Transcripts For CSPAN2 Book Discussion On Warrior Diplomat 20150201

All for joining us. [applause] youre watching 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books on cspan2s booktv. Television for serious readers. At the new America Foundation. It is my great pleasure to introduce my colleague and friend, mike waltz who has this wonderful book out today warrior diplomat a green berets battles from washington to afghanistan, which really outlines by quite unusual career as both been somebody who is creating a white house with Vice President cheney and also carrying out the policies in the field as a special forces there. Mike also runs a successful business. If the fellow here at the new America Foundation and so he is going to outline kind of the big ideas in some of the interesting stories in the book and then well open it to a question with everyone. Thank you. So, thank you, peter. Thank you for coming out today. Lets take a brief moment and talk about some of the broader Strategic Issues that im trying to address in the book and really underline a lot of my experiences as peter mentioned in the white house looking for Vice President cheney over in the pentagon were working for secretary gates and rumsfeld and as a reserve special forces officer out in the field. So bear with me one moment. Lets take a little bit of a History Lesson back on the war. And where i think weve made some critical mistakes that historians decades from now will look back on. The first is that this strategy never really adjusted as it began growing back in 2001. So we had a very ct focused strategy. A counterterrorism focus targeting taliban leaders. But as that kind of died down and as the Afghan Government stabilized, and what that drove unfortunately was a perennial under resourcing of the war effort. So we found ourselves as violence began to grow in the 2003, 2004 2005 timeframe. We found ourselves chasing the violence rather than putting the resources in. There were some Important Reasons for that, one of which must obviously was the iraq war. I was on the ground and saw been down the resources, whether with helicopters, predator drones what have you come to getting pulled away from the afghan theater over into iraq. But where it really came into play was once the insurgency had reconstituted the taliban and truly reconstituted about 2006 and i came back from my two are back at the pentagon and said hey boss theres nothing to give. We truly were the iraq war and now is not being to commit. As we found ourselves more and more reliant on nato to provide this resource is that we didnt have at that point. That is not a moral statement on the iraq war. Vicious a statement from my days to fight two wars. So that is one. The other kind of critical mistakes looking back a number which i just mentioned is penning the effort over the nato and handing a mission over to nato different way wasnt prepared to do. Nato is in the pentagon and out in the crowd for the lead for security over to nato and the isaf coalition. They frankly thought they were getting into a bagram style there on the ground when the brakes came down when the dutch took over in kandahar and they came prepared to do what they called patrolling unengaging peers strictly in 2006 their political constituencies were prepared to deal with. So they signed up and found themselves in a fullblown counterinsurgency effort. So i write you back quite a bit in the book and being on the ground from French Special forces that didnt have the equipment, didnt have radios, sometimes didnt even have enough ammunition to be with the dutch forces and asking him to work with in the parliament for approval. So if both instituted and promulgated this under resourcing, but then it all so clearly tied our hands to buy enormously complex one with a 42 nation coalition. So three as weve never gotten our arms around it then or now and the sanctuary that they afford and seth jones and others have studies of counterinsurgency is over time and on that they have found have been successful when the insurgent enjoys a sanctuary nextdoor. Or, what i say is probably the most critical was announcing our withdraw years in advance of that control. I was standing in my headquarters in 2009 i think obama gave his speech at west point and in the same speech announced the end of the surge in my Operations Officer standing next to me. Can you imagine Franklin Delano roosevelt announcing dday, but then announcing to the germans into the world that would only last six months to a year. So not a perfect analogy, but one that he threw out and it had immediate effect of the ground. Two weeks later i was up in the mountains meeting with menthol tribe elder a gentleman i had been building a relationship with for the better part of a year. Many, many meetings. Many hours of getting to know each other on a building that relationship and building a level of trust because there is the largest tribe in that part of afghanistan. Due they wanted to work with the Afghan Government and against the Haqqani Network, which is the predominant Insurgent Group in that area and three, we had about 1500 tribal militia well trained, well armed working with us on this new program eventually called ilitch stability operation. Two weeks after the speech of last point by president obama go for the final signing of a commitment with karzai and a very cold reception didnt offer tea. Finally after a few minutes got the bottom of it and said look we always suspected it. Weve seen it in the past, but now your president has said it appeared you were going to abandon us. Con insert going to have tomorrow night and as soon as you do. I tried to kind of talk even though he was announcing the withdrawal of the surge. The nuance was lost. They hurt america misleading. And as centrally detrimental effects in other ways as well. We thought spike after that announcement, kind of get the money out while you can. We saw government officials that weve been gaining traction with Reform Efforts to be less inclined to do so. You know we really frankly were undermined by that policy statement within days within weeks of the announced that. The policies tended to go this direction, immediately on the ground with an operational effort. So, this is how i ended book. The theme that at last may when it was as we were leaving that again working in support and pledge not only to not work with us, the hedging out the Haqqani Network. He said look, until you are your tag your grandchildren, not your children, but your