Of building the russians into this 10foot tall man that they are not today. The russians have also admitted they are increasing their operational tempo. Of the previous head of the russian navy stated in 2015, their submarine activities had increased 50 in 2015 compared to 2014. As part of the study the Team Productivity to travel throughout the region, stopping in uk, sweden, finland and warsaw. We conducted another workshop here in dc. These were ultimately helpful in building out our findings and making sure we were tempering the report conclusion correctly. This is a useful image, actually taken from a study that looked at nato, any submarine more pair, science and Technology Cooperation during the cold war, so there are some things about it that are a bit off, notably the Breakout Group of russian subs from the baltic sea into the north sea. Might not be the operational construct of the day, but this really captures sort of the scope of the problem. For us looking to the north, you can see the two main area concerns in the baltics and then coming out of the peninsula through the g. I. Uk and sort of out into the broader atlantic. What this does not show in what i want to hone in on is the difference in the threat in the way that it has to be addressed in the baltic sea. Of the north atlantic is wide open. There are exportable choke points. And nato used it to its advantage in years past it is unclear how much they can use to their advantage to basically because in increases in russian capabilities, which i will touch on a bit more detail later on. In the baltic sea, its really a very very difficult environment for conducting submarine operations. Its shallow, confined and those that operate small submarines, there are many places to hide and lots of unexploded ordnance left over from world war ii and the cold war. I dont know if anyone saw, but dont during the most recent exercise they were reports of some of the d mining units actually finding world war ii minds in the mud. Summer its a very challenging area to operate in an something that will have to be different between the two basins and something that needs to be remembered and respected. Would we think the russians are up to . Theres a host of activities that have we view our concerning. Probably the most widely reported was that territorial believed to be territorial violation conducted by what most people think is a russian summary and sweden october 2014. There were reports released by the Swedish Ministry of defense that show what looks to be like a periscope inside the plushy zero. The swedes spent roughly a week looking for the submarine and there was no sort of conclusively Public Statement that said this is what it was and this is what we found. Again, another historical they said they were fairly certain he was a russian sub. Also, alarmingly for our Close Friends in the uk dire were Russian Submarines reported operating in close proximity to the home of the British Nuclear deterrent. Those are particularly concerning because the uk with the nimrod any submarine work aircraft, excuse me, had none of that capability. They were forced to reach out to their allies in nato to sort of say we need to get it in and start looking for this submarine important things to remember about these activities, in many ways russian returning to its normal course of operation during the cold war. So, what we perceive now as aggressive is really more of a return to what normalcy was and that was one of the core things we found in studies that theres a pretty big gap between how we perceive the activities and whats actually going on in reality. However, thats not to say that there are not places where russia is actually carrying out aggressive activity. Territorial violation in places such as sweden and finland, activities near a book undersea cable, locking of lanes of undersea cables primarily depending on how you want to refer to it undersea cable and the baltic baltics er provocative and what this shows us is that russia is using its underseas capabilities as part of what we perceive to be a larger course of campaign and allies in partners in europe and also what these have shown is that there is a current lack of capability and capacity amongst partners in the region. This is sort of a snapshot of the russian navy today, looking specifically at its submarine fleets. Its important to know the Russian Submarine fleet is considerably smaller than in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There was about 240 submarines at the end of the cold war. There are roughly 56 and the russian fleet. Looking at the russian fleet is always a challenging thing to do since the because its unclear what is and is not operational in the fleet, so whats russian claims is often not what he can put to see. Russia has been slowly overhauling its matter modern court of Nuclear Power attack submarines. Of that core forces are capable, well trained and very proficient and undersea warfare on the material side, theres a new generation of russian summary of coming out, a new Ballistic Missile submarine, missile powered attack simmering. From what we can tell from opensource reporting, they are fantastic submarines. However, there are not that many of them and they have been subject to extremely difficult determine processes and its unclear how many russia will be able to afford going forward. Want to talk about something thats not talked about a lot and its the russian auxiliary submarine force. Russia operates a small number of very small Nuclear Powered submarines capable of diving, believed to be in excess of several thousand meters. The us used to operate a submarine like this that was called and are one. It was a small deep submergence vessel that was used for research and other tasks. We dont operate it anymore. It had to be replaced. Of the difference being that the russians in their ingenuity figured out a way to make a small deep submergence vehicle with a converted pullet Ballistic Missile submarine, which is what the graphic shows here. One can only you can imagine what a clandestine deployable Emergency Vehicle could be used for and how its pretty scary when you start thinking about some of the types of missions it could be used for. We thought this was something important to highlights and probably the shadowy part of the russian undersea apparatus. Not operated by the navy, but a separate branch of the industry of defense. When you look at it, its a something one has to keep in the back of their mind. Would we think the russian navy is going . There are clear challenges. The sanctions as a result of their activity in the ukraine has hurt them especially in their terms of weston electronics, machine tooling. Their shipyard will likely face a falloff in train personnel sometime in the near future, simply because of demographic issues in the sort of a lack of funding through the 1990s and early 2000s. I refer to as the postsoviet naval platform having encountered problems, decades Long Development and production delays. However, and this is a key part to remember is what they do have is very good. Of the new submarines are technically excellent and head of the Naval Warfare center had a model of the new one bill in his office was so impressed with it. This is something we will have to monitor. In the baltic and for the diesel powered submarine fleet, its a bit more clear. They are prioritizing