Transcripts For CSPAN2 Capital News Today 20120410

kicked him in the dark and as a senator he hadn't had that close of access to the branch said he is still learning the job and the essence is because he's still learning the job he hasn't developed the political skills yet to be able to get what roosevelt might have been able to get. then the question is could roosevelt have had achieved this? it's one of these kind of counterfactual questions you think about i wondered if roosevelt had been able to do it. i'm not sure he would have been able to do so. what do you think? >> i think one side of this that is interesting and we point this out in fdr goes to war is fdr had lost a lot of clout in congress in 39 and 40. his court packing scheme in 38 really incurred a lot of people and then he also tried to of course purge of various members of congress and the senate did one of them was the senator from maryland and if you notice in the book it leads the filibuster to defeat several of the proposals fdr once passed before congress adjourns in the summer of 1939 and he's delighted to do that because he sees fdr as an enemy. some people are very suspicious of him and the way that he manipulated. >> he was only working 20 hours a day or 20 hours a week. he'd gone from ten atv 20 hours a day to 20 hours a week. his physician simply said the stress and all of this, he had high blood pressure and he couldn't take that, roosevelt was only working half time so it's hard to be effective and you are only working half time. i don't think he would have been able to do it. the other thing is walter george was the subject of a purge. roosevelt tried to get him out of office which is one of the reasons that george was hostile to roosevelt' attitudes in world war ii so george was always quick to be there to oppose him some of the chairman of the senate finance committee opposing you and a large block of republicans opposing you. i think what roosevelt would have been likely not to have been successful but it's hard to say she would have really tried and the thing is every time you try to think well roosevelt can't pull this off, sometimes he gets something on someone and that person ends up being an ally and he's able to put off. certainly it was easier for senator george dealing with truman than it would have been a healthy roosevelt. >> another political changes the senators that roosevelt tried to purge or democrats, it was the democratic primaries. estimate his own democratic senators, and of course if you are looking at the influence of fdr on truman and other presidents waiting in the wings is lyndon johnson and lyndon johnson is a new member of congress soaking up everything he does in terms of patronage and big government programs and of course as a big help to fdr and the national election of 1940. >> roosevelt has a task of manipulating said liberties which we haven't done as much with. for simple, he wants to put moses annenberg in prison, the editor of the philadelphia inquirer and there's a republican paper that threatens to bring pennsylvania back into the republican column so you go after an irs audit and it turns out it's vulnerable so in an byrd doesn't just pay a fine he goes to prison and then johnson is guilty of all sorts of misuse of campaign contributions and declaring some of his supporters so the irs is going after johnson, too seven johnson comes to roosevelt so roosevelt has to pull the irs off johnson said he can continue to be roosevelt' man in texas and then to make sure annenberg goes to prison you have faith maneuvering will by fdr he pulled both of those off, so he was someone you are dealing with that the executive branch to be very powerful. >> yes, in the back. >> al milliken. you both united and the way that you viewed economic relations with the lack of economic relations between the united states and japan leading up to world war ii and has pressed do you believe the united states was by the attack on pearl harbor? >> i think we were pretty united in our view on that and that is something i did the majority of the work on the book for so i will answer first. we do plan out in the book in the early pages in 1933 this is before fdr is even inaugurated as president he is talking with two of his advisers and they're both big new dealers the will be part of his trust. the above columbia professors and the totally believe in the government directed economy and of course the people directing the economy should be intellectuals so there's the recipe right there. fdr mentions he's always favored china and he thinks the war with japan might work better if it's sooner than later so why not now he had that flem and side to his nature and i will point out he had never been in a foxhole. he'd never been the military to the heat never been shot at. he took all that i think rather lightly, and when you look at the men who died in the pacific and the early days of world war ii i find that really appalling that he let them go into those exposed areas in parts of the philippines with such bad weapons and many of the men that died in the conflict could blame fdr but as far as pearl harbor ghosts, i do think that we cut the japanese off from their resources and i will say an interesting study is to read the papers of ambassador joseph prez in tokyo pleading to put off the embargo. pleading with them saying there is a peace faction in the japanese and we can build that if you put the embargo off. but roosevelt is determined to in barbaro oil and scrap iron and they make it very difficult for the japanese to receive any of that said the japanese party gains ascendancy in tokyo and then of course plans period harbor. people always say do you think fdr knew about pearl harbor? i think fdr knew that an attack was coming and he knew an attack was probably coming first of december, the first two weeks of december but where was it going to be? almost everyone thought that would be on probably singapore and the philippines. the japanese had 50,000 troops in saigon vietnam something from french indochina to the philippines or singapore was an easy thing and fdr and general marshall have had the war department warned the bases to go on high alert. the problem is if i had an hour i could go over what happened at pearl harbor. it's a perfect storm of mistakes and everyone there believes they were in command of the win command with the attitude of it doesn't matter any way because we are really not going to be attacked so why bother and that is a very bad way to do it and other commanders had done that but it was 1932 were 34 or 36 and your commander in hawaii, you could have that attitude and you were fine and you could spend two years out in hawaii and not do a whole lot and who cares but in december of 1941, it was a very poor way to run things. i don't think fdr directly knew would be pearl harbor but he knew an attack was coming, and what i blame him for most is pearl harbor because he had given 1900 anti-aircraft guns to other countries and he given away hundreds of fighter planes and i will give the commanders in hawaii this much credit. they didn't have the weapons either. there were very short-handed >> at marvil richardson got fired and we play this out in the book. he was the pacific fleet commander in 1940 and a realist and i think a very capable officer and he went to the white house finally in october of 1940 and argued for two hours with franklin roosevelt about keeping the fleet at pearl harbor. he said we are vulnerable and we need to move the fleet back to california. finally, he really -- it became pretty heated and he finally told franklin roosevelt mr. president, i have to inform you that most of the leaders of the pacific fleet do not have confidence in you to lead the navy, and fdr didn't do anything at that precise moment but he wouldn't act on what was said, and he finally fdr was reelected the next month november of 1942 and right after he fires joe richardson so i don't know that a movie is ever going into the life of the admiral or not, but he is backed in the united states on the day of pearl harbor' attack and he's sitting their getting all that news and he knows i warned them over a year ago and still haven't. >> did fdr acknowledge any limits on constitutional limits on the power of commander in chief during world war ii? you mentioned the internment of the japanese and i also have read historical accounts when he said the military tribunals to try the nazis out tours that some of the historical accounts that i've read said that he's let it be known to back channels if the supreme court tries to challenge my authority to try to execute these people through the three tribunals i'm going to execute them any way. i just wondered if he acknowledged any limit on the power of the commander in chief during wartime whether the bill of rights had any application. >> i haven't seen any. if he did i haven't run across at. he tended not to like to talk about that kind of thing so it's not something he talked about with a great deal of frequency but judging by his actions and i haven't seen any indication he felt they were those particular restrictions that applied. spaghetti are reminds me sometimes work to bill clinton reminds me of fdr because i think both men are really, really smart and they are careful not to step on land mines as they don't have to so fdr ignored the constitution. spikelet me ask a follow-up on that. we have debated a good bet whether the new deal model getting out of the great depression is a good model for getting out of the great recession today. there's been people on both sides of that. should there be a similar debate on what roosevelt' treatment of civil liberties in wartime is a model for what we've done since 9/11 or should be or is a cautionary model >> roosevelt by putting 110,000 a japanese internment camps has gone way beyond anything we've seen today. but roosevelt keep in mind there's a political angle to that. not only did the governor enthusiastically endorse doing that, it appears to be heavily political. we would talk up as often because the japanese were such good workers and had been so successful that many of the anglo-saxons felt competitive pressures since if you are to uphold california, you would find there was a majority of the non-japanese that thought if we could get these guys out of the way this is a good thing. roosevelt played to that and put them in the internment camps even though jay edgar hoover said they are not dangerous. let's not do this and he did any way as the attorney general didn't like get but roosevelt enjoyed the political success of removing them not only of the removed and the temple against him, they are removed and those people in california and elsewhere are going to be voting. he's been to pick up seats in california. the western coordinator is saying why are they still here? face been here for years. they join the army and they are highly decorated people to rely are we letting this group -- you might invite an individual who shows signs of having made overtures that should cause him to be investigated but you're talking about the whole group of people, the six-year-old, all of these people holden to these camps. was atrocious scene of the people in charge of the can say no, this isn't right. and roosevelt keeps it going, keep it going and finally the secretary at meds and says i've been around roosevelt along time. i have a chilling after the reelection things might change and sure enough, the first cabinet meeting after the 4040 election one roosevelt and safely elected the seats have been gained in california coming and then we work on getting the japanese out of the internment camp so some of it is a civil liberties issue for sure but there are political advantages to roosevelt to choose this and they thought they ought to put the japanese in camps it wasn't just roosevelt but they are suggesting there were many that said no let's not do this and some said let's do and roosevelt said yeah i think i will sign the exit of order. let's put them in there and then he took political the vantage of this and then lifted the restrictions when he was safely be elected. >> we will take one last question here. >> i just want to ask a couple of questions. one is the 90% plus corporate tax of excess profits was that applied across the board to the companies or the progress of corporate tax system. >> really most companies were caught up to 90% level at least pretty close to it and certainly all major corporations were caught in a 90% level so that was in place for getting people the right to decent home or the right to a good education and the right to a job. >> another question? >> just on the politics of truman. could he have vetoed these reductions and taxes if he wanted to? >> he could have and he didn't. he was in the enthusiastic but he went along with it. i'm not sure, but again, roosevelt -- he's gone and you are trying to think what would he have done. truman was willing at least on this first tax cut to go along with it and part of it was his his job, congress was urging him to do it, but when further tax cuts were passed by congress in 1946, 1937 he beat it again and again and again calling the tax cuts for the rich it fundamental basis for the 1948 campaign to respond to the book is fdr goes to war. thank you, burt and anita folsom and let's break for lunch. [applause] >> on c-span2 a discussion on global nuclear security. after that next a discussion of preventing global nuclear terrorism. panelists talked about the nuclear summit in south korea last month. this event of the national press club last week is just over an hour. >> welcome to the national press club. a member of the committee and the host of today's news anchor on global nuclear security. after the panelists speak for approximately 40 minutes we will take questions from the audience for the remaining time. the press club its reference to journalists and a preference to questions from members of the media. and many of those around our working journalists so please respect that they are here to do their job. if there are opportunities to ask questions when the audience is finished we will invite you to ask your question. please, keep your question brief and to the point. no speeches, please so we can get in as many questions as time will allow. everyone asking questions, please, identify yourself and state the agency or organization that you represent. before we begin, i'd like to mention a few upcoming events that may be of interest to you. on may 9th, billy king will speak at a press club luncheon. again, please turn off cell phones and other electronic devices. today's panel will