Privacy that she needed. One more time, thank you very much. [applause] feel free to come forward if you would like. Good afternoon. Im peter bergen. I run International Security program at the new America Foundation and its my great pleasure to introduce my colleague and friend who has this wonderful new book out. The green berets battles from afghanistan to washington, which outlines makes quite unusual career as these somebody who is creating policy in the white house but also runs a successful business here it is a fellow here at the new America Foundation. So he is going to outline pane of the big ideas and some of the interesting stories in the book and then we will throw it open to a questionandanswer session with everyone here. Thank you. Mike. So thank you, peter. Thanks for coming out today. Lets take a brief moments and talk about it default on the broader Strategic Issues have tried to address in the book and really underlined a lot of what makes the rss feed are mentioned in the white house, Vice President cheney and the pentagon working for secretary gates and rumsfeld and as a reserve special forces officer out in the field. There was the one moment. Lets take a bit of a History Lesson looking back on the war and looking back this far where i think we have made some critical mistakes that historians decades from now will look upon. The first is that our strategy never really adjusted with the insurgency has a pecan growing past 2001. We have a very focused strategy, counterterrorism poker strategy targeting al qaeda and key taliban leaders. As the kind of got that died down in as the Afghan Government stabilizers strategy or that coalesced and what that drove unfortunately was a perennial underresearched end of the war effort. So we found ourselves as violence began to grow in the 2003, 2004 2005 timeframe. We found ourselves chasing balance rather than putting resources and necessary to get ahead of us. There were some Important Reasons for that one of which must obviously was the iraq war. I was on the ground in the resources, whether helicopters or predator drones or what have you getting pulled away from the afghan theater into iraq. Prayerfully came into play was once the insurgency had reconstituted and the taliban had truly reconstituted about 2006 and i came back from a to her back to the pentagon and said hey boss there was nothing to give. We truly were the depths of the iraq war and there is not named to commit. So we found ourselves more and more reliant on nato to provide those resources. That is not a moral statement on the iraq war. The dishes more of a state benefactor my teeth. No country can fight two wars. So that is one. The other states looking back which i just mention if handing the effort over to nato and handing a mission over to nato that frankly wasnt prepared to do. I was in the pentagon and out in the crowd as we transition the lead for security over to nato which is the isaf coalition. They frankly thought they were getting into a bosnian style mission. Theyre on the ground in home ground in helmand whenever it came down, when the dutch took over in kandahar where the canadians took in 19 prepared to do a soft parade patrolling and engaging in a 2006 their political constituencies were prepared to deal with. So they signed up to do peacekeeping and found themselves by the time they deployed in a fullblown counterinsurgency effort. I read to allow quite a bit in the book on being on the ground from French Special forces that didnt have the equipment didnt have compatible radios, sometimes didnt even have enough ammunition to being but the dutch forces and asking them to work with us and have to go all the way up to their parliament for approval. So if both instituted are promulgated this under resourcing, but then it also really tied our hands and trying to fight an enormously complex floor with a 42 nation coalition. We never got around to run pakistan then or now in the sanctuary they afford and seth chose another done studies over time and not that they have found have been successful when the insurgent enjoys a better sanctuary nextdoor. Four, when i say is the most critical was announcing our withdrawal years and it of that withdrawal. I was standing in my headquarters in 2009 when president obama gave his speech at west point announcing the search, but in the things beach announced the end of the surge in my Operations Officer standing next to me. Can you imagine Franklin Delano roosevelt announcing dday but then announcing to the germans entered the world that it would only last six months to a year. So not a perfect analogy, but one that he threw out and had an immediate effect on the ground. Two weeks later i was up in the mountains meeting with men all tried alder a nutshell memento that building relationship with for the better part of the year many many cups of tea. Many, many meetings. Many hours of getting to know each other, building that relationship and building a level of trust because its the largest tribe in that part of afghanistan. They wanted to work with the Afghan Government and against the Haqqani Network which is the predominant Insurgent Group that area and they had about 1500 tribal militia which they call arbakai welltrained, but i wanted working the past. Two weeks after the speech at west point by president obama i go for this kind of final signing of a statement of commitment and a very cold reception. Didnt offer sea. Finally, after a few minutes got to the bottom of this and said we always suspect today. Weve seen it in the past but now youre going to be under nice. The haqqanis will have begun to my families had tomorrow night as soon as you do. I tried to talk the nuance into announcing withdrawal with the surge had the nuance was lost. They heard america was leaving. And that has them truly touch or mental effects in other ways as well. We saw corruption actually spiked after that announcement. Kind of get out get the money out what you can. We saw government officials that we have been gaining traction with the reform effort be less inclined to do so. You know, we really frankly were undermined by that policy statement within days within weeks of its announcement. It was a