Transcripts For CSPAN Tonight From Washington 20100812

>> harry truman in 1939, he suddenly hated him, just really despises him. he was seen as a senator from the tender grass team in kansas city. >> senate historian donald ritchie washington movies and his new book, sunday night on c- span's "q&a". >> now, retired coast guard admiral had adam on bt's efforts to plug its broken oil well in the gulf. he also talks about the big -- effect an expected tropical depression could have on the cleanup. from mobile, alabama, this is 30 minutes. >> good afternoon, everyone. i would like to give you a briefing on what is happening at the wellhead and the plans for the future. i would like to announce that we had a contractor working on the response that was killed in plaquemines parish early this morning, struck by a vehicle about 2:00 in the morning, working for a contractor. the name is being withheld pending notification of the next of kin. we have some weather approaching. it is a tropical depression at this point. we think it will have less chance to strengthen. we have suspended operations out on the wellhead or a couple of days to make sure that we can continue with the relief well safely. the winds are expected to be 30 m.p.h., slightly below the tropical storm threshold. but the seas will get up to around 12 feet and safety is associated with that. to that extent, development driller iii has not disconnected, but they have put a packer on the wellhead which helps fill the wellhead with seawater. they are remaining on scene. it will take 96 hours once the storm has passed to get back and finish their work. the local responders will be standing down and moving to higher ground, midday. in some cases it will be locally and in some cases we have moved equipment outside the levee protection and plaquemines parish inside the levee protection. development driller iii, we have moved back. there are some other things we have to do all in final completion of the wellhead. following a successful pressure test, he had discussions between the government's science team and bp engineers. there may be a chance that the cementing forced down to the casing of the well entering the reservoir might have actually moved over and come back up into the area outside the casing, but inside the well bore. we want to understand the condition of the annulus before we drill further. we're doing pressure test the will tell us whether or not there is free communication between the annulus and the reservoir itself, or if the cement has worked its way over there from the static killed. that will affect our decision on moving ahead with the end of the relief well. just to project out further, for everyone's information, once the well is killed, it is no longer discharging, it would no longer be considered part of the response because there will be no source of the oil. there are a lot of things that will have to be done out there, including removal of the blowout preventer, and the permanent plugging and abandonment of the well. that is actually a term in regulation. the department of interior oversees it. at a certain point in response, the control what happens with the wellhead will shift to the department of interior and they will manage that process. it will also do that in conjunction with the marine board of investigations, as it has been convened in new orleans between the department of homeland's security, and there will also be consulting with the department of justice on how that will be done. obviously this material is consequential to what is going forward. we're done some work inside the national incident command over the next three or four days. we will, a comprehensive plan to move forward to unify some of the concerns that have been raised with oil, subsea oil, and i have been working with jane lubchenco from noaa to make sure we know where all the oil is that. and with that, i would be glad to take your question. [inaudible] it depends where. we have been working with the officials in florida, alabama, and mississippi, and in some cases where the oil is no longer a threat, the boom will be removed. it could cause more damage than if you would remember it. if there is no threat of oil, we will decontaminate it. if there is marine growth, it has to be removed as well. that will make it ready for deployment and we will stage it near where it was, and then we will coordinate with local authorities. those are specific decisions that are made locally in conjunction with the incident command. is that responsive? for instance -- there is a great deal of oil in the marsh areas, so how we handle the boom there depends on where the oil is at and how close the boom is to the response. [inaudible] what we saw last time -- and this is not -- it is slightly less in strength than bonnie when it came through. what we saw last time was the surge, some oil was brought ashore, but it has been a long time since the well was capped. it is likely that we will have no oil, but you cannot have oil redeposited when it has moved down the shore. we will have oil actually displaced from where it back. we are mindful of boom being moved into a marsh areas causing damage. we want to make sure that we're safe from any surge associated with it. >> is there any protection out there right now? >> there is been in place in a number of places. we brought it into conjunction with a discussion with local officials. in the case where there has not been under threat from oil recently, it makes sense to store the boom. [inaudible] noaa has had an aggressive monitoring situation right around the well site itself and in other places in the gulf of mexico. they are sampling hydrocarbons in the water column, using gliders to do remote sensing. we've had discussions this week with epa and noaa around the fact of taking the current efforts under way and expanding that to include the coastal states, other research vessels, and coming up with a coordinated approach. there have been questioned raised about the 26%. what we would like to do was go out and make sure we actually had a coordinated effort at state and local levels. we have other initiatives going on behind the chandeleur islands where we have taken what we call snare booms. the oil sticks to it and the water does not. we have put that into the crab traps and check to see if any oil is thought to it. what will like to do is create an integrated monitoring system for the gulf of mexico. now that the well is capped, and there is oil to be a scam, and we want to redouble our efforts and break down the granular the of the response and get the oil wherever it might be. [inaudible] there is a very low probability that we might had actually sealed the annulus with cement. we want to see if the hydrocarbons can come up and through the annulus and the casing. it is going to drive that down and seal the well if that is the case. if there is no communication, we have stagnant oil trapped around that casing up to the wellhead. if you pump mud and cement in there, you could raise the pressure and push that up into the blowout preventer. that is a low probability event, but we want to test the pressure in the blowout preventer and see if we actually have pressure coming up to indicate they have free communication with the reservoir. if not, that would change our tactics in the final kill. we have to wait for the weather to come through. it is supposed to calm down around friday. by friday, we should be in a position to do that test. operator, i would be glad to go to questions from the phone. >> tell us about existing oil in the marshes. could you tell us about what concerns you might have about surface soil impacting shorelines as a result of this storm? >> sub-surface oil has always been a concern. we've been trying to find out more about it in the hydrocarbon testing going on. there is a potential that the agitation of the storm could make will show up on the beaches. we do not know that for a certainty but it is something that could happen with the passage of the storm. next question? >> stephen brown of talk news radio. >> the worker that was killed, was it connected to his work? >> he was off-duty, it was about 2:00 this morning, central daylight time, and apparently the individual was a pedestrian struck by a vehicle. no further information at this time. >> thank you. >> i will take one in the room. >> any information on how long this incident command post will stay open? >> that begs the issue of what i am going to do as well. i could give you an overview if you are interested in that, how it might implicate in mobile here. we've been in discussions with washington, with secretary impala tunnel and carol browner at a white house, on how we might make that transition. we will be looking at restoration, long-term environmental issues, assessments, and what we need to do long-term to return the goal to not only the condition it was in before the spill, but take on the larger issues that have been put off for a long period of time. we do not have an exact timeline but we will have some conditions to transition in the organization that i my head up. we have to kill the well. we have have no oil coming ashore so that we know the activities on the surface have been completed. i met with ken feinberg before we came down here. that needs to be up and operating. one of my response abilities is interfacing with the bp claims process. someone needs to assume that responsibility. the report by the secretary mabus needs to be structured and identified in a leadership position, said they know who is going to be the new person talking to you here. and when all those conditions are met, we will be of point where i can have a transition plan available to provide to my superiors how we would transition to a regional command, very similar to what we stood up in robert, louisiana before i was national incident commander. we need to make sure that we have response capability, that we keep our commitment to the people of the gulf, and we keep our commitment to provide oversight to bp to make sure they carry out their responsibilities. to the extent that those conditions trickle-down, we will be looking at how long we have had oil on the beaches, if there is oil to be cleaned up, how we're negotiating with state and local governments on "how clean is clean." that discussion is forthcoming. the footprint here will be commensurate with the operational requirements out there. it will not be downsized before any requirement has not been met. we will continue to work with local officials. no timeline, but it is related to how much oil has been cleaned up and the satisfaction of the local leaders. from my own particular timeline, the report is due late september, the approximate time frame for the national incident command transition would be somewhere around the third week of september or the first week of october, but that is all notional at this point. operator, i would be glad to go to the phones again. >> can you confirm that checking the sunken rig has already begun? >> i believe you also asked about recovery of the rig. let me cover it all. there are no near-term plans to salvage the deepwater horizon. there are several thousand feet away from the well head right now, slightly inverted, and sometime in early september, in conjunction quit the supervisor of salvage of the navy, we will try to do a comprehensive review, but we have staggered our work based on what needs to be done first. once we have finished our response activity and we are able to put the equipment in place into the plans, there will be a survey done of the rig. regarding the blowout preventer, that will not be removed until after we have confirmation the well is killed. at that point, bp will act under the direction of the energy of ocean management, what the department of interior. when the blowout preventer is removed, it will be preserved and brought to the service under the board convened under the department of homeless security. was the response of? >> thank you very much. >> the next question comes from the associated press. >> i want to clarify a point that you just made, and then a separate question. on your future, is it fair to say that you will likely beach rationing out as national incident commander between the third week of september and early october? and with regard to the bottom killed duration, yet been speaking with a great deal of certainty over the last few days from your point of view that you would be ordering bp to do just what they have been saying all along, pumping mud and cement down through the relief well into the bottom. it seems remotely possible that they make -- that that may not occur in that manner. i am just curious if bp has had discussions with the federal government in recent days and weeks about that issue and whether those discussions led to this current state of affairs. >> in regard to the first question, i laid out notionally that it happened then. the overwhelming criteria, including the cult claims facilities built project split up, the report submitted, and the structural long-term recovery in place. the actual transition will be conditions-based, and i have completed the work that i've assigned. regarding the pressure test, each time we have taken a step forward in our intent to kill this well, we have learned more. one of the reasons to do the static kill was to learn more about the well and we knew that we could safely after a well integrity test pour cement into the casing pipe. we can make sure that that was taken care of and reduce the risk for the bottom killed. what we have found out is that there's a possibility we could have part of the cement that went down through the casing, it might have blocked the annulus as well. before we make the final