuclear capability because of history, nationalism and other issues. I think south korea would feel obligated and then i think taiwan would feel obligated. I do not think we would get through the next 30 years without a nuclear war. Mr. Clapper well, you know, i respect your point of view. I would simply observe that the North Koreans already have the bomb. That is a fact. In fact, their that you have a nuclear, i do not think we get through the next 30 years about a nuclear war. Well, no, i respect your point of view. I would simply observe that North Koreans have them all. That is a fact. In fact the Nuclear Capability has expanded in terms of the nuclears asian policy. And i would suggest that the relationship we have with japan and north korea is different than the relationship we have back then. So anyway, go ahead. Thank. General, very interesting. Let me put on a few strings. We you said what has failed in the policy will continue to fail. That is not quite the way i would see it. I think any fail. The single focus of nuclears asian that nothing will be done until you can so what really happened where Obama Administration and again during the Trump Administration is that none of them were really willing to give serious negotiations unless north korea denuclearize first. And that is what i consider to be proud. In my own view. In terms of recognizing north korea as weapons. As you said, they do. So we do certainly need to deliver that. And recognize that. But, recognizing them what is that really mean . Would that mean that they would stop building up their capabilities to deter the United States . And instead, just focusing on the serious negotiations before the serious negotiation. The fact that none of those administrations were willing to allow north korea to have a severe a civilian Nuclear Program. Which they also question in a different direction. So, wouldnt it possible it that you could get a different result if you could have serious negotiation . But i would never walk away from the fact that the endgame has to be that north korea is without Nuclear Weapons. But they have to be serious about negotiating direction so that is my comment. I agree with that. I will take it. But i think the process has to are start with a cap. Thats why it into the large control regime of some sort with cap control so that they are not required their ticket to survival which is a way i think they think that other that they think of other nuclear capabilities. You know the disappointments when they get with kim and jan to ask him what it would take and what would be the inducement that would be required and and be specific about what it is you want to into negotiations to where some point in the future denuclearize. I should have made that clear i apologize. But if we could get north korea to get rid of the Nuclear Weapons it would be a great thing, but declaring that our policies are denuclearization and is a nonstarter. Ok. Go ahead. Books. I did not ask. Thank general. I think this is a step of nuclear relation and the u. S. Has also promised to sign that i will one day do away with Nuclear Weapons. So north korea is still in the saying implication. And this kind of step is why they feel confidence between us and then. And then i would really love to hear what mr. Trump talked with north korea when they decided to partially have a test shot because this was this fine the denuclearization in the nuclear test. And people were not able to seize this opportunity. And a year later we have this problem. But they also put something on the table. And even when this was restricted by us. They have more than one here before they ever started it. They have activities in north korea. I am sorry was their questionnaire i did not hear it . The last was that when did we see the summit fail north korea did still more than one year before it started the nuclear what they were rating they were probably writing something because everything was ready. With the exception of all the time but perhaps a Nuclear Weapon test. And they weres guarding it without any mishap. That is a good point. I do not know. I suppose they were trying to see if they would be some form of followup which did not come from the u. S. It is good point and like many others i am trying to figure out the North Koreans and i do not know what was going on in the mind of their leadership elite during that year. Tom youre next . Yes thank you. We all benefit from your service and expertise and your wisdom. And i highly command that you came up with this idea of a new approach that would be a transformation in leadership and then also support from all the agencies and people who work for the country. Now, a couple questions. Number one, when human sin when you visited in 2010, have you thought of ideas that you are talking about today . That was question number one. Question number two, how would you assess pros and cons for most of the members for which you been heading for many years and you know perfectly well. The players in the intelligence communities and agencies as well. And also, what Biden Administration would need support and their staff and how do you assess there is support for this new idea . Will let me respond to your first question which i think is an important one. My main interlocking was one king young shoe which at that time was the head of rgb which is the north korean soviet russian gr you and he titled himself as my