Transcripts For CSPAN2 1973 20240706

Im jim byron president ceo of the Richard Nixon foundation. 50 years ago tomorrow, after four years of delegate on and off again negotiations and military actions by the Nixon Administration, secretary of state William Rogers signed the paris peace accords for the United States. What was not on and off again and was in fact very consistent, was the approach that president nixon took in leading his administrations attempts to leverage great power rivalries and competition for americas benefit. The overriding objective of which was to end the war in vietnam. To discuss nixons grand strategy for ending the war in vietnam, im pleased to welcome pier assal, the Dwight E Stanford chair in American Foreign relations at San Diego State university. Neil ferguson milbank family senior fellow at the hoover institution. Rana mitter professor of the history and politics of modern China University of oxford. My colleague mark up grove, president and ceo of the lbj foundation in austin, texas, will moderate this discussion. And i turn it over now to mark. Thanks so much, jim and welcome. Neal, peer runner for what i know will be a very enlightening discussion on president nixons grand strategy to end the war in vietnam and the Peace Agreement that came into play 50 years ago tomorrow. But but i should remind our audience that you can get into this discussion as well by tweeting your questions to at Nixon Foundation, or if youre so inclined, emailing them to info at Nixon Foundation dot org. So gentlemen, lets start with before we get into the Nixon Administration, what was going on in vietnam and the world. Prior to nixon taking office in january. Of 1969. Lets start with you. How would you characterize the situation in vietnam leading up to the nixon presidency in 1969 . I think that one of the elements that that that americans looking at the war in vietnam tend to forget is that fundamentally whatever is going on in vietnam, by the time nixon becomes president is is is is a civil war that the this this the civil war breaks out in 1945 as as as the communists attempt to assert their jurisdiction over all of the vietnamese ghobadi. And then and then it gets kind of dramatically escalated and intensified an internal rationalize owing to, to, to, to the cold war. The french will attempt to recolonize. Starting in late 45, 46 and essentially at that point, the french war becomes kind of juxtaposed over this. This ongoing vietnamese civil war. And then, as we know, the french eventually lead the americans come in. But but that that that that civil war is is ongoing. So. So we have a kind of a 30 year civil war that unfolds in vietnam as the french, then the americans. Johnson and then. And then and then and then. Nixon become involved in in in in in all of this. So so when when when nixons elected to the presidency. I mean, fundamentally, again, for the vietnamese, it doesnt really change anything. Of course, it raises concerns in hanoi because because the North Vietnamese have been understanding of the kind of man nixon is it it kind of elevates optimism somewhat in in in saigon. But but it really remains to be seen how nixon will kind of change dynamics among vietnamese themselves and between northern and southern vietnam. Neal, how would you put American Perspective during the same period . Whats happening here in america . Well, of course, pierre is right. The United States, in a way, becomes the air on witting air of a french project of of recolonization. And its important to recognize that the Mission Creep was quite gradual. No one could one could say it even begun under eisenhower. It certainly was going on under John F Kennedy. But it was Lyndon Johnson who allowed the american commitment to South Vietnam to escalate massively. And i think its important to understand that this was one of the greatest failures of of American Foreign policy making, a failure partly of process. Johnson was not a great strategist. He was a great domestic political operator. But when he took the tactics that had made him master of the senate and applied them to Foreign Policy, the results were pretty bad. He was, of course, aided and abetted by an incredibly talented National Security team. And so this was a failure in many ways, made in harvard and and thats important to bear in mind that Richard Nixon inherits a mess made by two previous democrats administer nations, but a mess that that gets half a million american soldiers embroiled in a huge ground war, that they are struggling not to lose. That is the strong impression that the American Public has by 1968. Its the destruction of johnsons own ambitions. It rules out a second term for him. It is the dominant issue of domestic politics in 1968, although, of course, there were many other burning issues at that time, not least about race relations. Its hard for us today. We can keep telling ourselves that the country is terribly divided today, that we have appalling polarization and yet when you go back and look at the atmosphere, 1968, when leading figures were being assassinated and the violence in cities and on campuses was much worse than anything weve seen in recent times. You realize that that really was an extraordinary time of upheaval in american politics. And i think ill add a couple more points. It cant be understood. Viewed separately from the cold war, the grand ancestor and global struggle between the United States and the soviet union. Although theres this legacy of decolonizing. The real story here is that the soviet is ignoring North Vietnam more, hoping to succeed where they had not succeeded in korea, they had not managed to gain total control of the korean peninsula. But here in vietnam, there seemed a better shot of achieving total communist control of all of of vietnam than perhaps all of indochina. Because its worth saying from the outset, the we talk about a vietnam war, but cambodia and laos were soon to be drawn into the conflict. And i think none of this makes sense until one realizes that the United States by 1968 was discovering the limits of its power. If that paradigm seem unlimited, when John F Kennedy was sworn in by 1968, the limits were all too clear, partly in economic terms, but more in terms of what american domestic consent forces could take and what it clearly could not take already by 1968 was the nexus. Three efforts to win the war in vietnam. And thats thats the mess that Richard Nixon inherited. Ill ill pause there. But let me just ask a follow up question. What is Lyndon Johnsons principal failure in his strategy in vietnam to that point . Well, i think it was Henry Kissinger who became nixons National Security advisor who who got this right at the time, criticizing johnson in his role as Nelson Rockefellers close advisor. Johnson tended to think in terms of of boxing, and he would throw punches. But the throwing of punches, whether it was air power or of ground forces, was not well coordinated. This was kissingers critique with the diplomats like moves that johnson made. Kissinger wrote a in Foreign Affairs article about the war in vietnam shortly before he discovered he was going to be nixons National Security adviser. This was quite embarrassing. He wanted to try and avoid the article being published, but it was too late. And the article reads extremely well today, not surprisingly, because kissinger had been to vietnam several times in the midsixties, had been tangentially involved in johnsons peacemaking efforts. And its in that article that kissinger sets out the near impossibility of a victory and sketches out how he imagines it might be possible to salvage what came to be known as peace with honor. And im struck as i revisit that essay and then think about the subsequent events by how how consistent kissinger was. He certainly had no illusions going into the white house in 1969 that this war could somehow be won. From the outset, he understood his role as being to extricate the United States from an unwinnable war against a guerilla enemy that had ultimately time on its side and the motivation of its people on its on its side. And i think the critique of johnson stands up well to if i used to teach a course at harvard, perhaps rana, when he moves there, can create something similar. And one of the classes in that course focused on the decision to escalate the johnson took after his election victory of 1964. And its a fascinating case study in strategic disaster because the argue ments for escalation are so constrained by Lyndon Johnsons domestic political priorities that the u. S. Escalates enough to get completely bogged down with a massive land army. I mean, just reflect on how much bigger this was than any deployments in iraq or afghanistan deploys this vast force, and yet does not do enough to win, doesnt even have a clear vision of what victory looks like. So it is i think it is a case study in strategic failure. And the failure was Lyndon Johnsons. I think one has to understand in any discussion like this that Richard Nixon inherits is an almost unsalvageable failure from his predecessor and a lot of subsequent discussion forgets that until one almost fuels reading. Oh, i dont know. Christopher hitchens at his most polemical that it was Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger that started the the vietnam war. Theyre hard task was to try to extricate the United States from its biggest strategic blunder. And i want to underline how hard that task was. The notion that one hears sometimes from the armchairs of academia that there was an easy way out. I think we must be very skeptical about you run a lets pan out to the world. What is happening in the world just prior to nixon taking the white house in 69. Thanks, mark. Well, you know, weve had such a lot laid out there for us that youre giving the Bigger Picture is quite the quite the challenge. I would start to answer that question by first focusing in on the country, which of course, very soon would be at the center of attention for Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. And that, of course, is china. And i think its an understanding china and its part as a part of that global triangular relationship with the soviet union and with the United States, that we have to understand the wider context or what happens eventually. In 1973, with the paris peace accords. But 1969 is setting the ground for that. So first of all, i think its worth remembering that this is a period when the cold war is in a very, very unstable environment. Sometimes with those three legs, if you want to call it that, the peoples republic of china, the soviet union and the United States of america. We might think of it as a tripod, but if so, its a tripod where the third leg, if thats what china is, is slightly different, linked to the others and slightly unstable. And i think thats not necessarily a bad analogy for why this period is so difficult. And its important because actually the ill stop the tripod analogy at this stage. I want to take it take it too far. But in terms of the chinese desire to try and remake its position in the world, a lot of whats going on, both at home and abroad shape that question of how the cold war develops. Actually, really for the remaining 20 years of its existence into the 1980s. So first, just one domestic thing about china before i widen out for a minute or two into into the world again. And that is that this is a period of the utmost turmoil. It is the cultural revolution. The cultural revolution has kicked off in 1966. Its at its height between 66 and the beginning of 69. The red guard period, the one that, of course, has become, you know, an icon and millions of photographs. Mao standing at the center of Tiananmen Square in central beijing and fervent young men and women waving little red books while wearing green uniforms. And from the Foreign Policy point of view, this made this an absolutely hopeless time to try and have a sensible conversation. So i think we have to accept a great deal of what neil said in terms of lbj and his shortcomings. But we should remember that there was one important element when he was looking to try and make a list when his state department was trying to have sensible conversations with the chinese, the opportunities to do that were very heavily limited by the fact that half the time the Foreign Ministry in beijing was being surrounded by 17 year olds who were basically throwing paint bombs and demanding the place be burned to the ground, which may makes the writing of diplomatic telegrams a little more challenging than it might necessarily be in more normal, more normal times. But that didnt mean that china wasnt looking at the world around it and working out how vietnam fit it in. And one thing you have to remember is that china was an immensely important actor in terms of the way in which the vietnamese civil war, which has told us about, unfolded. It was a civil war, of course, but a civil war that lived in the world of the cold war. And in this particular case, as you know, great historians, this period, professor chang gi comes to mind with his book on the china the vietnam wars is that it moves to a period in which the actor doing containment to tell me almost always associate of course with the United States is not the americans in this case, but the chinese. They want to contain the vietnamese. They want to contain the vietnamese revolution. And they are more and more worried that the turn of the vietnamese is towards the enemy. From chinas point of view, which of course is the soviet union. Recall that, of course, just a few years previously in 1960, you have the final open split between the soviet and the communist chinese, which of course had been brewing up ever since the the death of stalin and the rise of khrushchev. But by the time you get to the mid to late 1960s, 1969, remember, is the year when china and the soviet union pretty much nearly went to war. They went to war. Nearly went to war over the jindo islands and the ossuary river. And there was certainly a fear on the chinese side that this might well turn nuclear. So there were a whole variety of constraints that mean that china at this stage really, really needs to orient its Foreign Policy towards speaking towards the americans. And i wont go further than that now, because i know were going to move towards the 1970s little later on. But let me just which i go get run out. Im just going to add one or two other things that also add a little further context in terms of this liminal period of the very late sixties. Before we go into the early seventies. First is to remind ourselves actually about indochina. He has just talked about vietnam. Hell talk more about the region later, im sure, and neal, i think actually just mentioned cambodia as well in that context. This is the year when the revolution is blowing up that will finally within a few months in 1970, throw prince sihanouk kings out of off the throne and essentially put for a very short period a proamerican khmer republic in power under law. No, initially. Now, this is also a reorientation of policy which actually gladdens hearts in beijing, because by this stage, supporting cambodian movements that are not going to follow the vietnamese and therefore soviet line is very important to them. And you see the seeds there of what they do just a few years later, perhaps the most unforgivable action committed by the prc and by the United States in different ways, which is support of the genocidal khmer rouge and whatever else you say about the vietnamese a little later on, they did put a stop to that particular ugly disaster. One of the relevant final one might explanation here, and then ill stop. But it does relate also very much to nixon and kissinger and their global view, at least of asia. And that is, of course, whats happening in india at this time, because were only about a year and a half from the conflict that comes the Bangladesh Liberation war. At this point, pakistan is still one country with two parts in the region. These india is undergoing a whole variety of internal troubles that will eventually, in the midseventies to the emergency period. But at this point, the real crisis is an international one. Its one about whether or not east pakistan is going to break off. We know, of course, eventually that it does. And as many people know, not least as they read the great work of gary bass, for instance, that the question of how the pakistan the pakistan india war and the bangladeshi nation war is going to be dovetailed with the pakistani role in nixon and kissingers approach to china and how that will also be seen in beijing becomes part of the complexity that makes the asian arena a very, very complicated one. Not just if youre looking from washington or moscow, but also if youre looking on from beijing in the middle of that cultural revolution. Thank you, ron. Appear. I think you wanted to add a point. Just yeah. Just a few things. You know what . We know what were talking about. America limits to american power. I think neal neal mentioned that. Right. And then and then and then kind of air is made by the johnson administration. But i think its really important to recognize also that that whatever mistakes the americans made, the outcome of the of the war was, i think i think shaped more by what the other side did. Right. You know, i mean, were not you know, by that by the time the americans come in in 65, were not talking about about about about enemies consisting of guerillas. Were talking about about about a Multi Division or army thats very well equipped. You know, i mean, even even by by the time the french war comes to an end, the what becomes the North Vietnamese army is a Multi Divisional army. I mean, you know, ten years later, when the american war begins, that army is i would argue its its its more its better trained. Its more disciplined. And its far more motivated. Then then the American Military. And its very important to recognize that, of course, the vietnamese are going to kind of play that, that, oh, were just a bunch of poor peasants, right . Were real realistic. And speaking, the the the air Defense Systems provided by the soviet union are remarkable. And the small arms that the chinese give to the North Vietnamese that are used to basically are go after american and allied forces in the south, or as good as the chinese have. So so when we look at all of this, you know, i think its important to to underscore, you know, failures on the part of of Kennedy Johnson and eventually nixon. But its really, really important to get beyond this idea that americans are fighting peasant men and women here. I mean, theyre theyre fighting again. When you look at the North Vietnamese army at the time, i would argue one of the best armed forces in the whole world. And that in itself, to me, goes a long way toward explaining the outcome of the war. So, so so the situation is stuck by the time nixon comes to power. But but but its tough because of how how because of the fact that essentially the North Vietnamese are waging and throughout the period will wage a better war around. Let me come back to you before we jump into the nixon presidency, and its very groundbreaking approach to to try to how did kennedy and johnson view china in in the geopolitical world . Yep. Well, theres some work coming down. Think of the story in columbus, for instance, have done really important work in looking at trying to break down a little bit. What has become a myth, perhaps of itself perpetuated that only nixon could have gone to china and opened up and certainly theres a very good argument that the way it was done fitted a particular geopolitical term and that moment extremely well. But actually the attempts to open up conversations in the 1960s under kennedy and under johnson and sort of lower levels of the Administration Rather than necessarily at that kind of top level. President show level are certainly visible during that time. There are, of course, channels of communication amongst other places in warsaw, which enable diplomats from both sides to be able to talk to each other in the context of another cold war and to media city. The problem came with a combination of the fact that it has to be because remember that the major issue from the point of view of the soviet union, the United States remained each other for most of that period. Now that the soviet union, as mentioned, undergraduates never believed that anything the soviet union really existed for real living people like me, they said to see was like bohemia or mauritania, one of their sort of legends. Historians make up to the police themselves. But at the time it was clearly very, very central in that sort of imagination and combined with the fact that Foreign Policy really became very, very difficult indeed to operate in the cultural revolution along with the overall. And again, just worth remembering, we know this sometimes its its its its its hard to realize it. The fact that china did not have proper diplomatic relations with the United States and actually really with a variety of other major western powers, it didnt have full diplomatic relations with britain until 72. And there are other examples as well. A lot of that, of course, it doesnt have the United Nations seat either. So theres no chance of having those behind the scenes called the sessions in new york, which you could do for the soviets and various other countries which the u. S. Found problematic. So all of that, i think, came together to mean that the attempts that were made were real, were useful in terms of brush clearing. But it did take that real change, that shift in the late sixties, early seventies, to bring about the change that we now think of as the american approach to china and vice versa. So Richard Nixon comes into office 54 years ago this month and he does so after campaigning with a platform that included a secret plan for peace in vietnam. Neil, what was nixons hope for vietnam when he took office 54 years ago . What its fascinating to go back to the deliberation lines of 1969, the very first National Security study that the Nixon Administration commissioned was on vietnam, and kissingers role was, in a sense, to canvass opinion from all the many agencies that had a vietnam policy. Hed made the point before coming into office that there really wasnt a vietnam strategy. The worlds bunch of agencies pursuing their own strategies, and in the course of 1969, there was a heated debate within the administration at that debate, ultimate italy produced the idea of vietnamization and took months to arrive at that decision. But the key decision was to start reducing the number of u. S. Troops in vietnam and to do it in return for nothing. And this was an argument the strongly favored by the secretary of defense, mel laird, and opposed by kissinger, who thought that it would he used the analogy of salted peanuts. The more troops came home, the more troops americans would want to come home. But that was a key decision of of 1969. And its important to emphasize that Richard Nixon, with astonishing speed, reduced the number of american troops in vietnam. Now, that didnt mean some kind of surrender was intended. On the contrary, nixon also wanted to apply pressure on hanoi, even as he was withdrawing troops. How did he do this . Well, the first step in this direction was to bomb North Vietnamese bases in cambodia, to do it secretly, and this, i think, is the key to what nixon had in mind, because he had an extra ordinarily sophisticated grasp of what would fly in american politics. He knew that he had to get the troops out and reduce the casualty numbers, you know, enormous numbers of american young men were being killed in the battlefields of vietnam in 1968. Nixons first goal was to try to reduce that number. But to avoid abandoning South Vietnam, he had to do something to apply a pressure. And i think thats the first i think thats the first thing to get across that nixon was seeking to use airpower as a substitute for ground forces, something that the United States had been doing in warfare since the 1940s. And for the generation, like nixon and kissinger and most members, the administration would force in world war two, it was by no means counterintuitive to do that. Reduced the body count of american dead and use american superior airpower to try to influence the outcome of the war. The key decision which gets us into the realm of the kinds of factual was not to use that airpower directly against North Vietnam in 1969. There are two big counterfactuals that we should maybe talk about what ifs the what if one hears about a lot is well, what if they had just thrown in the towel and essentially abandoned the effort to prop up South Vietnam, accepted the terms the North Vietnamese repeatedly put on the table in 1969. I mean, i dont think thats a realistic counterfactual. I cant imagine if Hubert Humphrey had won the election that he would have done that. But the other counterfactual is the one that kissinger and nixon subsequently he talked about what if the us had escalated earlier, had hit hanoi and haiphong earlier, rather than waiting really until 1972 to use the full might of of american