their Nuclear Powered boats and they have this struggle with building newer diesel boats, but what they do have again, is modern and well increasingly wellmaintained and the personnel behind it are generally pretty good. Moving on to nato. Comes as no surprise that capabilities nato did not think it would be involved in sort of Territorial Defense and highend war fighting in all of this it was looking more at afghanistan, Stability Operations in those type of activities. That shows as the types and kinds of equipment being purchased. With that said, there is a solid core of submarines within nato and other capabilities have fallen further than that. That said, there are promising sides of recapitalizations in places such as sweden, france and the uk. Longer turn, there are additional opportunities in places such as spain, poland and then looking further into the mid 2020s its likely both france and germany will consider how they replace their asw aircraft. Based on the shortcomings, sort of encountering the russian threat and what were our recommendations. So, they have fallen into three categories with the first being what were the organizational changes that we believe needed to be made. Sort of counter russian activities. There is a gap or wedge in the baltic sea. The two most important and most capable Baltic Sea States finland and sweden arent in nato and have a historic neutrality has to be respected or got the same time, they are subject to the same sort of course of action as nato members and the baltics er. Bridging that gap and finding a way that both respects their sovereignty and has a greater interoperability is capable of moving forward. Its like a across the baltic sea gap in particular. Thats not a problem that is this particularly specific and nato has that with for several years. Theres always been a lack of regular highintensity exercises. For these reasons we recommended the following. The Maritime Strategy is not been updated since 2011 and relax a different world and should likely be revised. Without that nato cooperation was an interesting route to take to bridge the baltic sea gap. Understanding that that is probably a first step and there are other things going on such as that enhance opportunity partnership, supportive agreements that have been signed between sweden and finland that will go east and beyond and help close that gap further. Greeting a nato center of lex excellent for asw and sort of greeting a common playbook for theater asw and that is sort of the outgrowth of that sinner and can also help drive there are several centers in nato that looks at issues that touch asw weathers the center for operations combined to Shallow Waters, shallow minds center of excellence excellent. That can help drive cohesion between those. Aligning the nato framework nations on the maritime groups sort of gives those a backbone that can help drive those. Information sharing again, and an object in training. One of the key things about submarine warfare and anyone that has done it will to you it requires constant training. Its a proficiency that has to be built and maintained. Is something we have to have done over the past 15 years and something that will need to have again. It will not come back quickly. On the capability side, the shortcomings that we identified in the study we believe are the results of different Investment Patterns that have created a sort of mismatch capability level across the life theres a need to level to the greatest of the possible and where possible create synergy across the lines. One country is investing more in one type of system and another is something thats complementary. There are aging systems and a general lack of capacity. The big three in terms of asw harking abilities maritime control aircraft, submarine, future networking that allows you to drive information between submerged and surface platforms, integrating land attack weapons, a little bit outside the precise scope of the study but sort of folded into some of the other research that the Security Program has been doing more broadly, we believe that is a powerful signaling tool to other elements of the russian cores and strategy. Lastly, leveraging nonmilitary platforms for acoustic intelligence collection is sort of a interesting idea of how one might use Oceanographic Research vessels in the crisis situation to reinforce your existing platform. Lastly, posture changes. Theres only two took the first is something we would like to see, but politically challenging. The russians should be specific about this in the early 2000 the norwegian deemed previous Submarine Base in northern norway to be surplus went through the process of divesting of it, put it on sale on the norwegian version of ebay and was bought by a private investor who then leased it to a russian deepsea exploration firm with ties to gasp wrong, which raises some concerns among people in the submarine Warfare Community about what the russians are doing here given the current climate there have been rumblings about the russians being kicked out. Its a useful facility. The us had rotational visits of there in years past during the cold war. For countries that wish to participate in any sort of asw activity in the. Is particularly to conduct resupplied other repair type of work. Second, using the former Naval Air Station to which is currently also the International Airport to as a support facility for maritime aircraft activities in the g. I. Uk. So, that is something that is currently happening on a us bases and has been funded through the european reassurance initiative, and we would like to see that moving forward other nations who are interested in participating rotate through their. It also gives an opportunity for them to operate with other nato allies, build interoperability and rebuild some of those funny mental skills which i talked about earlier that really require constant training in order to maintain. That is sort of what we did and what we found. If youre interested in reading a copy of the report, not just the abridged one we handed out, you can go to the website and with that we will take a 22nd break to mike at the panelist and turn it over to our panelist. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] i think we are good to go. Sorry about that. Im directing the international Security Program and i want to thank lisa and andrew pour that great briefing overview of the study. As we said, there are short versions out there, but if you forgive this terrible pun i will like to see the guide on this issue there is a full report available online, which i encourage you to look at. You have heard an overview of how csi s has looked at the issue in and we wanted to bring you some independent experts with their take on this issue and im pleased to have a panel before us. To my immediate left is olga oliker, who directs our Russia Program here took her Research Research has been focused on military Political Economic and social Development Countries in transition particularly focused on russia, ukraine and central asia. Prior to joining csi s she held a number of senior positions at the rand corporation, most recently as director of land center. To her left is steve mccarthy, the minister of defense at the British Embassy here in washington. Steve is responsible for all aspects of the uk us defense relationships and previously served among many other positions