Good afternoon. Im pete. Daily ceo and publisher of the Naval Institute and i our audience both here in the jack Taylor Centers lockheed auditorium and our remote audience whos joining us online. And so for those who are here, i just ask you to stand for a minute. And lets say the pledge of allegiance. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of america and to the republic for which it stands. One nation under god individual liberty and justice for all. Thank you. Special shout out to admiral katcher, whos the acting superintendent and one of our Naval Institute press authors. This is a moment todays event demonstrates what the Naval Institute is all about. Were an open, independent, Nonpartisan Forum that dares to read things, speak and write. The institute its inception 150 years ago. Its coming up the anniversary in just a couple of weeks. Supports our men and women in the sea services and has always championed their viewpoints, their exchange of ideas. The title of todays discussion is competition or confrontation the urgent realities for the u. S. Navy. When facing Chinas Peoples Liberation Army navy. Our moderator today is judy, who will lead a discussion with three of our great panelists, all of whom are Naval Institute press authors Jude Blanchette holds the freeman chair at, the center for strategic and international csis, and previously he was engagement director at the Conference Board to china center for economics and business beijing, where he researched chinas political environment with a focus on the workings of the communist party of china and its impact on Foreign Companies and investors. Stewart was the assistant director in the 21st Century China Center at the university of california san diego, and he spent published in foreign affairs, Foreign Policy and his translations have been published in the wall street journal and the Financial Times most recent books, most of the most recent book that doctor not dr. Jude blanchette has published is the chinas new red guards. The return of radicalism and the rebirth of mao zedong, published the Oxford University press. This will be about a 60 Minute Program we ask you if you havent already done so too, please put your phone on silent or stunned and and thatll allow people to hear the program on uninterrupted. And for those we are to do questions and at the end of those 60 minutes and for those who are in the audience we have microphones deployed here at the front of these two Center Aisles and and for our on our online audience, were going to have a chat feature enabled and you can chat in your question. We do ask that you ask a question and please identify yourselves so we know who you are. After the panel discussion, the panelists and the moderator be available again for any follow on questions you have and a signing continues out the foyer area where you came in. So ask our panel to come out please and join us and well get started. Thank. So im going to turn it over to dr. Keeps i keep giving him a ph. D. To Jude Blanchette thank you for joining us today and agree to be a moderator. And thank you our panelists in advance. Over to you and thank you. Just save me seven years of course in field work to to get a ph. D. In 100,000. So i appreciate it. Well the only ph. D. Im ever going to get is my initials. Well, thank you, first of all, for the welcome. And i really appreciate the opportunity to be here and especially honored. Share the podium with three individuals who have thought deeply and hard about a complicated set of problems around Us National Security and the critical problem of how we think about china. The play, how we think about china and russia. These are all at the heart of a of really confounding issues. Oftentimes when you moderate have to struggle to think about how youre going to get the get the panelists to speak, how youre going to ask the right questions but that this is really here is going to be easy for me because we have three authors of three really wonderful all new books which i hope everyone has has that really give just a masterclass in analytic perception depth of research and were going to get a taste of that today as i think has already been mentioned the flow is will have a discussion here. Well turn to each of the speakers in turn to give 5 to 7 minutes of top line thoughts. And then well go into a discussion and and 55 minutes in, well turn to a q a just very, very going from from my immediate right. Thrilled to have admiral mike, who is a senior fellow at center for naval analysis or c and a prior to this spent 34 years in the navy doing everything across board, including for at sea warship commands, including of an Aircraft Carrier group and his wonderful new book is china as a 21st century naval power, it looks boring up here only because i had to remove the dust jacket, but it really a penetrating, powerful book we have a shopping lee whos a professor in the don betz endowed chair in International Studies at the university of central oklahoma, who himself has written a really fantastic history of of the pla navy tracing it all the way back to antecedents and how it grew and developed and learned throughout fifties, 6070s and eighties. And then last but not least, we have brant sadler, whos a Senior Research fellow for Naval Warfare and advanced technology in the center for National Defense at the heritage and before that, 26 year navy veteran, numerous operational tours of Nuclear Powered submarines and. The offer author of this this fantastic. Us naval power in the 21st century which as he was just pointing to me as an Aircraft Carrier on the cover not a submarine or anything, earning him the enmity of all his fellow submarine said. But so without further ado, why dont we well get right into it. Ill turn to mike first and well go down the line for initial comments here. Thank richard. And id first like to thank admiral dailey and the Naval Institute, the Naval Institute press to my surprise, they actually agreed to publish book that i wrote. Ive been a life member here, and its a delight to be back and have this opportunity to talk about. Let me start with where is the pla heading . That seems to be the question that a lot of people ask in terms of how many ships, what capabilities and what have you. And the answer is we dont know for sure. Their objective for the strength they will eventually wind up at is a class defined. It is secret in china. So all we can say for sure is its going to be big shipping several years ago said he wants the entire play the navy to be world class and he says want this to be done largely not completely, but largely by 2035. And then have a done for sure by. 2049, the hundredth anniversary of of the peoples of china. Now, we dont have any idea how xi jinping defines world class. It could it be mean without peer. Oh, we just dont know. And so let me give you assertion of what world class means its going to large enough and capable enough to establish control strategically important regions to china and the most important regions, the western pacific and would argue the sea lanes across indian ocean. Now, this is a pipe dream today. The pla navy is the second most capable navy in the world in terms of a mix of destroyers, minesweepers, frigates, Aircraft Carrier, submarines. It is balanced. It is essentially mimicking the u. S. Navys approach to for full coverage of all of the Maritime Mission areas. Its larger the us navy. I