officer number up. My counterpart. Why antiamerican, just exuded hatred for the United States i think he had been assigned by kim young to hostess because he obviously did not volunteer for it. We had a long 13 course dinner and the discussion got very nasty. He was it was not pleasant. I will put it that way. The only point i was able to make that had some residents within and by the way, he later became the letter carrier between there president and ours at the time. The only thing i saw president a all within where he did not have was when i made reference to the fact when the United States has no permanent and permanent enemies. Such as japan. I saw in my own personal experience of vietnam. I served two tours in southeast asia. And it was a terrible experience. I was there 6566. I hated it and it was 43 years before i went back to vietnam and i saw how much vietnam had changed for the better. The economic success that vietnam was enjoying and the better quality of life of the vietnamese people. And the fact that we had diplomatic relations with vietnam. Economic relations. Intelligence relations even to some extent. I said, so could it be with the dprk. And that seemed to take them back. That there was a possibility i said here we are former enemies the u. S. And vietnam. And now, we the relationship has changed profoundly. And that was the only point i saw a resignation with him. And he asked me to many questions i cannot remember them all, but one of them was, what about support or not for a new approach. And i inspected little support for it. But within the Intelligence Community we are supposed to be policy neutral the Intelligence Community is. So intelligence would provide its best judgment and assessment about north korean capabilities and what the decision about whether to change our policy or not. And i am sorry if you could repeat the question i miss. Oh i guess we lost him. Well i am guessing the question the real question was, the Biden Administration has squandered one year without accomplishing anything and you know how south korean president yoon proposed a and he did not act with communication by the topic of communication by supporting u. S. Korea providing u. S. Economic data and what have you and so forth. But north korea can clearly rejected that and they said they do not even they were in no way they pointed out that it came back to south korea. A new suggestion. And they may have some residents in the south korean population. The populations are murray fruit 50 opposed for such a thing. And ideological reasons that were included. Nevertheless, i think by administration between the years of doing anything, as you provide and explain to us, we have leadership and there are people who got to start taking actions. And i think this new idea for a new approach has come forward in such a high level as yours in authority and experience as wisdom. On the prospect of this new idea. I appreciate that. I think it strike too much influence for me but i think the Biden Administration is i think their policy is called strategic patients. Wished to me as a euphemism for exasperation. Which to me is a euphemism for exasperation. We have other frisch and other fish to fry around the world and they do not have focused they are focusing on the Korean Peninsula and i think that is the case. Theres been so many efforts made with an attempt to do something about north korea under the Foreign Policy umbrella. And i think in the minds of many, it has been a futile exercise. Thank you. Thank you. Points have been raised that are interesting. It seems to me, that if north korea can recognize north korea as the worlds ninth or 10th nuclear power, that would give japan a terrific opportunity to do away finally with article nine and its corporation. And japan is potentially, in my view, the Strongest Military power in the region stronger than china and russia will russia. So i think we let the genie out of the bottle. But the other question is, i was just making a comment, of course i love your view, the real question is, what makes you think all these economic inducements and talking would have the slightest effect after kim jonguns youngest sister told him to shut up. How can we expect the luers that youre talking about and the suggestions of numerous others how can you possibly expect that north korea will react positively to any of this. Even if we came out with a we want to try a new approach, ok, we will recognize you as a nuclear player and we are expecting changes in your behavior. And it is over on them if they do not want to do that then ok. Again, it is another effort to break the ice that we are in right now. Where we fall you got to denuclearize before we do anything. It has had the opposite effect. And i liked your comment about article four in their constitution the one that restricts the japanese from offensively rearming and that certainly includes Nuclear Weapons. And that could be very interesting if the japanese were to do that. I agree with you about the potential about in relation to north korea or china even. So that is interesting genie out of the bottle which a lot of people would be wary of. David go ahead please. I have a question about recently north korea made recognize russian sovereignty. Of course, potential north korean in the region. I was wondering if even much of the 21st how we might you are breaking up. I could hear about every third word you were saying. I