Transcripts For CSPAN2 Book Discussion On Before The First Shots Are Fired 20140921

Group. President s that have had key advisers, the kissingers, the brzezinskis, the cheneys that sort of dominate the advice in one way or another. President s that have used their cabinet. President s that rely on the National Security council or a handful of trusted adviser. So the analysis, the intelligence which has sometimes been good and sometimes catastrophic in misjudging events and how that has led us to a decision. I talk about president ial decisions in the book, whats going through the president s mind . Is there a degree of emotion . Is there Something Else thats happening . Did this catch him by surprise, or is there something beyond just the cool and cold analysis that leads to that decision . Also the strategy thats created. Before you even decided decide p onto a battlefield, i can tell you from a military generals point of view, tell me what you want me to do. You know, i was a student at the National War College as a lieutenant colonel, and we had a representative from Congress Come to speak by the name of newt gingrich. And newt said to us someday some of you will rise to higher rank, youll be generals, and your political masters are going to tell you go do this, attack this, you know, intervene here. He said, it is critical for you to ask this question, and then what . You know . Now think about iraq. We went in and the mission was to take out saddam. We did in three weeks. We stayed there for ten years. You know, okay, mr. President , saddam is gone. And then what . You know, so the same thing this afghanistan. Get alqaeda. Well, we didnt Pay Attention to the mission, and alqaeda beat feet into pakistan. Now alqaedas gone, and were standing there in the middle of afghanistan. And then what . Were still there. You know . And so if you dont see this clearly through, if the political objectives are not clear, you get into mission creep, the military doesnt understand what theyre supposed to do, we get bogged down in missions like nation building that may be unintended in some way. Theres another part of this now thats become more critical important as weve gone on. Its what i call in the book the battle of the narrative. You know, the enemy now has become very sophisticated. Look at isis, you know . Look at how they handle social media, how they dominate the media. These horrific scenes of beheadings and atrocities, near general side. That plays to a certain genocide. That play toss a certain audience. There is a battle that goes on to make the case that youre right and just. Theres a battle of the narrative that goes on that says to the American People, i want you behind me. I call this in the book the my fellow american speech. The bully pulpit. Some of us may be old enough to remember the fireside chats. Im not, way before my time, but my father told me about em. [laughter] but, you know, we have had great communicators as president , people that could make the case, president s that were willing to make the decision, then explain it to the American People as best he can to try to gape their confidence. In doing to try to gain their confidence. In doing the research for the book, i talked to a number of president ial advisers, and i just want to talk about one example. And i had talked to a cabinet member that was very close to president reagan during the reagan administration. And reagan was faced with his decision to go into granada, if you remember that. Now, the beirut bombing had just occurred and, of course, the administration was getting slammed. What were we doing in beirut, troops just sitting there . This was horrific, 240 some marines be can others that we ma reaps that we lost there marines that we lost there. And the stomach for going into a place like grenada just wasnt there. And this cabinet member or cabinet head told me the president was given the advice, mr. President , do not go into granada. This is the worst thing you could do right now. Youll never sell it to the American People, and its going to be politically damaged. And he told me the president turned around and said is there a potential for american lives to be in danger . And the Intelligence Officer that was briefing said, sir, theres some american medical students that could be at risk. He said, then the decision is clear, we go in. No if, ands and buts. My job is to explain it to the American People. But he had a clear purpose in mind, you know . However politically difficult it might be, there was a higher order that went into his Decision Making. You know, rightly or wrongly. In this case it was the risk to americans, you know . American interests, but more than that, american lives that might be at risk. This battle of the narrative now has become significant. I was doing an assessment in iraq and afghanistan for the generals out there, this was after i retired several years ago, and i was amazed to see something i didnt want see in my i didnt see in my time on active duty. There were actually staff sections that did nothing but work the narrative, the message. You know, were in a communications battle now, and its not just at the operational level, but its at the strategic level. Its not only you versus your potential adversary, its you versus the political opposition in your own country. That constantly goes on. So that communication becomes extremely necessary. Now, when the balloon goes up and weve got to commit our military, its not like you suddenly turn around and create a military. You have a military thats there. We have a military structure. What goes into making that structure . Well, during the cold war we pretty much can make some judgments. We knew what the enemy was doing, we were in an arms race. It was very expensive. Remember eisenhowers warning about the military Industrial Complex that was growing. People often quote that speech but forget the first part where he said our arms must be mighty. We were in this very expensive arms race. President eisenhower was looking at a federal budget that over 50 went to defense and National Security. Over 50 . Which means the rest had to be split up amongst other programs that were vital to our nations well being. But right now its less than 15 , and its actually going down. But what kind of military can you afford . What kind of military should you have . In an environment like this where the threats are vague, theyre hard to understand, theyre difficult to predict for our intelligence community, what do you need . I mean, where do you accept risk . This is a difficult decision for our pentagon and others. Im very critical of the process of making this decision in the book. I talk about that its not based on strategy, its usually based on political decisions. When it goes to congress to decide on which programs to fund or not to fund, its usually made on the basis of what do you make in my district . Is thats what im going to support. And so process of deciding where to take the risk, not to take the risk, what kind of military to step up and be ready, you know, remember that image of Donald Rumsfeld out there in kuwait when that soldier asked him, you know, my god, we have equipment here that cant stand up against ieds, explacive devices explosive devices. Were having to go to the junk yard and put pieces on and rumsfeld made that insensitive statement which was you go the war with the army you have. Unfortunately, its true. Now, we can adjust and adapt very quickly sometimes to what the need is, but you have to have some structure. President when the cold war really began at the end of world war ii, we decided we needed a military that could fight two wars, two major conflicts. Very expensive and engaged in a High Technology arms race with the russians and the soviet union and red china. The two wars were potentially red china and the soviet soviet union. President kennedy decided its two and a half wars, because he thought the communistinspired insurgencies around the world, the way they would engage us because nobody wants to go to nuclear war, well, now we needed this robust military created in the 60s and on into the 70s that was huge to be able to fight two and a half wars. At the end of the cold war, we said two major theaters of operation. Maybe in iran and a north korealike commitment. Right now today we could maybe do one of those in the cuts weve taken. Now, defense expensive. Id be the first one to tell you that. Affordability is a major question. We, obviously, have other parts of our society that need tending to, and we need to expend our resources on them. The big issue is where do you take the risk and judiciously apply that military force . When the decision is made to go in, beside a strategy you need another decision. What are you going tad on the ground to do on the ground . What we in the military call the operational design. Remember general petraeus said, well, were going to conduct a counterinsurgency which really means were going to rebuild afghanistan and iraq. You know, rebuilding a nation is very expensive, time consuming, takes a lot of resources and a lot of troops. And if the Political Leadership doesnt understand that, you could have us attempting to do something on the ground that the political will and the numbers of troops and the authority and the resources that are provided arent sufficient to do it. Thats what happened to us in iraq and afghanistan. That operational design has to fit the strategy. If there is no strategy, then we are going to get into the what is commonly called mission creep. You know, wars dont end the way we would like them to end as in the past where we go and seize the nations capital, defeat the enemys military forces, plant our flag, and theres a clear winner. Doesnt happen that way anymore. So how do we measure success . It could be aboard an Aircraft Carrier and declare victory and find yourself years and years still mired down in the mission that didnt get quite accomplished. So the metrics we use, how do we decide whether were winning or losing, succeeding or failing . If you dont have an operational design that fits a strategy, thats very unclear. And how do wars end . Another part of the book. Sometimes wars end in ways that create more problems. Each though theres a seeming victory even though theres a seeming victory, charlie will softens war, you know, we had a member of congress decide were going to fix the soviet union. Well give them their vietnam in afghanistan. We went into afghanistan and supported what became alqaeda, the mujahideen, and said theyll punish the soviet union, and the soviet union will be thrown out of afghanistan. What can be worse than that . Well, we ended up with the taliban and alqaeda after doing that. I was testifying for a Senate Foreign Relations Committee as we were going into iraq. I said to the committee, this is a big mistake. Its the wrong war, wrong place, wrong time. Saddam is contained, youve got a mission to get alqaeda who did us harm on 9 11, and why are we going into iraq . And i had one senator that said i dont understand you, general. What can be worse than Saddam Hussein . Well, look what we have in iraq now. You know . What do we have in iraq now . Saddam hussein was evil and bad. Can something be more evil and worse . Is were learning that lesson were learning that lesson, you know . So sometimes be careful what you wish for. The outcomes at one end could leave open a possibility of ending up in a worse situation. In the military were certainly not perfect, but i will tell you we try. We study every battle weve been in, every fight weve been in, every war weve been thrust into. We spend a lot of time on Lessons Learned. We want to understand what we did wrong, what we did right, where the threat is. We spend a lot of time trying to get it right the next time. I want you to think about this because the commitment of the military comes in two parts. Theres the military part on the ground, those boots, those troops, you know, the application of the fires and maneuver that go on. But theres a second part. Its what this book is about. Its about all the political decisions that get wrapped around that. Now, we hold dear a principle that i subscribe to and i would fight and die to protect, civilian control of the military. Thats what we need and should have in a democracy. The decision to go into war, the decision to use our military, the authority over our military should be wrested with our people and expressed through our elected representatives. Thats a principle we hold dear and, i think, is critical to our democracy. But theres an obligation that goes with that. Just like the military men and women who have to study and learn