airpower against directly against North Vietnamese targets. I think thats a more challenging and interesting counterfactual. Im not sure that they would have had the domestic basis to do it. I think its important to remember, as i mentioned earlier, the febrile atmosphere of 1969 and the constraints, the protests that were going on in washington itself and all over the country that led nixon to a very important conclusion. And this is the last thing i want to say. If everybody was aware of the Antiwar Movement, it was all over the campuses. It was all over the newspapers. It was all over the television, which played such a big part in american politics then and there were great internal deliberations about what to do about this Antiwar Movement that seemed to be so elected, refined, particularly to Young Americans. Nixon in the fall of 1969, has an epiphany, and it is that although theyre noisy, theyre not a majority. And he understands correctly, i think that theres a he calls it silent majority of americans who really dont have this very negative view of american power. They want the war to be over, but they dont want surrender. And nixon decides to try, regulate, if you like, to make his policy directed towards the that constituency, because, of course, hes already thinking about reelection in 1972. And nixon understood and that what hes going to do has to satisfy the silent majority of americans who dont want the war to keep going, who didnt anticipate some kind of victory. But they do not want to bug out a phrase that was much used at that time. So that, i think, is the way to think about the early strategic decision making. Ill leave 2 to 2. Rana, the significance of of china, but but let me kind of provide, if i may, some linkage to what ron is about to say. They knew that it wasnt enough to apply pressure to North Vietnam. They realized that the way to bring this war to a conclusion was indirectly by applying pressure on the two powers that were supporting the North Vietnamese war effort, the soviet union and china, both of which were supplying weapons and and indeed personnel to the North Vietnamese war effort. So from the outset, and i think this was kissingers particular contribution, the goal was to try to find ways of incentivizing the soviets, in particular, to stop supplying so much weaponry, to to North Vietnam and try to find incentives was a big part of the early phase of the Nixon Administration. Hey, you want to do strategic arms limitation . Well, you better cut us some slack in vietnam. You want to have a conversation about the middle east, what about vietnam . All the time in his endless interactions with the soviet ambassador, anatoly dobrynin, kissingers trying to find some way of getting in return for concessions in other domains, some help with vietnam in the end, it doesnt work. What . And this is my link, my linkage to rana. There is one extraordinarily clever move that really does put the soviets under pressure. And that, of course, involves beijing rather. Robert krulwich right. A plea. Yeah, please talk about that. The how china and the soviet union come to bear in the plans that that nixon and kissinger are putting into place around vietnam in order to strike what they hope will be an honorable peace. Absolutely. Well, its worth remembering, again, just to sort of have the kind of chain of continuity here in a couple of minutes, i think pierre is going to come back in on the vietnamese. Is that every single one of these major actors, china, the United States, the soviet union, is seeking to use the vietnamese revolution as a tool in in service of its own ideological aims. And the vietnamese themselves have rather different ideas, in many cases, not least about how they want to construct their own country. But lets look at that geopolitical scheme that is being woven at this at this particular moment. First of all, its actually right to say, as neil just did, that both the soviet union and the chinese are supplying arms to the vietnamese. And both of them do what the vietnamese revolution to succeed. But of course, rather like warring parents who arent talking to each other, they want that the the vietnamese revolution to succeed for rather different reasons. And theyd rather the other parent didnt get the get the credit. So in this particular case, there is a very strong sense on the part of the chinese that they do want the vietnamese to have a successful revolution, but perhaps rather more slowly than the soviets want them to do. And thats one of the dynamics that really shapes whats going on here during during during these years. So to give a particular example, there are visits from some of the top vietnamese communists to beijing when they get wind of the idea that it may be the case that mao and july are going to invite Richard Nixon to, as president to visit visit china and the vietnamese with some of the vietnamese communists, really dont think this is a very good idea. Theyre not keen for this to happen at all. And theyre saying that in large part by this stage under soviet influence, because clearly its not in the interest of the soviet union for the americans and the chinese to be getting close together, whereas china by this stage is still essentially playing in shanghai, have mentioned before, will bring never again has called a dual policy in other words of supporting the vietnamese revolution with arms and ideological input and all of those elements, but also trying to play another string in which they are maximizing their own position with regard to the americans as well. So they know perfectly well so at the beijing now, john joint like others know perfectly well that the americans are in a mess in vietnam and they need to be pulled out of it, so to say, to speak. And thats clearly a very important part of the deliberations that are going on during the the internal debates in beijing about whether there should be an invitation to nixon at all. And thats again, there are prominent people, many of them associated with the more leftist radical faction in beijing, jiang qing, the wife of of some of mao, and the other figures who become part of that group that sometimes becomes known as the gang of four, are really, again, not very enthusiastic for this direction. And again, while much of the detail of why lynn bell, the then leader, designate to follow mao, the defense minister, who in 1971 took office and still very mysterious circumstances with his family in a fighter jet fleeing beijing and crashed in and out of mongolia. All of this is linked to a whole variety of issues, including domestic politics. But the question of opening to america is very central to all of that. So in that particular set of circumstances, to the desire of beijing to essentially try and play both tracks is a very important part of its outreach to america, because it knows that the soviets are not going to be pleased with that. Its also an important part of the developing situation in terms of Chinese Support for the opposition in cambodia, which will also blow up and become much more of an issue during the years leading up to the paris peace accords and afterwards as well. But again, the playing group like jane, i should say, that people probably have got a lot to say about what the vietnamese thought about the chinese approach as well. Well, thats precisely what will go broader here. Let me let me just go back to the the speech that that neal referenced, that president nixon delivered on november 3rd, 1969, which you talked about, the silent majority, but he talked about the changing approach to the war from the new administration. You said in the previous administration, we americanized the war in vietnam. In this administration, we are vietnam izing the war for peace. What was the response as to what became known as as neal mentioned, as vietnamization by the the the vietnamese . How did they respond . So its just, you know, nixon is that again, its a vietnamese civil war, right . Its always been a vietnam ized war. What nixon is really doing is americanizing the war. Right. So so the vietnam war, vietnamese civil war is americanized in 65. And then. And then. And then undergoes a process of gradual americanization in in starting in 1969. Right. So, so and slowly but gradually, were going to return to the pre 65 situation in in in in vietnam. I so so for the vietnamese the response doesnt really matter much. And this idea of of of of vietnamization simply means what both hanoi and saigon expected all along, that at some point the americans would either capitulate, capitulate or or leave gradually or or suddenly. Just a quick note here, because about about nixons strategy. Right. Because france is looming very large here, this idea of vietnam ization as nixon presents it. Right. I mean, its essentially based on the french policy, occasionally smart, which they they they introduced in 1949. Right. Starting in 49, the french tried to relieve the burden on their own forces and colonial forces by by making more vietnamese fight that they call this the yellow wing of the war. Right. Only smart like that. And thats basically, in a way, what nixons doing here, right. And then and then and then beyond that, in terms of kind of talking about peace with honor, thats de gaulle in algeria right where the goal was in peace with honor. It was basically peace in honor like that, left with l. A. And then we look at nixon taking his time to pull back. Thats thats, again, de gaulle in algeria. Right. That took the gulf for years to get friends of algeria. So so france is looming very, very large in in all of this point about the soviets and the chinese of course, theyre i mean, theyre providing a lot of assistance to to to to hanoi. But but whats really shocking about all of this is that is that hanoi, despite all of this, never feels beholden to either moscow or or beijing. Hanoi is just chalk and lee autonomous throughout this whole process as saigon, by the way, is going to be vis a vis the americans. Nixon is about to find out. In late 1972. So, so, so hard. This deal put pressure on on on hanoi to desist. None of this will really amount to anything. And if anything, as much as as the soviets, the chinese are trying to use the vietnamese to meet their ends. I would argue that the vietnamese are much more at using the soviets and the chinese to meet their own rather rather narrow and revolutionary aims as as they themselves understood, understood them. You know, the launching of the spring offensive in 1972. Right. Which is actually bigger than the tet offensive. I mean i mean, there was no consultation of beijing or moscow. In fact, both the chinese and the soviets are shocked, angry, surprised by all of this. And to me, its just a testament to the not only the audacity of hanoi, but also to within dependance, relative to to to its allies. And and thats the thing mean its you know, certainly nixon will score big by going to moscow and to to beijing in 1972. But it doesnt translate into anything as far as the soviets and the chinese and their influence on hanoi is concerned. Hanoi become concerned about potential abandoned ment. But but its a response to hanois own strategic calculation and not enough to what soviets or to chinese are are telling them to do. And get going back to the soviets in the chinese, hanoi understands how flaky they are at the onset of war in 65. When you look at 1960, fire the soviets dont want this war. The soviets are going to actively urge hanoi to negotiate with the americans and and the chinese on the other hand, are pushing really, really hard in 63, 64 for hanoi to actually go to war in in in the south. And part of that is a manifest manifestation of the sino sinosoviet split right . And then next thing you know, the soviets become more engaged in the war, especially the u. S. Starts Rolling Thunder. The sustained bombing of northern vietnam, as the chinese then start to reconsider their militant stance vis a vis the war in vietnam. And then. And then. And then the World Revolution. Every process in general. Theyre not always aware of all of these things by that that its own allies as reliable as they are in terms of providing for for for the fight can also be kind of fickle when it comes to their own strategic priorities. And i think thats one of the reasons why why hanoi never really kind of pays close attention to what the soviets, the chinese are telling them, which which, by the way the soviets and the chinese will complain about. I found these great documents in the french archives where soviet diplomats in hanoi are telling their french counterparts that, you know, we really feel sorry for you. The french having to fight these guys and try to colonize them because, you know, were were their friends and theyre not talking to than not telling us anything. Theyre treating us as as as the were nothing to them which which again, you know, given vietnamese strategic purposes, vietnam, these communist tragic purposes became became kind of a nonissue despite the fact that theyre so heavily reliant on assistance from the soviets and the chinese here. You touched on this, but let me just for but how could we be so boldly defiant to these two behemoths, china and the soviet union . How is that possible for that . Annoyed understands the sinosoviet split better than anyone else in in the world. I would argue so they know that whatever they do to the soviets, the soviets will still have to support them if only so as to not just a fine chinese denunciations of the soviets as as revisionists who dont care about the World Revolution and vice right. The chinese one of the kind of essential feature of this time the soviet split is the chinese claiming that that they are the true standard bearer of the world, marxistleninist cause. And they get to misunderstand this so, so, so whatever they tell the chinese, they dont really have to care because they know the chinese will have to keep supporting them. If only so that their image internationally remains. One of china committed to World Revolution and being more marxist leninist. And then then moscow. Theres this. Theres a remarkable strategic manipulation here on the part of hanoi of of of the soviet union and the chinese and and ironically enough, of the sinosoviet split, which could have been a serious liability for hanoi, turns out to be one of its biggest assets. I mean i mean, again, the soviets never wanted this war in vietnam, but they get into it because of the sinosoviet split, because once the americans start bombing, then then theyre on the spot. Will you help a marxistleninist ally or will you abandon it as the chinese have argued, you abandon cuba in 62 and so. So so you know, just like, you know. Johnson, in a way, is reluctant to become involved in vietnam, but does so anyway. The soviets, as of 1964, 65, are similarly very reluctant about getting involved in vietnam. But as ron and you have mentioned, because of larger considerations, because for the soviets, the chinese like for the americans, this was never about vietnam. This was about larger geostrategic considerations for ford, for for the soviets and the chinese. This is something that we just have to do, given our commitments to other parts of the world and given how that same world is going to judge us based on our actions in vietnam. You know, despite i mean, just like the spotlight is on ukraine today, at that time it was on vietnam. You just couldnt avoid it. You couldnt ignore it. And the vietnamese were very much aware of that. And through really clever diplo messy were able to get guns from the socialist camp as theyre getting moral and Political Support from the third world, from the western world, including from the americans themselves, by the way. I mean, thats just genius. Imagine that, right . You you find the way to coopt a segment of the enemy population. And so, so, so, so again, go back to my earlier point, right . If when we look at the situation nixon inherits and fundamentally his failure to really change a whole lot about it, it has less to do with the things he tried to achieve than what the the enemy managed to to to accomplish. Neo, lets come back to the United States in the Nixon White House. You wrote a marvelous book about Henry Kissinger prior to his coming into the white house as president nixons National Security advisor. But talk about the role he played in shaping policy in vietnam, how his views matched up to president nixons. Well, they certainly didnt agree about everything ive already mentioned, kissinger skepticism about vietnam ization and. I think there were other points where they when they differed, too, however, i think they shared a Strategic Vision which weve talked about already is as the triangular diplomacy using the opening to china not to apply pressure to the soviet union. And i think piers identified why that didnt work in the case of vietnam. But its worth emphasizing that it worked in a lot of other ways very well, not least, for example, in the middle east. Ill say more about that later. I think its worth emphasizing that in the great scheme of things, the middle east mattered more than indochina and succeeding there mattered more than failure in indochina. But failure is a relative concept, isnt it . It didnt look like failure in 1972. On the contrary, it looked as if nixon and kissinger were geniuses. They had not only got nixon to go to china, which was one of the great televisual diplomatic triumphs of the 1970s, they had secured a strategic arms limitation agreement with the soviet and on the eve of the election of november 1972, kissinger was able to say with what seemed like credibility at the time, that peace was at hand, vietnam and ive revisiting the Media Coverage of those events and it is impressive that even the New York Times is entirely caught up in the excitements of the moment. At that moment, nixon and kissinger really are at the zenith of the of the the careers, their reputations they have them on the front of Time Magazine winners as men of the year. Its its its an astonishing achievement. And so we know with the benefit of hindsight it that it all falls apart and that South Vietnam has gone within a little over two years. But they didnt know that then, not even the most skeptical journalists on the New York Times. And i think if one thinks about this carefully, one can see that at the end of 1972 and then january of 1973, there still seemed a plausible chance that South Vietnam would survive the way south korea had had. I dont think thats a wildly unrealistic counterfactual. I dont think its true to say that nixon and kissinger all along knew that South Vietnam was doomed and were just looking for a decent interval. They sometimes talk that way, but at other times it looked as if that might be a way of keeping the show on the road. And in saigon. And im struck as i read over the document by the effort that went into the terms of that peace and the seriousness with which all the different components of it was studied. We know it all ended in failure. I dont think that that was absolutely predetermined. And here i have to mention the inevitable villain of the piece the counterfactual that haunts the Nixon Administration must always be what if there had not been watergate . What if nixons position had not collapsed underneath him because of watergate . And more broadly, what if had not seized weakness of nixon as an opportunity to assert its complete control over policy with respect, at least to aid to South Vietnam . Remember, its inconceivable that south korea would have survived if there hadnt been aid in the in the period after the end of the korean war. But theres no aid for South Vietnam. Its basically cut off and this day, Henry Kissinger argues not. I think in sincerely the South Vietnam had a shot in 1973, but without sustained american aid and without therefore congressional support, it didnt have a shot. That seems like a very, very important dimension of this story. Before we go to run it, to talk about the the China Dynamic here as nixon and kissinger are looking at the world at this point, what is their top priority. Avoiding World War Three . And this is often forgotten that ultimate attlee, when they sit down in 1969 and here from the joint chiefs what the war plan is they both completely appalled because. By 1969, the logic of mutually assured destruction, sharon has established a scenario in which war with the soviet union means the obliteration of the United States and the soviet union. And i think we forget that that was the number one priority making sure that that relationship did not produce another cuban missile crisis. And, of course cuba was back on the agenda before long in cienfuegos. So i think thats the top priority. And we forget no, the making sure that relationship was stable was the number one preoccupation. Thats why kissinger spent so much time with dobrynin. Makes him almost the most important interlocutor that he has in the world. And i think the way to understand Richard Nixon is in terms of strategic hierarchy, there is a hierarchy of priority, as ive mentioned, number one. And then come down and you say, well, tiger, some leverage with the soviets. The opening to china is the ace and its an ace that i dont think Hubert Humphrey would have played. Worth remembering now that humphrey was entirely conventional in his view, that china was just a crazy place that you couldnt deal with. And the key was the soviet relationship. So i think nixon is boldly original in accepting the overtures from for mao and and seeing all that could be done with that. And vietnams kind of thought because getting out of vietnam is something that i dont i dont think. By 1973, its nearly as important as these as these other issues, because by that time with the american troops home interest in the war has substantially diminished. Its no longer the number one issue, though it is for some. A journalist and i mentioned already the middle east in 1973, it becomes clear that thats the place to really matters in cold war two and cold war one, rather. And in this region, it really is a tremendous american achievement to essentially shut the soviets out, kick them out. They cease to be Major Players in the course of 73, 74. So thats thats the way i would think about this. Vietnam is the number one issue in 1969. It really isnt. After the election of 1970 to run. So how does nixons plan to open china relate to his grand strategy in vietnam . Well, at the most basic level, its clear that theres a whole neal, i think, has it exactly right. And hes right on the money that essentially neutralizing or making the vietnam vietnam war no longer problematic from the point of view of an american goes hand in glove with this. Why did admit which base of course know creates the image of nixon as a statesman who can go places where other people cant and think . I broadly agree with with that neal i would say remind again that there were efforts before that to try and open to china. And i do slightly wonder even if Hubert Humphrey will counterfactuals was difficult to to do that neal is the master master of them i think everybodys got virtual history. I highly recommend you do so. But in that context, the idea that actually china, which of course under its own dynamic was certainly seeking under its more moderate members of government. Zhou and nine others to open up by the early 1970s would have simply refused to open up to any kind of possibility of talking to the americans, i think is less likely. I think something would have happened, but i would absolutely say that the boldness of the Nixon Kissinger gambit is something that shouldnt be denied and absolutely to be acknowledged is really very, very distinct. And that fits, i think, into the idea that essentially asia is broadly speaking, reduced in significant overall as an area of immense concern. And so, you know, again, i think, neal, sort of you call it the priorities list is a useful things to have in mind. If by about 1971, two, three, you can argue that to some extent the Nixon Kissinger administration has managed to make the east and Southeast Asian arena one that is much, much calmer than it would have seen just a few years prior to that and the eventual fall of South Vietnam isnt something that matters in the way that it would have done five years previously, that the indiapakistan question, which i mentioned, which had the potential to break out into a much, much greater and much more destructive war in south asia was no longer a question that no, no, an issue which could have spread further after the ultimate establishment of bangladesh in 1971, the middle east. I mean, again, my 73, not the greatest year for the middle east, but nonetheless, some very, very active efforts to try and calm that down and a Detailed Program which actually in many ways holds all the way until the second cold war. If you want to call it that, emerges with the freezing again of soviet u. S. Relations in the early 1980s. It was, i think, one of the things so the chinese side that a perhaps a slightly surprising deal to back up neils idea peoples idea i think is well actually that the 1973 paris Peace Agreements essentially