Bronoman recalls leadership during world war ii. Good morning and welcome to the roosevelt president ial library. Were glad to have you today and happy about our annual reading festival and this wonderful turnout as well. Especially on our 75th 75th anniversary which were celebrating june 30th. I think that president roosevelt would be quite pleased to see everyone and to see this turnout and to know that his library, as he intended, would be used torii search and scholarship to continue to explore the issues of his era, and especially how they still have an impact today on political and social life. Now im going to speak for just a moment about how this works. Many of you already know there will be 30 minutes during which mr. Bornamman will speak to you about his book, and then well follow with ten minutes worth of questions we ask you to good to the microphone because were fortunate to have cspan with us today, and its great if your questions can be heard so that everybody can benefit and so that our speaker can provide the good analysis and explanation in response. Walter bornanam is a military and political historian, and his work on macarthur is particularly interesting. I read the book and its great. Explores his rapid rise. We know about the outline of macarthurs life, but what i found particularly interesting was the attention he gives to the myth versus the realities of macarthur and roosevelts relationship. And we often speak about truman and macarthurs relationship but the one with president roosevelt is equally compelling. And he has previously written the admiral nimitz, hasey, leahy and king the win of othe award in naval literature. His commentaries appeared in the new york times, web site, wall street journal and other places. So, without continuing for too long, were all here to hear walter bornamman. [applause] thank you so much. Its wonderful to be here in hyde park, and i am indeed going to talk about macarthur. Macarthur at war, world war ii in the pacific. But i thought i wanted to frame this because of our historic venue here a little built more about the relationship between Douglas Macarthur and Franklin Roosevelt. And permit me, if you will, to actually start with someone else. Admiral william d. Leahy. Now, you roosevelt scholars in them know leahy as roosevelts chief of staff. His wartime counselor, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and really the de facto National Security adviser long before that position was set up, and four years ago, when i published aid millers which you mentioned, about americas four fivestar admirals, a scheduling conflict prevented me from being here at this conference so i jumped at the chance to come here to talk about macarthur. But ifed had been here four years ago to talk about leahy and the admirals, i think i would have mentioned that leahy really was the man during the last three years of roosevelts life who really was the mainstay of his administration, and perhaps more to the point, is the one who really i think sort of transitions and explains the Roosevelt Legacy to truman. How does that relate to macarthur . Well, lail he is actually a great segway to macarthur because douglas older brother, arthur iii heres the story was a classmate of leahys at annapolis. Arthur graduate in the 1896 and became a navy captain before his untimely death in 1923 of append situs. Lay egraduated behind arthur iii and by no small coincidence among their best friends war thomas c. Hart, who would go on to command they asiaatic fleet in the nil peoples in 194 1. What that means is that lay economy hart of the two people who have known the macarthur family and douglas for the longest period of time. They think absolutely nothing of calling him douglas, and as Douglas Macarthur goes on to this great hero status, here are two men very much on a firstname basis with him. If you know anything about Douglas Macarthur there arent many people who walked up to him and called him douglas. In fact his second wife, jean, is on record as always calling him general. And referring to him in her soft southern drawl as, my general. So, i think its interesting from fdrs standpoint that the man who is so close to him in terms of being a counselor, really knows macarthur well, again, on a firstname basis, and i think those conversations between fdr and leahy, as leahy serves as his chief of staff, really go a long way to sort of helping roosevelt understand a little bit more who macarthur is. Now, macarthur and roosevelt certainly knew each other from their days when roosevelt was assistant secretary of the navy during world war i. Macarthur at that point, before he shipped off to the trenches of france, was actually in the War Department, working for newton d. Baker. Interestingly enough, on the publicity side of things, and those of you who know macarthurs world war ii record, know that he certainly became a master of publicity and that fit in very well to his rise quite rapidly from someone who i think on december 7, 1941, was certainly known. Heed been american chief of staff, hes been always in the newspapers for one thing or the other. But if he had really retired in the philippines and not accepted Franklin Roosevelts recall to active duty in the summer of 194. He would be a famous guy in history but certainly would not have risen to the level of renown that he came to in those critical six months between december of 1941 and june of 1942. Now, my book, macarthur at war is really that. Those four years of macarthurs rise from being, okay, known, but certainly not this Great American hero or Great American general that he would become