decision, it relates to how the pressure can be worn inside the annulus. we have a technical team in a houston, augmented by the science team led by secretary chu, and discussions have been continuous. there is a call to secretary salazar with the leadership, and these issues are discussed in great depth. they talk about risks associated with certain activities, how to mitigate them, and any procedures that bp develops are reviewed and recommendations is made by the science team. in any direction to proceed is a decision made by me, and i issue are written order to bp. that is the process that we have been following. he had more information on the success -- the great success in cementing the casing in the well. we just need to and need the -- which is needed to understand the implications and make sure it that we have all potential risks covered that would impact our decision on how we use the mud and cement. next question. >> the next question comes from reuters. >> i am a little confused and what me through something. you say the pressure test would tell you whether there is cement or not in the annulus, it would affect the decision on the relief well. what you mean by that? would you drill into it to see what you think it is? >> more detail whether we think the reservoir is connected to the annulus. if it is, we would add mud and followed by cement around the annulus like we did in the pipe casing. there's discussion about whether it was forced down into the casing and might have impacted the annulus. no one knows that until we get physical evidence by mastering it or intercepting it. that thought it might be prudent to do a pressure test that would indicate whether or not there was hydrocarbons coming up the reservoir to the annulus before we go to the final stages of the intercept. could it impact the decision to intercept and whether or not we would kill from the bottom? it could. we do not know that. we're doing the test to rule out one more possibility and improve our chances of killing the well fully. >> one more thing. you're still looking at the intercept around monday-tuesday? >> it will be about 96 hours from when they stop. if we're back on friday, it would put it in that range. we will take two more questions, operator. >> getting back to something you said earlier about there could be stagnant oil in the annulus. you mentioned about raising the pressure into the blowout preventer. is there concern that killing and with more cement or mud, it could somehow backfire and cause a problem? >> good question, joel. i am not an oil well engineer although i have been to school for the last 100 days. the casing in which the drill bit in the wealth i sets hang from the top of the well head. and then the telescope down into the smaller diameters. in that mechanism where they hang off of the top of the wellhead, there is a seal, and if enough pressure is applied in from the annulus outside casing on that sale, it is meant to give way said that it does not cause damage to the well bore. it is like a relief valve. the seal completely circles the casing at the top of the well, if enough pressure is exerted, it will rise up and allow all the oil to flow. sometime during the explosion, that pipe could have been lifted up to allow that still to be open and allow the oil to move up into the blowout preventer and might have been the source of hydrocarbons coming up other than the casing itself. we do not think that that is the case right now. we think it is seated where it should be, but we would not want that have happened, starting to pump mud and cemented and then you have the stagnant oil there, it would increase the pressure so that the stagnant oil is forced up and forces that seal to rise up, open up, and go into the blowout for better. we restrict the pressure on the injection test and in the top kill to be less than 8000 psi. the cap is rated at 10,000 psi. if we go ahead with the mud and cement, is there any chance that that what was stagnant oil ought to lift that up again and push that into the blowout preventer, and then approach pressures that might be of concern to us? we think it is a low probability outcome. but the discussion of those seals and whether the pipe has ever been lifted is something that has been discussed. we need to rule it out before we go forward. was that detailed enough? >> the well would still have the cement plug at the bottom. you would not return to free float, would you? >> absolutely correct. very little harm to the environment, but we would like to have the blowout preventer removed intact. you want to understand what happened inside the blowout preventer during the incident itself. there are not a lot of hydrocarbons down there but we would want to minimize even stagnant oil. we just do not know. the consensus of opinion between the science team and bp engineers is probably good to do the test to understand whether we have an issue with the annulus there. >> is that the scientist from the government's idea? >> it is hard to say anymore. some of these conversations start around the coffee pot. this is a possibility and the implications are not huge, but we're using an overabundance of caution all along. we adopt these procedures for 24 hours from time to time to make sure we get one more look. we do a set pressure test when we think we need to do. this is consistent with the work arrangements that have all bald and is a testament to the collaboration developed between the size team in the bp engineers. we all understand that we need to do this correctly and minimize impact on the environment. last question? >> i want to understand how safe the annulus is. and with the approaching storm [unintelligible] are there as many vessels out there as there were before? >> not before, because we're not working on the second vertical riser pipe and that sort of thing. the main vessels our development driller ii, development driller iii, and q4000 is in the area. to operate in the 12-foot seas, it does make a problematic if you are hooked up and trying to drill at the time. they're trying to stabilize the current situation and hold their position so they do not have to completely immobilize and return once the weather passes through. it is a lower-level tropical system than bonnie that came through. >> and the annulus. >> the difference between the concentric rings in the pipes. we're talking about inches. thank you, folks. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> that was retired admiral thad allen. to learn more about the approaching tropical depression in the gulf of mexico, visit our website. you can also watch hearings on the oil spill. go to c-span.org/oilspill. now, a short discussion on worker safety on oil rigs. >> carol leonnig and her colleagues at the washington post had an extensive article that ran in the tuesday edition about the safety of oil rigs, particularly for workers on the oil rigs. carol leonnig, what did you find out in covering this story gregoire >> market i work involved in investigation looking at how well the minerals management service had been investigating actual accidents on rigs. who want to see it every once in investigating the bp oil spill, how well they had done the job before. we were gripped by the investigations by the rig inspectors for the federal agency, mostly because -- not because of fines ever levied, because very few ever work. not because of penalties for violations, but because the event leading up to the accident, even if it was minor are led to the death of multiple workers, the events leading up to it showed a really frightening place to work. chaos, lack of communication, many workers really had no training or very little training in the exact assignment that were being given that day. whether it was windy, dark, stormy seas, you name it. it was frightening to think about this as a workplace. >> your article thoughts out -- starts out at a frightening you talk about an incident where crew shows up on an oil rig and they basically had very low training or experience. >> remember, federal regulations require these companies to give them safe operations on what to do if there is an emergency and how to handle evacuation from a huge 300 feet off the sea floor. what you learn is that these guys a arrive and they have had two hours of sleep. they walk up and start working in the dark. they came out on a boat for 10 hours in choppy she's it -- choppy seas and while they are working in the dark, they missed the safety meeting that was designed to discuss this. you can see that this is pretty frightening. one of the workers on that crew actually went to a supervisor because he was afraid that they did not know what they were doing well enough, and that something bad was going to happen. when he came back, indeed, he watched one of his co-workers call to his death. >> i think people recognize that oil rig work is dangerous work. you point out about where it ranks in terms of dangerous jobs. what is the level that one can reasonably expect or that the government expects of safety that is not being met? >> it is a grim tale in the investigation lines. sometimes feel like the people -- while the mms does this work as a police officer tried to find out what caused the accident, it often finds that the company failed to follow federal regulations and rules set by the interior department for safe operations. and yet even though they find there is evidence of that, that sort of gross negligence and that failure to update the rules by training their employees, there is not really any accountability. there is never any real punishment for that, at least not in many of the reports that read. i read one where a night crane operator ditches the crain by accident in the ocean, and the crane falls of the sought a vote, of the platform and ultimately into the gulf. when interviewed, he explained that he had very little experience and had never operated this crane at night, yet his job assignment is not crane operator. he did not know that the action he was taking was a violation of everything in it crane operation. >> you talk to the director of the international drilling contractors association, who refused a lot of these claims of lack of safety, etc., and said that most operations are pretty safe. what sort of evidence are data did he give you to back that up? >> he did not give us data, percper se. he said that many companies have expensive -- extensive training, extensive safety briefings, the make plans for assigned tasks. again, what we saw in the words of the rig inspectors to reviewing the investigation, was that these basic, minimum requirements were ignored and flouted it regularly. >> the coast guard interior department investigation heard from mike williams, who talked about the alarm systems being disabled or shut off on order from executives, so they were unable to warn before the blast there on the deepwater. did you find other typical examples of that? >> that was a really fascinating and common complaint in many of the accident investigations, going back as far as the late 1990's, that balls were shut off the were meant to alert people to -- valves were shut off. they should tell you whether or not they were properly pushing water off the edge of the platform. they are also supposed to alert you to the potential of a fire. they are also supposed to alert you to the potential of overload of the circuits. it was a pretty common theme, and they also do not always merit a fine or even a citation of a violation. i was also struck by just often this basic procedure that is required, it is called the joint safety analysis, where for each job, the rig operator is supposed to make an analysis of how to safely do the job and in brief all employees on how to do it. over and over in the accident reports you find that the company never, ever brief anybody on what the task was and employees were just being yelled at on allow platform to do certain things that were confusing to them. >> it sounds like you and your colleague have immersed yourself in this issue of oil rig safety. what are you looking for next? >> we do not easily tell what we are going to publish before we publish it. we are hearing there is great concern about the agency's past administration of the existing laws, but also for the perhaps some other regulations or intentionally week. they were pro industry, and not meant to really police said. there may be an effort by congress to really clamp down on these and make it very specific, when the company should be fined, when it should be penalized, and went maybe it's rigged operation should even be shut down if unsafe conditions are found. >> the article by carol clinile. thanks for joining us this afternoon. >> now, an investigation into the gulf of mexico deepwater horizon explosion which killed 11 people in april. we will hear from chief reed engineer stephen r. tongue -- stephen bertone, who survived the blast. this joint coastguard bureau of energy management commission hearing in kenner, louisiana, is over three hours. >> mr. bertone, for the record could you please state your full name and spell your last name? >> mr. returning, we do speak into the microphone please? >> is the red light on? >> how long were you electrical supervisor, sir? >> seven years. >> was that all on board deepwater horizon? >> no sir. >> what other rigs have you been on? the have experienced outside trans ocean and global santa fe? craigslist art in the oilfield, i started with self drilling and they were purchased and then again purchased by trans ocean. >> how long have you been assigned to the deepwater horizon? rex's 2003. >> how long had you been the chief engineer? >> since november 2008. >> was there any safety problem of interest on the deepwater horizon, considering