take take vietnam sort of off the of the table as a major issue the same issue at same judgment i think was also made mao and by zhou enlai, who were actually quite pleased with what they saw emerging from the paris Peace Agreements and actually wanted the North Vietnamese to lay off for a better empire. Will have more to say about this probably in a moment, but basically zhou enlai and the other chinese leaders talk to the North Vietnamese and say, you know, this is a bit like when we defeated when chiang when the japanese were defeated in 1945 and we didnt go straight for chiang kai shek. You know, we spent a couple of years trying to look at alternatives and we took the time to regroup. And you should do that as well. So yes, of course, you must reunify vietnam at some point, but need to be in such a hurry. So in that sense, they too, i think, could have been in the category of people who are somewhat surprised that the treasure in the South Vietnamese state disappeared as quickly as it did. Since from the chinese point of view, if things have gone a purely linear, linear extrapolation, i think they were expecting that state to certainly be around the that much of the 1970s at at least and therefore the determination which of course halpin says absolutely the autonomous choice of the North Vietnamese revolutionary movement. I mean, they done and others by that stage that no, were not going to let beijing tell what the pace should be. Were not going to sit in order to let the the americans do. But also, the soviets are not our masters on this question. And in the end, the accelerate nation of the destruction of the South Vietnamese state has a dynamic that is very, very heavily driven by the ideological desires of people in hanoi, rather than any other superpower. Cold war capital. They quote president nixon again, who said, i have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to a just and lasting peace. As president , i hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the nation along it. So how did he do . I want to ask each of you by, if you look at president nixons goal, how did he do in meeting it . And ill start with you, pierre. I, i you know, for for i for all the criticism that nixons been subjected to, much of which is deserved, i mean, to me, as as as someone who studied the war from the vietnamese communist perspective, that he was able to get any kind of an agreement from the North Vietnamese is quite remarkable. You know, despite what they would claim publicly afterwards and what many historians have gleaned about, oh, this just being a piece of paper, this was so much more for the North Vietnamese. Remember, these guys had entered into an agreement with the french in 1954. Right. The socalled geneva accords. And nothing good that came out of it as far as as as as as vietnams communist leadership was concerned. And so so when the war with the americans begin, its very clear that whatever happens, were never, ever, ever affixing our signature to any sort of diplomatic settlement. And and, you know, they expressed a willingness to negotiate, yet at first with johnson and then with nixon. But theres no theres no actual earnest desire to achieve anything tangible unless of course, its its its the unilateral, unconditional withdrawal of u. S. Forces. Right. But by then, through through a very, very. Clever application or use of diplomacy, military initiatives and other kind of political maneuvering. Nixon manages to put so much pressure on hanoi that he gets that piece of paper and and you know whether thats peace with honor. I think really realistically, its its really an individual call as far as were concerned. But but, you know, given how in tractable hanoi had been, you know, that nixon was able to at least get a piece of paper to me, theres theres you have to acknowledge a measure of success here. The problem is that for for nixon to get piece of paper the he basically had to mortgage his political future. And this is where you know as much as we want to blame congress for what happens after, i mean, you know, all of that secrecy, all that bombing, and it was bound to take a toll, i think. I think as you know, as historians of discourse think, if you try to to look at this objective really, you know, i mean, nixon is supposed be ending this war dramatically, the bombing. And hes got his reasons for doing that. But the problem is that the more you the more you produce prisoners of war and those prisoners are i mean, theyre theyre had no leverage over the United States. So so so you know, by 73, nixon has, as good reason to all so want to finalize an agreement, even if the terms of that agreement are far from from from from perfect. So so, you know, i it of course everyone would claim victory, right . In 1973, hanoi would claim victory. Washington would claim victory. But but i really think, you know, saigon, which which which really didnt think much of the agreement that that perspective is, is the one that i think each side kind of genuinely embraced. You know, hanoi understood that that that this agreement would probably be violated because it was still committed to reunifying vietnam under under communist governance. Nixon, lets face it, never really cared about peace in vietnam. He wants the prisoners back and i do agree he doesnt just want a decent interval for the south. He wants to give the south a fighting chance, but, you know, promises made. But i think thats thats the problem with with nixons diplomacy also, is that is that hes making promises that he knew could only be honored with the support from congress. So, you know, when people say that, well, you know, he didnt provide the assistance, the reconstruction aid that he promised. Well, i mean, you know, given how unpopular the war had become by by the early seventies, and as neal points out, given how preoccupied by other parts of the world the u. S. Had become, we kind of had to expect that congress not be particularly keen on on giving the North Vietnamese billions of dollars in reconstruction aid. So so, you know, its its an agreement. When you look at the Paris Agreement it feels certain immediate needs for each of the main parties. But but as far as peace itself, i mean that agreement never really gave it a chance. Neal, let me ask you the same question. Lets start with you, neal, briefly. How do you evaluate nixons performance . How would you grade nixon in terms of striking an honorable peace with the North Vietnamese . Well, i think its important to give due credit to kissinger, because he was the one who slogged his way through endless hours of negotiation in the secret talks with lee, dr. Remember, there were official talks going on in paris, which were essentially a talking shop, but kissingers rather 19th century belief in secret diplomacy, he did pay off. I dont think it would have been possible to have arrived at that was a compromise wise in the course of of 72 and into 73 without that style of incredibly interfacing able patient negotiation with the interlocutor he paid tribute to is the toughest person hed ever had to to deal with. To simplify. And i have to simplify because there are so many pages and pages that one would need to go through, give all the detail to simplify the United States accepted that North Vietnamese troops would remain in South Vietnam, but the south but the North Vietnamese accepted that they couldnt simply depose to and the South Vietnamese government would continue to exist. Those were the two major shifts that occurred relative to the positions in 69, the kinds of factual that the peace could have been made in 69 could be right, because in 69. The North Vietnamese wanted the South Vietnamese to be effectively deposed. So that thats how they arrived at an agreement. And when one thinks of how long that took. And when one remembers the crucial role of escalation to close the deal, then one has to say that that nixon achieved what set out to achieve. He reduced the salience of the issue domestic politics. He got american troops out, but he continued to exert sufficient military pressure that ultimately, as pierre says, the North Vietnamese overcame their allergic aversion to precisely this kind of of agreement. And i want to reiterate that i dont think it was a chronicle of a death foretold. I dont think one could say in january of 1973, this last and q and the saigon regime will be gone in a of years time. I think that all dependent on subsequent events and in particular depended on nixons collapse domestically because of watergate. Rona, whats your whats your view . Well, if im doing a report card and i think that one has to be to differentiate different elements, then theres one element that i think we can, perhaps with revisionism, give a pretty high grade to maybe a lack of an ace. Ace b or as we say, an oxford alpha slash. Peter neal remember that, im sure from his days marking the undergraduate essays in the oxford for he escaped to the glories of california. But then the second part, the report, which im afraid i think is an f and ill tell you what played card. So i think it is fair to say that when we look the reality of what was possible at that time in terms of an agreement with the vietnamese and it was a peace with honor was is necessary the term we could use even now but suddenly it brought peace and that was a very necessary and very important element of changing the geopolitical situation in a way that then enabled some of those bigger elements that weve talked about, notably, i think, actually contributing to the possibility of freeing up space bandwidth, as we have now, say, for nixon and kissinger and others to deal with. They talked in europe, for instance. I mean, we know from the present day that there is a limit to the number things that any u. S. Administration or any other administration can think about at the same time, which i think is one reason why many people are hoping that were not going to have a major crisis in east asia. At the same time as our existing major crisis in europe. We should come back. We could come back to that. But i think in those terms, i would say that there is a good argument for saying that in the end, the vietnamese, the americans and the chinese actually, i think, got really quite a lot out of what they would have wanted during that period. And the soviets probably werent massively unhappy by this. So i think that that counts as a as a plus in deescalating the the crisis there. And i think also id agree with neal that there is a 1971, 72, some realistic sense that a government in South Vietnam, out of saigon has some possibility of being supported and maintained. I dont think thats a misleading position at all. But i do have to Say Something about what i would say. Perhaps others will disagree. Very happy to have that offers as what i think does count as an effort and that is the bombing of cambodia during the Nixon Administration. And we as secretary of state said the National Security advisor and secretary of state very much involved the decisions on that too. There were a lot of retrospective arguments that could be made there. Obviously geostrategic arguments about the way in which Norodom Sihanouk played both sides in terms of the ability to use cambodia as a sort of backstage opportunity for the revolutionaries, the vietnamese revolutionaries to put forward to restore and to essentially launch a second set of assaults. But that, i think, gets away from the fact nonetheless, this was a country that was essentially at peace, that directly because of the bombing of the country, ended up having to deal with a very very distinct political movement. The khmer rouge, which was not vietnam, were not similar to what happened either in vietnam or in laos. And those two countries ended up with highly authoritarian, communist governments. They still got versions of that today. But cambodia was subjected to something much much worse than either of those. And while it would be wrong, you know, its clearly misleading to suggest that the american bombing, the only factor that created that one person has to take blame for that is mao, who famously met pol pot in beijing in 1973 and told him, amongst other things, the mistake that i made when i took over china was not to empty out the cities early on. And i should have dealt with the cities very early on. We know that pol pot certainly took that to took that too hard. But i think without the bombing, its harder to see how you get to what becomes ultimately the khmer genocide. And that has to be brought into the equation as well. I think. Thank you. Run, neal and pierre, do you see cambodia any differently than than rather just try . I do, actually. I dont think i dont think cambodia was ever at after 1945. You know that for for for i mean for vietnamese authorities indochina was one theater. Right. So so theyre not just fighting for for the liberation quote unquote of vietnam. Theyre also fighting for the liberation of cambodia. And laos. Right. And so so so while while the cambodian communist movement is very small from the very beginning, supported, enabled and eventually and large because because the vietnamese are behind it. The you know, nixons bombing of cambodia was savage. It it i mean, it may very well have been a war crime right under the i mean, and as to whether or not they caused the khmer rouge, i dont know. But whether, you know, in in the defense of American Foreign policy, it was the the North Vietnamese who extended the war to cambodia in rather dramatic fashion, starting in the late fifties by using cambodian territory to infiltrate men and supplies to support the insurgency, which then becomes big in in in the south. So think weve got to be careful here right. You know, again, if we try to think of this as as as good historians. Right. I think i think that you cant put everything on the americans making clear that you you putting everything on the americans. I dont know. Just generally speaking. Right. The shawcross types and say that, you know, the khmer rouge in the genocide is all on on on nixon. I think thats going too far. But at the same time, its not just on the North Vietnamese, so, so, so various circumstances will will contribute to to i mean, what we all have to agree on is there is an incredibly tragic fate for poor cambodia . And its and its in its people, but its in terms determining whos really responsible this kind of a, you know, chicken in the year kind of thing. Right. I mean, technically, you have the North Vietnamese, you could say start it, but then the americans escalate in a way that maybe was not really kind of reasonable. But but i mean, its cambodia becomes a victim of of circumstances, you know, its own leaders make bad choices. But then but then at the same time vietnam cambodia cant cambodias have to deal with with north and South Vietnam the americans the soviets, the chinese and eventually the international community. So so so again, very a circumstance is end up creating a very sad situation for for for for cambodia. Just one sentence. Senator elect which is that nonetheless history shows that the vietnamese communist movement and indeed the lao, the communist movement did not become genocidal, even though they are very abusive of human rights and authoritarian. The cambodian one did. We should look at the range of reasons as to why that. Ill just add mark, if i may. To me, its remarkable. William shawcross, who wrote that very influential study, such as repudiated the argument in recent years. I think the notion that theres a direct link from particularly the secret bombing to the advent of pol pot is, i think thats not right. And even he now acknowledges that thats not right. But i want to come back to the point about the hierarchy of strategic priorities. Much of the criticism of Richard Nixons Foreign Policy zeroes in on a particular country. We could equally well talk about the human cost of of the the bangladesh case. And i think its very easy to find bad things that happened in the 1970s under ford and carter. But the problem i have with these historical accounts is that they they omit the broader strategic picture just as hitchens as in his trial of Henry Kissinger barely mentions the soviet union at all. I think its mentioned twice in our book one one puts the the cases cambodia or bangladesh or for that matter, chile the notorious cases into the broader strategic framework. One understands why these were not High Priorities a not much time was spent discussing the future political order of cambodia they consciously turned a blind eye to atrocity in bangladesh because they the pakistani regime as vital to the china strategy. And i could go on kissinger before he became National Security adviser that Foreign Policy was mostly the choice between evils and one had to try to choose greater and greater lesser over greater evil. And in the Foreign Policy, many academics forget this and imply not. Not often very credibly counterfactuals which everybody lives happily after. In all the Different Countries concerned. And we who study Foreign Policy rigorously, think historically, know that in 1969 there was no way to foresee what cambodias fate would be. Indeed, probabilistically youd have thought it quite unlikely that a communist movement in the country in indochina would become genocidal. This was quite a surprising outcome of of events in cambodia that certainly nobody in washington was thinking about with the with the decision to escalate the and to cambodia or rather to to recognize that the North Vietnamese had already made cambodia part of the war. We have about 15 minutes left in the discussion. I wish we could continue, but several people have asked about Lessons Learned. A lot has happened in the world since the paris accords were signed 50 years ago. The cold war ended the collapse of the soviet union. We saw that america once again could get bogged down in military quagmires and in afghanistan and iraq and now russia invaded ukraine in an attempt to once again expand the russian sphere. So id like to ask each of you, what was the what the principal that we can draw vietnam as we consider americas role in the 21st century appear. Well start with you. I think i think going to a point that that neil raised earlier, when did a colleague of mine air san diego, greg davis, has been making in his own writings, i mean, there are limits to american power. There are things that that that no matter great you think you are, youll never able to to to achieve, particularly if youre facing an enemy like like like like like the vietnamese were or dogmatically committed to this. And i want to emphasize one thing here. You know, when you look at the vietnam war and that kind of the relentlessness of of of of of the of the of americas enemies, this is not, you know, an organic thing by the vietnamese, right. You know, the young men and women who were fighting against the americans for the most part, or were fighting for the same reasons that americans were fighting because they were told to by their leaders. So, so, so, so know what the vietnam war underscores is that when youre facing leadership, stubbornly committed to a particular objective, which also happens to be ideologically driven, youre going to get a run for your your your money because because, you know, i mean, when you look back on all of this, you know yes the us cause massive death in vietnam it could have ended the war sooner but so could have had no and so so understanding enemy is really really important. And to me that thats a lesson the u. S. Has completely failed to to learn from vietnam, which americas to war in iraq and afghanistan claiming to be fighting evil do worse terrorists and this and that never recognize that conceivably these enemies might be well better organized than we think. And were the same thing right now in in ukraine. We keep discrediting the russians, the military, weak. Putin is old, is going to die were going to start coming to our senses here. When you look at other powers that that we happen to have conflicting interests with and kind of learn to appreciate them on their own on their own terms. So i think for americans generally American Foreign policymakers specifically, i think im fortunately very little was learned about about about the American Experience in in in in vietnam. Before i ask neil and ronald the same question, why havent we learned that lesson here . I think, you know, for the same reasons that the americans got into vietnam after the french. Somehow you always think that now were smarter. Were better, were going to do things differently. And and were going to win and and, you know, we we always interpret to fit our own purposes. Right. I would say, i mean, if anybody has learned anything from the vietnam war, it. Zelinsky right now because the way hes engaging the world, its very much like the North Vietnamese war at the time, right . Kind of claiming that, oh, i havent done anything wrong. You know, were poor people. Were waging a peoples war. You know, we have so and, you know, were were fighting war criminals. I mean i mean i mean zelinsky doing everything had no idea. Right. And and hes succeeding and hes hes taking advantage of tensions in the west between the americans and europeans to get all of them to give them everything that they could. You could you could possibly use it. And to me that the resonance between the ways alinskys and how the North Vietnamese were behaving at the height of the war right trying to again play that that that innocent victim card which is to an extent true but not all true is is fascinating. So so so i think i think hes learned his lesson right and invited jane fonda zelenskys inviting ben stiller. Right. So theres a lot of parallels here. But i think as for the American Foreign policy makers and i guess russian policymakers also very little has been learned from the war and still talented. And the only time that jane fonda will ever get compared to ben stiller. Thank you. Ronda. What do you think the principal lesson we should take from for in 21st century america, we should be. Well, i think i would give three, but three very short ones which come together, i think are drawn from our experience here. The first one is that 50 years on, from the paris peace accords and from the Nixon Administration, regardless of what you think of the effects of the Foreign Policy decisions made at that time, and you have gathered that i that some are very admirable and others you know, i still dont find actually worked out but step aside from that for a moment and look at the level craft that was involved in trying to see a hugely complex holistic picture in the sum of the parts. I mean, this is a administration had to deal with crises in the middle east, in europe in south america, in asia, in south east asia, in south asia, and juggle them all in various ways and in many very important areas. I mentioned detente. Ill say it again, south asia ultimately. Well, and thats what were talking about here in vietnam, managed to lower the temperature. If you back at the how the how the cold war looks now this and very, very, very dangerous times in the early sixties. Theres some pretty darn dangerous times in the 1980s and the 1970s. Does in many aspects, not all, but many of them seem to be a period when detente was real. And you have to give great deal of credit to the president s of Richard Nixon and kissinger, others involved in creating that. But the other two things id say almost, almost from a contradiction, but those of who spend time reading chinese, chinese marxism will know that ill do it or contradiction is a good hegelian marxist term. The chinese, even to this day like to add two years. So lets say that there are things and theyre contradictory things that you can learn, which makes sense today. The first is how important ideology is i mean, i think i entirely agree with paul that young men, mostly men, not entirely. And of course, in the United States, certainly actually, of course, in indochina, the recruitment of at least some women revolutionary soldiers was an important part of the movement, too. But mostly young men being sent to front line by their governments was because they were told to do that, because people had strong ideological beliefs. But i also would not underestimate the reality in all societies of how much these beliefs really do matter to. People. And i think, you know, its become a cliche, but its worth noting that the in ability of much of the american analytic policy analytical establishment to understand that the vietnamese idea about themselves was not simply a product of communism per say or even the cold war structures, but to do with the specificities of vietnamese history. I think, is one lesson that we can apply to a variety of other places as well, not simply to accept it, but to it into the mix. But the final, which, as i said, almost kicks against the first one. But i think its always worth noting. Noting, too, is that you can also get too seduced by the idea that ideology tells you what you need to know, whether its communism or a particular form of islamist related radicalism or whatever it might be. And the evidence for that