Panel celebrating the publication of democratization and authoritarianism in the erab world edited by Larry Diamond and me and published by the Johns Hopkins university press. If im not mistaken, this is the 30th journal of democracy book at Johns Hopkins has published since the series began in 1993. These volumes, which mostly but not exclusively draw up on articles that previously appeared in the journal have addressed a very wide range of regional issues related to democratization around the wor world. It is a quarterly publication sponsored by the National Endowment for democracy. It has become a leading global forum for serious analysis of the problems and prospects of democracy around the world. Larry diamond, who is also my coeditor of the journal will serve as the moderator of todays discussion and i will limit myself here with just a few brief remarks mostly about the book itself. Today given the intense worldwide focus on the shattering events in ukraine, the arab world is no longer at the center of attention for those that follow the Global Politics democracy in some might say that the arab spring is a brief direction left behind a great deal of violence and very little democracy, yet it would be premature to discount the impact of the uprisings in recent years. Not only has it made possible by a democratic transition in tunisia but still not yet aborted the transitions in yemen and libya. They also changed the politics and theyve given many citizens a taste of freedom that will not soon be forgotten. Regardless of how one evaluates the events of 2011 through 2013, they must be considered a critical juncture. Interregional sweep by the wave of the transformations of Eastern Europe in 1989 to 91 the journal of democracy monitored the uprisings in their aftermath intensively into the book reflects the variety of the coverage. Its not easy of course for the quarterly to stand in the unfolding events and we couldnt expect the authors to hit a moving target. So along with some accurate assessments of how seems outdated in the events. In fact, one thing that we have asked the panelists to do today is reflect how they might have altered the analysis that they contributed to the book if they were rewriting their articles today. But we also believe there is a value in bringing together the essays that showed a Key Development in the evolution of the springs or perceive as the time may occur. They occurred. A democratization and authoritarianism in the arab world is quite large containing 29 chapters along with an introductory essay. 16 of the chapters consist of dramatic essays with regional wide applications and they address such questions as the relationship between islam and democracy, the role of the parties, the culture and Public Opinion and the reasons why Different Countries pursue very different paths. The remaining 13 chapters are devoted to case studies of individual countries with multiple chapters on egypt and tunisia and individual chapters on yemen, libya, syria, bodhran, algeria, morocco jordan and saudi arabia. At the conclusion of the panel we will have copies of the book available for sale in the back of the room for those that might wish to purchase one. I believe that the privilege of introducing the panelists all of whom have contributed at least one chapter of th the book but t wwithme say a word about larry himself as one of the worlds most eminent scholars of democracy, the senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the institute for International Studies where he directs the center on Democracy Development and the rule of law and he also serves with me as the cochairman of the Research Council of the National Endowment for Democracy International forum for democratic studies. I want to call attention to the superb job that was done by the journal of democracy staff first editing the articles when they initially appeared in the journajournal and then preparine book for publication. All the essays were edited either by the executive editor who is in the back where the Senior Editor tracy brown who im sure is here also somewhere and the managing editor who isnt here today and over the Production Design of both of the original articles and the subsequent book with its customary insurance and the assistant editor played a valuable role in helping draft the introduction so much so that larry and i agreed he should be listed alongside with us as a coauthor and hes also in the back of the room. I also want to thank melissa, jessica and dean jackson for the democratic studies for their help in organizing todays presentation and i also want to note the presence here today of suzanne, the book editor at Johns Hopkins university press. Those of you on twitter i told you can follow the Panel Discussion and contribute to the conversation by using the hash tag and ed events or follow the forum at think democracy at medemocracy. Join me in th silencing your cel phone and i am very pleased to turn the floor over to where he. Thank you so much. We are very grateful to the authors to give a reflection on the buck and where the world is now in the wake of this publication and in all of the developments of the last three plus years. Im going to briefly introduce the speakers that will speak for each about ten minutes in the order that i will introduce them. I may ask them a few more questions and get them intellectually and then we will have plenty of time for you to pose questions or challenges. Daniel is one of our oldest in terms of longestserving [laughter] in the journal of democracy in fact he joined the Editorial Board at an early stage in his career and hes been very influential in shaping our coverage of the Political Development related to the islamic world and hes a associate director at georgetown university. He also serves as a special adviser at the u. S. Institute of peace to the Muslim World Initiative where he focuses on democratization and political reform in the middle east. Also a longtime partner and interlocutor with the journal of democracy in the center and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute where he direct the center on the islacenter of they and the future of the muslim world. Hes the founder and coeditor of the centers Current Trends in the islamist ideology, and hes taught at chicago, columbia, yale and georgetown. We are very excited about the work that he is doing and hes also contributed to the journal of democracy. The new book is just about out. Counting the islam religion class and elections in egypt and also the author of the very widely acclaimed book order, conflict and violence with Cambridge University press. So i would ask you each beginning with you to reflect on what you wrote and also on the challenges of the democratization and the authoritarianism at this moment in the era world. First i want to say that i very much appreciate the opportunity to be with my old comrades and friends at this meeting and to have contributed to this volume. The list of contributors is extraordinary and it is a test to the widening arena of the scholars that are doing this work on the arab world and in the wider middle east. When we started this venture, the notion that we were going to work on the arab world i recall in 88 and 89 when we had to hold meetings just to sort of put us on the agenda and convince people that this was a credible thing that needed to be studied and the journal was way ahead of the curb. Curve. I mean that. It really was compared to ask questions long before some folks were able to think of them seriously, so i can get this to a credit to the journal that has devotejournal that hasdevoted sd attention and space. And larry has done such a good job with making that happen. So, i appreciate and im sure that many people in this audience also contribute and to recognize how important it was that the journal and then there is so much ahead of the curve on the matter. I have been asked to reflect on the piece that i wrote and what i write it any differently . Mark was