grandchildren Standing Shoulder to shoulder, weve got work to do in this will never work. That commitment or lack thereof runs throughout the book and the signal that sends both to the region, the Afghan Government to the afghan populace and the enemy has really hurt as throughout the war effort. It was whether youre only here for al qaeda for your handyman bastinado for your announcing the surge to bring security, but now your announcing withdrawal. So where does that leave us . Today i think we frankly have, to be very blonde a policy of hope in a lot of assumption. Right now we are just discussing today at the 11 00 lunch so we are assuming the Afghan National army police can stand on its own. I find it difficult to wrap my mind are bound by the National Security forces are going to do alone without our support in the 42 nations, 42 western nations. Personally, i have been hearing not in pentagon briefings in the white house that the Afghan National army would be a lot to stand and operate on its own in 2005, 2007 and now 2009 and 2011 and now by 2014. We are assuming this unity government will hold. As we all know the afghans havent politically, peacefully transitioned. We have a very tenuous situation right now in the same year and at the same time we are announced in frankly almost borderline irresponsible from a policy standpoint. We are also assuming a test of reconciliation talks will address our interests. We are assuming best intentions will continue to rise. I think washington grossly underestimate the contention on the ground right now. Most importantly, we are assuming al qaeda cant innocents already reconstituting in the wake of our withdraw. I just did a q a on fox news and we went through all this and she went through all this and she said mike i got it. Its just why should the American People care . Weve been at this for 10 years. Weve lost thousands of lives. That always scary but why should they care . I think we see now with isis anorak what can happen in the wake of our withdraw. And if that makes you nervous having isis on the doorstep of bag dad having a reconstituted al qaeda on the doorsteps of islamabad should have the petrified. It certainly does me. We can talk about the nuances of the analogy and there is the law, but i think the areas some real issue and i have real issue and i write that in the book. So what is the policy Going Forward and how are we going to get this long war to a better place . A few years ago i gave a talk to a bunch of new congressional staffers that were coming in the wake of the 2012 election and i talked about a country in asia that at one point had a higher Literacy Rate in afghanistan today. No infrastructure certainly no army because its been occupied for the better part of 50 years. And it did indeed have a higher rate than afghanistan does today. Not a perfect analogy. Theres many many smart people in the room that can poke holes in it. But its a great example of a sustained u. S. Engagement can do over the long haul. I argue at the end of the book despite all the things we certainly need to learn, but the sooner we stop attacking ms. An 18 month threeyear for your increment and rapper minds around it, this is a generational, multidecade after is the sooner well be in a better place in the examples of germany, south korea and while not perfect, are examples of what american engagement can do over the long haul. Those are the underpinnings of the book from just kind of a policy and schematic standpoint. What i try to do chapter by chapter as i try to have you experienced them through time in the ground in the white house the pentagon and also of course with the introduction starts with where we are in the black helicopter. We are going after taliban commander. Some of the afghans do not tour, really a bad character where we enter the home and a night raid. The emotional toll that had any impact it had on the Counterinsurgency Campaign in that area, but then flashback with president bush, Vice President cheney and Vice President karzai with the issue they had in the fact that its going to have or not have on afghan wars. Each stir, you know, kind of goes into that type of backandforth trying to look at these issues from all angles. Whether it is pakistan and there we are what do we do but the arsenal, what do we do with the support of the insurgency, but yet we are dependent on it for both air and ground supplies but yet there i have literally getting rocketed from inside Pakistani Military bases and how do we bridge that for the Afghan National party is not ready and will not be ready for at least a generation. Or you know, when i took command, i commanded all of the special forces in southeast and. I had about nine. Our lack of continuity in what we had done. I wrote in another chapter about a patrol that we cannot did outside of bagram airbase. I arrested every Intelligence Officer i could find. This is in 2005. To just talk to me about who had been there before for the United States, who did they talk to what coalition efforts. We knew there had been development at first. All i could find was target tactics and targeting some of the taliban leaders. So i titled that chapter that is what we were doing. We were up in the area to figure that stuff out. Ran into ambushes. And afghan sergeant that i came very close to was killed died in my arms and im still taking care of his family today. That sacrifice i would like to think was worth the information we gather but im not confident that went into some types of repository that others can learn from. I know it did because i looked for it on my next tour and it was gone. We just didnt do a great job. I talked to a number of those issues in each chapter. I also try to address i think the fundamentals the army has yet to deal with. You know one is the layer of bureaucracy is we had to go through. One chapter i write about the 12 approvals we had to have two go after the taliban commander and i literally had an elder on the phone a proud old man that we had a great relationship with interiors because the haqqani commander that threatened his life was next door. I couldnt come get him offer the approvals to go out down the road. We ended up not only boosting that elder pitt lost his son and we lost the village because we couldnt get out. Still looking not at from a different is we have all heard about the negative of not direct action or nitrates are about of positives and negatives or inaction as well. I also look at the overall issue of risk aversion that we found. You know, one