fascinating case of how a policy intended to go this direction immediately on the ground with the task one operational after, totally different threshold. This is how i ended the book. The thing at lunch and he went to us as leaving that meeting where he withdrew all of the support and pledge not only to not work with us youre going to be hedging their bets now. He said look, intel you are prepared to have your grandchildren not your children, but your grandchildren Standing Shoulder to shoulder with mike ran children, we cant work with you in this will never work. That is really a theme that kind of commitment or lack thereof that runs throughout the book. The signal that sent both to the region to the Afghan Government to the afghan populace into the enemy has really hurt us throughout the war effort. You are only here for al qaeda or now you are focused on iraq or you are handing us off to nato for your announcing a search to bring security, but now you announce withdrawal. So where does that leave us quiet today i think we frankly have to be very blunt, a policy of hope in a lot of assumptions. Right now we are assuming here that i was just discussed today at the london conference, but we are assuming the Afghan National army and the Afghan National police can stand on its own. I find it difficult to wrap my mind around how the ansi are going to do alone without our support with 42 nations, 42 western nations in the last 10 years. Personally, ive been hearing that in pentagon briefings and in the white house and about 2005. The Afghan National army would be able to stand and operate on it done in 2005 2007 now 2009 now lebanon now 14. The next assumption we assume the government will hold. Be active politically peacefully transitioned its entire history. We have a very tenuous situation right now in the same year and at the same time we are not being this frankly almost borderline irresponsible from a policy standpoint. We also assume any type of reconciliation talks will progress in our interest. We are assuming that the tensions will continue to rise and i think washington grossly underestimates the amount of tension on the ground right now. Most importantly, we are assuming that al qaeda cant and wont innocents already reconstituting in the wake of our withdrawal. I just did a q a with Dana Perino Fox news and we would throw this but she said mike i got it. So is the simplest questions that are heard. She said why should the American People care . With enough this for 10 years. Weve invested billions of dollars. We lost thousands of lives. But also scary, but why should they care . We have seen now what can happen in the wake of our withdrawal and a vociferous withdrawal. If that makes you nervous, on the doorstep of baghdad makes you nervous, having every constituted al qaeda on the doorsteps of islamabad with the key to nuclear weapon. We can talk about the nuances about analogy and there is a lot, but i think that there is some real issue and i have real issue in their right to in the book, which is turning our back on the region. So with the policy Going Forward and how are we going to get this long war to a better place . A few years ago i gave a talk to a bunch of new congressional staffers coming in in the wake of the 2012 midterm elections. Hightop about a country in asia that at one point had a higher Literacy Rate than afghan and as today. No roads no infrastructure, no political system inserts they know me because its been occupied for the better part of 50 years and it did indeed have a higher ilLiteracy Rate in 1940 than afghan this end. Its not a perfect analogy. Many, many smart people mr. Capote holds on it. Its a great example of a sustained u. S. Engagement can do over a long haul and i argue at the end of the book despite all of the mistakes weve made and we certainly need to learn from that the sooner we stop attacking menace in a team on threeyear for your increments and start wrapping our ryan around this is a generational multidecade after the sooner we will be in a better place. The examples of germany south korea japan while not perfect are examples of what american engagement can do over the long haul. So those are the underpinnings of the book im just kind of a policy standpoint. What i try to do chapter by chapter is rather than talk about these things, i try to have you experienced them through my time on the ground, my time in the white house, my time in the pentagon and also of course my men with me. The introduction starts with a rear in the black helicopter going after a taliban commander. He was responsible for the death of some of our afghans and that to her. Really bad. There where we enter the home in a night raid and we killed. I had just typed with my little girl the night before. The emotional toll that had en masse, the impact it the impact it out on her Counterinsurgency Campaign in that area but then flashback their im with president bush Vice President cheney and president karzai talking about the issue of civilian casualties and the effect that will have or not have. Each chapter kind of goes into that type of back and forth trying to look at these issues from all angles. Whether its packaged in and there we are. What do we do with the Nuclear Arsenal . What do we do with support for the insurgents he but yet we are dependent on it for air and ground supply. But yet there i have literally getting rocketed inside Pakistani Military bases along the afghan border. And how do we bridge that . For the Afghan National army is not ready and will not be ready for at least a generation. Or the total lack of continuity. When i took command i commanded all the special forces in southeast afghanistan. I had about nine months of data to deal with. Our lack of continuity in terms of learning from previous lessons of knowing what we had done, i write in another chapter about a patrol in the valley outside of Bagram Air Force base. I went around to every Intelligence Officer i could time. This was in 2005. We have been there for years been talking about who had been there before from the United States. Who did we talk to . We knew there had been some Development Projects they are but why in this village and not in that village