as director of International Security policy in the uk ministry of defense. Finally, in the end we have brined car, senior fellow at the center for strategic and budgetary assessments and prior to joining in 2013 brian was special assistant to chief Naval Operations and director of the Commander Action Group and he has previously served until 2007 in the navy. We wanted to bring to you today sort of a range of respected perspectives from looking at russia to partner capabilities and have a little bit of a conversation about where we think this panel thinks this issue is going and how serious the challenges. I will start with you to get your perspective. You have seen the briefing and you actually helped us in shaping it. I would love to get your sense of whats you think the russians objectives are with regard to the development of its naval and subsurface capabilities. Also, the extent to which that is manifesting itself in the activity we havent seen in northern europe. I would like to begin by saying this is really an excellent support and i recommend reading this report. My only trouble is with the title in the sense that we its not warfare; rightfax is preparation, deterrence, activities which are dangerous, but not actually warfare and i think its an interesting thing to think about. When you are looking to deter, when you are looking respond to another nation, what are you doing because it would make you more effective and what are you doing for various Political Goals and i think that is important when looking at russia. And i think also as the report very clearly and enters a review suggested what are the challenges and looking at Russian Military developing today is that there is a study in contrast, which supported range of narratives. I could tell you a story about how incredibly good russian capabilities are. Improving system with pockets of and that submarines are one of the pockets of accomplishments but small pockets. I think its important to the naveis not the priority for the russian federation. We can talk about naval priorities but we have to remember that the navy has only started getting resources recently because the military as a whole has done more resourcing. Its a trickledown effect. To they get around to supplying the navy when they have taken care of everything else. So, having said that. What do i think the most important thing for the navy wasnt actually that important for the russians as a whole. The russians still are putting a lot on the fleet. Could argue not because they think its survivable, not even patrolling it. A lot is about parity with the United States, but in the context of how they actually think about fighting, we have new systems coming online. Got in trouble, they got canceled in 2011, brought back on in 2012. Theres a rebound that is much quieter, theres a new class thats in development. Its not clear what its going to be. Theyve theyre working on this stuff. The more money put into it, the more theyll be able to do. If the russians are cash strapped well see dribbles and drabs that is not very effective. Doesnt mean we get to ignore the russian navy. Theyll use what they have to punch above their weight politically, theyre operating in the same waters as we are and theyre not an ally and they are doing these things, which means you need why this report outlines a very rational and reasonable set of responses. I think our response is they think were pretty good. Theyre worried about falling behind in submarines. Falling behind to china. But they think theyre bigger, stronger and better. Steve, from the uk perspective, be great to get your thoughts on howl you see the russian threat and also the uk has already signaled in many ways in 2015 theres an acknowledgment that asw is a capability area that is need. So love to get your take on the asw challenge and how the uk is looking to meet it and any thoughts you might have on working with the u. S. And nato on that. Valuable timing in the release of this report. It shines a light on an area that has been a but of a cinderella in the recent months and years. To answer your question, the extent of having the report. The first is a contextual one and this is to the point which is you have to think about the undersea issue in the world of the overall conflict so this is one and its important that we look at it and say, also strikes me as very crucial that we dont lose sight of it with the broader issues we have to deal with. In that respect, it was quite interesting is that while we are talking a lot in the report about the baltic sea and to some extent the black sea, both of those seas have not had a russian land base as part of the and so be careful not to forget bet it when we talk about undersea dominance, but land bases that impact that environment. And want to emphasize the conclusion which is you have to look at the whole issue through a strategic lens, not an individual thing. This is not about submarines or aircraft. This is about the whole thing and how deal if it. Second issue is just came at the end and said the point about absolutely correct. Its not like we have a blank sheet of paper. Last month we had the wonderfully titled dynamic mongoose exercise, a competition for the best exercise name is right up there. Check my numbers. That had 2,000 from eight allied countries taking part, doing specifically the things youre talking about. Using ally submarines as threat and detection targets, and thats the sort of thing we clearly have to sustain and do more of. And quite rite that a lot of folks have to make an investment, and last published last november, uk has returned into we are investing and the things take time but the reason the British Government the rapid availability. This is a problem we recognize we have to pay more attention to than perhaps we thought we would have to when we were looking at this in 2010. And of course, one of the thing is not just an airplane but cooperation with the United States and australia from a rather local allies in europe, in due course, when they make their own decisions inch that respect, the recommendation in the report that reykjavik. Well be based in scotland, which happens to be the other end of the uk. Uk is important from that perspective. Theres a really big opportunity to work with the u. S. Navy in europe. The eu looking at bases for the same purpose and were all having the conversation. Similarly, i think when we talk about that particular part of the world lets not forget what the g stands for, greenland is covered for defense and security burned by denmark, a country has longstanding relationship with the United States, and i think that gives you an opportunity that we can work very closely with in order to maintain. Generally speaking, the report perfectly right, and no way let not forget denmark because theyre an important player. Last point from me, for us, you talked in the report about potentially codes, very good argument for doing that. And other games in town, too. We are part of a forum which we call the northern group, which comprises the uk with the northern baltic states, plus germany, plus poland and the netherlands so all the countries with a clear interest not just in baltic sea. And the ukled joint expeditionary force. We go forward, well this is a nato issue because its important. We look at the angles in this but also recognize there are other forums to help brim