of the issues i dont think we fully wrapped her mind around was the first and longest war in our history that we thought was an all volunteer force. Not the first, but certainly the longest. We need to look at what it does. In previous wars, coming out of the draft, you are in it to win it. Youll pulled out of their lives, whether as a lawyer farmer or what have you in your sent to the war and you have every incentive to take every risk possible so you could come back to your life. Now, a tourist a oneyear blip on an otherwise promising military career and the incentives often became dont mess anything up. Dont get a face of a run. Dont take too many casualties. Dont lose too many sensitive items, what have you. The default reaction in any gray area he came inaction. I say that carefully because i never want to disparage anyones motivations or service anyones motivations are servicing the countries. Its more of a fundamental issue that we havent started to deal with and we felt that risk aversion yet permeated and a number ways. The perfect example. We were on the pakistani border. 18 soldiers from the foot to if you see the review of survivor for the navy seals were killed and the one was captured. The mans unit out conducting reconnaissance. After that able came down that the individual soldiers. That makes sense. After the fire base was not overrun in 2008 another unit came down the last than 14 u. S. Soldiers. You can now do the math. This platoon had 18 soldiers. They couldnt necessarily leave their base because they wouldnt have enough. They couldnt go out because they wouldnt have enough patrol. They ended up having reinforcement every time they wanted to go down to the farmer the taliban were openly harassing. A girls school in the village would think about the signal backside. Military platoons ran at the top of the hill in this large down shops. A girls school and every time i saw helicopter come in they need the americans are coming out. Guess weve got to ambush. It is kind of those tactical and operational permissions of the risk aversion that comes from the fundamental issues we tried to address. Theres a little bit a manner for lawyers and rules of engagements and law of land warfare. There were a number of instances that anyone who has had to fight in this type of war or had to deal with didnt make it any easier on me. There is a certain one where mortar rounds started coming into our position and we saw them walking in. One of my snipers finally found who was calling my name. A nine 10yearold little boy on the hill with binoculars and a cell phone. No weapons. But every time he raised his cell phone we saw another round come in. Hes looking at me with a hey sarah, what do we do . Make the call. It splashed rocks on the kids from cover, but he came back out with binoculars, racist cell phones and another round came in and wanted the afghans. I am clear. But i still make a decision to keep putting mornings around the kid and tell it slant. Who knows that the taliban had a gun to his families had. What the situation was but that was a call that i made at that time about was it right or wrong. I think it was right. What i feel right about explaining that to the family of the man who was killed by a mortar round. So i want to bring those types of experience is to the american reader as well. Aside from the broader policy issues. Just a few other things and how we move forward today we are about 13 years into 70 80, 90 100 yearlong efforts. And at the end of the day and that is by far the hardest thing and it would seem that now with the adulation after we build Osama Bin Laden but the idea of extremism has survived and it will take a long time to undermine not. One of the things that i think we are doing right is made a moderate era of coalition. This is the first time weve done it. One of our key partners there, the United Arab Emirate has been there with us. Theyve been with us in bosnia, afghanistan. Theyre with us in the intervention in libya and to have partners like that, i sat on the ground in several chapters of the book in southern afghanistan and just to put a face on this, to have an american officer standing next to an arab officer, talking to groups of afghan and to have the arabs say this is not the way. Look at dubai. There is a better path for you and your children to still be followers of islam. Look at what the United States did for germany. Immediately undermining the ideology and frankly the ignorance of the taliban was worth the time that the u. S. Soldiers. The other piece i became very passionate about his womens empowerment. We need to take that out of this feelgood humanitarian realm and put it in the National Security round. No ideology and i think the u. S. The Nobel Peace Committee but they got that would write and i about fell out of my chair. If you think im brave or any of our soldiers are brave that little girl is brave. Those of the Women Leaders we need to empower and really put the full force of our government. The issue of our veterans and the impact its having on us particularly if you buy into a multidecade or multigenerational effort. It truly is having a detrimental effect and that doesnt mean we are not ready. We dont need sympathy. What we mean is probably some support anomalous kind of Technical Assistance of how do we train late these skills that were locked away into the private sector going to the next light. But most of all its an all volunteer force as i was saying earlier. But the families kind of good drug long and they have to live with the consequences are bad. If we dont come home and often when we do come home, its really the families that are suffering we wouldnt have the military today without their support. One of the things i want to make sure everyone is aware of his 100 of the process for book sales for the green beret foundation. And i think ill stop with that. Thankthank you very much. [applause] you really get a sense of the big policy questions and also your experience on the ground and how they cannot. So you know, when i had your presentation this kind of the big question here about the United States, because i think it was a big tension between the United States, which as we basically were created trying to escape from an empire and therefore we have a natural aversion to the building and the fact that the counterinsurgency like afghanistan, you know, nine months or a year none of that makes any sense. So theres a big question, which is to the United States have the political will to do these