know thats a shock to many many people about 340 or so what the us calls battle for ships the that the u. S. Navy counts so compared to about 300 for the us navy so the us navy is already outnumbered if you will but. We need to unpack those numbers bit. We need to look at what i would or define as blue water warships. In other words, Nuclear Attack submarines, Aircraft Carriers, egis destroyers. And so forth. And when you count up those kinds of ships, we, the u. S. , about 180 and the pla navy has about 115. So why are they so its a fair question to ask. And and the reason is, is they have a of smaller frigates and corvettes conventionally powered submarines that are used mainly in the seas near around around china, the east china sea, South China Sea, yellow sea and what have you for the defense of china, the pla, navy is built primarily to defend china from attack from the sea, which is, of course, is something that happened to china repeatedly in the 19th century and early in the 20th century, being invaded from abroad. And so, for example, they have about 50 conventional diesel powered submarines, 90 odd small corvette s and frigates and an important to think about when you look at the totality of the western pacific is that if it turns out theres a fight appeal, a navy is not going to fight alone. They have the entire play. Air force. They had the land base play navy, air force, and they have pla rocket there as part of a joint campaign on their their their part and they make sure they can all of those systems effectively with it of a really incredibly effective open ocean system. Let me finish with a thought on everybody. Ask how good are these guys . And i think the answer is we dont know for sure. Again, the seventh fleet, im sure, keeps track what theyre up to and what theyre doing and draws some conclusion about their operation or performance. Ive been watching what been doing and during peacetime exercises and how theyve managed to conduct operations in the far reaches of the ocean. Theyre antipiracy patrols and they seem to be competent. Their ships are not breaking down. They dont to send a tugboat along like the russians to make sure that they have somebody to bring home. If they if the engine Engineering Plant fails. So perhaps more telling is what xi jinping and senor play have to say. They are often harshly critical. They publicly the entire play for not being good enough for suffering from disease, for not conducting realistic and rigorous enough training. They keep emphasize saying that the objective is not simply to fight the objective it is to fight and win. Keep in mind talking about a party navy strictly speaking this is not a national navy. The pla navy is an element of the armed wing of the Chinese Communist party and xi jinping never them forget that he and senior uniformed leaders never fail to mention that loyalty to the party is paramount. Officers and sailors alike are required to study be tested on xi jinping. In short the pla. Navy is expected to completely in reliability role reliably red as well as proficient in combat at sea. The final point i would make is the shared command between the ship the warships captain and the ships political is a potential wicked one that is foreign to the western tradition of naval command. And because in this case the officer and a political officer essentially coequal. Now this is this is the only system that the play officer ive ever known. So but what we dont know is we are excuse me. What do know is it has never been actually tested in modern warfare at sea. So let me end there. And look forward to your questions. Great, mike. Coming. Thank you. Well, my book traces the evolution of the navy by his adapting ocean modernization and the setbacks over the past 60 years. Based on newly chinese sources and the personal interviews the book offers a chinese perspective of the pr and war fighting history. Again, as admiral mike david mentioned here. So what we can learn from his past, what hes Operational History can help us have better understanding of todays chinese navys operation and the strategy. So this shows that the chinese navy lacked the war fighting experience. So the early experience in the cold had a very impact on todays they war behavior and the strategic of the chinese navy. So as admiral liu watching the former pr any v commander or as chinas l. Fred marcus, an expert emphasize, the chinese navys active role to project chinese power and status in east asia. Xi jinping supported and more loose perception and had this proactive defense which has shifted from engaging in a land wars in the neighboring countries like career and to preparing for Naval Warfare in the east china sea. South china sea and the taiwan strait. Its happening, for example, in the taiwan strait, the pr navy is preparing for huawei and area denial, prepare for their joint operations as a megamansion here and stress and their combined they forces, including navy, coast guard and armed fishermen or militias. For example, in the offshore island like kim and our community. So here whats going on today . First, the local government of the Fujian Province established a county government of two men on the mainland china. And then in july, the chenzhou city issue announcement. Offering the chinese id for those residents from jim there, who engage in the business construction and education and the family relations on. The mainland. So next month, theyre going to be a talk between chenzhou city government, the jin county government, about crossstrait gasoline pipe construction and under water, electricity, cable. So according to their proposal, you they prepared a proposal for next month. They will include an article on atoms about joined administrative. Authority are joined between mainland government and the jim county government because you will have thousands of Chinese Workers going to your island working on joint ventures and have you have 40 of residents now taking the id choice. Reasonable. Its natural for the chinese join your administration on this island anyway youre only a few miles away from the mainland of course. Taiwanese government reject. These are local deal and but unfortunately jim is not a green county which is a blue county. So what taiwan needs government could do can do send reinforcement to jim and garrison. Now so a navy prepare for war. They like to fight engage against Taiwanese Navy by the American Technology which had to be equipped to Taiwanese Navy along offshore areas. So thats the first preparation for this to and add operation between taiwan and jim in second and join occupation i mean joined operation with other services for possible war over german and the combined forces. This very traditional chinese look at the history of the naval. During the Landing Campaign of e zhang junction and tojo east sea fleet mobilized coast guard and militias. In the battles over spooky island piracy island South China Sea. The south sea fleet mobile. The hainan coast guard. And again local militias actually, militias opened fire first at vietnamese. They took over those island, not marine corps, not naval sailors, but militias. So, again, any operation in the future against those offshore island like jimmy and marshall going to be Chinese Navy Coast Guard and militias. Thank you. Great. Thanks, brant. Oh, thanks again for having me. So when i was writing the book. There was one, i guess, admonishment. Sun