your job responsibilities, prior to the incident? i was going to try to have an open question to see if he had any step that he had on his mind before i went into detail. were there any problems with a chair, b,chair or c chair? >> i do not recall. >> can you define what the a chair is? >> it is where the driller said. >> what is he monitoring? >> he is monitoring the block placement, top drive to work, the depth of the well, palms, and so forth. >> was there ever an incident associated with loss of electrical power? >> during the bid or prior to? >> prior to prevent yes, there was. >> when was the latest one? >> i don't recall. >> was there any problem with the no. 4 thruster? >> yes. >> and how long had that been going on? >> roughly about eight months. >> were any alarms bypassed for the activation of to any general or visual alarms for any high death situations? -- high gas situations? >> i don't really know how to answer that. >> i did not hear you, i am sorry. >> i don't know. >> or any alarms bypassed on the deepwater horizon? >> i don't know. >> you are the chief engineer and you don't know if any alarms were bypassed? >> i not in control of those alarms. >> who is in control? >> the bp operators. [unintelligible] >> if there was an alarm that was bypassed, would it have to be under your approval? >> yes, sir. >> let's go to april 20. i have your witness statement in front of you if you want to refer to it. can you please give us the detail of that date -- that day and up to the incident caused more >> from that time in the morning when i woke up? we had 86 got 30 meeting between the captain, a senior tool pusher and myself. there was a phone call to tell where we spoke to james kent, the asset manager, and paul johnson, the performance manager. after that, at approximately 8: 30 we always have our supervisors meeting and all the supervisors are required to attend. after that, i went back to my office and was working on the upcoming removed, the second upcoming rate move, and also preparing budgetary items and such for the bp officials and transition officials that were arriving later that day. i went to lunch at approximately 11:30, went back to my office and continue working on these documents. at approximately 3:30, we had a meeting with the bp officials and trans ocean and it was deemed we would go on a tour of the rig. we toured several different spaces, made our way up to the rig floor, and when we got to the record, we went into the drill shack. that point, i was the last one into the drill shack. it was standing room only. at that point, i knew there was something going on, but i have no knowledge of what it was. i was asked by either jimmy or randy that was on that tour with us to please continue the tour without them, that they needed to stay up there. we went down and show them a few more items, went down into the pump rooms, show them the thrusters, and then went to dinner at approximately 6:30. after dinner, we had a pre scheduled meeting of all supervisors in the conference room, along with bp and trans ocean officials. that lasted until approximately 9:15. after that, i went and had a cigarette and went to my state room, took a shower, and got into bed. >> and after that, after the time -- >> i had just opened up my book and started reading the first sentence of a paragraph and i heard what sounded like the attention errors being bled off. i thought that was strange because i had just spoken with chris pleasant and he had said they were finished bleeding off the tensioners. it got progressively louder and sounded like a freight train coming through my bedroom. there's a thumping sound that consecutively got faster. with each the, i felt the rig actually shake. there was an initial boom, the lights went out, i jumped out of bed, ran to my door, because i knew there was emergency lights out there so i would be able to see to get dressed. when i open up the door, i actually smelled some sort of fuel as well as tasted it. when i turn to go grab my clothing, the second explosion occurred, which threw me across my room. i jumped up, grabbed my clothes, slipped my work boots on, grabbed my life vest and my hard hat. i ran out into the hallway to the center stairwell. that point, i observed about four or five people just standing there frozen, looking up at the stairwell. when i looked at the stair well itself, i don't know if the stairs where there are not, because there was so much debris, it was completely impassable. i hollered out port forward or starboard forward and go to your stations. i went to the port spiral staircase and made my way to the bridge. once i arrived on the bridge, i went to my station, which is the port side back computer station system. that point, i observe that we had no injuns gunnoe thrusters, no power whatsoever. -- no engines, no thrusters, no power whatsoever. there is no dialtone whatsoever. i hung the receiver up several times, thinking maybe someone had left it off the hook. i picked it back up, there was no phones. i hollered out, we have no phones. at this point i ran over to the starboard window of the bridge and looked back to the derrick. prior to this, for whatever reason, the second explosion and everything had not registered with me. i initially thought that the wire had parted and that thumping sound was the block coming down the derrick. i was fully expecting to see steel and pipe and everything on the record. when i looked out the window, i saw fire from derek laid to deregulate and as high as i could see. i realize we had just had a blowout. i ran back to my station thinking that the engine should be started up. there was still no power of any kind. no engine starting, no indications of the starting, i heard the water tank bore bank directly on my left behind me. i heard somebody say that engine room and pump room are gone, they are all gone. i turned around, i did not recognize who was at the time because he was covered in blood. i asked him, what do you mean, gone? he said they have blown up, they are all gone, blown up. >> i looked at him and recognized his voice, it was mike williams, the chief e.t. at that point, i ran over to him and he had a laceration across his forehead. i hollered out where the medical supplies were. they said it was in the restroom at the back of the bridge. i ran to there, try to find some calls are something. the only thing i could find was a roll of toilet paper. i ran back, stuck it to his head and said hold is there. i went back to my station, still not truly believing that these engines were gone. i just could not fathom that. upon looking at the screen, there was still nothing, no engine starting, no thruster's running, nothing. we were still lay dead ship. i heard the watertight doors slam again. i noticed an individual holding a rag on the back of his left head. he hollered out to me, i am hurt, bad, cheap. i am hurt real bad. at that point recognized his voice, because he was covered in blood as well. i ran back and looked, pulled the rag away from his head and looked at his wounds. i immediately put the rag back to his head and hollered out for a medic. i ran over just in case there was a medic on the bridge, which there was not at the time. i ran over to the starboard water tank door and hollered down to the lifeboats, we need emetic up here now. i ran back to my station, still hoping that engines would start. there was nothing. when i turned and looked when ibrent notice standing behind him, chris pleasant was standing at the bop panel. i hollered out to him, have you eds'ed? i asked if we could, and he said yes. i turned to look back at chris pleasant, and someone hollered out that hollered outeds without approval. i hollered out for jimmy, can we eds? he said yes. when i turn back to chris, he was in the panel, pushing a button. i hollered to chris, i need confirmation that we have eds'ed. i told them we needed confirmation again. he said yes. i said we have to be certain, have we eds'ed? he said yes and pointed to a light on the panel. i turned and hollered out to kirk for permission to go to the stand by generator room and manually start it. i thinking at that point was the bop had unlatched, what remaining fuel would be in the rice or were burned away, and we are going to the power as well as fire pumps. kurds said yes, go. the cheap they came running over with the radio. he looked at the radios, turn them on, tried to get coms and could not get them through the radios. we were standing 5 feet from each other. we verified we were on the proper channel. again, we had no coms. i said don't worry about it, and i laid the radio down. i left the bridge and when to close the watertight door, and mike williams pushed the door back, and he said you are not going along, cheap. i said come on. the motorman also fell in line and we ran forces than by a generator. as i was running to the stand by generator, i looked up at the derrick where the crown should approximately be, and i could see nothing but flames way past the crown. i remember looking down at the deck because it was very slick. i saw a substance that had the consistency of snot. i remember thinking to myself, why is all this snot on the deck? it was approximately an inch to an inch and a half thick. we had to pass right to passbop house, which has a huge door, approximately 90 feet tall at 50 feet wide. you can actually look down into the moon pool. when i have looked into that space, i could see nothing but flames. i could see no equipment whatsoever, it was solid claims. when we walked into the standby generator room, myself and mike williams ran to the starting panel. i flipped the switch from automatic imanuel, hit the reset button, and the start button. there was absolutely no turning over of the engine. i tried it again, the reset button and the start. again, nothing happened. mike williams had hollered out because there was a voltage meter on the panel itself. he said we have 24 votes. i stood there for a second. paul was standing over by the watertight door. i looked at him and told him to shut the door, because he was standing there with the door open, looking at the flames. at that point, i thought maybe if the engines are completely gone, all the switchboards, maybe there is some kind of electrical interference or something not allowing the generator to start, so i turned, and right behind a panel i was at is the 480 switchgear for the standby generator room. i ran to it, close the breaker, the main feeder breaker from the generator and then reopen it. i also turned the switch for the automatic synch on the standby generators to manual. i ran back to that panel and again tried to reset and start. there was no turning over of the engine whatsoever. i believe it was mike that hollered out, try the second battery bank, just in case. i want to say it was paul that actually flipped the switch. i cannot be sure, though. but we did, after the second battery bank was turned on, we tried again and there was absolutely nothing. the engine did not turn over whatsoever. at that point, i said that's it, let's go back to the bridge. it's not going to crank. when we open up the watertight door to go back out to the bridge, that is the first time actually felt the heat, and it was very, very intense. we ran to the bridge. we came in through the port side door, watertight door. i observed yancey and andrea were still at the radios. i ran across the bridge to the other watertight door on the starboard side. kirk was standing with the door open outside the bridge and he was looking down at the lifeboat station. when i ran over there i looked down and saw the light of #one driving away, pulling away from the rig. lifeboat to was already gone. that point, i turned to mike and paul and hollered out, that's it, abandon ship, let's go. they ran across the bridge and passed by me. i turned and looked. and see an entry were still at the radios pig i hollered to them, that's it, abandon ship, let's go now. i saw them take off running to where we work. i turned and ran out the watertight door. captain kirk was in front of me. as we were coming down the stairs, i observed a man on a gurney at the bottom of the stairs with three people trying to get his life vest on him. the three people were stan come up chad murray, and randy ezell. that point, i did not know who was in that journey. as related to the bottom of the stairs, we went to the life raft. we hooked it up and proceeded to crank it up out of its lift, rotate it around to the side of the rig, and then drop it out so that you could inflate the raft and get clear of the rig. there was a rope attached to the shackling the vice that went from the shackles of bias to the boom. it had to metal hooks that the rope was wrapped around and unshackled to the front of it. i do not know what this rope was for, but it hindered the life raft from clearing the rig. that point we hollered out for a knife. nobody had one. mike williams found the shackle and tried to unscrew it by hand. he could not. he pulled out a pair of nail clippers on steroids, basically. he proceeded to unscrew it, the shackle. and that popped off, the life raft moved out over the side of the rig. we started pulling the painter line. at that point, i looked over the man on the gurney was. there was one gentleman standing there. i do not know who that was. i jumped up and ran over there, grab the gurney and said let's him to the life raft. when i got back to life route, i was on my knees right at the opening. there were two people in the life raft. one of them was a bit young. i do not know who the other person was. at that point, i honestly thought that we were going to die. the light draft -- the life raft actually fell. at that point, the life raft actually get forward and