Ill leave that question hanging there, i think. [laughter] [inaudible conversations] did we get anything right . Um, well, i think that what did the get right in the middle east, well, lets just try and end on a happier note. I hope this doesnt sound frivolous, you know, but there is this, there is this earlier history of a welcome, benign presence of United States in the middle east, you know . The era which saw the creation of institutions. Fine, important institutions like the American University of beirut. [inaudible] excuse me . [inaudible] a lot of good stuff. Well, its and i think, you know, its worth remembering that moment. And i refer anybody here who isnt familiar with the work of medici to a historian of that relationship at Rice University to his work. Its a really fascinating moment that is less known than it should. And on that somewhat e evasive response [laughter] ill say thank you very much for your questions. [applause] for more information, visit the authors web site, americasgreatgame. Com. Booktv continues. Marwan muasher, former Jordanian Foreign minister and ambassador to the u. S. , takes a critical look at the arab spring and argues that for arab countries to prosper, they must embrace pluralism. This is about an hour. [applause] thank you very much. Its always a pleasure to be at the carnegie council. This book has a very simple message, you know . Secondary wrap awakening and the arab awakening and the battle for pluralism. You think it should be selfevident, and yet it is not. In the arab uprisings that have started and are still ongoing three years later, the word pralism does not appear anywhere in the lexicon of those who have revolted against old regimes. Weve heard about social justice, dignity, but no one yet is talking seriously about the process that would put in place the foundations for a democratic, for a pluralistic system that would be sustained, stable and process rouse. Prosperous. I call it the secondary wrap awakening because, of course, there was a first arab awakening, an intellectual movement that started in the maybe mid 19th century by intellectuals in many maces in the arab world that today are witnessing the same turmoils, this lebanon, in syria, in tunisia. And that movement was calling for the arab world to get rid both, first, of ottoman rule, then colonial rule. Later found its way into popular movements all across the arab world that called for ip fence and in the independence and in the end was successful in achieving it. The secondary wrap awakening second arab awakening have not been contextualized, if you will, into any kind of an intellectual framework. So that today we know more about what the movements were against than what they are for. Nobody has done that in a very convincing manner. And, therefore, what we have seen so far with the second arab awakening in contrast with the first which was battle for independence, the first arab awakenings main shortcoming, in my opinion, is that it has battled for independence against this public rule and against [inaudible] once independence was achieved, no arab government, secular or well, they were not religious then no arab government, progressive or conservative, truly gave pluralism and democracy any attention. No effort was done to that ability was artificially induced by autocratic governments that, basically, had alit on, you know, societys aspirations for democracy and pluralistic rule. Once that weight was lifted, it is natural in the course of three short years, it is natural to see what we are seeing today. And, therefore, i think there is no movement in history, no transto have missional process that transformational process that took lace in, you know, a short that took place in, you know, a short three years. We tend to forget that countries like germany were a dictatorship until 1945. Spain and portugal did not achieve democracy until the late 70s, early 80s. Countries of Eastern Europe did not achieve democracy, some of them, probably not until today. And the list goes on. No one should expect in a region that as was said did not experience a culture of democracy, no one should expect such democracy to really emerge in the course of three short years. So i would my first message is to exercise patience. People were too fast to call it an arab spring three years ago, and people are too fast to call it an arab inferno or an arab winter. We are first witnessing the we are still witnessing the first page in a very long book along the way to democracy. And that does not insure, of course, that all countries of the arab world are going to end up with stable and process produce cultures. It is also wrong to treat the arab world as monolithic. We will see some countries succeed, we will see others fail, and we will see yet others struggle in the process. But there are some trends that we can already see. Some of them certainly negative, but amongst the negative developments in the arab world today, there are also some positive trends that we can already discern that are being ignored as people are more focused on the negative developments in the arab world today. What concerns me most negatively at this stage is that so far in many countries of, that have undergone transitions, it is still a zero sum game between the secular and the religious elements. Both forces are in some countries, not all, particularly in egypt secular and religious forces are engaged in a winnertakeall battle where if the religious forces come to power, they behave in an exclusionist manner as they have done in egypt last year with the, you know, development of a constitution that did not enjoy consensus among all forces in society. But we are