Transcripts For CSPAN Washington This Week 20141220

Diplomatic corps alive today. He said, i do. We could have gotten that agreement if we had been a little more persistent, flexible and creative. But what really cost us was the political withdrawal. We cut off highlevel Political Engagement with iraq when we withdrew our troops. There were no senior visits. Very few phone calls. Secretary of state john kerry made one visit prior to this Current Crisis mainly to lecture the iraqis on how bad they were being for facilitating iranian Weapons Systems to syrian Bashar Assad Bashar Assad and we left them to their own devices, knowing if left to their own devices it would not work out well. You have mr. Blinkens comments and juks to pose them with juxtapose them with crocker. Heres what leon panetta said, secretary of defense quote it was clear to me and many others that withdrawing our forces would endanger the fragile stability then barely holding iraq together. Thats from secretary leon panettas book. Then he went on to say my fear is i voiced to the president and others is if the country split apart or slid back into the violence that appeared in the years immediately following the u. S. Invasion it could become a new haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the u. S. Iraqs stability was not only in iraqs interest but also in ours. I privately and publicly advocated for residual force that could provide training and security for iraqs military. Then he went on to say, those on our side talking about the pentagon. Those on our side viewed the white house as so eager to rid itself of iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interest. That is a statement by leon panetta. On afghanistan ill move on to afghanistan. Mr. Blinken said quote weve been very clear. Weve been consistent. The war will be concluded by the end of 2014. We have a timetable, and that timetable will not change. This is why im so worried about him being in the position that hes in. Because if they stick to that timetable, i am telling my colleagues that we will see the replay of iraq all over again. We must leave a stabilizing force behind of a few thousand troops or we will see again what we saw in iraq. So lets move on to syria. An msnbc interview in 2014 responding to a question about president obamas comment in august 2014, calling it a fantasy to say that arming the Syrian Rebels three years ago would have helped the situation. Blinken fantasy was a notion that had we started to work with these guys talking about the Free Syrian Army six months earlier that somehow would have turned the tide. That that would have turned the tide. Blinken do you know assad has been a magnet for every extremism were fighting against and it is inconceivable with syria being stable with assad as its leader. He has forfeited its legitimacy. Isil is the wolf it the door but the answer to isil is the moderate opposition. They need to be built up so they can be counterweight to assad. Near term they need to be built up so they can help on the ground to help deal with isil. Candy crowley isil is the wolf at the door but assad sphrs the u. S. Is concerned as far as the u. S. Is concerned is the next wolf at the door . Mr. Blinken as long as assad is there it is hard syria being stable, you continue to be a magnet for extremists were fighting. Crowley a transition is not the same as we will actively help you bring this guy down. Blinken the best way to deal with assad is to transition him out so that the moderate opposition can fill the vacuum. Thats what weve been working on. The more you build them up, the more you make them a counterweight, the more possible that becomes. Let me just remind my colleagues of whats happened. Theres a guy named caesar who about a year and a half ago smuggled out thousands of pictures. These pictures are the most gripping and horrifying that i have ever seen, and they were pictures, actual pictures which have been authenticated of the atrocities committed by bashar assad. They are wrenching, they are heartbreaking and they are terrible. Now, 200,000 people have been butchered in syria. Three and a half million are refugees. 150,000 are still in Bashar Assads prison experiencing things like this. You know, these are little children here. These are little children. They have been massacred by bashar assad. What have we done . What have we done in response to this . First of all, amazingly these photographs have been authenticated by this guy caesar. He did testify before the House Foreign Affairs committee. It didnt seem to rise to the interest of the senate Foreign Affairs committee or the American People or this administration. I was in a refugee camp in jordan where at that time there was some, i think, 75,000 refugees. I was being taken around by a young woman, and she said, senator mccain it was a school teacher. She said senator mccain, see all these children . I said yes. She said those children believe that you have abandoned them, senator mccain, that you americans have abandoned them. When they grow up, theyre going to take revenge on you. So here we are, this incredible slaughter, massacre, torture taking place, and what is this administration doing . Trying to make a deal with the iranians and leaving bashar assad to wreak havoc on the Syrian People that are still able to fight, butchering thing with a thing called barrel bombs. Most of my colleagues know what a barrel bomb is. Its a huge cylinder and its packed with explosives and nuts and bolts and pieces of shrapnel. And bashar assad unimpeded flies over, theres helicopters and others, and they drop these barrel bombs. Then when they capture these people, this is the kind of thing that is done. So and today it is clear its whats happening, is that we are attacking isis in syria. We are not attacking bashar assad, this butcher. In fact, bashar assad has intensified his attacks on the Free Syrian Army. Intensified them. And not surprisingly, the morale of the Free Syrian Army is very low. So general allen and others have recently proposed a nofly zone or aircraft exclusion zone, something weve been arguing for for about three years. This president still refuses to do it. Its heartbreaking. Its heart it breaking and its tragic. And it will go down in American History as one of the most shameful chapters because of our failure and the president s personal decision not to arm the Free Syrian Army when all of his Key National Security advisor his secretary of state, hillary clinton; head of the c. I. A. , general petraeus; and secretary of defense, secretary panetta all strongly recommended providing arms to the Free Syrian Army. In the case so ill move on. On ukraine, what putin has seen is the president mobilizing the International Community both in support of ukraine and to isolate russia for its actions in ukraine and russia is paying a clear cost for that, unquote from mr. Blinken. The notion that this is somehow the result of syria makes very little sense to me. Thats because its not about what we do or say in the first instance. Its about russia and its perceived instance. What mr. Blinken doesnt understand is that weakness in one place translates throughout the world. When i tell my colleagues, when i tell my fellow citizens that we will not supply the ukraine people with defensive weapons, they dont believe me. Theyve watched the country dismembered. Theyve watched crimea go, watched a shootdown nobody talks about anymore. And they continue to create unrest and killing in Eastern Ukraine and we wont even supply the ukrainians with weapons with which to defend themselves. I see that im nearly out of time. Id just like to say that i wish that mr. Blinkens words were matched by his deeds. At the Holocaust Museum october 6, 2014, he said a new notion is gaining currency, a responsibility to protect. It holds its state side responsibilities as well as interests, especially a responsibility to shield their own populations from the depraved and murderers. This approach is bold. Its important and the United States welcomes it and has included it as a core element of our National Security strategy along with our commitments to prevent genocide and hold those who organize atrocities accountable. No one can look at those pictures, the thousands, and believe that weve held bashar assad responsible. He ended up by saying endorsing the responsibility to protect is one thing. Acting on it is another. All of us in the International Community will have to muster the political will to act diplomatically, economically or in extreme cases militarily when governments prove unable or unwilling to prevent the slaughter of their citizens. That is a remarkable statement from an individual whose actions have clearly contradicted that at every turn in literally every corner of the earth. So, madam president , i know we will lose the vote probably, but i i believe that history will hold this administration accountable, and history will hold those individuals who were part of this administration who allowed these acts to go on, dismemberment of a country called ukraine, for the first time a european country has been partitioned since world war ii. The needless slaughter of thousands and thousands of ukrainian men, women and children. And the list goes on and on. Thousands and thousands of syrian children. The list goes on and on. And now we are going to promote this individual to replace probably the finest diplomat ive known, secretary burns, who is thought only is not only is mr. Blinken unqualified but he is i believe a