those lessons, build a career, go to school, be educated on how to prosecute at their level what goes on, where is that at the political level . Where do president s and secretaries and congressmen and women understand what they need to do . Where is the education, the Lessons Learned . Theres less and less military experience in our government can at the civilian level. So we have a mismatch. We have a mismatch in those that are required to set the strategy, the policy and the politics are not as steeped in the lessons they should learn as the military is on the ground. Theres a disconnect in many ways in how that happens. And i wrote the book just to sort of summarize this because i wanted for as much as i could inform the American People about this part of it, you can go to the book shelves in this store, and you can see the military history piece. You can pick up those books, and you can see all that is written, all the studies, all the analysis, all the history on how the fighting has gone on. You dont see many books on how the political Decision Making process went. You know, how we ended up op a battlefield on a battlefield, maybe doomed to fail right from the beginning. A flawed strategy. Well, the dominoes may fall in southeast a asia if we dont defend vietnam. You know, where we have gone in and not understood the people on the ground and the culture. Where we have gone in and not had a strategic design under which we could operate and under what the political understand what the political objectives are. So this book is about that part of it which, you know, ive seen from every side, from the battlefield all the way up to the oval office, as i say in the book. And its something we have to fix. You know, the decisions on how we spend our money, what kind of military we want, when we decide to commit it, how we build strategies and understand it, much of this has become a lost art. I say in the book where are the marshalls, where are the kennans . Where are the strategic thinkers we used to have . Weve become a reactive, transactional society. We dont understand how to look and examine as to what threatens us, where our interests are, where we should invest in and how we should react. So in summary, thats the book. That i see and right now, you know, i wrote this book a while back, obviously, by the time i got published i certainly didnt understand wed be in a situation right thousand where this could be glaringly right in front of us as we say it. But it is timely enough for us to look at this and see this process now pretty clearly in front of us. Im glad to take any questions or comments you might have too, so thank you. Yes, maam. [inaudible] going on now in the political process [inaudible] in addition to fighting for the district [inaudible] the other side says this [inaudible] absolutely, well, absolutely. I mean, it used to be that sort of thing stopped at the the wart, at our waterline. When our nation was threatened, we came together. And we found a bay to work a way to work together. We saw this in the world wars, you know, we saw this when we may have had a, you know, a Democratic Administration and a Republican Congress as we did in world war ii, and and we had mar hall who was apolitical to marshall who was apolitical to bring it together. Truman, vannedden burg, marshall, maybe different political perspectives, but certain isly saw the need to defend the United States, protect our interests, and they were able to come together. Its a poison asset atmosphere now, and that adds to the problems we have. Its another element that adds into the dysfunction in setting these sort of strategic goals. Yes, sir. Sir, as a military intellectual, might you consider leavening the political establishment by throwing your hat in the ring as a Vice President ial candidate . [applause] first question. [laughter] and second, spoken seriously and from the heart in terms of the need out there. Second, we all remember 2006 and the Biden Initiative to create three semiautonomous regions in iraq passed the senate, and then all of a sudden it was plowed under. In retrospect, might we not be heading that way or forget that. How did you see that bidengell proposal at the time, and how does it look today . Well, on the first part of your question, since my parents were married, im not eligible for political office, and so i choose not to run, you know . To be serious, i hate politics. Im apolitical. Ive given up on both Political Parties. I tried both, i didnt like either one. So thats where i come from. I mean, but on the second one, you know, this is, this is a very important question that you bring up. When i was a young second lieu tempt, my first assignment in vietnam was an adviser to the vietnamese marines. I wore their uniform, i is spoke their language. I spoke their language. I rarely saw another american. The vietnamese marines operated the entire length and breadth of the cup, and when we were in operations in areas and villages, we moved in with the people. And i mention this little slip yet in the book. I was in one village, and i was living with the village chief. And his wife had kindly prepared a meal, and it was evening, and she came to me and she said what do you want me to die for . What do you want us to die for . And i thought it was a strange question. She said, why are you here . I said, well, were going to bring democracy, free market economy, were going to make your life great. And she this was in the northern part of south vietnam. She pointed south towards saigon. She said, now, how can i believe that when i look at whats in saigon . If you can remember if youre old enough, the rotating generals, the coups. Were there fighting and dying, were losing general american lives. One corrupt general after another is taking over the government. And, you know, the answer was always, well, thats their decision. We cant control that. Be were going the put our lives on the line and expend our treasure, i dont see mac arthur in japan saying you can pick any kind of government you want or eisenhower in germany saying that. Why do woe do that . Why do we pep a maliki in iraq, a karzai in afghanistan . That becomes us. That identifies us. And so when you do that, to kind of get to your point, what were doing is we walk in and tell you how its going to be, and then we give you something you cant