discuss the global nuclear security and ways to prevent nuclear terrorism, topics covered licht today given the concerns about the future, nuclear ambitions of north korea and iran. our panelists today are from my immediate left roberts, president of the john d. and catherine t. macarthur foundation. he served in the government for 21 years including as a special envoy to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as the assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs. on my immediate right is -- sharon, sorry, sharon director and senior fellow for the prevention program at csis for the center for strategic and international studies. >> ms. squassoni was in the program at carnegie institute for international peace before joining csis. on my far left is alexander glaser, assistant professor at princeton woodrow wilson school of international and public affairs to read his work publishes tv to focus is on the aspect of nuclear fuel cycle technologies and policy questions related to nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation. finally, on my far right is joseph cirincione president of the global security foundation. mr. cirincione is the author of a bomb scare, the history and future of nuclear weapons and deadly arsenals, nuclear, biological and chemical threats. and previously served as the director for nonproliferation at carnegie endowment for international peace. now the order in which the panelists will present will be the order in which they will speak and after the last panelist has spoken we will open the floor for questions. >> thank you, thank you for coming to the national press club for hosting and i want to say how pleased and honored i am to be on this panel with alex, sharon and joe. if the subject was the purpose of the meeting for the president traveled that's why he traveled all the way there and back. he, like previous presidents and candidates is the national security issue to the united states of america, mainly the possibility that a group would acquire a nuclear weapon and it made an american city. the single most important thread. that was the conference in the national conference to deal with the single most important threat to read it went almost entirely unnoticed even with the president traveling there. what got into the newspapers and was highlighted was an open microphone incident. this is too bad but worse than to bad. what we have i think is not a scenario or the idea that just makes good television shows but a real world a threat to the security. it's been lost on me why so many people seem to take solace in the fact it hasn't happened yet. but i would like to persuade you of is that we are living on borrowed time, much better concept, and as you know as most people who do these calculations believe the magnitude of the threat to the united states has something to do with just what are the consequences and the probability of it happening i'm going to try to persuade you the probability of nontrivial now and growing and the consequences are extraordinary. think in terms of tens of thousands of people dying promptly in this city or other american city perhaps a lot more 100,000. it's an improvised nuclear device. i'd like to persuade you that it wouldn't be difficult except for one thing. getting of the siskel material to make things happen. enemy is out there. the enemy is known to want terrorist material to have a nuclear weapon to cause this destruction and i'd like to persuade you the other steps and the sequence of the scenario are not insurmountable for the dedicated terrorists, in other words designing, manufacturing and improvised nuclear device, delivering improvised nuclear devices, not easy, but not overwhelming obstacles. the thing that keeps us say for will keep us safe is preventing the terrorist from getting the material. focus your mind on fissile material. that's why the summit is the nuclear security. the security of this material. i'd like you to think about a couple of scenarios under which a terrorist entity could get the material. i find these possible and the way that i would like this issue to be conceptualized. in two ways simply, by the transfer of material or the theft of the material. i transfer, i mean some government decides that they will transfer the material to a terrorist group. you may say that the moving stuff again. i would say think again. 2007. what did you learn, what did we all learn that north korea we had asked is it possible they could ever sneak out. they not only got a spot weld, they built the plutonium production reactor and syria to produce plutonium. what for? what purpose to make nuclear weapons. do you think they could get a baseball out? i think the answer is clearly yes. the only reason there isn't pumping out plutonium now five years later is because of the version of nonproliferation policy. take another case, take iran. i'm not here to talk about the case except to make one point. everybody is focused on iran with nuclear weapons and what it means for stability in the middle east. it's all serious stuff to the right to get seriously. but states nuclear weapons are open to deterrence. i'm talking about a threat that isn't open to deterrence. iran right now is the source of conventional arms transfers to terrorist groups. i am concerned long before iran its nuclear weapons once iran would have the material again on the prescription for this case, that is another topic. i'm saying if you are going to look at these cases, the north to be a case, iran in addition to thinking about nuclear weapons and instability in northeast asia and the middle east think about this issue. transfer. the second initial one you to have in mind is theft. in three ways that happens. .. >> i do believe we are making this threat substantially worse. prescription and then i'm done. let's first secure the material that's there. secure it to a high standard. then get rid of it. if it is uranium, blended down. plutonium, either burn it -- my favorite option, better than nothing, better than stockpiling. and treated as radioactive waste and dispose of it. finally, a bit of description. this is a prescription one has heard when in a hole. the prescription is simple. it would be for all countries -- all countries, to forsake any future reduction of separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium for any purpose whatsoever. that means no plutonium used in the current generation of reactors. no separation of plutonium for future reactors. no preprocessing of stem fuel for radioactive waste management. none. no research reactor fuel of highly enriched uranium for radioactive production. no naval reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium or additional highly enriched uranium. and it's. the proposition here is that we are serious about this being the greatest that to national security. let's act as though it were. thank you. >> thank you, good morning. i'm going to switch gears here a little bit and talk about the solo nuclear security summit and talk about some of general gallucci and his comments. it was about passing the baton on nuclear security. did that work? i would give you a qualified yes. yes because we got countries there and there was strong support that it was processed. one is that nuclear security is not presently in our strongest interest. we are okay that -- for south korea, nuclear terrorism their worries about north korea. the second reason not to underestimate the summit is that few leaders are endowed with president about ms. power to persuade. the good news is the dutch have a strong interest in nuclear issues in particular. here's the qualification. however, in not only was the comment targeted or commented on by the media, but it was completely focused elsewhere. you might have expected that. they stole the limelight with a plan satellite launch. but that really raises a big question. the media and the public wondered why the summit wasn't about the two biggest nuclear threats that we face, north korea and iran. how do you focus attention on the threats that are not visible, the kind of threats that bob was talking about, versus attention to the threats that we know. that is it calmly function -- it is a primary challenge the summit faces. north korea and iran have clearly violated treaty regimes. we have problems limiting the threats. how much harder is it to reduce risks in a system where there on the question -- there are no enforceable systems of standards. this is exactly the case in the nuclear regime. i'm going to talk about the specific achievements of the s.o.u.l. summit and opportunities and give you a few observations. the s.o.u.l. summit, it was a reinforcing mechanism. it helped speed up some activities. you had some highly enriched uranium removed from the ukraine. the story you don't care about is that we have been asking them since 1995 to remove that material. the summit in 2010 helped. in mexico we converted some other research reactors. we even got a little bit of plutonium from sweden. that is one specific achievement. the other is that the s.o.u.l. summit created a few new activities. you have to import agreements. one is by the u.s., belgium, france, and the netherlands to eliminate highly enriched uranium or production. for the non-geeks in the audience, these are cancer therapies. we need to limit that and reduce the cancer treatments by 2015. there was another agreement, very practical steps, including research reactors. this was something done by the u.s., korea, france and belgium. this is kind of an innovation from the summit. they integrated working groups called baskets. there were some very concrete plans that emerged, particularly with respect to how countries are combating problems with security. over the opportunities we missed? first of all, the lack of enforceable standards and continued focus on sovereignty means that everyone has a right to do very little. in the summit declaration, you have language, which when i was in the state department, we called [inaudible]. we encouraged them to consider to do certain things as appropriate and consistent with national security considerations. that kind of language. the second is that this summit really took the spotlight out of individual countries. you let specific countries off the hook. there are lot of countries at the summit who could've done more. russia comes to mind. pakistan, south africa. how do we move forward, i just want to make three points. increment the progress is good. but the problem is big. you'll need leadership, buying, and the game plan. but we can expect in 2014, at the next summit, is that victory will be declared because it is defined as what is achievable. second, you need to tackle the issue of enforceable standards. this is a tough one. you might have to start out with more peer reviews, but you need to move forward to actually -- pakistan says it has excellent nuclear security. we would all i could have verification of that. third, i really agree with bob. we need to do more on plutonium in both the military and civilian sectors. if we win the battle on highly enriched uranium, that will be important, but it does nothing about the plutonium that is generated every day in research reactors. in closing, i would like to bring your attention to something that president obama said. when he was in korea at hancock university on march 26. part of the speech was a strong support for nuclear energy, but he also said that we simply can't go on accumulating huge amounts of material like plutonium that we are trying to keep away from terrorists. we need an end to -- international commitment. remarking that the u.s. is developing new cycles where materials cannot be stolen or diverted. this conjures up a nuclear nirvana that does not exist. experts agree that there is no purely technical solution. countries need to begin now to view their few cycles and choices. whether it is like reactors in china, russia, south korea, and india, or engagement in enrichment processing. they need to view those choices through nuclear security lines. this will be a more equitable -- but i did not say easier -- approach to reducing nuclear risk area thank you. >> good morning. i'm alex from princeton university. the four i turn to the idea that bob gallucci introduced and to propose my set of action items, let me briefly summarize the way we are today with regard to material and production. i am a member of the international panel on material. we annually update material on stocks. it also includes -- and you should have found in your press kit are related report which summarizes our numbers. overall, we are looking today at almost 1450 tons of high in -- highly enriched uranium and plutonium worldwide. combining several hundred thousands of nuclear weapons, which is a staggering amount of material, of course, and the potential of -- for destruction is something one cannot imagine. at the same time, the securing and eliminating 2000 tons of material is technically not a big problem. you could put it in a small warehouse, i guess, and deal with the material. now, at the security summit in 2010 and two weeks ago in seoul, the security meetings dealt with securing materials, which account for about 1% of the global stockpile of this material. this effort pointed out that it is extremely important but it is often narrow. we are missing 99% of the problem. i think that is part of the reason for the point that mr. gallucci made in the beginning. if that effort is not good enough -- and i hope we can agree on the problem, and it probably is not good enough -- what should be done in? i think the first step could be mass productions in stocks by the united states, russia, and some other nuclear weapons states. to begin this process, weapon space could offer to safeguard material that is no longer in weapons. the second step, as could be verified in possession of these excess stocks, it can be done in the case of love plutonium. i think to begin this process, we need to develop a culture, in a sense, where the extra stocks are identified and declared as such. this has not received much attention so far. we have made progress with regard to regret -- reductions. that is really where it stops. we agree on an upper limit to employ strategic weapons, but we do not ask what's going to happen to these weapons and material that we recover from these weapons. i think we will have to change. i also think we need to go further and focus on new production on material also. [inaudible] but there is no collective statement to that effect. i think the weapons [inaudible] on a moratorium of materials. india and pakistan have been mentioned. in the