threat to the traditional interests and values bob menendez and spoke in blinkensanthony nomination. The presiding officer without objection. Mr. Menendez madam president , i come to the floor in feafer of the confirmation of tony blinken who is no stranger to this institution and no stranger to the most significant National Security issues this nation has faced in a generation. As the former staff director of the Foreign Relations committee and a close confidant of thenchairman biden and now a member of the president s National Security team, he has earned a reputation as hard working, studious and keenly analytical. And he comes from a family of diplomats and has lived his life in and around the foreign service. His nomination as deputy secretary of state comes at a time when the United States is facing a range of critical challenges. From ebola in west africa to russian aggression in ukraine to the challenging of countering isil in syria and iraq to irans continuing quest for a Nuclear Weapons program. At the same time, we are forging new global alliances and partnerships with india, in the middle east and asia and looking for opportunities to expand american exports and business opportunities. There will be no shortage of Critical Issues that well face. Foremost on our National Security agenda is countering the barbarity of isil whose terrorist ambitions threaten our National Security as well as the stability of an entire region. We also face a continued crisis in ukraine where a ceasefire has collapsed and russian tanks, troops and weapons continue crossborder incursions into Eastern Ukraine. Clearly, the list of challenges is long, the diplomatic calculations are complicated, and all of these challenges will be part of the portfolio the deputy of the deputy secretary of secretary of state. Now, i know there will be times where we agree and times where we will disagree, and i look forward to working closely with mr. Blinken should he be confirmed, and i expect that he will be. Now, i know there is opposition by some of my colleagues to mr. Blinken. As we consider his nomination considered his nomination in the Foreign Relations Committee Last week, several of my colleagues raised concerns which id like to take a few minutes to address. First, there is an incredible notion that mr. Blinken is somehow unqualified. Madam president , anyone who has served as the Senate Foreign relation committees staff director, two president s, a Vice President and a deputy National Security advisor to the president of the United States and has chaired the National Security councils deputys committee is more than qualified, and my colleagues know it. They simply disagree with the politics and the policies of the president , which is the responsibility of the person who is serving that president to ultimately promote, and anyone he chooses to appoint to a key position, but they cannot disagree that mr. Blinken has served the nation admirably, with dignity, diplomacy and has honored every position he has held, that he has devoted his life to serving this nations National Security interests, and he has excelled at doing it. Now, frankly, if mr. Blinken is unqualified, then the bar my colleagues have set is so high for any human being to reach. So i ask those who object to the nominee what additional qualifications can there be . Outside of already occupying the position for which he is nominated, its hard to understand what additional qualifications my colleagues would expect mr. Blinken to have to demonstrate his worthiness. Perhaps they would prefer he be nominated by a different president whose policies they agree with, but thats not how it works. This is an eminently qualified candidate who has the full trust and confidence of this president , my colleagues policy concerns notwithstanding. They may disagree with specific policy decisions of this president dutifully carried out, i repeat, carried out by mr. Blinken, and even listening to my dear friend and colleague, senator mccain, a distinguished member of the committee who i regret we are going to lose in the next congress from the committee, you know, when he made the comment that the president s personal decision im referring to on syria when all his National Security advisors recommended providing arms to the Free Syrian Army, well, mr. Blinken is clearly one of those National Security advisors, but the president is the one who ultimately makes the decision on what policy will be pursued. Which leads us separately to the questions about mr. Blinkens participation and decisions involving iraq, afghanistan and other parts of the world, as certain members of this body have taken issue with. Mr. Blinken has had to defend those decisions no matter his personal views or advice. That is his job. You can disagree with the president s policies, but you cannot blame this nominee for doing his sworn constitutional duty to carry them out. Now, i want to be very clear, we cannot judge the qualifications of this nominee, or for that fact any nominee based on the policy decisions of this president or any president. He has been part of this administration, to be sure, but if the Senate Starts to hold every nominee to account for every decision made by every president that they serve, i think that we will find that there is no one who will pass muster, no one who will be confirmed. I happen to think that president bushs decision to evade iraq invade iraq was a geostrategic blunder of the highest order. I opposed it at the time, and history tragically has proven that judgment right. The brave sacrifice of our young men and women and the squandering of hundreds of billions of our children and grandchildrens inheritance have compounded this magnitude of this error. Would my colleagues suggest that i should oppose all future republican nominees who served in the Bush Administration because no matter how qualified they are, somehow they must be held accountable for what i believe history will show in evaluating the bush presidency as a historic blunder that led to the civil and secular wars that are changing the shape of the middle east. I dont believe that that is what my colleagues would suggest, but that appears to be how they are judging mr. Blinken. But none of that is a reason to oppose mr. Blinken or any nominee. I hear these references to iraq. Well, Prime Minister malaki at the time opposed signing a status agreement, and without such an agreement, it was impossible to have our forces continued to be in iraq subject to the possibilities of any issues being pursued illegally under iraqi law versus our own law. Or in afghanistan, the question of what the force of the size should be in 2014. The president has made the statement of what it is to be. And maybe we can even have disagreements with what the size of those forces should be in 2014 as we see things evolve, but it is not for someone in an appointed position who is supposed to carry out the president s policies to say no, were not going to have that size, were going to have a bigger size. I fully expect that if confirmed, there will be a number of issues where mr. Blinken and i probably wont see eye to eye, or rather that the administration he will represent and i may not see eye to eye. When those issues arise, i fully intend to let mr. Blinken know exactly how i feel and to engage in a debate to influence the policy, and i will avail myself of all the tools that a senator can use to do so, and frankly, given his experience working for this body and given his professionalism and experience with the Senate Foreign relations committee, i would rather it be mr. Blinken who will be across the table from me rather than someone else who doesnt have any of the understanding of this institution and the prerogatives of senators. Im confident that he will understand where i am coming from, even when we disagree, and i am confident that he will approach these discussions with an open mind, that he will seek to persuade, but he also will be open to persuasion. Madam president , i dont think any of us here in this body would like to be held to a standard of perfection in our judgments, one that holds no space for Loyal Service to this nation, no space for qualified nominees who have honorably and faithfully implemented the policies of their president. Lets be clear. We are not judging the president s policies. We are judging the qualifications for a man who has loyally and professionally carried out those policies. I do not doubt the sincerity of my colleagues in this body, even when i may disagree. I do not doubt that they are seeking what they believe is the best for the nation. In times at times, i think theyre right. At other times, i think theyre wrong. And today, as it relates to mr. Blinken, theyre wrong. Tony blinken is a tireless and able Public Servant who serve the nation well, and i urge my colleagues to confirm this nominee. He is a man of the senate, a qualified and distinguished Public Servant and an accomplished n when members return, you can watch the house life here on cspan and the senate live on our companion network, cspan2 appeared president obama also away from washington, d. C. Traveled toamily hawaii last night where the air expected to remain until after the new year. The president spoke with reporters during a year and News Conference at the white house. You can view that online at cspan. Org. You can also watch it tomorrow here on cspan. Day, what shen q1 perceives as the hypocrisy of liberals. What is the problem with ted kennedy . Was the 2012 convention when they