types of things required to actually win but at least manage the situation so that afghanistan has a reasonable glidepath . So i would answer that in two parts. Guess we do have the will, but we need our leadership to begin explaining why someone poured in. Ill ask you, when is the last time obama mentioned afghanistan. And really begin making the case in the campaign and i was thrilled to hear it and make the case of why we need to make this investment in why this is our National Security interest. You go back and mock. If president truman or president eisenhower had announced that will have 30,000 voters in south korea for 70 years, that probably wouldve been a little bit difficult to swallow. Let me ask you another question because you and i completely agree that afghanistan. It seems to me the other piece i think we take a lot of things for granted. The world has enjoyed a fungus. In the history of the world and a lot of that is because the overlay frankly of American Military power, whether its keeping pirates at bay. Somalia, the suez canal, the fact that we can go to a gas station that we can go to mcdonalds and order off the dollar menu and enjoy the benefits of free trade. Theyve come from our projection of power and in my view we are seeing the consequences of when we turned our back and look inward. Name a Success Story right now the Foreign Policy realm. Weve kind of seeing the wheels come off the bus and moniker stability is overlaid. You know, it goes to the fundamental question of american engagement is no harm than good. I would offer its fantastic not to say we havent made a number of mistakes along the way. So i could imagine Hillary Clinton or candidate jeb bush both putting in their platforms, going 20 and 2016 is also a smart idea. The republicans and what they would be happy with. We have negotiated 2024. A lot of effort was put into that. So i think that the policy clearly mentioned in your presentation, 79 and arrived. That is the talk i gave in 220 tawdry bunch of congressional staffers and made the case for a multidecade after it about a halfdozen staffers thought out of the room. When i checked later almost all of them were republicans. This issue of americans will Going Forward to the American People have the will for a quiet what are the cost benefits . I think its on both sides of the aisle. Debate about 2009. You know there was one option there was a group trying to think through. One of the ideas we came up was go like but go along. At the end of the day, they dont care if its 21,000 or 15,000 they want to hear that her grandchildren are with them. Its going to be a long time commitment. There is a sort of minimum number below which doesnt make any sense. Has been a number of studies. Look at what we need to do. We need to continue our Counterterrorism Campaign and to the pakistani lawless tribal regions in the fosse. We need to continue mentoring and training the Afghan National army and the police. But the army has a priority. We have folks that such a high level that if the trees are falling in the forest so to speak i dont think we have the visibility to know you cannot. Silly to push those background. You add data appeared at the Interactive Team to 20000, which up until 2007 is where we were. It was interesting though, they thought they were getting a peacekeeping mission. You mentioned the Term National caveats. Can you just explain what that meant . So at that time there were 42 nations in the nato isaf coalition in each had its own rules of engagement, it clearance process. They all reported to the commander that they also had their own National Officers are reported back to kind of overripe yang senate just created back in each one being assigned a specific province had not been able to move a shift in rainforests. The germans didnt fly at night. So what other examples spring to mind quiet well, the dutch could not embark on extensive operations. For instance we wanted them to pull Security Force and sniper teams that we had out with the operation potentially having to go back to their parliament for permission. Demand that controls problems. You know come you go to war with the coalition you have. Even before those caveats, would it be better to have 42 people in the tent. It kind of reached a tipping point. We became almost as fast i would say was getting more members of the coalition. I read in the book at one point i was visiting and i talked to a group of surgeons. We have 36 u. S. Soldiers training 24 nader mentors to go mentor the afghans because they came unprepared. I think we really underestimated the level of atrophied that natos military, you know, experienced after the end of the cold war. Number one. Number two, nader was designed to be territorial homeland defense. Theres now a few things that we take for granted to move made sense, supplies and refueling to the expeditionary area environment. They were in one of the most complex environments in the world that their government hadnt fully signed up to do. It was not only the military dimension of chorus, but the huge aid organization, the dutch and all these Companies Come in and. That they had a pretty good projection. They do. But what you have to have that in the field is a very Close Military civilian organizations and often let to the e. U. To do a lot of the advisory and other things. So you didnt have what you often wanted. I think here at the end of the day, yes theres benefits of having a political coalition. But we have to be very clear about what they can do on the ground from a political will standpoint, but also from a military capability. How would you assess how the coalition is doing right now . We are in a coalition, but the other piece is the proportionality of american leadership. Right now we have a heavily americanled coalition. They have arab partners to make standpoint and from a broader strategic standpoint, but down on the ground it can almost work against you. The issue of the casualties kind of really tightened up the rules of engagement. Were you there on the ground . You know, i think he really was it a sort of miscommunicated in the way that people on the ground in a sense it made them overly riskaverse . It needed to swing. When i was there in 2006 often times we would getting gauged by some relatively small insurgent elements and colony air force. It was too heavyhanded. Part of that is how few forces we had on the ground how isolated they were. Part of it was we needed a shift from a counterterrorism focus to a counterinsurgency