also seeing Secular Forces once they come to power, you know, engage in the same exclusionist policies that they accused the islamists of doing before them. And so far as the arab world is seen as a battle between secular and religious elements, so far as it is seen as a zero sum game, the sum will be zero, in my view. If both forces do not work maybe not together, but at least for the development of a Pluralistic Society in which they push for the right for themselves to operate, but for others to operate as well, unless they are able to do so, they will stay engaged in an exclusionist discourse, and what we will see is the replacement of one dictator or one set of dictators by another and no more than that. There is a notable exception that no one talks about in the arab world today that, in my view, has the potential of being a model that many other countries can use on their way to a smooth transition to democracy. And that is tunisia. Tunisia today has not been engaged in the same kind of exclusionist policies that we have seen among other arab countries in the region. As we speak, tunisians are probably voting today or maybe tomorrow as we speak on a new constitution. A constitution that has been arrived at by consensus, including all forces in society, religious and secular, a constitution so forwardlooking that it is not just the best constitution in the arab world, but probably among, you know, many other countries of the world, a constitution that upholds the right to free expression, the right to free belief or no belief, a first in the arab world, full parity between men and women, full prevention of any, any force to to operate so a peaceful rotation of power at all times, etc. , etc. They have engaged in they have had a Coalition Government for the last three years in which no, you know, even if the islamists won a plurality, they did not rule alone and were engaged with others in governing the country. And no interference, no interference by the army. That is a model, in my view, that holds a lot of promise for the rest of the arab world. If elections are held in tunisia today, the islamists will lose. To a cohesion of secular force coalition of Secular Forces. It does not mean that they will vanish, but it will mean that they will lose their plurality. That they enjoyed over the last three years. And it would with the first time in the arab world of an islamist government coming to power and leaving by the ballot box. Not through military intervention. And that is going to send huge waves across the arab world, particularly in countries that have not undergone transition and have been preaching, you know, that if the islamists come the power, they will never leave and, therefore, they are the better of or the lesser of two evils. The second very important lesson that we can discern from the arab awakenings that have took place so far is the loss of holiness that the the islamists have enjoyed for the last 50 or 60 years. Arab governments have, basically, prevented islamists from coming to power artificially, artificially, have bound them in most of the arab world. And be as a result, when people were not satisfied with systems that did not have any, you know, systems of checks and balances, the islamists were the only protest they could go to. And the islamists on their hand were able to promise many, you know, many issues to the general public without having to put these promises to the test, because they were outside the system and did not have to prove what they were promising. In three short years after the islamists came to power in egypt and tunisia, in three short years, the islamists lost more support than arab governments hoped they would through their exclusion over the last 50 or 60 years. And today islam is the solution which was the popular slogan of islamists, today it means far less not just in egypt, but across the arab world than it has meant in the last 50 years. And that is my second point, and the book also talks about this because i show [inaudible] particularly in egypt that show that even show the egyptian public, and i would claim the arab public as well, is conservative and religious, the same public does not want its government to dictate to it how to be conservative and religious. The public wants its government to worry about the economy. Basically. 70 of egyptians want their government to worry about the economy. 2 want their government to worry about ideological issues. And that has been, of course, proved in egypt when the same hick that brought the islam public that brought the islamists to power two years ago went to the streets in large numbers to protest against the policies. If that is not a message for inclusion and pluralism, i dont know what is. And that is a message i think that also is extremely important to the rest of the arab world. Not everything, of course, is rosy. One very worrisome issue is the life of sectarianism in the arab world and sectarian politics. Particularly in the eastern part of the arab world in countries like syria, lebanon, iraq. Not yet jordan, and i hope it stays away from it. These are all countries that were artificially created through the agreement in 1916. But more importantly, since 1916 none of these countries put any energy in developing a ru sense of a true sense of a national identity. Not a panarab identity, but a syrian identity, a remember nice identity, an iraqi identity that would trump all these subentities whether they are ethnic or religious. And today these countries are paying the price. Lebanon has paid the price multiple times over. Iraq is paying the rice and, of course paying the price and, of course, syria is paying it most