were comeng this tribute video up for trying him as a womens rights champion when he let a young woman to drown in his car. If he had not gone back for nine hours and try to save his own behind, she would have survived. You cant do an entire video at a convention claiming to be preaching and fighting about the war on women and glorifying someone like that while not including that part of his life in the video about womens rights. Sunday night on cspans q a. Next, a look at the different factions that make up iraq and whether National Reconciliation to theng an and violence there. The impact isis is having in the region and the role of the u. N. This runs just under two hours. I believe im the only representative of new america here today. Andehalf of our president the Vice President for studies, thank you very much for being here today. We are very excited about this panel and about talking about the possibility for reconciliation in iraq. Too much of our conversation has to do with politics or reconciliation. The focus is on things military, things kinetic, airstrikes, terrorist attacks, isis, so on and so forth. Sometimes its far more important dialogue when we look at the longerterm. Not to say the military peace is not important in the short term. As we look at the longerterm, this is where the action is and where the hope for iraq really is. We look forward to each of them having their conversation. We will start with my f friend from the radcliffe institute. Hes published widely on issues in the arab world. A pleasure to be here. Since i have only 10 minutes, lets get to the point. Reconciliation in in order to understand ae problem, we need prehistoric analysis of whats happened in iraq since 2003. The main problem in my point of view is the failure to integrate this problem is to the rules on which the old iraq was based. Used to be airaq highly centralized state dominated by sunni elites. They adopted visions of , nationaltion identity and ethnic identity. They saw as a threat that needed to be eradicated. Most sunni arabs were told that there are three major threats for iraq. Occupation, the kurdish nationalists who are per trade as part of the separatist movement, proxies of foreign enemies in the Shia Islamists groupyed as a reactionary controlled by the iranians. Walked tounni arabs togetheriers, sitting with rules for the new iraq. It was not only a regime change, but the reef formation process that entirely changed the nature of iraqi politics. Change is the introduction of the idea of powersharing. The idea of National Identities that previous regimes perceived as a threat are the main categories that define representation and organized politics in iraq. She has an kurds managed to adopt the new realities very beenly because there had institutions with some degree of legitimacy. Establishment maintains some level of autonomy, legitimacy and was able to represent the common interests. You have the shia parties which were operating in opposition. Haveurdish community, you the Kurdish Regional government, the kurdish factions, the National Kurdish movement. They have their institutions installed in 1991. The were able to represent common interests present demands and visions for iraq that the kurds wanted to be part of. , the maincommunity problem they face is they lack outside of this database to dominate. World of sunni arabs is a category imposed on people who share very little outside of the basic structure. It is true that most share visions and ideas about themselves and iraq and its identity moment these visions on four sunni arabs, the state was a sect. There are no longer controlling that state. There are three main factors that deep in the sunni alienation. There is not onesided to be blamed for that. It is a very complex situation. These three factors are important to understand what has happened since 2003. Resistance was the idea of sharing, which required them to become a minority group. Dominanceave the shia in the processes that shape the new political roles in system political rules and system in which sunnis were underrepresented. Inve the conflict for 2010 come in the election, most of the sunni arabs voted for a coalition that presented a , anostalgic iraq unified community. There were elements of antiiranian discourse. Most of the ideas that most. Unni arabs identified with after the election, you have 10 months of negotiation that ended strengthening the sectarian power sharing over the constitutional rules. Afterwards, the Prime Minister tried to further weaken the sunni arab groups. A political vacuum is created in the sunni arab community, filled by isis. Isisonflict today between and its reluctant sunni adversaries is not only a conflict to control territory. Define theflict to meaning of being sunni. What is next . I think we all agree that the isistask today is to fight. This is not an easy job. We might agree that this cannot be achieved without securing representation, a genuine sunni partner that is able to challenge isis narrative without losing the support of the sunni arab communities. Visions the need for a appealing to the Sunni Community and able to challenge the state that isis seeks to build. Needpeople think that we to deemphasize governance and i agree with this perspective but i want to conclude by mentioning some issues, some problems that we need to be aware of. Onorder to make our debate decentralization more serious. The moment we Start Talking about how to share resources in iraq, we will Start Talking about why do we have to share resources . Iraq is the most Oil Dependent state in the world. 90 of the government possible is secured government s budget is secured through oil grants. Elites in ruling urbil andnd strengthening their tendencies to exclude others. It is not easy to find a good formula to share resources. Thatially, when we know geographically these resources are not distribution easily we just saw that after the baghdad government, voices saying why it should stay. We will see the same question about thewhen we talk most impoverished regions. Some mistakenly think that having a sunni region will provide them with an economy from the shia dominated government. This is very unlikely. Arabs dont have established united leadership. They dont have enough resources to ask in the penalty from baghdad ask independently from baghdad. Also, to form a sunni region that will lead inevitably to the formation of a shia region. Im not dismissing this idea. This way we are going to tensionsn sectarian and conflict as each region is trying to turn itself into a state. A more realistic approach is to diffuse power without going into more tiresome conflict. To grant more powers to the already existing provinces in iraq. My friendturn to abbas, a senior foreignpolicy fellow at the Foreign Institute here at johns hopkins. He is the author of reclaiming iraq. Iraq inost recently in the summer. For organizing this panel. So many people worked on it. I will go right to the point. I will be my own moderator. I second everything he said. A lot of these remarks he made our to the point and they are they fairly describe whats going on in iraq. Maybe i can elaborate on a few things and provide a few other points that might broaden the somere and let us and on spots that are not covered so far. Aboutfirst think reconciliation in iraq. They tell you everything we do on databases is retaliation. We are Holding Meeting after meeting, talking to people, trying everything to accommodate everybody and everything else. Reconciliation is in the eye of the beholder. Reconciliation for the shiite is different than for the sunnis or the kurds. That is for the international players. Whose are we going to talk about . The narrative of reconciliation has been set in a way that there are so many myths and realities, but always a dominant reception that the shia are the ones controlling the government and pushing everyone else out. Many people dont look at the math. When you talk about pushing sunnis out of the government, how can that be when the sunnis are no more than 20 , but if you iraqithe positions in the cabinet, they have 34 . That is greatly appreciated. From 2003,t the 99 but still above their quota. The minister of defense and planning, education, trade. The list goes on. Then they have the speakership. Which controls the legislation in iraq. There is not a lack of representation there. The math does not lie. Rhetoric can be formed in any way. Why arent we getting satisfaction in the Sunni Community . I think we need to look deeper at the micro level. Do these people who get these positions really represent the sunnis and work for their interests . I can tell you that anyone kurdish member of parliament in all works much better than of the sunni and shia arab representatives combined for their own constituents. Gettinglem is, who is elected, who is getting appointed to a cabinet job . That means much more than how many there are. Most of the people who are now in the cabinet or the parliament dont represent much of the Sunni Community because they cannot even set foot in their own districts. Yet, they do speak and make and daytoday business on behalf of the Sunni Community. Same thing with the shia representatives in the parliament and the cabinet. You cannot believe the level of dissatisfaction of the shia. The two of the iceberg of the dissatisfaction of the shia community. The sunnis say i representatives are not able to deliver much to us. The shia say they are selling us out. Every single concession part of the