mentioning how you deal with events that are changing as you are writing them and i finished and i said my two predictions things were grim in egypt and wouldnt work out and they were okay and tunisia and would work out and then they were not looking so good and every day i was like my god when are we going to get that constitution written in the journal thats going to work out . Lets go. And my reputation is on the line. And behold, even a week before the constitution was finally agreed on i met with colleagues who didnt know what was going to go on and it happened. But i felt and im saying this for a serious reason. That is because this may sound selfserving to be the Analytical Framework that i tried to set out in that article comparing egypt and tunisia as a framework that i think i am more convinced than ever i have to say is a useful way to think about the challenges of moving from what i call authoritarian rackets, protection rackets to democratic protection governan governance. The paradigm itself focuses on the dynamic of the conflict and identity in the political systems. Thats paradigm is by no means limited to the cases in the arab world. Lets look at ukraine right now for an example, the issue of the identity politics intersect in a democracy. But i think the issues of identity and the conflict are especially pressing and in the arab world for a variety of reasons and isnt something that the expected in the sense that when they were both started in the course of tunisia and in a ruratheraleigh area, not in that of the metropolitan capital, but in the world areas, it was about the revolt searching for the social and economic equality and dignity. And so many of the initial slogans not only indonesia, and i much prefer the notion of the political rebellions in the arab spring as well as in egypt and elsewhere, these rebellions were in part or large measure initially about issues of economic and social justice and dignity and stuff like that. Tom friedman wrote a long piece about the whole intersection of theory between the issue of the water scarcity and the environment and the rest of that and how that played a Critical Role in the revolt in this area. So people were not aware of the extent to which the issue of the identity politics has loomed so large area and i use the term. Electrically because they do not think the issue as ive written in the past i wrote a piece two or three years ag ago maybe more, you know how time flies, called it is not a solution or the problem, and irq that the issue is much more about how different segments of these communities can learn to live together democratically as opposed to having a kind of peaceful coexistence or not so peaceful coexistence in the authoritarian system, and i think therefore that of the identity issue is blooming large that many people were surprised by it. I remember that they wrote a piece of six months ago when he said he was shocked that the issue had loomed so large and i was thinking my gosh this is a man that knows egypt while but sometimes it isnt easy to sort of stand back with what you know and sort of see the drain. Cut to turenne and to the struggle over identity is that the political systems had in large part been organized around the Protection Systems in which the governments regime is backeregime is backedby the stry cases provided social and economic protection to the vulnerable minorities were communities in return for their acquiescence to their power. And that sort of relationship that i had called a long time ago the ruling bargain, that kind of relationship meant that in many respects the dynamics of the identity conflict were institutionalized deeply before we saw them explode onto the political arena and they were deeply embedded among the contesting political elite who did or did not necessarily have the linkages to the other groups revolting in a systeresulting iy saw as corrupt and unfair. And so when the politics shifted, it shifted in the context of that Protection System and didnt necessarily transcend. And i think that in that sense it was and rich respect nothing was surprising when you look back, thats for sure. But i had been thinking about this stuff for a long time and while i was hoping that it would shift to the pragmatics of the social and economic struggles, it didnt. Now, when we think about transitions, i think that we think about the transition paradigm and i still think that it is in many respects still an important intellectual. But the paradigm assumed that the democratization would emerge not because people were committed to democracy but because people were using democratic rules as a mechanism of conflict resolution initially, the notion of the democracy but the democrats. But that presupposes that there was no basic identity. It really did. And so, the extent to which use the paradigm. They were correct. You need some sort of a political bargaining to make a transition. But its particularly difficult to have contact with the the pae struggle isnt over the economic and social issues but over identity issues having to bargain identity issues a issueh or difficult than dealing with the demand of labor and inflation and so on if you compare the struggle over the pact in brazil to lets see egypt. They were not trying to figure out the National Identity or National Struggle that egypt was over the National Identity in many ways. And the question therefore is how do you move from as i said before and authoritarian system to democratic one and in each case you have a different set of variables and im not going to do the Political Science science petition here, god forbid, about those variables. Even the word variable scares me, but [laughter] were even dependent variable. But i think that the structure of that relationship really hopes in retrospect to begin, understand the difficulties as well as the opportunities. In egypt, you have a basic struggle between the military regime that offered protection to different elements of the community to the business communities to the secular intellectuals come about in egypt there were two things. First of all it was maintained by the powerful military that sustained us off as we well know, and in the end its not only provided protection to the secular groups, to business leaders, but also to the islamists. They were always negotiating with the regime and they continued that and they thought that they could reach a political pact with the military and guess who laughed last fax that was the egyptian story. He didnt reach out to do what the reader has to if he is going to move towards a democratic system and that is to reassure the losers of their basic rights. If you cannot project to the losers particularly in the military if you cannot signal that your going to come up with a bargain he will not get a transition into the struggle dance really signal to the secularists that they had a place in the system. Many of them are back in many respects i call it a coup and im ashamed of it. Was it a mistake . The democratic process requires a democratic solution. Look where we are today. We have a system that is about as close to fascism as we can now describe. It really is. In the technical sense of the term in so many ways. Tunisia benefited from a very tunisia had a strong divide. Theres no doubt about it. But they didnt have a military to appeal to resolve their collective action problem and so they either talk or the fight. They fought a lot. Im sure that they are still going to fight a lot. But at the end of the day, they appeal to their own sense of selfinterest, but also to be arbitrating role in the trade unions and other institutions and results the political hacks and creating the constitution and they are i remain optimistic. I think it is much more difficult and countries such as bahrain and syria where you have a relatively small minority that sees the democratization as an existential threat because the election could mean that they are overwhelmed by the majority. And the sunni government doesnt see