tzu, of course, gets over quoted, but i think it really plays out. And with the three of us up here, three authors up here, and that is need to understand your adversary deeply. And then you also have to understand your own capabilities in yourself also as deeply, if not more, in order to put together an effective approach. And so what us naval power in the 21st century is trying to do is to try to embrace that and theres three points that i that ill make in for the ill try to be brief so we can get to the two the interaction but with you all here and folks online. First off at least when i really started looking at this problem set of like and what shall we do about confidently belligerent china theres in 2010 was actually over the several years in several cases that us concepts statecraft are failing and the reason theyre failing is that theyre not embracing the reality that weve been in for well over ten years. So one of the Core Principles are organizing constructs in the book. That construct is what i naval statecraft. Its the merging of developmental economics with a were very proactive and focused diplomacy, backed by a forward presence. Now, thats not navy. Thats naval. So thats also other elements of government power and economics and commercial. But the core of its the one that more directly a president can move around for specific strategic the us navy and thats what the rest of the book follows in and lays out. It also has a very term view looking at out to 2050 the environmental as well as the demographic changes, the economic pressures that are going to be dictating the u. S. Navy needs to be and where where these challenges demands are going to come which really gets into the second point that i want to make and that is the nature of our principal foe, the Chinese Communist party, where their weakening weakest at and where we are strongest, and leveraging allies and partners across world and in the power of ideas is actually rooted in a maritime approach. And im not one to argue for more strategies. I think the moves that we have, like the National Fence strategy going back to 2018 and slightly, is a continuation of that. Weve got it about right. Its just weve got to start doing and taking in a more concerted and effective way. Thats thats second point. And the third and final point that i want to make. And again, theres a fair dose of the book in this which talks about how you build the right force. How do you employ the right force . And the first thing ill say is, after you go through all that understanding how the chinese operate and how we have to operate, we to reorganize on the scale of which we did entering into our first cold war with the soviet union in 1948. Its National Security act which reorganized it, created the Central Intelligence agency. It created the department of defense. Before that, you had department of war and you had the department of navy. We might need to revisit the that were structured if we ever hope to be effective in this new cold war that we find ourselves. So reorganization is is has to be embraced and it should be resisted. A couple of other key points on that is, you have we have limited resources. So we have to play our hand where it has the biggest impact, strategic impact and the book. I go to Great Lengths to talk a hold a build and an advanced. And so this is actually the first, second and third island chain construct. Again, looking at how our adversaries view the world, how we can actually get around that. And based on those kind of construct, we can get into more in the q a. What that and examples but the decisive theaters where the united must act and where it will actually have the biggest rallying effect to our allies and partners is eastern mediterranean. I mean, an active war going on now. China invested in that region as well as the russians. And ill touch on the russians before i close. And then, most importantly, the second decisive theater is the South China Sea, where china has been very aggressive in the last few years and its actually modified going into adjusting its modus operandi there in its cabbage strategy or gray zone tactics as we speak. Its much more confident, which requires United States to tailor its approaches to two regions and others. And one last point in the reason why i touched on russia. Theres a lot a lot of folks kind of disparage the russians and say theyre not really what we should be worried about that would be misplaced. They may not be the principal threat for us, but they can cause a lot of death and destruction as ukrainians are finding now. So we have to take them serious from that perspective as a distraction, a strategic distraction. And so the strategy of the book also talks about the importance of so that actions that are taken, investments made. Respect to china cannot be derailed by passing political or diplomatic urgencies to deal with russia or another. And so keeping strategic clarity and Strategic Focus is another key thing, which, again, the book goes into great detail about. And it lays out not a strategy, a framework, and principle in which to try put in place a very Proactive National power towards, specific objectives. At the end of the day, to prevent a war and bloodshed this decade, which is, some would say, the most dangerous decade that weve faced in the history of the country. With that. Thank you. Great. Thanks, brant. Just a few quick follow up questions to this. Three speakers and well go to q a. Mike i wonder if i could start with you. And you were touching on this in the unique aspects of the structure of the play as a as a as a party army, rather than a nationalized army. What are things about a Rapid Military build up your your sort of physical hardware goes faster than the software and the human component . And, you know, it takes 15 years to get 15 years of experience. So whats assessment of how, as you the play operate as you look at how well it operates jointly. And just your own understanding of having spent 34 years in the navy and knowing how important judgment is experience. A lot of these you know the the play is lacking. You know, shopping has written a lot about the last time china was in an outright war, which is 1979. So theyve sort of been watching with their face pressed against the window. What do you think are theyre going to be the real strengths and weaknesses on that ship then that software side, the human side within the play . Well, theyre the first thing to to recognize is the leadership of china and. The leadership of the pla recognizes what you just said. Its not a mystery to them that they have experience and and thats what i say is suggested that they keep harping and as i said, in very strident and sometimes embarrassing language, calling out the pla different branches it for one thing, or another for for not training enough, not being tough enough. Now to the navy. In the book, i focus on how important it is now almost 13 years that the pla navy has sent a small task group to the far reaches of the indian ocean, usually a destroyer and a frigate in a neuer or two frigates, whatever it is, two warships in an island, and they just dont. Theyre not just going their point a to point b, they actually operations and this is a five or seven month deployment. And so they have been, as i say, been doing that for almost 13 years when one of these task groups arrives in a northern arabian sea, the one thats been relieved