population. The pendulum so went too far. General mcchrystal i think was right to enter what he did here the problem was then the next layer of command, each layer of command he went down and were more and more cautious. They won in the crystal singer in their boss boss chest. So it overinterpreted and really tied her hands so in situations where the really did need support and you saw from the medal of honor winner, what have you, in the middle of firefights was frankly egregious. It was an overreaction. Petraeus try to kind of break the pendulum when he came in the general mcchrystal did not the opportunity, but it did swing too far. That part of the world, people respect strength and when they see the taliban and insurgent and haqqanis pushing and pushing their limits and constantly attacking the basis of what have you and you see a very tepid response because of the bureaucratic wrangling, it sent the message. You have reasons why afghanistan a lot of things have to go right. But you know what is going right . I think a lot of americans listening perhaps on cspan. I think they tend to bracket iraq and afghanistan together. The civilian casualty rates in the fact is he spent a lot of time in afghanistan. What has gone right . All of the things that have gone wrong. My intent here was lets learn from the lessons in the book in the last 10 years looking at the different angles that works in for the next however many years. That doesnt mean we didnt do a lot of things right. I mentioned the education, which was just nonexistent in the early days of the war. And you know my company now works with a number of womenowned is missing from afghanistan that you just wouldnt have even seen in five years. The economy broadly speaking and they should get a lot of credit for this for stabilizing the currency for such a wartorn country has been okay. I hope it survives the withdraw of donor funding. One of the reasons im so passionate about sending a longterm message that we are invested in afghanistan it is in our National Security interests and that we are not going to abandon it to come in and to exploit not exploit but work with the afghan to take advantage of the Many National resources that they have, that we are seeing the chinese and russians already moving to. From a security standpoint, we were starting to really get things right when we took what i call my drive the special forces, Army Special Forces green berets specialize in and working with indigenous with indigenous forces, putting them into the village and putting them into tribal areas and asked for our support. We were truly seen the benefits they are. The Afghan National army. But we have to give it time. Well, they are taking a lot of casualties. I think that people in washington a year ago how did the army do most people would say its a complete catastrophe. That seems to be basically wrong. In fairness to the iraqi army, folks who are following closely were lucky not to violence and the casualties for the last two and a half three years. They did finally collapse. I am worried. We just saw base overrun. One of the bases down there bagram, named after one of my soldiers that was killed there and its now been threatened by the taliban overrun. I am worried we are beginning to see those initial indicators that we saw two years ago. One final question. You know, how men had a huge amount a lot of americans embrace tight. Did that make any sense . The whole point of counterinsurgency is to protect the population living in holman. Why did we do that . How men made sense from the fact that helmand river is a virtual highway into kandahar. Should we have focused on kandahar city first . Absolutely. I think the team is often not happen for political reasons having to do with the braids and then with the marine corps wanting to have their own. Were they trying to beat germany by attacking austria first . If you have a question can you wait for the microphone and identify yourself . Gentlemen . Hi, i am with the voice of america services. I have two questions. One question, two parts. The first one is pakistan. They are not interested in having a Foreign Policy towards afghanistan. The civilian government is one thing and the government has no power over the military. What can the United States, kind of a broad question, but what should the United States do to is the military because at the beginning the United States had 1. 6 billion to pakistan and over half of that was the same military funding haqqani and the other Afghan Taliban had. What can the United States do to prevent the military . The second question is what natos new Mission Starts in a month. The main purpose of that mission is to train afghans. Would you consider this new masthead for lack of a better word, a failed strategy . Because training afghans is not going to defeat the enemy. It is just going to create more soldiers because afghans are there to make money to bring food home. But for taliban, they are willing to die. I know a lot of afghan families and the first thing they say about their child as they say that was the only breadmaker at home. So they are in the army to make money, not to fight. It is pretty clear. Supporting the families of the afghan soldiers. Not only do you lose a husband and a father you lose your only breadwinner. So what would you suggest for new Nato Missions in afghanistan . How should they approach the training . Two easy questions. The first time pakistan, you know, from one perspective yes, i hear you. Pakistan cares about its own interests like any country does. You know, again i know i sound like a bit of a broken record. We saw a shift on the ground with pakistan when we did the whole shift over to nato. It became very clear at least in off the record discussions that this was the beginning of the eventual u. S. With draw. Thats not making an excuse but just looking at the afghan viewpoint that theyll be left holding the service be that they viewed afghanistan and they will work for the proxy. We all know that working through surrogates enterococci is part of pakistan policy. What do we do about it . One, i think we need to reload the issue of our voluntary support to the Pakistani Military. But we have to be very careful. I sat in many, many of these debates. Are we truly prepared to one but pakistan become destabilized given its arsenal, or two make an enemy of pakistan. How far down that path do we really go . Every time we did from a policy standpoint, it got so scary in many ways that we pulled back and continue trying