Transcripts For CSPAN2 Book--Warlords Strongman Governors And The State In Afghanistan 20140531

It is a pleasure to be back here in this room where i might mention that 17 years ago in january 1997, a charity meeting that was open who is today president of the American University in cairo. A meeting where we had a dialogue with the first individuals who came to the United States from the taliban, it came to new york about three or four months after they kept taking control to ask the United Nations to give them afghanistans u. N. Seat. Of course not really about was not in the power of the u. N. Secretary general. I make mention of the people who were there, the delegation was led by, a gentleman to get later became the foreign minister and he is one of the reconciled of the taliban. And he was interned for some time. And he is currently of the afghan eyepiece counsel and also reconciled. This includes one of the individuals from to hire, who is the minister of refugees and assassinated a few weeks ago after returning from a confidential meeting in dubai, trying to start some kind of a peace process. The interpreter at that meeting was the individual the later became chairman of the central bank and the minister of commerce and a president ial candidate who is very likely to be the next cabinet. And so its a historic room and it is such a pleasure to welcome him. Many years ago they came back from san diego and he just came back from toronto so something that jack mentioned. I was a u. N. Delegation which set up a launch the process that led to the current government government of afghanistan in the u. S. Decision to overthrow the taliban regime. One of the issues that we face there was how to cope with the fact that there were men on the ground leading armed groups, such as the main figures in your book who later became governors and they sometime called them warlords. And so there was a question about how to have them be incorporated and whether they should be held accountable. There are issues whether there should be an amnesty for war crimes or not. One person who isnt here today who headed the sponsor of the organization, was at that time the undersecretary general of the u. N. For peacekeeping operations and, as an outside expert along with some others that we will be hearing more about, it is the chair by this gentleman. And i went to see him at his office at the u. N. To tell him that as a result my conclusion from this meeting at the state department is that the u. N. Might be asked to keep untranslated peacekeeping force in afghanistan to maintain a capital free of the influence of the armed men on the ground for a nonmilitary political process, so it can develop. Which is one of the classic problems. And of course he blanched and as it turned out there was not a peacekeeping force but a multinational force. But you have an extraordinary degree of access to this and have done a really remarkable piece of research about the development of some of these figures. So im wondering if you could reflect a bit on the dilemma of accountability and militarization and how to cope with such people as the country is transitioning from a transnational water and i dont know what to call it, but to a greater stability and political legitimacy. Let me just start saying what a huge privilege it is to share these two comfortable chairs with you. For all of us who have studied, this has been the central sort of text that we have started with. So to be here and get to talk about my book is really wonderful. So i think that the conundrum or the central dilemma that you present about the presence of these actors come in fact that they were partners of the u. S. Military, and then the question of what to do with them, that was sort of the central western that led to the writing of this book. For me, it comes down to a question of definition. If you find that has predatory spoilers who are seeking gains at the expense of the state building project in the creation of these, and Good Governance, then its very difficult to make an argument that they should not be marginalized. And on the other hand if you define on as leaders at the National Level of particular constituencies that have access to money and economic power and have social and political ties with in this realm as well. And so its very important as we look at what is going on. Okay, so giving us a portrait of the two main characters in your book. Sure. I have had the privilege to talk about this. This is about the two men, one who is currently the governor of northern afghanistan and the other is one that comes from kandahar. So it open with very interesting pictures of you in our company. And you stand out in that group even more than you do sitting here. Thank you. Yes, ive had the interesting pleasure of viewing both of these men each. So he is currently the governor coming up on eight decade. He is a native and grew up there and joined when he was a teenager and then went on to join the taliban. Along with his longtime nemesis, he joined the americans with the central northern ca back to the taliban in 2001. So he has just finished his run for the presidency and it looks like from the numbers he doesnt quite have a shot. But it shows him from the southern part of the kandahar area, and coming from this area that has a long way to he of this in afghanistan, he helped the americans which was the center of gravity for the taliban in 2001. He said that the american helped him . Yes. And then he he took the governorship of kandahar for himself and then was taken out of kandahar and then was sent back and eventually 2007 the sort of began and he then began his tenure there. And then it came to an end when he decided to run for president. So he was interested in running to which he was saying that it would be better for them as a whole to support president karzai. Okay, can you say before we get back to your conceptual argument, what it is like in their offices and not just telling interesting stories, but understanding their style of governance and how they integrate their informal ties which are linked to things that people might call corruption with their formal position. Yes, with the policies that they have and when you meet with them they have a couple different types of things. And its an experience that kind of goes back in time where they are essentially entering a kind of court. You can hold up the cover of your book for the camera there. Yes, it is seen from these times in india and it is quite amazing. So you have an audience with a number of other people and there are people who have come from the district, they might be business people. These are basically people who have come to ask for advice or and its this courtly part of politics in which you realize the informal is as much as important as this kind of formal stuff. So he has more of what i think of it as a more corporate style. And afterwards a child in a shape to it. So yes, hes got a really nice watch him and hes got very nice shoes. And he has a staff that kind of operates in this way. I would say the other governor is kind of a relaxed individual, and he is actually very interested in the aesthetics of courtly life and he spent a lot of time and money renovating the palace. The second time that i interviewed him we sat in the garden and it really feels like they are at a different point in time. Not to put you on the spot because these men know you and you dont them, but to lay out one side of the argument, there are people who strongly criticized the incorporation of men like this into the political system and can you start by giving us a brief outline of the type of arguments that those people would