that gap to countries that dont happen to be allies and theyll bring us along as well. Lets build on that point. There is incredible wealth of challenge sets for the United States navy globally. Can you talk about where this sort of fits in and where the u. S. Brings valuable expertise or capability and maybe where others can step in with complimentary capability. I say thinking about its important to think about what the russians might be trying to do with their submarine fleet and their force. Ways to counter them. The report is terrific. Have to commend you on. A great job of highlighting this challenge and how nato and the u. S. Might deal with it. So, the small but very cavable Russian Submarine force is not a great asset for trying to do largescale operations. Doesnt give you the capacity to do largescale strikes or do Surface Warfare against a big navy threat but allows the russians the opportunity to put a threat against in the United States homeland that otherwise they would have to achieve via the intercontinental Ballistic Missilesful so the huge concern of the United States, we have a way to stem a large attack but didnt have a way to prevent the russian sub maron from getting northeasterly the west coast and launching on the homeland. That may be far out there scenario, but if we get into some conflict with the russians in eastern europe, an opportunity for them might be to impart to u. S. Leaders theres Russian Submarines near the u. S. Court that could attack the u. S. , try to do a decapitating attack with Nuclear Weapon or conventional strike that causes the United States to have to pour resources into defending our own coastline in a way a havent had to do since world war ii. So that may by one way the russians are using their submarines. Its important that the gap is detected and we have a way of tracking submarines that pass that beyer and keep an eye on them until the complete their deployment. We did that during the cold war because of the potential for Russian Submarines to attack the u. S. Coastline. Right now the United States does this, mounting a significant antisubmarine effort in the northern atlantic, and then sending submarine after submarine to trail these guys as the make their deployments. Doing this track and trail operation. So opportunities for allies to contribute to that would be, for one, britain has excellent attack submarines. Ive gone to sea on the stewart, an exercise tracking a virginia class submarine, and they do pretty good at that. So a very capable submarine the cry crews are very proficient. Britain wants to send one to eastern suez which keeps the submarines busy maintain thing presence in the middle east. If they shifted the focus and contribute to the effort to try to monitor russian attack submarine deployments that would offer an opportunity to reduce the demand on u. S. Forces. You think about this idea of finding the submarinas its leaving the norwegian sea. Britain and other countries with maritime control aircraft can contribute to that effort. The main way you do that is you use a submarine or deployed sensor, and now you use unmanned sensors and theres a lot of capabilities out there that can contribute to that to initially find the submarine and get an idea where it is and then the submarine trails it. Norway, britain, other nato allies could contribute Maritime Patrol or contribute unmanned sensors for that mission, which has a lower barrier to entry for some of the countries that may not be able to amass that kind of investment to create a maritime control aircraft, so these Unmanned Systems just need an attending vessel so a country like sweden or denmark could contribute that vessel to conduct the surveillance operation. After the partners and allies to contribute to the main effort that would be having to be undertaken against Russian Submarine deployment. Can i ask you another you can comment on this the very particular the baltic sea is a different animal, and the types its also an environment in which the u. S. Has not traditionally had the best expertise among the various allies and partners that can bring something. How should we be thinking bat network approach inside the baltic, and maybe russian comment on how the russians might think differently, if they do, before the the baltics. Your thoughts. The baltic i have been up there on surface ships and its a challenging environment. Its shall he shallow, a lot of mines on the sea bed as well, and acoustically very difficult to deal with. Submoreens have a hard item there, and countries in the region, the russians dont do a lot of deployment which is why they have a small number in st. Petersburg but theres opportunity because of the Shallow Water and because of the environment that maybe unmanned sensors and acoustic arrays, some path of technologies to put sensors on the bottom and be able to monitor a shallow area like that for submarine operations and can be effective because it is such a constrained area that even a short range system can give you coverage over what is needed, particular lay chokepoint going out over the baltic into the north sea. Two other points. The other thing thats different about the baltics is its an inland sea, surrounded by land, which provides more opportunity for greater use of systems that exist. The other piece is that the the level of coordination or ensurface traffic is not at great as you think it would be and in recent years we have been developing with countries in that part of the world membership and organization or system that enables us to join surface tracking of vessels coming in and out of the baltic sea. We need to think about doing that. And i think the big catch is the investment. Right. One more not on this topic. Im not really that worried about the russians attacking the u. S. Homeland. Thats pretty well deterred. I worry about a lot of things but a strike on the u. S. Homeland, i think were in really bad shape if that is happening, for a whole lot of reasons and were prepared for and it probably looking at 45 minutes. So, happy thoughts. I really i think that is what youre talking about when you Start Talking about homeland strikes. The baltic is interesting to echo some points. Its not a great submarine area. The russians dont prioritize submarines and dont prioritize their ball difficult fleet. They have not gotten as much as but the caspian flotilla, its being the black sea fleet, which got a lot more activity recently. Theyve also just fired most of the command of the baltic fleet for corruption and incompetence. So i think lets not get too excited about russian capabilities in the baltic. I think this is a place where the United States should rely on its allies and friends in the neighborhood who are familiar with the environment who have been operating, who are watching the russians there, and thats kind of my take on core competency making sure you take advantage of what your friends bring to the table. Push a little bit on this issue of how serious a challenge it is in the baltic. We do try to be i thinks you kindly put it rational and reasonable, easy enough for us to say here, as you travel through the region, and you think, youre sitting in anywhere from finland to poland and sweden and thinking about how russia could bring to bear even minimal submarine capabilities as part of an overall challenge. It was at least to me somewhat remarkable how little has