am sorry i cannot respond if somebody else could hear or help him. How about now . Repeat it david go ahead. Yeah can you hear me still . Yes. David, go ahead. Yeah i was just wondering, given north koreas recognition of mission sovereignty and given their growing relationship you think that might fundamentally change the dynamic of the region. And whether or not that might change the views on how realistic the possibility of north korean in your proposal north korea especially given the destabilization. I am not sure i am getting the drift here on the relationship of north korea recognizing russian sovereignty. Russian sovereignty in ukraine. Oh ok. Yes. I am wondering if that budding relationship might kind of mike. Well, what can the russians really do . For the North Koreans . At this point . Given their occupations for their preoccupations. So i am not sure that to me it remains to be seen of whether it would mean anything we would put it that way. David, go ahead. Thank you dr. Kitty and general klapper. Russia is shifting weight to north korea in return for is diplomatic score and efforts in ukraine. Went to the 100 thousand north korean troops go to ukraine as they offered. We will we see that Operation Network as well . Yes, me too. I think your remarks tonight will be headlining news for tomorrow. I think the korean press will jump all over these and i hope that they grasp the nuances of what youre saying, but i am afraid they will stand at the National Intelligence recognizing north korea in power in that could be a headline. So with that i would like to make a couple comments. Maybe not to get off. So we talk about the vietnam model but i think you should remember that it did not occur until after the u. S. Negotiated with the u. S. Troops from vietnam and then North Vietnam was able to unify its control. And i think that is something that north korea that is wet north korea would truly love. Know that is a point. And we talk about the Economic Development it is after north korea dominated the peninsula. Stated i would point out to you though, that the north korean government has made many many legal concessions to the south because of the economic powerhouse that the south of korea still in and so, and you know, it is very capitalist, and south korea in ho chi minh city. Great points, but with regards to north korea, we have to understand objectives and strategies. And i think i fear, that this kind of proposal will be assessed by kim jongun as a Political Warfare strategy. He clearly wants this. He wants to negotiate and be treated like a former soviet. That is central. And so we have to be careful that this kind of proposal does not cause him to double down on his strategy and his development of capabilities for his strategy to dominate the grand peninsula. Of got to jump in here david. Youre exactly right. Then i mentioned before, the downsides to any of the different approaches with north korea is if we change our approach from denuclearization. That will be seen and publicized by the north as reward for bad behavior. And that is clearly we recognize this is a downside or negative two the change in our approach to the North Koreans. I think we all recognize it as i think north korea will recognize it as success. And given the motivation to continue to do what its policies of subversion and coercion and i think we have to be clear that its objectives no matter how farfetched they are to us, that they still want to dominate the grand peninsula. In north korea. And keep that in mind, as an objective. With that said, it is my belief that there will be no end to bit Nuclear Program or the begins the crimes committed in till there is unification. What i would like to be, and youre proposing ross is to manage the situation. But i would like to see components through their President Union plan combined Alliance Plan that adds in a humans human rights upfront approach. An information strategy, because it is an essential threat to the regime, and a longterm focus on unification. Edification will come in four ways peaceful if they want it, war, the quickest way, regime collapse, still dangerous, and internal change in north area. We an emerging leader that macy unification. We need a plan that will give kim jongun the options to change his behavior. The option for him to be forced to change his behavior by the elite in the military or the option to be changed by the Korean People who no longer tolerate the rule. But come on, the real question to you is have you given any thought to unification to a policy of unification. I mean we have played service with it. Obama and even crop has talked about this unification. But have you ever given any thought to unification how the come about . As a stated policy objective, would you put that in i have, by the way, i very much appreciate and resonate with your comments. I think youre right on. I think ultimately, Korean Peninsula will somehow reunify. In the issue is, will it be done by force or some other way . And i am suggesting, by changing approach is a way of is a catalyst, or starting what i think would be a longterm process to reunify. Now a complication here that we have not mentioned much is china. China views, i think, my opinion, china views north korea as an imperative as a strategic offer. And the last time the chinese asserted themselves in relation to korea was 1951 when they were concerned that they were going to lose