horrificically because of that. That is less of a problem in the maghreb. In egypt egyptians have thought of themselves as such a long time before their modern nationstate was created. They are more homogeneous societies in egypt, tunisia, for example, and that is why, in my view, i think such countries have a better chance of making it maybe after they go through, you know, few iterations in which forces would, as i said, attempt to rule exclusively and find out that that is not going to be a sustainable path towards prosperity and stability. But in a place like egypt, it might take it 10, 15 years, but in my view after that period egypt stands a very good chance of making it to a stable and prosperous society. Thats not the case in syria. Im very worried about countries like syria where the sectarian issue and radicalism really has meant that it might take decades before, you know, we arrive at a stable and prosperous situation. The book talks about what the arab world needs to develop to move from awake ping to pluralism awakening to pluralism. Because awakening in itself is incomplete as arab world has found out with the first one. What does it mean to move from awakening to pluralism . And i talk about at least four elements that, in my view, are essential if we are to do that. Politically, the arab world must work for power sharing and a peaceful rotation of power among all Political Forces. Any country, particularly those that have not undergone transition, cannot talk of a serious political reform process if it does not include power sharing, if it does not include the strengthening of the judicial and the logistic branches at the expense of the executive so that we truly have a system of checks and balances where abuses can be institutionally addressed. And where no power can really dominate as is the case in the arab world today. No power can dominate over any other. Economically, the host important move the most important move, in my view, in the arab world is to do away with the system that has governed, the economy that has governed most of the arab world. In oilproducing countries, the system has meant that, you know, with money literally growing on the ground productivity was killed, people do not have to work for, you know, for a style of life and has meant no taxation, no representation attitude. If were not taxing you, dont hold us accountable. And in countries that are not Oil Producing but are receiving benefits from oilproducing countries like my own, a semifrontier system, it has also meant the development of layers around the regime that have benefited from this system, and instead of relying on a meritbased system, people particularly the governing elite have relied on these rents coming from the outside. If the arab world is to deal with its huge unemployment problem, with its huge Youth Challenge 70 of the arab world, 70 are under 0 years of age 30 years of age it has to find a new way, a meritbased system, to create jobs for these people. Because productivity can never be increased. Unless you encourage creativity, innovation, unless you provide people with the skills necessary to compete in todays marketplace. And from a Society Point of view, inclusion. Inclusion, diversity has always meant or been a bad word in arab cultures. The arab world is diverse. Its extremely diverse. It is ethnically diverse, it is religiously diverse, and yet no one really celebrates this diversity. Diversity has been suppressed in the arab world whether it was political culture or all religious in place of, you know, the common good. And what has, what, what it has meant is that people in syria today think of themselves as christians or kurds or alawites before they think of themselves as syrian, and it has meant people in bahrain also are engaged in sectarian fights, etc. And unless we adopt a system where diversity is truly, truly celebrated as a strength rather than a weakness, the arab world is not going to face some good times. There are and that brings be me to my fourth point, and i devote a whole chapter in the book about it, education. The arab world, if the arab awakenings are to really mean stable societies, education and educational policies must be revisited in the arab world. Not in terms of building more schools or in terms of even putting computers in them, but in terms of the values that are taught to the young general education. Generation. If a pluralistic culture is to emerge, it has to have a foundation that can only come through education where people learn about tolerance, learn about accepting other points of view, learn about truth being relative and not absolute, learn about critical thinking, are taught how to question, how to research, how to communicate. None of these, i maintain, none of these are issues that are seriously addressed in the arab world. And today when people in the arab world talk about education reform, most of that reform goes to building schools or to the quantity of education and very seldomly do anything about the quality of it. I want to close by reading a paragraph from the book. And its a paragraph that i inserted at end in anticipation of what many people will see this call as probably a naive call that has no connection with realitiment reality. Some will read this book and regard its arguments as a naive, almost romantic view of an arab world that does not exist. A view that is totally detached from reality. They will point out the current tumultuous state of affairs and wonder how can, how one can ever talk about diversity and tolerance when syria is being dismantled before our own eyes. How can one dream of a democratic arab world when countries such as iraq and