during the course of that time. And i think its really fascinating in terms of focusing on that period to see how he evolved at a number of different levels. Let me just tell you quickly a couple of themes in the book. One of the themes is certainly how he manages to go from, again, being known but certainly not renowned on december 7, 1941, through a sixmonth period of time to where he really is by the summer of 1942 the main man on the scene in terms of the pacific and the main man in terms of the American Public. A couple of the reasons he does that, very good, like we mentioned, about managing his publicity, i think theres something to be said that the mesh public, during that time, pretty tenuous time. Better remember were still not sure what is going to go on in europe. Were shocked by everything that has happened aft pearl harbor. The American Public desperately needs a hero, and i think that Douglas Macarthur fit that role very, very well. Another theme in my become is i really tried to get, as you mentioned, about the myths and everything, really tried to get to the core of this truth about his relationship with the u. S. Navy. Again, thomas hart, commanding the American Fleet in the philippines, is one of those persons that does in fact call him dug has. At one Point Macarthur bristled a little bit because admiral hart didnt have that men ships under his commend, and macarthur bristles and said, well, tommy, get yourself a real fleet, and then youll belong. But the truth of the matter is that admiral hart at that point was wearing four stars and macarthur was only wearing two stars. A couple stars short, and theres a little bit there in terms of ego at play. And i think in terms of a recent books and literature, theres sometimes the emphasis on contention, and how contentious things are, and you begin to wonder a little bit, how did these people ever really cooperate and actually be able to win a conflict and win a war . And i would suggest on the navys side in particular, Douglas Macarthur, even though he would never have admitted it, became the beneficiary of the navy and in particular admiral earnest j. King, in terms of watching resources, men and material, pour into the pacific. King convinced the chief of joint chiefs of staff and certainly convinced roosevelt, that we had to fight a twoocean global war, and because of that, a number of resources, men and materiale, were poured into the pacific and he, because of that, may actually have been Douglas Macarthurs best friend. Theres a lot more to the armynavy rivalry than might sometimes be said in just a couple of lines. The other thing that it think really ties into that, thats important as another theme of my book, is macarthur always claimed that he was shortchanged in terms of supplies. Operating on a shoe string was his characterization of it. Well, again, thanks in part to admiral king and his twoocean global war effort, theres a tremendous amount of men and material flowing to the southwest pacific. At one point theres so many ships waiting to be unloaded that George Marshall, army chief of staff, and actually macarthurs direct commander, has to send a communique to macarthur and say, look, would you please hurry up and get these ships unloaded because youre clogging the whole pipeline of supplies. So i think it was interesting to look at quartermaster records and other things and kind of get through that misa little bit, too. Macour their made some great decisions. He made some great tactical and strategic advances, but the myth he did everything on a shoe string, the record doesnt bear that out in terms of the southwest pacific. Let me spend a few minutes with the theme that i think is particularly intriguing and ask macarthurs role and his evolution as a military commander. I think we have to remember that at the basis of everything, macarthur definitely was a 19th century man. He is a man that guess to west point, graduates first in his class, of course, in 1901, and he actually learns horsemanship, very important at that point, but not much to do with horsemanship in world war ii. He learns about static operations in the trenches of world war i. He goes on and becomes superintendent of west point and even when he is in his position as u. S. Army chief of staff, during the 1930s in, he is on record arizona saying, airplanes, well, you know, im not sure that airplanes are that important. He only wants airplanes and bombers for the army when he learns that the naveis going to get some bombers, and thought the army better get some as well. So, on december 7th, 1941, i think this great expectation by macarthur that something is going to happen in the pacific and anticipates the war is coming in at the spring of 1942 and he is simply quite frankly, i would say, overwhelmed by the speed with which the japanese air, land, and Sea Operations, unfold against the philippines in december and january of 1942. Macarthur is the one who has basically convinced the War Department and by that we mean both George Marshal and ultimately frank frank roosevelt, that the philippines can be held. Prior to that we always talked about under the plan orange scenario there would be just a defense of manila, and the core there on luzon but roosevelt and was convinced they could defend the entire island. So when this combined assault of air, land and sea from the japanese side hit in determines, macarthurs trupps are overwhelmed. Heres the important part of the story and the evolution and the transition of macarthur as a military commander. Think because of a number of things. Geographic necessity, the ability to be able to project and