their strategic buffer in the form of north korea. So, there is a real art form here to promoting moving towards reunification which i agree needs to be the ultimate thing. The Korean People, north and south, i saw evidence of this when i was there there was still tremendous emotional magnitude between the north and south even though their languages are different and all of that. So, just to respect the emotional, spiritual aspects here, of the Korean People, as a people, so, the artform of how do you read that needle of moving towards reunification in such a way that the North Koreans do not find frightening and it does not jeopardize chinas position in having a some kind of strategic buffer. For them against us. I think youve laid it out extremely well. And q larry makes. Director clamber klapper taiwan has been mentioned but it is not being discussed as it is being discussed at greatly right now. I have a question about taiwan, china situation which i believe is a infinitely greater danger right now then east Asian Security and than north korea is. The washington the Washington Post contains and i am sure you read this, a very detailed article detailing how the u. S. Intelligence community gained knowledge, except advanced knowledge of russias plan to attack ukraine. And, the Biden Administration past this knowledge on to key nato allies and warned the Ukrainian Government about the russian plan to attack. Given your knowledge of the Intelligence Community, do you believe that u. S. Intelligence agencies have any kind of similar capability to discern in advance a definitive chinese plan to attack taiwan that would enable us to prepare for our response to that. Whatever that response would be. But also to warn taiwan in advance that that was coming. Do you think we have that capability at all . Two more in china in according to that Washington Post speech we had with regard to russia . I do not have any inside baseball on that any longer. I am five years out. But i would suggest to you though, that if the chinese p. R. C. Were going to physically invade taiwan, and capture taiwan territory that the chinese would necessarily show off preparation for that as much as they might try to hide it. Whether we would get some order passed down the command chain or something and message or messages a message that would indicate i know them. But i think, influential he, there would be a lot of indicators that the chinese were about to invade. I think the chinese are on their own time table. I think i do not think an invasion is imminent. I could be wrong about this, there are several reasons why i think the chinese would not do that specifically right now. Where g will be anointed as president for life. I do not think he wants all the young people and the invasion and what it would do to perhaps jeopardize that. China has profound internal issues demographics of which challenges with covid and a drought right now and their economy is not the is not in the best shape. Theres a lot of reason why right now i do not think an invasion of taiwan is imminent. I also think, the performance of the russians military performance is going to give the chinese a pause. And one of the things that everyone underestimated is of course, the ukrainian will to fight and we profoundly overestimated even with a warning, we overestimated the fight of the russians. Will the chinese have to think about that. What is the will to fight for their own troops that have not caught in combat since 1979. So i think, and how much resistance when the taiwanese citizens provide or give to the chinese invasion . So i think all of those factors are, right now, at least to me they mean that an invasion is not imminent. And i do not think we are in quite as serious of a crisis mode. But in the future, you know, who knows what the chinese will do, but i do not think it is imminent right now. Inc. You. Richard thank you. Richard. Richard are you there . One more point on that question. Go ahead richard. If we didnt have indication in the morning of an invasion by the prc, we would share that with the taiwanese. I think, for that purpose, we would be better served and the taiwanese noted that they intend to spend more on defense which is appropriate and the weaponry that we provided the taiwanese might be better where we profit from our experience with ukrainians. And better kinds of weaponry are better suited to repel an invasion would be in order. John . Go ahead. Yes thank you. General klapper, my suggestion is going back to kim jongun i think you bring a side basketball like did. I prefer Michael Jordan signature on the ball but i do have a question for you, what about a nonaggression pact between the u. S. , the North Koreans, that would show that we have no intent of attacking them and then later on, because they are not going to denuclearize. That is not in their dna right now. Well yeah, that is right. One thing there has been discussion about right now there is still they agreed to stop shooting on the 27th of july 1953. So we do not have a piece treaty or peace agreement, we, actually the united nations, i guess, the u. S. Rocked with the north, so i would assume, that if a piece treaty would have been discussed, that that would have at least implicitly be an aggression pact. But with the peace treaty you have to have china on board. Yeah that would be good if the chinese would enter into an agreement and you are right, they