meantime we can encourage them to join such an effort by conditioning any future civilian systems -- nuclear systems on an end to material production for weapons. verification of such a ban is feasible. it is already dunn in non-weapon states. that is part of the ntt. i am not going to focus on that aspect in my remarks. but there are some hard cases, and i don't want to push them aside. some countries have enabled reactors, most importantly the u.s. navy operates the largest wheat and uses one to 2 tons of hup year. new production wouldn't be necessary, even if we will be able to use it in the 22nd century. there is enough material for 50 or 60 years going for it. that really when make a lot of sense going forward. another hard case that has been mentioned also, plutonium separation are using [inaudible] fuel to -- half -- has been chelated as a fuel reprocessing program. that does not make economic sense today. even if nuclear energy expenditure medically over the next decade, there won't be uranium shorts for many years to come. i think there is a case for moratorium companies could store their fuel and keep the option -- if they think that now is the time, without any opportunity costs. if the plutonium is sitting there -- if you reprocessed and separated it. some countries are committed to reprocessing. there is a chance that some of them, including japan, the uk, and maybe even france, might reconsider their reprocessing programs. the hardest cases are russia, india, and china. i think we need to engage them about the and costs of reprocessing. he may want to learn it the hard way. i guess we will find out. in conclusion, i think the federal bureau is technically feasible. it would strengthen relations in many ways. it would support [inaudible] and it is ultimate protection against terrorists. that is it. thank you. >> thank you very much. i am joe cirincione, and i am talking about cleanup here. i won't take up much of your time because i know there's lot of questions. let me just reinforce a couple of the things that people have said and try some of this together. i think there is no question that all of us believe that the administration worked very hard on this. we know many of the staffers who were involved in this, and we know personally how many hours they have put in and how difficult these things are. i think we all share the belief that in the end, this was an underperforming summit. it had a minimalist agenda. one of the reasons that other issues might grab attention, is the summit itself did not produce any great attention or reach for new goals. as the speaker said, it sped up things that were underway anyway. when you look at the declarations -- when you look at the press releases and the achievements of the summit, they are all good things come about a lot of things are pretty small potatoes that are gathered up here to make them look like a more formidable banquet. the national security strategy of the united states says that the number one threat to our nation today is the threat of nuclear terrorism. but the administration is not acting as if that is true. they are not devoting nearly the resources or financial and personnel to this task, and it shows up when you come to a summit like this. we cannot let this pattern continued. i know that people are already working on the summit in two years. they have to be told now that they have to do better than this. otherwise, these summits are in danger of becoming like the nato summit, where it becomes together, they had a great time, there are lots of speeches, but nothing really happens. everything is brought down to the minimum acceptable standards. we can do better. we have to avoid things like the problems we had at the summit in seoul. i will be frank with you, south korea wants to produce plutonium. south korea wants to be processed plutonium. this is their big thing. they have a lot of nuclear reactors and they would like to take those reactors and start viewing them with what they call next oxide fuel. it is plutonium fuel. in part to burn up the plutonium, but in part to reprocess the plutonium. we see the dangers in this in the japan earthquakes last year. it raises environmental concerns is that fuel -- that particular fuel, a was spread over many square kilometers over japan, adding a new and unnecessary poison from the already added degree of that plan. it is understandable that the administration is under constrained about pushing plutonium, but it is also because the administration has a very weak internal policy on plutonium. you heard sharon bring the quote up from the president's speech, talking about new fuels of the future. these are not fuels of the future. the plutonium fuel is the failed fuel of the past. but the administration is committed to building a new plutonium fuel factory in the united states. in the united states. this is a multibillion dollar was early that is supposed to be -- facility that was supposed to be part of the nonproliferation facility. it is paid for under the nonproliferation funds out of department of energy. it is supposed to take uranium, mix it with the plutonium and sell it to power companies in the united states for fuel. one big problem. nobody wants to buy it. this fuel is dangerous, expensive, requires major modification of the reactors. so you have this plant producing fuel to nowhere. it is charging ahead based on contracts and political commitments that will actually make the problem worse by development of plutonium economy. it will start to develop a market that will encourage people to make more plutonium to mix it in this fuel. it is exactly the wrong path to be going on. there are things that the administration could be doing and they should consider several of them. you have for them today. i saw lisa support the idea of [inaudible]. of not producing any more highly enriched uranium -- any more plutonium anywhere. so when south africa left the summit and went home and made an announcement it was producing 96% highly enriched uranium for research purposes, the united states should have had a statement regretting that decision. as far as i know, there was silence on the part of the united states. you have to make sure -- this is a priority. if you want to stop the proliferation material -- if you want to stop nuclear terrorism, you have to make this a priority. you cannot continue to be governed by trade relations and put this proliferation issue down at the bottom of your to do list. there was a very constructive suggestion in "the new york times" by former assistant secretary of state. he was suggesting how the leader of brazil will be visiting this country next week. brazil is interested in expanding its uranium enrichment program. but brazil could set a model for the world by abandoning this process. it needs encouragement from the united states to do so. it needs to feel that it is a part of the global effort to stop the spread of enrichment technologies. we are flooded with enriched uranium in the world. we have plenty of enriched uranium for fuel coming out of existing facilities. we don't need a new facility in south korea or australia or other countries -- jordan or others who have flirted with this idea. it should be part of the administrations plan -- to stop this material that could be used in weapons, material -- new facilities that produce material everywhere. overall, as the president spoke in south korea, could this effort to prevent nuclear terrorism is an integral part of a plan for how to deal with nuclear threats. the president of the united states has presented the most comprehensive coherent program for dealing with nuclear threats of any president in u.s. history. he puts together three critical factors and moves all of them together. prevent nuclear terrorism. prevent new states. reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. you have to do all three of these together. the problem the president had is that while he was doing these -- he's doing all of them too slowly. he has shown progress since april but, 2009, but it is all proceeding much more slowly than he himself once. the president had to find the personnel in the administration who believe as strongly in his vision as he does and put them in charge of the mission. he has to find members of congress from both parties who believe strongly in this mission as he does and work more closely with them. bring them to summits like seoul. bring them into the white house discussions. he has to work more closely with people like you. he has to work more closely with the press and close associates to explain what the mission is, to build up public support and overcome the number one obstacle that we face today, which is cynicism. what the president calls are deadly adversary. the belief that we cannot do this. we can prevent it. we can prevent nuclear terrorism. we can reduce the almost 20,000 nuclear weapons that exist today. but we need public and political support. the president has a vision, he needs more help polishing that vision. iq. >> thank you to the panelists. now i will open the floor for questions. okay. don't let mr. cirincione down. he said there would be questions -- [laughter] >> president obama has kept in place the bush administration officials in charge of the national nsa that is doing the [inaudible] at the savanna river site, they are still ongoing with that project, who politically is going to stand up and lead the way in terms of stopping fuel in south carolina? >> the question is directed to -- >> either mr. cirincione or ambassador gallucci. >> i am guessing that ambassador gallucci would rather answer. >> i will. i actually don't know -- i am not in a position to answer it if it is a technical question. let me just say one thing. i like the way that joe framed it. which is to say that whoever is helping the president bring these issues and, as sharon said, how we drafted those words that said let look at this exciting future were going to have with the toning fuels -- joe put flesh on that by pointing to the mrs. in terms of authority that my go to the president. you are suggesting a question that might be significant locally and nationally. this issue, i think, needs to be shaped up the way that joe was suggesting it ought to be shaped, which is to say that this probably, certainly -- let me drop the word probably here. this certainly makes no economic sense. it is a bridge to nowhere. a mox fuel production facility that makes no economic sense. there are political interests, that will benefit from this economically, but it is not a good national policy. the terms we are all talking about here goes exactly in the wrong direction, as well as being done. if you could shape it up this way, i think the president could make a decision and exactly what the authorities are -- i can't go to. it has to be captured in that way. joe? >> i think for the record we need to remember that this plutonium disposition -- disagreement we had with russia goes back to the clinton era. there are a lot of politics, certainly, about spending in south carolina on this facility. there is also bureaucratic inertia -- this is a big construction department project from the department of energy. you might know that the u.s. energy industry has been languishing for decades. there is a big push, even though a breed is a french company. there are a lot of money going to u.s. contractors. this is an old project decades old. i don't think you can just pin it on the bush administration. it is very emblematic of the problems you face with these big ticket items entrenched in interest. i agree with bob. and has to be viewed through a different lens. >> finally, are you saying the president of the united states should go against the political forces in south carolina and cancel the plan? >> no. what i'm saying is who is going to end up it -- and i wasn't blaming the administration. i'm just saying the policies have continued through, and there doesn't seem to be anybody politically wanting to lead in that correction. we are setting and an example. >> this plutonium fuel plan is the inertia example of previous administrations. we have to do two things about this. first, let's be honest. many of the decisions we face in the nuclear area don't have anything to do with national security or nonproliferation and they are about jobs and contracts. this is a jobs program. this is a big profit operation. so if you want to go up and stop that, you better have jobs and contracts replace it. the only person you can do that is the president. this is within his budget. this is going forward under his department of energy. he has to propose a different program for south carolina, or he is never going to be able to overcome that. let me give you another example. one of the problems the president has and reducing the number of nuclear weapons is to have military commanders say, you know what? we need 420 enter -- [inaudible] missiles. commanders don't say that. the senators senators in the five states that have those 420 long-range ballistic missiles say that. they are armed -- they formed a caucus. there is a caucus that demands that the president not top the number of [inaudible] in order to preserve the number of jobs associated with hydrogen bombs in colorado. if you want to achieve that vision, you better have another program that is going to keep those jobs and contracts that are more beneficial for the united states. you can do that. you just need staff that will help you develop those plans and implement them. >> i'm going to direct a question to mr. cirincione. he said that the seoul summit was underperforming. what perfect storm would have to exist for the 2014th summit to be a performing summit? >> you have the president of the united states who believes in the mission. whether it is president obama or the republican candidate. they have to leave. this is all happening because of the leadership. it is one of the shining examples as to how important that leadership is in the world today. former secretary of state madeleine albright said we are indispensable. we have to lead this. the second is that you have to start planning now for it. that means the president has to develop a plan of what could we achieve and what we achieve more than that? what is the real goal and start bringing republicans into those discussions. start making this a bipartisan effort. find republican champions. reward them for working on this issue. those are my two recommendations other than the panel may have. anyone else? >> any more recommendations? >> okay. >> yes? >> do you have western? >> do you have a question? >> the proposals we have heard today [inaudible]. as