to change the behavior. So in my view their Nuclear Arsenal is the key. We have to be very careful about how far we let this get destabilized. As we are providing funds are we providing funds to buy morte to face india or to help them one. In two, as we shift there, we try to work with pakistanis to ship towards focusing on this extremist problem that is now threatening pack in as well. I think we have to think about whether we are willing to accept the pakistanis being more reliant underneath where arsenal now visavis india. So it is a broader is such a broader regional patterns that i think the United States needs to figure out what its priorities are. I agree with you. I agree with where youre going. It is kind of like doing training only. Its kind of like telling the coaches of a Football Team you can only go with your team to crack this. Once you go for the big game you have to wave goodbye. We need to do the right thing, which means going out with them conducting operations to also facilitate the enablers the medevac air support, all of the other things take our time. On pakistan we had an off the record discussion with general sharif new head of the Pakistani Military. He had come to washington. If you look at the relations in 2011 they kind of have come a long way. And the border incident, but things seem to be a lot more normalized. I think the Pakistani Military operation in waziristan, something the United States has been wanted to do for a long time. What is your assessment on how that operation has gone . The operation is advertised months in advance and theres a lot of speculation about why that was advertised and talking to folks on the ground and kind of saw a shift of the Haqqani Network out of the area of operations up into the northern parts. So there are many folks who believe, and im not sure where i am on this. I think its more complicated. This is a very very example for the military wanted to do the operation in the civilian government was saying hey wait a minute clearly were never going to go anywhere. But if youre a civilian leader you want to sort of show we did everything we could. In fairness, there is a growing chorus within pakistan. We cant control this thing anymore. I dont think we go that far with the military writ large in the Senior Leaders to change the usefulness of using proxies. I do think there is a growing chorus among its junior officers. But again, what does it mean quiet that generation continues to progress. The new president went to pakistan. As the general sharif the pakistani chief of army staff seems to be like karzai was enormously critical of two countries. You are not hearing which is a pretty unhelpful way. So i think theyve faced this issue a grade on every cabinet position. They are both pretty savvy people. If it does not work, this whole thing goes south. And they realize that. I think we have two very reasonable welleducated decent men in those positions. Its almost like having that romney and barack obama in the same white house. Im not worried about them so much. I am worried about a secondary and tertiary warlords behind them that are going to lose patience at some point and are already beginning to hatch and do things better and helpful. I dont think time is on our side, but im still trying to be optimistic. Yesterday the u. S. State carbon released a specific at his very same u. S. Personnel should go anywhere in kabul. Is this the taliban trying to show really have been mostly soft targets essentially . From jalalabad to homeland on tran home and in the east, you see a pretty concerted push. I am praying that we can do a new set of ministers and really get to responsible government in place before what i expect to at the New York Times did say the Obama Administration seems to have changed the rules in terms of actually letting americans get involved . In fairness, it is letting us provide air support again on the ground, which had been essentially turned off by both president karzai in the administration. So that is turned back on with just a positive. In order to use back, which is what we see in iraq right now we are not dropping a lot of bombs are doing a lot of things on the ground as he made those tactically out with. Tell us what is really happening on the ground. In terms of what we are drawing down, but sure all special forces. They are all gone . There are pulled back. They do what is kind of what is known as the village overwatch, when they go out and visit the local afghan local police, but many are recruited chaco militia appeared in my view that is the worst of both worlds. Either dont have that type of program with all of the inherent risks that come with that. Or youre out there what is going on to create this kind of force and not have the oversight that we bring is really dangerous. So that is one. And two all of her advisers have been pulled up to the level. Anyone who has served in the military knows that a commander doesnt know what is going on. Conventional nsf . That is acrosstheboard conventional. We still have special forces as commandos which go out into offensive operations but the afghans. What they been open to questions. Hi, thank you for your service. Gerber, georgetown university. The media in the American Government and observers and never one referred counterterrorism and counterinsurgency often without making distinctions about what they are. Dealing with an insurgency requires different kinds of skills and deployments and so forth than terrorism. Yet our government, for its come has counterterrorism centers. I dont know of any counter insurgencies. Iraq now we are confronting the islamic state. The president was clear when he made his statement that we will degrade and destroy isis. Those were the very words he used. And that clearly would indicate a recognition that isis is an insurgency, not a terrorist organization, although it uses terrorist tactics. What kind of confidence do you have that the president and the u. S. Government is committed to the longterm effects longterm requirements of confronting an insurgency . Certainly it has garnered some coalition but it hasnt deployed the kind of forces, like for instance the airstrike personnel. Do you think its realistic what the president said about degrade and is right . You know ill go back to my analogy is with the cold war with our efforts against communism. You know, if you look at the end of the day over the course of history, people who are disenfranchised, let you dont have opportunity that does see a better path