started rocking back and forth. there was smoke in the life raft, and the next thing i knew, the life raft was descending. as we got closer to the water, the smoke cleared out. as we touched the water, i heard someone ask where the panel's work. i was by the exit door. i jumped into the life raft and grab the rope on the side of the life raft and started swimming, tried to pull the life raft away. chad murray was right behind me. someone else was right in front of me. i was swimming on my side, looking up at the rig. it was 25 or 30 feet above me. it was a tremendous amount of smoke billowing out. at that point, i sought a person's boots and his clothing come out shooting through the smoke. just before he landed, i noticed it was curt. he landed approximately 5 feet from me. another pair of boots and a person came flying out of the smoke. he was approximately 10 feet from me. before he hit the water, i noticed it will yancey. i got to the point where i could see the helodeck. i noticed an individual running at full-speed. enzi dropped off, he was still running. just before he splashed into the water, he was looking at us. that was mike williams. i noticed shortly after that we were not going any further from the rig. about that time, someone yelled. i looked over my shoulder past the life raft and noticed the painter line going into the smoke. at that point, i heard chad murray scream for help. i would have to say that probably 60 yards away was the rescue craft. i saw two flashing lights in the water. one of those was getting hold into the boat. seconds later, the second person was called into the boat. i started driving towards us. we feel that we needed a knife. when we got about 15 feet from them, an individual came to the bow of the boat with a large pocket knife. curt swam out, grabbed the knife, and swam to the back of the life raft. i followed him to the back of the life raft. he cut the rope. i swam back to the front of the life raft and immediately began to swim. chad and paul were tying up the rescue craft to the life raft. the life raft that does away from the rate at that point. when we got to the actual boat, we were all still in the water. the ones that got out in the life raft. the only people to my knowledge to were still in the life raft were an injured person on the gurney and two others. i stayed on the rescue craft and assisted in getting the rescue -- in getting people out of the lifeboat. once on deck, once all of the lifeboats and life rafts were empty, we had the first monster that i had witnessed. at that point, it was determined that 11 individuals did not make it. from there, i started checking to make sure that all of my people were accounted for. i did not find the whine b -- i did not fight the windone, brent mansfeld. he was laying on the floor. he had bandages all over his head. he had oxygen on his mouth. he also had a neck brace. his head and was facing a man who was on a bed. i stepped in between them and the man on the bunk and was trying to keep them from going to sleep. he kept trying to go to sleep. i kept waking him up and adjusting his oxygen mask. the man on the actual bed was buddy trahan. i tried to keep him awake. when the coast guard arrived, the rescue swimmer came in and asked who was critical. at that point, troy hadaway, who was the magic on the rate at one point in time -- who was the medic on the rig at one point in time. i stepped to the backside of the bed to assist with getting them on the gurney. i placed my hands on his hip and his shoulder to get the gurney under him. as i told him, he was screaming that his leg was hurt real bad. he had a severe lacerations on his leg. he also had a twisted and nine gold lower calf on his left leg. -- twisted and mangled lower cap on his left leg. he had lacerations all over. i told him and went to get a second position to roll him a little further. bill was standing on the other side abouof the bunk. buddies back was bart. b -- buddy's back was burned. we -- i stayed with them until they came to get brent. when i left, -- again, i checked on all my guys to see how they were doing -- i made my way to the upper level and watched the rig burn. >> thank you for the detailed report. in the statement you just gave us, you said that there was standing room only in the drill shed? what time was that? is it, to have standing room only at any time -- is it common to have standing room only at that time? were there additional people in the drill-dead at that time -- drill-shed at that time? >> there were additional people in there. >> during your conversation that you were just discussing, you said "yes we have" multiple times. at any time, did he mention to you that there were no hydraulics? >> no, sir. >> at any time did he point to the camera and indicate any problems? >> no, sir. in your written statement, you said the captain was screaming for someone pushing the distress button. >> i believe you are referring to the statement that was given after he was detained for 26 hours. i object. we will not be the cross- examined on the statement. we decline to answer that question. >> what we are asking him to do is to set the record straight. >> the statement is what the statement is. we are not going to sit here and stayed that that is or is not the statement. >> the statement was taken not under oath. he is under oath now. he can confirm or deny the accuracy of that statement. >> if i say good morning, then i am subject to prosecution. we are not doing that. >> your counsel and advice is you [inaudible] >> i am advise my clients that he did take an oath. >> ok. i understand. does adriana had the authority to activate the edf or to call out in distress? >> i do not know. >> mike williams is a subordinate of yours, correct? >> correct. >> how you communicate with the dpo? >> can you clarify that question? >> earlier you tell me that the people that monitor the alarms that would be aware of any alarms that were bypassed with officer.dp >> generally the dynamic position officer would call either the electrical supervisor are the chief at the tower directly. >> when you are in your room reading your book, was there any notification to you to evacuate? >> not to evacuate, no. >> to muster? >> i did hear yancey announcing that there was a fire. he started naming off the engine rooms and multiple locations. after the initial explosion, i did not hear any more announcements. >> that was audio through the whole rig? >> yes sir. >> if there were a gas alarm that detected too high gas in one song, which ripped a general alarm? >> yes, sir. >> did you hear a general alarm? >> i do not recall. >> with your the general alarm from where you're located on the rig? at any time during the evacuation we told to leave anyone behind it? >> objection. [inaudible] >> which engines were running at the time of the incidents are? >> i am not certain. i know there were two operational. >> are you familiar with the engines? >> yes, sir. >> were there any safety devices on the edges? >> yes, sir. your over speed device. >> mechanical? electronic? the net whenever last tested or inspected? >> the week prior. >> did you witness that inspection? >> no, sir. not personally. >> who would have witnessed back. >> the first engineer. it would have either been the engineer on the town or orbrenbt mansfield. >> what is the frequency of inspecting those devices? >> i do not recall. >> were you responsible for the inspection of the devices? to was responsible for the safety devices and the over speed devices? >> the second and third engineer. >> due date report to you? >> date report -- day report. -- they report. >> there is a difference between i do not know and i do not recall. do you realize that? >> yes, sir. >> did you ever see inspectors inspecting those devices outside of the auditors? >> yes. >> who are they? >> the coast guard as well as bp auditors and such. >> do you know if there is an emergency shutdown system in the control room? >> yes. >> was there any notification in the engine room to shut down the engines? >> i do not know. >> do you know if there is a policy in place for the people in the engine room to shut down if they are given any kind of warning? >> no, sir. i do not. >> earlier you mentioned that you heard a discussion in the drilling-shack. do you recall any of that conversation? >> no, sir. >> who is leading that conversation. >> i do not know. >> in -- are you familiar with the air-intake system by in the engine room? >> yes, sir. >> i have a map over there, but i think there is one in front of you. is that the intrinsic area around the rig for detail on that image? >> this is the problem that i envisioned. >> bp-00131951 >> that is the document? >> yes. >> i will give you one. >> thank you. >> is the grade-out area the intrinsic area of the fork? >> yes. it is the hazardous area. >> help or away from that area or the air-intake systems -- how 40 way from that or the air- intake systems from the -- how far away from that area or the air-intake systems? >> i do not know the actual distance. >> could you show us if i give you a highlighter? >> yes. there are multiple intake sites. >> he is going to put it on there. >> can you tell him what you just told me? >> i do not know the location for engine number three. >> do you have a different document? >> no, i had this one. -- i have this one. we are all looking at the same one. do you know how often they tested or inspected the air- intake system that prevented the flow of gas or anything into the engine room? >> i do not recall. >> to be responsible for that? >> the engineers. >> were you aware of this bp audit? it is and"title -- it is entitled "deepwater horizon." it was introduced -- i was introducing it and was going to follow up with a question. >> i would rather have the legal representative for mr. bertone asked the question. -- legal representative for mr. bertone ask the question. >> i may have an objection. i need to understand the question. i am not asking the question, i am asking to understand the question. >> is this the latest or is this prior to the answer that? >> it was prior to the incident. >> you want to question him about this document? >> i was going to ask him if he participated in that audit. >> yes. >> ok. who is the deepwater horizon's maintenance supervisor. >> that is technically classified. >> are you responsible for responding to that audit? >> yes. >> how do you reference that audit and complete the recommendations? >> when we received that the actual audit, we convert it to a spreadsheet and certain items are set to a certain department heads. the department heads report to me. i update it and awarded to the manager. >> that audit -- i have it if you want to open it up -- it references that repairs had either deteriorated or not been suitably addressed. work the repairs you were making on the deepwater horizon -- >> we did not receive any of these documents prior to today. i would not object if you ask him what he knows. >> that is fair enough. they are big documents. i am sure he is not read all of them. what was presented to you about that audit? whether any problems that bp had with deterioration of the equipment on the deepwater horizon? >> from the initial assessment? >> yes. >> yes. >> the problems they had addressed were not being properly prepared or were not addressed when there returned in september 2009. is that accurate? >> i do not know. >> i think you mentioned rmf. could you elaborate on that program? >> it is the rig maintenance system. it is where all the work orders and ordering of parts or carried out. >> was there any excessive jobs that were overdue for maintenance on the deepwater horizon? >> i would object to the term "obsessive -- object to the term "excessive." >> can you answer that? >> the thing with the rms system, that was implemented in 2009 at the time of that marine-assurance audit. thate were a lot of pm's were not appropriate to the rig equipment. there were many duplicates. we have been going through and eliminating those. if you look back at the history on it, you would see that there were a lot of pm's that were not done in the allotted time. the were also a lot of those that did not apply to this vessel. >> most of those, as i recall, they were no major pm's past due. they were more moderate or a minor. >> were there a lot of personnel changes in the past few years that you are aware of on the deepwater horizon? were there personnel changes under direct supervision? >> if yes. >> how many? >> i do not know the exact number. >> 15-20? >> i do not know. >> did this have they affect on your maintenance on the deepwater horizon? >> object. >> i think he would be well aware of the fact that if he had maintenance problems that they would be because of people he lost? >> i do not new. -- i do not know. >> is there a competency- assurance program all the deepwater horizon? >> are you talking about roles responsibilities? >> i am talking about a program that assures competency for the job be performed. >> if yes. -- yes. >> was everyone qualified to do their jobs? >> yes. >> the report that i referred to earlier, it decided that the maintenance supervisor had told the auditors that a lack of manpower as a result of no power on the engines because of injuries number one and and is no. 6 knitting maintenance. is that a correct statement? the net to be true? -- do you know that to be true? >> i do not know. >> de no the auditors? >> i do not recall their names -- do you know the auditors? >> i do not recall their names. >> i was there during the modu specs. >> did you participate at the engine room level? >> no, sir. >> the report indicated that the tests were successful on the oversee devices in the engine room. did you know what they meant by successful? >> objection. we