what they can live with come a, sostructurally there are cass that are much more vulnerable to the assertion. I think the kind of authoritarianism that we have in egypt is anything worse than we had before. But you also have to have the opportunities i see in tunisia and i still remain not completely pessimistic lets put it that way. And in libya i cant be overly pessimistic because once you do not deal with the issue early on you have a path situation so theres a variety of outcomes and i would close by saying the following. You know, in the wake of the revolts in tunisia and egypt there was a surge and they write out the mechanics. And you and all of those other guys you were wrong and its not a question of whether they were wrong or right but we have to put aside the expectations and that the context and really embedded the understanding of what is possible in the complexities of the systems. They are always in their own history. Its not a matter of in history or out of it here in their own histories we have to take it from that legacy seriously. Thank you very much. Okay. Thank you very much. It would have been a useful service if i had told the audience what you had written, but in fact you did it very well. Your topic was transforming the arab world brackets. Its not bad. Its almost as good as the liberalized photography. In this blog jim youve shared with us some of the work on islamist thought and mobilization. The title is Arab Democracy or islamist revolution. So, three years later, which is it . First before getting to that, i want to thank larry and mark for this work and the National Endowment for democracy. I also mark observed early on in his remarks the worlds attention is moving on from the arab spring because of the crisis in ukraine. It is extremely rude of blood america tend to have done so, but it does mean that this may be the last time for some time that we will have a opportunity to discuss these matters because other issues will emerge. I will talk a little bit about the article that i wrote and what is said an it said and hows today. But to focus my remarks that way, i think that requires me to go another 15 rounds which would be timeconsuming and unfair to all of you. So i just really want to begin with what was largely the task to reassess the er arab spring d to indicate what we have learned, and i suppose this meant that we have been asked to offer the interpretation of what has happened over the past three years. It would be best to say what has happened or what are the major facts concerning the arab spring and for this purpose i would include in such a fact that regional developments that go beyond the circumstances within the specific countries on the revolt. First, to bear upon as i will indicate to the subject in the first because the countries in the middle east have a habit of thinking of themselves regionally, because sometimes acting as such. Such has been the case in the arab spring with various countries acting upon the region and being acted upon by it. This is of course almost inevitable in every part of the world. But it is especially the case in the middle east because most of the countries share not only a geographic place, but the Common Ground of being muslim and of identifying themselves as such. And the second and related to it because the question of islam and its relationship to these revolts became almost immediately an aspect that was important to understanding then and has remained so. The net result is that all muslim countries in the region, non arab as well as arab soil themselves as having a stake whether positive or negative in the outcome of the revolt and to the extent either necessary or possible. This is proven to have brought the consequences both in themselves and for regional politics as a whole. The most appalling case is syria and its civil war. For the revolt that launched it has by now drawn in one way or another almost every country in the region. And of course it is now being caused as a struggle between sunni and shia islam. This consequence wasnt strictly speaking anticipated. I will not claim to have done so. So. But in the end it may prove to be the most significant consequence of the arab spring for the regional politics. The exception who now look says he will survive and apart from gadaffi the worst of a lot to. But the establishment of new democratic regimes has large they failed to materialize. One possible exception is to be shut. What happened . To visa. It contributed to the failure from other countries and we will explore if those are discussed but here of a bite to focus on egypt that seems to be the most important case for several reasons with that was largely the focus of the article in this volume. The largest arab country country, the country that the greatest hopes were invested. It did have a genuinely democratic revolution in the sense it held more or less where we are inclined to forget this multiple free elections that produced a new regime. The islamist regime of the Muslim Brotherhood supported by other parties. As we know that regime has failed and is in the process to be replaced by a new regime whose character is still uncertain but to the restoration. If of a new kind. So what happened . What was the dynamic . At the beginning we make reference to the article, at the beginning it seemed the main beneficiary would be the brotherhood. That did not prove to be the case. Also it seemed they would be inclined to move relatively quickly to move the pd rules vision of governance. I drew this conclusion as well as the history of the brotherhood movement. The question at the time was how quickly and how successfully in the event, i was prepared to move fairly quickly but not as quickly as it did. And for a while, successfully. Partially because it was filleted by very considerable public support from the islamist allies. Of course, his reign ended last july. What do you would get from this particular experience . These you should revolts did provide an opening and opening to the expression of popular will that we may describe as a democratic opening. But the first expression was a religious populism not devoted to a democratic order. And other advantages is what led to that in the first place . But the populismxd comment presented certain questions or problems what kind of religion would approach and how would it govern . These issues were never resolved. They never properly resolved the issues and try to address them in the increasingly autocratic mode. It does not excuse them but they had help because of the frustrations encountered with the resistance of various authorities within the government. This managed to produce resentment and chaos and failure. The political skills proved unequal to their ambitions. Where does that leave egypt today . Would be nice if it led to the emergence democratically inclined but such has not been the case but it seems to be weaker even still now. Part of the reason it was underscored in the new book the constituency of egypt is traditional and conservative. It doesnt have a natural instinct feel for the that kind of alternative. That is not to say popular will can no longer express itself. But it now endorses a charismatic save your. With how to interpret it and so far as he seems genuinely popular that still seems to have some power. Moreover that that populism may not be over. Pcs himself to appropriate in some fashion and it is notable that he has some support with the overthrow of morsi. The net result may be a new regime that is religiously populist and authoritarian at the same time. Whether this could work is dependent if the skills are that of the brotherhood. At the present time his main opponents those that showed an earlier form must we egyptian populism. So we will have something of a test in the near term of which kind of populism is the most appealing to the egyptian public. What is the bering . I confess i dont have a clue but i do have three observations. First, the prospective led to their religious pashtuns