reconciliation is coming out of us. When they go and make a deal on when theys from go and make a reconciliation with the sunnis, that goes from the shia share. Yes, the shia are less complaining, but those looking at the rhetoric and the shia community, listening to them talking with their community, there is much more dissatisfaction and many more consequences coming. As we speak, there is a movement to create the province it has is done mainly as a revenge Movement Towards what the government in baghdad is doing. It does not have any sort of representation to speak of. It has not had so in a long time. Established,is that is going to be changing the rules of the game. There is another movement at the larger level which is the suma republic. Separation from the rest of iraq. Fore is a division there the first time in my own lifetime. When i went to iraq and went to several provinces in central iraq, the lack of commitment of the shia towards the unity of iraq has not been seen in my own lifetime, definitely. People are not committed any more because of the blood that was shed in the fact that people are not served the way they should be. The south and central iraq is in ruins right now. There are some shia in baghdad, but they are no better in their representation in performance than the sunnis for their own. In the going on here reconciliation, we are thinking about it in the wrong place to we are thinking about reconciliation in terms of how many positions go to how many people in each community. That is not real reconciliation. They are not reconciling the translate into better performance and better to the respective constituencies of the people. Here that weblem is the fact that we need to look at the grievances of the populace rather than the grievances of the politicians. There has not been even 10 or 5 of the effort spent on reconciling populations as much as we are working day and night reconciling politicians. The other part is, who is going to reconcile the community . Dont haveaining much to complain about but there and other in urbil not on people who are talking terms with the socalled sunni representatives and the government. What about these people . Are we reconciling with them . There are two kinds of disputes. Those that are irreconcilable. Some say the entire process, im not interested in it. Everything built on the occupation should be torn down and we should start again on a new term. Or those were willing to work with the existing system, that is important. We have to look at reconciliation in light of the previous or parallel processes of reconciliation. There are great examples in the , even south africa morocco, we dont see any of their elements present in iraq. You cannot turn the page on 80 history and then say lets forget everything. Especially the fact that right now, the perpetrators of the past are still thinking and that everything that was done is the right thing to be done. Thesystem now, we here socalled representatives of the sunnis that you need to reconcile, calling the shia forans corporatio persians. We are looking at places in the west and north, mosul to baghdad. They have either fled or were butchered. There are silver linings. There are many sunnis who risk ia flingves for sh that kind of thing needs to be worked out. Looking atnce reconciliation in terms of a meter a mediator. There has not been a good mediator that would sponsor important and workable, sensible reconciliation in iraq. Leaving the process to the iraqis to work on their own, on their own devices with all the troubles we have with representatives of every group is the long wrong way to go. Be deeply in trouble and detrimentally in need of a mediatorest, effective to work that project in a fair way. We can talk about other things in the q and a. Balal. Now turn to pul he teaches politics a. Has been on he extended winter break in the United States since october. Welcome and think you very much. Im surprised that it always takes a war for iraq to be on washingtons radar. I wanted to comment on some of the things said earlier by my colleagues. And then maybe talk of bit more about the Vantage Point from iraqi kurdistan. In iraq, we have political representation. Sunnis are represented in the federal government, kurds are represented in the federal government, what is missing is powersharing. The kurdish representation in baghdad. They cut the budget of the kurdish government kurdistan gets 17 of the national budget. The revenue sharing agreement that has been in place since 2005. Without going to parliament, it was an exact order this executive order done by the former Prime Minister. Theut the budget and economy was crippled overnight. Listen to this. The foreign minister is kurdish. You have a large kurdish population. They cannot do anything. They cannot lift a finger to change this policy. You have representation but you dont have powersharing. These individuals cannot help their constituents. That has been the grievance. Power notd the even allowing representation. Was not sectarian. That is the problem we still have, the legacy that has remained. Reason,ad, for some they refused to share power. Representation is fine. Sharing power is a problem. That is why the people are not being taken care of. No one thinks of the people. Look at the budget in the past decade. Last years budget was 100 billion. That is a lot of money. At budget iraq has ever seen. I hope one of you gets to see baghdad. The largest village in the world. Where did the money go . With reconciliation as we focus too much on history and grievances and do not look at institution and structures. The economy of iraq is failing the country. He talked about the countrys chronic dependence on oil. The iraqi economy there is nothing else going on. , it was budget was cut 95 of kurdish government budget. You go from a rich country aspiring to be the next Dubai Government next they haveernment no choice to be myopic. This myopia i described the system as not as an economy because it does not have institutions. It is a distribution system. We sell the oil, we cash it, we sell it. If prices are low, theres nothing to distribute. The other dimension is, unfortunately, the other chronic problem, which is corruption. This is something that is not getting enough attention. Let me make a distinction between corruption and the washington context in the washington context and , money notin iran being well spent, not having enough efficiency. In the case of iraq, its a matter of National Security. The army dissolved because we had corruption in the ranks. Afflictedat disease the kurdish district and the s they faced when they were attacked by isis. Let me turn to kurdish vision for iraq. It may be confusing to look at kurdistan and ask what the kurds want. The kurdish commitment to federalism, the kurdish grand scheme our grand plan or strategy for secession and independence. I think the kurds have been working as a plan a or plan b on these trajectories. On the one hand, that is a desire for independence. Respectscountry that iraqs vote as a sovereignty is the United States. More often than i visit baghdad, i visit istanbul. This country that was put together has failed its people for a variety of reasons. Why should we be asked to commit to this nation that has already failed . Another question being asked now, if isis is allowed to have a of the country, why cant we . The grievances are there. The International Humanitarian requirements, the country that has failed you, the genocide and now the kurdish government has been building institutions in , and economy that is dependent on oil but independent from baghdad, some attempts toward secession. Subconscious, something political leaders often say that everyone has a desire for statehood, a desire for independence. Is very aware of the challenges associated with independence. People know that we are not in a friendly neighborhood and are aware of the regional risks and the historys. The history. That is one track. You have aspirations and serious Work Associated with the infrastructure. That is why you see the government some time acting like a sovereign state. When they visit the capital, it is very important they highlight the red carpet. Those are big deals because they represent symbolism. This is one side of the schizophrenia. On the other hand, you have federalism. The kurds were adamant about enshrining federalism and the constitution. Some see this as a step towards independence and others, which is my opinion here, see it as an opportunity to live within without suffering the decentralization of the past and yes, they have enjoyed the perks of statehood through federalism without the responsibility associated with sovereignty. You have institutions built and the economy is drastically different. It feels nicer and is a completely different city. That is because of better leadership, consolidation of power, and also, a unity that does not exist in the country. Federalism is still personal and political, rather than institutional and legal. We have a constitution that depends on who reads it. That is still not clear. We have Many Political deals. Iraq lacks a hydrocarbon law. The sharing of these resources the sharing of the resources, the right to sell oil, those are completely unclear every time there is a situation such as baghdad needs from revenues, there is a political deal. For example, im talking about 2007, there was a political deal baghdad allowed them to sell oil, there was some process. Price of oil went up, but oil was enough to