Close to the militant industrial complex, it seems that this new doctrine will before related in aggressive terms. Nuclear tactical strikes are not just a method of last resort but they will actually be used in a very aggressive and forward moving fashion as well as a certain level of threat is perceived. Do you see this approach you are proposing here will actually make its entry into this new doctrine . Is this based on your ideas, on your theoretical developments that you yourselves have worked on or does this reflect a more technical approach among Russian Military circles that is kind of above or below the current hysteria that surrounds the question . One of the interesting things about this project and doing the research was going back into the different strategies that existed on the soviet side in the cold war. They dont follow in a nice clear statement. This doctrine is not a significant change from the historic position on Nuclear Weapons. They were always just weapons. Usable in the event they have retained an enormous arsenal of nuclear arc of nuclear artillery. This was always part of their war fighting doctrine. I think it is chet it is telling they have not been used. I think it is likely they will not continue to be used. In the awareness that Nuclear Weapons are weapons, that they are not there for some abstract notion of reserving mutually asserted instruction, theyre there for use and have a deterrent function because theyre usable, that is completely reasonable. This is not so different from american thinking and the contemporary context as well. The level of engagement russias nuclear power. I dont believe this is a huge departure. I dont believe it has to be destabilizing. I do not belong to the Russian Security community. Neither is he. Though i dont belong to the Security Community i think that there is selection is going on and it will be just one of the products of this reflection. The Security Community adapts much more flexible. Taken into consideration they emerged from the borders suddenly. Middle east russian chinese relations are strategically though it does not prevent both sides from taking a certain security measures. I would agree that this approach is not much different from what has been developed after the second world war. We write that Nuclear Weapons are always considered as just another. Just another instrument. Thank you. Congratulations to both of you. Having seen the paper developed it is an impressive document. I have a couple of questions. Thinking about how either american or russian officials would react to the change you are proposing it strikes me that current russian officials would be far harder to sell on this and that they have somehow become more better students of shelling than their american counterparts and more interested in concepts such as a secure second strike and focused on the utility exclusively. What happened . How do we understand how we went from war fighting to Nuclear Weapons to what we have today. That is the first question. This question about arms control and transparency, it is worth thinking about how we achieve transparency. They have been the only means historically of providing forward. The Data Exchange and inspections and even the commitment not to mess with the other side home means, only if they are legally binding in the context of arms control. Verifying compliance it is the only way we have figured out how to do the transparency we described. We have never had that before and it would be a different thing. The question about whether you are talking about on Nuclear Weapons or just to teach it Nuclear Weapons comes up. It is the same principle of nonstrategic weapons. This paper changes how we think about it. This is the Legal Framework where the legal from her can be found to ensure transparency. I do believe we do care about political issues. The debate was predominated the classic american approach. We have more intensive debate. It is also just a weapon. We have five future generals. We think the debate is not developing. The adoption of second strike capabilities, strategic and shelling, i think it justifies larger military budgets. It is a way of articulating Strategic Concepts that justifies much more military sent the terri spending. They had requests about this insane proposal. This argument continues to hold. What would be the harm in unilaterally reducing your Nuclear Arsenal to the level at which you could simply destroy the other country . Is a pretty powerful deterrent in and of itself. I think that is a very subversive concept for defense complexes in both countries. It was an accident, a high product a byproduct. We should be focusing on agreements that simply provide transparency. It was quite unlikely to achieve in the current context. We would be much more likely to achieve just the transparency and just the observation verification. Both sides have an interest in that. Russia would be interested in making sure we are not mobilizing to attack in to attack. We are facing a lot of crises these days. Whether we are talking about on Nuclear Weapons or strategic Nuclear Weapons, in many ways we are advocating class to turns. Straight out to terrance. To the extent of your capabilities that involve nuclear artillery, those may enhance the turns as well. If we are concerned about the baltics or ukraine, then limiting the Nuclear Weapons and removing them from a strategic doctrine would advocating their use. It may be a way of limiting conflicts in the future. The conflict has remained relatively limited. The question i want to ask it is about the implications between the two sections of the paper. If keith was right in saying a possession of nukes has moderated what might have been an excess of american or unrealistic reaction of some kind, lets say that is true. Lord knows we have had enough