a passion that it briefly and power those that define themselves religiously that was said earlier about identity being the question. In some places more or less but were not all of one mind to play a heightened role of politics. For example, especially in syria. Second, however may play out in egypt the possibilities of a religious populace to the authoritarian model may be explored elsewhere. To as is presently the case in turkey as is being pursued under the rubric of advanced democracy. At the beginning of the era of spring many wondered what would follow the turkish model and so it may now is the sense that would be very ironic. Overall with the question raised in the spring of 2011 with osama bin lot in by a professor who said at the time that the problem is not how you can destroy something but how you can resist something the build something new, a new state, a new party, a new relationship between the public and leadership and a new Civil Society and arab spring has yet to find an answer to that question. Thank you. Thank you for those eloquent remarks. We will now give the floor to where next baker. He has to articles in the book one he wrote almost three years ago after the egyptian revolution i think we can say is it more cautiously hopeful peace plan may be your view of the situation now and with an extremely influential and widely read and say and say that is now in the arched into a book that would be published soon to take stock why the era of spring happened in some countries and not others. I am constitutionally incapable of speaking. [laughter] i first. [laughter] who is this upstart . I want to thank you for inviting me to speak today i have been lucky enough the first time i wrote for them finishing my doctoral dissertation. The mark was dubious but afterwards i wanted to know what mark thought and i thought thats been a key said it is a good thing you had your entire career ahead of you. [laughter] so every time i sit down to write i think of marks words [laughter] identify and good it taking advice but i try. And my dear friends has noted that when the revolution was fresh and the possibility seemed to be endless another october 2013 when a fullscale of the arab spring and became evident. Each piece is reflective of its time. I will seriously take the question that you ask is how would we have done things differently . The piece entitled the road to and from liberation square i think was broadly optimistic about the prospects for democracy and at that time i believed it was possible for egyptians to get to a democratic order and this is a very big if all of those political players from the military to the Muslim Brotherhood or the secular or liberal opposition to the leftovers of the mubarak regime if all of those actors made all of the right decision so i thought there would have to acquiesce. That they would have to resist the temptation to lew dominate the political order. And non islamists i thought would have to acquiesce to the idea of a political order that has more religion than they want that those would come up as the antimubarak opposition would have to resist the temptation to exclude the former mubarak regime because with the new class of spoilers to tear down the entire egyptian edifice. Simic a surprise to us before. None of that came to pass. More than that or to believe that it could come to pass. I am neurotic and i . That peace open to remind myself and i have to limit i come away pleasantly surprised i am not as dumb as i thought because at the end of the article that was an extremely poor country to make it to democracy they usually fail to keep it. But i further noted going to the islamists dominion or crisis or chaos people begin to your in for the stability and i think that was working with me to craft that. [laughter] but that is what happened. With two of the greatest intellectual partners in the peace is more consistent with the pessimism with that article it we basically resurveyed the entire arab world and was far more continuity in that part of the world period change. During the revolution remain have been thrilled by the ingenuity of technologically connected young activists, but we neglected to note they seemed to be feeling more than they succeeded. And of the 22ttiul countries y six of them faced anything we would characterize as the regime challenging protest and only four of those cases did you actually get success the you can define very nearly as the regime and we note successes predicted pretty well by structural factors. Whether having access to oil with the essence of the people or guns to people over the head and if the regime had experience of successful hereditary succession retake as of proxy for cohesion. People grapple with this but basically in the 21st century a few minutes past power from father to son that is evidence your regime is tightly bound if everybody there can sign onto that. So basically with the new articles we try to redirect the attention scholars put from agents to structure. It does not matter how courageous or ingenious or how they made use of information to overcome the collective action but the outcome was essentially preordained. But this is pessimistic by no. People say if you want to look smart always be pessimistic but it is useful not just deal comes a protest but also to explain the outcomes of the places that manage to overthrow their dictators. So it is worth noting of the cases that we have the first suffered a military coup, the second still has not had a multiparty democratic election, and more important the person who rules yemen is the guy they overthrew. With libya has devolved into a state of near lawlessness and only to visa tunisia has critically kept institutions afloat although as ben noted there has been polarization and Political Violence including two assassinations in 2013. I am far less optimistic about tunisia than my colleagues to save only looks good in comparison to the arab spring neighbors. Why this record of failure . Why wasnt the arabs spring were like the revolution of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s . Not like the variables i dont like it but. Died of it. One variable we try to measure is how a democratic you are. Oneway there is a group at the university of maryland and the scores of every warsaw pact member they move to be much more right around 1980 including russia experience this really nice job. Of the eight warsaw pact members only two of them have not made it or kept democracy. Updating the scores we will not see a jump like that. Maybe with tunisia but no where else we will see much more continuity and change. Why is that . Becomes to the two things that requires a level of Economic Development and state capacity neither the everpresent in majority countries. The argument i am making that it was not where it needs to be people think i am making an argument how the egyptian a muslim people are not ready for democracy. But we are arguing that our colleagues say there is not a constituency for pluralism , and i think those are wrong. But to simply recognize the fact you need to have a Political Landscape in order to sustain a political system that everyone agrees turnover of power is a good thing and should be included in the Political Institutions of the state. With that landscape is not where everybody is a liberal but in the United States if we try to put the bill of rights through a referendum i am not sure it would pass you need a Political Landscape were any struggle can defeat the other. This comes from a famous line from Walter Lippmann and wrote to with the indispensable opposition that the democracy depends on monday even balance of power to make it impractical to be arbitrary and the opposition to be irreconcilable. Both sides have to have the belief they can win in a future democratic contest to abide by the rules. The equilibrium clearly did not exist with the egypt after mubarak. One of the sad ironies is it went from one kind of oneparty state to another kind after he was overthrown