clinics adjusted next days. All i could find were a few target passages on the key taliban leaders. I titled that chapter patrolling the ambush because that is essentially what were doing. We went out to the area to figure that stuff out, ran into ambushes. I was nearly killed here by Master Sergeant have come close to was very killed died in my arms and i still take care of his family today. That sacrifice i would like to thank us for the information we gather but i am not confident that when into some type of repository that others can learn from. I looked for it on my next tour and we just didnt do a great job. So i talked to a number of those issues in each chapter. I also try to address i think some fundamental issues that the army has yet to deal with. You know one is the layers of bureaucracy that we had to go through to conduct each mission. In one chapter i read about the 12 approvals that we had to have to go after one taliban commander and i literally had and elder on the phone, a proud old man who had a great relationship with, the suns were working within two years because the haqqani commander that threatened his life was nextdoor looking for in coming begging us to come get them. I couldnt get off of the approvals to go 10 kilometers down the road and we ended up not with only losing the other, but is found in the village because we couldnt conduct a night raid. Looking on it from a different perspective, with all heard about the negatives of conducting direct action and night raids with a lot of a lot of positives in is an action as well also look at just the overall issue of risk aversion. One of the issues i dont think weve wrapped our minds around is that this is the first and longest war in our history that we fought with an all volunteer force. Not the first, but by the longest. In previous wars and we need to look at what that does to our incentive mechanisms. In previous wars coming out of the draft you are in it to win it. You were pulled out of their lives, whether as a lawyer or a plumber or what have you and you were have you and you were sent to the war and had every incentive to take every risk possible so you can come back to your life. Now it is a wonder that on an otherwise promising military career. The incentive he came dont mess anything out. Dont get a base overrun. Dont take too many casualties. Dont lose too many will recall sensitive items, what have you. The default reaction in a gray area became an action. I say that carefully because i never want or intend to disparage anyones motivations or service to their country. Its more of a fundamental issue that we havent in the military started to deal with. Without that risk aversion permeated in a number of ways. One other quick anecdote was i came across kind of a perfect example of this. I came across the base we were working within a packet danny porter. 18 soldiers in a platoon. If you think back to everybody thought the movie love survivor where the navy seals were killed and eventually one was captured, the fourman unit of conducting reconnaissance. After that rule, it came down that no less than six individual soldiers out on a patrol. Okay that makes sense. The firebase was overrun in 2008 in another dday came down no less than 14 u. S. Soldiers guarding the base. You can see now come to do the math. They couldnt necessarily leave the base because they were not enough. But they couldnt go out because they would not enough patrol. They ended up having reinforcement flow name every time they even want to go down with the taliban were openly harassing a girl school that was down in the village below their base. Think about the signal that send. Military platoons at the top of the hill and taliban commanders openly shopping and shutting down shops and every time they saw a helicopter come in they need the americans are coming. It was kind of the operational permeation that the risk aversion that really comes to the fundamental issues that try to address. There is a little bit in there for lawyer and rules of engagement. There were a number of instances that anyone who has had to fight in this day before had to deal with didnt make it any easier on me. There was a 14 mortar rounds came into our position and we saw them walking in. One of my snipers finally found who was calling him in. And nine 10yearold boy upon a hill hill with binoculars on a cell phone. No weapons. Was unarmed. Every time he raised the cell phone, we sought another round. He is lucky not be. What do we do . Make the call. I told them to put a warning shot which he did. He dove behind the cover, but he came back out raise the binoculars, raise the cell phone another round cave and an wind of some of my afghans. At this point i am clear from the chita convention. But i still make the decision to just keep putting warning around the kid. Who knows if the taliban and had a gun to his families had, what the situation was but that was a call that i made at that time. Was it right or wrong . I think it was right. What i felt that way with a family fun of by men killed by one of those mortar rounds . I dont know. I want to bring those type of experiences to the average american reader as well. Aside from his broader policy issues. Just a few other teams today and how do we move forward today and what i am is a 100 year after. Yes this is our nations longest war, but we are about or two years into 70, 80 90 100 year long after just as in the early days in the effort against communism. At the end of the day we are fighting an idea. We fight in ideology and that is by far the hardest thing to do thing to defeat. Weve seen that now with the adulation after we killed osama bin laden, but the idea of extremism like the idea of communism has survived. Ill take a long time to undermine that. One of the things they think we are doing right is forming a moderate Arab Coalition. This is in the first time weve done it. One of our key partners they are coming at it Arab Emirates have been there somalia. They been with us in the afghanistan. They were with us in the intervention in libya and to have partners like that, i was out on the ground with them in several chapters of the book in southern afghanistan and just