difficulties in recent months. Of we know there is one issue in which russia would be even more incensed of american policy changes shift. That will be on the question of nato enlargement. What if ukrainian leadership takes the lesson from these events that it either has to nuclear rise ukraine it had a physical custody over weapons it could not fire. Nonetheless it had them. Of it gave them up and now is in this very difficult situation with its neighbor. The alternatively if you cannot build your own and ukrainians could do this only against a very stiff resistance of the United States who wanted to do that, the alternative would be to join nato. Is it possible this would be an unintended side consequence of what you are proposing and is there nonproliferation . I think that is a false choice, nuclear rise or nato, to provide your own security. Ukraine is in the situation it is in now. In addition to the fact that a social movement overthrew the government and the government lakhs legitimacy in parts of the country that created the conditions in which separatism can grow. Him or is no question separatism was supported by russia. The real problem is ukraine lacks state capacity. Nuclear weapons were not solve this particular problem. Him with ukraine would ukraine fire Nuclear Weapons of moscow . I dont think so. Would there have been secession . We had secession in chechnya print this is a different type of problem in chechnya. This is a different type of problem. They dont play very Important Role in dealing with internal challenges like the ones the Ukrainian Government is facing. I think that ukraine cost choices ukraines choices it is billed the state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. Build the state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. It is a political problem. It is not a military problem. It is removing oligarchs from power, removing private companies, removing the private he the privately supported information. If ukraine could have been a nuclear state, who could absolutely assure the Nuclear Weapons will not get into the wrong hands . Those that can employ them regardless of the intentions of the ukrainian or american government. Them i want to talk about the role of conflicting strategies in syria between how the conflicting strategies of both countries will affect the strategies of the two countries. How will the situation in syria affect the compatibility of the two nations . I think strategic compatibility gives us a sustainable framework. I think strategic compatibility will leave us selfish of our diplomatic action. It makes the diplomatic action more solid, primarily on the russian side. When it deals with problems like the syrian problem, it is more about bilateral relations. The danger is not cases like syria. Him if there were circumstances in which both countries perceived a vital interest was at stake, those are the ones at real risk. Him if there is a lack of common interest in areas of vital interest, where there is equal resolve on both sides, that could escalate into a broader conflict that would undermine the stability of the relationship. The u. S. And russia can have very different views and pursue different policies on a variety of conflicts throughout the world but not fundamentally destabilizing their relationship with one another. That is the historical norm in international politics. We would like to avoid armed confrontation. The capability of the relative powers is not going to play an Important Role. We have limited ambitions. We enjoy the situation when the survival interests are not contradicting and overlapping. This is one of the arguments in the basis of power. That gives us luxury to develop the entire concept. With regard to Missile Defense, the assumption is if the country has Missile Defense capabilities it will make the use of Nuclear Weapons if Missile Defense did become the norm between the two countries, what with that have on quantities necessary. What are missile both United States and russia have a level of technological sophistication in their weaponry that they should be able to defeat any Missile Defense. Missiledefense is largely a filter for other countries. If not for the type of weapons that the United States and russia are likely to have in that sense it is not destabilizing. Russia and United States would no longer have a deterrent. It would simply be in the realm of conventional weaponry. Kings that are real threats to the United States and potentially similar threats to russia. In terms of unilateral reductions, we are faced now because all machines have a lifespan the rockets we built during the cold war are coming to the end of theres. It is not a question of do we reduce but do we rebuild. We are now faced with a choice of if we could start it all over again would we build the arsenal . The answer is clearly no. It is a question of letting certain missiles go through the end of their lifespan, building new certain missiles that are sophisticated, and that is a different model than the cold war and a much more reduced force. Him that is what we mean when we say reductions. Him that is what we mean when we say reductions in not returning to those cold war levels. We will be able to develop the Nuclear Forces which will be able to penetrate any american defenses. If russia will feel unsecure unprepared. This is an area where transparency will be important. Russia has to have some familiarity with the Technical Specifications of our Missile Systems to know that it doesnt negate their nuclear capability. We should be able to provide that information because it enhances our security. I have three questions. Do you guys see a world where there are no Nuclear Weapons echo weapons . Does your paper just getting rid of the icbm component . And did you guys have any good or funny stories from the