and those islamists that far george their opponents were able to run roughshod at the ballot box is not surprising the opponents thought democracy and elections needed to appeal to the military to protect the basic interesting concluded the only way to prevent the new dominion was to welcome with open arms and i would further notice as a little wrinkle my argument is a little different that the nature of the conflict does not matter. I dont think it says that a severe freeze jack did sodium pentothal there were broadly sympathetic with the principles of this day i think it was simply that these people are winning and we cannot. Net of this should have proven it surprising to in for people much snyder smarter than myself that was not but there is some solace to be taken. For what happened after as opposed to before because that is better than not understanding what happened at all. Thank you very much. [applause] thank you for your personal discipline i get nervous when authors leave my immediate reach to go a distance away and i dont have the ability to be the agent of horizontal accountability. [laughter] i will have a trio of questions posed to each of you and answer what you want to engage one another more directly with the most controversies that were struggling with. I thought i heard you somewhat agree with the implication that i was not certain, who and what was the government under morsi . So when you say it is not surprising the other side perceived the emerging one party hegemony. But most of us feel lets get real was a military coup july 3, 2013 and was of a tragedy and resistance to consolidating and authoritarianism and could not be mobilized than the administrations of what they think is now a fascist military regime. But was this a authoritarianism . Or just a oneparty dominance regime . What is the wider meaning . This moderate Islamist Party play the political game with the rotation of power with the normalization of this phenomenon is it dead . If this is how do we explain the radically different decision as the of more or less ruling party to give up control of the government . That is one set. So what is egypt and today . I heard of vague disagreement the little bit over here that dan said i have to agree that it is a fascist regime but i heard Hillel Fradkin say wait a minute. That it does not look good but we dont know the character and what it will be and can moved in a different direction. Finally if the three of you want to address this come in the book will look at 15 arab states and if you just looked at another indicator the Freedom House ratings the Freedom House of Civil Liberties the states that have changed during this period almost all of those have gone south to become more authoritarian. The only to that have been improving their scores the you can call a lawless states is libya that i think pauls profoundly into question how Freedom House calls it as a democracy and also tunisia that is clearly on the road. The ledger does not look good. I thank you are right to. But is it fair to say it is still early days . Who knows how this will play out and did you mention yemen there has been more than a little bit of progress the fact they could agree on any constitutional framework battle seems to have been a major and vastly underappreciated achievement not only by the yemenis but the united nations. So dan you start and we will go in the same order. Response to larry is questions and remarks i see, and i see less distance between the three of us. I know you are pushing for conflict. Now that i have used the f word, fascism with the egyptian. [laughter] ill the bv observer anytime soon i imagine. [laughter] but clearly the system is much more shut when i use the term fascism is psychological that is hard to grasp there is aspects theyre difficult to grasp that do not fit but i do want to answer the question to say that i am not saying because there is the identity conflict it precludes transition to democracy. I would disagree in the sense that when you have a disagreement over identity it is easy to manipulate peoples fears the most basic concerns where they will end up in the system. It is up tussaud peters if they will manipulate those or not or exaggerated. I have not read the book but the adviser throat when time flies much of the backgrounds of the book seems to have been laid out with the basic argument with the election when leaders try to mobilize they are tempted to play to that and you have to decide as a leader what he will do or what the agenda you will set. z za . We cannot expect all political leaders to be and nelson mandela. That is an exceptional record in human being but in terms of responding to addressing the basic features of the of users this is the islamist regime by Security Apparatus and the establishment of clerics and intellectual secretary fear losing their agenda through democratization. How do you engage apperception . So what we have in the region is a failure of leadership simic and a failure to understand that someone who seems to have understood this and that makes me happy and were worried because it seems they have kept their party together. As i am understand the story in tunisia they tried to push the agenda and were pushed back partly by the circumstances of the assassinations but i wonder what will happen to the party if he is no longer there to guide its. It is not for lack of trying that the elements of the party did not succeed but i wonder what will happen. There is a relationship and how political leaders engage but we do know it is the surprising that iran it predicted negotiated a pact with the military but they also needed to do that with the secular. That is the other critical saying that they needed and that they did not get. Thanks for the questions. Let me say one thing about tunisia it does stand out as the one actual or potential positive. First come on a hickory , i agree dealing with the of peters is the most intelligent and a very, very long time. But one also has to observe unlike egypt the brotherhood did not war win it with the election. You dont have to be a genius to see there was a difference is to ration to deal with. There were a lot of people who did not see that and were pushing for something more radical but those people could say the situation does not permit that. And that is a function of at least partially of different history and constituencies in which case it was useful to make an agreement with other sectors like the labor union the secular educated. Budget even in that case he resisted said government it was not an easy thing to reduce. Then compare that with egypt and larrys questions dan just said morsi needed at pact with the military and with the other forces. That would have been a good idea it is good to have more than one partner. But it is not there is the equivalent to with the is on his constituencies but what was the government under morsi and we are is egypt today and i disagree how to explain the current regime. How was that under morsi . In the first place it was a composite morsi pushing for word in the still existing bureaucracy with other institutions which were not under their control. There was a constant attempt to push to control those things especially the a judiciary which first of all, prevented morsi from very quickly control of things and the critical thing seems to be december 2012 when he just lost patience and tried to rule by decree. After that the trajectory was downhill and if i had been morsi i would have been more patient. But i dont think he was getting advice to be patient i think there was the impulse there this is our time and lets make it work. Now. As for where egypt is today, i was suggesting that the new autocracy is not the old autocracy because you pass through this experience and mubarak is gone. A lot of the old autocracy had to do with the autocrat and what he was like and how he came to office which was through the assassination of sadat. So that created structures but the agents are also important with