operate over the southwest pacific, he really very quickly has to come to embrace what today we call combined operations. Today we take for granted the air, land and sea four forces are all going to work together. Again, in those days, the army and navy were pretty well separate. So we get to a point that because of those things, macarthur has to begin to embrace combined operations. Now, i would hesitate to call him the father of combined operations, but i think very, very quickly, when you look at him as a military commander, youve got to give credit to the fact that he adapts, that he embraces the resources that he has, and that he does go ahead and be able to use air, land and Sea Operations together. Its always to his credit, i think, that he gets a lot of great commanders in each of those areas of operations. One of the myths of macarthur is it he is this lone wolf, sitting there brooding coming up with great strategy and operating by himself. No. No. I dont think thats true. He really put together a great team of subordinates and that is to his great credit, that he recognized talent, people like George Kenney, with his air force, people like Thomas Kinkade with the navy, man named dan barbie who ran his amphibious operations, called uncle dan the amphibious man, and to show this great outpouring of Americas Industrial strength and what happens so quickly through 1942 and 1943, barbie leads the first Amphibious Assault of the war on the north coast of new guinea in the fall of 1942 with literally a dozen or so Landing Craft and two destroyers. Fast forward two years, and theres six or seven hundred ships, not Landing Craft but ships off late tee for the invasion of lehti and there will be thousands of Landing Craft. So its a huge transformation, and i continue to say, not only are the men and the women back home at the factories and doing things so important to this war effort, but the amazing part to me and, again, macarthur is the beneficiary is this great outpouring of Americas Industrial strength and how quickly this country marshaled its assets in order to be able to go to war, and prosecute the war. Well, of course, combined operations, macarthur goes on this great leap along the new guinea coast, he attacksly attacks latety and goes through the fell peoples and a situation he has put together as supreme commander, great people in charge of each of those forces of operations, and used them with combined things. And he has one other ally that i should mention, too. Ultra. The codebreaking operations, very important. He doesnt always use them totally effectively, and again, by he, really mean his staff at that point. And theyre not always black and white. You have to do some interpretation with him. But some of the great victories that macarthur has really are based on codebreaking. Im thinking of the great bat of battle of the bismarck sea, the ability to leap over Japanese Forces and hit a weak spot. He had a lot of good intelligence behind those Strategic Decisions that he did make. Lets spend a few minutes and talk about macarthur and fdr. As i mentioned, they knew each other from the first world war, and im just going to give you three quick vignettes in terms of their relationship. And the first one would be this famous most dangerous man in america quote, okay . For reasons youre about to hear, im skeptical. I dont know what you think here but im skeptical that roosevelt ever made it. Macarthurs relationship with Franklin Roosevelt within back to their preworld war i days when macour their was a junior officer on the generals staffs and roosevelt assistant secretary of the navy. Heres the point. Pulled apart politically they were, i think, uncannily alike at different levelsful both had protective and domineering mothers. Both were masters of the theatrical moment, and each definitely carried with them an unwaiverring sense of destiny, both for themselves and for the country. It seems clear from both sides later telling that fdr usually addressed macarthur as douglas, one of the few people, again, who did. And that certainly did not exist between fd and his other generals. Remember the story that George Marshall, one time roosevelt called him george instead of general, marshall bristled ate that a little bit. For his point, of course, macarthur was enough of a soldier and i think also enough of a politician, to call macour their excuse me to call roost mr. President. Let me read you a quote from the book macarthur at war about this situation. Setting in his office in albany, the governor of new york and democratic president ial nominee, franklin d. Roosevelt, hung up after a ranting call from louisianas fire brand former governor, and then senator, hughie p. Long, and admonished his aides to remember all the time that long really is one of the two most dangerous men in the country. Asked if the other was the conservative radio priest, father charles coughlin, roosevelt shook his head. Oh, no, he supposedly answered. The other is Douglas Macarthur. Well, lets pick that apart. Recorded by a member of the new deal intelligentsia, this quote has been repeated in numerous occasions and accounts of the Roosevelt Macarthur relationship, without, think at least, much scrutiny, both of its historical and editorial context. According to tugwell, roosevelt went on to express concern that many people mired in the great depression, wanted Strong Military leadership, bordering on totalitarianism, and were, quote, willing to trade liberty for it. Roosevelt stopped short, however, of suggesting americans were ready to embrace macarthur has the man on horseback and charge the