live and die for. Now, my argument with Vice President biden is walking in at the beginning of the conflict and then dictating how the country should be structured and saying, well, you know, you need to split it up. Well, do you . I mean, do we know enough about that . What does he know about iraq . And, you know, it may end up that the country does get split up. But eventually, that has to be something where we empower the people to make those decisions. E we ought to not stand for corrupt governments, not if were going to give the lives of our greatest treasure, our men and women in uniform, out there to protect them. Weve sort of lost that standard, is what bothers me. Now, i think you certainly can offer creative alternatives to government. It may be that iraq looks like the united arab emirates, and there is an emirates thats kurdistan, theres an emirates thats sunni areas. And they come together in some loose hifitted federal looselyfitted federal system. But i think we can help them create options they can live with. But to dictate and hip shoot from washington our solution to the problem and to accept corruption is not the way to go about it. Sir. How would you put it into perspective today for us to understand that now our friends seem to be somewhat of our enemies like we are now now aligning with the people assad, the rebels. We are now changing with iran and iraq. Our enemies seem to be somewhat our friends. If you were sitting or you were obama, how do you explain that or what would you do . Well, let me give you something in principle but then go to those specific points, because i do not think we should be working with assad or cooperating with him in that we may have a common enemy, but that doesnt mean we necessarily need to be in bed together. Thats just part of the confusion and complexity of the situation we find ourselves in. But let me Say Something about enemies. In our history, weve had a lot of enemies who are now the closest allies. First 100 years of our existence our greatest enemy was great britain. Wed gone to war with spain, germany, with a lineup that very much looks like our closest Coalition Allies right now. And and so todays enemy could be tomorrows friend and ally. Although i do not think that will happen with the examples of assad and iran because these other potential enemies have transformed boo something thats into something thats more akin to our governance style and concept of government, and so its made it easier for us to cooperate. But you will find yourself in this position. Now, what gets you into this position . Im going to tell you a little story. I was with a couple of friends from the middle east, arab friends, when we were about to go into iraq this time, the last time after 9 11. And president bush was making the case for war. And he was saying something to the effect that this conflict is going to be about the forces of freedom, of 2ke78 accuracy against the forces of authoritarianism, you know, dictatorship, Saddam Hussein. The one friend of mind on my right side numbinged me x he said numbinged me, and he said this war will be about persian versus arab. Youre unleashing something we have tried to keep tamped down for a long time. This is a devil youre going to unleash. The other friend on the other side said this war is about sunni versus shia. Youre about to start a religious war when you do this. Now all three are right. President bush was right, each of those people on either of my side was right. Did the president understand those other two levels . So when you say were partnered with assad, assad is annal a white. Al a whites are closely alined with the shia. Isis is a sunni, radical movement. Some of our allies are sunnis that oppose isis. The regime in baghdad may be more aligned with iran because its basically the majority is shia. So what youre saying is when you say its same interests as assad has or the same interests of rapp, when you start peeling that onion back, you find more complexity, you find a religious element, an ethnic element. You find different elements that critsz kris cross and create an even bigger problem. So when you set to sort out your enemies and friends, it becomes a much more complex effort in this environment. Yes. Sympathy for the president when he says that he doesnt have a strategy versus isis . He said it . Yeah. Yeah. I mean, either i mean, im trying to understand what he was trying to say. If we take him, you know, the words as they were given, he didnt have a strategy, and what bothers me about that is there should be a middle east strategy, there could be a there should be a strategy for syria and iraq. Isis might have been a wildcard you didnt expect, but it has to fit in an overall strategy. If it meant that he didnt have a military plan for immediately responding to this, then thats not a strategy. Thats an operational plan. So either he didnt have a strategy or he doesnt understand what strategy is. Either way, im troubled by the comment, you know . And it is yet to be explained. Strategy is not just a military action. Strategy is how you employ diplomacy, your power of information and influence, your economic power. It end compasses all the elements encompasses all the elements of government and power. Its building of coalitions. Its forming of assistance to help in governance, changing social programs and other things that might in the region help you succeed. In addition to a military part, but thats just one part of it. Thats not a strategy in and of itself. Yes, sir. Sir, sir, i think we need not more of the people you said we need, but id like more captain ripleys and more colonel spries, okay . And you are right that for conventional war, you can train b people to fight a conventional war in 90180 days. You can get very good soldiers to fight a small war, and im sure youve read the small war marine corps manual, to fight a small war it takes a long time. You have the language changing the Language Training and knock and tocks take about nine months and then about six months of practice. So youre talking about four to five years. Captain ripley stated to me that he had to tooth and nail to the a marine corps to get him the training. He said how could he tell without that training, without speaking the language, without being like them, how could he tell 600 marines to go in and commit