to put a face on this to have an american officer standing next to an arab officer, talking to groups of afghan villagers and to have the arabs say this is not the way. Look at jakarta look at istanbul, look at dubai. There is a better path for you and your children so the proper muslims and followers of islam. And take it a step further and look what the United States did for germany. Look what it did for japan. Look what it did for korea. That kind of a voice immediately undermining the ideologies and frankly the ignorant the taliban was espousing was a time for the u. S. Soldiers. The other piece that could come very passionate about its growth education of women empowerment. We need to take this out of this feelgood humanitarian realm and put it squarely in the National Security mom. No ideology can suppress 50 of the population. I think the more we put brave leaders like mullah, the Nobel Peace Prize for the Nobel Peace Committee doesnt get a lot of things right, but they got that one. They got that one right and i about fell out of my chair was so thrilled. If you think im brave or new soldiers are brave that little girl is brave and those are the Women Leaders we need to empower and really put the full force of our government behind in terms of emphasizing. The last thing i will leave you with them then i will turn it over to questions is the issue of our veterans and the impact it is having on us particularly if you buy into that we are in a multidecade or multigenerational welfare. It truly is having a detrimental effect and that doesnt mean we are not ready. We dont need sympathy. What we need is probably some support and i must kind of a Technical Assistance on how do we translate these wonderful skills do with lost away from the saffron into the private sector or the next wave. But most of all could ask for your support for the family. It is an all volunteer force. No one forced us to do what we were doing. But the family is kind of a struggle on. You have to do with the consequences good or bad. If we dont come home and offered only to come home, it is families that are suffering and we wouldnt have the military we have today without their support. One of the things i wanted make sure everyone is aware of his 100 of the profit from book sells for coach of the Green Beret Foundation that focus on the children of our operators that were enabled to come home. Thank you very much. [applause] you really get a sense of the big policy questions in your experience on the ground and how they connect. When i heard your presentation there is kind of a big question here about the United States only because i think there was a big tension between the United States, which is we basically were created trying to escape from an empire and therefore we have a natural aversion to anything would like to construe his empire building. And the fact that afghanistan for nine months or year none of that makes any hands. Do they have the political will that are required to not win or at least manage the situation in southern afghanistan has a reasonable glidepath. I would answer that in two parts. And it goes to the fundamental question, is american engagement doing more harm than good . I would offer it has done fantastic good, not to say we have not made a number of mistakes along the way. I could imagine candidate Hillary Clinton or candidate jeb bush both putting in their platforms, hey going to zero at the end of 2016 is a good idea. It would fit with what their base party would be happy with. You know i think we have negotiated a strategic plant with the afghans. A lot of effort was put into that. So i think the politics we will change around it. Clearly iraq speaks for itself. That talk i gave in 2012 to a bunch of bunch of professional staffers and made the south korean analogy, about a dozen staffers walked out of the room. It was not welcome. When i checked later almost all of them or republican. I think i think this issue of americas role Going Forward, can we afford it do the American People have the we will for it the costbenefit, its on both sides of the aisle. The debate about the surgeon 2,009 there was one option the pentagon, colonel a group of colonels and the pentagon one of the ideas they came up with was go light but go on to it looking back on it it might have been the smartest because at the end of the day they dont care if its 21,000 or 15,000. They want to hear that our grandchildren we will be standing next to their grandchildren. Or at least that it will be a longterm commitment. There is a minimum number below which it does not make any sense. Well, theyre have been a number of studies. Look at what we need to do. We need to keep the airbase at barber open. That we will take several thousand. We need to continue our Counterterrorism Campaign into the pakistani lawless tribal regions. We need to continue mentoring and training the Afghan National army and the police. Right now we have both at such a high level that if the trees are falling in the forest i i dont think we have the visibility to know at the tactical level. We need to push those back down. You have that up which up until about 2,007 is where we were. It was interesting for you to mention that nato problems, they thought they were getting a peacekeeping mission. You mentioned this Term National caveats. Can you explain what that meant . At that time there were 42 nations in the coalition, and is basically had its own rules of engagement, its on clearance process. They all reported to the commander but they also had there own National Officer the reported back to the capitol and could override things. Between that and each one being assigned to a specific province. They would not fly at night. What other examples come to mind could not embark on offense of operations. So for instance we just wanted them to pull security for some sniper teams that we had out. An offense of operation potentially had to go back to parliament for permission the commandandcontrol problems. Donald rumsfeld you go to war with the coalition you have. Even with all those caveats, better to have 42 nations in the tent . It kind of reached a tipping. They call it off like to post and we became almost obsessed