except during it was except covid, this was change. But then those port calls around, the littoral of of africa or in eastern med or or south asia and what have you to get experience. So as i say they have a cadre of flag officers and and officers and sailors who have been out maintaining a ship, keeping a ship running at sea for a very long period of time. And those of you who have ever deployed on a ship and you know that it is it is a challenge just to keep everything ticking over and so now nobodys shooting at them. But then again, nobodys been shooting us either. And so we dont know how that would would pan out. But there theyre using these antipiracy patrols which are effectively patrolling or sea lanes. They use these antipiracy patrols. I think mainly is a is a training event that the sailors have to go out and be on their own thousands of miles away from port for a substantial period of time. Just a quick follow up on that. One of the things that xi jinping talked about is the importance of joint warfighting capability. But when you look at the composition, the Central Military commission, its become less joint over time. Right. So its still overwhelmingly army dominated. Theres no navy. I think theres one sort of one navy presence, but its a commerce. To political commerce role. How do you read that signal . Because it is its confusing. On the one hand, what everyone the pla needs to fight and win wars, but how the leadership is reflecting in terms of whos advising xi jinping . Well, its as a retired naval officer, i at the fact that the navy doesnt have a seat at the table. But the reality is. They fired the head of the rocket force and. His his political is the to the to top leaders of the of the play rocket force and they brought in quote a full admiral. Hes all of a sudden dumped in there as the head of the rocket force and of full force, the equivalent of forced our air force offshore and dumped him in there as a political commissar and said okay, youre now in charge of the rocket force. Id like to. Thats because naval officers can do anything. But but the is that it is an army centric system. But increasingly in terms where you look at the resources are going where where theyre going. The army has gotten smaller. Theyve been the bill payer for the navy and for the air force and the rocket force. The army has lost a lot of men and what have you in their struggle, perhaps more than the other services, with learning how to be joint. They cant. Theyve been camping in one garrison somewhere for 20 odd years. All of a sudden they have to show up at a quote, a headquarters to be a j5 and they say, what in the world is the j5 . And so this is the entire is in the throes of problem learning how to be joint. But the army i think is the one that is most affected by it. So i wouldnt read too into the fact that theres all green suits sitting around shopping. Youre traces the entire historical arc of, naval thinking in in the communist party of china. Then the evolution of the play. Im curious one of the big discussion points now is what lessons is the play learning from the war in ukraine . A more general question, though, which is, you know, the subtitle of your book is the evolution of the plan. Looking out over the past 70 plus years. What evolutions and change in the play . Is it them watching other powers fight in wars . Is it them operating in their in their sort of nurses and figuring out what works and what doesnt . Are they studying textbooks . How do they what drives change and innovation in the play . Well, the major reason the National Security concerns and also the civil struggle across the taiwan strait. Taiwan had been a priority for Chinese Military development. Since 1949. But they think the reason the years of chinese really learn the lessons about the war overseas. From 1950 to 19 seventies. The current leader believe that we can win without intervention. So actually chinese navy try to avoid direct confrontation with the American Navy and the armed forces in places like taiwan street. They believe they a better chance to win without american intervention. So with that in mind, they tried to are prepared to win the war. Neighboring navies like having these navy japanese, navy and others. So they like to have a war experience with those navy without intervention. Just quickly shopping. Michael mentioning some of the i politely can call it personnel changes in a rocket force. We have defense minister who hasnt been seen since the 29th of last month. Now weve got changes in the play. Undoubtedly going to be were in the middle of a clearly a significant. We have the foreign minister chin gong whos hopefully vacationing a dacha somewhere. But what could be much worse, there seems to be volatility at the senior level, especially in the military and diplomatic corps. I know theres a lot we dont about this, but i guess my question to you is, do you worry now as you see this political infighting . I mean, we just had two days ago, 103 sort of play chips out in the taiwan strait. You know, theory is they want to signal to the rest of the world that even as theyre cleaning their ranks, still ready to fight. So you have any concerns that this volatile were seeing might affect the way that the play is behaving in the nearterm, are they going to get more sensitive . Is there the prospect of miscalculation . Mm, yes. Yeah, larry. But you know, the mechanic or the institutional tradition of the prc, i had two problems. Doesnt matter what kind of problem they had, corruption, mismanaged demand and the power struggle. But early in the past, according to my book, during the cold war and beyond the party allow that to fix his own. The party leader, mao zedong and deng xiaoping, which i tell you know, which one should stay, which one should go. The military work out the way among themselves. Not anymore. Now the party have to step in direct to lay off or replace or dismiss those generals, admirals, because the military lost their traditional political power to fix his own problem. So xi jinping ran out of the patience. So if you dont do, i will do for you. So that what happened, according to the news we learned and theres a more problems you know because these are not just the personal issues. There is, again institutional system problems. You know, just move one person, you know, he has a network and the strong build up behind or under so thats could be a major blow to the military system. Yes. Fred, im glad you talked about china russia relations. And its its one of the frustrating aspects of we both work in d. C. Is there seems to be this continual dismissal or that the relationship defined by tension. I think theres a little bit too much over learning of the sinosoviet split, but i appreciate your book. You i think think creatively how the russians and chinese could work together. I wondered if you could just think a bit allow about as were thinking the next decade where might cooperation between the russians and the chinese go . And it is a second question. If were thinking about in the taiwan strait, where might we be . Underestimate the role that the russians could play either in capabilities like submarines or increase doing problems for us in other theaters. At the same time that were looking that taiwan. So thats. Thank you for that question thats definitely one that ive been living for quite a while the the Strategic Partnership beijing and moscow is