suicide to give them time to blow their bridge . He couldnt. And my question, my question is i think that we should have a american French Foreign legion; essentially, small wars. We should have a thousand howards, a thousand [inaudible] a thousand ripleys, a thousand a million, excuse me, a million vans, a million captain of matches, okay . Of matches, okay . Hoffmans, okay . We should create this following the small wars manual and keep them available, active people. So i would like your comments. I mentioned a lot of things, and i know you were in, you had the same position as captain ripley. Right. Well, what you just said is what john kennedy said. He said we are going to confront now, of course, this was during the cold war we are going to confront communism in a different way because the unthinkable is to engage in conventional war which could lead to nuclear war. Thats not going to be on the table. We still have to keep our powder dry, we still have to deter, stay ahead in the arms race, but were going to engage day oday on these communistinspired ip insurgencies. So he wanted to create a force that specialized in this, that had Language Training, foreign area development, and he did. Special forces. When we first created them we had a problem. They couldnt get promoted here because these were artillery officers, aviators and others that chose this as a second course and were finding themselves not competitive for promotion. Many of us were regional commanders, we really took on the services to say these are extremely valuable people. They have to have a promotion track. That has change. Now theyre becoming successful in the own right and able to rush through the ranks. You are right on what you say, do we build into our system this week. We have civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces, special operation forces. All the services are required to participate and commit to this. The small wars manual is now being revamped to reflect the times today and the lessons weve learned out of iraq and afghanistan. Do you and other generals play chess . And if so, is there any chess strategy that could be applicable any political military complex context . Most of the generals i know play golf. [laughter] i was asked today whats my premise achieve an inability. I said id never certain the pentagon and i never learned to play golf. We wargame. Wargaming probably about the mid 80s began to rise in popularity, if you will. And so we wargame on many dimensions something such as simple as tabletop games, as terrain models to very sophisticated computerbased gave me. We have mixed real field exercise, computerbased and others, weve integrated them in major ways. We test our war plans through these systems. Each of the services are then combined in a joint capability as an elaborate computerbased team system that you have to do with a lot of software and didnt get in all the capabilities we have and potential enemies we have. After vietnam when we were building the allvolunteer force and sort of rehabilitating the military, one of the things that we felt strongly about is we lost the emphasis on the operational art. We were not measuring success of our leaders, officers entered in deals based on the operational capability. We have become great administrators. We are managing well. We were not leading in an operational sense. Each of the services them, and then the joint perspective that created these tests, if you will. You will, youre allowed to make the state, you can challenge yourself in the exercises, but everyone will be evaluated. You will be evaluated on your operational competence. If to demonstrate this. It doesnt mean there are times you can make mistakes and you can try things and experiment. And we sort of had in the 80s and 90s a renaissance in the operational art. Talk about maneuver warfare, studying the art of conflict and combat and war. More so than we had in the past. It was something that was sort of a regeneration of understand what our perfection of arms was all about. The answer to your question is yes. But its more sophisticated than just comic believe me. [inaudible] we did. Iraq there was a war plan in place to handle iraq. I left it at centcom. It was thrown the baby luka leadership, by the rumsfeld and bush because they said i will quote Donald Rumsfeld. Its old and stale. Its on the shelf. This was a war plan that was wargame time and time again, adjusted every year, proved by the joint chiefs of staff, forces allocated, exercised by centcom and by its composed. The required 308,000 troops every going to go into iraq. Why . We had a field borders. You had to control the population as she rolled back the regime. If you didnt seal the borders, all kinds of crazies would come over. If he didnt control the population they would start killing each other. You had these brilliant civilians who had gone to that the gaming, that analysis, that understands that the intelligence gave us. Remember he said it will be a liberation, flowers in the street, a cakewalk. We can do this with 130,000 troops. They will greet us with flowers in the streets. Those flowers were ak47s, unfortunately. If youre revising president obama about isis, what with that advice be . I think there are parts of things we need to do right away, and parts of things it will take a little time but need to be added to this to give you a strategic framework. The first thing is you have two dry ice us out of iraq, whatever it takes. If the airstrikes in support of the Kurdish Peshmerga ive been in kurdistan but i was with the peshmerga in the first gulf war, desert storm. They are fighters. They need military support and equipment. The reef and Iraqi Military, we will have to change the acidity Assistance Program because they were devastated by the tax and they need to bolster their military. But whatever it takes, even if it takes us putting boots on the ground, and im not afraid to say because thats a capability and sometimes that saves casualties. Remember the first gulf war, desert storm, when norman schwarzkopf, storm in norman, we resolve that in a matter of hours with very few casualties. Because we play to our hand overwhelming force. Colin powell doctrine, Caspar Weinberger doctrine. Dont try to be cute and just incrementally applied troops. Hit them with your sunday punch. So get them, the first