make about what those men had done and why it is not appropriate for them. Sure. And i think that the dominant narrative especially after 2001 was responsible for driving the country in terms of a war. They demonstrated their inability to set aside petty differences and come together. They made it clear that they were interested in profiting from Economic Activity which didnt serve the development of the country. And after the reign of the taliban, which many people argued that it was an upcoming movement because it was a replacement for warlordism, that after 2001, taking the country back to a really dark time and chose to ignore what was a kind of popular enthusiasm which would be democratic and accountable and representative and kind of a new chapter for afghanistan. So why would you want these old characters would be his legacy is, why would you want those to be the main players in this new and promising time in afghan policies. After the agreement one these men were appointed to various positions, the odds are it was initially the head of the garrison before becoming civilian and governor. They did not care particularly but he was also in charge of Security Forces in both of them exercised authority over several provinces that they were supposedly governors. So nonetheless, they did not they did not behave entirely as people feared, as we did not have a renewal of the war. And of course there was plenty of activity between those two things that is quite difficult to discern. Especially in view of the main Economic Activity was part of this and actually produced and distributed including the drug trade. And so why is it that they did not reproduce exactly what they had done before, although they maintained their capacities to exercise power through having command over men that could use violence to have control of money, some of which was official state money and so much was something else. How did they change from protagonist in the civil war to powerful figures in the government . Spin up one of the things from the beginning that the province was about as trying to understand this intuition that i had from the beginning that required a lot of investigation to see if it was true. And jewish lies they are not all warlords. So for me, i was interested in trying to figure out this question. By the time i started researching 2000 of them, people were already talking about this not as a warlord as much as powerful governors. So okay, something already seems at a minimum and its not just the warlords. And i think that the reason that they made that transition, for me it is partly about understanding them and their circumstances in the way that states organized in afghanistan. So many people dont realize how highly centralized this is. And so to president karzai, there was and how much there in the beginning. But it afforded him this very important tool, which was the tool of appointments. So every appointment would be at least informally, there was an administrative hearing and informally it was his decision as to who would go with this. What that allowed him to do it say the warlords have to play off of each other in ways that brought them from the system. So the kind of central argument is what i make, the reason were not all equal is because we can understand them not only as from one another in terms of how strong they are, but also different in terms of what the local environment looks like. So for example, the head of the seven army corps, he was a powerful commander and he had access to resources and relationships. But most importantly he had a major competitor and he also had another competitor in another major figure. And they had two separate groups . Yes, that is correct. And so because, i think he recognized, and this is my interpretation, he recognized and it was clear, he could not dominate that state on his own. And this is where the use of the word warlords becomes unhelpful. Because the assumption is that they are waging war against somebody. So i think that the reason that i kind of took us on this because these are individuals with great strength in their own right. But under certain circumstances, its actually very valuable for them to be part of this project. In the central region, as i understand it, is in order to be a part of this. And so we kind of began an interesting relationship in which sometimes he misbehaves, sometimes he demonstrates a, in order to corner and find this relationship. But by the time this happened, everyone knew including him and karzai that he was going to be in charge in part because president karzai had decided he was going to be in charge. So knowing this was these individuals, there were all of these other players that wouldve liked either themselves to be there or others. That motivated him to continue to have the support. I would ask you about the relationship of the government. As i mentioned, the major source of money and coercion and violence was the United States and its coalition partners. So both of them have developed different types of relationships with the International Military presence there, which is important for us as americans to understand. While people often see this as a phenomenon, as you know in afghanistan many people say american stop is here and you put these people in power in your money has greater corruption and so on. So this governor first in kandahar, which is the home of the taliban, which meant that there is a large u. S. Military force there and there were Counterterrorism Operations as well, those who are part of special forces operations in the main military operation. Special funding, some that was used by him in kandahar. And so when he moved again, it was a little bit less dramatic most of the time. But still it was close to the border in this area. So in the north, they became relatively stable and had until a National Military presence there became part of it, and nato became the organizer of the International Military mission. Can you describe how each of them related to the International Military because in doing with the Central Government, that relationship was very important. Yes, the relationship with the americans is absolutely essential to understanding his story. A lot of people sent me over the years, he is really not a major player until the americans saw something in him and connected with him and afforded him an opportunity to take power and allow him to do this. And many have estimated how work even before he moved there. He had already made several hundred million. Through his contracts. Okay, so what does that mean . Contracts of u. S. Military, that sort of centered around conception, and so he built a kind of expertise, in particular that they brought with him. That they relationship with the americans continues to be very much a part of this and i should say that my first trip in 2007 was not on my own, but with the u. S. Military commander and he suggested to me you are interested in warlords and government, you should come back. So i got there and went to cabo at the time. I had never flown in the u. S. Military helicopter. And so that is how i got here. So i didnt realize they would let me go off the base. But theyve all kinds of people in. What i realized was that this is not a good way to do field work. But what became clear it was how intimate the relationship was. And its been very interesting for him because on the one hand the benefits are very obvious, and this includes an independent source of influence and income outside of the relationship with president karzai. And it also gives him a leg up. Not only the taliban. Yes, that is right. Other local competitors in one of the most common families