not a natural one so just allowing natural courses their own National Interest kind of play out theyre not going to be closed for long. But putins very disastrous and horribly executed invasion. Ukraine in february of 22. Its making him more and more reliant, some would say subservient to beijing interest that will agitate russian nationalism. Again, nature take its course. Theyre going to be Strategic Partners for long. But as long as putin and his power circle is in power there in moscow, i think we have to assume that this no limits relationship is going to Start Playing out in ways that we dont really anticipate and most certainly not to our advantage undersea capabilities. The one that i watch on this with deepest concern and the analogy that i use is if we have a similar type incident like we had with a walker spy ring and, the silencing and Milling Technology that made its way into the soviet union and fairly rapid order a quieting submarines while its nowhere near what we could have what we have it complicates and causes us to have to allocate more more resources to go after a single Chinese Nuclear submarine or diesel. So thats thats a bigger area down to a very specific niche. And theres more. But thats the one that i stay up nights of the most worried about. To drive a wedge like building out a strategy and having a plan to try force these to part. Thats not something i as very effective it would more more likely fail and we would probably do more to bring those two together most likely in the near term is that we should try to find ways where russian interests that dont align with china get accentuated and maybe facilitated in places where the chinese have interests are not in align with russia to try to agitate those more in, accentuate them more, bring them to the forefront. For example, the arctic comes to mind. Thats a place where supposedly on the surface both are working together. But china has covered its eyes, seafloor resources up there and eventually going to run into the russians. So dont craft a strategy dont build a plan to try to force them apart. But the same time, it has to be part of the planning that we do and how we build and how we employ our forces. Actually, comprehensive National Power should also inform the diplomats. In the book you talk a lot about and you mentioned in your opening comments on how important allies and partners in our are to thinking about u. S. Power in the. If were thinking about taiwan scenario. I wonder if you could just give a high level of where the defense relationship you think are strong and are going to be critical. What might be some that are critical, but are not strong. So for quite a while if go back in tokyo with Prime Minister abe, he and his administration led and kind of brought an awakening in d. C. About the dangers and threats from china. So in some regards id say japan is our staunchest, stronger east and also most proactive ally. Well also play a very role and theyve made no secret of recent past that taiwan security is intimately integrated into their own National Defense and having been to tokyo last summer. The environment in the japanese public is one that i never id never seen in my life much more willing to play a proactive military and defensive role in the world, embracing concepts and circles that i would have thought i would view as very liberal or socialist. Kobe University Comes to mind who were embracing concepts of shared weapons, like a construct that supposedly is in natos framework with use of weapons. So japan top korea. But south korea will be focused in on the north, but a lot there in the sea of japan or in the east sea that also have to Pay Attention in the south koreans can be a great ally for that. Australia, i think Southeast Asia and the south and Central Pacific, thats a relationship that we two capitals, canberra and dc need to do a better job. Our interests have not perfectly aligned for a very long time and weve also had gaps in coverage. And this is partly think why we saw the turn of events in the solomon islands. Its also why were seeing perhaps bad things playing out in the in papua new guinea. I like an independent is looking at the island but you have other places in the in the and Central Pacific where playing zone is not working to our advantage. The United States and australia need to integrate, approach and work more integrate in a more integrated fashion rather than playing regional. Mike, you want to come in . I just i just want to make a point about the allies. Its a i think its important that we keep in mind, thankfully, china keeps making own goals to scare the bejesus out of its near neighbors and making it easier for us to improve our relationships, our allies and them and they themselves improving their defense. But before we break our arm, patting ourselves on the back. Its important to keep in that. Whos going to show up when the shooting starts and we dont that none of the countries that were allied with and what have you there are actually have indicated perhaps japan the closest that would come. Fried ride with this to go fight china. So you know allies are terrific during time and what have you and and what have you. But you have to be careful not counting too much on them when the shooting starts. Maybe we can segway to on on that thinking about taiwan and maybe bringing these threads now to try to conceptualize what effective deterrence is going to look like. And maybe we start there. The dword gets around a lot. Oftentimes it feels like we Say Something is deterrent because were doing it rather than understanding how it refracts through chinese calculations and strategy. Youre thinking out of next ten years over what are going to be the foundational elements of deterrence. What are they and this is for all three of you, what are the things were not doing now that we to pick up the pace on if were going to extend deterrence through, say, the next ten or 15 years. Of course, for deterrence to work, the other side has to believe that you either have the ability to really whack them hard deterrence by denial, or that you have the ability to frustrate their attempt, in this case taiwan, to to take take taiwan deterrence by denial. And so, you know, to answer your question is part of it is making sure that they believe that we that we have the ability that if the if the conflict we have not only the capability to respond but the political will to respond. And in the case of denial, we have convince to play taiwan has to help us convince to play that. They will not be successful if you try to invade taiwan, we will be able to stop you. I think i think its pretty clear if you think about whats going on in ukraine, its pretty hard to stop being bombarded with Ballistic Missiles and cruise missiles and aircraft. And so taiwan is probably going to take a hell of a beating if if its not an invasion but just essentially, essentially an attack from. The air and theres very different that would be difficult to stop even if we had had the ability to do that. But if we have the ability to stop an invasion and taiwan is willing to fight on and hang on that be enough deterrent hopefully. But china has to believe that and we have to demonstrate that capability and through our and what have you and weapons procurements and those things that they believe we can do what we say or we assert we can do. And i if im into your implicit is were not quite doing