is, the aftermath to this, which of course, is the last of vietnam wars, the site of vietnamese war, which broke out, most notably in 1979 for a short term period, during which when i think its come quick to say president carter asked them helping what on earth he thought he was doing. He replied with spanking the vietnamese, but in in chinese and, this was clearly a territorial dispute, but also one about who was going to be the ideological wrong, the kind of nationalistic victor between, the two sides. But the fact that both regime was clearly shared, shared a whole variety of ideological precepts didnt prevent them going to war any than the soviet or the chinese. Similarities in the 1950s. So stop splitting in the in the sixties. So ideology definitely does matter is one thing that i think i would take from this period. But ideology is not the only thing that matters or sometimes itll take you in surprising directions is the other side of what i think i learned. Neal the major lesson you would take away from vietnam and apply to the 21st century. Well, ill give four briefly. The first is that the us didnt learn the lessons of vietnam, only to forget them, i think its important to recognize is that in the 1980s and the 1990s, radical changes occurred in the us military as well as in the political elite. The shift to an all volunteer force, for example, was a radical change. The reluctance of successive administrations from reagan through to clinton to become involved in a large scale in any major conflict, even when as for example, in lebanon, large numbers of american casualties were inflicted. The odd thing is that all lessons that were learned then that continue to constrain policymakers right through the bosnian war, up to kosovo were forgotten in the wake of 911. Anecdotes. A member of George W Bushs administration, quite a senior member, read the first volume of my kissinger and wrote to me that in somewhat awestruck tones, saying as he read the chapters on kissingers early visits to vietnam and kissingers critique of the american operation in vietnam, he was stunned to find it almost exactly what had gone wrong in iraq. And i found it amazing that he was amazed. So we had a kind of strange amnesia. After 911 and found ourselves therefore forgetting the lessons of vietnam. And i think that explains a lot of what went wrong in iraq and in afghanistan. A couple of more final reflections as it is generally easier start a war than to stop one. And this is highly relevant to the situation in ukraine today. I have just come from the World Economic forum last week i heard a great deal of enthused, indeed passionate rhetoric and support of president zelensky. I yield to no one in my admiration for him and for the heroism of the ukrainian people. But that i heard, had a good answer to the question how does this end . And that is a problem. And i think the lesson we can learn from studying administration is just how hard it is to end the war. And finally, i agree with pierre. Theres much of North Vietnam about ukraine today, but theres also a bit of South Vietnam. When i was last in kiev in september, i said to zelensky, and as people you want to be North Vietnam fighting while talking worked for them youve got to be very careful not become South Vietnam a corrupted reliant on american weapons and support that that reliance could be fatal if you expect it to be indefinite. And surely the lesson of this discussion is that you can have that of support for a while, but its never going to be open ended no matter whos president. Neil, let me ask a question that was asked by a member of the audience relating to what you just said is with honor, possible in ukraine . I it is. I think its already in a sense achievable now because ukraine has done so much better than anybody expected. And kissinger himself, who, of course, still with us commenting on these events, said at davos, ukraine has, in effect, won it has shown that the limits and vulnerability of what we once overrated, the military power has established itself as a as a military power and as a nation which which is a victory in its own right. The challenge for president zelensky is to lock in that victory and not assume that this war can be continued to maximalist ends, which can only, i think, be achieved with the unconditional surrender. Russia. I find it highly implausible that ukraine, even with western tanks, can achieve such an emphatic victory that it can return itself to the status quo. 2014. So there must some realism amidst the patriotic in kiev, and im afraid to say at the moment i dont yet detect it. Pure run and we have about 3 minutes left. Do you see it any differently in ukraine, do you think that peace with honor possible . You know, i first of all, i think i think, you know, if we if we draw from vietnam i think ukraine could conceivably win. But but consider what the vietnamese have to sacrifice to win. Right. So were talking basically two or 3 Million People and then a completely devastated country. So so so, you know, for those of us who advocate for a ukrainian victory, it has be clear here that that that that its certainly doable. But but if history serves is indication were talking about a conflict that will last a very, very long time and be immensely costly to the ukrainians. Right. In that i cant help but think of looking at ukraine. You know, and how its been internationalized. I think about vietnam and what the vietnamese would say after the vietnam war. Right. That looking back this a vietnam is right. They would say that the russian, the americans, the chinese were willing to wage this war to the last vietnamese. And im looking at our approach to ukraine and its were so enthusiastic about it and to the point where, its almost like, you know, we really dont care about ukrainians. We just want them. Its become a cause, right . And its im afraid that were going to be supporting that, too. To the last ukrainian peace is. Definitely possible, but it will require compromise. It will require some hard choices and above all, it will require wider international collaboration. Right now, to me, the west is so driven to to humiliate russia that that that i just i just dont dont dont see the prospects for for peace. Hopefully, cooler heads are going to prevail. But there will have to be some some tough choices to be made as in the case in any successful negotiation. Ron, we have about 3 seconds for you to give us the last word in that case. I think the very last word, great points from both the other panelists from karen neal would say its absolutely possible, but it be done clearly in a bilateral way. This has to be a major Internet National effort and all sides are going to have to pitch in on that. Ron, a neal, thank you for a fascinating. And back to you. The Nixon Foundation. Thank you, mark. And thank you, gentlemen. From the outset of his administration, president nixon was determined to keep the American People informed about the situation in vietnam. Between of 1969 and march of 1973, he made 14 prime time addresses from the white house, specifically dealing with vietnam. 50 years ago this week, january 23rd, 1973, he announced the signing of the paris peace accords, providing for a cease fire throughout vietnam and the withdrawal of all the remaining american soldiers and advisers. All 14 of president nixons vietnam are available in full on youtube from the nixon library. Now, heres a brief montage of several of president nixons time address to the nation on the war in vietnam. Good evening, my fellow americans. I have asked for this Television Time to report to you on our most difficult and urgent problem. The war in vietnam. Since i took office four months ago, nothing has taken so much of my time and energy as the search for a way to bring lasting peace to vietnam. I know that some believe that i should entered the war immediately after the inauguration by simply ordering our forces home from vietnam. This would have been an easy thing to do. It might have been a popular thing to do, but i would have betrayed my solemn responsibility as of the United States if i had done so. I want to end this war. The American People want to end this war. The people South Vietnam want to end this war. But we want to end it permanent so that the younger brothers of our soldiers in vietnam will not have to fight in the future in another vietnam, someplace else in the world. The fact that there is no easy way to end the war does not mean that we have no choice but to let the war drag on with no end in sight for four years. American boys have been fighting and dying in vietnam for 12 months. Our negotiators ive been talking with the other side, paris. And yet the fighting goes. The destruction continues. Brave men still die. The time has come for some new initiatives, repeating the old formulas and the tired rhetoric of the past is not enough. When americans are risking their lives in a war, it is the responsibility of their leaders to take some risks for peace. Would like to report to you tonight on some of the things we have been doing in the past four months to bring true peace and then i would like to make some concrete proposals to speed that day. My fellow americans, i am sure you can recognize from what i said that we really only have two choices open to us. We want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all americans from vietnam. Regard to the effects that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement of possible or youll continue to implementation of our plan for vietnamization, if necessary, a plan in which we withdraw all of our forces from on a schedule in accordance with our program as South Vietnamese become Strong Enough to defend their own freedom. I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It the right way. It is a plan will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in vietnam, but in the pacific and in the world. So tonight, do you the great silent majority of my fellow americans. I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the presidency to end war in a way we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support i can have from the American People, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed for the more divided we are at home. The last likely the enemy is to negotiate. Let us be united for. Let us also be united against. Defeat. Because let us understand. North vietnam cannot defeat our humiliated United States. Only can do that. Good evening, my fellow americans. Ten days ago, in my report to the nation on vietnam, i announced the decision to withdraw an. 150,000 americans from vietnam over the next year. I said, then that i was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity, laos in cambodia and in South Vietnam. And at that time, i that if i concluded that increased enemy activity any of these areas and danger the lives of americans remaining in vietnam. I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. Despite that warning, North Vietnam as increased its military aggression in all these areas and particularly in cambodia, was after full consultation with the National Security Council Ambassador bunker, general abrams and my other advisers. I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last ten days clearly endanger lives of americans who are in vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be after withdrawal of another 150,000 to protect men who are in vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal. Oil and vietnamization programs, i have concluded that the time has come for action. North vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries. They are encircling the capital of nam. Here is South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam. North vietnam already occupies this part of laos. If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band in cambodia or the entire country, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely outflanked and the forces of in this area as well, the South Vietnamese would be in an untenable military position. I would rather be a one term president and do what i believe is right and to be a two term president at the cost of seeing america become a second rate power and to see this nation accept the first defeat and its proud. 190 year history. Good evening, my fellow. Over the several weeks, you have heard a number of reports on tv, radio, in your newspapers, on the situation in Southeast Asia. I think the time come for me as president and as commander in chief of our armed forces, to put these reports in perspective. Delay all the pertinent facts before you, and ill let you judge for yourselves as to the success or failure of our policy. And while we hear and read much isolated acts of cruelty, we do not hear enough of the tens of thousands of individual american soldiers. Ive seen their building schools, roads, hospitals, clinics who, through countless acts of, generosity and kindness, have tried to help the people. South vietnam. We can and we should be. Very proud of these men. They deserve, not our scorn, but they deserve our admiration and our deepest appreciation. And the way to express that appreciation is to end americas participation in this conflict, not in failure, in defeat, but in achievement of the great goals for which they fought South Vietnam, free to determine its own and an america no longer divided by war, but united in peace. I have asked for this Television Time tonight to make public a plan for peace that can end the war in vietnam. The offer that i shall not present on behalf of the government of the United States and the government, South Vietnam, with the knowledge and approval of president thieu, is both generous and reaching. It is a plan to end the war now. It includes an offer to all American Forces within six months of an agreement. Its acceptance would the speedy return of the prisoners of war to their homes. The past three weeks. You been reading and hearing about the massive invasion of South Vietnam by the communist of North Vietnam. Tonight, i want to give you a report on the military situation in vietnam. The decisions i have made with to the role of the United States in the conflict and the efforts we are making to bring peace at the negotiating table. As i reported in my address to the nation on january 25, we have offered the most generous peace terms in both public and private negotiated concessions. Our most recent proposal provided for an immediate cease fire, the exchange of all prisoners of war, the withdrawal of, all of our forces within six months, and no elections in vietnam, which would be internationally supervised with all political elements, including the communists, participating in and helping to run the elections one month before such elections. President , you and Vice President quang would resign now. Hanoi answer to this offer. Was a refusal even to discuss our proposals. And at the same time a huge escalation of their military activities. The battlefield. Now that we have achieved an honorable let us be proud that america did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war or, that would have ended the war for us. But would have continued the war where the 50 Million People of indochina. Let us be proud of the two and a half million Young Americans served in vietnam who served with honor and distinction. And one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Vietnam might live in freedom, and so that the world might live in peace. In particular, i like to say a word to some of the bravest people i have ever met. The wives, the children, the families of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died, those who suffered, would not have died and suffered in vain. And so that where this generation knew more the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment. And the fact that your long vigil is coming to an end. Just yesterday, a Great American who once occupied this office died in his life. President johnson endured the vilification of those sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared about more deeply and achieving lasting peace in the world. I remember last time i talked with him. It was just the day after new years. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace. And i was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he. And i know he would join me in asking for those who died and for those who live. Let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last last. Thank you and good evening. Is an historian of the vietnam war who has written three books on the subject, most recent recently was earlier this month. Triumph brigade, the 2018 to 2020 2019. Dr. Moyers served as director of the office of civilian military cooperation at usaid and previously served as director of the project on military and diplomatic history at the center for strategic and studies in washington, d. C. He holds a b. A. , summa cum laude from, harvard and a ph. D. From cambridge. Dr. Moyer is the william p. Harris chair in military history at hillsdale college. And its my pleasure to introduce dr. Moyer for remarks on the vietnam war and the paris peace accords. Dr. Moyer, thanks jim, for that great introduction, appreciate the opportunity to speak. Im going to talk today about broader issues of vietnam historiography and talk a bit about nixon himself and his role in what i covering the new book triumph regained goes from 6560 age. Its the sequel to, the earlier book i wrote, triumph forsaken, which goes from 54 to 65. And now the last version will look at 69 to 75. And i spent about seven years on the first volume and then off and on, worked on this. The new one for about 13 years. And so just digging into the research on the nixon period, i wont attempt to get into debates with the great group that was, but came before and is speaking afterwards because i think i have learned and this is till you really dig in to the documents primary sources, most of what you heard is probably inaccurate. So premise of both of these books of mine is that the early versions of history were, in many cases distorted either just because there was a lack of information or people had partizan agendas. Now, 50 years is often seen as kind. The time when we look back say, well, we can take a more dispassionate approach. I think theres still a lot of passion in the subject. But i think hopefully we can be a bit objective in how we look it now in the books i address what has been the controversy between the orthodox and revisionist views of the vietnam war . There are some who would say, well, i think we can we ought to move beyond these labels and those are a thing of the past. But i do think theyre useful in staking out some of the ground. I dont agree entirely with the revisionist, but i think its correct in many respects. It hasnt been fully covered by the academy and for those who arent familiar, you know, revisionist during the cold war initially, the group that was critical of the Us Government for its conduct of the cold war. But when we get to vietnam and the much of the establishment shifts against the war, then then the antiwar anti administration faction becomes orthodox. And its those later who come to defend, to a large degree, the administration or the the. The. Well talk very briefly through sort of the origins of the war, which i cover and some of you may know nixon president nixon was very involved in some of the early discussions about vietnam in 1954 with the battle of jim byron phu. He supports sending american troops to take the place of french troops, as the french are trouble. The president says no in. The first of my books, which im only just doing my very briefly, i do the title triumph forsaken refers first and foremost to, the coup of november 1963, when South Vietnamese generals overthrew and assassinated president newtons with support from the United States and at the time, i think actually Richard Nixon understood than most what was going on. And he said in october of 63 that and i quote that i would say the day that in vietnam the choice today is not between president and somebody better. It is between and someone infinitely worse, which is, i argue that dont argue that that that is spot on and in fact is this coup that leads to a rapid decline in the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and will encourage North Vietnam go from guerrilla war to conventional war. We also know that nixon told on november 4th, just two days after the assassination, that said, our complicity in murder was a National Disgrace child. So i agree with. But at the time, a lot of people didnt really understand this. But he clearly did see that. So after jem you have this revolving of South Vietnamese governments, changes in power and each them purges people who they saw as being too loyal to the preceding regime. And this has a highly debilitating impact on the South Vietnamese government in 1964 and august, you have the tonkin gulf where theres a North Vietnamese naval, a naval attack. The second one, it seems doubtful it actually happened, but there was a perception of attack on the americans and Lyndon Johnson decided to take a limited response based on the academic theories that that robert had been giving him and that hoping to convince north that this is showing resolve. But in fact, the opposite happens. And the North Vietnamese take it as a sign of weakness. And then johnson reinforces that in 1964, during the election, when he says were not going to send american boys nine or 10,000 miles away from home to, do what asian boys ought to be doing for themselves. And when nixon and johnson gets to middle of 65, the North Vietnamese invasion is now in full bloom. General westmoreland saying hes about to fall. Johnson takes a sober look at whats going on in Southeast Asia and and he subscribes to the dominos, as did Richard Nixon and dwight eisenhower. And most other serious statesmen of the time and the domino theory will get maligned later on after 1975, when the dominance fall. Most of them cambodia falls and khmer rouge kills a couple of many people. But of the other dominoes in the region dont fall. Its argued that, you know, the domino theory really wasnt valid and it was just foolish to be in vietnam. But i argue that the world changes fundamentally from 5 to 75. And this particularly germane to the nixon period and the anniversary were selling a set of celebrating today because the strategic stakes are going to change very dramatically the now in the new book i pick up with the American Intervention in august of 65 and its not long after that that we get to what is one of the most important events in the entire cold war one that gets ignored in many cases. And that is the indonesia and coup and countercoup. Of october 1965 in that episode, president sukarno, who is now in league with the Indonesian Communist Party is decides he to destroy the leadership of the Indonesian Military because they are seen as too hostile to the communists. So he orders that the leaders be rounded up and they are some of them are killed, some are arrested. One escapes, but he neglects to arrest one critical general thats, general suharto and he thinks suharto is an opportunist and will go whichever way he sees things going. And to some extent, thats a proper analysis because doesnt do anything at the beginning when he learns of this coup, hes near the location where the where the coup is taking place. So what he does is he goes and surveys other generals in near the capital to see which way there are to go and. Enough of them say that they want to resist the communists that that is ultimately the course he chooses to take. And in book i said a lot of evidence indicating that in fact, the americans ended. Vietnam is critical to this decision of the Indonesian Military. I think had the United States bailed out in South Vietnam, the indonesians would have seen that. Basically theres no hope that the americans going to help them resist communism and they would have gone along with sukarno and, president , future president nixon is actually one of the first people to recognize this truth. And in his famous Affairs Article of october 1967, he actually writes that the u. S. Presence has provided tangible and highly visible proof that communism is not necessarily wave of asias future. This was a vital factor in the turnaround indonesia. So then from there i argue that, chinas specialists looking at what happens next, highlights the impact of two critical setbacks for china in late 1965. One is the American Intervention. Vietnam and the other is the failure of sukarno in indonesia. So he had beginning of 65. Things were looking great for him. All of a sudden, these two big victories, hes hoping for a fall out of his reach. And this encourages him shift away from Foreign Affairs, internal affairs and to look for enemies within. And this then provokes the great proletarian cultural revolution which will devastate chinas economy and its military. Several Million People probably dont know the exact numbers, but a lot of people killed, including a lot of the societys elites. And it will lead to a decline in support for other in the region. It will also be