obviously would have to lay. I think practically. And, if the chinese did draw into that that could be managed appropriately and it could be a good thing. I this is Richard White can you hear me now . Richard go ahead. My question is how do you think the russians would view your proposal . You mean the nonaggression pact . Know your original proposal about allowing them to keep Nuclear Weapons under certain rules. I think that would be ok with it. Ok, richard, dorothy go ahead. Yeah. So, to me there are issues with North Koreans and this is really a creation and destruction dynamics. Meaning, according to parties, they are unique thoughts, actions, and laborers, i mean, they have been careful going into three digits now talking about bread baskets on the table, monkey business, and we are not just talking about labor issues we are talking about i. T. Rights and issues. It is really long overdue. North korea refugees came to this country have been disproportionately victimized. In their livelihoods, and their social life, and then firsthand, and eyewitness to victimization in Higher Education in schools. And i think that they are having become victims for their love of integration activities and it can trigger and snowball down into north koreas territory and given them legitimization to Nuclear Weapons. So the best way is to recognize, recognize, recognize. And the parties, their thoughts, actions, and laborers. Thank you for that. I think the comment i would make, you know, the discussion like this there is all kinds of implications. To change in policy certainly have not thought about that we would have to contend with there is no question about that. David. No ahead. Yes, thank you. Thank you for speaking with us, general. For what it is worth, i would say that i agree with you your opinion that we should definitely rethink our north korean policy. I think that a lot of folks would agree with that. We might disagree on what the next step or policy should look like but we all agree i think, that something should be changed. I would like to ask you a question take this with a grain of salt ive only seen this reported in the korean press so it may not be accurate but former usa commander said we should take korea and work to make north korea an ally. Never mind a peace treaty or it never mind integration or anything like that just make them an ally. And obviously a lot of folks have their own opinion about that but i think he is kind of hitting on something. One of the prisms that i have to tend to have on north korean policy is isolation. And when we think about denuclearization, we are missing something that the they have Nuclear Weapons because of the security guarantee. In a world where some countries do not have Nuclear Weapons. We have to think about what the security guarantee what if is replaced with. We have this weird situation where the security guarantee is replaced by us. Essentially. The u. S. Alliance system and by extension, particularly in the nuclear aspect, by our Nuclear Weapons if we were to bring in north korea under been Nuclear Weapon. That raises my eyebrow a lot. So i was wondering on that aspect, the first aspect idea of making north korea into an ally, what do you think about that . And if not, if we make them an ally or even if we do not, what is the securities they situation if in north korea if they no longer have Nuclear Weapons . Would making them an ally proceed or come after reunification . In other words, i am not quite sure how we get to making north korea as a dprk and ally. Think it is a great idea. I have a lot of respect for brooks he is a smart guy and he has thought about these things. So, i think, it is an idea worth considering. I think what we would have to think through, and i did not know from the top of my head, i am not smart enough to figure that out tonight, but what would the relationship be with that having north korea as an ally in some warm and reunification to david maxwells point, i think ultimately that has to happen. A reunification. So, under that scenario, but the whole country would be an ally and would hope. Nobu free here . If not david maxwell, do you have a followup question . No, no i dont i am good. I appreciate the comments. Ok tom . Mr. Bonus. So many points have been raised, but, i just wanted to pursue the question of the inducements we would get back into talks since Everything Else has failed. And kim jongun is not responding to south korea or the u. S. So, what is the next step. I did not know how to bring this off, i mentioned earlier, that i saw President Trump missed a golden opportunity to ask kim jongun and get get a what would it take what would be your inducement over the longhaul to change your behavior and, you know, i do not know how he would respond but it would lease at least be the opportunity to get it from the horses mouth. I am not sure that we understand what would induce the North Koreans to change their behavior. Certainly, some form of security. That is what motivates them now to have Nuclear Weapons and expand their capability. For them, it is about survival. And they understand, nobody paid any attention to them if it were not for their Nuclear Weapons or the perception that they have weapons that they were that work. Thats all they have to create for the terms is an assumption. I think it is a great west and great question. We can speculate but to me, the best thing to do would be to ask