with getting more members of the coalition. I right in the book at 1. I was visiting in my capacity from the pentagon and i talked to a group of surgeons. We had 36 us soldiers training 24 nato 24 nato mentors to go mentor to the afghans because they came frankly, unprepared. I think we really underestimated the level of atrophy that natos military experience after the end of the cold war. Number one. Number two, nato was designed to do territorial Homeland Defense and we are now asking them to do things that we take for granted, move maintenance and supplies such as and then three they were going into one of the most complex and difficult environments in the world. The military. A huge Aid Organization dutch and all these other countries coming in. Pretty good soft power projections. They do. What you have to have on the field as Close Military integration. Nato is a military organization and they often went to the eu to do a lot of the civil policing advising, and other things. You did not you did not have that integration. At the end of the day there are fantastic benefits to having a Political Coalition but we must be clear about what they can do on the ground. From a political we will sandpoint and also from a military capability. How would you assess of the coalition is doing right now . s. We are in the coalition. The proportionality of american. Right now we have a heavily a heavily americanled coalition. There is real benefit to having arab partners for messaging standpoint and just from a broader strategic standpoint, actually down on the ground. Can almost work against you. The issue of civilian june the issue of civilian casualties. Were you theyre . I think that it was you no was it miscommunicated and away . It needed to swing. When i was there in 2,006 often times we would get engaged by relatively small and minors in certain element in the air force. It was too heavyhanded. Part of that was just how few forces we had on the ground how isolated we were part of it was we needed a shift in thinking, a shift in mentality from the counterterrorism focused to the counterinsurgency Population Center focused. The pendulum, though went too far. Gen. Mcchrystal, i think, was right to issue the edex that he did. The problem was the lectionary and to follow next line the next layer. Each layer got more and more cautious because no one wanted mcchrystals finger and their bosses bosses just they over interpreted and it tied our hands so that in situations where we really didnt support him and you saw this from the middle of our winner, what have you handwringing. Unfortunately he did not have the opportunity. It did swing too far. In that part of the world theater people respect strength. When they see the taliban insurgents pushing and pushing the limits they constantly attacking nac a tepid response because of this bureaucratic wrangling. You have big reasons why a lot of things have to go right. But what is going right . Americans listening on cspan. The. Of them together. Civilian casualty rates are off the charts. Hes been a a lot of time in afghanistan. First a lot of things are gone right. My intent was to learn from the lesson in this book in the last ten years looking at it from the different angles for the next over many years. I mentioned education which was just nonexistent in the early days. My company now works with a number of womenowned businesses. The economy broadly speaking such a wartorn country it has been okay. I hope it survives the withdrawal of dollar funding. Certainly has the potential to. You know, one of no, one of the reasons im so passionate about something a longterm message that we are invested in afghanistan it is our National Security interest that we are not going to abandon it for outside investors to come in and to exploit not exploit, but to work with the afghans to take advantage of many of the Natural Resources that they had. The chinese and russians again. From a security standpoint are starting to get things right. We took what i call my tribal special forces, army special forces, green, green berets specialized culture, language, working with indigenous forces and putting them into the village and putting them into tribal areas that asked for our support for truly starting to see the benefits i think the Afghan National army. But we have to give it time. Taking a lot of casualties suggesting that they are fighting. And i think that the if you ask around washington now with an Afghan National army do most people would say is going to be a complete catastrophe. In fairness to the iraqi army folks who were following it closely were looking at the violence in the casualties in the fighting that has been going on the last two and a half to three years for years command this is not a brandnew problem. They did finally collapse. I am worried, we just saw based get overrun. A fairly large base. One of the bases down there named after one of my soldiers that was killed theyre and is now being threatened. So. So i worry that were beginning to see those initial kind of indicators that we saw two years ago. One final question. You know a lot of americans. Would that make any sense . The whole. Of counterinsurgency is to protect the population. It made sense in the perspective. Should we have focused on the city 1st . I think i think i sequencing was often that happened for political reasons. Having to do with the marine corps wanting to have their own. Like trying to defeat nazi germany by attacking austria 1st. Throwing open to questions. And with the voice for american afghan services. Not interested in having a a clear Foreign Policy towards afghanistan. The military does another thing. If government if government has no power over the military what can the United States kind of a broad question, but what can the strategy for the military because at the beginning of this year the United States spent 1. 