a cultural revolution and also vietnam itself lead to a widening of the split. The soviets are appalled by the cultural revolution and they are competing with china for influence in North Vietnam and as us air war builds up over North Vietnam, the vietnamese increasingly look to the soviets help. Because the soviets have antiaircraft craft weaponry that china doesnt have and. The growing dependance of North Vietnam on the soviets will cause china to become increasingly skeptical and eventually and so we see because of these changing dynamics, because of indonesia and also what we see china losing its appetite for these International Crusades and then the falling out between china North Vietnam that the Strategic Value of South Vietnam is declining from the of view of the United States. It doesnt go to zero at any point, i dont think. But but this is certainly something that i think is weighing on the minds of nixon and kissinger and others in the United States as events proceed in the early seventies. Now, during the period in the latter of the johnson administration, one of the biggest disputes which i covered in detail is over the question of expanding the war the joint chiefs of staff, president eisenhower and other hawks, including Richard Nixon, are arguing that under the parameters by president johnson, there is no way really to achieve a decisive end because. Youre just fighting in South Vietnam. You allow the North Vietnamese to keep sending troops indefinitely into country. So no matter how many of you be killed, theres going to be more. The war could go on and they they want, in particular, cut the huge human trail. Whilst theres a lot of pressure to step up the bombing of the north, operation Rolling Thunder and the belief that the gradual escalation of Robert Mcnamara has not been sufficient to for most of this period, johnson is still under the spell. Mcnamara and mcnamara has a lot of reasons why he opposes these methods of escalation and arguing that not going to work, that theyre going to provoke chinese soviet intervention, particular now we have with the wisdom of 50 years and is more information has come out we have a much better idea of how to assess these alternate options and we know from both the soviets and, the chinese, that in fact, they were not interested in intervening militarily directly in vietnam. They had own problems to deal with. The chinese had gotten burned in korea. They didnt want any part of that. So there were a lot of missed opportunities on the us part because of false fears of the enemy that president nixon will himself. In each these cases at some point in his presidency take action, the incursion to cambodia in 1970, sending the south and hes in laos since 1971 and escalating the bombing in 1972. There is one point ive found one of the more interesting things that ive had no idea about is that in 1967, there is a point where the North Vietnamese appear to be on the brink of submission because johnson is temporarily authorized new strikes in North Vietnam and, North Vietnam, the city of hanoi, on the brink of starvation because of the damage to their infrastructure. But johnson will end up backing off and he doesnt really. Understand whats going on. The depth of the problems there and so this will be another missed opportunity. So Lyndon Johnson in march of 1968 goes on the air to announce that he is not going run against four president s and hes going to stop bombing parts of the north for a while. And this is often taken as evidence that basically the United States has begun to check out of the war. And this is another, i think, critical missed, which is also important in understand ending how the war transitions the nixon presidency. But johnson does not actually really plan to deescalate in the north in areas he stops bombing at this point in time are actually areas where the weather is so bad that you couldnt bomb much anyway. And well see. To the end of his presidency, he will not reduce the u. S. Troop level and he will continue to to keep up the military pressure in the south south. In the second part, well, starting in may 1968, theres two more big North Vietnamese offensive, as they call them, the second and third wave. First wave being the tet offensive of 1968, which had gone horribly wrong. The second third wave are not as well known. But in the book i have made use of a lot of North Vietnamese sources from merrill probono who, some of the other people on this have also benefited from these north east sources and clearly that these two, the second and third wave offensives were even more devastating to them than the first, because they basically tried the same thing which was attacking the cities, and this time they didnt even have the element surprise. And so the american South Vietnamese are just there waiting to crush them. And so this will the end of the third wave. This will pave the way for an expansion of the Pacification Program and will leave the incoming president with a much more favorable environment within the south. And i argue that the its really this change in the military situation that leads to a fundamental change in the american way to the war. I think sometimes the argument that general abrams, when he comes in 68, changes things just based on philosophical differences. But he actually keeps things more or less the same until. This third wave of friendship has been crushed. And so in november of 68, we get to the accelerated Pacification Campaign where something in his government starts going very rapidly. A number of villages where it had not been for a long time, and with considerable success. When we get towards the end is 68 also found sort of startled to find information on Public Opinion that seem to contradict what we generally thought people who read about war are probably familiar with a chart that shows over time the answer to the question do you think the u. S. Made a mistake sending it sending troops to fight in vietnam . And in 1968, for the first time, you see more americans are saying it was a mistake that then was not a mistake. And so this has been interpreted as proof that, aha, see now the American People in 1968 have lost hope in the war. Theyre ready to to give up. Well, that turns out not to be the case it turns out that there are a lot of people who think it was a mistake and we dont know why it necessary, why they thought it. But it was a mistake. They think we should still keep fighting there. And, you know, a lot of these are hawks who fight it was a mistake probably because of how the administration handled it, they didnt like how theyd been handled. We have two polls from late 68 about us policy and what people think should be done. And one of them says, and this is in october of 68, how many how Many Americans want to out of vietnam entirely, its only 13 . And the other poll thats taken in this time is about 19 . So less than one out of five americans are actually at the end of 1968 advocating that the us just out of vietnam, which is very from how we often perceive this period, one of the most interesting aspects of this enduring support, too, is the fact that you never really have a president who is selling war to the American People in the way that other have done. And Lyndon Johnson will admit to this in some candid conversation. And he says at one point, if history indicts us for vietnam, it will be for fighting a war without trying to stir up patriotism. And so its especially remarkable that you have this ongoing for a war. And i think it reflection of American Culture that americans recognize the importance of perseverance, they recognize the damage could incur. If you go a nation and then just bail out on your allies very quickly when things go south. Theres also a general recognition that there is a global struggle with communism thats going on and that the United States needs to prevail ultimately in this struggle. And you can also see interesting signs of the public mood from the president ial race, the contrast between richard and Hubert Humphrey. And when you get to the Chicago Convention in august 1968, the democrat convention, humphrey he is being urged by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party to adopt a dovish plank which involves quickly pulling the United States out of vietnam, forming a Coalition Government between communist and noncommunist. The same sort of Coalition Government that had failed miserably in in czechoslovakia and poland and elsewhere. But humphrey decides hes not going to go with that liberal plank, even that he himself fairly liberal, but the partys moderates and conservatives do not like this liberal plank. They are among those who want to stick it out. And so its an indication of the support for the ongoing support for the war that humphrey ends up rejecting the liberal plank and going with a more centrist which involves continuing continued american participation in vietnam and he gives a famous speech at Salt Lake City in october is an attempt to close, which a very large, large gap with Richard Nixon. And so he about being more comedy aiding in negotiations but he still at the end says that we are not going to withdraw from vietnam. You still concerned about all of these moderate and conservative democrats and other voters who are not on board with the idea of pulling the plug on vietnam. Now, nixon himself during the campaign, he is very interested in courting moderate voters and. Hes in a pretty good position to do this because hes already built up this reputation as a staunch anticommunist and so can afford to make some more than humphrey really. Then to to make some talk of of negotiating a peace without seeming to stop and he does oftentimes try to avoid committing himself too much to any one initiative. And he will on a number of occasions that preserving South Vietnam is essential to our security. He doesnt talk as much as before about harsher and stronger measures of escalation and he does at one point is asked by a journalist if he has a secret plan to end the war and turns out he didnt say that. But. News reporter somehow decided he did. And so we have this myth out there that he promised to have a secret plan and now and some usually allege this was sort of a falsehood because he didnt actually have a secret plan. Well he does think the record shows indicate that he had something elements of plan. It wasnt a highly concrete plan but it included strengthening the South Vietnamese armed forces and increasing American Military pressure while seeking a diplomatic solution and to do he was going to put pressure on the soviets and the chinese, too, to pressure the North Vietnamese. And he also talks about threatening the North Vietnamese with devastation as a means of getting them to go along. And that seemed that he was expecting that he could achieve this sort of diplomatic settlement within his first year in office. One of the things i want to mention briefly about the 1968 election, it was covered near end of the book. There is the longstanding assessment or allegation that the Nixon Administration, nixon candidacy campaign colluded with madame shino to throw the election and that chenault and nixon convinced president to to avoid getting into peace negotiations simply by by drew underhanded and so forth and after looking at this its its very clear that chou did not fact need any of this pressure cajoling from china nixon. He knew early on that humphrey was a bit tepid towards his and the cause and knew that nixon would be tougher and more supportive of South Vietnam. And so he does face this choice negotiations that could influence the election in you have to make a decision and he does decide to abstain from the negotiations which will help nixon get elected. But there is no its just no reason to believe that either nixon or chenault had any influence, because, again, chou already knew that it would be better for him if nixon won the. One other piece of evidence just about the prevalence of support for the war is in the final vote. Humphrey gets less than 43 of the vote, whereas the rest goes to nixon and then to wallace, who was even more hawkish on the war than nixon. And we get to the end of 68. You see jubilation among South Vietnamese and among Many Americans about nixons election because they concluded that this is going to lead to a tougher tougher policies in the war. And the North Vietnamese, by contrast, are now very discouraged because they are convinced that nixon is going to be tougher than than than johnson been the last point i just leave you with is that. When we of the long term perspective that we did the u. S. Does end up saving most of the dominoes. It doesnt save South Vietnam. When you look at what happens in the rest of the region the countries that the us does end up saving south korea and taiwan in these internal struggles they now two of the most prosperous nations in the world. Whereas china, north korea are two of the least free and theyre in comparison not as prosperous. And vietnam i think the same goes for vietnam. So i think tragic legacy is that there is not today a South Vietnam and this i think there certainly could have been a South Vietnam that would look a lot like south korea today. So thank you very enjoyed the opportunity to speak with you for. Thank you, dr. Maurer. Over the course of several months in 1983, historian and writer frank gannon conducted, eight interviews comprising more than 30 hours with former president nixon in washington from 1971 to 74, dr. Gannon was white house fellow and special assistant. The president in san clemente from 1974 to 78, he organized the research and writing of r n the memoirs of nixon. Since 1990, he has been a consultant to the Nixon Foundation. Before we return to the second panel. Heres a short excerpt about vietnam from the second and third days of the nixon gannon interviews. November 1968. Youre president elect. Youre looking at options for vietnam. You have been elected with a youve been given a free hand, arguably a mandate for change. The war is divisive and unpopular. Men are dying. Two is unpopular and corrupt. Why didnt you do one of two things . Either do what . To be done militarily in order to win end the war by victory, or develop a sort of withdrawal with honor option. Cut our losses and and get us the hell out of vietnam. Well, first the you have two options. One is called the option to the right and the other is called the option to the left. The option to the right, unfortunately, had been completely taken away from us by the bombing halt, by reason of the bombing halt. I was bound by it, even though i had not negotiated it. And so all of the negotiations going on in paris and i sent cabot lodge over there to indicate how serious we were to try to find a negotiated settlement and as far as taking military action was concerned, i felt that that option had been had been taken away from. Let me say also that while you say that i was elected with the mandate. We have to realize that houses of the congress were under the control of the democrats. This was very difficult. Different from the situation that president johnson had after 1964. He had 2 to 1 majorities in both the house and the senate. He could have done anything that. He wanted in vietnam and gotten away with it. He just provided he had leveled with the congress and level with the country. And that and eisenhowers opinion and a mind to which his great mistake, gradual escalation. And as a result, we have 500 had 500,000 in vietnam rather than 16,000 when he came into office with course, enormous more casualties. Now, as far as the other particular option is concerned, the option to the left, i know that there were those among my political advisers who said, look, kennedy started the american commitment, vietnam, at least the commitment to combat units and combat advisors. Johnson escalated it. Now you can end it and put the blame on them for what happened in vietnam. In other words bug out. I couldnt do that. And frankly, i considered it. I said in effect, this is not kennedys, as some would suggest are johnsons war. It is americas war. I knew what would happen. I had been there. I had been there going to 1953. I was there in 53, 56 and four times in the sixties. And i knew that if we were to get out of vietnam then the communists but overrun it. I also knew that if we got out under those circumstances, it would have a devastating on our other allies in that area. The ties for example, the filipinos and so forth. And i also know and this is a conviction i have even today i knew it would have a devastating effect on the american morale, on our willingness to play a credible role in the world, because there be instant relief for a while and then there would be a turning and say, why do we have this loss of life for nothing . What would it have taken to militarily in vietnam in 1969 . Or was a military victory . Impossible, given the guerrilla nature of the war. In 1969. A military victory over the north . Not impossible. In fact, if i have a regret, it was that i was to do early in 1969. What i later in 1972 to bomb and mine in the haiphong hanoi area. Because we could have brought the North Vietnamese military capability to its knees. And without the North Vietnamese support, the South Vietnamese would have been able to handle the viet cong in the south. There was question about that. Incidentally, there were some what i call super hawks who thought we should have gone further. They said that we could bomb the in North Vietnam, particularly in the winter, in the wet season and other say we could use Tactical Nuclear weapons. I ruled both of those for two reasons. One, because i didnt think it was necessary. And the event we went on the military option. I thought that the bombing and mining which i advocated incidentally in the sixties visiting vietnam that that enough would quarantine North Vietnam, which is phrase that i used. On the other hand, i felt that if we use Nuclear Weapons or if we caused of thousands of deaths of, innocent people in north and north in order to win the it would be a pyrrhic victory would have had devastating consequences all over asia including particularly in japan, which was the big prize in asia today as it was then. Your november 3rd speech was one of the most extraordinary moments of your presidency, even one of the most extraordinary moments of contemporary political history. You went on television, defined a whole political constituency, and then rallied it to do something that few thought possible to support, continued fighting of the war. We have a clip from that famous silent majority. Tonight in great majority of. My vote on this. I ask your support. I pledged in my campaign to the presidency to end the war in a that we could win peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support i can have on the American People, the that i can be willing for the more divided are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate negotiate. Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against because a lot of understand North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only americans can do that. How did you plan and that speech and did you have any idea. It would have the effect that it did have. Well, first we got to look at a little of the background we had had the october moreton, as i pointed out earlier, that had destroyed any for us to escalate. And another moratorium planned or they called it Something Else, a mobilization, i believe on november the 15th. So under the circumstances, i knew it was necessary to address the nation. I think what made the speech a success was first, the tactics i, in presenting it. I remember i drove my staff up the wall. They to me, almost every hour said the press has really complaining that they dont have an advance copy. I said, dont give them an advance copy. I want to talk directly to the American People. I knew that 90 of the press was against. We were doing in vietnam and i knew that if they got an advance copy, they would destroy by putting out earlier what i was going to say and by giving their arguments it, they would destroy the effect of it. So i gave no advance text. I also did not give an advanced text to members of my staff and to accept just few minutes before i went on. I informed everybody, concerned what i was going to say without into all detail on every respect. I did most of the writing with a great deal of help, incidentally, from our nsc staff, from Henry Kissinger and others. But i did the writing at camp david, and thats where very late at i think it was 2 a. M. In the morning, the silent theme came into my mind. Not that its brilliant, but as i pointed out in that speech here, we had damaged gyrations going on all over the country. We had people indicating that our brave young men, our best men, were going to were not in vietnam. But thats. They were going to canada, rather than in. And vietnam. But under the circumstances, i therefore tried accomplish three things. First, i deliberately in advance did not try to put down speculation as to what was going to say. Some senators were speculating and i was going to announce a major withdrawal forces. Others that i was going to a cease fire. Other said that i was going to announce more conciliatory attitudes toward the demonstrators, toward the North Vietnamese and so forth and so on. I didnt discourage any of that at all. So by the time i went on, it built the biggest audience i had up to that time in the presidency. And i think the biggest Television Audience at any president has had up to that time. And they heard directly from me rather than through the media, which of course would not have presented it the way that i wanted to come through. And after hearing it from me, it had a dramatic effect because the mail just poured in, not as stimulated as some of our critics indicate, but in part in spontaneous salutes such as youve never heard it, had just three major themes in it. One, i did what i felt. Johnson had not done adequately. I tried to the American People what the stakes were, that it didnt involve just what happened to the people of vietnam, but what happened to the people in the rest of southeast . What happened to the United States as . Well. Second, i told them what we were trying to do and way of bringing the war to conclusion a program of vietnamization that means in effect that were going to withdraw American Forces. At the same time that we were training the South Vietnamese forces to take over their own defense. And that program eventually was carried out and carried successfully. And third, i made this point very clear that. Our policy was not going to be changed. It wasnt going be affected by demonstrations in the street. I pointed out that i didnt the right of people to demonstrate, but on the other hand that, as far as a president is concerned, he must make up his mind. A got after getting best advice from his associates as what is best and then follow that course of action. And that is why concluded with the line our policy isnt going to in effect going to be made in the streets going to be made under our constitutional process by the administration. And i called on the silent majority support him and the silent majority was out there. Our Approval Rating went up to 68 right after that. Right in the midst of war and in spite of huge demonstrations, what i was really trying to get across was this that despite the fact that the media was overwhelmingly against the war despite the fact that many members of were making great noises to the effect that the war ought to come to a conclusion on any terms whatever. And despite fact that we had demonstrations, thousands of them that were very loud, that that was not the voice of america, the voice america was the silent majority. And that sustained me as, a matter of fact, throughout the four years until we got the Peace Agreement in january of 1983. I mean, 73, the paris peace accords were signed after four years of delicate negotiation runs by the Nixon Administration, with National Security adviser. Dr. Henry kissinger serving as the chief us negotiator in paris. Dr. Kissinger writes in his published leadership that hanoi, quote, had not fought for decades against both france and america, for sake of a political process or negotiated, but to achieve a total political victory. To explore every avenue of negotiations. Nixon now resumes secret political talks with hanoi. Hanoi would send its chief negotiator and politburo member upto to paris, where i would connect with him every three months or so and quote to explore this further. The four years of negotiations and military amid the wider ongoing implementation of a new grand strategy, it is my pleasure to introduce David Prentice of the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute at Oklahoma State university. Thomas schwartz, distinguished professor of history at vanderbilt university. George vi is a former army captain. Dr. Wife is author of four books on the vietnam war. Moderating this conversation is dr. Luke nichter, the james h. Cavanaugh endowed chair in president ial at chapman university. And i now turn it over to dr. Victor. Well. Well, thanks