them. You know, maybe there should be some form of communication between President Biden and kim jongun they did not have to do it in person. You know. Have someone bring him a letter. Have of i dont know. I think the question you raise is an excellent one and i am not sure that we really know. Inc. You. Thank you. Ambassador do trani out there. Do you have a final point . Yeah. Yeah a couple questions. The first question is if the u. S. Recognizes north korea as a nuclear country, then after that, north korea can send the Nuclear Weapon to other countries because of guarantee by the u. S. And the second question is, north korea propaganda said they joined the iba and and the mpt and they just get on from the mpt. So now, they have a Nuclear Weapon. Does that mean, how can it follow the north korea model so they can have recognizes as a Nuclear Weapon country. Those are the two questions. I am not sure we do not attach too much importance to the fact that the North Koreans have Nuclear Weapons. So, i am not convinced either just how much it would change anyones behavior and other nations behavior just because we say, ok, we now recognize the fact of what weve known for year, that the North Koreans have Nuclear Weapons. And so, we are facing up to that fact. Rather than not recognizing what has really existed. So, i am not sure all these kind of implications if they would happen or not if we simply approached north korea differently by recognizing what they have and trying to deal with it. And i would vote for some forms of an arm reform regime and if they do not want to have that in terms of reduced minced we would have to find out what would appeal to the North Koreans. So, again, this is a tough problem. We have been doing business one way for a long time and we have not achieved our objective of denuclearizing. In fact, just the opposite. Ambassador trini go ahead. Director clapper, you have been generous with your time, your comments are really insightful and i am not just saying that either, and you are absolutely right, or has to be a different pattern on here. Because if we keep doing the same thing and we keep moving a certain way, they get more Nuclear Weapons and delivery systems, it is so obvious, we do know what they want, we know they want security assurances. We do know that they want the sanctions lifted because they are really biting. And we also know that they want a normal relationship with the u. S. In many ways, as we have said to them in many times, the best security assurances you can get is globalization relations within the u. S. We have embassies in washington, and dr. Klapper is right on. You talked about the intersection Madeleine Albright talked about it as well. It can be a process. So, it may be a question of terminology of what we are talking about but if we are talking about actions for actions, we are not saying dilute denuclearize first before you get deliverables. We are talking about as you move toward dismantling Nuclear Weapons infrastructure that you will get benefits and ultimately with verifying denuclearization there will be normalization of relations. So, in some ways, i think we are talking about the same thing, but it is also a question of perception. And that is why, the North Koreans need to come back to talks. And and what your administration put on the table is good opening volume has not come back. And hopefully, the Biden Administration and the u. S. Died and others would really endorse it in a significant way to get north korea realized that being tethered to china and russia is that their best future . What you say of about that general klapper . Think that is where they would like to be in the long term . An ally United States . No, i think their preference would be not to be tethered to china. And i think the history has been with north korea over the years, so, i think they would like a better life. With further people and a better life in terms of recognition internationally. In this is what we have to figure out. What inducements can we offer and importantly, the sequencing of those inducements. And for some period of time. I believe in order to get the North Koreans into this, we have to recognize them as a nuclear power. With a view towards it in the future and this is not going to happen by close of business friday. It is moving towards a less threatening postural i will put it that way. For some period of time they will have to have some kind of Nuclear Capability for their own security. And their own feeling of survival. And, i am not sure we appreciate that. Sufficiently. Thank you general. Ok this is your last question dennis. Go ahead. Ok i was going to make a comment to general klapper and to ambassador do trani and in bassett are due trani, you may remember talking about the Liaison Office in 1996 in beijing at the embassy where you and i and chuck hartmut remember him from long ago . It came out to beijing and there was the meeting i was there i did not know if you were there with the Swedish Embassy and we asked them to open and to look after american interests in kim jongun because we had some young people being retained by the North Koreans and the swedish embassies said at the meeting, well, we got him out of beijing we do not have a for that. And we said did not worry it will be two or three years and that was 26 years ago so that is my comment. Thank you. Please do not change. Well, i need to go. Because i have