cover iraqi budgets, baghdad on the decisions. Two years later, three years later, there was another deal and then this time, the k. R. G. Wanted it, they didnt need baghdad. They build their own independent pipeline. Theyre all political deals. I tell you this history because we just had a new deal on december 2, 2014, where the kurdish government and the Iraqi Government agreed on some shortterm political deal to sell oil and share the revenues. Again, is it going to last or is it just another shortlived political deal . My worries are, my hope is, of course, that it will be a step in the right direction and the right direction being a National Hydrocarbon law that has at least the quad political backing on both sides, but i also have worries. Past legacy is not very promising and, of course, we also have all of these pending issues such as land, such as revenue sharing, the grievances of boss are, the bosra, that the same that is echoed, why should the kurdish share oil with the government. These are challenges that the hydrocarbon deal is being faced with. I think kurdish oil policy when it initially started in 20042005, some say how oil is being managed. The pushback in baghdad was so strong and fierce and aggressive, this small cat was correspond into the corner and it was turned into a tiger that is thousand big enough for baghdad to deal with. That has been one of the landmarks of kurdish policy, to shoot and ask or maybe not ask questions lately, to impose status quo on baghdad and build the pipeline, and tell baghdad, here it is, would you like to fight it or join it so we can share the revenues. It has worked sometimes, sometimes it has overplayed its hand. So far that is where the Iraqi Kurdish government is. There is also regional and International Pressure on the kurds to stay in iraq. Coming from this capital, coming from teheran and in addition to the realities on the ground. To conclude, though, some pressures that the k. R. G. Is currently under, what really angers and disappoints kurdish leadership and the kurdish in general is that every time something goes wrong in iraq, the kurds are the first to help solve it or and they have to make sure iraq doesnt fall. Oil prices go down, the kurds come under pressure they need to rescue iraq once more. Prime minister mall i can creates a ton of problems for everyone and the kurds say, ok, thats it, thats kind of the last straw and were going to call it a game. There is pressure, come on, give baghdad another chance. This doesnt go well in kurdistan, ok. People, and again, politicians have played this because they said the end institutional federalism that i was talking about, comes with perks, it comes with lack of accountability. It offers room for lack of transparency in a lot of realms including revenue. The kurds are getting fed up with it, we were promised too much a sovereign state. We were promised and too many times and now its time to see it. Its time that im expecting that that kind of rhetoric that the kurdish leaders have been promoting, again either as politics or as policy is going to backfire in iraq as a country not going to deliver what the kurds want which is an independent economy, a continuous revenue stream and maintaining the level of autonomy that the Iraqi Kurdish government has been enjoying. The pressures on the k. R. G. Also include an influx of refugees, people from isis captured territories and you add the demographic pressure in addition to budget cuts from baghdad that were imposed in this new deal of december 2 is going to address that as well as low oil prices and economic creation that the country itself is facing as well as hundreds, actually 1,500 kilometers of borders that now the k. R. G. Shares with isis. Sorry, thats the failed state, im not the bearer of good news, but my main point is that there are these two tracks. We cannot focus on the past history and grievances. We need to look at economic structures and institutions. I thank you very much. Thank you very much. Well now have our hostess, she is a longtime activist and democracy promoter who has been working reconciliation tracks for many, many years. She is also a fellow here at the Foreign Policy institute as well as working track two issues at our other sponsored middle east institute. Thank you very much. I was involved in a track 1. 5 National Process between 2006 and 2009 in iraq. Listen to my colleagues, fellow panelists, its deja vu all over again. I was bring back to that room involving iraqis many of whom are in senior positions in the Iraqi Government. Its the same issues over and over again. That should be telling us why National Reconciliation is needed. I was recently at the meeting with a group of senior iraqi figures, experts and officials. One of the participants in that meeting said while we cant defeat isis or dasch militarily now, but without National Reconciliation, were not sure that we can prevent it from returning again. There are many former officials from iraqi that said dasch is iraqi 6. 0. So if this critical opportunity in my opinion is facing iraq today at taking another attempt at National Reconciliation is not taken up by the iraqis as well as by the region, i think that im afraid even if we defeat isis in a year or so, in five years from now, were going to have, who knows, a new group under different terminology. More importantly, i think there is the realization today in iraqi, that this is it. This is the opportunity to make this country work and if we fail at this this time, there will not be a second chance. So as few people know in the field, in conflict resolution there are critical junctures in a countrys live or a trajectory where intervention can really move that conflict from one state to another. I think iraq today its at this critical juncture where a serious effort can have a long Lasting Impact on the future of the country and its people to make it work. Now i think its important to also, to address Region National efforts, why they have failed and use them as guide posts Going Forward in thinking about a National Reconciliation process. Between 2004 and 2006, 2007, there were three attempts at National Reconciliation efforts. Im talking about not track 1. 5, im talking about official attempts. There was an attempt in 20042005. There was mall i cans National Reconciliation project of 2006 and there was, and this is where the top bottom effort, the top down effort. And then there was an attempt or in fact an assumption underpinning the surge in 2007 which says instead of looking at the National Level which at the time was stalled, was going nowhere, maybe by focusing on the awakening, you create the space through these bottom up National Reconciliation with sunni tribal group to create a space and opportunity then that can go and move the National Reconciliation opportunity, move the process at the National Level. I think each of these attempts failed and there are common reasons why these attempts failed. One of them and primarily one of them is what he said, the lack of negotiators, a convenor that was accepted, seen as neutral and as having the morals and political graph tass in the eyes of all of the parties, sunni, shia, kurds, armed groups, political movements. The arab league was not seen as a neutral negotiator for the shia and the kurds for its years of silence facing the saddam regime acts of violence and definitely mall i cans was not seen as a neutral garktor by the sunnis, especially at the time when he was failing to end the militias in 2006 and 2007. The second issue is i think something that had its end is the failure to deal with this clash that existed at the time between the public of violence between 2006, the outcome of the two narratives in iraq about the violence in the saddam era, but the violence, both of them eras from 2006 and i think each of these National Reconciliation efforts failed to create a forum where these matters could be addressed an reconciled. There was also escalating sectarian violence at the time, especially starting in 2006 which did not help in creating a National Climate that make the reconciliation feasible and the actors, the invasion of 2006 brought to the forward iraqi parties movements, armed groups, hundreds of them, many of which did not have political skills, did not have the practice of working politically with each other, many of which have diverse agendas. Some of them have the nationalist iraq agenda, but some of them have very much a sectarian agenda. So that clash between these different movements and diverse agendas also created obstacles to National Reconciliation. I have to end with mall i can. Mall i can was definitely the single most influential if we can put it this way obstacle to National Reconciliation and the way he went about it that he put forward the 2006 initiative for National Reconciliation and he made all of the right moves, supported and pushed it forward and then in 2007, in the awakening gave him the perfect excuse to go back and say, well, we dont need to do National Reconciliation at the National Level because you have all of this local reconciliation happening at the local level. Basically he used the awakening movement as an excuse to an sond the National Government and his group of doing anything at the National Level. And here we are. We are now at another critical opportunity and i think the window is going to close very quickly, but we are there at this critical juncture where a National Reconciliation process led by an acceptable mediator and that were talking about that. I