for that introduction, jim. I should say at the outset, its no easy thing for a president ial Foundation Library to welcome academic scrutiny, especially on a difficult and subject like this. So for that reason, i like to say hats off to the Richard Nixon Library Foundation for providing this forum for really a Free Exchange of ideas on this important anniversary. You know, for those of us joining, us from the earlier panel on president grand strategy for the war in vietnam or mark moyar is excellent. You know, remarks we will already heard a lot of new ideas and discussion and probably a full head of steam by this point in our program. Id like to follow and mark up to grow first chaps and the first panel basically just in that you tweet if you have a question at Nixon Foundation or email info at Foundation Board and the plan is that theyll pass me the questions about half way through our panel and ill ill do my best to toggle and forth and incorporate them in our discussion. Otherwise i will keep my remaining brief here just enough to let our know what to expect the duration of our panel. You know, this is really less of a celebration than it is a somber commemoration of sorts, as well as an opportunity to gauge what weve learned in these past 50 years. There are also plenty of Unanswered Questions well try to tap into here during our discussion on things we dont know yet, and lots of records that restricted in both american and foreign archives. There are certainly future Academic Work to be done on this topic. My role in todays event is made infinitely easier by the assembly of three of the most serious researchers i know. Between us think and i hope we can do an adequate job of covering the events led to the paris peace accords. Some of the key personality is involved and also from a wide variety of viewpoints, vietnamese and others, to bring structure to our congress and i proposed to approach our topic of seeking peace in vietnam in three parts. What the paris peace accords meant at time. That is the past. What weve learned since and what they mean today that sort of bringing us up to the present and also what dont know yet. The Unanswered Questions. Areas for debate future potential areas of research. That is the future. I admitted a davidoff that after i wrote this up it seemed like a dystopian version of Charles Dickens a christmas carol. When i saw it in front of me on the page, however, you know, let me reassure you that any similarities are purely coincidental. Everyone here something to say about all three of our segments. So i propose a sort of round robin to help minimize crosstalk. Zoom on each of these three parts, followed by an open discussion and q a will come in at a toward the end of our panel. So, you know, taking one at a time. What the paris peace accords mean . I mean, the time 50 years ago, david youve done an awful lot of work on the background, the events that led up to their. And i feel like theres all kinds of my favorite subjects that we could get into, whether its loss of chords. In 1962, the consequences of leaving saigon out at an early stage the talks, the structure nixon inherited the private public in paris. But you take the direction that you want to in terms of what some of the background we need to understand how we got to this point in 1973. I think my perspective its fundamental to reflect on how difficult nixons domestic political and strategic environment was as when he was inaugurated in 1969. Theres that sense both at the time and in retrospect, that as nixon it i had no good choices coming into office. And indeed, on the one hand, there is, especially in congress, significant point and a rising antiwar that is looking to cut appropriations restrict operation in indochina. And nixon has a keen sense of that domestic limit. At the same time, he understands a majority of americans are against precipitate from. They want americans out the war. They may look at the war as a mistake but they still see american visibility is on the line in vietnam and they still want something of an american victory. They want the republic, vietnam, South Vietnam to survive. So that when nixon starts serving his options in 69, there is this internal struggle for when and how to begin withdrawing american troops from the war. But also how to pursue peace. To get an agreement. To help contain new american aid. The republic, vietnam, but also retain the ability to use american air power to perhaps or get hanoi to stop its aggression against the. I think on one hand theres a lot of optimism within the administration, within allies in early 69. There is a sense that hanoi is still reeling from the 68 tet offensives that americas ally, the republic of vietnam, is relatively legitimate. Its democratic in many ways, far, so far more so than North Vietnam. And its enjoying a bit of popularity and a brief spirit of unity after the tet offensives. And so with good reason and a fair amount of optimism, president nixon and his South Vietnamese counterpart present. When you embark on a policy of americanizing vietnam izing the war. And thats the path nixon starts in 69. And its a path that ultimately shape the contours, the negotiations that will follow. And what leads up to the accords. But to briefly sketch out the trajectory of nixon, i would also add, though, that there is a popular sense within the white house that nixons options are increasingly narrowing after the cambodia incursion in 1970. Theres a real sense congressional dissent is an that it will continue to rise and limit what the white house can do in vietnam. How fast it can withdraw troops. And then lampson 719 in 1971, as well as 71 president ial elections, South Vietnam in many ways underscores, i think nixon and especially Henry Kissinger, that vietnamization may not necessarily bear the fruits that its wanting. South vietnam, so that they need to seek other means, particularly diplomatic means, to get a settlement to both, perhaps get hanoi to restrain itself, the south, but also especially in 1972, to build support in congress to continue the appropriation the economic appropriations, the economic aid, military aid. Thats essential to making vietnamization work. But nevertheless, id say by late 1972, especially as the elections in the house and the senate dont go, perhaps as nixon would wished linebacker to something. Sure. Well talk about later on begins to fan dissent and the senate then nixon needs an agreement to continue to provide aid that nguyen went to you and others see is absolutely essential the survival of South Vietnam. But nevertheless, his options, the windows close just as the circumstances like North Vietnamese will and the control dominance of the south and large swaths of south. After the 72 offensive. All of these, i think, limit nixons ability to achieve a durable peace. But nevertheless, through 1972 is a on achieving and searching for peace with, honor. But no time. The rest of us have written a biography of Henry Kissinger. And so youve spent some time studying the course of the key personalities at work, the opportunities that they offered, but also the limitation implicit in some of those relationships. Talk to us a little sort of in responding to david, also, you know, adding on and talking a little bit about some of the key personalities. Who are these people, you know, who were involved in the search of peace and how did their both create opportunities as well as establish limitations about what was possible . Well first off, let me just say, davids got a book coming that i think does an excellent job of talking about how vietnamization comes about and how these these choices do indeed get limited. I learned a lot in addition to what i knew already about kissinger. I learned a lot about that direction and that momentum from his book when i studied kissinger. One of the things that, of course, comes through with is, i think both intellect and i think also is a judgment that about the diplomacy and the political process. Kissinger always favored some of formal settlement of the vietnam. This is fairly consistent all the way through. And i think in one sees a different from his the man who gives him his authority, Richard Nixon, who politically was, i think, looking for peace with honor. But i think could have accepted a different on that something more a korea frozen conflict something along those lines. But kissinger is looking for a settlement and hes partially arguing that a settlement will both also not only will it be a good thing for americans Foreign Policy, but it will also help in reconciling the divisions within the United States polarization that had occurred that makes our contemporary polarization polarization sometimes look minor compared to the degree of violence and hatreds that the vietnam war had had brought to American Society and so i think kissinger does have this sense, and thats one reason why hes not as enthusiastic about vietnamization. And, in fact, criticizes it and suggests that it will only lead to a sort of unilateral withdrawal of American Forces and ultimately, perhaps even a. So he is he, from the very beginning, interested in this kissinger is given authority, nixon, to conduct secret negotiations with his counterpart late october. Well first beforehand with other vietnamese officials but then later with late october and kissinger will pursue an agreement. And over period of time and i record this in my biography he is at various times optimistic that hes going to get some sort of settlement. Always at times thinking North Vietnams about the talk. Nixons a bit frustrated with this. He kissinger is overly optimistic constantly about the possibilities a settlement gradual. Ideally the americans are worn down in part by the North Vietnamese. The one crucial issue that they dont give on is the idea that they must depose to as president. This is one thing that the North Vietnamese are demanding. In 1969, it be the one concession they will ultimately make that will allow the paris peace treaty to actually come to fruition. I think nixon also in a way different from kissinger, also sees that hes elected in part to end the war, vietnam, so that he will, in be judged in 1972 by how he ends the war in vietnam. So for him, its also a matter of politics. Its a matter of how going to be seen by the american electorate. And so it also is it plays that role for him. I think ultimately both of come together but they have slightly different emphasis on what they think is most crucial about the vietnam and about what how the United States should go about ending it. Ultimately, i think this will bring in october of 1972 the first inklings that there is a settlement that will, of course, go through a tortuous three month period. There of of both hopes and, then dreams dashed, including the infamous or the christmas bombing, North Vietnam that takes place. So of this is is partly the element of trying to get a settlement out that preserves American Foreign policy and. Also the possibility for the survival of the republic of vietnam and i stress the possibility because think from a very early stage its that its unlikely the United States can achieve the of a permanent commitment to the security of South Vietnam that it had managed to achieve with, say, south. But that said, we we can discuss all these things the course of the next hour and a half. Thanks, jay. What are we missing . Because i think we all, as researchers, try to oppose approach topics with as many viewpoints as possible. And i think its normal that americans tend to overestimate their own influence on almost every topic and tend to underestimate everyone else is influence no matter subject. And so, you know, what are we missing here in terms of the consideration and what did you perhaps americans not realize at the time about vietnamese perspective and what would you add to to bring us a rounded here on what the peace meant at the time . Well, youre precisely correct, luke. I wanted to follow up on toms discussion of the personalities, and i wanted to take a look at the two main vietnamese personalities, which appeared in late october in the North Vietnamese side was leading the negotiations. And then president hu on the south side. And while the North Vietnamese have written extensively and published a great deal on sort of their strategy and different tactics during the paris peace accords, the one person who never really anything something going to mention here in a was late october. But over time having him read some of the opinions that people have written about him. I convinced that he, by late 72, had become invested. Kissinger on completing the accords mean hed been working on this since 1968. As you well know. And at some point i think he was looking just sort of completely in agreement. Mainly this get the americans out to sort of take a pause in the war. You know, North Vietnam, a chance to rebuild itself. But as you look those two, as you look at what theyve written, that the peace accords for the vietnamese came down to two core principles, which were dramatically on both sides. And the first one was that North Vietnamese troops would absolutely remain in South Vietnam. There was no way unless allied forces militarily kicked them out that they were ever going to agree withdraw their troops, physical, which, if they were a little more flexible on, is rarely on the shape of the postwar government. How the government would look after a Peace Agreement was signed and the politburo had really come down three options, which i told this the kissinger years ago. Basically what the first option was and was their best option was that american withdraw, they would overthrow you on the way out the door, a Coalition Government would be formed of all levels and that would shortly present bring in the communists, who would then merge with North Vietnam. So again, level one of the americans really gave their beef. So the two governments about the national and the local level. And then the third option, which is the one that kissinger actually got, the least one that they wanted was, that the what they called both governments, which was the few governments and the project would remain as is, but there would be Commission Formed to hold elections and to do over things. And so its a testimony to, kissingers negotiation skills that he was able to achieve the sort of the lowest goal, the politburo, despite negotiating under very difficult circumstances. Now for to on the other hand, he had been involved that would be an army developing South Vietnamese negotiation tactics as there were five. The number one thing for them was they all communists out, all the communists had to leave and that there would be no Coalition Government and. There would be no allowing the communists into the government unless they agreed to participate in elections and which they could. Then when some seats were to have is too quiet principles that each side would opposed to agreeing to. And i think that those set the tone for the paris peace. But then was ultimately its downfall. That provides a pretty good overview and to get a started and i heard you talking i scratch a few notes i think ill ill give ill give you my toughest right now that i had a plan for the whole panel. What did the paris peace accords achieve, not achieve . And do you think Something Else might have been possible . And before i turn it over to you in any way to order, you want to go . I like the allusion during one, i think it was by Niall Ferguson that Foreign Policy is often a choice. Evil, you know, bad, worse. And at the time, its always clear which is worse. And in hindsight, you know, were looking at were reconstructing the past on records and interviews and we think, why didnt they do a better job . You know, that it was black and white was good, there was bad. Why did they why would anyone choose bad . You know, if they had a choice to choose bad . And so thats the next question that you the toughest one to have on my list is what did these accords achieve . What did they not achieve . And and was could they have been more than the limited accords that they were. And ill turn whichever you want to go on. Ill just start off and just say that both my dear friend priceline and john carlin have both separately written and i agree with them on a percent that the paris peace accords was the best bad deal they could possibly achieve. And it sounds like thats an awful thing, but as i was told many years ago, diplomacy is the art of the possible. And i think this was the best bad deal that they could have achieved. The problem is, is that both sides the us side, the North Vietnamese for the paris peace and vastly different terms and those terms were so diametric opposed again that ultimately made them unworkable. And with the vietnamese side, is this or at least tolerant the world it just was a tremendous victory. Whereas the americans believed it was peace with honor, without me to me had their own opinion, which i think everyone can guess. I want to jays point there that, i think it was probably the best that. It is fascinating to go back. I spent some time watching henry, his press conference trying to explain the deal in january, january 27, 24th of 1973, when he had unlimited air time really. And he kept talking about how the deal involved the flat prohibition of the reinforcement North Vietnamese the flat prohibition of foreign troops in laos and cambodia, the flat prohibition of crossing the demilitarized zone. I was thinking to myself, well, you know, always flat prohibitions. There was absolutely no enforcement mechanism. This was and that sense it was a deal based on, at least from the american side, a series hopes, hope that. North vietnam might indeed shift its emphasis from military conquest to the south. The some sort of peaceful attempt to take South Vietnam through elections or a more normal process or, it would devote itself to rebuilding hope that china, the soviet union, would try to restrain vietnam from any military activities, and that North Vietnam would gleefully accept american money in the manner of the Marshall Plan and rebuilding and forswear military operations. But that was the hope on the american side. On the vietnamese side, just seems to me that they were determined in the sense that they had a of wanting to of keeping their soldiers there, of taking a pause and judging them on what could be achieved subsequently was certainly there. The one great achievement, of course, of the accords was getting the american prisoners war back. And that was of the absolute central objectives of getting this agreement was the p. O. W. S back. And that did provide for a moment, although quickly eclipsed by it, did provide for a moment of americans to celebrate together as these men returned from what was an extraordinary ordeal that they had suffered. But its i would agree that it was the best of bad deals that could be made. I agree. I was what were leaving out with that luke. So what are leaving out . We must be missing something. Well, i think its hard to imagine better like thinking about counterfactual what should nixon and kissinger done differently is in my mind, its hard to imagine a better. We have to remember that vietnam had already accomplished hanois cheap negotiating demand. A complete unilateral u. S. Withdrawal. Nixon comes in with what, 550,000 u. S. Personnel in vietnam and theres around 25,000 left. By the time his first term ends. And so that principal demand of North Vietnam is already been met. And as nixon also realized, despite winning in a landslide, hes facing a Hostile Congress coming into the next term. And this will also constrict his options. And so hanoi knows that South Vietnam knows and nixon knows its gonna be a hard fight going forward. And so in many ways the accords represent, the best of what they could have achieved, hoped to negotiate, especially after dropped the demand. You resign, get a deal. But on flores what . It didnt succeed or did not achieve. And i think that in many ways what Nixon Kissinger had hoped. And since theyre hoping something will come out of the accords is that it will sustain american political will continue at least financing to preserve the possible polity of. I think toms right in suggesting the possible clearly theres no certainty here and hasnt been a certainty since early on in the war that South Vietnam would be persevered or, would preserved, but nonetheless, the possibility rested on domestic and even without watergate, it seems that the odds of nixon being able to sustain the money and the resolve necessary to keep funneling air power and dollars to saigon, it seems like its going be difficult no matter what. And so the accords not achieve the the ability to sustain Domestic Support for saigon. And luke to follow up on davids point, there was another hope, which was that North Vietnam would quote turn inward and begin to rebuild a society as late october repeatedly told kissinger the day would turn away from this fanatical desire to reunite the country. It would give some time for South Vietnam to continue to build itself. And so that was something that never achieved because. The infiltration continued at a rather high level, despite the ban on infiltration, the failure to withdraw North Vietnamese troops from cambodia, that there was another hope there that those two countries could find a way to negotiate a settlement, that overall peace would come to all of south east asia. So there were a lot of other hopes that were unfortunately not achieved by the paris peace accords, but point to follow up on some themes that you all touched on and came up in the earlier panel today. Just a follow up to to all what all said. One of the things i enjoy about teaching a u. S. History survey on College Campus is, you know, were often reminded the media that were more divided than we ever have been before. And i remember i think it was more of my first section of freshman. And almost 20 years ago, when this had come up in the context of the 2004 president ial election and, you know, hands shot up, you know all over the classroom, as i said, you know, what about the civil war . You know, what about the 1960s . And and so in terms of things we didnt achieve in the paris, in terms of limitation that nixon and kissinger had on their designs, you could talk about the limitations of nixons domestic position. You could talk about the effect to which congress and the funding being cut off in 1973 was a factor or not. I mean i could also point you to nixon tapes in late 1972 and early 73, when nixon was quite happy to be done with it and hope not to go back, or at least in that moment, or the fact that the agreement that resulted failed to more comprehensively include the whole indochinese region as a sort of roadmap for because earlier in the panel it came up cambodia and the khmer and all that without going too deep down any one rabbit hole talking about some of the constraints that were upon this process. I think its important for our audience, you know, many of whom might not have been around back then to get sense for what the environment was really like at the time. So any of these subjects or others that you might want to touch on in of the constraints and limitations placed upon the process, please go right ahead. Id like to just add a constraint and that in some sense was selfimposed in the morning conversation. There was a discussion of south korea. The comparison between korea and vietnam and one aspect of the Paris Agreements that certainly played a key role was that the United States did get out of vietnam in its entirety in a way that it did not withdraw after the armistice in korea and kept forces there that served in some sense as a trip wire and preventing subsequent north korean aggression in the in South Vietnam, they did get out the United States did get out. And that was partly because the issue of the prisoners of war had become so central to the negotiating strategy. The and also to do encouraging support the nixon presidency had emphasized the treatment of the prisoners in North Vietnam had had used the prisoners as bargaining tools but also had treated them did not adhere to the convention and had behaved in ways that created a great deal of hardship. And i that became a way of of of regaining Domestic Support in the United States. So in the prisoners were hostages to full and complete american withdrawal from vietnam that did create a difference between the korean and vietnamese situations that ultimately worked to the detriment of the survival of South Vietnam. I think in retrospect, we could see that more clearly, but we can see how different forces worked to make that to the prisoners become absolutely central an issue so that nixon had to get all of them and promised, in effect, to withdraw american soldiers as a result. I think. Right. I mean, one of the big things that president hue wanted americans. He wanted an american residual president as much like korea, much like germany, like other places. And i think that that failure to keep some sort of american firepower in South Vietnam, which by 72, the offensive there was basically negative naval and air