thing is getting out of iraq. The second thing is though that that peshmerga and those Iraqi Military and what Iraqi Military and what it would take in advising and equipment and the support thats necessary. The third thing is with this new government in iraq, now the maliki is gone, this government we have put political pressure on, diplomatic pressure. Theyve got to be more inclusive. Maliki excluded the sunnis and to a certain extent the kurds. The only way youre going to get the sunnis to reject isis and stand up and fight as if they feel they have something to fight for. Again, remember that ladys story told you about, tell me what im supposed to die for the next thing is build coalitions in the region and internationally. Why are we not at the u. N. Now getting a resolution for the authorization of use of force . This allows us to build coalitions. Under that its easier to do. George h. W. Bush before he went to kuwait to knock out saddam, which we couldve done easily on her own, james baker went to the u. N. , got a resolution authorizing use of force. We built a coalition in the region under all the Muslim Forces to work sidebyside with general schwarzkopf. We built another coalition with the british, the french, the japanese and others. All because we had the International Legitimacy of the u. N. Resolution. If its necessary to strike into syria, and particularly at isis, i would do that. So these are the pieces that need to come about in the short term. [inaudible] you dont understand, you dont understand what im saying. Training and equipping does not put backbone in the military. Theyve got to have something to fight for. If you look back at the capitol and they see a corrupt government that isnt responsive to the needs of their ethnic group or religious group, why are they going to fight despite all the training and equipping you give them . The key to make why do americans fight for america . They fight because the american something they believe in. Theres a concept, a constitution, something that we fight for, a way of life. If they dont have that, all the training and equipment in the world isnt going to make a difference. Why do you think isis and others as a powerful . They have an ideology, however growth and distorted. They have something they believe in. You can wish her time giving them more tanks and artillery and everything else. You better give them a reason for being there and doing what they have to do. [inaudible] i be interested in your comments on the war between the israelis and the palestinians that just ended, for the time being. I be interested in your comments. I think what is happening here now, let me sort of take it from u. S. Perspective because there are many which can come at this. We have signed on to be the mediators. I had that mission as special envoy for two years. What struck me, we never really understood the complexity of this situation. This cant be resolved in a summit. It cant be resolved with special envoy at this touch and go. It cant it is always somebody saying given nine months and we will solve it. We just saw what happened with her second a state not long ago. This requires working groups on the ground. The issues are called the final status issues, issues like the status of jerusalem, right of return, borders and many others, water from all sorts of issues. Each of these requires experts from both sides and mediators and others to work out the details. The agreements we had in principle, oslo and the ones that have come about where everybody signed up to them, the people on both sides said, what does that look like on the ground . What does that mean . We have never done the details. We have a quartet out there that works this. Theres a big absence on the quartet. The arab league should be involved because they will have to sign up to whatever agreement, just beyond the russians, the u. N. And European Union and the u. S. You need to open up multiple channels of medication, a private jet, a formal channel, and most importantly an unofficial channel to float ideas. When we would offer ideas or thinking more creatively about potential situations, i found on both sides that was politically difficult for the political leaders to even explore that or show interest. So what you do in whats called track to, you bring in retired academics, retired government officials, retired military. They have no position and they can brain storm. And offer these ideas so that people see them and say that would be acceptable. We could live without. You were allowed to move into the form of negotiation. Im talking about a major restructuring over a considerable time of the way we mediate and bring these parties together. That needs to be done. This shortterm pick a big celebrity figure, have them go out there, give them a couple of months and think you will solve this will never work. This is too complicated. The other thing that has to happen, and when i was there ivisaid this to both parties te and time again, i cannot mediate for your ancestors. Everybody wants to tell me their birthright and i dont know who crapped on what rock 3000 years ago and i dont really give a damn. We are doing this for your grandkids. Look forward. What kind of arrangement can your grandkids live under . You are both here. Its a fact of life. Nobody is going anywhere, no matter what. So how do we make this work for your grandkids . I spent time with palestinian and israeli kids, teenagers want to come together. Its tough for them. Its an easy kumbaya, believe me. They have a difficult to understand who is this person im supposed to hate. They tried to work it out. I spent an entire day with them. I was sitting in the middle of them as they were sitting on the floor in a room like this. Ever asking me questions like this. Violate one girl stood up and said, general zinni, if we kids can figure it out, why cant you of those . Which hit home to me and gave me the sort of focus, the focus is on the future, not on the past. Because if you focus on the past commute focus on principle, you cant get it done. You have to be creative and think about the future of those grandkids out there, and what kind of future and to live under, and had to bring them together to see who they are, each other . They will have to live under this. One of the point. Peacemakers in this part of the world dont