lebanon are still organized along sectarian and not National Lines . How can one speak of an awakening when the initial calls for dignity and Good Governance have turned into an islamist takeover by forces whose idea of reform is to take all steps necessary to insure their grip on power as they slowly oblige the whole of society to practice what only they believe . Status quo forces in the arab world will point to the past three years and say, we told you so. They will argue that the turmoil that has characterized most of the transitions is evidence that their policies of stability have worked better even if the political space is limited or closed. They will dismiss arguments that much of what we witness today is, in fact, a direct result of their own policies of suppressing the development of societies that respect diversity in all its forms and that empower people the exercise a true sense of citizenship. I strongly believe, however, that history is our Guiding Light in what is transpiring in todays awakings. I arrive there at the Firm Conviction that the battle of ideas has at least finally started to unfold in the arab world. It is a battle that will be won only by those who are ready to toil and sweat to get their point of view acknowledged. In other words, gone in my view are the times when the lifestyles of Secular Forces, women of any other force in society can be guaranteed by dictator regimes that might guarantee some of these lifestyles but then go and abuse their population in a brutal way. From now on, if anybody wants to preserve their lifestyle, they have to work on it, for it on the ground as the islamists have done for decades. Once again, there are no shortcuts to democracy. This task of these third forces that i talk about, forces that, frankly, are yet to emerge in the arab world in any organized manner, so far most of the Secular Forces that have emerged as alternatives both to the status quo forces in the arab world as well as to the islamist forces, most of them have been maybe success lahr or secular or liberal, but they have failed to be democratic. They have engaged in selective democratic positions, meaning that they believe in democracy only when the outcome is to their liking. And when the outcome is not to their liking, they are, you know, ready to join forces with the military or join forces with any other undemocratic forces to preserve their lifestyles. So this task is not for the fainthearted or those whom i consider to be the true romantics; individuals who are too quick to give up if democracy does not emerge overnight or if their lifestyles are not guaranteed without them rolling up their sleeves. And this is how i see the contribution of this book. My hope is as it is read and reread through the lens of time maybe 20, 30 be or 50 years down the line and possibly after all other alternatives to diversity have been exhausted, it will inspire some to reject the prospect of waiting that long and encourage them to devote their energies to creating a pluralistic arab world mow that the chance to do now that the chance to do so is at least made possible through the historic process just unleashed. Thank you. [applause] so simple yet so difficult at the same time. Id like to open the floor to questions, and id like that when i call on you, please, introduce yourself. Well start back there with the mic. Warren hogue, International Peace institute. Marwan, your conversation, discussion of the psychs we coe countries, the countries that were created by european demographers, european chartmakers and then your further discussion about were watching the dismantling of countries like iraq and syria, and its possible to imagine them being dismantled three ways, a sunni part, a shia part and a kurdish part, is it your point of view that it is in our by our, i mean the international communitys interests to maintain those europeandrawn borders, to maintain syria as it is right now and create pluralism within it, to maintain iraq, to maintain lebanon . Or do you imagine Different National boundaries . I think what is worse than sykes we coe is to try to dismantle it today. [laughter] because in dismantling it, you are going to create, you know, ethno whats the word, countries that are ethnically pure, religiously pure, and that is that runs totally against the message of this book. The message of this book is a call for pluralism and appreciation of diversity. In the arab world, as i said, its an extremely diverse place. But the solution to that diversionty is not through chopping diversity is not through chopping off the arab world to, you know, sunni and christian and shiite enclaves. That are going to be engaged in wars for, you know, if the foreseeable future. I think the solution is to treat, treat people as citizens in their countries, not as subjects regardless of their ethnic, religious or cultural background. And that is possible. And that has been done in many countries around the world including in your own. But the solution is not to, basically, carve it out even further. [inaudible] thank you. James starkman. Within the 70 demographic of the arab world thats under 30 be, where does the religious culture that goes back over a millennia intersect with the Economic Needs of that group, and how would you extrapolate that trend into the future . Well, as i said, the pulse in the raich the polls in the arab world show that regardless of whether people are secular and religious and, you know, in many countries of the arab world the overwhelming population is rather conservative and religious, but regardless of that factor all arabs, secular and religious, worry most about the economy and worry most about