think if we look around the region, i agree, its not going to be the iraqis doing that. I think each one of them, any iraqi mediator will be a polarizing figure for some party. It has to be a regional figure. I dont think the americans can play that role. We have lost in a way that moral credibility in the eyes of many iraqis to be able to play the role of a mediator. We were talking about this panel, egypt. I think egypt still is a possibility. There is a possibility for egypt to play that role of a convenor, of a negotiator, of a National Reconciliation process in iraqi. It carries a lot of baggage for a lot of iraqis, but egypt maybe has an opportunity to claim that leadership role that it had as being an anchor of the arab region and playing the role of mediate or of a National Reconciliation process in iraq is maybe one way to do it. It has to do also with what the new egyptian leadership, what vision they have for the country, their vision for the Foreign Policy of the country and the role that egypt can play as a mediator in the arab conflict. Now i agree that any national recancelation effort Going Forward, why it needs to be at the top level coming to readdress some of the issues that in my opinion the constitution failed to address, the constitution in 2005, talk about a missed opportunity. Constitution writing is always an opportunity for negotiating among the different movements and parties in a country, the new rules of the game Going Forward. Negotiating, for a social government. And i think at the time in 2005 that opportunity was missed partly because of the administration owns reconciliation and electoral timetable pushing the iraqis to finishing writing up the constitution in my opinion in a way that prevented that kind of discussion, that kind of negotiation among the political elite, but at the same time the kind of debate within the iraqi public to readdress the issues of how this country can move forward, the new rules of the game. We need a National Reconciliation effort among the political elites, among the different, representing the different components of Iraqi Society and i agree and one question when it comes to the sunni, who will represent them. And whether this pact that has been struck recently between parts of the Sunni Community, tribal elements, large groups of the Sunni Community and isis or dasch can be broken and whether the sunni political elites who are in baghdad part of the government today or who are sunni officials from mosul can represent the Sunni Community is a question here. I mean, you work with what you have. These are the elites, the sunni elites that have be in political participation and are in the best position and can make the argument for the rest of the sunnis about the benefits of sticking with political participation Going Forward. So you need that level of National Reconciliation at that thought, but at the same time you need the national recancelation at the Grassroots Level. It has to be a second to act to National Reconciliation Going Forward in iraq of a bottom up, whether in the form of confidences, whether in the form of meetings at the provincial level, the local level. This twotrack approach is important but also importantly, since 2003 and the removal of the saddam regime, regional players, regional actors have an Important Role to play now inside iraq. What happens in the region flows into iraq, but also what happens in iraq affects the region. I think when National Reconciliation happens, it needs to have the blessing of the regional actors that have most influence in iraq. I mean by that americans, i mean by that the saudis. I mean by that the turks and the iranians. That brings forward the question of the future of u. S. Iranian relations. I think without the kind of blessing or umbrella provided by the regional countries and the countries that have influence in iraq, i think National Reconciliation, whether at the top level or at the Grassroots Level has limits in how far it can go. Now, in terms of agenda, i think my panel, my fellow panelists here have talked about what the agenda of National Reconciliation process, especially at the National Level should be focusing on, the question is back to the forward, how you make that work. I agree with you, there is no power sharing and i remember in 2006, 2007, many of the sunni participants in that track 1. 5 of reconciliation, the word they came back to time and time again is the idea of partnership, that what you are looking for is partnership in governing which is very much similar to what you are talking about in terms of power sharing. The second issue that needs to be addressed i think Going Forward is the status of kirkuk. We know that the new state of affairs is not going worse. I dont see anybody in among the kurdish leadership arguing for restoring the status quo. What will be the status of kirkuk Going Forward and how this is settled goes a long way in affecting the attitude especially of the sunnis because these are kurdish authorities. Lastly the militias, the shiite militias which are now playing an Important Role in standing up to isis, but eventually the fear is that theyre going to start adopting political agendas that will have to be reckoned with. We had a bad experience with militias that gunned dont get disbanded in the middle east. Hezbollah was established in 1982 and hezbollah now is the primary force in lebanon and a sector of lebanese politics. That is a fear among sunni and some shiite of some of the shiite militias which are now playing an Important Role in fighting isis with political aspirations Going Forward. The same with the sunnis with militias. The fear being raised, especially in places like bosra and in baghdad about the National Guard and whether the National Guard and the way they get formed can become the focal point for creating a sunni nation to stand up against the shiite militias. So how also the National Guards law is agreed upon and how they are formed on the provincial level is important on Going Forward. I will give just a few points, our hostess asked me to say a few things in addition to moderating. I think today has been a wonderful example of the difficulty of reconciling competing narratives, which we have heard in very mild, polite, and academic terms here on the stage, but in iraq itself become much more pointed and much more political. Ill pick on harriet for just a moment. Certainly from the perspective of the sunnis and the old regime, sectarianism begins in 2006. I think from the perspective of both the kurds and the sunni arabs, thats simply not the case. And from the perspective of baghdad, there happened to be these unruly people up in the north who revolted in the mid 1990s and went and put they will down. The fact that they happened to be kurds was irrelevant to baghdad. That is not the way it was perceived in the north. Likewise from the perspective of baghdad, you have one particularly unruly cleric in 1980 who needs to be removed and is killed under torture by the government. You have this uprising that occurs as kind of an aftereffect with the war with the americans in the south. You have another unruly cleric that needs to be assassinated in the 1990s. From the perspective of the shia south, the killing the cleric and then the slaughter of the shia in the south followed by the assassination of another cleric is a narrative of sectarian repression from the perspective of these two people. So we have these competing narratives of what was going on and what was happening. From the perspective of the regime, probably not a sectarian intent, but from the perception of those who were on the receiving end of this repression, it certainly had a sectarian effect and fed into long narratives, both on the part of the kurds and the shia of repression by either the sunni or the arabs, depending on which camp youre from. With that said, i think we are at a point where this is both the best and the worst time to attempt reconciliation. It is the best time because i think objectively speaking when you look at the situations, all three sides have realized that iraq needs to Stay Together and it is exponentially better for all sides to Stay Together, the iraqi sunni for all intents and purposes live in syria. Who wants to live in syria right now. They live in an area without government control and without any significant resources and so long as they are separated from the central state and of course they still continue to receive some remittances from the central state which mitigates their situation somewhat, but so long as they live under the Islamic State outside of baghdad, they are in a bad place. They need to rejoin iraq both for the security that it provides, the monies that it can provided and outside of this, they would simply become a saudi client or a gulf state client. The kurds i think are a very interesting case right now. We have all heard in town for the last 10 years from the kurds, in our heads, we know we need to be part of iraq. In our hearts we want to be independent. I have never seen those two narratives even more magnified as in the last year. On one hand, the kurds he will pangs into kirkuk, the exuberance that came about because of this, because of their expansion, because of the retaking of kirkuk really put the kurds in a euphoria over the possibility of independence. I think the fact that they are now coming to terms with what a border with isis means, what this has done to their brand. For the last decade, kurdistan has been the other iraq, if you have a border