power, that failure to some american presence in south, whether with intelligence, logistics, huge air power with was probably one of the biggest mistakes and biggest constraints the Nixon Administration. Yeah in terms of a few other constraints i dont want to belabor domestic point, but switching to North Vietnam echoing some appears comments in the first session they are in many ways one of the best fighting forces in the world. And hes right in pointing how strong and resolve they were and the americanization in the early phase of the war. But in the vietnamization, i think we see continue Food Evolution and adaptation, especially as they move towards and greater conventional firepower. The Nixon Administration saw that in lamps on 719 level of coordinate action the arms theyre using artillery and the like all point a significant military threat both the vietnamization but the survival of South Vietnam as and to take that and look at the other side and 68 through 70 i think are pretty good years for the republic of vietnam. But beginning in late 1970, 1971, you start to see what i call vietnamization economic problem arms, political problems, military, and that these problems continue to manifest themselves ways that show vietnamization was not strong or as durable as nixon and you had originally hoped when i started that program in 69, and i think in many ways that points our attention back to the importance of the accords to try overcome as kissinger i think would have seen it, overcoming vietnam in nations frailties and try to eke out something or possibility for South Vietnamese survival. You know, so count going from there and and then hindsight reflecting back the paris peace accords and years since kind of the second phase of our conversation what weve learned since what they what they mean today. And i think theres any number of ways comment here i think we learn an awful lot about the sino vietnamese relationship the communist world as a whole the u. S. Hesitancy get into quote, another vietnam which we still hear about in recent years how vietnam affected whats been called the american way of war, going, how president ial leadership and media have changed when it comes to sort of credibility of president ial statements. So, so kind of giving you the lots ideas there to dive off of as well, as your own, you know what we learned since since then. So what is hindsight that we can bring to the conversation conversation . Well, i think president you was right in the sense that if the North Vietnamese were refusing withdraw their troops if they were refusing to discuss without vietnamese representative directly that those were key indicators, that North Vietnam was not interested in, peace. They only wanted the americans out so they could continue the war at some point, the future. And i remember when the accords were being being discussed, and i thought to myself, the same thing is happening here. The taliban are just to get us out so they can once the american empire, bauers gone, then theyll have free rein. And so i think that if look back now and again, the North Vietnamese published a great deal. The pretty blatantly obvious and honest about it that it was as the koji men have said you know up and out i mean american populace collapsed and. I think thats the key one of the Key Takeaways is that president you was right. They werent to negotiate in this way then. They werent negotiating in good faith. Yeah, an excellent point you raised. I remember the first time i went to vietnam and they say, you know, the vietnam war said no, the american war. And so, you know, perspective, everything about how we approach these issues, calling these the paris peace accords. But it was really, you know, a negotiation in negotiations or almost sort of unilateral withdrawal of American Forces. So terminology is is important and so you bring it you bring a good perspective. But tom or david, want to jump in. What are some of the things weve learned since then . I think we have learned one thing we did have learned is the degree to which in many respects people supported the war were right about certain things, as well as people who opposed the war. And one of the things people who the war were right about was that it that North Vietnam was guiding South Vietnam, this insurgency was not a genuine viet cong insurgency against the South Vietnamese government, that North Vietnam, hanoi dictated the National Liberation front and that it was in effect also with substantial aid from russia and china, and that in that sense it was part of the cold war and. It was not simply a vietnamese civil, but it was also part of the cold. And we know the extent to which russia and china provided enormous amounts of assistance that enabled north really to prevail and to to survive during its conflict. The south, we know in sense we know a lot more about the vietnam years, although not completely. We know lot more about the degree to which hanoi really directed the and was directing it from the very beginning . And i think in that sense, even if the people who supported the war were right in, the people who opposed the war, on the other hand, were probably were right in the sense that the war ultimately not mean as much as many who supported the war did, namely the idea that the loss in vietnam would have terrible conflict throughout the world. The dominoes, this sort of thing. So in both sides have had been, i think, by some of the things we have learned since that it on the one hand that indeed it was that many respects american of of what what washington said about vietnamese communists was correct on. The other hand the implications it suggested would happen as a result of the loss of South Vietnam where. Were dramatically overstated. Just to continue that thought, tom, i think it plays to in the vietnam war as a whole, should reemphasize a need for humility in approaching Foreign Policy in advance and an understanding, especially in hindsight, how come events can be and the need to bring in lots of different perspectives . I think thats one of the benefits of the research that a lot of scholars are doing at the moment that were hearing more vietnamese, chinese, soviet perspectives on the war and in many ways that emphasizes just how difficult the decisions are that nixon was right. He said he had no easy choices. And certainly the longer i look at vietnam in any stage of the rather than finding easier, clearer answers, with the benefit of hindsight, its complex and if anything, that again, in my mind points toward a need for greater humility and circumspection also also, luke, i wanted just touch on one other thing and that is at the linebacker to bombings in the sense that the use of american firepower sort of killed them until they stopped sort of nothing is is is dramatic early effective and can in some ways things so i know a lot of people the americans always say and i remember talking to kissinger about this directly was that you know we had bombed them and to make them force them to come to the negotiating table or. You take a counter fire. Negroponte is have them until they accepted our concessions. On the other hand, the vietnamese, North Vietnamese at it, and they called the and flew in air that they had taken the americans best punch. They had gone back and shot down all these planes and they had those ira things and. So i think that there are both sides of overhyped the linebacker bombing to to make it to buttress their own point of view. And a couple of things i want to just point is, for example, by the end of 72, hanoi, only had about a third of its air defenses that it had in 1967, a of those same years are gone south to support easter offensive. The other thing that we claim is that while theyre all out of missile which is why they were trying to come back to the table that is also incorrect. They were out of assembled. They all the pieces of it. And the third thing i want to mention is that the sam two Missile Technology that they were using was in the fifties. The North Vietnamese agreed a dozen different ways to make more effective. But there was a sam three missile regiment across the border in china and it wasnt able to get it. The freighter had been in the fray when it caused a lot more american casualties. So you know, one of the things i think we need to at some point recognize in terms of both the paris peace accord and afghanistan, other future wars, is that there is a very careful to overstate element that overstate the effects of american firepower on, forcing people to do things in terms of peace accords. The point, you know, another topic that has hasnt been discussed yet today is theres also the role of the draft. If anyone wants to comment on at some point. But but let me also throw out Something Else that came up in the earlier panel today. And which that wasnt really explored very deeply. But i would present to us here in terms of what might be the proper geopolitical global, geo strategic context to see vietnam. And in the first panel, it was the relationship between the peace accords in the vietnam war and the opening to china as a broader part of dayton or opportunities that presented in the middle east to sort of take control, remove or limit reduced soviet influence in the middle. And i set up this next question because, you know, when i was researching this biography of henry cabot, who had all kinds sort of interesting notes to himself, his files, and, you know, sometimes things were clearly written for the record and and wanted to guide researchers a certain way. But i remember one i couldnt figure out the date on it. I guess it was midseventies clearly after the peace accords. But not that much after where he sort of argues to his reader, which i suppose was me at that moment. And dont know how many people saw it before me. He sort of argued that the vietnam in a sort of broader geo political sense was a success and his rationale was that that not only the of china and taiwan in the middle east but as i think argument is certainly controversial was the idea that all the top policymakers that a war between the United States and china was basically inevitable at a certain point and that what the vietnam war showed protracted conflict, that showed the degree of american commitment and the high cost that such a war would be to the chinese if this happened so well, an interesting, you know, counterfactual. I certainly dont deal with it in a large biography, but there was a lot of sort monday morning quarterbacking went on, you know, after 1973. And so i would submit this to you also for your comment. And i think of the draft issue also in terms of if we were fighting this war at all, again, with was then called an all volunteer army, how it might have been different, how if wed use as jay said, you know linebacker or to strength much earlier in the war you know that came up also earlier in the panel would that have made much of a difference . So here heres a few more provoca tive ideas to chew on. And four year old for your comment. Can i jump in on on both of these are the interesting thing is of course many people think that the development of the volunteer army allowed washing to and to use force more readily because. The draft was so central the opposition to the war that the absence of a draft reduced the degree of antiwar sentiment. Now the iraq war showed that thats not always the case, that that that a war that seems to drag, even if fought by volunteers, can become distinctly unpopular and become a problem for domestic or a domestic public. But i think it is the case that one of the most consequential effects of the vietnam war was the end of the draft and the end of of that. And that has had other aspects to it. I think terms of how americans see their relationship to their country and and making for a difference and perhaps in levels of of sentiment national sentiment, patriotic sentiment. But to go to the question you posed about seeing the vietnam war as a success, i will say for project i was working on, i had a conversation recently with an australian diplomat who of course echoed lee kuan yew, the famous singapore minister, who said that know from from their point of view the vietnam war was a success because it bought time for the rest of Southeast Asia to itself and prevent dominoes from falling that they had the United States withdrawn in 1965 and given up that might have been very different. Indonesia might have collapsed. The sort of thing we are was talking about a bit there too, that they would have been a very different strategic and that in fact, the United States had to commitment in vietnam preserved a noncommunist Southeast Asia. I him though that any argument on this side of the pacific that the vietnam war was a success is still a hard sell given its consequences and its what it what it did to American Society. But it is it is interesting that that still out there from a sort of geopolitical framework and all the rest that people from different perspectives in different parts of the world see the world different ways. Yes certainly in terms of if were looking at game of chess i think any any chess player would gladly give up a pawn for a rook or a knight. I know were talking also about human lives. You know, a certain point in terms of policy makers and also think think a couple of other unintended consequence in the last 50 years. Certainly bilateral relations between the United States and vietnam today are better than any point in my lifetime. They become our in a sense what of our closest friends or at least frenemy with being on the periphery of china and they knew containment strategy not to mention the fact i was thinking the other day my my primary care physician is vietnamese. My students are vietnamese. You cant go anywhere in Orange County without running into vietnamese. And in a sense know sort of vietnam loss was americas gain in terms of, you know, vietnamese americans have had certainly richly to our own national cultural, you know, to really bring it forward 50 years later. But these are just sort of random thoughts that occurred to me when i was getting ready. But other college and, another controversial idea, we havent talked is the way that vietnam changed the relationship between. The white house and the media, you know, is factor i think we get down. But again i thought throwing out a bunch of ideas for you to potentially on if youd like to you. Ill come back around to the geostrategic comments next. One of the things we dont often think about as far as the operating context that Nixon Kissinger, secretary defense melvin laird as well are looking at is a perceived sense and its something the Johnson White house and the Nixon White House shared is a sense of rising neo isolationism in the United States that after the americanization of the war there are rising voices in congress. Im thinking senator mike mann still senator fulbright that are calling not just for reductions if not withdrawal from vietnam, but also reductions from. And by 1969, especially after the traumas of 68, something professor ferguson and others talked about in the prior panel that americas allies are uncertain about u. S. Resolve not in vietnam or not just in vietnam, which for many of them is a minor domino. But in terms of naito the Relationship Alliance with kansas, australia and new zealand as well and so i think one of the things nixon, laird and kissinger as well all appreciate is that a precipitate withdrawal from vietnam, we all have credibility not just with americas enemies, but its allies who are very nervous about american actions. And 69. And so i think that in many ways, Vietnamization Nixon doctrine, as well as the diplomacy towards detente and, the opening of china is many ways an effort to reassure American Allies that, yes it may not be possible to what america wants and South Vietnam, but its not to be due to a lack of american to preserve South Vietnam so that the responsibility is back on the vietnamese and vietnamese parties to work out their their future in the civil war. And i do think that their actions, 69 and 70, helped by time for americas allies to adjust the limits of american power, and thereby, when vietnam. South vietnam does fall on five. Its not the shock americas allies that it would have been had had South Vietnam in such a dramatic fashion in 68 or 69. Thats a great point that david brings up and the discussion about american credibility, which ill talk about. Do you look is one of the central themes the nixon and kissinger you know design for the paris peace accords and for their policy on vietnam. Ive always wrestled with that one in terms of whether they were right or whether it was overblown. But it was under blown and sort of curious what no one else thinks in terms of american credibility and the reasons for vietnam. Credibility is of those fascinating concepts because seems to constantly being tested and then its lost and then its won again and all of that. And its something that is deeply by Decision Makers at times. The question of how other countries actually perceive the united, i think, is for historians is just an ongoing question. I was thinking that in the context of more contemporary events, the argument for example, that putin would have gone into ukraine or not have gone into ukraine and the United States precipitously withdrawing from afghanistan and sort of shown itself sort of not even not being willing to maintain even a minimal military presence there and, willing to accept a rather humiliating defeat. These types of things that that type of argument is going to be an ongoing one. I, i think theres no question studying diplomat documents that foreign leaders do american tell american that credibility is important. Now, sometimes they do that for their own domestic purposes as well. And how much theyre telling us something we want to believe have always comes into play as well but i think i think did believe i actually think that he was more concerned, less about foreign credibility then what would be the consequences . A disaster in vietnam. American Public Opinion that in effect, i think he that a disastrous defeat in vietnam would discourage americans and would have an impact on the ability of a president maintain the type of foreign commitments that he believed were necessary and i think in that sense, one of the biggest issues of credibility that i, i think from my own sort of looking at nixon and kissinger, the was with the American People, but that in the end, he believed one of kissingers mentors fritz kramer wrote a memo early on in the administration saying that the people are not generous with losers. So that, in effect they resent defeat much more than they did then people believe and effect saying that if defeated in vietnam youre going to pay for it and its going to be a real its going to have a real consequence for your ability to carry out Foreign Policy. And i know kissinger forwarded that memo, and i nixon thought, yes, hes right about this that. This is something that will there that i share in that belief. But thats that thats my take on it. Well. I suppose another way to interpret that is is a is a kissinger to kramer on the tapes as my right wing friend in the pentagon. And i think another way to reinterpret that, in another sense, were talking about controversial ideas is that perhaps vietnam was bigger and american domestic policy than it was Foreign Policy, or at least it did, you know, became so at certain point. And im not many people have commented on you know in that sense. I will tell you, we do have questions come in so were not reaching complete radio. We are we are going on the airwaves and reaching someone. So we will get to get about a half dozen questions that well get to here in just a minute. But let me sort of transition here from this second part of our conversation to, our third part. And if you were waiting to chime in there in any other issue, feel free to do so in just a minute. So where do we stand today . What do we not know . What are the Unanswered Questions . What are the future potential areas of research, i suppose if Donald Rumsfeld were with us, he would say it was what are the known unknowns . You know about the paris peace accords and research that goes on here . Certainly, you know, easy, low hanging fruit. We all struggle with access in our own archives. Certainly access in chinese archives, russian archives in hanoi, vietnamese archives be essential to having a fuller understanding of this subject in the future. But where do you all came out on this . You know, what do we have yet to learn on the subject . Well, i think you, you know, as i mentioned earlier, that the North Vietnamese hanoi published a great deal on this part of the strategy and behind the scenes maneuvering on the paris peace accords, we know almost nothing about what led up to. I actually thought the only thing that ive ever seen and this is just a recent find in the south the vienna archives was a speech that he had given right after the paris peace accords were signed in february of 73. Later giving a speech internally to. Lets just term the missile troops, where he talks about some the Lessons Learned from the paris peace accords. And i wont go into whole document, but the three main things he talks about was how he had used different strategies to affect kissingers mindset. Youll remember the very famous one, which comes back in june of 73 after he had gone to hanoi. And we bombed it, and he starts slamming table about how i you know you bomb me as soon as i got home and he fully admits this was merely theater he was doing this to unsettle kissinger. And the second thing that i want to he mentions that he had fooled kissinger on the dmz. And then the third thing is the kissinger had fought with him on my mind. And so this is the only insight we have until later october is this captured document where he talks about these arms. I we still need a great deal more access in terms of what was discussion internally within the politburo as to what were going to do and how theyre going to respond to various american proposals now certainly on that point, we have thousands of hours nixon tapes and even of those 500 hours of still never been released but we certainly dont have you know lead october tapes or mao tapes or diaries, you know, any anything of that sort to give us a clue. What were they not written for the record . What did they really think at the time . Its a good question. Or david. I think one of the things i would really like know is how people the ground found this maybe a knowable, but id like to know how both those in the north, but especially those in the south reacted to the aftermath of the 72 events as. Well, as the accords, because in my reckoning and j could probably correct me on this or, add more to it. There is after 73 a ever shrinking or willpower within the south or perhaps a diminished hope that things will work out, that the republic will survive. And a lot of thats contingent on what people on the ground and how people on the ground view, the accords view the possibilities of the republic surviving or the possibility of a North Vietnamese communist victory and. How they themselves on a family level begin reconciling in selves to that. I think if we knew the answer to that, wed probably better understand what happens in 75 and the speed with which the republic collapses. But again, as the expert on that, i want to defer to him if he has answer. Right. Well, there is a there a great deal, thanks to there is a great deal of discussion about that. And its funny, some of that some of the really hard line and a lot of people have been look at the paris peace accords as actually hanoi shelling of their interim is a very different sort of viewpoint of things. But there is a great deal discussion in, North Vietnamese tactics and primary sources, how troops in the south, many of whom look at the paris peace accord, says we can home, the war is over. And so theres a great deal of to stiffen everyones resolve. They sent politburo members down, they sent all kinds of people to sort of like the war is not over. You know, look at the South Vietnamese are breaking the ceasefire, etc. , etc. So there was a tremendous amount, effort, propaganda to jump sustain morale in the south. But on the South Vietnamese side, there was a great the same thing happened. A lot of. Troops said, you know what, war is over. And desertion rates skyrocketed. And so the South Vietnamese took a lot of their army cadets and sent them all these teams out to the villages and army units trying to back up morale again. We know we cant trust the communists. Look, theyre attacking us. So your your point is well taken. But there was a great deal happened on both sides to sort of like, you know, maintain morale. I want to say youre your your and so youre an analyst angles madam bien is interesting because one of the things i always ive always thought about is how many prominent positions in the in the new united unified government did the nlf really receive and thinking not many you know that i know of so its youre right i think its a whole another way of looking at it and give you