6 billion to pakistan and over half of that goes to the same military funding the other Afghan Taliban across the border. What can the United States due to prevent the military stop supporting megan the knew mission the support. The main purpose of that mission is to train afghans. Is not going to defeat the enemy. A lot of families with a left children. Hamburgers the 11th on the phone a how should they approach this training . First on pakistan. From one perspective yes, i here you. Pakistan cares about its own interests. A bit of a broken record. We saw a shift, out on out on the ground and then back your diplomatically with pakistan 2005, 2006 when we, you know, did the whole shift over to nato. Did the whole shift over to nato. It became very clear to them at least in off the record discussions that this was the beginning even that early of the eventual us withdrawal. That is not making an excuse. I agree with you. I agree with where i think you are going. Going. It is kind of like doing training only matan the coaches of a Football Team you can only go with your team to practice. Wave goodbye. You need to do the advising which means going out with them and conducting operations that facilitate the enablers the medevac, the air support, all the other things i we will take a long time for the army to develop. At the follow to follow up on pakistan, and off the record discussion. Ahead of the military. And you know 2011, they are kind of come a long way. The border incident. But things have sort of they seem to be a lot more normalized. The military operation something the United States has been wanting to do for a long time. You know, operation was advertised months in advance and there was a lot of speculation about why that was advertised for my shift of the network out of the area of operations. So theyre are many folks who believe and i am not sure where i am on it. I think its a little more complicated. This is a rare example. The military wanted to do the operation and be constrained. The civilian government was saying, hey, wait a minute. We need to expand these negotiations. Negotiations. Theyre never going to go anywhere and didnt. For a civilian leader you want to show, hey we did everything we could. I think in fairness their is a growing chorus within pakistan the genie is out of the bottle. We bottle. We cant control this anymore and truly have to take them out. And that is encouraging. I dont know that im i am willing to go that far to say the military Senior Leaders have changed their couches of using proxies. But i do think theyre is a growing chorus particularly among the junior officers. Again what is the constant theme hear . That generation continues to progress. The knew president went to pakistan the pakistani chief of the army. It seems to be karzai was publicly and honestly critical of two countries, the United States and pakistan. Kind of a pretty unhelpful way for all concerned. Yes, there was an issue. Not not agreeing on the cabinet position. Both technocrats. If it doesnt work between them the sole thing goes south. And they realize that. They have two reasonable well educated, decent man. It is it is almost like having met ronnie and barack obama is im worried about the secondary and tertiary layers. There already beginning to hedge. I dont think time is on our side. The theories of attacks. Lisa very explicit advisory. I mean, is this the taliban trying to show the flag . Really getting mostly soft targets essentially. From jalalabad to kandahar and helmand. We are praying that we can get a new set of ministers is levying to provide air support not talking a lot. Its now very clear in terms of what. Special forces. Theyll pull back. They do what is kind of known as a village overwatch for they go out and visit the local police. Many police. Many of them are recruited from tribal militia. In my view has the worst of both worlds. I the you dont have that you out there with them. The conventional. This gentleman here in the front. Georgetown university. The media counterterrorism and counterinsurgency often without distinctions were what they are our government still has counterterrorism. And i dont know of any counterinsurgency. The president was clear when he made a statement that we we will degrade and destroy isis. Those were the very words he used the recognition that isis is an insurgency not a terrorist organization it uses terrorist tactics. What kind of confidence you have the Us Government is committed to the longterm effects larger requirements of confronting the insurgency like i us garnered some coalition. The airstrike. To get back to the cold war our efforts against communism. You. You know, if you look at the end of the day over the course of history people who are disenfranchised, dont have opportunity are disconnected from the government, dont see a better path for the children have gravitated toward some type of movement whether it was socialism, communism and now extremism that they feel gives them a mechanism to address those grievances. At grievances. At the same time we have people who use and abuse. Its all about power. And they either maintain power or seeking power. I power. I mean, taking a macro view the entire extremist islamic Extremist Movement is an insurgency to some degree against either the monarchies or what are what they see western liberal society or the kind of abuse of government. So to answer your question i think we need to take a broader very broad view of how we undermine this ideology just as we undermine people ask me what his victory look like, and ill tell you i think i think victory looks like when Isis Al Qaeda has below are what have you cant recruit anymore ideology has flaws. Think back to the 80s, gst nine, red brigades those communist groups shining down in peru for a very powerful, good recruits and more furthering of their agenda. Now they are a joke. Why . What happened to the job that ideology . I think we have to get this current one to the same place, and i take your point. Terrorism is a tactic a tactic, mechanism. Communism is an ideology. He did not last very long. Really the soviet union expired. Expired. I am sure there are still communist professor somewhere. It is a minority position. So it was very tied to the Actual Experience of the soviet union and the fact that it just did not deliver ultimately. I was the biggest variable. So the ideology that is in a sense older and it was the claims that it is sort of a centric ideology. They are often harder to kill or even to manage