for their children have gravitated towards some type of movement, whether it was socialism communism, that they feel gives them a mechanism to address those grievances. At the same time you have people who use and abuse those movements. It is all about power and neither maintaining power or seeking power. So taking a very macro view the islamic Extremist Movement is an insurgency to some degree against either the monarchies are what they see in western liberal society or the kind of abusive government if you want to really drill down that they have grievances against. And i take the point. Spirit so it didnt last very long. It expired when the soviet union expired and im sure there are still communist professors somewhere. It is a tough position. So it was very tied to the Actual Experience of the soviet union and the fact they just did it to deliver automatically. That was the biggest sort of variable. So, the ideology that fuels isis also claims that it is a sort of centric ideology. Its harder to manage or hope that. So sketch out a future that could go on for a hundred years. They trot out of the war and this is something that could go on for a while. About what would be ed you explain what it looks like but how do we get there because yes i think to the gentleman critiquing where the administration is also the fact that there is an element. Adult can we do and how do we hasten that in our government has a lot of this because we talked about it in a meaningful way. So you were advising the president in 2017. What would you say . There needs to be a few components. Some of it is looking at our way into saying we are not organized as a government to really conduct this type of effort and to put it oversimplistic that the scales that we need whether they are Border Patrol agents or Police Advisers or what have you in the civilian agencies and the ability to update and a stable space in the military so you have the last 14 or 15 years tossing back and forth about the platoon leaders trying to figure out how to be the town ayers and then we are reaching out and we need to help iraq or afghanistan control its borders. Last time i checked it is in expeditionary. So we have made attempts to do that whether it is the prt or whether its the office in the state department this is a response board, so we need to look at kind of a broad effort that we essentially take a stability approach to many of these areas and then we can talk about how do we prioritize. Number two is countries like the uae, countries like turkey really need to be the key partners in this and i tried to get that anecdote in the buck. I just cant overstate how powerful that message is coming from the elements that can say and do things toward the ideology whether they are sitting down with a group and really exploiting to them how they are different. So there needs to be a coalition element in the whole of government element in the organization on the joint is across the inter agency to be able to address it and then there is a political dimension in terms of wrapping their minds around the fact that this is going to be a longterm effort and the International Interest to begin giving it much like we had in the 50s and 60s. I get it there are many in perfect elements about an allergy in the cold war and communism, but i think there is a lot of commonality that they say okay that puts us 70 years in the deepest effort and while we dont have the soviet union that is kind of the big enemy these are nonstate actors but we have certain states that have been more responsible than others. I think the analogy of any proportion in this country is almost without exception. Very few Fund Abortion clinics. So we have to be careful about how we identify that. I served a very short time as a civilian advisor during 2010 2011. On the Economic Development side i would like to hear your comments on the shift from the top down approach to Economic Development where we spend billions and i had to sit next to the consultant during the collapse where our taxpayer assets went to buy properties and western institutions come of it is banks probably wont exist in afghanistan in the longterm. The u. S. Treasury position we needed them to adhere to basel number two or number three but thats never going to happen so where is the bright spot on the horizon for the bottomup Economic Development and how are women in a part of that change in your view class and had the opportunity to really work with the afghan private sector but ive never come across a more Entrepreneurial Society and i have worked and lived all over the world. They will truly make their own future for themselves it is just getting a little help so i think part of it is both women and men in the private sector. Theres a lot of folks looking for the investment dollars but they needed the basic things. What does every investor wants predictability and frankly in a lot of these conferences they would come to me or i see charlie from the Commerce Department saying what is the United States going to do . Are we going to turn out the lights this is a few years ago when there were these constant questions. So to answer the question more specifically through the private sector, there is enormous opportunity. The topdown bottomup, we struggled with that. It was one of the biggest components of putting the funds through the afghan ministries under the kind of of guy if both we will never develop capacity if we are always going around this and at the same time, we have to be responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars and we want to get to where it is going to make the most impact as fast as possible so we have the prt method to do that. Does there need to be in a balance of both . Pretty much like in anything. They have the National Solidarity program that is on a local basis and that seems to be it hasnt cost a great deal of money no matter what we put in that is that a success . It was a success and again i worked with members all the way up. But success are relatively single. We broke up for elite special forces unit that was distorting the National Solidarity program and the host in 29 and 2010 and everyone said this every once if this is a program that basically lets or elects the local that are authorized to receive the funds and then basically help them make decisions on where the dollars are going rather than folks trying to make those decisions but what happened is they literally had a gun to their head said get it done or else. So i know a lot of money remarks