have not read the report. >> do you know how the engines were tested? how did they perform the audits in the engine rooms? >> they were manually overspent. >> did they shut down? >> to my knowledge, yes. >> was that information relayed to you? to relate that to you? >> that would be from my engineers. >> was the deepwater horizon schedule to get to the shipyard? >> yes. >> when was that? >> it was supposed to be the early part of 2011. >> do you know how long it was going to be in the shipyard? >> i do not recall the exact amount of days. >> was there any information passed to you along the lines of maintenance issue being the reason to go into the shipyard? >> objection. >> were you ever in any meeting with transocean or vp personnel who scheduled maintenance and said they were going to the shipyard? >> again, i object. >> i did not hear them talking about it. >> what was the plan for the shipyard is it? -- shipyard visit? >> there were many items that were planned, but i do not have all of the specifics as to what they were. >> review -- obviously you were aware of the visit by transocean and b p personnel. at any time did they talk to you or your staff about maintenance? >> to you just want to know his personal knowledge? -- do you just want to know his personal knowledge? >> what is most important to get done as far as maintenance when it goes into the shipyard? >> that would be your thrusters, your engines, you're drilling systems. >> based on your knowledge, what work needed to be done in the shipyard? >> i do not know. i do not want to speculate. >> you are the chief engineer. i am tried to make sure i understand. did you have a list of items that you had prepared for when it went into the shipyard? >> yes. >> what was on the list, if you remember? >> thrusters, engines, drilling equipment, and sea-water systems. >> thank you. >> did you discuss with any deep the our transocean management -- > >> we discussed the out-of- service. between wells -- out-of- service period between wells. >> what was said to be fixed during that time? >> there were multiple items. >> or any high-priority? >> objection. >> what was the most critical to be maintained or prepared -- maintained or repaired? one last question -- you have been on the deepwater horizon since 2003, correct? >> correct. >> was it a practice to have able-bodied seamen on the bridge to go into areas with gas detectors in lieu of a general alarm? >> you are asking if it had ever happened or is it a practice? >> was a practice. >> a practice would be a continual ongoing thing? >> could you rephrase your question? i am not following what you are trying to ask? >> earlier, i ask you some questions about the electrical alarms -- the high-gas alarms. they would initiate a general alarm that would have lights go off. is that true? >> that is correct. >> in your seven years on the deepwater horizon, did you ever see or talk about having an able-bodied seaman monitor high- gas alarms that have multiple alarms going off in one zone in lieu of having one alarm go off that trips an audio or visual alarm? >> can you please clarify that and break it down? >> you have able-bodied seamen in the bridge monitoring multiple gas alarms? is that true? >> yes. >> you have a gas-detection system that monitors the high- gas? >> yes. >> if the high-gas -- if two high-gas alarms go off, does it trip an audio or visual alarm? >> yes. >> is it a transocean practice on the deepwater horizon to bypass that alarm and have be able-bodied seamen go down with a gas detection system? >> i do not think he can answer what the practice was. i think he can answer to the direct knowledge as to whether this ever happened. >> did you ever see any seaman monitoring high gas alarms from the bridge and go back to the area with gas-detection systems? >> are you referring to two items in one zone? >> yes, sir. >> no, i am not. >> the note if an alarm was actually bypassed? >> i do not know. >> thank you. i have no further questions. >> just a couple of quick follow-up questions. do you meet with them when they come on board? >> yes, sir. >> was the last time they came on board? >> i do not recall. >> within the last year? >> yes. >> do you recall any list they may have given you as to items that needed to be repaired? >> yes. >> did any of those items and all the engines? >> yes. >> did any of those items involve the engine over speed? >> no. >> did they check the engine over speed when they came on board? >> i do not recall. >> are you aware that they do an annual inspection? >> yes. >> do you know what to check on the annual inspection? >> i know basically, yes. >> can you give us specific details? >> no -- i know that they go through and inspect the injectors, the air boxes, the ventilation, and multiple other items, but i do not recall what they all are. >> do they meet with you at the end of the inspection? do they give you a detailed list of what they check? >> yes, sir. >> do you recall anything specific that was related to the engine over-speed that was not working? >> no, sir. i do not recall. >> thank you. >> good morning. i had a few questions for you. you took over as the chief engineer in september of 2008. is that correct? >> yes. >> were you required to read the deepwater horizon operations manual? >> if yes, sir. >> did you read the section which prescribe -- which describe the duties of the chief engineer? >> yes. >> are you familiar with those duties? >> for the most part, yes. >> are you familiar -- in your testimony, you indicated that the deepwater horizon was in the process of implementing a new system -- a maintenance management system. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> when was that implemented? >> i do not know the exact date of its. i can give you a year. >> to your best recollection, how long had the process been going on? >> i do not want to speculate on that. >> have you received any formal training of the system? >> yes. >> to provide that training? >> transocean. >> was the one session or multiple sessions? >> it was a single session in town and we also had people come out to assist us when we went live. >> did they assist you in implementing the system? >> they worked out there approximately three weeks. i do not know. >> more than once? >> i do not know. >> based upon your familiarity with the rmf system, you indicated there were some discrepancies between the previous maintenance on that system. at the time of the casualty, how accurate -- how accurate do you believe the information was? you aware of discrepancies in the system at the time of the accident? >> [inaudible] >> were you aware of any reported maintenance contained in the rmf system at the time of the casualty that were incorrect? were you aware of any discrepancies specifically concerning overdue maintenance contained in the system at the time of the casualty? [inaudible] reported maintenance our scheduled maintenance that was not completed? >> the question is do we know of any maintenance that was not completed prior to the casualty? >> let's be real specific. the air-dampener to the engine room -- what is the frequency that they were required to be inspected? >> i do not recall. >> would it surprise you to know that it was required every 14 days? >> [inaudible] >> you are the chief engineer and you do not know the frequency -- >> yes the question and he gave you an answer. you are badgering. >> chief, how all the did you review the system for maintenance issues? >> daily. >> excuse me? >> daily. >> your be them daily. so you'd be aware of any discrepancies as they occur. >> correct. >> if you noted a particular maintenance item that was overdue, what actions would you take? >> we had periodic meetings with different department heads to go over any overdue maintenance and see when they could be accomplished. >> do you recall any overdue maintenance relative to the air- intake dampen nurse in the engine room? >> no, i do not recall. >> let's move on to a different topic. i am not going to ask about statements. i am going to talk about testimony. if i recall your -- if i recall, you went to the bridge after the first explosion. you and two individuals but to the stand by generator room to find out why it did not start. is that correct? >> we went there to start it, not to find out why it did not start. >> you testified he flipped the switch to manual when you got there. why did you do that? >> because it was in automatic mode. >> why would it be in automatic- mode? >> that is the standard position of it. it is always in automatic. >> what does it mean to be in automatic? >> the generator would start on and its own without any -- the generator would start on its own. >> you said that this was a standby generators and that it was not automatic. i am tried to clarify the issue. >> the question was -- >> i am try to understand what it was from the person on the rig. that is my purpose. was it your understanding that this was designed to be an automatic start for the main generators? >> after a certain period of time, yes. >> if i heard your testimony correctly, that did not happen in this assistance. >> i have no recollection of time-frames during that event. >> you indicated that you have been on the rate since 2003. do you recall an instance in august 20008 when he lost all power? >> i do not recall. >> while you were on board, do you recall if there were any chance ocean -- recall at the rear any transocean issues? did you have any guidance on that? >> i do not understand the question. >> as you are going through your various maintenance items, one may be more significant than another, did you have any guidance as to when you should have advised someone others might and its issues? -- ed buys some wind of those maintenance -- advise someone of those maintenance issues? >> i do not know. >> can you get the basis of what you do not want to answer any questions? >> provided a statement 26 hours after this interview. we are not going to be cross- examined on something that was done at that time. >> are you advising him to take his fifth amendment rights and not answer questions about that document? >> i am advising him not to answer this question because his statement speaks for itself. >> if i ask a question for the record -- we cannot introduce anything in our report that is not public record. this is not a public document. >> this is an official document. this is a document that was filed while under oath. we are not going to be cross- examined on it. i instruct my client not to answer any questions in regard to specific things. >> so you are telling him to take his fifth amendment right? >> i am telling you that we are not going to answer questions or be cross examined on statements reflected in this statement. >> can i ask a question? did anyone tell you to leave anybody behind? >> he already answered that question. any information about that is contained in the statement. the statement speaks for itself. you have the statement. there is no purpose. it is not relevant. that is not the purpose of these proceedings. if there were any other purpose that i do not understand, we can discuss it. >> it is a fact-finding mission. we cannot put anything into a public document because it is not public record. >> this was given under oath. you had it. you know what is in debt. he is not answering -- you know what is in it. he is not answering any questions about it. >> you said you knew there was something going on when you were in the drilling shed. how did you know something was going on? >> objection. when did he say he knew something was going on? >> he said when there was standing-room only that there was something going on. >> when you say the word that i know something is going on, you are taking that out of context. can you had the court reporter read back what he said in that testimony? >> we had that ability? i do not know. >> earlier, did you not testified to the fact that there were standing-room only in the drilling-yet? >> yes, there was standing-room only. >> did you mention anything to the fact that there was something going on? >> object to "something going on." >> it was standing-room only. there were a lot of people in that drilling-shed. i do not know what was going on. >> thank you. >> i just want to caution you on one thing. this is a fact gathering investigation. as part of that gathering, we are evaluating your knowledge, skills, and performance. i understand that you have legal counsel and he advises you on what to answer and what not to answer, but i wanted you to be aware that when you have basic knowledge that requires your duty and you indicate that you either do not know or do not recall, that brings into question your performance and to your knowledge and skills. i just want to make sure you understand that. >> yes, sir. >> that has no part in this. you are trying to intimidate the witness. >> i am just try to make them understand. do you feel intimidated mr. bertone? [laughter] >> this is an employee of hours. >> you are not representing mr. bertone. >> i thought that was wrong when you challenge them. if that was my witness, i would have stopped you. you are trying to challenge this witness, to intimidate him because he said at various times, "i cannot recall." >> i understand. mr. bertone, i -- it is my duty to make sure you are well and born of the policies and procedures of this hearing. i just want to make sure you understand that. >> i am want to make a statement regarding that. i believe when you started this, you gave him an oath. it does not have anything to do with whether he is intimidated. it does not have anything to do with whether he can remember something. if the truthfully cannot remember something, i do not see why we would threaten him about something that