progressed on the allies side, even though the russians, as you say, have put it low on their priority list, its still better than nothing. I guess this gets to the issue of how seriously should we take the mail tear joint military approach. The russians pop up and show force, just show of force are they really exercising some Operational Capability . That can be relevant. The question is what is the Operational Capability for . Theres come opponent. You dont want other people operating in your area and if you dont want them exercising, playing, in your area, that means youre exercising capability to keep them out in the event of conflicts. The same thing. And a lot of it is russia pointing out that its their neighborhood. Theyre active there. That you have to reckon with them. And again, do we plan for war there . They dont plan to start a war there. Theres very little evidence to suggest that this is theyre trying to avert a war there. Theyre trying to its all a mutual deterrence thing. Doesnt mean we stay out. We have to say, okay, were not too worried. Were deterred, put does mean we have to keep in mine that our goal is keeping them not want took fight that war. Rather than encouraging it. Steve, want to just pick up on the points you and brian made between you about the importance of working together across nato and then also beyond nato. It would seem to me that, as in almost all areas, the information sharing challenges here are significant and or at least i should say its important that we overcome information sharing barriers. Is this an area that has been a focus, from your perspective in the uk or even for nato to think about how to make sure we have fluid information sharing on antisubmarine capabilities . Yes and no. Yes, share more information the better well get. In this particular there are limitations from all of this. And i think thats something we have managed over the years in very close working relation shapes between the u. S. And uk. You have to see how we can stenthat in other directions with other countries. But i also think the nature of what were dealing with is trying to get to cant be more simple than people try to make it. At the end of the dave its a big ocean and but also certain geographical features that you need to do things more than in the baltic we talked about that. Certainly the same in the context of greenland. There are ways we used to do this in the cold war, and we have to understand that. Same kind of question for you, brian, your perception that in the u. S. Navy theres an appreciation for the need to work with our allies and partners in this space and what has been a traditionally very the ultimate sovereign state, our subSurface Warfare. Is there an openness to getting to a point where we can share information if needed . The difference might be looking at undersea warfare where we dont have information sharing, and Antisubmarine Warfare which the u. S. Does traditionally with airplanes and surface ships. Theres more information sharing on the Antisubmarine Warfare side and theres been examples of the for example the operation in the gap in the cold war and still today, other examples of information sharing done between allies to accomplish that mission of Antisubmarine Warfare. Undersea warfare is very different. We dont have the same level of information sharing but its improving. With the uk the u. S. Is trying to increase the amount they share with france and other countries, less so because they dont have the capability to exploit that technology in the Operational Force might use. Maybe less need for that. Okay. Well open it up for questions and ill ask you when i call on you to give your name and affiliation, if you have one. Theres a mic coming your way. Thank you very much. Great panel, and any panel that talks about submarine is is okay in my book. Twopart question. Perhaps the former submariner wants to address this. Throughout the cold war we spent a lot of time doing antistab marine warfare, and Antisubmarine Warfare and people acknowledge we werent as good at it as we wanted to be. What are we doing to get further up the curve given that everybody has got very rusty in this skill set, even though everybody focusing more attention on it . From an undersea standpoint, the russian versions of nr1 are particularly vexing from that standpoint, and at this point were trying to track them talk about whether or not surface ships are carrying them that makes detection difficult. When you look at it against our undersea infrastructure we dont have the capabilities that we once had to literally have the oceans wired the way at one time we did. So its a twopart thing for anybody to take. What are the things we have to do to get better on the power curve and the second thing is, what is the investment level and is anybody interested in investing to deal with the problem, especially if it gets disruptive, judged sea cables carry 95 of everything we depend on that is not going through space. On the first part, every time submarine warfare proficiency is something people talk about a lot. One thing were finding, going to be a feature of future every time subma rain warfare is modifying away from i have to go out and practice every day and get really got as being able to recognize what they trace looks like of this submarine versus that submarine and know the different sound signatures, and the art, rather than the science. Moving away from that and more Technological Solutions that enable you to do the kinds of things underwater we have done above the water for a long time. So, automatic target recognition technologies, sound signatures classified as something you care about or dont care about. The automatic target motion analysis and fire control systems, they can do that. So the things we do with radar today, were looking at doing those of with Acoustic Energy as well. So its turning Antisubmarine Warfare from art to science and becoming a little bit more likely to be in the future much more fire and forget kind of approach to warfare. So we use an antiwarfare or strike warfare on than this very labor and skill intensive effort that takes hours or days to undertake. I would draw a big distinction there between that kind of shift towards the fire and forget kind of approach in combat, to what we do in peacetime, which is this very surveillance intensive, labor intensive effort to track and trail a submarine that can build the intelligence knowledge that lets me develop the technology to do the more fire and forget methods ill use in wartime. So, Antisubmarine Warfare has two very different dimensions that require almost two entirely different approaches, and one problem we have right enough is that we try to use the same approach for both. We think of Antisubmarine Warfare is hard in surveillance mode but when it comes to fighting, going to take a different approach. You look at previous conflicts we have shot at submarines its been more about shooting at the submarine to make got away and then maybe 20 of the time you actually kill it, and its not bothering you anymore. So we have to return to that idea that combat is different than surveillance in peacetime for Antisubmarine Warfare. Anyone else . Okay. Well go the infrastructure we have not the infrastructure, big vulnerability for the United States. The vulnerability we have to consider is not so much undersea cables. Theres 300 undersea cabled