barricadeses behind him. If roosevelt indeed considered macarthur one of the two most dangerous men in the country, heres the thing hemp offered that view while still a washington outsider, nominated but not yet elected. He has no experience wife, macour thunder as chief of staff and it was a highly charged summer of the bonus march. Hardly the shining movement of macarthurs career by any standard. Now, i think lets look at the other side. There also has to be some scrutiny of tugwell. As the sole source for this, whichization. Tugwell was the selfappointed guardian of the new deal legacy. Macarthur, particularly in the shadow of the bonus march, was handy symbol, endowed with charm, tradition, and military appearance, as tugwell suggested and characterized him, for stoking fears of military dictatorship prior to roosevelts own aggressive leadership. Nonetheless, the dangerous man quotation is repeated in many secondary sources at face value if indeed roosevelt said it, it certainly wasnt indicative of their total relationship. That was to prove much more complex. Now, of course, the story is that macarthur ends up in march of 1933, because of john j. Pershing is ailing at that point and cant perform the duties, its macarthur that leads roosevelts inaugural parade down pennsylvania avenue, to the capital, in march of 1933, and macour arthur will go on to serve roosevelt as chief of staff for two and a half more years, before he takees assign independent the philippine assignment in the philippines. Another macarthurroosevelt vignette. Its this retreat from the philippines and a levels of support again that macarthur is receiving. Douglas macarthur was always certain that Sinister Forces were against him, and i think this was particularly true as macarthur was trying to reform west point during his tenure as chief of staff and especially after roosevelt promoted craig to the position of chief of staff of the army. After pearl harbor, given that the deteriorating on and the meager, again in macarthurs eyes the meager amount of men and materiale that were making it way to australia, i think it was really easy for such fears to escalate in the spring of 1942. Let me suggest to you that the record, particularly from Franklin Roosevelts standpoint, simply does not justify macarthurs paranoia. Theres usually three suspect that macarthur is sure to get them. Roosevelt is certainly one. George marshall is the second one and Dwight Eisenhower the third. I think you have all heard the story that when ike got to london, proper british matron tame up to him and said, well, general eisenhower, do you know General Macarthur . Well, ike, who had been macarthurs aide in washington and the file peoples, supposedly philippines suppose lets replied, know him . Madam, a studied dramatics under him for four years in the philippines. So theres that relationship there let me suggest that particularly from roosevelts standpoint, there are number of times that he really could have put macarthur out to dry, and there were certainly political implications involved, this whole idea of macarthur and his hero status and everything, but i think that on all three levels the evidence is that roosevelt, marshall, and eisenhower, did everything that they could in the spring of 1942. It was a tough job. It was an impossible job, but they did everything and tried to do everything they could in terms of getting relief to the philippines. Final quick story and then well take questions. Fast forward to the summer of 1944. Roosevelt is nominated for an unprecedented fourth term. Now, think about that. Thats about four months before the election. How long have we been involved in this . 18 months in this campaign been going on . A little bit crazy, and of course roosevelt waits almost until the last second to tell the nominating forces of the Democratic Party in chicago that, oh,ance i, ill be glad to accept another term. But at the time, of course, he is about ready to well, quite frankly, roosevelt faces a decision should he go to chicago and appear before partisan crowd or should he do road trip and go and appear as military commander . He chooses the latter and for the first time in what must be about nine years, he actually is going to meet Douglas Macarthur face to face in honolulu. Heres agent built a little bit of that star. The hearty applause Douglas Macarthur, thissed in a leather flying jacket, despite the hawaii heat, alighted from a car and strode purposely up the gangplank of the cruise are baltimore. Thats what roosevelt took from san diego over to honolulu. Roosevelt greated him warmly and macarthur acknowledged their last meeting had been when macarthur was roosevelts chief of staff. Leahy, who relationship with macarthur went back nearly 40 cheers at that point, and who was by the way never one to really stand on much ceremony cut to the quick and dryly remarked, douglas, why dont you wear the right crimed of clothes when cow come here to see us . Well, macarthur gestured to the heavens and replied, well you havent been where i came from, and its cold up there in the sky. So, there they are. The three of them. Roosevelt posed between macarthur and nimitz, the jenna his leather jacket, nimitz in his whites, for a series of photographs. Now, for macarthur this session the first thing of his own president ial hope you can talk about that in the cozy macarthur still carried a considerable influence in republican circles, and as well as remaining wildly popular with the American Public at large. Political maestro roosevelt has weighed the benefits of either appearing before a partisan crowd or showcasing his commander