in afghan politics with a long legacy of pallor and they had a legacy of having great influence and they are natives of the province . Yes, they are natives in one of the Major Brothers and figures before he came. And people talk about how it didnt really work and it was a bad relationship. People said they didnt think that he was serious about reconstruction, they thought that he was someone who didnt engage with them in the same way. Rhodes started to become paved, consistently they talked about the paving of the roads and its interesting when you talk about this, who actually pay for the road to be paid for. Well, the americans. But a lot of people dont know that it shows that companies and contacts and of course the provincial government. And that is interesting when we look at the experience. Because they want the governor to take credit for the work that they have done to enable his authority and presence. But it started to become clear to people whose power is whose. So the dilemma is building the institutional power of the state or the government, or are they empowering this individual . Yes, that is right. There is this in this weakened state, its often not a clear distinction between the government and the institution and the people that are occupying that institution. And so i think the tricky part is that americans were doing some work and by this we mean military operations and there might be civilian casualties and in this case is the blowback might come back. So part of what i think is valuable to the americans is really what is on their side, willing to absorb that political unrest. And there is much more and i think he became increasingly incapable of managing that process. Its a very wealthy province kind of in the central area and its also on the border of pakistan. And this includes the one ability with insurgency that is very real and theres one thing about the relationship between the americans, which i think is a nomadic. So i spent some time and by this time the president obama had been elected and people were still talking about this. When he was a president ial candidate he talked about this. And so if he made the decision, to go meet him and say hello to the governor. I dont know if you remember that. A number that is not a decision that he thought he made. He had no idea who he was. But he wanted to talk about meeting the american troops in the field and he didnt want to go where everybody went. So they had to find a place that was reasonably secure and had an airfield big enough for his plane to land. Therefore to meet the american soldiers. However, they said, while you are here come the first thing you must do is meet the government. And so that was the picture that afghans saw of barack obama meaning the governor of kandahar. That is part of the same story. That story was tremendous. People treat that in a number of ways. And so this includes the a group of people in a number of other places as well. Barack obama first comes to see him and what does that mean . That means does he want him to be president instead of hamid karzai . And it means that if he is president , he was invited, but did he come anyway . So you can imagine this. So this explains how many people know about this story. And there was a story many years later in the wall street journal about how corrupt he is and getting all these contracts. So of course the tables can turn on somebody like this quickly. Okay, so clarifying this that that is very much the perception. Yes, for him, the relationship had some ups and downs, but mostly ups that were extremely valuable. Correct. And it was very different. The british and the germans had a big base and they had a different approach to development. Including channeling the majority of this through the sense of government in order to support the creation of a governing system that is part of this. So it was described not that way by just local people but others as well. On multiple occasions he asked them to leave as well as rename their team that implied reconstruction, and that was not accurate. But then he said we the Security Forces are providing this and that was not really accurate either. So there was a potential relationship and what was interesting about it is i think he used it to actually consolidate power counterintuitively. So he cant take credit for everything that happened in that province. Even after we created this and all of these things for which government and usaid has had a chance about. So unlike the americans, the europeans are not really doing much and all of the relationship of the Business Community is kind of monopolized. And as well as all the fallout with the military activity, he really didnt have to deal with that. So the relationship can become problematic at times. Let me ask about another issue when it comes to drugs, narcotics, kandahar in the province next to it, they have been among the major coffee producing areas of the country and production has gone up and down. There are also both on the border with pakistan. Kandahar is also closer to iran. They have been major trafficking routes going in and out of there. So i believe now much of this could be the place with marijuana. And its also a major trafficking area as we mention on the border with pakistan, including central asia and western europe. So can you describe, can you describe this relationship of those two governors in the narcotics economy and the counter narcotics that was spearheaded especially by the United States . I dont have any hard evidence of the involvement on the part of the governor. There is talking on their part about the different careers in a number of other government officials. So having said that at the time that these two governors assume this, it was very high. And so one of the central performances to the Donor Community was part of this. So there are a number of extraordinary works with the incredible complexity of what it means to think about this. Of course poppies are the flower in which the opium is extracted. Yes. An important fact is that they are highly visible and photogenic. Yes, i have a photograph of myself in 2004 in a glorious field of purple. Thats kind of the top of the opium production. Yes. The more refined it is, the harder it is to pocket. So both of these provinces saw a really dramatic production about six or seven years ago. And it was touted to come down and labeled in this way and it was very interesting to understand how that exactly had happened. Including people inside the government that told a story about really powerful Law Enforcement and explaining to the Afghan People and that there was an enforcement of that policy. So really it is a language of government. So when i talk to other people outside of government, it was a slightly different story and there were a couple of different sets of people who were really involved in these different activities. And then most people were either inside the administration or informally they were connected to power and that was something that once the decision was made, they said this kind of activity is over and there was an extremely informal apparatus. Okay, where was it in the informal apparatus . Inside and outside the police who have this ability in the its one of the things that became really clear to me and one of the reasons that they have a role to play in government. When you look at an institution and you look at it on paper, especially at the beginning, this is the first time that there havent been enormous opportunities. And now we are talking about a new chapter of government and the people who had been policing this part of the taliban are no longer doing so. So what i