research that you put into this paper . Do we envision a World WithoutNuclear Weapons . The answer to the first question is there is no answer is no. The stories are so politically incorrect that i cannot tell them in this room. I could envision a World WithoutNuclear Weapons in the same way i could envision a World Without spears as the primary methods of warfare. And the contemporary context i think taking away some of the most powerful weapons you have without new weapons emerged is extremely unlikely. China has not been a party to any of these bilateral cold war agreements. That is the dark shadow on this paper. We talk about the u. S. Russia relationship. China is out there. China is a threat to both parties. That is going to have a nuclear deterrent. There is no question about it in the nuclear context. This is political talk already. The upturn the the opportunistic point is that neither russia nor americas feeling from danger feeling of danger from china is objective in nature. The cases are very subjective and not by the objective threat of china but by how we perceive china. That makes the situation looks better. In terms of funny stories, when we started writing this paper we were hammered for being too pessimistic. Increasingly we are hammered for being too optimistic about the nature of the relationship. Even if trust is nonexistent. The myra memories conversations. What i still dont quite understand is if it was possible to achieve another armscontrol agreement between russia and the United States, if we were able to obtain that we have, wouldnt that still be preferential to the proposal you put forth . Or are you trying to say in fact i squirmed when i heard you say this are you saying that doing your own thing is preferable to negotiating bilateral treating a bilateral treaty between russia and the United States . I would suspect there would be plenty of russian generals that would like to hear what you had to say. I thought part of what you had to say was unless the u. S. Is interested in reducing its nuclear are so Nuclear Arsenal can do so without concerns. They should be comfortable of that. My concern is how you would sell that here. Those in the nuclear zero community would be worried about taking unilateral reductions that do not get us closer to a world of nuclear zero. There are plenty of people in this town who you will never be able to convince the United States needs to unilaterally reduce its weapons, not only given a certain level of russian capabilities but in the new context we are in. I am still uncertain how we are going to sell this. There is a chinese saying that that words make bad deeds. I did not believe in the continuation of the arms control negotiations would be good as i do not believe continuation of any cold war preferences would be good any cold war practices would be good for continuing National Security security. I think the problem with arms control is they read assigned to achieve parity. Parity, largely in nuclear capability. In the current context with american superiority and everything about Nuclear Weapons, i think it is not likely to symmetrical reductions in nuclear arms will not achieve symmetry insecurity on the two sides. I do think that unilateral reductions could occur. We have certain financial constraints. We may want to invest those resources somewhere else. Would you allocate resources to something that is a fantasy that is not likely to obtain . I wouldnt if i faced a budget constraint. This country faces a budget constraint. I dont think we would do things that are unnecessary. It is plausible. You just mentioned the u. S. Should allocate resources toward more strategic defense things. Do you think we are entering a new era in u. S. Russian relations that would be more beneficial to the u. S. The thing to be wiser to allocate to the u. S. To allocate Resources Americas ability to project its power more effectively echo more effectively . I want ask you to comment on improving american security. I wont ask you to comment on the ruling american security. I think better Nuclear Weapons may be a good goal for funding. That would be a reduction in number. I do think priorities in other areas should be pursued. Manned fighter jets would not be first on my list. I think that is going the way of catapults and things that are no longer going to be important. Of not convince the navy paid navy plays ace im not convinced the navy plays a centrally Important Role in what you are suggesting we spend money on. I am not opposed. I am a Lieutenant Colonel air force pilot. I wanted to talk very quickly. I understand the argument in terms of its not a nuclear not a numbers parity game. What you feel about an asymmetric jump lets say the lungs the longrange Strike Bomber gives a true largely penetrating capability against a country like russia. How does that factor into the arms control debate and this idea of stability between the two countries . How does russia feel given the fairly extensive use under the bush doctrine of preintervention by the United States, how does that factor into this . We talked about the turns and stability being a capability and the will to use it. We display the will to use conventional force and now we have an overwhelming conventional force that will only go stronger. How does that play in your argument . For me compatibility is to answer and resolve our own fears related to each other. The compatibility meaning to have enough power and assured ability to feel safe in relation with russia or america on the other side. As the situation in europe grows there is a certain feeling of compatibility. This paper is intended to give it a feeling of more structure in a systematic way. I do believe there are weapons that would reduce the stability. Art of part of compatibility is the deterrent capability and Hypersonic Weapons