that well it all depends. Well were not doing it. All of the gee whiz good that were talking about having or the more missiles that were buying and what have you, were still cranking up the production lines and so once all of these sorts of things have arrive, well be much more capable. So the longer the longer are the situation that we have today. Last, the better it off it is for us. Believe. And in terms of deterrent capabilities, you know, we submarine or can tell it. But Something Like 30 , 35 of our commissioned submarines that are down for maintenance and everybody understand submarines are the are the our ace in the hole when it comes to dealing with with a taiwan attempted invasion of taiwan. So we need to fix that problem something weve done a lot of thinking about how the chinese look at the taiwan whats your assessment of how are looking at us deterrence and capability these and to mikes point credibility now right i i think they they are believe that American Armed forces may not you know make an Immediate Response if there is a uh attack took place. So probably for the first 48 hours, im arguing well wait and see. See whats the situation over there. So thats very critical for the Landing Force to make a determined moves and, uh played Important Role so that as the the chinese calculation. But again at that point at this point uh. Attack of taiwan is not the first choice because the like, you know mike mentioned here the risk caused and the possible war with america. Thats what the chinese leader to be worried about because the award decision in china is for that not for the National Interest or security, but for the Party Control anything. You know we can all threatening to the ccp leadership. Uh, wont be, you know, the top choice. So what xi need today its a political accomplish ment achievement or for his third term dont have to a big you know that you know or attack on taiwan could be on some small island under like gee man could it be serve that role to help him instead hurt him to strengthen his leadership instead weakening his leadership. So taiwan probably is not immediate a war decision for beijing in the recent years. Thanks, ren. I couldnt agree more. I think the danger and i certainly dont think we have the luxury of time. I think we are in an urgency of feel, a period of urgency for action now. Are i am one of the believers of the davidson window that 2027 presents, a time at which we reach peak danger, where from beijings perspective they may perceive their advantages reaching a maximum, a window of time to act. And again, its the perception, and its intent and intent can change minutes. And its really whats encouraging things mind that morning that it wakes up before he goes to bed the decision to go and how i think in the near term theres a lot of question marks. One, theres the has a lot of uncertainty about how it would perform in a conflict. But looking at beijings war planning, theres also a lot of question marks in their mind about how we would respond and how our allies would respond as well. And so how do you figure out how do you refine your you do an intelligence point, you spike the system, you create perhaps an incident that might serve a political purposes. Xi jinping personally in beijing, but at the same time provides the play that insight. Where are the actual red lines for the us, the japanese, the filipinos would the filipinos invite more u. S. Military presence if things start to heat up around taiwan . These are the question marks and it feeds into another term of this equation. You know, going to war equals, you know, a positive military military balance. Well, other countries in the region are also spending more money in defense and building up. So thats going that erodes trends is down beijing but that other the Political Uncertainty or the effective control thats whats really holding them back right now. So sowing doubt is whats needed so and then going back to this being the most dangerous decade if we dont play our cards more smartly we could inadvertently through ill informed engagement or unwilling unwittingly having a too passive posture and our military are ready when the play and does decide to trade paint with us. We could send a signal of weakness or green light that further would be warranted. And the unfortunate thing of that is they would cross a red line with not even knowing it. And i think that red lines a lot lower than. I think most of our Political Leadership realizes, because once the bombs start dropping in taipei, theres 50 to 80000 u. S. Citizens there. No politician. The United States is going to be able to do nothing. Yeah. Well, this is the part where we invite mass democracy to join the discussion. So weve got some microphones up. I know, admiral mcdevitt is live question asking is it has to be a question and it has to be concise. So please just name your name and then your question, please. And im going alternate between weve got some online questions and in person here. Hi calvert mango carrier engineer can aircraft survive a fight in the South China Sea . I guess thats for me. Yes, sir. All right. Well, actually, ill defer first to the admiral and. Well, the issue now is that can the Aircraft Carrier or can the airfield survive, the fight and right now it seems that theyre most people are wringing their hands about the fact that land based antiship Ballistic Missiles with maneuverable warheads as they come down through the atmosphere, could could, in fact, hit a moving ship and ostensibly the pla navy is tested. The only test im aware they were shooting at a moored barge well thats a little easier than somebody than a 25 ship going 25 knots the is in most war games ones that ive played for certain people are not willing rush the carriers forward immediately because theyre afraid theyre going to get whacked and the plan now is extend the range of the aircraft by organic tanking on the carrier the drones that will be used as organic tankers as well as Long Range Air launched antiship cruise missiles that collectively be between and air launch cruise you can fire at 800 knots nautical miles or 900 nautical miles away, keeping the aircraft out of the sam problem and keeping the ship from missiles to be determined if it would or not. But thats the plan, and thats what the system well, thats what people seem to be buying to do. Yeah, i would just so i would add that moving targets are hard lot harder than an air force base or facilities that are on land. Those are fixed. And that also means have to buy into a lot of infrastructure to defend them. Decoys well as active defenses. So Aircraft Carriers are always going to have a role. The other thing is they move around and you can surge in power project where you need to. Thats an uncertainty provides the president and provides of commanders a lot of flexibility and a lot of more options. So i dont see them going away, but they can take a hit. It hasnt happened yet. So we dont have any historical evidence. But looking back to records from World War Two, we need to be very smart about how we repair the Aircraft Carrier after hit. And of course, echo all the points made about we need a longer range airwing. We also need a rethink about what naval air looks like. Its not just going to be resident on the Aircraft Carriers for strike power. It may be on other ships, maybe in other forms and. So i think thats something thats well past to do. Im heartened