he may remember. this committee was the truth. he gave truthful answers. if he did not give truthful answers, we would have to address that. i do not appreciate the admonition. we are here and we are answering questions truthfully. >> we certainly do understand this committee. >> i just want to make sure mr. bertone understands that part of that gathering is -- that they didn't -- that gathering is to look at his performance. white do we not take a five minute break -- why do we not take a five minute break? thank you. >> mr. sabol the debt, please raise your right hand. -- mr. mr. > mr. sepuvado, please raise your right hand. before we start, if kelso and the witness will make sure that you speak into the microphone. thank you very much. >> good morning. for the record, who is your attorney. >> i am ralph whalen. >> thank you, very much. >> could you please state your full name and spell your last? >> sepulvado. >> by whom are you employed? >> bp. i am i am, the well-site leader. i have worked for them for 12 years. i was with arco for 20 years. i have been a well-site leader for 23 years. >> could you describe your job is possibilities on the deepwater horizon? >> we supervise the drilling of oil and gas wells at the rig at site. >> about how many people are you responsible for on the deepwater horizon? >> approximately 140. > to you have any other dbp representatives with you? >> there is one other well-site leader on the rig. >> how long have you been assigned to the deepwater horizon prior to this? >> i have been on the deepwater horizon eight years in october -- october of this year. >> thank you. >> do you recall sending an e- mail about a visit to the deepwater horizon? >> yes i do. >> i had it in front of you to refresh your memory. bp-mbi00127131 is the e-mail. it appears that you were approached to find out why the to the rig. coming >> that is correct. >> de know why they were coming to the rig? >> we only had the names of the individuals who were coming to the raid. there were coming to make a routine visit. they wanted to commend the crews for having seven years with no accidents or days away from work. >> how did you personally feel about that visit? was there anything you had concerns about? >> it was pretty much routine. somebody normally comes out every three months or so. >> was there any reason why they came to you to find out what they were coming to the break? >> he got the mail before i did. >> if you know who scheduled the date of the 20th? >> no, i do not. >> was that proposed by the rig? >> i do not know. normally they just send us an e- mail to let us know when they are coming. that is usually the only type of e-mail's that we see. >> was there any coordination with someone on the deepwater horizon for what would take place when they arrived? >> i do not know. i left on a friday. i was gone when they came. >> was there any communication with you about what was actually taking place on the deepwater horizon? >> no, there was not. >> are you familiar with the acronym pob? personnel on board? >> yes. >> were you at capacity before you left the rate? -- before you left the rig? . . >> where review on april 20, sir? >> i was then dop school in lafayette. >> was this for a scheduled training could mark >> yes, it was. >> were there specific issues with the weld you had encountered? >> we had some loss returns. the only problems we have always out there was loss returns. they took kicks further up the whole, but i was not on the rate at that time. i cannot remember exactly what function it was, but it was one of the bop functions that was leaking hydraulic fluid. an rov guy spotted it and came up and told us about it. it was not a critical function of the bop stack. you had the yellow and blue pots which was backed up systems to each other. they had a leak, not during the operations, but in other words, when you close something more open something, it would vent fluid, and you would have to put the pod in neutral or block it, and then it would not vent. had problems off and on with the shuttle valves that make fluid it go from one place to another. sometimes they get trash in them. >> if a pod is put in new.com what is it able to function gregoire >> it will function, but you have to put it back in neutral to keep the fluid from venting to correct were you aware of any the production changes leading up to april 20 before >> when i left the rate, there were discussions -- the original plan called for [unintelligible] there were discussions about running the liner. as a matter of fact we had the equipment out on the rig to go either way. >> you had the equipment to run the lighter and that paper? >> yes, we did. that was before i let. bob came out and took my place what was going to the of bop school. >> it was a temporary leave? >> yes, it was. >> was there any form of reading or any kind of exchange with him prior to your departure? >> i sent him an e-mail and i talked to him before i got on the helicopter, went over with him what we were going to do for the next day or two on the rig. some of the equipment that we had on the rig to run the casing, and that is about it. i did send him an e-mail telling him about some of the things we were going to have in the next day or two. >> have you worked with him before on any wells or had he replaced to par to this incident was marked no, i haven't. >> were you confident with leaving the rig with his knowledge of the well and what was going on with the deepwater horizon? >> i had never worked with him, so i don't know what his qualifications were. all i was told, he was coming out to relieve me, and just the exchange we had there at the helicopter, while waiting for the helicopter and the email, that's it. >> was the oh, well site leader at another deepwater facility? >> yes he was. >> which one was that? >> i think it was the under wars. -- thunder horse. i know he had been on the mad dog project before the under wars. >> you know if there was any other a typical type of scheduling going on the deepwater horizon outside of yourself being scheduled for well control training, such as billing engineers from the beach that i normally at the rick sent to the rig in lieu of brian merrell? was he the normal in jr that would come to the rig, or was that mark? >> both of them. mark was the lead engineer and ryan was the back of engineer. both of them had came out to the rig. >> in your past experience, the beat the send out a specific person? >> i don't have a lot of experience running a lot down sleeves. i have been in the exploration program for the last seven years. we don't run that many lockdown sleeves. bp did send somebody out to run the lockdown sleeves. bp said represented out to run it. >> to knowledge, did they have a specific person that they sent out whenever they did run a lockdown sleeve on the excretory side --, exploratory side? >> yes. it was ross skidmore, as far as i know. >> as far as management on the rig, who has final say in all operations? >> it is a joint effort. usually if we decide to do something, we talked to the oym, tool pushers, drillers. any plan we send out, we try to discuss with them what is coming up, what were going to do. they have input if they don't like something we are doing, we have a discussion about it. >> are you familiar with the term "management of change" circus or >> yes. it is somebody else like a drilling contractor, the oym does that. >> if you have reproduction change it goes through -- are you the manager of the facility? >> someone else will domoc, probably some of the engineers in houston. >> but there is a process, and one process is called authorization of start up. the manager of the effective platform has to authorize the process. >> i cannot remember signing any moc's if we were going to change its a plan for running casings. >> he said they were running a tapered string. at any time when you were -- purge your departure, were you consulted about the upcoming segment job? >> the only thing i saw on the cement job was e-mail's, and normally that is the way it comes to us. that is done in town by the engineers, and they usually have halliburton, they run models and make recommendations to the engineers, and they determine what kind of see meant we are going to run. from the rig, we normally get the additives that go into this a man. whatever we need to go whichever -- that go into thec ement through >> was there any time in your history on the deepwater horizon that they had run -- >> the only time we ever run production casing on verizon was maybe two or three under wells in the seven years. like i say, we were in exploration, so most of the wells we did not use. >> earlier we were talking about personnel being at its maximum quality if you have to make room for certain people. we do consider someone as performing a cement block to be non critical? >> not for going to use them, no regrets ever in your career, even if you had a contingency -- if any progress that the rick, did you ever not use them if they were already at the rig with the equipment? >> we normally did not run c bl's in exploration. on this well we had them out at the location. i had lined up to come out to the location, and the only reason we are going to use them is if we lost returns. if they lost returns, did not see what we call lived pressure, if you did not see that left pressure and you lost returns, we are going to run them. >> as well sought later, are you ever involved in the scheduling of manifest for people on the rig? >> 3 clark did that. >> do you sign off on that? >> no, i did not. what is went and told them who we had coming, and they took care of the rest of it. >> hypothetically, if a person was scheduled to be on a flight on april 20 at 10:00 in the morning, would that have to be preapproved on the day before the 19th? >> yes, it would. >> so if schlumberger on the reed to run a cement bond law of the 20th because the job was being performed at midnight of the 19th for the 20th, how exactly would that be a contingent on blog, and i know you were not on the rate so i am not trying to put words in your mouth. how would the court notes to put the personnel on the helicopter go to hit the beach before the job was even required if you had lived pressure? >> a lot of times, since we have to give notice the evening before, we will put people on the helicopter in case they have to go in or are supposed to go and. we can take them all. it is easier to take them off than to schedule them. we can take them off that morning, but we cannot schedule them that early. >> earlier we were talking about up bop, our records indicated that you were the well site leader, and i have some records in front of you. indicated that when you were on board, you with the last well site leader to perform above bop pressure test. that should be it right there. this should be the mbi. is this what you are looking at? >> it started on april 9. >> it is bp-acn-mbi 00002499. >> that is in it. >> it looks like 2504. there are to test if you pull it out in that one pamphlet, sir. >> i am not really familiar with these type of tests. can you please tell me what we are looking at? i am not familiar with the digital bop test. >> we worked 89 years trying to develop this is the eight or nine years, and it was approved to use some time last year. that were used on the horizon. you have to do your first test using synthetic mud. the reason this came up is because that synthetic blood compressibility. -- synthetic mud. your line has to be a flat line, and the digital test the use as a baseline. then it uses red lights and green lights after that. in other words, it follows the same slow as the original test. it will get a green light, if something is wrong with the test, you will get a red light if it does not fall on the same slope of the line. they are assuming the slope of the line is the compressibility of the fluid. gibber cheer affects -- temperature affects the compressibility of the mud. sometimes we wait as long as two hours for one test, for that line to get level. >> that test on april 9, was there any indication that the bop did not pass the pressure test with our >> no, there was not. >> there is no signature on this. how does that normally handled by the well site leader? there is no signatures on here. do you normally sign that at the request for >> yes, we normally sign them. >> this was submitted to us, but we do not have assigned one. but it is signed. >> yes. >> earlier we talked about the leaking -- i have some other documents right in front. is bidet operations report, 13765. i believe i highlighted a section. it indicates there was a pilot leak on the bop on the yellow pawed at 1 gallon per minute. switch to blue pod leak slowed. is that accurate, sir christopher >> yes it is. >> do know why this was not carried over into the reports on the rig? >> no, i do not. >> are these made available to the mms, the bidet operations report script or >> we have them on location if they want to see them. it should have been documented ion the report. >> would you be surprised that it is not in the report? >> yes, i would. >> i want to move on to modifications. to your knowledge, were there any modifications made to the bop stack without payment review? >> none that i was told about. >> do you know if they changed out the valve package on the stat? >> i don't know. >> if there was any modifications, would have brought your attention? >> sometimes it may be and sometimes it may not be. >> use lee when they work on this? is out of critical path and they sent what they call a swat team to the rig. the subsea engineer does all the repairs to the stack. a lot of times that is done out of critical path. a lot of time some of the step that they do does not get passed onto