that were quite accurate. It could lead to bringing us back to the 1950s with a very effective first strike that was a surprise. That would be destabilizing in this context region of that would be a good case for this new arms control regime. Him awareness of the launch would be extremely important. Him we are just aware of what is going on with each others forces. I do think some of these arguments are sensitive to current weapons technology. Him the general principle behind it of compatibility would give us some guidance on how to move forward in the event the technology changes. It would require more handholding than others. On the issue of the United States, russia is very uncomfortable with preemption. In large part concerns about what is going on in ukraine from the russian perspective are that this was a prelude to the entry of nato forces into ukraine, creating instability, over overthrowing the government, and then asking for our help and us providing it was a way to bring our forces closer. That is a powerful merited. It is not a correct narrative. We are not eating ukraine cost military. I think there are ways that we can take down the temperature. Through wise action and policy and communication with the russian side. I think a country with a predoctrine of strikes and scary to a lot of people. Thank you for your presentations. You look at military issues, the assumptions that you couldnt the analysis of security and what achieves security for a country these comments seem to lead to believe that the amount of weapons in the country would leave it to resolving the issue with russias sense of insecurity in todays world. I want to bring in the issue of values and economics into your story to say that russia has been compatible whether through arms control or without arms control and the strategic incompatibility is more valuebased incompatibility. Let me bring in merkel. There may be some truth to statements looking at russia as trying to live in a realist world view and western countries and the United States at least been more divided in terms of realism, constructivism, liberalism. It doesnt have that much money to spend on weapons. It amounts of money to spend on weapons has been increasing get the sense of security has been rising as well. It is also about the values and the World Vision Team eaters have. It is about the globalization and who it benefits most. The Global Economy has been beneficial to russia as well. Him if we look at how it was integrated into the economy, that is where the sense of insecurity may be coming in as well. Whether allowing either country to spend as much on weapons as they can would actually bring a sense of security or if that is the way it is a little confined studying psychological issues. That is a good question. I think the feeling of security is always of a subjective nature. This beautiful lady would have a huge snake in her hands and say it never bites. We would still feel a little bit unsecure because security is very subjective. It is security as we perceive it. I take the liberty and responsibility to formulate and to suggest what might be the resolution of the National Security concerns. Of course these suggestions come in line with my theoretical congregation, which you can see and understand. Taking about the Global Economy speaking about the Global Economy, we are living in Interesting Times where the Global Economy, Global Market is more and more in contradiction with national regulation. We see it in europe, in asia, many other cases. I think this story only starts with how the countries will see themselves. I think there is a difference between allowing countries to spend as much as they want, not having strictly enforced arms control agreement, and advocating they spend the law. Moving away from arms control but advocating they build less, that they take the notion of sufficiency and we are putting forward a different notion that would require less spending. As to the west being the real world we have a large military and if we trusted in International Law and believed that the norms of territorial integrity were sufficient to limit states and the public outcry were sufficient we would not have the defense spending that we do. Him we clearly think we live in a world that has threats and we take efforts to counter those threats. Russia does the same with far fewer resources. We are advocating a way this could be done better that was less threatening to each side. Im with usdi. My views and questions to not represent the department of defense. I was caught by a footnote. In a way this follows from the previous question. Take a look at the question of the angle of political culture. It talks about the soviet view of instability and that the soviets believed that stability was best achieved through their own supremacy. Contrast the american view your views may be a very enlightened way to look at the problem. Your approach with taken the how would your approach take the way that you would like an russian political culture, particularly strategic culture, that the expectation would be that the russians feel secure because they have a decisive defensive capability. Others might worry that with the background of the political culture they may feel emboldened in a way that may not be rational in some sense but might have some historical precedent. That is quite a theoretical question. I always tell my students. It is impossible to draw a clear distinctive line between the willing believe and willing to do. Dealing with this nation we never know what is enough. It is why we are so concerned about china and their potential. I believe that the clear absence of strong ideological content in russian policy now keeps optimistic notes to this to how this Foreign Policy looks. In soviet times the Foreign Policy was ideological. Foreign policy was