with isis, youre just iraq. You have all of the violence. You have all of the risk and so on. I think just in the last month, we have seen the stubborn fact of the fact that kurdistan cannot declare independence and for that matter cannot export oil without the concurrence of ankara and that dates back to all of the decisions, if kurdistan wants to do anything that baghdad does not approve of, it must have ankaras concurrence. The realization that they would not do nothing without the concurrence of ankara. Its a single commodity oil economy but also has the Political Risk on top of that, what they are willing to do and those two risks together strike all of us objectively speaking as an overwhelming argument against independence. Of course, this has nothing to do with what is in the hearts of the kurds. So we have the unique time i think where objectively speaking its a very good time, but in the hearts of i think both groups, its a very difficult time. I think this is further compounded by the perception which i believe has been a sunni shia dynamic for some time that the shia have perceived the sunni as in a large part collaborators with terrorism. I think what we see now that narrative has now spread to the kurds and we are now seeing the kurds dont, of course, use militias or death squads to push the sunni out. They do use visas and checkpoints and bureaucratic procedures. We are hearing anecdote stories of it being much more difficult at the very least for them to cross the borders into kurdistan, for them to act in kurdistan. Its a very interesting, both best of times and worst of times. Stealing my thunder on who can bring this together, i concur that egypt is a unique figure that perhaps could bring this all together. Everyone else who has the gravitas to do this the gulf states, the United States, iran, turkey, all vietnammed by one vetoed by one of the three parties and arent plausible. Ill close at the tension that i think is at the heart of trying to find the right federalism approach for iraq. We have had my good friend just left town, articulately talking we need a more decentralized and less powerful baghdad. Yes, in a way. On the other hand, you want a baghdad that is powerful enough to bring the revenues from basra, bring it in and distribute it. Maybe it isnt compatible or tensions in these two positions. Do you want a strong baghdad or not a strong baghdad. These are difficult to reconcile. I think the kurds are perhaps insufficiently attuned to how baghdad is balancing not only their negotiations, but everyone elses. For example, i think if we were just talking about baghdad and the kurds, we could probably reach some kind of accommodation. Im not a party. The iraqis could reach some kind of accommodation on how much oil is pushed through the state oil company and how much can the kurds manage to export on their own. Because there is boz rough in the equation bazra, it has to be redlined on how much can come to the state oil company. I dont think baghdad can afford to coppermine is eyes on that condition, not because they could not work it out but because that president has been set. This is the problem with a multiplayer game, its not like you can reach an accommodation with two sides, you have to reach an accommodation that includes everyone and i will close on a pessimistic note that even if Prime Minister a body would say i will do whatever it takes to get a deal, there are no red lines for baghdad whatever it takes, we will do. Im not sure he can cut a deal with the sunnis and im not sure he can cut a deal with the kurds that is acceptable to the sunnis. That is the difficulty moving forward and bringing peace to an iraq that needs piece. And objectively needs to Stay Together. With that, what time do we end . 10 minutes. 10 minutes for questions, we will start right here. Of the middle east institute i have two short questions, what about the role of religious leaders, nobody has mentioned this but they figure very largely in the narratives and why are you ignoring the u. N. Which seems like the obvious mediator . Religious institutions . Religious institutions or religious leaders . I just met one, it was a great honor in august. I can tell you if there is somebody holding the shia from secession than it is him. Thats what i heard from his office and from him directly. With the bazra the was another top call for a bazra region in the past. When i met his son forcing him in 2010 he told me point blank that we made the basra province fail. He singlehandedly socked that. For anybody interested in keeping iraq together they should say think god for him. One of the u. N. . Why not the u. N. . They could do that, the process needs to happen under a u. N. Umbrella they can provide that kind of aid. They have their role to play in helping, provincial powers act it has provided venues and forum that enable some elements some agreements as i said like the 2015 act to take place the question is in this situation, what needs to happen is the arab legitimacy for that process. Iraq looks at itself as an arab anchor an arab center of power. And in egypt, the political gravitas that egypt carries in the region can prove to be less polarizing and at the same time bring the kind of legitimacy of its consolation process under the arab umbrella especially with the dissident proponents. I agree the u. N. Might be the most credible party but we should know that it is not about the party with well intentions we need a party that is able to oblige all negotiations to enforce them and oblige by the commitments they give i agree about the egyptian role because they hope the egyptians egyptians will work on their own National Mitigation [laughter] i dont feel they have that force and credibility is the right form to power. One sentence comment, the religious institution that figures generally speaking the religious institutions are increasingly losing power because of the accumulation of wealth and power because of politicians and which enables them to coopt the religious institutions. But this is a whole different category. Right, a major outlier. My comment has somewhat accuracy if he is in the picture the derailment in the red tie. The gentleman in the red tie. I am david mack i have a good news, that news scenario and maybe some of you can help provide an answer to what happened if as i suspect, diane dyash is really overextended. Places like mosul are running out of fuel, his tradition of food is breaking down to say nothing of a total failure to reestablish the economy and health care. What happens if you have what is first considered good news with former he former officers rising up to kill dyash officials and on the pressure from the outside you have a implosion of the administration but everything ive heard doesnt indicate they would be prepared to move in and do much better. So it would be kind of in an era away like 2003 in an ear he way eery way like 2003 with the fall of saddam hussein. Is there some way the iraqi state could take advantage of a fortuitous of Element Development . The scenario you are describing happened. The sunni tribes rising against the al qaeda and against others and that put an end to al qaeda s foothold in the country. The necessary steps after that which were powersharing and partnership, inclusion, did not follow through and therefore that military victory was not caps on lies on capuslized on. So any sunni leader would say why would we play that movie again we have already seen it and we know how it ends. Unless there is credible evidence that if they do the same thing there will be something different. The gentleman in the blue open collar. Great presentation. My question was regarding the repeated suggestion that the current egyptian regime could not act as viable mediators and he mentioned 1. I wanted to say which is that given the depth of the current regime they are not able to cite strike any kind of National Compensation in the country and might preclude egypt from playing a viable role added to this is the current egyptian regime will not be viewed as neutral it is viewed by many, especially sunni, islamists as an antisemite regime so it will not be viewed the third and final thing is the gravitas that you talked about. What kind of leverage in terms of political enforcement does egypt have given the Economic Force deteriorating and the troubles going through at the moment . Fair points. I dont think any of us i think we concede your points go ahead. Quickly, i am with rhonda on this that egypt is not have to be involved as a state, that egypt has great still among statesmen. There are others who are important, skillful negotiators, skill for skillful mentors and it does not have to be egypt alone, there are several other people. You would like to see a combination of egypt with a u. N. Umbrella and the u. N. The u. N. Has one option on the menu if anything happens, ibrahami. But there needs to be exploring other talent because there are places where he cannot be as effective. He can provide the talent and maybe even have people from south africa who may have walked the walk. It is good to be an International Effort with some kind of International Talent and a new umbrella to give us the credibility needed. When we talked about before the panel but egypt we were trying to look at which of the Regional Powers can play the part. It has to be led by a Regional Power but which one . Iran and saudi arabia is for either side, the u. S. Is not acceptable for the large front of the population that leaves you with a very