to the procession of president obama in defense matters, perhaps they are [inaudible]. as to russia, -- love the sony even -- bush is the first country -- we agree with all of them. support [inaudible] you have not touched. the collapse of the united states aside from the damage we have received, [inaudible question] after proving and being in complete agreement with what you said, i say that the safety of the world and the future of freedom in the foreseeable future is [inaudible question] america's military power. >> do have a question? >> yes. you insist on all those reasons you gave -- [inaudible question] >> again, do you have a question? >> [talking over each other] >> we want a question. >> [inaudible question] >> thank you. anybody? going once? >> i agree with the questioners do that the united states plays an essential role in the stability, peace, and democratic transition in the world. i would not say there is weakening in the americas capacity to play an essential role. there is nothing in what i or my colleagues have recommended that i believe would weaken america's national security, their ability to defend our security, or to defend that of our allies or to play the central role around the world that it has played and is playing now. >> anybody else? okay. gentleman? >> i am interested in knowing about this situation in washington. we talk about budget cuts and everything. this thing about nuclear thing -- all this kind -- is not going to get a front seat and a situation when everybody -- the cuts and all these things -- not talk about weapons, but talk about doing more and what we are doing right now. do you see that there would be more difficulty in convincing -- you talk about difficulties with the republican party in doing this -- there will be some sort of solution that you can think about at this point? >> the question is directed to? >> mr. cirincione and mr. gallucci. >> let me start. something very interesting is happening in the united states currently. the president of the united states has a very forward-looking 21st century vision of u.s. national security. he has united his administration, including the military leadership in. nuclear weapons is playing an increasingly smaller role, and to hear the secretary of date -- secretary of defense, secretary of the joint staff and the president himself say that they want to reduce the number of rules of nuclear weapons. this is happening. we have been doing this for the last 25 years. president h. w. bush cut the stockpile in half. president george w. bush cut the other half. suddenly coming you now how do a budget shipped it is marrying up with a policy shift. the defense budget is no longer growing, it is shrinking. the budget is coming down. when the joint chiefs have to choose, they do not choose nuclear weapons. they choose the weapons they actually need for their troops to accomplish the missions they actually have against real-world threats. so you will see -- you are seeing it now and you will see it in the future, that the nuclear weapons part of the budget will start to come down. i believe that it's also going to affect things like the plutonium fuel facility. this is just a good government, businesslike approach. you have less latitude to afford -- that you truly don't need and you are just doing for political purposes. you have to preserve the programs that are absolutely essential -- the programs that are essential in this agreement are things like what you heard my colleagues talking about. the uranium and plutonium disposal programs. programs to shift production of isotopes from highly enriched uranium to lowly enriched uranium. the cost benefit ratio tends to favor programs like this, and shifts away from big-ticket items like plutonium fuel plants. >> i agree with everything that joe said. but i would really -- i would really like you to focus on the last part particularly. we have been talking about nuclear security and while it is organically connected to our policy, with respect to nuclear weapons, that is not the central focus that we have had. i would not want any impression here left that this is a budget issue. it is a security issue. it is not so much of a budget issue. yes, there are going to be those who will use the environment where there is a serious budget issue to take on programs they don't like. for example, it may be used to knock out a social program with a social program is not a budget issue. you can use the budget as an excuse. in this area, where we are focused, these aren't generally speaking, large budget issues at all. we are talking about matters of national policy, and then there are, of course, as we were saying in the case of mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities, they're going to be local issues where there is a budget concern. it is a political concern. on a monthly, i would disconnect are -- our budget environment from the policy prescriptions that we're talking about. these are not the ticket associated in the cost associated. the prescriptions we are advocating are not much. >> i would just like to add one thing. stepping back from the u.s. budgetary issues, if you had to -- fighting a war in iran to discover weapons of mass destruction that weren't there, that was a very expensive thing. spending money to reduce these risks where you know where they have nuclear material, it is a whole lot cheaper than trying to find a needle in a haystack and trying to inspect every single cargo container that comes into the u.s. or other ports. i think of it as more bang for the buck. i like the way joe characterized it as low cost international security payoff. that needs to be the message. it doesn't cost a lot of money, but it is the most effective way to do this compared to the other options. >> all right. we have time for two questions. the gentleman in front and then the woman in the back. >> i am from the boston globe. maybe all of you could weigh on this quickly. >> what is less talked about in this world of transparency and the packet you put out today had the nti material indexed in their -- is israel. i'm curious to what extent you think, if even as a responsible nation, israel's inability, unwillingness, to be more transparent about this nuclear program. how much does that affect the iranian equation? and/or other so called bad actors who will [inaudible] nuclear weapons in a matter what we do. really quickly, that can get talked about a lot. >> let me say this about that. i don't believe to take on what i think is -- the point of the end of your questions -- the iranian nuclear weapons programs. that was its purpose. in other words, were there an israeli program, there would be an iranian program. i don't believe that iran is threatened by the israeli nuclear weapons program. i do believe that to the extent i have consumed literature on this, i believe that the israeli nuclear weapons program was developed as a deterrent, but largely against the soviet union. the conventional capability and qualitative edge that these people want to have and conventional arms united states have supported, has been what they wanted to do with deal with the threat that they have perceived in different ways over the decades since the creation of the israeli state. the nuclear capability had particular reference to a possible soviet intervention. i don't believe it is provocative, certainly, in a historical sense. i do think that one could imagine circumstances in which -- we imagine that all the time -- where the peace process is succeeding. the israeli perceived need to have those weapons deteriorate so that they don't need them in the future. we are not there yet. this is not an apology or a defense of the program. it is a description in my perspective of why it looks like it does now and why it is not going away anytime soon. it is also an assertion that we are now, it is not going to leave a cause of the current problems in the middle east. >> i agree with that. as newt gingrich would say, i have written several books about this. here's what you can do to buy them. [laughter] the israel's israelis had weapons since 1968. it has many delivery equals for this. delivering missiles and jet fighter bombers. it is understandable why it would be developing this. it has not been a cause of proliferation in the middle east. it is interesting. those who believe in the nuclear domino theory and think that iran getting a bomb on will automatically lead to other countries getting a bomb, other countries to knock it bombs. it has been a sore point, but it has not been a source of the arms race in the middle east. in the end, it is a part of any conference of middle east peace solution. it is inconceivable that you can get peace in the middle east with one, two, three or four nuclear states. i think we are actually headed toward that. we've seen it happen in other areas and continents, i think the middle east is a tough problem, but in the end, israel will have to take the bombs out of the face and put them on the negotiating table. they will have to be compromise until the israelis feel secure enough and understand that this is in their interest, but there will be three or four nuclear weapon states, but none. >> last question? >> i hope you would agree with me and saying that the u.s. would be able to after the 2014th summit, be a pioneer of [inaudible] energies. mr. cirincione, you mentioned that put on them is the energy of the past. what do you think is the energy source we should be focusing on, and are there other countries that are leading the effort? >> well, honestly there are strong views about the future for nuclear energy, and i think japan highlighted it. the future for nuclear energy is more certain today than it was two or three years ago. i do think that there will be some countries that will pursue nuclear energy as one of their options, including the u.s. but as we agree to on this panel, we do not think that the processing needs to be on the table were should be on the table. that does not mean, unfortunately it does mean that we will need enrichment -- people would argue in and of itself, it is a serious proliferation risk. a question i do not think we will make a lot of progress towards nuclear weapon free the middle east -- i do think the future is threatened. i think sharon alluded to it. the future will have to come to play the option of having facilities under regional multilateral control. it is not a bulletproof solution, but it may be the only way we can imagine using nuclear energy in the future in a sustainable way. i also do think -- some countries are walking way for nuclear energy. i do think that that could be -- they could set important precedents. if you take the example of germany, carbon emission targets -- it would set a example to follow. >> anyone ask? >> yes. >> go. >> nuclear energy is special because of the risks. the risk of production. unfortunately, that also makes it procedures for a lot of countries. i don't think this administration and certainly the one before it hasn't done a very good job in taking the shine off nuclear energy. it is really just another way of boiling water. i agree with alex did in germany can make a go of a non-nuclear future, it may sound ridiculous to now, but make solar wind, geothermal -- a whole lot of other things. renewables attractive as an advanced country, that will go far. i think. towards diminishing some of the allure of nuclear power. we also have to do our own job and not make it such a special thing that we can for on our good allies and try to keep away from our not so good allies. >> i don't think it contradicts work cuts across any of my colleagues, this panel has been about security. this was not a panel aimed at oregon's nuclear energy. no one came up here to speak against it. we came to talk about the nuclear security issues. as sharon says, it is usually correct. you would not eliminate the nuclear security or proliferation issues. if there wasn't a link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. but if you didn't have nuclear energy, then nuclear programs would be unambiguously connected with nuclear weapons. that would be clarity with that. that is not actually what workout. we are saying ok, we're going to have nuclear energy. how can we do it in a way that does not threaten the existence of humanity? we are not against or for any particular mix. >> i would like to thank our panelists for their enlightening presentations, and i would like to thank the audience today for joining us. with that, this proceeding is over. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> afghanistan will hold elections in 2014. tomorrow, a discussion on the political transition and upcoming u.s. withdrawal from the country. we will hear from the state department special representative marc grossman, and former national security visor stephen hadley. live coverage from the u.s. institute of peace starts at 10:30 a.m. eastern on c-span. at 9:30 a.m. eastern here on c-span two, a form on the health of the u.s. housing market. the discussion includes the acting director of the agency regulating fannie mae and freddie mac. watch live coverage from the brookings institution. >> now a look at iran's nuclear program. we will hear from the director of the atomic energy agency. iran is representing six of the world leading powers. george washington university hosted this 50 minute event. >> good afternoon. welcome back to the george washington university elliott school of international affairs. i am doug shawn, and i'm grateful for your participation. today's workshop on teaching the nuclear fuel cycle. what the public needs to know. i'm particularly pleased to welcome our guest. this advance in the nuclear policy talk series is a response to make the world a better place by conducting research that responds to global human challenges, educating a new generation of leaders to face those challenges, and by engaging the policy community to deal with those challenges every day. today's discussion is particularly urgent. we live in an dynamic moment. just last week at the nuclear security summit in seoul, south korea, president obama said we all know the problem. the very process to get this nuclear energy can also put nations and terrorists within the reach of nuclear weapons. he responded to that challenge by calling, among other things, for an international commitment to unlocking the fuel cycle in future. a short essay in the huffington post yesterday, the president of the mccarver foundation, robert gallucci, urged a ban on the proliferation of materials that would end the separation of kryptonian and enrichment of uranium to high levels. elaine grossman reported that the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission has deferred action on the decision from the american physical society, urging that an assessment to risk should receive licensing of each new enrichment or reprocessing facility in the united states. informed opinions are burgeoning on these topics. this agreement remain. framed by the differences of different expert communities. it is our objective here in this series to bring these together. we have brought over 200 nuclear policy experts to campus in the last three years. as part of the talks series, and acting under secretary rose got a mark -- we are engaged in research on this topic as the mit book [inaudible] coedited by the dean of the elliott school, michael blount, reflects. we are also new course offers -- offerings in this area. nuclear material science for non-material students. funded by a grant. it is a great pleasure to convene this discussion to date to have all of you here together and have the opportunity to introduce doctor olli heinonen to discuss the situation in iran, which is obviously a depressing issue that intrudes discussion of nuclear fuel cycle choices into the lives of many people around the world. doctor olli heinonen is currently with the center for science and international school of affairs at harvard university. he has spent 27 years prior to joining harvard with the international atomic energy agency in vienna, and the last five of those as deputy general director. he led the agency's efforts to identify and dismantle proliferation networks, including one led by scientists in pakistan. he oversaw efforts to moderate and contained the program. he led teams of investigators to examine nuclear programs around the world, and inspect nuclear facilities in south africa, north korea, syria, libya, and elsewhere. he can ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted for purposes. he led the international atomic energy agency's efforts to implement analytical culture to guide and complement traditional verification. please join me in welcoming doctor olli heinonen. [applause] >> thank you very much. good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. i hope that i do not spoil your appetite, because i don't think i have very good news for you. nevertheless, if we look at the nuclear program, i have been asked to provide a snapshot where we are today, and then i'm going to look one year forward where we might be one year from now. then i will try to draw the first lessons from my point of view. .. that right all those reports but also difficult to read. so, let's go now back to the iranian nuclear program. the international community is concerned about this for a number of reasons quote and maybe the biggest reason is iran conducted this clandestine uranium enrichment two decades without fulfilling its reporting requirements for the iaea. and moreover, actually iran directed to the nuclear matter which has received from a broad reported to the ira and this is a classical diversion of the nuclear material. it also exempted the nuclear material and did some additional experiments. and here is the lesson number-one. it is called a spade a black but you never heard the iaea say that nuclear matter is diverted and the reason for that was in 2003 when the skin into the light the agency didn't call it a diverse and noncompliance because it would have immediately transferred to the united nations security council in from germany and the u.k. at that point in time failed that iran would comply with the requirements and therefore there and would be the solution and if this turned out not to be the case because already in 2003 when this came out and committed itself to transparency and it did quite sometime okay but nevertheless when the first came from iran and other shock came it didn't include what was called the p2 program which is more advanced than the ones that are now currently running. iran is to include the declaration and here is the second lesson. the international community's would have been harder at that point in time should have put a clear red line if there is a problem with the compliance of the declaration it has its consequences. but this was in the case. people say okay it's a small problem. let's not worry about it. until we hit the next snag for the reestablishment of uranium in the spring of 2004. again, iran passed another because the original agreement with the e.u. was no enrichment activities until iran is in full compliance with its international obligations and at that point in time it wasn't, but the international community lead this again and i think the lessons from the earlier state when you deal with a problem like that you need to be clear this is what is required, this is the red line that is thervant and has consequences to this and if the deal finally collapsed and the iranian enrichment. this time the enrichment went up very swiftly. today iran is even producing uranium which is 20% and with regard to the to hundred 35 partially for the underground facility, 15 kilograms per month that they would have a stock or to wondered 50 kilos of that material by the end of this year to. you don't need to put any you just use the current ones. you can turn the 50 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium to the high enriched uranium and let's say one or two months' time. this is a stepped or situation where we are today, so iran is actually heading to beagle to have the capability to produce the weapons grade material if it wishes. in other terms when you produce the uranium and you want to produce the highly enriched uranium once you have done 20% of the enriched uranium you have done 90% which is required so you have only that miners that left and this is why the concern as their, because at the same time they have raised questions not only with regard to the test nuclear declaration but certain military aspects of the program. what are those? the start already in the 1980's and the late 80's when iran established an institution located in hatari on the the real installation was erased in 2004 when it became public and they liked it away and they were not able to access the place when i was there. why the concerns about the research effort? actually, if you go to their web site where this young lady was working before and still is working. there's a dozier that explains what has been preparing from open markets or equipment related to the nuclear activities. they're our equipment related to the iranian enrichment and the equipment related to uranium conversion and things like that. why would the military research acquire the nuclear related equipment? only equipment some of it is new but when you put them all together it looks like the institute was involved somehow on the nuclear studies that contributed to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle particularly the content. this was never clear as an installation to the iaea and has not yet been declared. then when this became public, iran started to move the people after erasing that to other institutes and today they are sitting there in an institute you can read from the november report. then when you look at what the scientists are doing it doesn't look like it was wiped away. the continued to study and have continued experiments which could be useful if you are ferc simple designing a critical nuclear device. the hid and during experiments with high explosives which are also essential for the nuclear weapon research if he would pursue that route. iran has explained - and acknowledged this kind of research is going on. if you go to the reports in spurring, 2008, it's there but saying that these are conventional including lots of civilian applications in the rea ea before then asked what are the civilian applications where you need microsecond timing for your explosions that you have simultaneous explosions unfortunately iran was not able to answer this question and said that they are military secrets and they cannot disclose them what i have a hard time understanding why you cannot disclose the experience. maybe the argument is the military people who do this sort of thing. what is the lesson we learn from here? that is more tricky but it's important. first of all it is to do with that access rights in a state. if they see this kind of experiment which appears to be supporting nuclear weapons r&d, it should have access to the sites and the people, documentation and other studies and interview these people. why? if i read the article 3 of the npt it says that the object if of the nuclear energy to nuclear weapons or explosions, so the job is to prevent cannot detect. once we detect its to late and we have failed to prevent. so therefore the iaea should be proactive and him in front of the game and the u.n. security council directly has supported this view but this is the grave lesson from this. iran doesn't adhere to this and it has sent to the request of the board of governors, not to the request of the united nations security council. as a result of that, the authority of the organizations are diminishing whether you get someone who doesn't comply, and syria for example has already used this playbook and answering this and similar questions so we have created a dangerous precedent. the first came from north korea and it's not only in answer to the questions that provide access to surgeon sites but also the npt. so what is at stake is actually the credibility of the whole regime. then let me talk a little bit more about the military activities. it's been accused bets using information that comes from intelligence and comes from federal parties and it isn't able to verify this information. i don't think it is quite true. first i mentioned this has about according to the website 1800's documents which iran has been buying and procuring and it includes communications. these are coming from the member states of ali eda. these are hard facts. the pieces of equipment have been ordered and delivered according to these documents can come cities are hard facts. you cannot take this information from ten different countries and you cannot take retroactive things that took place 20 whose ago. but in the process the iowa ea corroborates and found out that indeed these went and for the first ones to the military aspect not in 2005 after the famous but already spring of 2004 they had discussions with elon in particular of the procurement of things that took place. then the other pieces of information etc.. they use this information to follow the people who are on those communications, people who went to work with the people in iran you have seen a scientist and several locations and the person indeed was there and has explained to the reports of what he was doing and what kind of lectures to he gave and with whom he was working and this is the way that you can corroborate the information which is there. you cannot ever say from a single document 100% true or not but when you have this kind of wealth of information and a 90% probability and you put this together and there is internally consistent and externally consistent, the equipment that is irrelevant to that nuclear weapons r&d, you can come to the conclusion someone was indeed studying this. the country then breaks in this circumstance it safeguards obligations. yes and no. no in the sense that as long as the experiments, if they have been in the domain of the nuclear weapon development if they hadn't included in the nuclear material actually under the comprehensive safeguard agreement they do not need to be declared as long as no nuclear material is there and you can do a lot of the experiments using materials like something else so you are not in noncompliance in this particular item but certainly this is against the npt because i said first full article 3 is to prevent the nuclear weapons and says you shouldn't even a clear nuclear weapons or knowledge so in both cases actually iran is working against in my view. however then you can ask what is the authority to verify the nuclear weapons related our indy 500 if it is not involved in nuclear material. that mandate comes from the security council resolution, the security council resolution requires the secretary to clarify the purpose of those experiments and that's why they're doing it and this is also the reason why iran is today challenging the security council resolutions doing it in a very twisted way. they say that since iran was never found by the secretary as noncompliance with its safeguards obligations, so passing of this dozier to the united nations security council was a legal there for the security council resolution is also an illegal and therefore iran doesn't need to comply and this goes back to my statement let's call a spade a spade and a black black and white white because it the secretary had this in the 2003 report written that iran was fond of noncompliance with its safeguards agreement it would have been not okay at that time for iran and they wouldn't use this argument the are now using an dutrow league the have even very well written a document for the statutes and there's another kind of procedure which the secretary followed later on because of the noncompliance according to the secretary is established by the safe guard inspectors. it's not the director-general. the directors general take this report the inspectors may get pass it on to the board of governors. but in practice that doesn't work like that and actually the board makes its own procedures and practices and of rules itself so there are precedents for example you don't need to follow that way. it wasn't the reporters that suffered the report or north korea to reduce the director general said the practice shows this argument perhaps is not the right one that is one of the lessons we need to learn. so but then who needs to be done next? first of all there should be in meeting her, p5 plus one next week, freddie the 14th of april. as someone asked me this morning what is going to take place, i think my character as i think that there is still a mess because it appears the haven't even agreed on the venue whether this important meeting takes place. i haven't seen anything on the agenda either so we will see if it takes place but it is an important juncture in the that says if we look where iran is today and i spoke about this that there might 50% uranium by the end of this year or maybe even more if they so decide. then very often is asked iran has always been 18 months away from the nuclear weapon, so why this is always like that? there are several reasons for that. one is that the sanctions are biting the nuclear