by the fact that you have an Aircraft Carrier on the cover of your book, rescue. Sorry, im sorry. The heart of i love them to please and just to the folks who are giving questions online in fairness to the people standing, well clear through this round of standing questions and then ill go the questions online. Im veronica carter, member of naval insight and independent. Think, think for me today. Discussion the urgent on me. If the survival really is. To the fact that china aggressive enough. With their Community Allies such as vietnam laos and cuba and recently china had military with cuba that brought brl eight and and ccp in our region less than 100 mile from florida to. Sorry etc. We just have many people. Yes, sure. Could you just let me get this point. Thank you. As dr. Lee book, explain stated on the offer a few faqs page, the plan is ready be and is ready to open fire first in defense offense against adversary power like the u. S. Navy. So in my opinion sorry im, sorry. What was the gist . Whats the question. Yes, i will. But then you didnt manage to understand the question. In my opinion, ccp are already in the u. S. , so you in our government controlling leader and decision. And ccp already supported and close to russia so our situation more dangerous than before. So. All right then the reality is that my is in the survival for how long we have respond as china 50th we already have the first strike they are already inside the american soil and. So when america respond to that act. Thank you. And i thank you for for this opportunity to exercise my freedom of speech. At least i have no thank you. At least i have no gag order. Thank you. Why dont you . Well, i think that was actually more of a comment and a question, but it was a good comment. Thank you. So please, ill take this question then ill go to one question on line. Then well come back. So i think russias brilliant performance in ukraine has blown the davidson window. And if anything, its now wide open. Its not going to happen. Why would xi jinping do anything without a declaration of independence from taiwan . Why bother . Hes got everything he wants right now and taken all the comments, his criticism of the military, i would think that hes actually down at the tactical trying to figure out whether or not his service can fight. Why am i wrong. You skirted the line between comment and question various. Yes, that chip has been used now. No else can can use that strategy. But what would i miss . The bottom, which is what was the question . So the question is why . Why you think were on the precipice of war . Well, i dont i dont think were on the precipice of war. I think that she is anxious to shoot and i dont think hes anxious to start start a conflict. So i think i think that that particularly whats going on in china right now, the last thing he wants is a fight. Well, maybe my questions for brant. Yeah im on im definitely the other spectrum but you want to maybe very briefly. Yes i agree with admiral mark david that she tried to right avoid a direct confrontation with iraq. So a couple of things. Ukraine win lose doesnt necessarily send the signal that that todays not the day to go to war over taiwan or the advantage and the reason that is ukraine could win but the west could be so depleted its resources and its industrial capacity. If we dont address that, then thats a green light because we have an empty arsenal and were a paper tiger. Their eyes and the advantage has been proven out. And thats in the ukraine victory or. We pull back our resource and our support to ukraine and ukraine falls. That also signals weakness in the part of the west. That unity of of narrow countries and of western thinking countries is also a lot weaker and therefore the red lines are a lot lower down sends a green green to beijing. So its how war in ukraine ends and that take the appropriate lessons to bolster Defense Industrial base, to signal to china that hey if we get into a fight we its going to be a long one and we are prepared for that if we dont take those lessons, we may find ourselves in a sooner than 27. And again, its all about intent. If just looking all of the economic the military, the region, if youre just looking from a pure ballet perspective, there could be a rationale for acting sooner and not appreciate that and not taking actions that decades past due and building our defenses growing our navy, strengthening our economy to economic coercion from beijing to. Then we probably are going to make that projection at prophecy reality. So its not a foregone conclusion that date, that projection was actually earlier in this decade, ten years ago, it shifted because of actions that weve taken like the rebalance the free and open indopacific and japan under Prime Minister taking a lot of aggressive actions to grow their own defense as as south korea starting to look outwards. So theres a lot that we can do with our allies and partners to change it, but we cant dismiss it. Im going to do just because its builds on this discussion and and shopping. Im going to ask this to you this past two weeks or so, as weve seen, chinas economy undergo significant. Theres been pronounced concern about the prospect of a diversionary conflict. The leadership in beijing feels threatened or sensitive. Xi jinping might be looking to fend off attacks. And so he looks get a safe, bloody nose. Could be on the Indian Border just to you, how do you assess the likelihood in the near term of beijing doing something stupid as . It tries to divert attention from economic challenges. Probably some International International crisis may, you know, help xis political crisis. But we just dont know, you know, when and where. But right now, a couple of possibilities, including that the offshore island crisis. And also you mentioned disputed borders along the chinese Indian Borders and other areas. So thats those are International Incidents may help release xi from domestic crisis. Great. Please your next and then well go over here Harry Mallory shall one with us and i news i wanted follow up on something admiral mcdevitt said we hear a lot about capability and capacity of the plan, but there is this question how how good are they . Just to follow up on that point, are there any examples outside, you know, pure shipbuilding capacity that you can point to that show the plans, efficacy . The examples that can show their efficacy, their reliability. Well. You honestly, i dont follow it as closely as that is active duty Intelligence Officers follow it. So this is this is impression tastic. For example, their development of carrier aviation tactical aviation, taking airplanes sea. Theyve been very deliberate. It slowly trying from one thing or another going you know, they send out bulletins with a first nighttime landings and whatever but they have they not been in a in a hurry. Theyve been very deliberate and careful and taking step by by step to make sure that when theyre large carrier thats still under construction is completed and what have you, they can actually have a credible wing that doesnt have to jump jets to to fly. Theyll have catapults. And it will be able to perform it with. New tactical airplanes better the ones they have now i would say thats an example of the fact that theyre they recognize what they dont know and theyre very willing to the time spend the money and move in a way to make sure that when they finally get it, that its right. And as i said, though, the one thing you know, until the shooting starts, we dont know for sure how well will their radars work, how well, will large work work . You know, when we see in ukraine, theres a lot of russian missiles that look like theyre way wide of the target. Is that going to be symptomatic of chinese missiles that a huge number of them are not pinpoint operate with pinpoint accuracy. I dont know perhaps people the classified level know but so those are uncertainties that. We really wont know until and hopefully well never know because it would mean that there is a conflict underway. So im not sure if i got to your question, but you did if anyone else does. I mean, yeah, its a turkeys. I an exemption to the newbury. My question is about the china russia relation. China does not condemn the russian invasion ukraine because it considers that nato expansion provoked that invasion. And on the other and you see that russia moved closer to china just after. 