or hope that they just so sketch out the future. You said in your remarks that this could go on for 100 a hundred years. I mean, other people talked about a 30 years war. This is something that could go on for a while. You explain you explain what the end looks like, but how do we get theyre . Yes, i think the gentlemans innocence critiquing where the Obama Administration is but also endorsing the fact that theyre is this element of the coalition which is very important. So what else can we do and how do we hasten . And of course the American Government we cant talk about islam in any meaningful way. So you are advising the president february 2017, what would you say to him or her . There needs to be a few components, and some of it is looking at ourselves internally because we are not organized as a government to really conduct this type of effort. And to put it its oversimplistic but our skills that we need, whether they are Border Patrol agents or Police Advisers or what have you come in a civilian agencies our ability to operate in an unstable space. So you have this kind of, you of, you no, at least over the last 14 15 years this constant backandforth platoon leader should need a 2nd airborne trying to figure out how to be tom ayers and then youve got we are reaching out. We need to to help either iraq or afghanistan control its borders. Last last time i checked the Border Patrol is an expeditionary. So 1st of all, we have made attempts at doing that, whether it is a prt or whether it is you no, whether it is the state department, the civilian response court. But we need to look at a broader effort that we essentially take the stability approach and then we can talk about how we prioritize. Two two is countries like the uae, countries like turkey although not under the government really need to be key partners on this. I try to give an anecdote in the book of i cant i mean, i just cant overstate how powerful that messages coming from modern arab elements that can say and do things toward ideology, whether sitting down and really explaining to them how there hitting the ball. We just cant. So there needs to be an Arab Coalition element all of government element and a reorganization, a joint this across our interagency to be able to address it. And then there is a political dimension that you hit on in terms of American Peoples minds getting wrapped around the fact that this is going to be a longterm effort to International Interest to begin doing it, much like we had in the 50s and 60s. I get it. There are many imperfect elements of that analogy with the cold war and communism, but theyre is a lot of commonality that people can say, yeah. The 70 years to be this effort. Well we dont have a soviet union that is the big enemy these are nonstate actors. We have the hobby is in. We have certain states that have been more responsible than others. You have to be careful. Careful. The analogy, anybody who bombs an Abortion Clinic in this country is a fundamentalist without exception. We have to be very careful about how we identify. It makes you ultraconservative. I served a very short time as a civilian during 20102011. On the Economic Development side. I would like to here your comments on the shift from the topdown approach to the Economic Development where we spend billions command i had to sit next to them during the Bank Collapse where our taxpayer assets went to dubai and western institutions. Thanks probably wont exist in afghanistan. 2002,. 2,002, 2,003. So where is the bright spot on the horizon for bottoms up Economic Development and how are women part of that change . In terms of womenowned businesses. Sure. Ive had the opportunity over the last three years to work with the afghan private sector. I never come across a more entrepreneurial society. Ive worked and lived all over the world. Afghans truly we will bootstrap and make their own feature and just given a little help. So part of it is through both women and men, to the private sector, bringing in private investment. A lot of folks in the middle east in particular that i looking to employ investment dollars that they need. Many the basic things. The unpredictability, some level of stability. And stability. And frankly and a lot of these conferences back there from the commerce department, what is the United States going to do . Only going to turn out the lights . This was a few years ago. To answer your question, question through the afghan private sector, enormous opportunity. The topdown bottomup, you no we have struggled with that. One one of the biggest components of putting those funds through Afghan Ministry under the kind of guys of will never develop capacity of where always going around. At the same time we have to be responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars dollars and we wanted to get to where it will make the most impact as fast as possible. We have the prt mechanism to do that. There needs to be a balance of both. I would be much liken it to anything. Basically something called the National Solidarity program. Very very small and local basis. That seems to be a great deal of money compared to what we have put an end. There is success. And again, i work from the most all the way up. The success in areas that are relatively stable. We we broke up my special forces unit broke up a number of rings that were extorting the National Solidarity program in 2009 2010. So this is a program that basically elects tribal or elect local councils that are authorized to receive the funds and then to receive the funds and then basically helps them make local decisions on where the dollars are going rather than folks doing it. But what happened was the insurgency is. A gun a gun to there head, go withdraw the money. I no a lot of my remarks were security focused whether it is National Security or the private sector or better government you have to have security is just the oxygen. The bank to my 1 million robbery. The administration is now having to answer some pretty strip handing out some pretty stiff prison sentences. Are absolutely right. I worked counter narcotics policy and the Defense Department for years and spent years in my life frankly undermining folks in the state