program. it's more difficult for iran to get equipment, sensitive role materials that you need to have when the manufacture the centrifuges. you don't want to produce yourself or small pieces in your own factories. if you do that, you will slow down the program because intellectual talent for the reverse engineering learning lessons through the heels house version things ought to be manufactured so they are troubled. this is one of the reasons for the delay of the sanctions and consequently not access to the material and the additional resources for the indigenous production. and the other area is sabotage. there is a, against the relations and this is nothing unusual if you go back to the soviet military program someone must sabotaging them from the 1950's, pakistan had their program when it became public during the 1980's, so we have precedents of there. it's nothing new. there has been also some unexplained debt will in there and resources to protect certain things more ineffective. the military threats, they have also impact to read when you look for example of the underground and they are saying that they are going to build the enrichment underground. once you build another enrichment you waste your resources on planning and acquiring infrastructure which is hard to get due to the sanctions and you use your best people to make those designs so they have an impact on the program they are caving in enrichment and conversion, etc. when i say caving in, they have also to protect those materials which they have produced a with more than 100 kilos of the 20% enriched uranium almost 4 tons of uranium fluoride and 3.5% level. a lot of talk has begun for the research reactor and its need for the few i think this is an artificial need for a number of reasons. in 2003 when iran is close to the iaea that it's building its reactor which is another concern because of its plutonium to devotees the argument at that point of time by the iran is that they need the heavy reactor because that a wrong research reactor is aging. it is not any more safe, and then besides that, they also acknowledge that it's located in the earthquake prone area in the middle of tom from the 1960's when this reactor was filled so in 2003 they felt that the reactor was not needed and i think it is in a way still true today because if you think that it's been built in the 1960's the location is not the best so if i had to do this i would build the reactor someplace else outside of tehran. i don't need to produce 20% enriched uranium to read as a legacy of the high yen reached iranian and i am sure the they are happy to sell it if they find a client and you have 100 tons of highly enriched uranium you need to take only 20 kilos and than the 20% level you will have fuel for the reactor for the next ten years at least. same thing with the production of the 200 with 20% enriched uranium it's enough to have at the research reactor for the next ten years. more recently, iran has to prepare the public opinion by telling the also want to export this material to read this is than to continue the production because if you already produced for ten years why would you produce for 20 years or 30 years. but by exporting you can provide a sophistication even at the same time if you remember when the president mahmoud ahmadinejad was in new york and he mentioned this isn't economically viable, so for me on the one hand to produce something that it's not economics along with to continue to produce? also, 3.5% enriched uranium, there's a real little need for iran on that as well because they have secured the production of were secured fuel for the next ten years. even if you enriched uranium and heavy enough, manufacturing isn't an easy thing and i would tell you more about you live to have the specifications and such kind of details in order to be able to manufacture the safely. you cannot reinvent yourself and if you want. it means 20 tons of low-enriched uranium every year. producing the last ten years who may be altogether too tons per year. so you need ten times to be doubled to. i think if you do it you need much different centrifuges to accomplish. the last thing before i summarize the elections further is how well we know the iranian nuclear program. i think it is fairly well handled this their something we don't know we all know kind of assurances we have. i wouldn't raise any cheers to this end because of iran is doing when it sees this assassination of military threats, etc., what it's been doing in recent years is a stylish as a thing in the defense organization which is to diversify, concealed, go under that may not last long because iran is like any other country and right the have wright sought to make countermeasures. so i don't think we can be sure for example one or two years from now we can read the nuclear program necessary like an open book they have taken measures and to continue to sue for the international community the solution is to final some to stop this aggression that cannot clarify all of this related r&d which clearly serves for offensive and not defensive purposes. it's sometimes said it's protecting the people but if you are studying simultaneous explosions it's not really to do with the protection would of the civilian people it's more the desire of a nuclear weapon and what you need to do if you plan to go that road. then why the last thing is people say this program came to a halt in 2003, a 2004. i would say yes and no. yes a lot of activities or ideas and people to the others jobs but they maintain their will to devotees and do some experiments which serve with the origin on purpose so i don't think we should feel happy but there is another reason why the loss was to adopt everything they were doing. why would you document something which you don't plan to use? i think someone in the country decided that one day we may go back to those experiments and need to have this document. so then there are major lessons again. there are positives and negatives. first of all i will start with a positive and this is a verification scheme because we have seen it in iran in 2003 the protection of the highly enriched uranium particles and explorations put iran to disclose its enrichment program at that time. second, all the inspections right it's a powerful set of tools and i think we should have used it in the earlier states and in particular i think the u.s. did in syria with. the fourth lesson is when countries have this kind of compliance there are two ways to go. one has stopped, then it can be closed and a fairly short period of time and i give here as an example libya. we went through this verification process and a couple of years and seen was the case of south africa it wasn't the compliance when they dismantled its nuclear weapons program and then they called to verify that in 92 it went fairly swiftly when there was a corporation. but among the confrontationist taken like the with currency is the case of syria and iran things drag and at the same time the country's 51 to do the can reach capabilities and they're closer and closer and higher and higher to get the nuclear weapons capability and there is a difference in my view what is the nuclear weapons capability. you shouldn't do this sort of research but guilaume has done to really should not as i said to share that they stop the activities in 2003 because the information is there to read this part of the program should be dismantled, how why it was, it should be dismantled or made in a verifiable manner and then there should be long-term and place like south africa for a couple of decades so that these places are not used to reach those things. then the last lesson before as i said already in the beginning when we look at cases of iran, north korea and syria there's an erosion of the scheme in such a way that fee of 40 of the challenge at this point in time and a the director in an unfair way the states they try to undermine the but i personally feel that he's doing the right thing at least based on that information i had when i left. the authority of the united nations security council is diminishing so with these positive remarks i am ready for your questions. [applause] >> keillor in national treasure of norway and all right thinking people and leading to free much for your remarks two questions. use but about a hardening, deepening, that underground caving in. i'm not sure if he meant the slate or underneath it probably doesn't matter. as you know, we all know, there's a very prominent prime minister in the east i forget the exact phrase that a limited time for which one it will be too hard to bomb so to speak underground facilities, and i'm wondering if you have any views on that in terms of whether it is have your going to be one more year. that's my first question to get my second one is in your closing remarks you talked i thought about what position. and as you know at least according to the press, the u.s. intelligence community doesn't believe that they have now gone further with weaponization. i guess i have a two-part question. one is to the truck weaponization. i really don't tell the answer to that. a second, do we have a long period of time before above what then can be fabricated. >> i hope first of all of us gets rattled and iran agrees to the process first and capabilities and provide little more transparency that what is needed is openness on plus side to explain the rationale that the behind the program in a very good way and provide more access and some additional but that's why i think that when mr. netanyahu sees the time is closing because if they could do more with of their military means israel can't do it alone without if so they have limited capability to strike when you can still stop the program for a while. but once it is all the underground it might be beyond their scope and what's happening in iran war the places particularly the manufacturing of the centrifuges. i haven't seen anywhere what is the place for example a manufacturer today you see every now and then distributed all over in iran said they now have one target you may have three or four if you want to eliminate as an example so it's not only have about [inaudible] the problem of you want really to stop them when by military means need to accept a lot so i think this answers the difference the trend of west and israel but the u.s. has much more power and this isn't anymore a surgical strike white was the reactor in iraq or this place and syria because they were isolated buildings union what you have to get here we have tens of places to make sure this doesn't take place. it would than a surgical strike is a surgical strike. if you really want to stop the program you should use a sledgehammer. elimination in a couple of places to the international community used a sledgehammer in iraq. we talk about stopping the reactor, and the gulf war actually release of the nuclear program and you have now seen the history books he himself also gave it up. why he kept some ambiguity there was a need to ways, for his courage in iraq or which was iran, so he wanted to show i have these people will the peace if needed to. then the weaponization and the iaea. first call if you see someone is working with the experiments on the nuclear weapons you should be worried about the completeness of the declaration of the state because sooner or later if you work with this kind of thing you would raise the question has all the material been clear to the iaea or some other activities of which i don't know and in order to understand that you also need to study velo weaponization part and see how it fits in the other findings and this is a scheme we have been true for example in self africa can which is a good example for the way that it works because first of all, south africa had given up the weapons program was 86 or 87 the tenet concluded and they started the verification inlet 9292. still we started to verify thinks. what we did is published a whole history of the south african development until 1992, see how it developed from the peaceful type of explosive studies to the well-positioned we went through the equipment, through the nuclear material day-by-day huge amounts of the information which was also difficult because some of this information sulfur that destroy it of course they were expecting their regime change and it failed at that time it's not good to leave this to contusions' we have to interview the people to understand what took place and then cooperate to all locations and people in the funding to get worth. something similar what we are not doing in iran and in order to do that, and he should have additional authority like the security council resolution that also love to interview people and have access to the sites and equipment. islamic thank you and i'm afraid we have to give the last word but you're his remarks were eliminating for us and i'm very grateful cost please not join me in thanking the. [applause] >> if i could invite the panel on global security to join us here we will get under way [inaudible conversations] with martin luther king is a man of all the people i've met and talked with and spent time with over the years demand the most american individual that i admire most of always. he's my personal hero. why? because martin luther king put his money where his mouth was. [applause] thirty-one days that changed america and saved the world. the book details the bombing of pearl harbor and america's entry into world war ii. mr. shirley spoke at the heritage foundation last year around the 70th anniversary of the pearl harbor talks. thn >> thank you all for joining us at the heritage foundation this afternoon. asas you noticed we are back int the era with our music before hand. we would ask everyone here in the house if he would meet the last courtesy check that cell phones have been turned off andy would be appreciated and if you would simply in nellis that speaker and mccotter, heritage r your future reference. our guest today is craig shirley, president of shirley and the minister of public affairs same relations marketing firm whose written for "the washington post," "the los angeles times," the "the washington times," conservative digest, the weekly standard and many other publications putative she previously authors reagan' revolution the untold story of the campaign that started it all. there was the first book detailing his pivotal 1976 challenge president ford in the republican primary. and he also offered that rendezvous with destiny, ronald reagan and the campaign that changed america for the 1980 campaign revealing the behind the scenes story for the white house. you will note there is a consistency