who they are. It remains to be seen but he has come through. Its seems he doesnt want to be those bureaucrats that mubarak is but he may think it is not possible. To find the theme that would bring them to power and how successful they would be for thats. And with the difference between tunisia and egypt he has 30 percent of the bow than some portion of the is now supporting him and defending him. If they are useful to him he will try to give them some satisfaction that presumably comes in the form to appropriate the religious sense. That is what i mean. That may work. It does not fix the economy but as the means to Blind Society together. Thank you for a great set of questions and for some insight dick gives me very little to add. If we just a back to answer the comparative question why is it that tunisia worked out and egypt did not . I think the comments validate the perspective that with tunisia you had a more balanced Political Landscape was not out of the realm the when you have a new sets of elections you can do better. From that standpoint it was the required a remarkable character but just a minimal the level of understanding of politics to know your opponent are ones that you have to negotiate. With the egyptian case the Muslim Brotherhood is running elections and who doesnt turn at is the most potent competitor . Not the liberal socalled secularist but the more conservative party. Of which to steelhead description mentioned in an article old drug conservative religious monsters. That is a great line. [laughter] if you were the Muslim Brotherhood thinking politically who do i have to outflank . So it is not surprising if the brotherhood is with the most political competitors and not the socalled secular is that would give the military and excuse to drive tanks down the street. I think it is a function of the Political Landscape and not necessarily a particular factor. It is interesting to mention the identity conflict i really dont believe that was important but if you think about the literature that we have on two sides the structural lest we think youll make it democracy with this level of development then on the other side you have people going back to the 70s that said there are no prerequisites only a political elites that agree. If you read the piece carefully he says what you need is the inconclusive political struggle as the participants conclude democracy isfj[ important to. Inconclusive. Meters side can win but i think she meant you have to equally matched sides. How do you4get that . That comes back dues structure so that wastj lacking with the egyptian case and remember thinking about a saudi arabia and of the countrys or jordan, they have significant structural barriers not the least of which they are hugely diverse there are challenges to the authority that they were never reconciled or also from of the of light transnational movements so they have always been fragile states and never great as a fur tyler ground for democracy. I will stop there. Looking for dissension and let me just say he also said the model only those countries that would risk a consensus of National Identity. We can have a debate about that. He did not mean there is consensus of religion and politics only that we all agree we are egyptians. What is striking to me is a struggle over what it means to be egypt or syria or algeria or tunisia. One other variable that i will go to the two of you. I want to channel our late esteemed Editorial Board member and his frequent coauthor to note that egypt had a president ial system and tunisia had parliamentary. Morsi round the first round with 27 percent and barely won with 51point 5 . It does enable people to the grandiose projects with. My name is mohammed i am from the accountabilities center. But none of the speakers touch specifically the gulf countries and with egypt to cut the funding and how they Muslim Brotherhood with military but my question is if you can touch on this because there is the balance of power in basically prevent countries but one thing that was mentioned that was selected from the u. S. Involvement with the soviet union and lost the support of that area. To now make that area stable it is surprising how shocking in the National Interest of the United States that these emerging democracies otherwise we will shift to libya. Please keep the questions briefly have a limited amount of time. My question is did in the same direction. You spoke about the fear of the sudanese the sydneys. But to look get them it is much easier to go through a transition of a democracy because i dont feel this is a case where the saudis have control in bahrain. They dont mind as the human rights activists. And that is a dangerous role. But the interest is by the current regime. So what would change . So i want to ask the question of identity. Can we separate the internal problems of identity with the government . Thank you. Im elected member of the Egyptian Parliament with the freedom for justice party. Living in egypt, i dont agree with that characterization morsi have to lose by decree but to conceptualize the situation he did not rule with the freedom government but the interior minister stated it was not morsi even when he insisted it would give him wrong information. In to control more than 50 percent of the economy to make serious challenges still the Muslim Brotherhood not only a loan but other Political Forces with the referendum i think that to stay away from the revolutionary cause through the democratic process. I believe the trust of formal democracy is a big mistake of all parties. There was a need to keep the balance of both the revolutionary and democratic but i do not want people to leave Tahrir Square at all but to make sure the country is moving in the right direction. I disagree that i think the revolution will likely continue. I think the people in egypt still have the say and theyre not likely to except the status now we try very hard to work with other people all of this realizing we made mistakes in need to push that for word. Thank you for that. I would like to ask on an issue that none touched upon the role of the states two encounters of ways that they have moved on . Hi dave maneuver or manipulate to put a brake on the air of spring countries . I o from a learning is to from iranian society. Activist looking at egypt looking backward and forward that there are comparisons between what is happening in the tips now or under morsi but the four ford look we could have a Tahrir Square that goes somewhere. My question is about the analysis for things to take shape and consolidate or move forward you need to have all sides feel there is a chance at winning elections this is not the case in a jet. From not of an analyst or a person or an activist on the ground when you see what is happening under morsi what is the moral thing to do . Do you wait and wait and wait for the next election that you say there is no chance of winning or do you stop the process as undemocratic as it is with the hope to stop infringement of all manner of human rights . I am from the Hudson Institute. Three very quick questions. There was a comment but i wonder if the panelists could comment the euphoria of revolution is in deuced to making packs or if that meant that possibility to say the least . With the comment about it democrats mentioning briefly the liberal secular democrats could we share the view of the possibility of democracy with committed democrats . In the panelists do not talk about this point but i may use that opportunity is the future of the islamist going into a long debate but how does that panel see the future . I get the feeling the panelist do not agree with that. Rodrigo from this point for word . In make you have the last question in very briefly please. I am with the center of the egyptian americans say q now i would like to ask your opinion we will meet the family tomorrow and what should we do and what is your opinion with the Obama Administration. In meeting with the minister of egypt next week. I will