2014 crisis. And was very reluctant to do so at first. So my is how do you explain that the United States didnt try to derail or to prevent launch that close chinese and russian partnership, which obviously is detrimental in the context of those two conflicts, taiwan and ukraine. Great. Thank you, brant. You want to. Oh, so that Strategic Partnership goes back to 2001. So by 2014 it had been pretty mature between the russians and the chinese. But on, you know, meaningful military operational level, it really hadnt started to take off. That all changed. 2019 when you had chinese and Russian Nuclear capable bombers circumnavigate docked to island in the sea of japan rather than seoul and, tokyo, reacting against beijing and moscow, they reacted at each other. So they were able to use bombers together and operate a high level of operational and again, strategic assets. And thats very concerning but they also exposed problems with our allies and partners that have to be taken into consideration. And so i dont necessarily see natos expansion as the cause for or, you know, bringing china and russia together. I think it predates actually quite further back that because on the issue of, pushing back against the United States based order or global. Hey, jimmy however you want to characterize uss role in the postwar era its the us and that are against and in this case russia is interest and chinas interests are very much in a line. Well they may differ in other places and it has very, in my my estimation to be with natos. And that includes the nato expansion that some talk into asia which i find is the odds of that is very low. But the relationship is one that should continue to mature with say that japan, nato, we have exactly 4 minutes left. So if you dont mind, i might take both of these questions together, then well let let our panelists answer. So please, sir. Yeah, my short john kuhn, incumbent fleet admiral, professor of naval war college, but currently teaching at fort leavenworth, kansas, argus. As for panel, what the impact of the august agreement on the calculus. Thank on on what the australia and u. S. North korea agreement on on the couch gillis oh of the region thank you thank you phil bizarrely taxpayer. If you change all your from the pejorative Chinese Communist party the person of the nation of the leadership. And just say china. And you look at in the context of it could be Thomas Jefferson or the president monroe fdr. Ah how does that change the prospect of on china versus the u. S. And i apologize for using versus versus great weve got 3 minutes so thats a minute each to pick between one or both of those question so might when we go to you, i think orcas, uh. I dont know for sure if xi jinping is his hands over orcas or not but anything that raises the prospect that there are going to be more Nuclear Attack submarines running around the western pacific is something that is not good deal for the play. The fact that the kingdom, another Nuclear Weapon with ss means and and what have you is engaged in an alliance with the United States and australians with that seems clearly aimed at. Deterring china cant be something that they look at with equanimity so i would say on balance that orcas is probably uh now it has to orcas has to work there has to be and as i said at the end of this story, thats out there flying the Australian Flag and i think thats a we have long way to go before we see that. But conceptually its not a bad idea coming. So, so the question about the americans image of china. No, if you if we strip away the communist party and we just think of china as a very large country with with a different regime type, would we still be in the same rivalrous dynamic or you think theres theres other there would be other possibilities. So is it the party or is it china . That is the the challenge you want to skip. Probably china, i think, you know, the party, the president as we know as any place else is presenting the history. So they to power not the accident not by you know a revolution actually their war history the background and those or policy or strategic cultural you can go back way to ming and chu and so densely. Some emperors believe or had a similar view about. Countries like korea, vietnam. They were not communist for sure, but so is a very tradition. Wasnt just the common ideology, you know, aggressive or expansionist, but very traditional. Brant, you get the benediction. So hard part first, the yeah. So if you strip away the Chinese Communist party, you have to look at National Interest. Sure, there is going to be some differences there. Even if the nationalist had won the war, there still would be from what that government have in u. S. Interests. But theres a lot of ifs, but i do think the nature of the Chinese Communist is on on whole actually a driver for a lot of bad behavior, a lot of it very dangerous risk taking the near term. Its not a very dynamic regime. It is brittle and that is the danger in it. Now, the easier question, i guess i dont think some future 2040 submarine that could come about australia thats not the the dynamic thats weighing in beijings calculus its what u. S. Nuclear presence is going to be in australia think tenders doing maintenance sustaining submarines in a fight ford without having to go all the way back to the west coast the United States are to pearl harbor. Thats something that if we focus in on the near or bias actions to the next 2 to 3 years that actually can be the biggest advantage for as a deterrent value in orcas. If i could one piece on that submarines u. S. Submarines out of fremantle in World War Two operated in the china sea. Factoid for you between and december 1944, we had 45 us submarines operating the South China Sea. So we are at the end and i would like to recognize dude. Admiral Mike Mcdevitt shopping and brent sadler lets give them all a big hand. Detroit this discussion. I got the feeling we could have done this for hour and it would have still been we very much appreciate the fact that you gave us your most asset today, which your time and for each of you it just doesnt quite cover it but weve got a copy of our Naval Institute press book mastering the art of command about admiral chester nimitz and the victory in the pacific by trent hoehn, one of our authors. And we you and also we invite our audience to join us out in the foyer again, where well continue book signings for all our authors. Lets them one more big