in craig' books. rendezvous and this are both very well researched although this one was over about 15 months and this one is only about 31 days. we are pleased to have him with us today and we will do so questions up here and then we will open up to the audience for anything out there as well. there are a lot of things different in 1941. there were a lot of things still the same. the redskins were being referred to as the dead skin's among others, so those of you in the room will appreciate that of course. and then we are doing their arguments that even we were doing still today. was capitalism dead for example, and several of those things. craig, you talk about leading up to the seventh command with about the culture in that period of time did you find more interesting or surprising? >> america was a very in mark looking country on december 6, 1941. there was a saturday, and it was quiet in america now. peoria it if people were listening to the radio they're listening to bob hope or shirley temple or quiz kids and things like that. that night they were going to movies and seeing john doe citizen kane and maybe the movie international squadron with ronald reagan was. but america was looking forward to is the most prosperous christmas for the first time in years. unemployment recently dipped to about 10% which is the lowest that it had been during the administration of franklin roosevelt. they were not thinking about war, not in the context of american men and women getting involved in the war. world for one had left a very bad taste in americans mouse. the war to end all, to make the world safe for democracy had done the opposite and had given rise to freedom democratic institutions in italy and germany and other places. we were walled off from the war by the to try and oceans and after world war i there was a saying going on in america that the only thing we got was deaf and debt, so we were distinctly isolationist. in charge, neutrality had been passed in the 1930's including one that prohibited american soldiers from leading north america. that's how -- of course we pass other restrictive training max, so we are very inward looking, very interested in getting involved in the european war and we were not even thinking about it in the pacific and that as of the evening of december 6th. >> i think you also mentioned on culture, cigarettes were everywhere. >> that's right. this to make everybody smoked. the average americans looked about 2500 cigarettes a year and that's the average coming and people smoked in the movies. when they went to the movies the smoke in restaurants and airplanes and trains. the smoke on train platforms, libraries, obviously in their own homes considered a tour for a much a part of the culture is considered to be sophisticated. >> and you had radio was the major. >> radio and television at the time or a big part of the newspapers. there was no television per say. there was a little bit, but not really. although the first television ad had been broadcast in 1941 for the watches but there were almost 2,000 daily newspapers in america in 1941 most of which were afternoon papers, not morning newspapers. >> we also noted the culture -- you start each chapter with headlines and other things you researched for example. airport coffee shop refuses to serve colored quartet out at the washington evening star. of course they were very conscious and the divisions. did that all of a sudden multiply into the internment that eventually came about, too? >> i don't know if it is the overlooked in the whole interment issue as the fact that also italian-americans and german americans were also picked up and turned by the fbi. eventually over the accepted figures about 100,000 japanese a chilean and german-american torturo at some point during world war ii. but there was a great year in erica after december 7th, because only because of the attacked and the great anchor, to that because after the attack in japan declares war on america and this really has entered america's sense of fair play. but the one -- with the government knew and the roosevelt white house knew that both the germans and the japanese had incredible spy networks operating in the united states and in the territory including in this memo right here prepared by the office of naval intelligence on december 4th, 26 page memo that we found in the franklin roosevelt library and i don't think it's ever seen the light of day before, but it was in great detail about japanese espionage activities and that washington, new york, all major military installations, especially naval around the country and in the canal zone and the hawaiian territory. >> where you fall not longstanding question? >> i dhaka as far as i could on that, john. it is that in some ways it is similar to the time before september 11th and that there were pieces to the public sold scattered about the government, but they never been assembled and even so even if the had been assembled nobody would have come up with the idea that the japanese were going to attack on pearl harbor on december 7th. strolls were in the wind. we knew that. the government knew that, the navy knew that and the roosevelt white house knew that. the japanese had become increasingly militaristic to read it yet invaded east china and manchuria. the hit with the league of nations and signed with nazi germany and fascist italy. the side of the tripartite pact in december, 1941 that formed a mutual defense treaty with those two and formed the axis powers, the three principal axis powers. so there had been more and more belligerent behavior on the part of the empire of japan and. so we were watching very closely but obviously not closely enough. but i just want to read from this memo is page two and this is the memo that we uncovered. it says the focal point of the japanese espionage effort is the determination of the total strength of the united states. anticipation of the possible open conflict with this country, japan is vigorously utilizing every available agency to secure commercial information, paying particular attention to the west coast, the panama canal and the territory of hawaii. so, there were theories, there was speculations, the newspaper the week before actually had a headline that said a japanese attack expected this weekend. the other areas of government has speculated about a military move by the japanese but most thought it was just beyond the imagination, and everybody thought the next military move because they had already invaded french indochina a master for 100,000 troops and the next was an invasion of thailand. estimate because that is what was cut home with the japanese. >> as of the morning right as the bombs were falling into the harbor, secretary of state cornell whole was meeting with japanese envoys, the negotiations that had broken down at that point, the japanese had sent tokyo has said the 13th part of the long, long communique, and was all basically just an attack on the united states and u.s. military power to attack on diplomatic policy and they were breaking of diplomatic relations but that isn't privy to the war. many countries of broken up diplomatic relations and have withdrawn their ambassadors without it being a declaration of war. >> some of the questions, too we didn't declare war mcconnell three. >> that's a very interesting point. the night of december 7th, president roosevelt convenes a meeting at the white house with the members of the cabinet and the congressional leadership. one of the members of the cabinet was henry stimson who was the secretary of war free capable public servant. in his papers we found a declaration, draft of the declaration of war against japan and germany and italy but as we all know the next day roosevelt declared war on japan but was clearly being discussed and considered because there was a draft of the declaration against all three powers. >> they were not considered a unit. >> we definitely considered them a unit. my assumption is that it's interesting because. we did there war of the afternoon of the seventh and we did third war on december 8th. but in the intervening four days between the seventh and 11th there's a will in this country there are no columns or editorials camano outrage from the citizenry saying we have to go to war with nazi germany and fascist italy it's only after they become the war on the motions to declare war on them. >> in some ways it is ironic because roosevelt almost immediately goes to the european theater in his primary focus. >> and in the days after we are now what war and charlie world war there was an churchill's pressuring roosevelt to devote material and the arsenal of democracy first two gwyneth .. leader. it was to help great britain and number two, to take on the japanese. >> in the current condition at the time of our military what we have been better -- >> very much so. it's just that we didn't really have the navy so we were moving ships back and forth between the atlantic and the pacific and of course the japanese had done great damage at pearl harbor to much of the fleet. fortunately the three carriers had been out on assignments so that they were not there and the was the principal target of the japanese through the american carriers, so fortunately they were out, but we were completely defensive in the pacific. we eventually lost the island and the bombing and the philippines and the british eventually lost, kong and singapore, so they went after midway but we didn't hold midway and then after it got to midway again in 42 but we would win the decisive battle. spec i would be glad to recognize audience questions if he would want to put your hand up at any time i will catch you otherwise we will keep on going from up here. i would like to go for a few people. what about the admiral? >> a true dictum. if he had been recently installed as the head of the pacific, and one was unaware, was getting more warnings from washington as well as the army general in charge of garrison walter short, but in the days after pearl harbor, scapegoats were friendly needed. and the blame there was calls for the congressional investigation and the media wanted to know what happened, and how did this happen, how were we caught with our pants down, and quite frankly the blame was either going to go to roosevelt or go to stimson and haul in the navy ordered was going to go to camel and short, so there's kind of a political calculation as people in washington were more politically sophisticated in the two military men and the access to the media and these military men didn't have access to, so eventually they were replaced by fdr and actually both left the military in january of 1942. spinet if i remember right to say that he wasn't about perot and it being a target to the estimate yes, she was and he had recorded it and he had taken some preparations obviously not enough. but he was a very concerned about it. he did have plains of flying, scouting out around the hawaiian islands looking for possible ships coming in. estimates that you also point out there were always on the same schedule at the same time. >> exactly. and of course the japanese consulate was there, right there on a beautiful location that overlooked pearl harbor, so right there they could see the comings and goings of naval vessels because the planes were sent to do their inspection of the surrounding waters every day at the same time, so the theory was the japanese were able to schedule the fleet to come in close at a time the navy plans were not under surveillance missions. >> if you would wait for the microphone and don't might identify in yourself as a courtesy. thank you. >> my name is joe. regarding the situation as far as the united states looking out toward or in word in december, 1941 how much knowledge was there within the country that we were actually firing the german navy and the american navy attacked a let war? was there an american cruiser or something? >> there were both commercial and naval vessels that were fired upon and sunk in the north atlantic. ever since back in the spring of 1941, of course fdr as you know had the least of great britain to help churchill. upon at action, adolf hitler ordered a shoot on sight order that were patrolling the north atlantic but the american people knew about it and it wasn't a spur to them to get involved in the european war even though this was active, the war was in fact going on in the north atlantic. and of course roosevelt ordered the naval ships to defend themselves against the u-boats. lusitania wasn't the spur to go into world war i either. >> in some respects we forget a free period what time japan was already at war and asia for 37 so it had been for years. >> the invitees china. islamic as part of the books, and then we were at two years and three months with germany and europe, so it's not totally isolation and then it is just we don't want to get involved. >> we are aware of it we just don't want to get involved in it. especially coming actual manpower into the positions. >> yes come down here in the front of you will also wait for my colleague, he's coming. thank you. >> how much impact did it have when the united states decided to curtail supply incipient with certain critical kinds of material? >> there is a theory that's kind of floating around that we provoked the japanese into attacking us. one of them is that fdr personally ordered the fleet moved from san diego to honolulu in the spring of 1941. but those embargoes, and by the way we didn't embargo because we didn't want to send another shock to their economy, as we could shipping oil, but the scrap metal and things like that we stopped shipping. but that was in response to the invasion of china, so it was in the other way around. it wasn't that our actions provoked them into military actions. we were taking economic actions in response to their militaristic actions. >> anybody else from the audience? i will start donley other list of people. >> sorry. i usually look to my right. [laughter] >> my question is was it a cultural thing that we greatly underestimated the japanese military portales? >> maybe there was a factor surveillance wasn't easy on an island that was thousands of miles away from the united states. we have no basis to do the flights it was all based on hearsay or second-hand mostly. the military did their best to track the japanese ships in the pacific but we frequently lose track of them. we've attempted to track the movements but also lost track of those as well. there's probably a little bit of that pitted a was a failure of the imagination on the part of everybody in america to imagine that a japanese cosell thousands of