their government being able to provide jobs for them. Another alarming statistic related to this, Unemployment Rate in the arab world is double the worlds average. Double. And that shows that the economic policies of the arab world today have not been and, of course, im talking about the arab world as if its monolithic. But by is and large, by and large the economic policies have not succeeded in addressing this issue. In my own view, it is largely because, you know, we bring up generations that, of people, that are not taught how to question authority. And in doing so, both the secular and religious forces in the arab world who have been, of course, at odds with each other have basically had an Unwritten Alliance to teach people that truths are absolute so that they dont question authority and so that they, we have docile societies. Of course, the result has been exactly the opposite. People have been brought up without any skills that are needed to compete in todays marketplace. And, therefore, become extreme, you know, increasingly frustrated, unable to join the market force. That explains the Unemployment Rate of double the worlds average. And in the end, going to the streets in the way that they did in egypt, in tunisia and in other places. Is that a lesson that is being internalized by countries, both those that have undergone transitions and those that have not . I dont think so. Those countries that have not upside gone transitions think undergone transitions think they are different. The rich, you know, and ironically most of them are the monarchies of the arab world. The rich monarchies still think they can avoid this money largely or security means as in the case of bahrain, and the poor monarchies, jordan and morocco, are trying to deal with this through what i still call either ad hoc or cosmetic reform processes that to not go as far as resulting in power sharing and in developing systems of checks and balances. And i think they need to do that. But unless this is done together with an Education System that teaches people how to think critically and question authority, we are going to face the same situation in the arab world today. In egypt and tunisia today, you know, people are economically calling for, actually, what i would say antireform policies; increase of subsidies, increase of the states interference in the economy, all the kinds of things that are simply not sustainable. But they do that because economic retomorrow in the raich world reform in the arab world has assumed a negative connotation. It was carried in the last 20, 30 years, it was implemented without a perilous system of a political reform be system that would insure when abuses do happen and they happen in any economic transforformation to insure that these abuses are institutionally addressed. Today countries like egypt and tunisia face a huge challenge pause they still have to because they still have to carry the economic reform policies, but time they have to convince a very skeptical population that this time theyre going to be able to do that together with the political reform be process. [inaudible] alan young. Many people argue that democracy in the west was successful because of the enlightenment, and the enlightenment was successful because of the reformation and what followed the reformation and understanding that you have to live and let live with other sects. Theres never been a reformation in the islamic world. To what extent do you think that that could be a serious problem in terms of trying to achieve the pluralism that youve been talking about . Well, that is true, and that is why i wouldnt say there has never been enlightenment. I hi there were periods in air i think there were periods in arab history, you know, in spain, in the first maybe few hundred years of the islamic empire, arab empire where we have seen some enlightenment, not total enlightenment. But i do agree that the arab world needs to be able to do so before we arrive at a stable society. If the question implies that this is not possible with islam, okay . I mean, thats the big elephant in the room, if the question implies that this is not possible with the presence of islam as a religion that some view, you know, is not conducive to pluralism, then i would strongly disagree. And i would disagree, one, because there are successful examples of countries that are, you know, more or less democratic in the islamic world, the in turkey, in indonesia, in malaysia. And, two, because of tunisia today. I cannot, you know, i cannot overstate the importance of today where the constitution that upholds the right of people not to believe at all in any religion is agreed to by the largest islamic force in the country. For those who say islam is not pro for democracy, i strongly disagree. Regardless of any muslims religious point of view regarding issues, regardless of that point of view, that has to be kept separate from individual as well as collective rights of all citizens. And tunisia has proved that it is able to do so. And if they can do it, theres no reason why others cannot do it at the same time. This is not going to take place quickly or automatically. And the arab world, i think, will go through most of most of the arab world, will go through decades before they arrive at what you are saying. My optimism comes from the fact that at least the battle has started, at least the chance to do so, the battle for pluralism has started from independence until 2011. That battle was suppressed by pruitt force. Brute force. That battle more ideas was suppressed. Unfortunately by secular governments. Today the battle is possible, and some will win it, some will lose it and some