saw in particular is that even though the formal appointment was processed and people were chosen to be leaders , that was decided from the ministry of interior. And in fact the governor in that province and the kind of armed men who had relationships for a long time, he had enormous influence over this. And the result of that was a lot of them had followed the governor for a long time, some of them having been teenagers together who now owed an entirely new likelihood to him and an opportunity not just formally a part of this, but those that have new Business Opportunities through their relationships with them. Those that had opportunities that could get involved in a formal way, all kinds of different ways and these men were kind of reinventing themselves and they owe that to the governor. And so when he made decisions, he actually had the ability with that policy. So what is interesting is there have been, you know, there was an uptick in poppy cultivation during the second president ial election in 2009 and what im hearing from people who are doing research closely on this is that we are seeing the kind of control of the government now and that, on the one hand, it is a real Success Story because the policy was part of this. But those that are no longer cultivating poppies are suffering economically as a result of that. So there are problems with other Economic Opportunities that have not manifested. So there are questions about when the donor is withdrawn or intense presence from the country. Will they enforce the ban . Because the governor has not had a successful experience in terms of enforcing the ban, partly due to the dynamics that are much more difficult to control power in our kind of way in a tribal province. Thats something we havent had the chance to get into. But before we turn to questions, lets comment on two things. One is we really talk about the process of state building and governance in afghanistan, but we never talk about what is covered in the media here. And im wondering if you could comment on this very briefly. Second, i would not be surprised if some people are looking at you and try to imagine you in these circumstances, that they are rather serious about your personal experience as an American Woman and graduate student of Indian Origin doing these afghan strongholds. Its an unusual form of work just from personal experience. Yes, we hear about the taliban insurgency and we question how it ends and etc. And i think that my experience of studying these two in particular, the two other governors that i talk about who were not as successful because they didnt have the same profile as these two governors, is that they are a whole host of very powerful offers that are not at all interested in kind of his stereotypical sense of retaking it. And so politically, economically, they have this from the changing of the regime. So i think what is really interesting about these characters were fundamentally a part of this, there is an extraordinary pragmatism to afghan politics that no animosity is totally permanent and to the core of any particular afghan strongman. And im sure that we can talk about the decision. If someone had told me about what happened last year, i wouldve laughed hard and for a long time. And so i think that they are they are part of this. That is correct. And he was one of the most Important National critics including those who are now his running mate. So i think what that progress, to me it is about the agility and sensibility and dynamic quality of afghan politics. So looking at these characteristics, we are looking at a very different story and of course they were fighting on behalf of the government with policies and through their influence on Security Forces but i dont think that includes down the line some interesting positions on their part about the possibility of the role of afghan politics going forward. So in terms of my personal experience it was difficult for me to convince anyone of this in 2004. I was lucky that i met the ambassador was her First American ambassador after 9 11. And he said to me that you should look of this development network. They let me buy my own ticket and pay my own way and work are free. Many of our students do so, but they let me come with them in the far northeast. And it is one of the most remote places ive ever been and i just fell in love with the place and i fell because we were in a small village that i started to see two things. First how complex politics were and how these individuals who have a particular kind of strength, what kind of influence they had in the complexity of their role. The other thing was its really hard to find in afghan someone who isnt interested in talking about politics or able to articulate a specific analysis. So i realize it would actually not be difficult. I dont think i decided to look at the politics of governor Chris Christie in new jersey, for example, his perils there. But if i decided to look at that, im not sure that i would try to talk to different people and i just dont know. There are members of your ethnic group in this building. Yes, that is true. But im not sure that i wouldve had the kind of access as i found and so i think the other thing that i realized was that you will find very interesting things happening. And also a lot of people who havent been passed about this. So is very rare for someone to go to an interview, which is an interesting experience. And it was actually very helpful that i was female. But i was sure it. Because i think i just dont have a terribly intimidating persona. So when i approach people who might otherwise find the kind of questions i was asking or subject matter potentially threatening, i dont really think that i put off a threatening five. So it can be a very disarming identity. So i really have no preconceived idea of what these people have done and i was sincerely interested. But the vast majority of my time up there, the vast majority was talking to people and that seemed unrelated in some ways. We started to piece together the story. I just came back from a few weeks ago. People like us are very much part of the insurgents activities and the people that work with us. And so its hard for me to imagine this, its very dangerous. So the more i was there, the more comfortable i was an objectively the situation has gotten more dangerous. So it remains to be seen how can we find a way to continue this and this type of environment. Right, and of course we remember these three journalists in afghanistan and at least one badly wounded. Wow, there are a lot of other things we can talk about, including questions are to be on a lot of peoples minds, such as is the american effort toward that end we have until 730 . We have until 8 00 oclock. So i would like to ask you a couple questions. Oh, okay. So especially for me in the light of reelection ticket could be slightly more part of this and im wondering if you can talk to us about the extraordinary experience of studying our country at a time and we are trying to understand politics when people were really concerned about this and this has been kind of like a center of american policy. Someone if you could share with us a little bit what that experience was like of having that knowledge and then to become part of the americanborn policy establishment. When you look at it now having been on the inside, what do you think as we enter this new chapter. You have a sense of what our role will be. Going forward. Well, first i should say when i started working on afghanistan in the 1980s, it was of greater concern in the perspective that i brought to it is that coming from a particular generation and being the kind of