miles, stop in the middle of the pacific to refuel and then steam up again and make it this way all away undetected because we forget that pan am for instance the had routine over flights between san francisco and the philippines and other parts of the pacific. they were commercial vessels and ships that operated in the there were naval ships that operate and so i think it was partially an assumption that nobody could get away with this massive strike but it was probably a little bit of a cultural aspect as well. spearman gandy underestimations to respond to the complacency? >> they thought the japanese bought into the myth that america was soft and we could not conduct aggressive were fair that we didn't have the national will to do it. speck of course it did take until april to hit tokyo. >> which is a little -- exactly. >> yes, back in the back. >> billy mitchell many years before had predicted a japanese attack on pearl harbor. i think that he was off by half an hour in the morning. was that an issue they took his advice or did it go back to the zero original documentation? did you find out in the answer to those? >> i didn't. what i do know is that there had been some analysis of previous military action by the japanese and was noted for the japanese war of the 20th century. and the japanese and interesting and were met with russia had attacked on sunday without announcing were declaring the war at first they sailed into the harbor and was their guinn and he. it never actually went to a formality of declaring the war before they actually engaged in the war. there were possible tax but again, i go back to nobody could have conceived that it could be that audacious but they would try something so risky. it would be audacious for them to attack the philippines. we didn't have much of a naval presence in the philippines, and in a memo army. was there no thought given -- was there not much thought given to the fact that there would almost look like the target. estimate it had been reported as of december 1st it looked as if there was a horse shoe encirclement of the philippines and douglas macarthur around the main island. as a matter of fact they did attack on december 8th. and that was a natural target. as was thailand, because japan as you know has no natural resources per say. they don't have oil, they don't have natural gas, they don't have metals, they don't have the precious metals that are needed for the peacetime economy or the wartime economy. so this is why they were spinning out word to ponder from the nearby countries those resources that they need to supply their military machinery. and that the libyans were also rich in natural resources and precious metals and so there was clear the target as was thailand. but the theory was among a lot of the navy men the japanese said as much what they really want to do there was a cultural resentment on the part of the japanese that the british and the americans were in the western pacific. so to that extent that is true. but they really want to do is to decapitate the british and military presence in the central and western pacific and then have that regional to themselves without any interference with either the allied powers. >> you mentioned one character. t want to see anything more about general macarthur in this case? >> she was brilliant. the occupation of post war japan should have earned him the nobel peace prize. he was able to do it better than was handled by america and europe and the berlin for cutting berlin into three sections, for sections was ludicrous led to the divisions of course that what happened in most conservatives were astonishing but we forget to put the allow astelin to take all of eastern europe. mcarthur wouldn't take anything from the russians. they try to occupy to the island chain and they tell them if you do that i will for the entire general staff and to present to this and she's able to keep the russians from taking any territory and he brought in the constitution and brought in a peacetime free-market economy, and otherwise brought in progressive changes for the culture and for women and truly remade the country and did a brilliant job at it. he made the mistake of the philippines on december 8 but not dispersing the claims they were still lined up wing tip to wing tip even though there were also done that we in honolulu, and it was easy for one bomb dropping from a japanese plan to destroy many plains underground and so he hadn't dispersed the plains. so by mid december he has no air force to fight off the onslaught of the japanese air force for the army there and the retreat and it was an act of brilliance moving up the asian peninsula and bypassing the japanese strong points. spec charles lindbergh and him. she was in the head of the most. there's been this mythologies that he was a nazi sympathizer and wasn't a nazi sympathizer. he was a patriot, he was american, he did not like franklin roosevelt from all accounts didn't like charles lindbergh. there are many people involved and first movement and the right-wing isolationist operation but as a matter of fact, by december 6, the america first movement is a very respected political institution and there were the women on the left and right that were involved. walt disney was a member of the america first movement. al smith, a democratic nominee of 1928 was a member and so was herbert hoover. lampert, cummings, thomas, the communist activist was a member of the america first movement, and the america first movement was so politically potent that they were actually making plans to open up the campaign offices in every congressional district from 1942 to support the most isolationist candidate running for office was republican or democrat, and there were many members of roosevelt' own democratic party who were striving to isolationists. islamic the campus is on college campuses or more pro war than they were -- >> there are some academics and intellectuals feet. among the intellectual class is and the editorials it was more interest. and that's because there were more democratic campuses and they knew where fdr was and what his thinking was, but then if you go in the middle of the country get the rural parts of the country is more isolationist. >> you mentioned again about winston churchill and the relationship? was it built before this? >> the heavily met once before in and they were not that enamor of each other. although they had a lot in common, john mechem said that was the love of the sea and the end venture that brought them together. ebullient exploration of the relationship between the two men. they grew to become very fond of each other although churchill was fond of roosevelt than roosevelt was of churchill. he once said meeting franklin roosevelt was like opening a bottle of champagne, and roosevelt told churchill she was glad they lived in the same decade so there was a respect. tertial came to visit and astonishing and was big news in america. churchill came to america several days before christmas in 1941. stay at the white house, didn't state the british embassy's, lived in the west wing to the estimate the night before anybody knew he was there. it's been exactly, and left london by the blackout train and then took a herring flight or ship across the atlantic and then flee from boston to washington all top-secret come only people on the need to know basis knew about this and all of a sudden there's churchill and washington and this is big news. he was a hugely popular figure in america as he remains today. but there was one funny story that churchill got up early dating and was in his birthday suit and the president opened his door to the suite in the white house and churchill -- they were both surprised. >> audience? >> everybody knows 1941. there we go. i know, this is ancient history >> if we could go back to general at arthur, i know what truman thought about using the nuclear weapons on japan. what was mcarthur' thoughts on it and you think if we wouldn't have used the nuclear weapons macarthur would still have the capability to kind of control the entire japan initio meaning they had more power if we don't use nuclear weapons? >> macarthur was personally repulsed of the use of the atomic bombs especially on the civilian cities. and there were a lot of people who fought at the time truman should demonstrate the might of america by detonating in tokyo bay with minimal loss of lives so they could see the awesome power of the atomic bomb. the commonly held, and it's probably true belief is that the war would have gone on for several more years. the japanese culture is such that to surrender to your enemy is the worst thing you can do to be captives of your enemy is worse than death. that is part of the culture that was dominant in japan at that time. there may have been a cost a million casualties on the part of the allies and had to fight inch by inch to take the entire, all the japanese islands, so of course truman never looked back. he never second-guess himself and so there is probably a lot of truth to the notion that it did shortcut the war and ultimately save lives although i personally think that truman should have tried demonstrating it without hitting a civilian city first come and given the time to consider the implications of being dropped on the city's. >> i made sure he still went by the supreme commander and the allied forces there to occupy. there may have been more resentment because he was a student of history, and he knew that alexander and caesar and others had failed and conquered the country is because the policies were very tough on the local populace, and she wasn't going to make that mistake by allowing the allied troops to be harsh or cruel to the civilian population. [inaudible] roskam if it would have taken a few more years ticker for japan to think the russians would have made more? >> they would have had more of a pretext. of course the only declared war on japan after japan surrendered but they were part of the allies and they may have been part of the invading army. i don't know. certainly macarthur would have been in command of them and they would have made sure of that as fdr and then later truman. but i don't know. i don't know. it's a good question. >> i think i want to go to the day of december 7 and focus a little bit here in washington. i found it interesting that the prognostication of the bombing was like 30 minutes and was interesting to realize that hawaii at that time was on a half hour different time frame which i hadn't realized. so actually, when the current first stock it was like 105, the redskins are playing the eagles at griffith stadium and people were not with salt domes of course and a few people would have press announcements come, call your office by and as you wrote at one point as the rumor of the war spread, the seats emptied. one enterprising wife said her husband who was attending the game the telegram delivered to the section top row, seat 27 opposite 25-yard line east side griffith stadium, war in japan from get to office. the redskins ownership leader said using the p.a. to announce the war news was against its management policy. now of course today -- >> l.a. times had the war occurred while the redskins are playing a game? >> the other thing is today it would have been panic with of the cell phones and the communications. the dough into a little bit how we did communicate, how washington reacted and of course the rapidity and the massive extent to which the government took over. >> the radio and one-on-one communication dominated everything. everybody gathered around the radios from the towers are their radios that might be set up by the radio repair stores which were not unusual. i remember that on the tv and radio repair there would be a radio out on the sidewalk playing local music, whatever, so people were gathered amend the hotel lobbies all listening to the radio and then of course afternoon newspapers unprecedented because you didn't do a sunday after a newspaper with the "washington post" and other papers had, japan attacks. estimate how long did it take to get a full attack documented? spec it was weeks. the american people were not told the extent of the damage on pearl harbor for weeks afterwards. only the names of a couple of ships week doubt and they were not told the extent of the us destruction of several hundred planes, nor were they told the extent of how many men had actually died during the attack of period harbor. it wasn't for weeks that americans were told full scope of it. the reason being is that roosevelt government didn't want to let the japanese government know how successful the and then, so the idea was to put a clamp on it. washington reacted extremely quickly as the attorney general starts to order the roundup of the japanese right here in washington. washington becomes an armed camp and there were canceled. military men were told to report in uniform to the base immediately. roosevelt that afternoon is taking reports coming from the media coming from the army and he's meeting with george marshall and frank knox who is the secretary of the navy and the herald store, operations meeting with his political people and, hopkins and the press secretary, his guards are posted around all federal buildings in the navy and marine guards as the carvings and outfitted with bayonets and helmand and they go of all federal buildings they go up at the memorial bridge and the bridges are closed between virginia and washington and there's the martial law essentially imposed very shortly so washington becomes an armed camp. the constitution and the declaration of independence were put in hiding in maryland. at the time they were on display the library of congress and they're taken out of the library of congress and hidden in maryland because they were fearful of there being bombed and destroyed. >> you're assigned to the sanitation corporation in georgia and this is what his departing so it was all newspapers. >> rather interesting. >> skill equiano we haven't put one person -- >> i'm the kind of guy that comes to these things and it picks. a couple of questions i might was the six a couple of things i might comment on in question. one mentioned in the isolation of the sentiment for the pro war sentiment in american colleges on would tend to think that is much less in sympathy with any democratic party ambitions, but more so an antifascism based on what they had seen a fascism do in western europe and also the bye yves -- am i yves outlook on the goodness or the bad of the soviet union. there were a lot of american college students who were sti

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