go in reverse order. This is a wonderful set of questions from the engaged audience for i cannot answer all of them actually i could bet that would be very rude. [laughter] let me respond to the question why was it a failure to make a pact could possibly be in the revolutionary atmosphere . I would say in the aging case there was a pact between the islamic stand up army over the political timetable it just excluded a particular set of factors nobody thought was consequential but they proved their ability to make problems to spoil the political game. If you have democracy without democrats i believe that you can. Redefined this simple test if it is said democracy corrected if the details are wrong you have to have to turnovers of power or consolidation. Sorry. [laughter] larry is moderating. But i remember in interview with karl rove where he said we want to have a 100 year republican majority. Nobody wants to be the democrat. So to be committed to that is too high of the bar you have to be opposed forces being committed but the future of islam isnt is how we define it the Muslim Brotherhood . An open question. I really dont know if it is defined as my friend does political activism that definitely will not disappear reverting to issam but i think both the the current regime has its own islamism after all the interim constitution that the current regime plans for after morsi was overthrown they check one of the most objectionable articles and putting into number one. Clearly signaling of revolution with some of us love brotherhood. In to have that in the middle east and we have not enough cases into many variables but that these were far more developed so there are a lot of reasons to expect them to do better. In the of big question as that they selected at the outset i believe this relates to the comments but they make the point morsi was not trying to rule in the president ial mode. In this case he is rate right with the declaration of morsi as exhibits day with the bill of particulars against the Muslim Brotherhood. What did he do . First of all, why could he issue a constitutional declaration . Because once he is elected the Supreme Court dissolved the legislature so now he is legislature and executive in to make declarations not that he created or inherited. Then he tried to bring back the legislature that because he is committed to have parliamentary oversight dominated by the brotherhood. But he tried to bring it back so the military says no. Then he says my decisions are above judicial oversight. What is he talking about . To make the upper house of parliament to be the legislature. Youre next. Is that all you have to say . I spoke for the shortest. Okay. Im trying sorry trying to theres a fair convergence between some of these questions, but obviously the comments from different perspective. Let me begin in a way backwards with the question about the role of the deep state, which is raised by yes, because i think it reflects relates directly to what in fact they were just talking about with respect to egypt. There was in that case i agree with the character characterizations. You had a deep state that was both functioning as an opposition to the elected authority, and also not functioning. Difference functional in a way dysfunctional in a way that was indescribable constitutionally, as eric was implying. There was no legislature no , no clear likes of authority so morsi made them up as he went along. And what i meant earlier by the fact that he just lost patience. So i dont think in fact it was simply unimportant that the super constitutional decree was made. It deepened the problem because it didnt there was still no real Constitutional Authority that conveyed more generally to people that now there there was now a different spirit in the government. So, in each case, the problem of these the preexisting state, which collapsed all together, as it seems to have done in libya, that means thats going to play a role in the transition. The role of outsiders. Both regional and the u. S. I think thats been the way it was put in two different sets of questions. In the case of the this is where i began with my remarks, in fact they had a very large impact on internal developments in Different Countries, and since the region didnt act as a whole but in conflict with itself, it affected the trajectory of these events. Especially in egypt whereas, as you say, they were supporting the brotherhood government and others were opposing it. The role of the u. S. Is a different matter. And here obviously a very long discussion because we had separate, obviously, reactions to the different resolutes and so forth. But at the very beginning in the early spring of 2011, the president was quoted assaying, effectively, i want to keep hands off of this, period. He did it more positively. The statement was, these are organic revolutions, and organic revolutions are good. Theyre good because they reflect the plant thats there. The people who are there. And the problem with us getting involved is were outsiders and we would distort the growth of the plants. And i think by and large i know that in egypt, everyone claims that the president has been on the side of their opponents, but he was probrotherhood and antibrotherhood. He was in where basically in any consistent way, which went back, i think, to the original notion. We make things worse we americans make things worse when we intervene, therefore were not going to. And this will all be healthy er. Turns another that organic growth has liabilities of its own, and were now in a situation, as we can see, for example, especially and emphatically in the case of syria, but we have not prepared the way for that was in a way by design but it was conceived of benevolently. The proof we were being good was that it served no interest of ours. And it hasnt served the interests of anyone in the region, either, which is part of the problem. And related to that, i would say what was the other thing going back to our the speaker from the freedom and justice party, i hope its clear it seems to me that president morsi had a lot of obstacles thrown in his path, from a democratic point of view, dubious. In fact this discussion about that took place earlier, i think about a year and a half ago or a year ago. On the other hand, the response wasnt particularly democratic, either. So thats how we got to the present circumstances. Greg. Well, a lot of excellent questions. My sense on Regional International factors is that theyre very important in the case of syria and libya, but i think counterfactuallyim not as convinced their ultimately the decisive factors. The ones we have been talking about, which are very much local for the most part, are the crucial ones. What i tomorrow the regime fastist we dont know what that regime it. Its a fascist moment, when a leader is exploiting the deepest fears of the population and identifying enemies who are enemies and deserve this or that fate. So, when the court says, 560 of these are sentenced and member of the government says why not 20 thousand . You have to wonder what is going on. This is aster strange situation and dish does islamists and nonislamists. The nonislamists rubric is bigger and more complex than the merely secular islamic struggling and theres a possibility of Coalition Building as a result of the learning process of this, and the result of the mistakes that leaders look at and assess and the kinds of alliances, and theres more flexibility and malleability in the identity map than would be suggested by secular islamist divisions, at least many of them. But the balance of power is absolutely critical. But notice whenever we talk about identities were not talking about workers versus the bourgeois see, were always talking identities. The tunisia situation doesnt it was fascinating, who did he encounter the most questions from . Islamists. They kept asking him, you say islam is thats what is left of our agenda. You say islamists accepting the pluralism and working with others. This is