reason the world that carry 95 of the communication traffic. But right now a quarter of them are dark north being used so theres Spare Capacity available. Not always in the place you need and theyre have been outages, where we 50 or 60 of those a year and theyre repaired and we move on. As the infrastructure is built up undersea, the ability to recover the capacity, this idea of a catastrophic loss of communications is not as big a scenario for a country like the United States. It can be a big problem for a done trip that is relatively isolated or whose cable goes to the same place and can we interdicted. Thats something that is more specific to a particular country or particular location. The bigger undersea infrastructure challenge is just the idea we have a lot of stuff undersea that makes potential targets that would create a demand for labor intensive responses. So i russia was to attack a peace of undersea infrastructure in the gulf of mexico and cause an oil spill, it wouldnt be catastrophic for the u. S. Economy but a huge cost to the u. S. To now defend that because it would be obvious that was a requirement that had to be met. Its more of a cost imposition strategy than truly a warwinning strategy. Former diplomat. In the environment is it possible to use magnet nick anomaly detection aboard a drone or perhaps even lighter than aircraft on a continuous basis . Really effectively reveal all russian maneuvers 24 hours a day . Seems to me that might be possible and not even that expensive. Right now, magnetic anomaly detection does work. Its extreme live short range, and extremely short range so it can only detect a submarine a mile or two away. Its a very short range. How many of those Surveillance Aircraft am i going to need to be covering an area of ocean so the cost becomes astronomical very quickly. Theres ideas of shifting those to unmanned vehicles, like you buy in large numbers. They have short endurance. Thats the downside. Have to replenish them frequently. So its a technology that could be used but a much more localized approach than maybe the search technique. There has been of course significant debate and discussion about whether technologies that could change the undersea paradigm. You want to comment on that . In general, what is happening is because of this theyre quieting the submarines and the increasing capability of them to hide from sonar, its likely that countries will shift to use more active sonar technologies, which a lot of the current submarines they designed to defend with coatings but up more vulnerable to that than to passive sonar. So thats something that is already happening. You can see that our allies, nato allies, feel that sonars that and the russians and chinese are pursuing similar technology. Also, nonacoustic technologies are improving improving and ite in a couple generations those technologies would be able to contribute as well but the big thing that points out is the focus we have had on submarine quieting wont be sufficient. You cant build a noisy submarine anymore because you have to deal with passive sonar and the undersea world will be more like the above the water world, where active sonar will be a problem just like radar is a problem. So have to think about hiding myself using Acoustic Energy to jam or decoy as well as being quiet when it comes to dealing with passive sonar. So makes the below the water world more like the above the water world. Sidney. Thank you all. Sidney freedberg, breaking defense. Mr. Mccarthy, question for you, although if others wish to secondguess you, i one thing in the report is how starkly the royal Navy Capability has declined in this area, mo so than perhaps other allies. The carrier class going away. What of the things like pa, the carriers, type 26, whatever is coming next, will help rebuild that uk Antisubmarine Warfare capacity, and to what degree, because the uk retains its global ambitions and the submarine east of suez, the uk risk spreading itself too thin, the opposite of this idea that not frying to do it all because none of them has the economy to support doing it all. Well, the three capabilities to answer your question, the reinvestment in maritime capability, also has some rescue essentially antisubmarine, the investment that will come in the program to replace submarine warfare is next generation warfare. And so one of the things that specific specifically did was gets called the carrier and and british capability and replacing both of the things we deleted in the 2010 review. If you take that point of the the reason that the uk decided to get out of the maritime aircraft and the carrier based capabilities in 2010 was entirely to do with affordablity. The government made painful decisions which we didnt want to take in order to make the program better. But even though we did that. We began to invest in carrier and we retained from a skills perspective, seagoing capability by posting british airmen on american, australian and other allied nation capabilities so we kept it going through the gap. The royal Maritime Patrol at the end of this decade when the pa comes into service, we have a crew of people that will be training the next generation. So, while its true we thats the decision we took last year, to get back into that, and thats in part because of the report. Five or six years ago we thought this was not such a strategic priority now. It seems to be coming back again and were responding to that. Also just worth mentioning in passing, slightly offtoppic, the parliament passed the program want to say anything about that . Very important for us. They vote to replace the uks Submarine Based deterrence, passed in one day by an overwhelming major justice, 100 votes more than the last time it was put to vote ten years ago. So, i think in this context its a slightly different version of undersea warfare but obviously very important to us and part of the reinvestment. Okay. Question back over here. Right now theres consideration of the northern sea route becoming an International Route and might take a few years, obviously, but i was wondering what the impact or what the relationship of the undersea situation in the north atlantic is to the development of that route from the standpoint of all the stakeholders in that route. You mean in terms of trade . Or military in terms of how does the undersea situation in the north atlantic how would it impact that . I would think that if were going to have a sea route that would become an International Sea route potentially, we would certainly want to be concerned with the undersea situation and how it impacts that. Russia is one of the bigger proponents of shipping stuff through the north. Theyre the most excited people about Global Warming on the planet because it will the think it will improve their ability to transport goods. So, im not terribly worried about their trying to disrupt that militarily as long as everybody is at peace. If any more than on any other route where you have military capablities as well as commercial capabilities, which is everywhere. If you have a war, then of course commercial shipping is endangered, but again, the same as it would be anywhere else. I dont know that this theater presents a particularly unique or interesting consideration in that context. The other way around to some extent. From a military strategic opportunities because a number of the worlds trade