will struggle. How do you explain the phenomenon thats taking place in tunisia and why it hasnt rippled over to the other countries . You know, several factors. The tunisians are educated, an educated society. They have, they do have a thriving middle class. They do have an Islamic Party which has, actually, been more forward looking than any other Islamic Party in the arab world. They do have a tradition of not interfering in politics, so they do have all these factors. Its a small country, relatively homogeneous also, doesnt have all the sectarian issues that other countries have. And so, you know, yes, it is small but has a lot of potential. Interestingly on that point, i asked and to answer also your point i asked [inaudible] and i say that in the book also, the leader of the largest, of course, Political Party in tunisia until recently. Now the polls show that, as i said, the secular Opposition Party has more support. But i asked him about something which is very important to my understanding of how islamic parties will operate in the political field. And i said that in islam there is a very famous, of course, very known principle that says no coercion in religion. That is, you do not force people to become muslims. And i said that principle, in my understanding, is a oneway street. In other words, as long as you are not a muslim, there is no coercion. Once you become a muslim and if you choose to opt out of the religion, then there is coercion. Youre not allowed to do so. By all arab countries. And i said does that principle alie politically apply politically . In other words, theres no coercion as long as youre outside of power. But understand you are in power, then you might deny the right of all other forces to operate in the system. And his answer, which is not the mainstream answer of islamists, but it is, it is what he believes in and has practiced, was you are wrong on both counts. You are wrong theologically, and you are wrong politically. Theologically if somebody becomes a muslim and he or she opts out, it is not up to us to judge that person. And politically if the communist party wins the elections, we will have to leave and give, you know, power to the communist party. Again, that might not be and probably is not the mainstream argument, but its a good beginning. Its a good beginning and serve as a model for others to follow. Thank you. Thank you [inaudible] a few years ago there was a very interesting empirical study by the world bank which documented, i think pretty well, you know, the repetition of violence and civil wars in societies is more likely in the absence of strong institutions, but particularly Legal Institution ises or judicial institutions; ie, rule of law. What makes you think that in the context of the second Arab Transformation that youre talking about that it will be possible to create confidence by people in Legal Institutions . Because this, i think, is a pretty fundamental part of creating a stable and Diverse Society that youre talking about. Rule of law is probably the first step to, you know once again, democracys not going to flourish in the arab world overnight. But taking the first step of building institutions that would insure the rule of law is something that the arab world must engage in. Is it going to happen just out of the blue as you stated . No, it is not. It is not going to happen automatically. People are going to try other alternatives. In tunisia, it is happening, in my view. In egypt it is not yet, in my view also. I think people will try other alternatives, particularly in a region that has not known democracy, you know, islamists in egypt last year when they came to power behaved in a totally majoritarian way, tried to push a constitution that did not enjoy the consensus of all other forces. I maintain it is now this is being murdered today by the government in egypt which is also trying to behave in a majoritarian way. My confidence is still with a street that might not know what democracy is, but that does not be know, you know but that does know, you know, what it wants its government to do. And it is not governed by ideology, in my view. Its a street that is showing that performance to the street is way more important than ideology. They dont, in other words, care whether their government is secular or religious. They care whether their government is able to deliver or not. And, you know, they give, they give the religious forces a chance. It did not work, in their view, and now if the secular government in egypt does not also deliver on economic matters, i dont think the streets will stay as supportive as it is today. And we must admit today the street in egypt is very support i, for example, of government. And its very critical of the islamists. But that, i think, support is going to be governed increasingly in the arab world also by performance and not ideology. David musher. Youve written this book for the nonarab audience. I wonder whether it might be more appropriate for the arab audience . I wonder whether you might comment on that, please. I actually, no, did not write it for an arab or a nonarab audience. I wrote it for a general audience to try to explain what is going on in the arab world. One, this book will be translated into arabic as has my first book been. And, two, i write in arabic. All of the ideas in this book come about also from my own writing in arabic that are published in the arab world. But i agree that, you know, principally a nonarab audience might find this book entering or helpful in interesting or helpful in explaining what is going on. My own, my own position is that i would like this book to be read by an arab audience primarily. And