department that wanted to make our a counter narcotics policy eradication and aerial eradication, i had and do push for more of an interdiction strategy. We pushed president karzai and others just left a handful of these most notorious guys. It sends the right signal to your people since our signal to them. And. And i think it really, you no, we will tamp down some of the egregious behavior. Good afternoon gentleman. I had an experience. Reverend component i have seen things that struck me most, risk aversion is probably the militarys biggest problem. I was wondering are people aware of this and what it means . You will read a chapter in there. At that time, the secretary came out. I walked in through the problem. You should have seen the depths. Having been on his end of things i knew what he was coming at. Let him make them aware of these layers. And as i was saying to put in place for good reason. Reason. It makes sense in isolation. There is accumulation over time that cause the problems. I was in the pentagon with president karzai 1st complained about that to secretary rumsfeld and the commander at the time then said every time we go after a taliban commander has to come to a threestar level for approval. Imagine what that is. So the answer is next. Sometimes your aware sometimes is done on purpose. And purpose. And in that case he wanted to come to his level to tend down the numbers of her going on. Sometimes were just not aware. There is a real reluctance for civilian policymakers who are going out to the field to have the 7000mile screwdriver and begin questioning and changing how we conduct ourselves operationally. It is a tough, tough problem watch that realtime by the commanderinchief. And its really the 1st time in history the tactical operation was being seen in realtime by the commanderinchief. The commanderinchief, yes. In operation you do in the field. Had is that change . It changes a lot of things. Having one in a few weeks. The effect that that has had on modern warfare, it is a mix between risk to answer your question a little bit further, risk aversion that i think is seeped into what i call the careerist force rather than an all volunteer force because now we have folks that are focused on this is one spot in their career and then between technology the that literally allows things to be managed as from afar. Ive had it done to me and im sure you have as well. It plays a huge role and is one of the reasons i take umbrage to flip that around, this notion that we often here in the media that are special forces guys are cowboys that are out theyre just kicking in doors willynilly all we are dropping hellfire missiles from predator drones kind of the flip of a switch. There is is an elaborate process with lawyers at every level standing right at the commander shoulder with a series of kind of criteria whether we can take that shot or of whether we can go on that rate to the. That i argue its to our detriment. Our hands are too tight the spin you to have the pendulum has swung too far. Our inaction often has greater consequences than the action. Ive been part of the guerrilla insurgency along with your community and a few others for a few decades now. Trying to fight the battle inside the policy rooms in the way your. What would you offer as a vice . Representatives from the joint staff, dod advertising that the Afghan NationalSecurity Force and police will be able to take care of this problem. At the same time were sitting hear listening to introduce your book and all the things we no about the reality. We have a severe policy disconnect. What would you you offer for advice . And dont just say vote for the right people. I mean the signal and directions its is in some ways the way that it should work. The military should. And the civilian run military should be aligned with that. Theyre are some fundamental issues within particularly the army itself that are also at play regardless of who gets elected in two, four, eight years now. One is that the army in particular still wants to fight the wars. This is getting into a long conversation with the militaryindustrial complex and requires Big Equipment and big shiny objects that employ a lot of people in factories spread across all. Counterinsurgency does not have a constituency. It does not require special forces, the us military. I want to say at least army special forces, its like three to 4 . Its like one a half. It is very inexpensive and does not have all the bright shiny objects attached to it is is the army well, some very bright people trying to retain lessons learned. Do you think there doing an okay job . If you look at the strategic vision, i think it is an important step in the right direction. The holy grail for moving the massive tanker that is the u. S. Armys. Now the deputy at the army staff command trail which i applaud. So theyre are some of the right people. It has been a decadelong decadelong effort, if not longer to get some of the right people in place. Like we were just talking about with pakistan, some of the Younger Generation that will stay in the military to effect some change. Part of it is the situation isnt changing. The army this a ministration can wish the world would look differently and want to shift where it wants to shift, but the enemy gets to vote and they are certainly voting right now. It is going to require highly trained, highly skilled alternately attune special operators that are willing and capable and able to live among local National Populations and take a by. One of the disconnects with things going on right now his boots on the ground or know boots on the ground. And i think to a lot of folks boots on the ground means another invasion. We are talking about trainers. Many of us are talking about letting them advise, letting them do. By the way, 3000 american soldiers, american soldiers, do they where boots . They do. How many were there a year ago . 300. So is this like 1963 . At least in 1963 they were able to go out with the south Vietnamese Army and help them. The analogy that i i received the most response to is the football coach. And we have to be able to go to the game. On that note i think you will be willing to sign books available outside