chokepoints may and so, there is a sense in which the shipping when that happens, change the dynamic in the way the worlds trade system works. Well, it could create, again, tertiary effect but could create a more competitors for resources resources for naval capable such as search and rescue. That creates challenges for balancing. I think overall, commercial development, if anything, its greater disincentive to militarize although you also have the desire to protect your investments as you seek by the russian movements. Very good. I thought i had another one over here, yes, please. Im hank gaffney. I have access to classified we did a lot of studies of the russian navy. And ive been googling to find out what the condition of the ssns in in the Northern Fleet have been, and im getting not being able to pin down the numbers. Can figure out maybe five theyve been listed as being under repair for a long time, and i think theres one sierra one and another supposed to emerge in 2017. I even see one victor 3 still alive. Are they really good . Over to you. You can tries to counsel daytoday life than i do. Its interesting to look at the patrol rates as well as the patrol rates are still low, and i find that striking, and then in terms what goes into repair and what comes back out for repair, depends on when you look and the news varies and perhaps the folks following it have a better sense of it but my guess is if youre googling and paying attention to what folks are saying you have as good a sense of it as i do. I dont have any special insights. Others . I have one more over here. Hopefully any company forgives me to ask the question. Ike michael from ebe, electric boats. Theres the nato sentry and the nato c17 pool. Any chance of nato p8 or whatever they roll out next out of their im assuming for their next generation mpa and obviously with the lower barriers of entry, from sort of alliancecommon platform that doesnt matter whether its a norwegian attack sweden, finland, patrol craft that you can just take it around to whoever sharing the afw. The road of potential programs is long and strewn with rubble. And i think there are some quite good arguments in principle and practice it tends to come out not quite that way. Tends to be a lot of concern to keep National Sovereign capabilities so one of the issues was developing a natowide capability, who runs it, who orders it to go where . Whats the basis it does its own patrolling . And the need in particular with relatively scarce sometimes send them outside of the nato so one of the concerned the uk has about engage independent natowide capabilities. Our approach is more in the uk based on trying to prove shared capabilities and make sure give them all the intelligence and training and collective activity we can, to make sure the individual nations provide that efforts for the broader good rather than having a big collective effort. Building off another that you mentioned in your remarks about working with the u. S. On rotational asw or npa in particular. Do you think theres opportunity there to move beyond usdk and have a broader sort of opportunities for exercises or rotational operations out of that location . Absolutely. I think thats probably when you have countries to make important decisions. Once they do assuming they do then okay. I want to thank everyone for coming, in particular our research team. And i want to thank our panelists. I hope everyone has a chance to review the property and please feel free to follow up with our research team. So join me in thanking our panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] a reminder as we leave this program you can watch this discussion on russias underwater military threat anytime in the cspan video library. Go to cspan. Org. The Washington Post writing this afternoon that turkeys top diplomat undersea the United States to quickly hand over a selfexiled cleric turkish leaders linked to the coup attempt, a risk of causing serious tension between the two allies. Turkey was ready to take part in a Commission Proposed by washington to discuss the extradition of but there was no need to take a long time. Following the coup, turkey has cared out a widespread crackdown on the army, police, judiciary and educational institutions. But the United States wants clear evidence. President obama reacted to last weeks attempted coup at a White House Press conference today. Heres what he had to say. I talked to president erdogan and the earliest reports that a coup was being attempted in turkey that is that we strongly reject any attempt to overthrow democracy in turkey, that we support the democratically elected government there, and i think one of the signs of great strength in the turkish people was the fact that even strong opponents of president erdogan, when reports of the coup were taking place and when it was still uncertain, who exactly what behind it, even opponents of to president erdogan pushed back hard against the idea that the military should overthrow a democratic elected government. Any reports that we had any previous knowledge of a coup attempt, there that was any u. S. Involvement in it. That were anything other than entirely supportive of turkish democracy, are completely false, unequivocally false. Said that to president erdogan, and i also said to him that he needs to make sure that not just he but everybody in his government understand that those reports are completely false because when rumors like that start swirling around, that puts our people at risk on the ground in turkey. And it threatens what is a Critical Alliance and partner ship between the United States and turkey. So, i want to be as clear and unequivocal as i can be. We deplore the attempted coup. We said so earlier than just about anybody and have been consistent throughout. At the turkish people deserve government that was democratically elected. The president said today from earlier during a braving with the mexican president. By the way this afternoon, cspan will be live with Hillary Clinton at a Campaign Rally at the Florida State fairgrounds in tampa. She could announce her pick for running mate sometime today in the form of a tweet or email. Well have the news if and when it happens today. And watch our live coverage of her Campaign Rally at 4 30 eastern on cspan. Still have a frontrow seat to every minute of the Democratic National convention on cspan2. Org. Watch live streams without commentary or commercials, and your video clipping tools to create your own clips of your favorite convention moments and share them on social media. Also, read twitter feeds and delegates and reporters in philadelphia. Our special Convention Pages have everything you need to get the most of cspans gaveltogavel coverage. Go to cspan2. Org to see what is happening during each session and every speech will be available on demand for viewing whenever you want on your desk top, laptop, tabless and smartphone. Our special Convention Pages and all of cspan. Org are a Public Service of your cable or satellite provider. If youre a cspan watcher, check it out on the web at cspan. Org. British defense secretary Michael Fallon testified before a house of commons Parliamentary Committee on the conclusions of the nato summit in warsaw and the findings of the british iraq warrier, nobody as the chilcot report. Ladies and gentlemen, aid like to we can you today on behalf hoff the brookings