people that were 18 and 1968, i was trying to look at politics in that region more from the ground up. I was doing my dissertation in india. And i got involved in afghanistan initially of documenting human rights violations. And so my interest developed into one of trying to understand how we look to the people who were living them and not solely as part of the cold war. So i had to indicate all of those various things. And then it went through much less interest in this includes my academic subjects and their a lot of peoples plans and lives. And i might add that at this vey gathering are at least one person who i met when he was working for the u. S. Government, one woman whom i met who works for the turkish government and who was involved, who was in the Turkish Embassy in afghanistan, quite a few people who are from afghanistan or who have studied it in some way or another. So you develop people who were in the u. N. Mission in afghanistan, of course, and who are now working on issues relating to it at headquarters in new york. So those are the things that keep you coming back. I think what the problem i dont even know how to explain this exactly, but what ive tried to do in a lot of my work is to look at how these big glebl issues have an global issues have an impact on very local issues that the global actors dont understand or perceive and vice versa. And, actually, the story you told about barack obama and scherr psi is a very good explanation of that. On the one hand, from the point of view of senator obama who was a candidate for the president , what was relevant about afghanistan primarily was that we had troops there who were fighting to eliminate terrorists. Not afghans, by the way, but alqaeda who had attacked the United States. And he wanted to show his solidarity with those troops. And there were some people advising him on his campaign who were aware of the realities in afghanistan. But when youre running for president of the United States, you know, the rivalry between the leader of the tribe in kandahar and his rival, hamid karzai, who was a leader of another tribe in kandahar is not what is utmost on your mind, because you are not competing for either tribes votes. So whats important is the picture of barack obama with the troops. But that wasnt the picture that the Afghan People saw, because they have their own media. They saw the picture of barack obama with scherr psi. And actually that totally unintended interaction had very important results because it was actually the start of Hamid Karzais belief that obama was out to get him which then continued through the election in 2009 and so on. It was a completely unintended consequence and one which may not even be understood today. I think similarly these issues of local politics in afghanistan have been interpreted by people here as having something to do with the war on terror which, you know, things that were concerned about which they might be somehow connected to. But often they are not. I mean, well, i wont go into more details, but and being in government and as an adviser in the u. N. , i would try to through my imperfect understanding which, you know, many afghans have criticized how imperfect it is and how affected it is by my relationships with various people, i try to bridge that gap. But i finally concluded its not really bridgeable, you know . Because theres just an asymmetry of power in the world, and we have a lot more money and a lot more violence at our disposal. And, therefore, we are able to implement our ideas, our conceptions, protect our interests more forcefully if not always more effectively. Because we dont know more than those with less money and power at their disposal. And that means that theres also an asymmetry of knowledge because, say, afghans have a much bigger incentive to try to understand the United States than the United States does to try and understand afghanistan. Their perceptions are also often incorrect, you know . Such as the belief that barack obama was trying to support his fellow tribesman or, you know, the many things we do unintentionally are actually intentional which gives rise to conspiracy theories. So i think the main thing that ive gotten out of all of it is something that may not be evident to those who know me well, because i dont always act on it. But, which is a degree of humility about what we can actually accomplish in the world either for good or evil, because aye seen a lot of ive seen a lot of, you know, on the whole i would still say that the effort that we and International Community made in afghanistan since 2001 was worth it. This week one feels that more than other weeks because of the successful conduct of the election. Although we dont know yet if its really successful because the purpose of an election, after all, is to choose a president , not to stand in line and have your fingers dyed. And the president hasnt been chosen yet. But, yet so much has been wasted, so many mistakes have been made. Perhaps they werent necessary but, in fact, no one gets to be president of the United States or the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff by spending a lot of time and Energy Understanding tribal politics. And you cant really criticize that. Thats just a reality. So its, its a constant strug is l. But i will add one other thing thats really changed since i started is the internet and electronic communications. I mean, the first, the first time i went to afghanistan well, first of all i went to pakistan in 1984, i went to afghanistan in 1989, of course, once you were there, there was no way of getting information out except by coming out [laughter] and then going to a telephone or a typewriter or something. So now the country, afghanistan and maybe nowhere in the world. Im not really sure, theres lots of places i havent been. But its isolated in a way that places like afghanistan used to be isolated because people are networked. And almost anywhere in the world if something notable or objectionable or painful happens, very likely no one will do anything to stop it, but someone will at least take out a cell phone, take a picture of it, put it on the internet so people will know about it. And ive seen that have a tremendous impact for good and ill on the linkages between people in conflicttorn countries like afghanistan and those of us who are fortunate enough to live in more peaceful and wealthy societies. Well, with that, why dont we open it up then. All right, so i will go over here so i can see the people more easily. Yeah. Okay. And i think we have a hike there. Oh, okay. So, right. Because this is being broadst, raise your hand broadcast, raise your hand. Ill recognize you. Or even form a queue, line as we say in the United States, behind the microphone. Identify yourself, name, affiliation, if any, and ask a question and try to keep it relatively brief. Thank you. Please go ahead. Congratulations and very good work. Im a fulbright student from afghanistan. Its good to see you, dr. Rubin. I think the issue in afghanistan is not as black and white because its very complex. Its extremely complex. There are so many factors. These war lords and strongmen did not exist as dr. Rubin suggests, theres a i know you, im sure you have a lot to say on this subject, but there are other people ill get into that. And the question that i have yes. I have worked with attah and with others because i worked for the government there. The stories that you say is very relevant. I have quite a few of them myself, but i wont get into it. The regional dimension, i think, these people are primarily help supported by different regional countries. Like attah was invited by the president of