what it means. And this is not an islamist agenda anymore. A plate more than simply the balance of power. He was been stick where about these things and he means it. But tend of the day when he at the end of the day when he defines an islamist agenda or agenda of his party in ways that question the role of islam as opposed to a mere inspiration for identity there are plenty in the party who believe it means much more, and in that sense the tunisia situation was not solved the islamist issue at all. The party face a situation where it would have been crazy to impose their will. They did for a long time but there were all kinds of peculiarities and results in the election, including the election of our all kinds of strange things. So the real test is after the next election and what happens when perhaps the party may do better than the first time and how it is ready to share power and work with the opposition. Thanks, larry. I did want to ask one thing that occurred to me in the context of dans remarks, which is in a way to stress a point dan made before, the structural things and then theres also just a quick of leadership, and how leaders take into account very specific events and respond to them. I would say a couple of things in the course of the events of the last three years, specifically in egypt, struckmer very powerfulfully at the time and in retrospeck. The first was the demonstration on february 18th. Which was the first demonstration more or less that was dominated by the brotherhood in tahir square. At which the leadership decided to invite decided to throw one off the platform. That was a moment to reflect on what was what kinds of things you needed to succeed in the revolution, and a decision was made, and i think it was made incorrectly. The other things like, were the probably remembers the exact circumstances when the assassin of sadat was asked to sit next to the general at a public event. That was not probably very smart thing to do. So, from the first of all, from the perspective of having a successful pursuit of your own program, and from the larger perspective of the egyptian or the arab interests, those kinds of things matter a lot, and turn out one way or the other. How things turn out one way or the other can actually be trivial as they are or small as they are, may be fairly decisive. Thank you. Thank all three of you for a remarkable Panel Discussion. Met close with these observations. In answer to your question, it ones answered and i think it would be very it wasnt answered and would be a lengthy discussion to answer it. I just say one thing. Whatever the Obama Administration does, i hope it will not commit the ultimate and unsustainable hypocrisy of declaring that egypt is now making sufficient progress towards democracy. You have to begin with first order principles, and the first order principles are not to make a fool of ourselves again in the arab world by turning these things upsidedown and predent we dont see what is happening. However you characterize it use, the fword or not, its a deeply authoritarian moment in egypt. Over a thousand people have been killed since the military came to power. Over 5,000 are in jail. I think theres very clear evidence of torture being used, friends of democracy and liberal principles have had to flee the country. In one case a scholar we wanted to bring to the United States isnt being allowed to leave the country. And of course many people are suffering much worse fates. So, we have Strategic Interests but it would be nice if we would stand up for our principles now and then, too. Or at least call things as everyone necessary everyone else in the world would see them. Id like to end on a hopeful note so let me observe this. We have had a situation for 40 years where the arab world was the only region in the world, the only significant, however you true the map, clustering of states in the world where there wasnt a single democracy, and now according to Freedom House, i think correctly judged, theres a democracy in tunisia. I if i was an american policymaker would i say, whats the economic agenda for embracing and lifting up this economy, for strengthening the state, for partnering with the Civil Society and Political Institutions. You got start where. This country is crucially important in an outside way, i think to the future of democracy and freedom throughout the world, and the final thing is, i really do believe i think my colleagues agree, were really still in very early days here in terms of a process of the struggle for to use one of the arabic words, dignity, throughout the region. And this isnt going away. And there are many historical events that are going to unfold in the years and decades to come that i think are going to rock these regimes or induce them to come to turns with the demands for dignity, accountability, and popular sovereignty. So we have to do another edition of this book, mark. The one thing we can say for sure. Marc, my coed did for, thank you very much. All of the staff at the journal of democracy, the National Endowment for democracy, and our three panelists. Thank you all. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] booktv is on facebook. Like us to interact with book tv guests and viewers, watch videos and get up to date information on events, facebook. Com booktv. Heres a look at books being published this week. Former treasury secretary Timothy Geithner provides a firsthand account of the decisions made following the 2008 financial crisis in stress test reflections on financial cries. In no place to hide Edward Snowden and the surveillance state, Glen Greenwald broke the story. The economist, john and adrian argue that the u. S. Government needs to reinvent itself in order to be successful in the fourth revolution the global race to reinvent the state. In a time to attack the looming yawnan nuclear threat, Irans Nuclear program is examined and calls for u. S. Intervention. The professor of ukrainian history at Harvard University reports the u. S. Was concerned about the collapse of the soviet union prior to it dissolution in 1991 in the last empire the final days of the soviet union. In aim of amibition chasing for and faith in the new china. A look at chinas recent transformation and growth. Look for these title in book stories this coming week ask watch for the authors on book tv. Org. The act passed in 1933 after fdr came to power was a very clear line between the speculative versions and services and things that a bank could do, and the deposits it took and the services itself provided to regular individuals and small businesses. A very, very clear distinction. The bankers were on the same side as fdr, the population was on the same side of fdr, and things became sable for many, many decades, several decades of that. Contrast that to what happened in the wake of the 2008 crisis, and has been a much more expensive crisis for the general economy, for the actual unemployment level, not the sort of tag line unemployment level. For what was lost to individuals throughout, and relative to the bailouts and the subsidies that have been given since, and doddfrank came along and did nothing remotely like dissecting speculation from depositors and traditional banking activities. A look at the relationship between 1600 pennsylvania avenue and wall street. Part of booktv this weekend. Online, our book club sleeves is it calls you back by luis rodriguez. Booktv covers hundreds of author programs throughout the country all year 0 long and heres a look at some events well taped this attend this week. Look for these programs to air in the future. On monday, were at the half king bar in restaurant in new york city for veteran writing project founder ron capps recount of being in war zones and how it affected it. Robert spencers talk, and then wednesday, in new jersey, mike earp, former associate director for operations at the u. S. Marshal service, looks at the over 200 year history of the marshal service. And then on thursday, its back to the west coastor