small cast of characters from which you can choose and egypt from that cast does not have to be alone, but their involvement is critical to give it the kind of arab umbrella it needs to have. Egyptians do not have negative Approval Ratings inside iraq, they are not as resistant as saudis are others . As saudis or others. Thats right. I have two quick questions. The first one is about some reporting and reading about what is isis imposed of . And my question there are people saying isis is just a cover for the iraqi army and these groups could you please tell us a little bit about what kind of competition you see inside isis . Second question, how important the american role is in keeping iraq together . I think isis is the latest incarnation of the group led by the foully and a rock in iraq. They managed to attract any people who are part of the former iraqi army and those people playing Important Roles in military planning, and creating sleeper cells but i still think that within isis there is competition on the divide between isis as an umbrella for sunni militant groups and isis as a global jihadist group, sooner or later i think that divide will become clear if you want the ability of isis to maintain unity in answering your question, i think the members of the foreign army play a role but i dont think theyre very influential in deciding the Strategic Decisions of isis. I will give a closing comment to what im told is our last question the answer is both, isis is both an International Terrorist organization that has incorporated a number of resistance groups and pieces of the old regime. There are many analysts who are confused as to which was primary in the immediate fall of mosul in may or june. The minute the group took its left turn and turned toward urb eal it was very clear which was the primary motivation this was the latest iteration of sunni resistance to a perceived oppression of regime in baghdad. It was a huge strategic flaw on their part in the could of exploited that ambiguity for a long time had they not taken the turn into kurdistan but now that question is settled. While it has sunni resistance elements in it it is primarily a extreme Islamic Group that has aspirations to do what it says to take over the entire levant and morocco to indonesia. We have time for two more quick questions. Because america is a america, it continues to have an Important Role in starting with 2003 there is a complex history that makes americas role very collocated and america will always be a player because it remains a global superpower but its history in iraq in particular require it to have partners to achieve legitimacy. My question is about the region and the efforts if you look at the history, the issue of the basra region would come up with negotiations with the kurdistan region and i think theyre trying to use the formation of the basra region information of the krg. Are there credible efforts by the people to form autonomous basra regions similar to the kurdistan region regions similar to the kurdistan region . There are some similar to the judge who has been a minister and Parliament Member who is probably the best person to articulate the cause of basra his narrative is quite well known. I think what goes on basra is not just about basra, the leadership and the Political Leadership the governor and city council, they belong to strong parties that are national parties. Also there are leaders from outside who paul their own politicians poll their own politicians, but the biggest problem to achieve political status is the politicians. But i think he is trying because there is a mechanism to collect signatures and present them to the Election Commission and then it will go forward that way. The question is will the same people who caused the previous attempt to fail do it again or is the momentum to strong right now too strong that remains to be seen. I think it is more workable to have not just basra but the south provincial that is more kind of a contiguous demographic and geographic and in many aspects that will work better. This idea of having a fullfledged shia presents, if you get that you will force more than one province and that will lessen the tensions nationally. I think the answer is both it is a real thing but it becomes more salient whenever they are perceived bargain is to make the rest of iraq look worse. I dont think the two ways youre putting it is intention they are very real. As the perceived deal that basra gets a piece of the rest of the country starts a look work than the salience of basras larger Southern Regional status becomes more salient. Wait for microphone please. Identify yourself. Im from the city college of new york a graduate student. My question is am a i want to go to the role of the u. N. Itself, you mentioned it has no large power over iraq but they do have in 2005, all members are obliged to act collectively should any member state failed to protect their own citizens and they already did that in libya for example. They can do that using peaceful or coercive means but the question is would the p5 led the u. N. Interfere into the iraqi issue for example they could build the trust that has been lost in these attempts to reconcile the Iraqi Society. I think they do have that role. I dont know if you agree with me or not. I think the u. N. Has a role to play but in this issue and it has played Important Roles in helping iraq on some levels it has played a role in training with the iraqi and iran government but in terms of National Levels involving the top political elites i think the u. N. Needs to happen under the umbrella and in terms of the actual leaders and the actual people. My theory and hypothesis is that it has to be led by arabs by people from the region. It has to be led by a country that is seen for all practical purposes an important country and an anchor to the region and egypt is such a country and has been applied before it does not evoke the negative attitudes among iraqis that other potential regions can say. The u. N. Has to play a role but we are in a definite gain in terms of iraqi politics and having egypt play that role it could be a member of the convening team and bring that game to a level that it needs to be brought to at this stage of the conflict in iraq. I agree and i think the u. N. Has a great moral persuasion role to play but in terms of an enforcement mechanism of getting chapter six or Chapter Seven on iraq that is a paper tiger and ill think anyone thinks that is a political possibility unless there is a quantum change in iraq. When he to be realistic here, were talking about region which there are almost five states now there are probably more coming but i dont think that the International Community will be able to have the same commitment it had in 2003 for the iraqi issue, i do think that you need to renegotiate the political process in iraq and to reach a new compact between iraqi factions you need a thirdparty and in this case a fourth party was able to enforce or at least to ask the party like themselves what they promised to do and i still think that sort of collaboration between United States and iran and turkey might be helpful you cannot execute Regional Powers because you are to exclude them and they will not exclude themselves they will try to influence the process and the best way is to involve them to be part of the solution and not part of the problem. Time for one more . Yes. Good morning, my question to my dear friends im from syria you mentioned that the sunnis the kick up the shia from their areas, can you elaborate more about what they did to the sunni as well and can you elaborate about how the sunni will react to the shia and others and how they will fight isis in their own area and dear friends when he met in damascus, you are there to brief us meaning the Syrian Government . Yes. And with the Iraqi Committee one of the cases you speak of is that there is no one preventing no one as you are proficient, how do you pick up the people that they got, how can you expand the point . Lets look at what he was referring to. Since the coming of isis. And later on in other provinces, isis clearly did not allow they give the christians, not just the shia, the christians were pushed out at least they were given 24 hours to leave some of them were asked to convert i went to school in years and is a change that for the first time in over 1000 years that has no christians at all not a single one. They were also slaughtered so was anybody else but also with the shia, they were not even given that luxury, shia be killed for their work cut and the other areas crisis came, there was a slaughter of shia, 1700 cadets were killed by sunni tribes, not by isis, before isis got to that place. In anbar, by headings of shia became commonplace. It is not every sunni kills every shia they found. Families at the risk of their lives rescued shia kids and send them back. If you look at it from the other side, all of the internal displaced pleas from people from fallujah, where are they . They have been hosted for months. The same thing. Nature happens in the south. There was no sort of counteract where sunnis were slaughtered. None of that happened. Your question refers to what they were doing in the fight. To groups thatng have been acting out of their own leadership and structure. A step back. E a lot of the footage shown was very disturbing to say the least. No less than the torture that happened elsewhere. Lets face it. Those groups, whether you like them or not, they were the only ones who did