in chief role. Let me just tell you the short story of the cartoon that appeared in the washington evening star that point. Jim berryman is the cartoonist and captures this mood when he depicts macarthur, million nit and a vibrant looking fdr wearing commander in chief on his sleeve, seated at a table labeled, pacific war council. Macarthur and nimitz are looking at another figure of fdr leaping jauntily against the palm tree, cigarette holder in hand, lei around his neck, while his hat reads not commander in chief but democratic nominee. Oh, dont mind him, gentlemen, fdr commander in cheers character tells macarthur and nimitz, the just came to get away from politics. Well, that is the story, and i guess i would just end by saying that this appearance of two of them at honolulu really is more of a political than a military event. I think to roosevelts credit, by this point in the war, he is really well into leaving those kind of decisions and the decision as to whether to return to the philippines or whether to invade formosa he is leaving that up to the joint chiefs. And theres lots of stories about macarthur badgering him to do this and roosevelt sort of assuring that, yeah, he would do that. But the records show that the decision to really go on through macour theirs return to the philippines is made by the joint chiefs a few months after honolulu. So the only thing i would end with is that despite the fact that both of these men sort of had their moments of friction, i suggest to you that theres was a very Important Partnership in terms of winning the war, and i think i might be putting a little built of words into this or too much thought, but i think that both of them come away from the honolulu conference in july of 1944, with maybe a little bit more respect for each other as aging warriors, and really an appreciation of what it cost each of them again, aging warriors they are get to that point. Thats macarthur at war. There. [applause] distinguishing im happy to okaytake questions. I have a question. Macarthur himself was talking about having this infiltration that is what we concern beside and i did research as the hoover president ial library, and the memo talking about can you tell us, do you hold macarthur responsible for what happened and was macare theirs statement bottom the communism threat really what was going on . From what ive been able to research i thing that a large part of roosevelts actions were because im sorry macarthurs actions were because he really caught there were a significant number of communists involved in that. We could talk about his later performance as dugout doug. I think that the macarthur of world war i, when he is in the front and going into the trenches and everything else, if he had been that kind of personage in the bonus march, he might well have gone down and sat around the camp fire with these men and talked a little bit. If he really had felt they were veterans but he really feels that this strong communist influence, and i think he takes the opposite extreme and really, really does come on as a strong and quite frankly to use the term, pompous leader thats going to show these guys. Another thread represented by the bonus march is macarthurs almost careerlong tendencies towards insubordination. He was ordered by president hoover not to go beyond a certain behind and disregarded the order and obviously another subject for another conversation. He was insubordinate in korea under truman and so forth. So he was his own man regard his of his orders. My question relates to philippines. Obsession may be too strong a word but i think studying literature on macarthur, i come up with the word obsession with the philippines. He had an obsession going way back, and i look at map of the pacific, and the most direct route from the early battles of midway and the various island chains to japan, which we were obviously going to invade at some point was not through the philippines. It was a direct route. You say that the joint chiefs decided on the philippines as part of the strategy after pearl harbor, but how necessary was it really for us to go through the philippines at a humongous cost of men . This is a debate that even though it was discussed at honolulu in july of 44, really doesnt get resolved until that fall, and one could say it doesnt get resolved until theres the final move toward okinawa, and i think in a nutshell, youre right, macarthur is fixated on the philippines, all through the course of the pacific war. There are these two different lines of attack, nimitz in the Central Pacific, macarthur in the southwest pacific, remember that the South Pacific operations on godle canal are between the fronts and every time the joint chiefs of staff wants to decide between the priority of one front over the other, quite frank live they kick the can down the road and theyre still kicking the can down the road in the fall of 1944. Macarthur early on said that the philippines were important to the whole drive to get into the dutch east indies, cut the lines of communication between the Natural Resources and the flow of oil to japan and certainly he had a strong point about that. Now, by the time that he has gotten back to the philippines and really gone ahead and moved moves into boreo in 1945, those operations as far as Natural Resources, the lines of supply to japan have been cut by american sub marines, the industries have been pounded by bombers. Sew the only thing at the end i would say in a nuttedshell is there seems to be pretty good evidence that despite the joint chiefs not being able to decide one way or the other, that drive