not based on ideology. Here to the western perspective it is optimistic. If you look from here to the western perspective it is optimistic. One of the purposes and one of the poppel one of the possible future areas on this strategic compatibility issue might be how we deal with the other rising powers like china, india, potentially brazil, potentially south africa. How do we incorporate their strategic culture, which is absolutely, fundamentally different from ours since the russia and the u. S. Belong to the same tradition, to the same religious tradition. It is a good question and a hard question. Does ratcheting down the two emboldening ratcheting down lead to emboldening . I would distinguish between weapons and results. You can have very high resolve with the weapons you have. That is a deterrent. If we can persist if we can persuasively drawdowns when affective set of weapons draw down to an effective set of weapons we would not embolden our enemies. You spoke of a Bilateral Agreement in unilateral action. As you just briefly mention the role of china is certainly a large factor in a clear nonproliferation or the reduction of arms. What reduction does china have in your position . Though we had some discussion between wed originally argued that china is much more challenged to Russian Security than i do believe. Since i still we can observe the Russian Military superiority over china is immense. Both in nuclear and conventional forces. That is why chinese do not go for military training exercises with conventional forces in the framework of our duration. I think that china finds itself in a very complicated environment. China is forced externally to act more assertive. This imposed assertiveness of chinese Foreign Policy of a country that is not used to be assertive can potentially create challenges because of the misperceptions and misunderstandings from the others, including russians. My politically incorrect answer is it does not recognize the limits to the territory indispensably governs it extensively governs. Russia make sure that the northern border of china is sincere. China will not expand to the north so long as russia has a nuclear deterrent. We dont need to worry about that. We need to worry about other borders. That is something for u. S. Policy to take care of. I do think china needs to be watched carefully. And to make sure it is deterred so it does not expand. We have reached the end of our session. This has been a stimulating discussion. I remain more optimistic than i was when i came into this. A huge thank you for coming all this way to be with us. Thank you to the davis center and tim colton and to the Carnegie Corporation of new york for sponsoring this wonderful endeavor. Please join me in thanking our wonderful panel. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2014] in a few moments, ralph nader and Grover Norquist discuss how Political Parties can Work Together and then q a. 7 00 a. M. , youre caught in the comments on washington journal. Calls and comments on washington journal. Communicators, discussing merger proposals before the fcc. The issue with consolidation is you have Huge Companies that are not only in control of the distribution of content, too. They are getting hammer locked. Information that we as a democracy will lie upon to govern ourselves. The adoption of smart phones is faster in minority communities than suburban affluent, white communities. That is fantastic news for america. You are seeing a developing world rapidly. And improving the human condition for allowing people to benefit from new information and and change their economic political expectations in a constructive way. At 8 00 on the communicators on cspan 2. On thursday, former president ial candidate ralph nader and Grover Norquist discussed how Political Parties can Work Together. Such ascuss issues government transparency, the minimum wage, and corporate welfare. This is one hour. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] good afternoon, and welcome. I am myron belkind, the president of the National Press club. The National Press club is the worlds leading organization for journalists with events such as this, fostering a free press worldwide. On behalf of our members, i would like to welcome our speakers. If you hear applause in our audience, i note that members of the general public are attending, so it is not necessarily evidence of a lack of journalistic objectivity. I would like to welcome our cspan and public radio audiences. You can follow the action on twitter. After our guests speeches, we will have a question and answer period. I would like each of you to stand briefly as your name is announced, and from your right, skip, an independent journalist and who organized ralph naders luncheon. A guest of Grover Norquist. A video producer. Dr. Claire nader. Pat host, and air force reporter and a member who helped organize todays event. Grover, i am sorry, we changed the routine because of two speakers. I will introduce you in a moment. A reporter for usa today, vice chair of the speakers committee. Skipping over mr. Nader, an account supervisor at a Committee Member who helped organize the luncheon. Wife of Grover Norquist. Economics reporter at investors business daily. A guest of ralph nader. And a veteran political reporter and former president of the National Press club. [applause] ralph nader and Grover Norquist might not seem like natural allies, but throughout their careers they have fought for a singular goal good, responsive government. How they defined a good response of government and how they get there is what the consumer champion part ways. Today they say there can be a common cause. Nader, who founded Public Citizen in 1971, fight to protect consumers from a collusion of corporate and government interests. Norquist wants to protect americanom