were very security focused but whether it is the private sector over better Government Security is just the oxygen in those efforts. It was basically a 1 billiondollar robbery. But the administration is now handing down some stiff prison sentences. I think that it is absolutely right. I have spent years of my life frankly undermining the booth in the state department that wanted to make the eradication where we are actually spraying the very people we were trying to win over. I do push for more of an interdiction strategy just a handful of these most notorious it sends the signal to your people and the right signal to them in Peace Networks and i think that it will really cut down some of this behavior so i applaud them for that. A good afternoon gentlemen. Im from third group and i have a bit of experience in iraq and afghanistan and from every deployment i seemed what you said it struck me most is that the risk aversion is probably the biggest problem. I was wondering if from your experience are people aware of this and for what it means for the Company Level and below tax you will read a chapter in their there where at that time the assistant secretary and now the undersecretary for security came out and visited the teams and i walked them through the problems going on and you should have seen the death stare as i was getting from the kernels but having been the advisor at one point i knew she wanted to get some truth and he knew i was going to give it to him and really make them aware of these layers that had accumulated and as i was saying each one was put in place for good reason. It makes sense in isolation. I was in the pentagon when he first complained about my grades to secretary rumsfeld and the commander at the time then said every time we go after a taliban commander i have to come to a threestar level for approval you can imagine what that data so the answer is mixed. Sometimes they are aware and sometimes it is done on purpose and in that case he wanted to come to his level to test down the numbers that were going on and the sometimes they just are not aware and there is a reluctance for the civilian policymakers who are going out to begin at 700,000mile screwdriver to begin questioning into changing how we conduct things. It is a tough problem. So the bin laden raid was realtime by that chief and its really the first time in history that a tactical operation was being seen in realtime by the commanderinchief. But not back here. But obviously the technology exists for the president or anybody in this cabinet to be micromanaging what you adopt into the operation you do in the field. So how does that change things . That changed a lot of things. We had a lot of discussions. And the effect that had on the modern warfare its a risk to answer your question further at the risk aversion seeped into the career force rather than all volunteer force because now we have folks that are focused on one spot in the career and then between technology that literally allows things to be managed from afar i patted him to me and im sure you have as well it plays a huge role and its one of the reasons i take a prince to flip that around this notion that we often hear in the media that our special forces that are out there kicking in doors or dropping missiles from predator drones at the flip of a switch there is an elaborate process with lawyers at every level standing at the shoulder with a series of crete here you whether we can take the shot or go on that raid. To the point that i argued close to the veteran today our hands were tied and our inactions often have greater consequences. I had a little bit of time in afghanistan and have been part of the guerrilla insurgency along with your community and a few others for a few decades now that have tried to fight the battle inside of the policy realms in the beltway and the combat and commands. What would you offer as advice clicks i would fix the policy. When we woke up in this universe this morning where we have representatives from the joint staff and dod advertising the Afghan National Security Forces and police are going to be able to take care of this problem and at the same time we are sitting here listening to you introduce your book and all the things we know about the reality we have a severe policy disconnect so what would you offer advice on how to fix that and dont just say vote for the right people. Signal and a direction in some ways is the way that it should work. The Strategic Direction by the commanderinchief the military showed any large degree and the civilians should be in line with that but theres some fundamental issues in the army itself also at play regardless of who gets elected and appointed that the army in particular still wants to fight big wars and this is getting into a conversation with the militaryindustrial complex that involves Big Equipment and objects that an employee a lot of people in factories. Counterinsurgency doesnt have a constituency. It doesnt require special forces are a special percentage. Of the army that special forces are like three or 4 . It is very inexpensive. So obviously there are some very bright people who tried to retain the lessons learned. Do you think they are doing an okay job . If you look at the Strategic Vision that it just released there was an important step in that direction. Grail for moving to tinker that is the u. S. Army is the doctrine which i applaud it. Its been a decade effort to get the right people in place and again its not talking about just in some of the Younger Generation that stays in the military to effect change rising up and part of it is the world situation ends up changing. The army come of this administration can wish the world to look different but the end he gets the vote thats going to require highly trained, highly skilled culturally attuned special operators that are willing and capable and able to live among the local populations. One of the disconnects of things going on right now if iraq is boots on the ground were no boots on the ground and that means a lot of divisions rolling through and we are talking about letting them advise and do what they are trying to do. How many were there a year ago . So is this 1963 fax at least 1963 theyve are able to go out in the south vietnamese army. The analogy that ive received the most response to is the football coach. We have to be able to go to the game. Lets get a big round of applause. [applause] and he will be willing to sign books that are available outside so thank you all for coming