across the pacific kept the japanese offbalance. Theres shut lie in question on both fronds there were horrific battles. Going into the macarthur with the savior complex, i shall return, as opposed to we, is there any discussion, theres what whole navy behind this, who are you . Well there, was well, think that guess to the core of Douglas Macarthur. There was a suggestion, after he said, i shall return, there was a suggestion by fdr and marshall, gosh, wouldnt it bit great if we could say we shall return . That sounds a lot more collaborative, but again, that is not Douglas Macarthurs personality. To his credit, he took it personally that he would go back and do it. It was a personal charge to him. And to your point earlier, dan, about operations and things, got to remember that macarthurs father in the civil war would where is which i begin the become its instructive that his father really leads this great charge up Missionary Ridge during the civil war and it may not have been the greatest charge of all time but by the time he got done tell his son about it had become the greatest charge of all time and it was i issue it wasnt we went up the ridge. It was i held the way up the ridge and i shall return. Yes, sir. To what degree, if any because i the battle of midway, a lot of people, seems to be a major turning point, at least in slowing the japanese advance. To what degree did macarthur participate in that or was that purely naval decision . Its a purely naval decision that comes out of nimitzs Central Pacific operations. So macarthur is not involved at all in the battle of midway. The precursor, of course, world war ii pacific historians know is the battle of the coral sea. Macarthur a month before midway, is involved on the periphery of that, at least, actually the Australian Naval forces under his command wouldnt like me to use the word periphery. They were a little more actively engaged in that, even though the main fleet element came out of nimitzs command. Yes, sir. I want to commend you for talking about macarthurs utilization of code breaking. Id like my only problem with that was that he didnt use it when he was in the philippines. Station in the philippines had one of the machines, pearl harbor operations the pearl Harbor Intelligence station did not. Commander letwhiler in charge of the station, operation in the philippines, that used roundtheclock code braking along with army, nave. And marine personnel, were well air ware what was going on with the japanese. They also utilized information from the british with radio fingerprinting. Somehowsomewhere along the line macarthur thought to use code breaking early on. Id like you to respond to that. But let me just mention this. You have short and kimmel that came to pearl harbor for not being prepared or whatever and they didnt have nearly the intelligence that macarthur had in the philippines. Macarthur gets the medal of honor and these two guys get canned. Queue respond to that . We can do a seminar on that for a week. The latter part of that in terms of clark and what happens at the philippine is write about a lot in the book, and its been dissected, but i do spend considerable time on that. The codebreaking operations i dont mean to say he didnt use them but i think it sort of like the combined operations. The best answer i could give you. Is that its something that he is aware of, its going on, but he really hasntablizes how important they will become in fact quite frankly the time he does realize how personality coatbreaking is, its George Kenney and the air force that uses intelligence to really find the japanese convoy that is the relief convoy going from new guinea in the battle of the bismarck sea and really obliterates that convoy, and its kind of like the whole air power discussion. Seeing that power and the power of that intelligence, i think makes macarthur pay more attention to it. I wouldnt call it a toy but in the days of when theyre reading this stuff, again, macarthur with this world war i mentality, where when he got intelligence in world war i, he was going out in the front trenches. I think that its just one of those many pieces of the combined operations that he has to get used to and rely on. One last question. Considering the performance of the army and roosevelt perhaps comment about dangerous man, how come he kept him around in 1933 . Any indication that roosevelt tried to move him out . Okay issue think that the short answer to that is that he keeps roosevelt keeps macarthur on for an additional year as chief of staff for, i think two reasons. One, he wants the position and long story about seniority. He wants the position his chosen successor to follow macarthur, but i think the second part of it, is roosevelt is already working to in the depths of the depression, begin to prepare the country for some level of mobilization for world war ii. Its great to have a conservative republican leaning guy go up to the hill as army chief of staff and take some of the flak when saying that our military budget needs to be increased. You know what the military budget was in 1935 . The total military budget for the army part . Something like like about 400,000. So, it is rather incredible in that. But i think that there were reasons to keep him around. All indications he tried to get rid of him. Well, im sure sitting in the house not too practitioner from here there were many times that roosevelt wanted to get rid of macarthur but always reasons why the didnt. Ill be glad to sign books. Thank you all for coming. To. [applause] installed [inaudible conversations] david priest, former daily intelligence brieferth