tajikistan or by turkey or others as if if hes a head of state. The same thing goes with [inaudible] he has very close connections with pakistan and so on and so forth. How do you see that . And i think the story that you mentioned about president obama, Angela Merkel also went and met sadat and a dozen other prime ministers of european origin. That kind of boosted the credibility of these factors. And i will just end it with this note, and its very interesting. I was with a bunch of ministers visiting [inaudible] in mazar, and its very interesting story that he say that he asked the usa to fund a project. The usa came three times, didnt fund the project. And at the end he told them, look, ill fund this project. Its like ten million. Ill pay for it fore front, but then you pay me later. And the same thing i hear from scherr psi, his companies were building [inaudible] because he had all those other thing, and the government had to pay him later. So theres so many stories. What i you had your question, so if you could just wind up there. If you could look at the regional part of it. Okay. Thank you. Dipali, before you answer, i think ill take three at a time because we have a long line already. Heres someone i know, carl, but introduce yourself. Yeah, karl meyer, writer and journalist thats written and followed afghanistan for a long time and was helped by barney rubin. Ive got two interrelated questions. One is im interested in whats happened from the figures from the past. Im thinking, first of all, of he can me tar who was a big figure on the radical islamic side. Are these people still part of the political equation . Second question, i was interested yesterday to hear Carlotta Gall talk on New York Times reporter whos just published a book called the wrong enemy. And her point was, she was right about pakistan making the obvious point that pakistan is vitally interrelated with domestic afghan politics. Making the point that there were two views that she discerned among the americans about the military, role of the military in pakistan that paradoxically the u. S. Military was much stronger and more stringent in saying we should be tougher on particularly their protecting of the radicals on the border with afghanistan. But it was the diplomats, the civilians who kept saying, oh, we really have to take care, we dont want to rupture our relations with this important and vital ally, and they were the soft line on it. And im wondering, what is your perception of that as well . Okay. And finally, yes. Please, go ahead. Hi. Im kathy with World Politics review. You were good enough to let me interview you about these people a couple weeks back, so thank you for doing that. I wanted you to talk a little bit more about this issue of centralization that you raised earlier. In particular, theres been a lot of criticism to the degree to which karzai had centralized the government. And you sort of implied that its a bit of an advantage in terms of his ability to bargain, so im wondering how you see the trajectory of centralization under potential abdullah administration. Thanks. So, dipali, why dont you talk about the relationship to regional powers and the issue of centralization, and i will deal with interagency discussions on pakistan. Absolutely. With great pleasure, i will cede that question to you. Yeah. The idea of the regional dimension is hugely important, and, you know, its important for a variety of reasons, one that you raised which is the political and that i raised, you know, the political leverage that comes visavis the Central Government and also other players that are in your area of concern as a strongman that you get from having direct relationships with other countries. You know, famously the major warlord from the western part of the country in Herat Province who features as a shadow case in my book of a strongman so strong that there budget any competition there wasnt any competition around him to make it worth it to work with the center had a relationship with the iranians that amplified his power economically, militarily and politically, and he used that. And so i agree with you entirely on that point. On the question of centralization, i mean, i think this is a really, this is a real paradox, right . That you have a state in which a tremendous amount of real power lies in the provinces and in the districts in the villages. And yet you have a government which is organized and, barney, you can comment on this, but as i understand it, historically this is not something that came from the outside that the westerners said, oh, this kind of government would be good for you, but that its historically centralized. And particularly that the idea of appointments, that that is, you know, an anthropologist who studies afghanistan described appointments as part of the prerogative of the afghan ruler to decide who will govern in which provinces. And he was writing about the Afghan Government 40 years ago. Thats right. From a historic perspective that it was the prerogative. So on the one hand, you know, it doesnt really it looks like it doesnt match, and yet what ive argued, and im just beginning a new project about this, trying to understand the different logics by which karzai appointed all kinds of different provincial governors. It clearly affords the Central Government a certain amount of influence. For this kind of informal politicking. Going forward, i think there are a number of political players this afghanistan who believe in afghanistan who believe that there should be serious decentralization, and there are a number of scholars and thinkers about this, theres a debate around what would be a better setup. And, barney, id be interested to know what you think. Just speculating, lets say that two of the main contenders for the presidency are Abdullah Abdullah, and afghani. My hunch is afghani would be interested in maintaining a strongly centralized state and Abdullah Abdullah would be more interested in the possibility of decentralization. I think and we can talk about more why that would be the case. But its not clear to me that the path is fixed in one or the other. Some people believe that there would have to be a constitutional amendment around this, other people say, no, theres room for maneuver here. But i think it is a central question for the next government about the extent to which decisions get made more in the provinces. The possibility, for example, might district governors be elected . Might governors be able to have Budgetary Authority . Might they be able to collect taxes . That would be a very different model, and its hard for me to imagine that at least in the short term it wont be a loss for the president. In terms of power. So ill leave it there. Let me just comment on that briefly. I think that we tend to think of government as having, as an institution that should provide accountable services to the people. And, therefore, a degree of decentralization that provides accountability to the people would be better especially if you have a very fragmented society. But the rulers of afghanistan have generally thought of government as an institution to prevent their country from being torn apart by imperial powers and rapacious neighbors. And that leads you toward a different structure of government. And that, the dynamics of control versus accountability are still there. Its, you know, if you have some argue that decentralization would lead to accountability, others argue that decentralization would lead to chaos, civil war and fragmentation. So its not a simple matter to find the right balance, and it is one of thish hsus in the current election the issues in the current election. Just briefly