do too well. Look at anwar sadat. Killed by his own people. If you look at king hussein in jordan, he also still by his own people. You look at people like a blue barack committed to ms. Offer and put on the table. His political career was ruined after that. So those who reach out for peace willing to take risk in this part of the world, the legacy isnt there either. The peacemakers may be blessed, but there theyre surely not appreciated in their own time, or maybe they needed after. Thats something weve got to change because its going to take a lot of courage on either side to take a risk and maybe to compromise. There cant be a solution where one side is a winner and one side is a loser. It wont work. [inaudible] thats right, yes. [inaudible] sir . We know the middle east is dysfunctional. The question is, besides the middle east where we know how things are, dont you think also that the Foreign Policy establishments are the big powers, is also dysfunctional . Ups and. The question was about the Foreign Policy of the major powers. I think we can see that. We have europe trying to figure out whether its still cohesive, whether can act as a single entity. Our Foreign Policy is confused, its over militarize. Were still struggling to understand. We have a leadership role in the world. We can see the russians that enough step back into the cold war era in their decisionmaki decisionmaking. The chinese who are aggressive and causing problems in their own region. The superpowers on the acting like adults. Not just our Foreign Policy, but certainly others but its a great point. I can take one more. You raise a really good point about the different entities getting into the mix and coming up with a viable solution that will make a difference. Meanwhile, you have political leaders who are not willing to step out of the way, it seems, for this to occur. So the idea sounds great, but how to get people to relinquish their powers and say, im going to give it up to the intellectuals, to the people who have the best experience, you can do this kind of thing to make it work . I would say in democracies around the world youre seeing people get thrown out of office a. In dictatorships around the world, look at adopted, look where assad is now. Look at what happened to mubarak. People are beginning to get a vote in the ballot box or vote in the square in some way. [inaudible] im also thinking about iraq. You said they have to have a purpose. They are so this functional, waiting to survive. Thats what their purpose is life today. We just saw the iraqis the right of maliki. It shall and palestine, israel is a democracy and was the election whoever is in office is who the people choose. That system with so Many Political parties and the need to form coalitions with odds and ends to me is a very dysfunctional system. Its a democratic system but a more Political Parties look how bad it is with us with just too big of a situation where its even worse. The palestinians bifurcate him. Changing leadership sometimes isnt always the best either. Its got to be the right leadership with the right motivation. And to be able to take risks and understand where youre going. I would just finished on this point. A couple of the peaceniks on both sides, israel and palestine, they took they also plan and they sort of revamped it a little bit oslo plan to get an idea that instead of the leadership arguing about this, the plan, flush it out, then put up for a referendum on both sides. Send it out to the people. Can you live with this . Both sides rejected that, the Political Leadership rejected it. So the voice may be in the decision going to the people. Thats what i was arguing for detailed in the plan so that people can understand. Dont tell me with a borders are a lush a showman exactly how this is going to work with security. [inaudible] my suggestion is, my suggestion is you need is working parties, these parties that do the planning. Israel, palestinian, american, anybody else, technocratic advice. Theres some issues like water dish region and other things that have technical aspects but nobody has double drilled down to that level to produce a detailed plan. Not some sort of agreement in principle that is vague as to what happens. I have been given the hook. Thank you. [applause] thank you, general tony zinni. Thank you for being with us. Ref copies of this wonderful book and would like you to have your books signed. Thank you all, and good evening. [inaudible conversations] booktv is on twitter. Follow was to get publishing news, schedule updates, offer information and to talk directly with authors to our live programming. Twitter. Com the booktv. Daniel green and William Mullen come to Operation Iraqi freedom veterans who took part in taking fallujah back from insurgents in 2007 talk about their expenses in iraq. Also about isis and use of american force. This is about one hour. [inaudible conversations] good afternoon. Im bradley graham, coowner of politics and prose along with my wife, and on behalf of the entire staff, welcome and thank you for coming out on this lovely afternoon. A couple of quick administrative notes. Notes. Now would be a good time to turn off a cell phone or anything that might be during the presentation. When we get to the q a session, because were being filmed we would especially appreciate if you would find your way to this microphone here so that the tape can pickup your question. And at the end, normally we ask the audience to fold up their chairs but you dont have to do that at the end of the session because we have another event this evening. You know, on this anniversary of 9 11, its quite fitting that we should be gathering here for a book that involves our military, and a look back at an important part of a longterm fight in which the u. S. Armed forces have been engaged. The iraq war, of course, was an necessitated by the september 11 attacks. That war was more one of choice, but it was fought for the purpose in part at least of helping to keep america safe. And its lessons, particularly lessons about balancing force and diplomacy and relying on indigenous forces, those lessons remain very relevant today, especially as we in this country prepared to reengage in iraq and go after yet another enemy in the form of the group that calls itself the Islamic State. Daniel green and Brigadier General bill