i would like it to be a contribution, a small contribution to developing an intellectual framework for what is going on in the arab world as i stated at the beginning. We cannot keep these as popular movements that are not contextualized. And i hope that this book will be a strong contribution towards that objective in the arab world. [inaudible] thank you very much, will mr. Ambassador, excellent speech and conference [inaudible] [inaudible] yeah. Teach economics at nyu and also finance. My mothers from cairo, and i quite often go there op holiday. Many years ago i remember there were songs and favor of panarabism. I think panarabism at this point is absent in this story. There is turmoil or change as we used to call it throughout a very large area, but everybody seems to be changing on their own with their own strategy. Obviously, they all have their own aim. That makes a lot of sense. But this whole idea of panarabism, that there is an arab world and this arab world may share a common set of ideals and must Work Together not saying like a Common Market in europe or the european union, but something approaching some sort of uniformity seems not to be there. We no longer hear allahu akbar being yelled out, and will there always be a segmentation at end of idea or, as some might put it, an ideal . I think, i think the panarabism which was the dominant force in the arab world, lets say, in the 50s and 60s and maybe 40s also died at the altar of 1967. Basically, panarabism was a movement that found resonance with many members, many arabs because it brought them dignity, because it brought about a sense of wronging to a larger nation belonging to a larger nation that was attractive to many arabs. Panarabism, unfortunately, did not work towards pluralism and democracy. And, in fact, lets say nasser who was the biggest maybe personalization of the movement, nassers famous slogan was no voice [inaudible] [speaking in native tongue] no voice can rise above that of liberation. Liberation of palestine, that is. When 1967 came and arabs found out that neither liberation nor freedom was achieved, panarabism basically died. At least as a Political Force. And it was replaced by an islamic ideology. If people could not, you know, subscribe to this, if panarabism did not succeed in solving peoples problems, then maybe islam would. In my own view, and this might be a bold prediction, islam is not going to tie as a Political Force to die as a Political Force. But islams appeal today is facing this same challenges that panarabism faced in the 60s. Because for the first time, for the First Time Since political islam came on the scene, it it s now been given a chance to govern, and its been shown to be no worse or better than any other force. The holiness of political islam is over. And so we have two, we have a big vacuum today, a advantage cook that anarabism and political islam contributed to. But a vacuum that is not yet filled by third forces who are both secular and democratic. We, these two characterizations dont seem to go together in the arab world. But i maintain that, you know, they have the potential of doing so. I dont foresee a return to panarabism. I dont foresee that. Maybe, you know, maybe a different version, maybe an e. U. Type. Thats still too early to tell whether we will progress along these lines. I think the specific problems of each country today are more formidable than to have seem think about such panarab aspirations. But in the future, you know, once, once countries are able to find stability, panarabism this a modern form in a modern form might very well, you know, be attempted. Thank you. Ron [inaudible] just a quick comment and then a question. The various references to sykes pecot reminds me that oxford and i speak with some experience in these matters oxford classics professors dont do good maps. [laughter] but, and we live with the consequences of all that today. But i wanted to ask you about one country that hasnt come up and perhaps some related countries in that part of the world which is saudi arabia. It seems as though saudi arabia hasnt even fallen asleep, let alone awakened yetment. [laughter] yet. And they do, nonetheless, have a considerable capability for mischief fueling sectarian conflict in syria. Theyre not responsible alone for that, but theyre certainly instrumental. And with the possibility of any moderating influence of the United States which now is on the verge of energy independence, whats going to happen to saudi arabia and what sort of impact are they going to have on the rest of the arab world . Saudi arabia has made it clear that in general with the exception of syria they are against what is going on in the arab world. They dont see this as a historical transformation process. They see this as an arab inferno, a revolutionary process that is going to really ruin the arab world, etc. And they see the world, i think, in terms of two prisms, be you will, a sunni shiite prism and a status quo change prismment prism. And these are not always, you know, converging. And so in most, in most of arab world they see it in terms of status quo versus change, and they have attempted to do so to slow down the process if not reverse it altogether through, basically, financial means. Theyve dope so in their theyve done so in their own country, theyve done so in the gulf, theyre doing so in egypt where basically, you know, now theyve poured billions of dollars not towards necessarily productive projects, but towards budget support which, in my view, this is, this would have a limit. I mean, they cannot keep on doing this forever. They tonlet want egypt to fall in the hands of the islamists, but they dont a