institute. Im the its a great honor today to host the French Defense minister, on what is actually a very difficult time for his country, but before we begin the event i would like to i hope you will accept on our behalf, brookings and everyone here, our most Sincere Condolence thursday the victims and families of the terrible atrocity in nice. A lot of our colleagues and friends and family have been affected by this great tragedy. Wed like to again express our most Sincere Condolences. A very difficult time for you and your country. Before i introduce the minister, and we begin with the event i want to make a few quick announcements. First of all, this event is going to be on the record and the minister is going speak in french so for those who do not speak french, i want to make sure that you have head sets with the simultaneous translation, and if you do not, we have them just outside of the auditorium. So make sure that everybody has what they need. On channel 2 well have english translation for when we begin. I just want to make sure that everyone is mindful of their cell phones for this equipment. Its quite sensitive. Of you have a cell phone close to the equipment, if you can switch it off or put it under your seat. And we have a after this event, u. S. Front, and i would like to welcome our cspan audience joining us for this very important presentation by the minister. Id also like to acknowledge and thank our french senior fellow for his work on facilitating this and other events on events in europe. The minister is here in washington, dc as part of the group of ministers from more than 30 states here to forge a common approach with the u. S. Secretary of defense Ashton Carter on how to combat the Islamic State in syria and iraq, an issue of great importance to the french and the United States. You have the biographical material of the minister but for those in the tv audience you do not. He is originally from italy, as is our colleague philipe, who is going to be moderating the event. He was formally the mayor of the and has had several National Level positions in france, covering defense before he was appointed minister of defense by president hollande in may of 2012. He has published a book on security issues,ing who is the english, and we have several copies outside of the auditorium. He will address from the podium and then turn over to the chairs to have a discussion. Moderated by philipe, along with our colleague, senior fellow, micah hanlan who knows a thing or two about defense issues, especially about the topics were covering today here in washington, dc. Its a great honor to host you. Thank you for joining us today and thank you for the audience also for coming. Sir, the podium is yours. [applause] are [inaudible conversations] interpreter ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, first of all id like to thank you for your invitation which was great pleasure to be here and i will look at the Brookings Institution which is just celebrated its centy inery, difficult century in which thinking, being able to extend back away from should help to us improve our analysis and the efficiency of our actions. As you know france has been hit one more time in this, on the day, national holiday, by an extremely violent terrorist action. This is the third time in 18 months. Without mentioning all tempt attempts that have been foiled. This the tragic information of something we were already certain of. France, its society, model, the quality of its democratic society, way of life, are unbearable in the eyes of those barbarians who want to kill us. As a state, their situation gives us a number of the first is to guarantee the safety of our citizens. The french people and at the same time they want to preserve their way of life, including liberties which are at the very basis of our social contract. Who, then, is this enemy who is targeting us . Wed like to try to define specifically the shapes of this threat on us and how it is possible to face it as sufficiently as possible. We have to start from a simple fact today, a number of terrorist groups around the major daesh and al qaeda and isis, are to its house. As an objective not to but in order to put us into a state of action, hoping our institutions are going to vacillate, and i think this is a multishaped enemy. Three different shapes which are closely linked. Its not a state. Strategically it is a proto state which is trying to exercise powers of a state. This proto state has a companion a transnational jihaddist movement which is like al qaeda, has a vast number of groups operating through borders and to our national lands. So, isis or isil is for us also protecting our own territory, and then isis, an extremely dangerous ideology, they want to go back to the days of the caliphate and fashion in this way a new society. Id like to insist on this. By san diego my opinion, isis is a fully totalitarian enterprise. It is based on geological basis which is deeply inequal by putting human beings in groups higher and lower all the way to reintroducing slavery in its most. This is a very Strict Police control population and under extreme violence like we can see in the execution perform in the territories dominated by isis. This calls for a number of reactions. We have to destroy this jihadist group. We have to protect our National Territory and the french army is contributing to this today. On an economic level, trying out the recruiting by isis or jihadists will go through its Financial Resources and lastly at the political and ideological level we have to fight against the influence of isis. We must go on the cyber attack to fight against the virtual caliphates which could be reinvested as the physical caliphate moving backwards in syria and iraq. The threats represented by isis is new in the way that it is shaped. We are done a lot. [inaudible] our action should adapt to the fact that the threat is continuous they are targeting us far from our borders just as well at the heart. Are our actions have to be internal at the same time and we must call on a number of instruments starting on our arms to forces deployed and a way to the intelligence services, police and justice investigating the capacity of the security to face the enemy when we are under attack allow me to center what im going to say on the military side of action led by french against these terrorists. France is not a country that goes to war for pleasure, but it cant disregard the fact that sometimes wars are imposed on. [inaudible] in 2003 we said the iraq war should not be led as in other ways i simply observed that one france goes to war its because it has very wellfounded reasons. To ensure syria and iraq, we are fighting the war against terrorism, not against terrorism but against well identified enemies. [inaudible] i want to repeat here that the idea that we could buy our tranquility by fighting in the isis is meaningless. This will have even more resources and fighters, just as it did last november when. [inaudible] a plan had been integrated for a long time. We are training in baghdad to members of an elite group against terrorism. We are training the iraqi army. We work handinhand and are aircrafts are mobilized and since september 2014. All of this has allowed us to reach extremely important results. Im thinking of liberation of falluja which is a major symbol as it was the first major city controlled by isis