mullen both served in iraq, overlapping in Anbar Province which is in the western part of the country. The book that they coauthored, fallujah redux, focuses on a critical turning point in the iraq war, a turn called the anbar awakening and sunni tribes in the province joined the battle against alqaeda and affiliated forces. Dan is a reserve this is banned by the way. This is bill. They are both pretty big, brawny guys. Dan is a reserve officer in the u. S. Navy and served as a tribal and Political Engagement officer for eight Naval Special warfare unit. I guess thats a seal team essentially, right . In fallujah in 2007. He also is done duty in afghanistan both as a military officer and as a civilian with the state department. In fact his first book three years ago, titled the valleys edge, was about a year with the posturings in southcentral afghanistan pashtuns. Dan has a doctorate and local science from George Washington university, is now a Research Fellow at the Washington Institute for near east policy. Focusing on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. I might add as well that dan is a regular here of politics and prose comment and were very grateful for that. Bill has been a marine for 27, 28 years . 28 years now. And currently is with the combat Development Command at quantico. He spent two years in fallujah, first avenue the Operations Officer for a Marine Regimental Combat Team from 20052006, and then as an Infantry Battalion commander in charge of the city for most of 2007. Fallujah has particular significance in the history of the iraq war. He became a center of insurgent activity and was the scene of one of the u. S. Militarys biggest setbacks in the first year of the iraq war. U. S. Forces eventually we took the city in late 2004, but insurgent groups continued to operate in and around fallujah. Then in 20062007 as president bush decided, to serve u. S. Troops in iraq, local tribes also moved to reject alqaeda affiliated fighters, and the United States was able to coordinate these efforts by the local tribes with the campaign of u. S. And Iraqi Security forces. That coordination of course have since come undone in the wake of the u. S. Withdrawals and sectarian this rule by the maliki government, and fallujah is now occupied by Islamic State fighters. While much has been written about what happened in anbar, dan and bill offered a perspective of those who actually served if there. In their book they hold the fallujah an example of what can be achieved by the right combination of leadership and perseverance. Their store is not really a story of a Major Military battle in 2004, but of the more complex military, political and diplomatic moves three years later that did for a time anyway bring Greater Peace to the wartorn area. So ladies and gentlemen, all, i want to make one other note, that bill has asked me to make. All of his remarks here are personal and they do not represent those of his command or u. S. Marine corps or the American Armed forces. Ladies and gentlemen please join me in welcoming both dan green and Brigadier General bill mullen. [applause] thank you very much. What i thought of begin with this sort of why bill mullen and i wanted to write this book. A lot of, how we remember war is so important and theres so many books, for example, about the battle of fallujah, and properly so. When it comes to the city of fallujah it hasnt iconic stat status. But when fallujah was finally won in 2007 from our perspective, victory wasnt a thundercloud. It was more of a whimper. Partly for that reason it wasnt covered that much by the media. The word many books written about it. By the end of the day its also more important to you finish it wasnt sometimes how you started. One of the primary reasons we wanted to club it on this book is a tells what we felt a become a sort of a final chapter of fallujah and how eventually the u. S. Forces learned a lot about iraqi culture, a lot about counterinsurgency, and theres a process of learning within the military after repeated tours that eventually we had an interesting of what was required to bring stability to fallujah. And may provide lessons for the future not just against isis but other groups around the world. We wanted to write the book to capture this moment that we both had a chance to experience. We were there in 2007 for six months. We felt like, if were able to put this on paper that maybe someday future units which may have to perform similar tasks, not going to read a dry after action report. They will read probably in a more. That some people get their understanding of or from books. Thats partly why we wanted to collaborate on this. Also we wanted to showcase that success as possible in this kind of conflict. When i arrived in april and built arrived in march 2007, there were approximate seven and 50 seated incidents in fallujah and the sure and countryside. Include improvise and posted devices, sniper attacks, rocket propelled grenades attacked. You name it. The city of fallujah, in partnering with the tribe that surrounded the city come were able to slowly squeeze alqaeda and push them out of the area to the point that by six months later they had less than 80 security incidents taking place in the fallujah countryside and in the city. We felt we want to chronicle this, put it on paper so future generations may have a chance to read it. And also we want to write about that showcases the sacrifices. One thing bill and i are keen on is we want to make sure we are not saying that two of us got right and thats why things changed. We benefited from sacrifices of countless others prior to our arrival. We benefited from a lot of social movements and things taking place in iraq with the anbar awakening had nothing to do with us individually but we are able to take advantage of that. We wanted to capture the sacrifices of people had come before us and to show their sacrifices were not for not. Eventually we did achieve success and other things took it apart later on. What i thought i would just turn over to bill to talk about what fallujah was like before both served their together, give a sense of things, and he will share his perspective on how we started to change the city. Hows everybody doing today . Were going to double team your. One of the things i wanted to add to what dan brought up i think one of things it