us. sometimes we will ask them for some kind of breakdown of what kind of work they are going to do on the stack between the wells. usually it is stuff just like replacing rubber goods and stuff like that. a lot of times they find something not on that list and the repair it, we don't know about it. >> the transaction is what team, is that just transition personnel, or do they bring the manufacturer's people in as well? >> the swat team is usually only transition. if they think they want to look at something else on the stacks, sometimes they bring a camera guy out, and sometimes bp were present a third party, usually from west houston or somebody familiar with the stacks. registered a was brought to our attention that it is a common are typical industry practice to displace the riser and offload to the vote simultaneously. is that accurate? >> yes, it is. you can still keep up with what you have coming back out on the well. they have what you call pvt monitors which monitors the volume in the pits. each got just the pits going into the well, you can keep up with what is coming out of the well predicts a you have no concerns if you were on the writ with the accuracy of what you recording and what is being displaced and offloaded? >> no, i don't. i would make them check the pits that we were pumping into and take the pits of that work pumping to the boat. take them off line, which would be out of the pvt sensors. they would not total them. >> who would you make do that? >> usually would have to get the driller to do it because it is a transmission system. you might want to tell the mud loggers, too, because they also monitor volume. >> about that pod that we discussed earlier with the leaks on it. the know if mms was never notified about the leak? >> if that have a problem, they usually send rov down. is he sees anything on the stack, he tells the subsea engineer. he goes to the oym that will come to us. i will call houston and let my team leader know. >> the know if anyone reported that to the mms in the new orleans district is more >> i reported it to the team leader at the time. i don't know if he reported to the mms, but that is usually the way it was done. he would reported to our regulatory lady and she would report it to the mms. >> are you familiar with the mms regulations caused more >> yes, i am. >> i have one regulation in front of you. is that in front of you, sir? >> yes, it is. >> what is the requirement if they pod is not fully functional? >> to suspend the operation until it is operable. >> was that done at the deepwater horizon? >> no, it was not. the reason it was not, i guess we assume that everything was ok. i reported to the team leader and he should have reported to the mms. that was john? >> yes. >> i am going to want to audit. are you familiar with the deepwater horizon is a follow up that was conducted in 2009? >> i saw the audit, but i was not involved in it. i was working nights, the first week of the each of you work nights, the second party were days. they came and made that audit. usually they talk to whatever co. man was working day like. -- daylight. usually they would have the audit and come back and have a debriefing before they left. they would get the company men together and give us a rundown of what they found on the object, and we would turn list over to the oym and leave it up to him to get those things fixed. every so often, they would call us on the phone and revisit some of these things. they would want to know how much of it was done, how much was left to do, and gives some dates when they would finish the rest of it. >> who were the people requesting those states? was that john, even locaian lit? >> i think john was in on some of the telephone calls. some of the guys doing the audit were in on that. and >> do you know kevin davies or norman long? are they bp employees? >> yes, they are. let me back up. i think davies is a contract high. i am not sure, but he works for bp. >> what was your relationship with trans ocean in addressing those recommendations? did you work with someone on the rig to ensure that those were created to your satisfaction customer >> a lot of those were things we did not know anything about, and normally we left it up to the guy that came out and did the audit to follow up on it. they would contact trans ocean every so often and we would have this phone conversation to check up on what had been done on the audit. like a said, what was going to continue to be done on it, what the status was and what had not been done. that was done from a houston office. >> did you know if there was any problem in trends notions of addressing those recommendations in a timely fashion? >> none that i knew of. we had some of the supervisors in the office on some of these audits, two mechanical supervisors and some of the marine people to check out anything or the status on some of the things on the audit on their end. as far as i know, they did not have any problems, other than some of them were longer than others and some were waiting on parts. >> were you present at the audit from april 1 thru april 14? >> that was of this year? >> yes, sir. >> yes, i think i was there, because i left the 16th. >> in those audits, it indicated that the bop was well past its inspection dates of every three to five years. is that accurate? >> yes, sir. >> are you familiar with the regulation 250-446a? >> no, i am not. >> are you familiar that you are supposed to have the inspection on that every five or six years? >> no, i did not. >> most of the turnover was core group people responsible for the minutes of engines and components in the engine room. is that an accurate statement? >> they had some turnover, but i don't know who in the mechanical department, what kind of turn over the head, because we hardly ever dealt with them. the only ones we dealt wit or knew of would be the ones in the drilling in the of the business. >> was there turner were in the drilling portion of it? >> yes, we did have some turnovers, but it was not really unusual. >> there was a note in the audit for the deepwater horizon that bt had completed. i'll read to you. says the automated number of findings based on the nature of these findings, the potential adverse effect on the read emergency preparedness and watertight integrity regarded marine related issues, our recommendation was made to the weld team to suspend operations until many had been satisfactorily addressed. did the welty's at any time shutdown the deepwater horizon for that recommendation? >> they had a flooding incident on the horizon. i don't know exactly what day that was on. i was not on the ribbon that happen. another rig was shut down for some time until they did their investigation, but any other time it was shut down for anything like that, i don't know. not while i was out there. >> were you on the rig when they had a stake the stand down in late 2009? -- a safety stand down? >> we had several safety stand- downs'. >> in 2009, there was one report it was due to 15 near misses. do you recall that one? >> no, i don't. >> have you been back to work with bp since the incident? >> yes, i have. >> are you wearing a trainer safety notices be he has put out with relation to this incident to is well site leaders? >> no precooks were there any safety notices? >> there have been safety notices. >> is there anything you do differently than you did do in the past we look at the -- then you get in the past? >> we do everything with the rov on service and we also do the dead man test on the surface. other than that, pretty much everything else is pretty much routine. we just make sure everything gets tested on the stack. >> the node id be he has senior greek -- do you know if the he has senior drill inspectors, ray? >> no, i don't. >> the know if bp has a drilling superintendent accountable for their regular discussions with contractors caused more greg's no, i don't. that is usually done in houston. >> do you know that in 2002 that the he had two incidents in -- for shallow gas wells? but there was a letter that indicated they would have both drilling superintendent accountable for regular discussions with contractors and senior drilling advisers that provide on site assurance to be personnel. and you don't know if any of those individuals were on the rise and -- on the horizon press mark >> no, i don't. >> thank you, i have no further questions. >> i did have a couple of follow-up questions. when you are normally on the rig, do you work days or nights? >> the first part of the hit show you work nights, and the second, you were days. >> who normally works opposite you? >> on the horizon? don vidrine, and i have worked with murray sepulvado a week bit >> how long has don been on the red? >> i would say least six months or longer. >> gassiyev prior experience that you would become to be it -- does he have prior experience that you would be comfortable on the rig with him? >> i think don came over on the rig to relieve somebody one hitch, and that is the only time i ever worked with him before he came to the horizon the second time. >> a you have no knowledge of his experience level? >> no, other than just working with him since he has been on the horizon. before that, none. >> thank you. >> mr. skidmore, please read your right han>> raise your rigt hand. >> do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? >> yes, i do. >> thank you, sir. please be seated. >> mr. skidmore, for the record, could you please state your full name and spell your last name? >> ross randy skidmore. >> but who are you employed crest or >> swift. >> is swift contract it out by b e? >> i am. i cannot answer for all of swift. there are various technology groups that they go after. >> what position you hold with lived with for >> i am de subsea oil supervisor. >> how long have you held that position at the deepwater horizon? >> this was the first time i have ever set foot on the deepwater horizon. >> when did you first set foot on it, what date? >> i believe it was on april 16. >> how much subsidy will experience had you had prior to this incident? >> i initially started subsea work with penrod. i broke out in september of 1983, if i am not mistaken. i have been employed in this industry since 1977, but i began my subsea work in 1983. >> i know you only arrived on the 16th, but can you please inform me of what you are actually doing out there and what your responsibilities were going to be? >> myself as a contractor, i assist and what we were looking at was taking possession of the deepwater horizon upon completion of the macondo and taking it to the nile project. >> what are you going to do when you say taking possession? >> moving to read to the next job. i was going to ride the rig to the next shop and perform the assist with the nile well. >> were you going to be involved at all with the main is that was going to be done on the stack wants it was pulled? >> the only involvement would have asked for maintenance would be -- i would be directed on what to do. i don't take anything on my own to go out and do it in bp's name. >> what are you going to be doing when you took possession of it and i'll, going to the nile well? i truly don't understand much responsibility was. >> we have not started receiving any of the equipment yet that would be required for the job. so i would be on board the vessel as the equipment arrived. i would call again and report project called in and report that these particular tools have arrived, we have received them. right down the list of the equipment that would be required to perform the job on the nile. >> inouye please take me through what happened on the day of april 20, from when you woke up to when you departed the rig? >> you are asking me from when the incident began on the 20th? the morning of april 20, when you woke up. >> the morning of april 20, myself, shane, and braque were the same three on the team that were going to take this read to the nile. what we were doing it that time was just going over the word that we will be doing, as far as the of nile project is concerned, as well as going over the pipe tallies on when they are going to run the rundown sleeve on the macondo well. >> after that happened? >> we drug it on through the day, doing just exactly that. around 9:30 that evening, that night, is when i went ahead and went to bed. i went to bed at 9:30 l was laying there in my bulk reading. i close my book, laid it down and laid back on the bed. i believed that i was well enough along to be able to go to sleep at that point, and that is when the incident took place there, about 10:00, if i remember correctly. >> prior to arriving at the deepwater horizon, where you given any documents from bp concerning the well or any of the procedures that you would be running? >> did i carry any out with me? >> were you given any prior to you going to the deepwater horizon? you may not have taken and we do, but did beat the ever give you any procedures of what you would be doing? >> like what was saying, when we were coming out to the job, the way it came about was, shane and myself arrived on the rig on the 60. the lead on the job did not come out until monday because of bed space. there's not any rush to get all of us out there. so we went out to the rig as soon as we could to get settled in, get things laid out. brad, the lead for the job, he wants to bring everything out that was needed. if i had something with me -- i know when i got there are requested some information. i received it when i was there, as far as pertaining to the well, where they are at proper when can i expect to get started with the lot downslide. >> who do report to. >> i report to merkt kelly -- merit caylee. he is the team leader of the subsea. >> how many lot down sleeves had you been involved