either a chance to respond. I think i cut time off there. I was just going to say i wanted to echo jays point that id love see more material out of North Vietnam. Im particularly interested in the degree to which there was a peace faction in the north. The hand when of course, had done this for, the 67 period where she argues that there had to be a purge before the telephones sort of and be interesting to know if there substantial political opposition or at least second thoughts within the politburo about maybe focusing on getting that reconstruction aid from the americans and and working on our own society and the rest. I tend i tend to think if there was it was probably not a significant group, but it still would be interesting to know to know whether there was a that desire. I think jay mentioned in terms of just relief that the war is over and can go back to normal. Well, going back to madame for a second, look to my dilemma your favorite cables from the South Vietnamese are shortly after the paris accords have been signed in the vietnamese ambassador to france, a man named frank dunlop had just met with the folks. There was was an established mechanism them to Start Talking and he refers to madam bien as theyre talking this that that replacement blackwood raged about what had happened that she was now having to talk to the South Vietnamese and then the other the second one was voisin was still still in paris. And he and dunlop had met what might have been some of the people from the brg. And so voisin turns that ambassador laporte was a known womanizer. He had a very famous South Vietnamese actress, was a mistress basically trying to get them to go seduce me out of them. I sort of take one for the team, but i sort of break ranks. That is one that the pr side. So there is a great deal of effort in terms of you know a great deal of discussion about how enraged of the pr people are by what consider a hanoi sellout. And one other comment i make just while you were a couple months ago, i made a first trip to europe, to paris since before the pandemic and. So id always wanted to seek out the location. The night of the paris peace talks in 1968, conference so International Conference there and you know what . Now, you know, now its a five star hotel and so i walked by there. I thought, you know, this is crazy. I cant believe that the peace talks were held in such a prominent public place. Now, you know, the real action was in the private talks. But i thought, you know it made me wonder one of the lessons of the peace talks and the peace accords is that americans would never agree to do this again. And cant imagine ever doing this in a major public venue with lots of traffic in a very busy. So just one of these of moments i had when i walked by impossible i assumed the french were wiretapping everything and nothing was secret. And if they werent, they missed opportunity, as i think John Negroponte or somebody told me at one point. But as i walked by this huge, huge conference, and you can kind of still see where the original were, where the talks were, you enter the conference center, you go in one without the other. It was fascinating for me to see it. But one of the Lessons Learned is we would never ever do this sort of thing again. I cant imagine with ukraine, you know, were all to meet at a five star hotel in the in the grand ballroom. And were just going to work out and this is an observation that maybe youll want to comment on. But as we will transition here to the the final part of our panels, im looking at the question that have come in and some of these more than one part. So i just read one at a time and let whoever that wants to respond to to this, anything else that might have occurred to you during the course of the conversation. So our very first question is what can policy advisors and leadership learn . Im assuming today, recently from the successes failures of the 1973 paris peace accords. Well, i think one one thing is, of course, recognize that a peace accord without substantial enforcement real teeth in it and mechanisms to make sure that the parties adhere to what they that if you do that that that thats theater thats thats not going to be a serious peace undertaking between sides and in that sense i think what i think one of the things that came at the end of todays morning discussion whether sort of peace in ukraine was possible and then the thinking you know, in order to do something there, youre going to have to ensure that you have real monitoring mechanisms and that theres some guarantees that are significant there, because otherwise this is simply an opportunity to go home in the way afghanistan the peace almost identical that know basically we got out and was just that was it was only theater just to conceal the the the withdrawal of the United States. I would agree with that. And think to dons point is that, you can into an agreement all the enforcement mechanism and codicil that you want. But ill ultimately if the other side does not refuse that talk, one side calls the american puppets insist on total american withdrawal. To me, thats just a smokescreen or the same playbook that the vietnamese did. The taliban i, i sat there and watched it and thought their copy in the vietnamese playbook perfectly. It was just an effort to get the americans out and their firepower out and their intelligence out. They get deal with what they consider a corrupt puppet they can overthrow very quickly and stuff. You dont see that genuine effort to negotiate peace if theres not an effort to sit down with their side and hammer out a power sharing, then theres just its just a smokescreen. Its just dirt and nothing will ever come or youll be back and do it again within two years. And that now one of the things that strikes me working on this book and on on the 1968, which includes substantial part of the 68 peace talks, is that consistently the United States is the only party in the talks that actually the war to end. I mean, the others dont seem to have any great disincentive to keep fighting. And as you say, its just becomes a war by either means. And the americans get out and whether its afghanistan or certainly or ukraine. So that certainly that that idea occurred to me. But i think i might have cut you off. David so i was just going to add that its a major, right . Like joining back to 68, the problems that tom and jay both mentioned are apparent throughout the american negotiation. Johnson years, all the way until the accords that theres a sense of sustaining disbelief and understanding and knowing what hanois intentions are and always this hope on johnsons part that the understandings that they negotiate in 68 that hanoi will not take of the peace talks, that they will sit down with the South Vietnamese and negotiate in earnest, that they should have realized those understandings are in reality meaningless, especially with no one for months. But in many ways, kissinger, either knowingly or unknowingly, makes the same mistake in 72 in agreeing to say, okay, youre going to say youre not going to resupply your troops, youre going to agree to a ceasefire in laos and cambodia when of the evidence on, hanois actions indicate very or should have indicated very clearly that their goal is completely unchanged and that while they switched to this strategy of peace, pierre calls it and 72, late 72 after the offensive, theyre also constantly preparing for that resumed strategy of pursuing military victory and reunification with the south under a communist revolution. And so know your enemy should by be one of the big lessons and points from this not just to look at the accords as a product 7273, but begin that story all the way back earlier in the war, how america approached negotiations out. And davids point, i mean, you know, were in dearborn, know, were the ones that are leading the negotiation which i think is is ultimately a huge mistake. You know, the negotiation should not between acting as a middleman, between hanoi and saigon or the taliban and and kabul. They should be, you know, if they really want to have peace, they should be talking to each other. And well just sort of take a step back. And the russians sort of did that. They did try to interfere with with hand, with their hands. They would say, okay with counsel. Then they would say, this man, the chinese do the same thing. But there wasnt tremendous pressure by the soviets, too, like, youre going to have to do this, or were cutting off aid kind of thing. Point in the in the in the interest of time i will move on to question two kind of shifting back to the american domestic situation when we didnt we didnt address this element. How did the inflation and woes of the. 1970s play into the decision by congress to cut off aid to South Vietnam. Well, i think its critical and many ways, even Richard Nixon in 1969, before we think of the real sharp inflation, the seventies he has a conversation with key congressional before he goes to meet the astronaut after they come back from the moon landing. And its where he gives the graham doctrine. And nixon doctrine speech. And he and congressional leaders are very concerned. Summer 69 that america is economy will dictate a reduced footprint abroad. Nixons responding to that with the nixon doctrine and vietnam but nevertheless yes, his efforts to deal with balance of payments worsening economy in the seventies in many ways also real pain on the South Vietnamese economy especially as goods later on in the war post accords especially at all shocks of the seventies complicate. The amount of money having to spend on basic munitions and fuel and the like. And its also a testament a lot of the South Vietnamese officials, least from our research in saigon, shows that theyre acutely concerned in nine and 70 about the American Economy and also their ability to get the money they need from congress to finance, not necessarily military vietnamization, but economic vietnamization as well. So that they can sustain themselves economic lee they can start paying for their own budget, the like. But americas economic woes in the seventies complicate that for saigon and way that theyre part of this larger macroeconomic environment. That luke, as i pointed out, i spent a great deal of time discussing this and drawing. I think if theres one untapped area, the war it is this is the economic side because it drove so much as david mentioned, there was a real concern, saigon, that the economy was far more paramount and driving. And we never recognized the South Vietnamese budget simply not even begin to support an expanded military base as were withdrawing troops due to go to both bolster his own military and whos going to pay for that. So the america is going to have to pay for that because the South Vietnamese so this whole idea of of the economics side of things is one of the really underrepresented areas of study of the vietnam war. And i try to address a great deal of that from the South Vietnamese side. In my book, john swords. I think you were going to jump in there a little bit ago. I just want to say that, i think the the ultimate cut off of aid or the restrictions on aid had didnt really have an economic justification. And those were those were simply it was thought that this war was viewed all as id been cutting off air power and 73 for example or air operations. So i dont think i dont think the economy was crucial there. But i agree with jay and what david, that it had the background, especially in South Vietnam. The consequences of, the reduction in american assistance in terms of the type of economy we had fostered. There were much more consequential than. I think people realized, yeah, of course, the questioner didnt did watergate. But i assume watergate also perhaps more than domestic economic considerations by the spring of 73, was obviously a major factor to question three. How vietnams fall to communism affect its economic trajectory in the last 50 years. In comparison, its neighbors. Thats a fascinating question in the initial years after the collapse, vietnams economy the attempt at imposing a collective system on agriculture in the south. The communist asian other the following of Old Fashioned sort of soviet type policies was a disaster. Vietnam went from a an exporter of rice to an importer of rice. The economy collapsed. You had the one of the reasons for the boat peoples departure, the exodus from vietnam was partially economic. Recently was in vietnam. And if you talk to vietnamese of a certain age, what they remember about the ten years after the end of the war is the incredible hardships of that period. After 86, the death legend was the sort of stalinist of North Vietnam and the beginnings of an opening you begin to see the development of prosperity vietnamese have seen in their lifetime of a certain age theyve seen an extraordinary change, the relative prosperity of their country before and after, you might say the opening to the west and to following in a way, following the chinese model of maintaining political tight control in the communist party, but opening the country up to foreign to opening it up, to allowing for to get rich, to make money this sort of thing. And so vietnam today is exceedingly more prosperous than it was, of course earlier, comparatively probably not as prosperous as some of the countries in the region, but certainly not as far behind as it once was. Yeah, you anticipated i was going to comment that there another way to ask that question which is if they werent part of the socalled asian tigers, what did they start doing right you know to get where theyre at today. But david or, jay, any final words on that or we move on. Okay. Question four and weve got about 15 minutes left. So i think were doing okay. How does modern and de see this whole modern how does modern day vietnam understand and president nixon and the vietnam war . Second part has the rise of chinas influence in the region and additional competition between and vietnam reflected on their opinion of the United States and the conflict. Thats a tough one. Vietnam prides itself on its neutrality in conflicts. So its even though one of the things that several said to me during my recent was they supported ukraine of officially they dont know officially. They dont talk about that. But the public sympathy is, of course for a country being invaded by another. And they see some parallels there to their own history. Of course, i dont know that one of the things thats hard, a country like vietnam, thats ruled by the party that won has its legitimacy because of its victory over the United States is allowing for much retrospective revisionist thinking. You certainly hear more of that in south the southern part of vietnam. You hear more sort of challenges to the orthodoxy, the heroic struggle and the victory of the vietnamese communist party. But vietnamese the actual sort of transition, thinking hard to say, i mean, vietnam is such a different country now and so many of the people now, its such a Young Country have no real experience of the war themselves. And sort of think of the United States as a place they want to go often and want to travel to, and that they have in often from the diaspora but that took place after the end of the war. Its just very different. But i its hard its hard to answer the questions the question or question in a in a solid way because i think that type of discussion has not really something that happens in vietnam today for me. I would add to it its not clear in my own thinking the extent which most vietnamese or at least subset who think about this issue at all how they view the american occupation, to use that term for a moment differently than the french or the or the long, you know, 2000 year history of relations with the chinese i think a good, good historian can take this discussion back at least 2000 years after all and so i think that parts unclear i see in some news reports acknowledgment of. You know theres still an awful lot of infrastructure in this nation that that was created by the americans and is not really commenting one way or the other. But i think at least an acknowledgment that it comes from from that era. But anything its a complicated question. Sure. But anything jay or david, you might want to add, if i can just say that speaking with a lot of the Us Government officials who travel back and forth to vietnam for the last 15 years as part of group have mentioned me that the government itself still uses the war. As you know as a prop to maintain a one party rule. But you know what we did we won the war reunified country and therefore we have a reason to be involved. Yeah if you consider the average people at the time into the very country most people were after the war have a pretty positive United States as a place that they want to go to is a place of as a people they want to emulate. A lot of that is just fear of commercial goods and pop music and all the sort of things that young people interested in and making money. Communism itself is sort of a dying held on to by sort of the old guard. But i think for the most part, what i would have been told is that most people view the americans as are america, in a positive positive way. Yeah, i thought you were there more recently than me, but i. I found it to be an. Proamerican place to visit. Sort of everywhere i went, in some ways more so than western europe. These parts of western europe. But i was really struck by that. And whether or not you want to comment on that, i will use that as a segway to our second to last question before get to sort of closing remarks, which was did the negotiations which led up to the peace accords in terms of the bilateral relationship between vietnam and the United States, did did the announcement of, quote is at hand fumble relations between. The United States and South Vietnam at that certainly did i mean president to was was outraged by the agreement which he saw as a sellout and especially the provisions North Vietnamese troops. David david knows this as well from the discussion so but it it it created a real crisis in relations between the South Vietnamese and the United States and you know kissinger has this plaintive moment where hes arguing with two and he says, we have mortgaged Foreign Policy for four years to the defense of this country. And here you are now youre not to agree. And there was this it was a tremendous crisis between the united and china and, you know, down to the last minute, the idea of whether to would actually agree to the accords. He had a nixon called in some conservative to talk to to and tell them that you know without this agreement, the americans might not be able to give you aid. All of these sorts of things. So it was a it was a very tense moment in us, South Vietnamese relations. Im just going to add to i remember the first time i listened to the tape were Henry Kissinger, the press briefing room, and comes into oval office and of course, nixon, kissinger sort of celebrating this domestic policy victory, you know, terms of seeing it in terms of theres no discussion of Foreign Policy at all in domestic policy. The is finally giving us positive coverage. And Henry Kissinger says something and like, mr. President , they hanging from the rafters and, you know, and you see that that image of all the press kind of packed in there. Right. And, you know, its not i think not far the truth. And i think that the lesson is that by that point in the conflict, my reading of the tapes is the nixon and kissinger are seeing this almost completely in terms of domestic politics. You know, the need to get nixon saying things like, you know, i cant i it has be done in this term. It cant go into second term of office. Otherwise, its a its a failure but i think that that ultimate really sets us up. If you want to jump in, youll have a chance in this final question, because i think that provides a segue way to our final question, which has been debated a lot by historians. But i think very much debated today. Could Richard Nixon have the same deal in 1969 as he did in 1973 . And knowing what the hour of the day is here, you know, this could be a whole dissertation. How what say you. The the the response is absolutely not hanoi had absolutely nine buys from his prior negotiation stance would not budge for years. It wasnt until the failure of the 72 offensive and prodding from its allies that it finally grudgingly gave in on the second part of the second part of its two core principles. It was not to move North Vietnamese troops, but it would be flexible on. The on a government in South Vietnam. And it didnt it didnt get until 72. So in terms of us being able to get a same deal weve gotten in 69, i think its just beyond your speculation, which we also only i get to talk about the socalled decent interval interval period, which i also think is preposterous. But i will stop and let david. But i think youre exactly right i think in the category of john lewis gaddis, we now know since we have access or more access, the vietnamese communist views and what theyre writing and saying, as well as the benefit of hindsight, i agree with you. I cant see any scenario that they would have accepted the basis of the 73 records and 68 or 69, but rather would have prosecuting war as they did. I agree again as well. I think this is a this is largely a political myth in the United States that basically is its an attack on nixon. Its basically saying he costs 20,000 lives. He could have had this agreement at first. And thats its historical revisionism and its worse. But it is of course it is. What you know, the politics of vietnam were really the domestics it was always a very crucial side. So its not surprisingly that we still see it in that way or that people are still making that case. Well, in terms of final remarks, well have a chance for a final round robin here. Look, is the 50th anniversary. Put it on your calendar now for the centennial. I hope we all come back here for another another panel to talk about the centennial the paris peace accords. So whether final thoughts, words of wisdom or in the world, are we going to be talking about on the go for it . Well, i think sometimes and pierre brought up on the earlier panel is that we have a tendency to focus too much on what the americans could or could not have done and less on what i view as North Vietnamese betrayal of their written word and in some in some ways the South Vietnamese kind of going back themselves also. So i think there was never any effort on vietnamese side to really try to find a peace. Both sides give each other what complete suspicion. So i think we have a tendency to sort of like as to your point in the very beginning of this panel, but to march on the americans side and not enough on the vietnam. Im not or anything on the vietnamese side, because ultimately once the americans withdrew, it was the two vietnamese sides which was ultimately going to come down to that could, not find a way to make a peace. I if i make it to the centenary of this, id be older than Henry Kissinger. Id be delighted to get there. But one thing i would love to see is a Political Revolution in vietnam that ultimately allows a more democrat and pluralistic vietnam to actually debate the civil war that they had to discuss, whether it was worth it, whether the the loss of life inflicted by the determination of the leadership North Vietnam to win was worth it. Be lovely to see vietnam become more democratic and and americans and vietnamese be able discuss this in a way as much as i. Ive also recently been in japan another country that the United States had an effect on to be nice to in a way america has this relationship sometimes with former adversaries. It would be nice to a democratic evolution of that would allow Something Like that that would be great to to to sort see in a hundred years. But i look i must they come up with a pill providing longevity like a Henry Kissinger. Im not sure im going to be around for that. What. Well, maybe david will maybe be, but not likely to parry off of toms comments, though i think in the long sweep of history, looking at other bad human rights actors of the seventies, south korea and taiwan, that their evolution to prosperous countries, democratic countries, i think in many ways complicates our memory of the accords and what have happened and i share tom starts that at and tom that perhaps more democratic elements of saigon the best elements of the republic of vietnam one day affect help evolve vietnam in a more pluralist and democratic fashion. Well, let me just say this has been an absolutely delightful experience for me, that i think the only way it would be more delightful, it had been in person. So lets find a way to do that before. Too much otherwise as as as they say. And, mr. President , yield back the balance of my time. Well, thank you, dr. Victor. And thank you, panel. Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes todays commemoration and marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the paris peace accords, i invite you to connect with the Nixon Foundation online at Nixon Foundation across social media and sign up to receive our emails by going to nixon