on the question of pakistan, i want to mention something that we havent mentioned so far which is that afghanistan is a landlocked country. And in order to maintain a military presence there or any for any outside country that does not border on afghanistan to maintain a military, any kind of presence there, you have to bring everything through other states. And specifically given its location, in order for the United States to have any access at all to afghanistan, it needs to have good relations with pakistan, iran or russia. And the Central Asian states. And the russian route, which also is politically fraught, of course, is very lengthy and expensive. So given u. S. iran relations, this simply was no alternative for the United States to depend on pakistan for its logistics. And there is can i would also mention that pakistan has nuclear weapons. And there is just a limit to which any army can launch offenses against its own supply lines. And that is why whatever the emotions people may have in different departments of the government about what is going on in pakistan, when i was in government, there was a lot of different views expressed by people in many different departments. But ultimately, the conclusion was we had to balance our very, sometimes very strong differences with pakistan with our mutual dependence on it. And i think that afghanistan itself as a state has a very similar and difficult problem. Yes, please. Hi. I have two questions, big picture questions. Has the war on terror been used as a justification for invading sovereign nations like afghanistan as well as taking away our Constitutional Rights such as the widespread spying by the nsa on americans to protect us in this socalled war on terror . And the second question is, do afghanis believe that 9 11 was an inside job by the u. S. Government and other entityies and saudi arabia in order to justify the invasion of their country . Thats a well take two more. Yes, please. Go ahead. Yeah. Joey [inaudible] mideast search far. On this question of warlordism, the thought arosed it may be a little farfetched that there is an historic analogy. Its stretching it somewhat, but to think of the feudal lords, of how their basis for continued existence of living off the surplus of peasants created great difficulties after a while; fighting each other, revolts of the peasants and so forth. And then, ultimately, they were able to maintain their privileges through or formation of through formation of what ultimately became the, an allpowerful state, a feudal state. I think there are certain similarities. First of all, the former feudal lords now became administrators of the Central Government, and the tax collectors continued to live off the surplus of the peasantry. I have a sense that Something Like this is occurring in afghanistan. Maybe a little farfetched, but we can use that kind of framework for understanding the dynamic of warlords being converted into governors and then integrating into a central, into a Central Government. And, of course, the interest of the United States which will not permit the power enables it to continuation or the return of the taliban as the rulers, perhaps some integration of taliban. Given the direction of globalization and the concern of the u. S. Formaintaining for maintaining hegemony, world hegemony in a globalized world, anticipating contestations with iranian provincial or regional concern for authority, chinese, russian. We see that manifesting itself today. So that there are some similarities, i think, or some overarching ways in which we could look at the emerging developments in afghanistan. Please. Brady, department of defense. Im just wondering what the current status is of poppy debt in the country. Debt . Poppy debt. The problem of poppy debt. Okay. I may have to ask someone in the audience that question. Sorry, do you mean debt on [inaudible] yeah. Because, of course, indebtedness is one of the main drivers of poppy cultization, indebtedness and insecurity. So, dipali, do you want to take the question about feudalism . Sure. Yes. Well, let me start with the first. Ive not heard 9 11 as an inside job articulated in afghanistan. They dont say that. The war on terror as a justification for occupation of another country, also have not heard that. I dont think theres any question that if 9 11 had not happened, that 9 11 happening was the catalyst for intervention in afghanistan. I think thats a very different statement than saying that it was an excuse for, to occupy another country. On the pair hell to dipali, before you go into that, id just like to comment on that same question. The United States held a series of direct discussions with the representatives of the taliban leadership in germany and in qatar over 2010 to 2012 and which, of course, alqaeda and talibans relationship to alqaeda was a central question. And i can say that the taliban never questioned whether alqaeda had carried out 9 11 or whether 9 11 was the reason the United States invaded afghanistan. They said you are punishing us for something we didnt do. So it was quite a different, a different argument. You can argue whether thats an accurate statement on their part or not, but they didnt contest the reality of what had happened. Iraq is an entirely different question which had nothing to do with 9 11. Were not going to talk about that here tonight, however. Dipali, go ahead. I hope the parallel to feudal europe isnt that farfetched, because it was the inspiration for a lot of my theoretical argumentation in this book. The scholar who influenced my work as well as influenced barneys work was the head of the Sociology Department here at columbia for many years, Charles Tilley, who described a process of state formation in europe as many of hi students have heard me my students have heard me say in, many times which involved engagement on the part of princes with strongmen of different sorts. It involved all kinds of bargains that i thought looked, had very interesting parallels and had resonance with the experience in afghanistan. I was lucky enough to talk about the project with Charles Tilley just before he passed away, and i think he gave his reluctant blessing. He was nervous always, at least in his writing, for people to draw parallels from the European Experience to other parts of the world. The cases are obvious and plentiful, but i think there are quite interesting parallels there. On the question of poppy, i dont have an answer to that. My only recommendation would be to point you to the work of David Mansfield who might have an answer. I dont know if you do, barney. I dont. This is [inaudible] from nyu whos been working on this. Do you know any recent data or information on that . [inaudible] i think you should go to the microphone. Or, yeah. Yeah, come over here. Its closer. Okay. Were working together on a paper now on what is likely to happen to the drug economy in afghanistan after the security transition, the end of nato combat role in 2014. Yes. [inaudible] i know youre not prepared to speak. [laughter] i would just say that i think if you look especially like the most recent afghan opiate survey, the number one reason for cultivation is always going to be cost. Sorry, profit. The price went up in 2012 which motivated a lot more cultivation. Debt is always a reason as to why cultivation will try and continue. And if you look at certain areas, for example, nimraz we believe the up 345 of cultivation. So you definitely see a parallel there. And also a relationship. E mean, thats probably the most i would comment for now. Well, thank you. One of the things that has happened to afghanistan as it does to all countries that go through