with running before? >> this would have been my first one to set. i have been involved as far as taking the measurements and inspecting it through an open well. >> did you talk to brag about his experience in running lockdowns lease customer >> no, i have not. >> did the issue in the concern about running the lockdown sleep? >> only to be successful with it. all we had was positive conversations as far as stepping into this job and going through it. we had drill quip on board. it would have been carrying out the job and we would have been alongside with it. >> was there everyone else from swift that had been on the deepwater horizon that did subsea operation were prior to -- >> not that i know of. >> do you know he would know that? like if we contacted some, if there was any other swift employees on the deepwater horizon, who should we contact? >> the reason i was saying that, i believe that myself and gary ellis are the only too swift contract employees that work in the subsea wells group. i am sure of that. >> a lot of my questions we had prepared for you were developed with the understanding that you were the subsea wells supervisor for the deepwater horizon. seems as though you were actually down there during the transition from going to the macondo to the nile well. for my understanding, you were only going out there to work on a lot down sleep, and you had never worked on one before. >> i was out there to assist and support -- to work on a block dowlockdown sleeve. >> i would be working alongside and with the drill quip as well as our own -- as well as the bp employees through it. >> had you had any prior knowledge of the timing that a lot downslides should be run? >> as in the sequence of events that it would fall into place in relation to the well? >> yes, sir. >> i knew that the timing that we were going to be setting again. >> did you have any document to reference it against and said that it might not have been an industry standard to run the lockdowns leave at that time? >> the document are requested and received from brian on the vessel was the sequence that it was going to be done in. that is the way i knew it to be. >> was there an issue with the timing of what time the lockdown sleeve was set? >> as far as a lockdown sleeve would go, the only concerns that would have been raised would have been to ensure that we have enough distance between the stinger and the balance plug. as long as you have that distance in there, you can have a sufficient amount of weight for setting this tool. and also have a clean well bore. the timing was not really a concern of ours. >> was there ever any discussions about a negative test and the timing of running the lockdowns leave? >> not from us. >> from anyone else? >> not to my knowledge. >> i have no further questions. >> we were not sitting in a shared space. let me add that in there. as far as our sophist -- our office space, where we were sitting, we were by ourselves. we were not sitting in the group as far as the well's teams go on that job. we were in a separate office so we were not involved in the conversations that were taking place on deciding what was going on. >> thank you, i have no for the question. >> when the incident occurred, i think -- was on the floor bucking up the tool for running the lot down sleep. is that correct? >> i believe they were ensuring that they had the crossovers, and that might have been getting this phase out and everything correct. i don't know exactly what he was doing. >> the drill quip guy was at the rear of the vessel using a bucking machine to prepare for the lot downslide. >> this is correct. i held him getting crossovers and altogether. >> during the day? >> yes, sir, during the day. >> when did you start that? >> i don't recall the times, but it was on and off all for the day. there would be several activities going on. the drill quip hands also took care of all of the casing run, the hangars, and all that is well-prepared he handled all of his communications back and forth to town. we were in and out as he could and as we had grain availability and assistance there. >> did you start bucking the tools together right after lunch, or was it after breakfast? >> i cannot tell you exactly. >> do you know what tools he had to but together? >> it would be some crossovers, because drill quip had the tools assembled in the shop and they were sent out as an assembly. but he still has to be able to get the crossover in to make it up to whatever that redtop would be for the stinger. the crossover for the top -- we will looking into separate tools, one of them being the impression tool to be run first and the second one being the lockdowns leave. >> did you assist him bucking of tools, are you just were observing him? >> just pretty much observing and looking through the area. we were having trouble finding some of the crossovers. we actually borrowed some of them. one of them i have come from halliburton, off one of their tools or something. >> was the drill guy familiar with the rig? >> yes, he was a regular on the rig. >> so he pretty much knew the routine and you were following his routines? >> yes, he knew everybody on a first name basis. he was like one of the crew members there. >> you are watching and to run the pressure blot first? that was based upon what? >> once you run into debt and landed out in the profile, the pressure of an energized the lead blocks. they will protrude out into the side of the well head, where the lockdowns leave would be energizing into into the profile. when you recovered the lead impression to, you can get your measurement from that. the indication that you get from the profile that tells where it is sitting at in the well head. you take that measurement in relation to your lot down sleeve, and that will tell you when you land its at this point, it will be locking in either just right or else we will have to make an adjustment to stroke it out longer or shorter so you will have a true mesh in the profile. >> so the reason you had to run the lead impression blot is because the tool does not always phase out the same? all the well head itself? >> it is just to make sure that the work was done correctly in the shop, and everything is the way it is supposed to be. it will also let you know that the casing was set all the way down and exactly where it needs to be. >> that is what i was trying to get too big the casing would necessarily be set all the way down? >> that is just one point that would raise a flag if you run a let impression and you are high or low. then you are going to get on the phone and have a set down and figure out why is it not the way it should be. >> does this deal assembly really is just a locking mechanism that does not sealed? it is not do anything to seal, it just is a lot of the casing in place? >> the lockdown sleeve would be assisting in the production side. it would give you straight into your production casing. >> can you explain that in a little more detail? >> a lot of down sleeve is going to land out on top of the casing hangar. it is going to lock in place. this will assist in holding, ensuring that casing will be held in place. when you run your tree any leger tree on top of the well head, it would step in to the top of this lot down sleeve area. it seals between the tree and the lockdown sleeve. >> it adds lee provides it that sealing mechanism. does it still on the other end where you have the case in hangar? or is it just a locking device? >> i would have to say there will primarily be a locking device where comes into the top of the casing. >> and the locking devices simply engaging some hydraulic movement there to lock id, or how does that actually lot christine >> is going to be weighed and hydraulics. >> say you have weight hanging below you, or you just have pressure on the top? >> are you asking me in reference to the lock down sleeve? you will be running 100,000 pounds below the stinger. that is the way that will be hanging underneath the lock down sleeve. this will assist in getting it through, setting it in their good and true, and when you slap of a sufficient amount of weight to land this out, you will not be putting anything in excess. if it calls for 60,000 pounds to slack off, the new head of 100,000 pounds thinner underneath it. >> so you runway above the setting wait? >> i believe that is what procedure called for. >> it only takes 62 said it? >> i believe is 60 to 72, not to exceed a certain amount in there. >> what is a hydraulic are the mechanism? >> that would assist you with a lot rain coming down on the uppermost part of it. >> is that the pressure from the top that activates the hydraulic mechanism? >> you are going to be in putting the pressure from the cement unit, coming three choker kill line. >> it is that pressure exposed to the entire well bore? >> it is in that area right there, from wherever you come in and that centered -- >> it is not contained in the running tool, is between the bop's and the running tool? >> if you come down for the drill stem and put pressure on the, you have a sure sub inside that will allow you to pump pressure down the inside. it will allow the column of fluid to vent to the annulus, and then you can pull your pipe dry and not have to be pulling wet string. >> did you have some share in georgia sheering out of? >> i believe they are brass types crews. >> is just a doll blocking mechanism that your engaging? like you just gotta profile you are going to push something hydraulically. >> that is correct. you are just walking into a profile. >> ever do get through setting the throughsleeve, is there anything else you do particularly to the well head? >> when we get to that point, after the stack would have been unlatched and off to the side, then the rov as a measuring tool that will land on top of the well head, and it extends down to the lockdown sleeve. it would give us an exact number of inches from the top that allied to the top of the lock down sleeve. >> that is so you will make sure the tree would fit on their properly when you come back with the tree? and so they would know it is in their word is supposed to be. i cannot say the exact number. we were told a number that it should be set at in there. that would be another indicator that this is properly done and a good job. >> but it does not seal the well bore. just seals regius locks in the casing, does not seal the well bore. >> yes, they are locked in the casing, and the production zeal is inside of that. >> thank you. >> what exactly is your title? argue the subsea supervisor? >> my title is the subsea well supervisor. >> i supervise every shore operations, when all is happening, and if i had problem with anything i am seeing, i bring it to their attention at the time. the cannot work through it, i pass it on freetown to my immediate supervisors. >> who is your immediate supervisor? >> merritt kelly would be my immediate supervisor. as far as on the job goes, the lead at hand on the job would be my supervisor at that time. >> what is your experience running in the drill quip, casing hang on, and the lot down sleeve? >> in my past have been required of you casing jobs, but i have never ran the casing in hangars, as far as my responsibility goes. >> but you have run the clock down sleeves? >> i have been around them. i have never had the job that was saying you are the lead on this, this is your responsibility, and been involved from day one, as far as procedures and all that. i follow a procedure i have not written. >> thank you. >> no questions, thank you. >> no questions, thank you. >> douglas brown. >> my name is steve gordon and i represent douglas brown. having spoken before you came here to trans ocean's lawyers? >> no, i have not, unless i had any conversation with any of them on the boat after the incident. but i had no face-to-face business talk with anyone. >> we use a boat, what boat you refer to? >> the code that we evacuated to, the work boat. i don't recall the name of it. >> is that we are pretty much everybody went to? >> yes, it is. >> can you tell me, i know it is hard to recall that night and that morning, but how many lawyers came out there? [laughter] as best you can recall. >> can you explain your line of question there? i don't know how that is said to related. >> i thought the first day's testimony is that there were no lawyers that came out there. >> i don't remember why i cut that line of questioning of, either, but i don't get anything relevant to the safety issue we are discussing here. >> did swift tried to get you off of the banks and, if you know? >> no, i am not going to say that anybody tried to get me off or separate me in any way. i was well taken care of. >> and you came in the morning of thursday? >> yes, i did. >> in you tell me, sir, if your work, when they pick up the bop from the macondo well, if your work would have had anything to do with the bop? >> i hope it does. i have not been told that i will get, but i would like to follow this whole thing through. >> for instance, if this event had not happened and the bop would have been picked up, with your work on board the deepwater horizon have had to do with tobop? >> no, but if i would have been asked or directed, it would have. >> so whether or not there were new and dealers on the deepwater horizon is completely outside of your scope. >> i would not have a clue. >> now your right, you said, on the 16th. >> i believe it was. that would be a friday. i believe it was on friday that i made my way out there. >> can you tell me why you were on board the deepwater horizon before 2200 hours on april 20, if you attended any safety meetings? >> we have so many. we have preached our meetings that i will stand in and listen to listenpre-

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