war is the destruction of the subsistence economy in which people produce their own food and other goods, and its replacement by a cashbased economy. And, of course, the influx of huge amounts of cash for counterterrorism and reconstruction only reinforce that. And under conditions of insecurity where its almost impossible to get regular goods to market and there are no functioning Financial Institutions in many parts of the country, growing and marketing narcotics is one of the few ways of raising the cash that people need to feed. And also its usually to get the cash to plant the poppy in the first place, people borrow money. And depending on how good the cob is, they may or may not be able to pay off their debt. So there is a cycle of debt which is one of the drivers of the poppy crop and which has to be addressed if the peasants are doing, and farmers are to enjoy security. And thats, as dipali mentioned, although these strongmen are able sometimes to use their capacities to mobilize force and so on to suppress poppy cultivation, it does lead to hardship on the parking lots of vulnerable parts parts of vulnerable parts of the population at times. Or sometimes there are rather perverse ways people address it such as growing hashish and marijuana instead of opium which is less photogenic and less profitable but also is, you know, something that you can make money out of in a situation where the rule of law is very weak. Well, i dont see anyone else up at the line, so i guess i will really thank dipali for [inaudible] oh, sorry. Someone is moving. Leads, go ahead. [inaudible] cipa. I actually have a history in afghanistan since 1967. That being said, we use the word strongmen, warlord, we can also use governor in some cases. Why dont we just say leader . Region alleyeder . Arent we regional leader . Arent we already prejudicing the outcome by using different terms . Also, without the u. S. Aid or assistance will there be a state in our sense of the word . Well, maybe, i mean, ill take the opportunity then in answering the question to just say a couple of closing thoughts. The question about the use of the word is a really interesting and important one, and its one that different people have written about. For me, the word leader is, as i said at the beginning, i think is an accurate label for a number of these actors. I think i was interested in the kind of strength that they were bringing to the formal state, the kind of informal strength. And so the idea of being strong in a particular way and in a way that could be studied and understood in different, as a function of different characteristics was an important part of the story for me. And i also was interested in using the word warlord because it has a certain connotation, and precisely because of that it strikes me as a word thats important. And instead of accurate, important to understand in a disaggregated and kind of more complex way. And so one of the ways to do that is to use the word and then move away from the word and try and look at it, you know, from a different set of perspectives. I just say on the word yeah, please. Its not a word that is used only by outsiders, its part of the political discourse in afghanistan. That is, these peoples opponents call them warlords yes. And their supporters counter by describing them in a different way. Yes. As commander or, which is an objective or leader. Or as a leader. Right. Or now as a governor. But any choice of terminology is taking sides in a political argument. Yeah. Thats true. As somebody who several people in this room know told me very early on in this project, notice who the afghan notice which afghans use the word warlord and which dont, and that could be a whole disisserration in its own dissertation in its own right. I think ultimately this project, and this is maybe to jims second question, started off as a project about warlords, ended up really being a project about the afghan state and questions around what it actually means to govern the state and the comment that barney made just now, i think, is really at the heart of this study and and kind of my Larger Research interest which is are, you know, in order for a state like afghanistan to survive, to what extent does governance involve the delivery of Certain Services in a transparent and accountable way . And to what extent does it really involve being able to have some as the Central Government or the regime or the ruler, some kind of control and influence over whats happening outside of the capital. And there are moments at which those two functions intersect, and theyre very and you end up getting something that looks like governance from both perspectives, but there are also many moments when they dont intersect. And part of i think what makes studying afghan politics from the outside so difficult is you see a lot of things that seem counterintuitive or problematic or corrupt or corrosive or even maybe the whole state is falling apart. If you think about it from a kind of Good Governance perspective, of what we hope the government would do and by we, i dont mean just outsiders, but also many afghans but if you actually try and understand the state as trying to survive in a particular neighborhood under a particular set of conditions, it becomes clear, first of all, that it is, in fact, very much surviving. But also that it requires a certain kind of politics at certain moments and certain places that may, in fact, involve intimate engagement with these kinds of actors. And so thats sort of, for me, the lesson of the book and, hopefully, an answer in part to that question. Id just like to conclude with a little elaboration of that, put it in some historical perspective. Of course, as dipali rightly said, the structure of the government in afghanistan is very centralized even if the government is often very weak. Thats not a natural phenomenon. Thats something that was built in afghanistan with the assistance of the British Empire and the agreement of the russian empire in order to bring stability to the space between those two empires at the end of the 19th century. And since that time the structure over how to stabilize that space which is a geographical area, relatively little water and which doesnt produce enough resources to govern to pay the cost of governing itself has been an international project. So whereas we sometimes will look at it and say, oh, this is how the afghans are, the afghans will look at it and say this is what the International Community has imposed on us. Similarly, this centralized state that afghanistan has had for over a century we have gone about trying to revise it, strengthen it, push it in certain ways because of our security needs. So in that sense afghanistan is in our neighborhood. And we are, just as the United States International Community, were very key political actors that interacted with this strongman sorry, i reversed his name again, attah in afghanistan, we are political actors and we cannot of course, we can. We have the power to walk away from it and place responsibility for whatever happens there on the people who live there. But im afraid that that is neither factually nor morally correct. Because we have been implicated, we remain implicated, and we will be in the future x. Thats why the discussion about whether we will remain involved and how we will remain involved is something that we cannot escape. And i think that dipalis book has been a very important contribution to that discussion, and you will now have an opportunity to queue up at this table over here and purchase it from her, and she will sign them for you. Thank you all for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]