Transcripts For CSPAN State 20240705

Citizens are truly influenced. Get it straight from the source on cspan, unfiltered, unbiased word for word from the Nations Capital to wherever you are, because if the opinion that matters the most is your own. This is what democracy looks like. Cspan, powered by cable. Announcer assistant secretary of state for intelligence and Research Discusses Foreign Surveillance and intelligence gathering and its impact on u. S. Diplomacy abroad during an event hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. Section 702 allows the government to conduct targeted surveillance of nonu. S. Section 702 allows the government to conduct targeted surveillance of nonu. S. Persons located outside the United States. When it was reauthorized in 2017 congress concluded a sunset provision, and as a result of that these authorities are set to expire at the end of this year, unless Congress Reauthorizes its use. Todays discussion is going to highlight this one aspect of 702, which is the ways in which the administration uses it to aid the diplomatic efforts of the u. S. And its partners and allies. In the weeks to come we plan to , have additional programs on 702 looking at both the value of 702 in other contexts but also looking at the discussions underway about ways to reform 702 to increase the publics confidence in its appropriate use. Today we are honored to host brett holmgren, assistant secretary of the bureau of intelligence and research at the u. S. State department. Assistant secretary holmgren has served in this role since 2021. Prior to that he served for 14 years in key leadership positions in the Intelligence Community, at the white house, and at the department of defense. During president Obamas Administration he served on the National Security Council Staff as special assistant to the president and senior director for intelligence programs. Following some opening remarks, assistant secretary holmgren will be joined by our very own glenn gerstell, nonresident Senior Advisor here at csis in the interNational Security program, for a fireside chat. Prior to joining csis, glenn served as a general counsel for the National Security agency and Central Security service from 20152020. Prior to that he practiced law for almost 40 years at the International Law firm of milbank. Before turning it over to assistant secretary holmgren i want to note that we will be taking audience questions at the end of the program. If youre in the room you have the qr code up there. Or if youre watching this online, you can find the form by clicking the submit questions button on the csis event page and you will be directed to the question form. And with that, please help me welcome assistant secretary brett holmgren. [applause] [applause] suzanne, thank you for that kind introduction and thank you for your many years of public service. And to my good friend, glenn gerstell, thank you for helping to organize this event. And the truth is for those of you who know glenn, hes a real expert on these issues. He ought to be the one you hang from today, but i will do my best. I also want to thank csis for hosting todays event, and for decades csis has been at the forefront of providing Cutting Edge Research and solutions to some of the most complex and consequential policy issues of our time. And they conduct the work in an objective nonpartisan manner that resonates with those of us in the Intelligence Community who are guided and share the same principles. So its only fitting todays discussion is taking place at csis and its an honor to be here. Since the founding of our republic intelligence has advanced the American Interest in the world. During the revolutionary war general George Washington relied on intelligence to inform battlefield maneuvers and strategy. During the Civil War Union forces established the First Organization to produce formal intelligence assessments, and in world war ii the legendary bill donovan, head of the office of Strategic Services, established the research and Analysis Branch, the predecessor to the state Departments Bureau of intelligence and research, or inr, to identify vulnerabilities of the axis powers. For 77 years inr, the organization i am proud to lead, has been able to carry on the legacy of providing u. S. Diplomats with Strategic Insights because we are able to rely on access to intelligence collected and produced by other agencies. Like many of the 18 u. S. Intelligence agencies, inr is a consumer not a producer or a collector of intelligence. But today inr and the state department that we serve is at risk of losing access to one of the most important streams of intelligence on which we rely if section 702 of the foreign intelligence or visit act is not renewed. As you know this all will expire on december 31, and Less Congress takes action to reauthorize it. My colleague Senate Intelligence committee and at the department of justice have already made a strong case for reauthorizing section 702 to protect the United States from foreign threats come from terrorists and cyber attacks, espionage and weapons of mass destruction. I share the sentiments. 702 has been vital to countering these and other National Security threats. But i worry the public discussion on 702 does far has not fully addressed how 702 enables other instruments of u. S. Power, including diplomacy. Simply put, the 702 program doesnt just help defend and protect u. S. Interests, it is essential to advancing and promoting u. S. Interest in the world. So today i want to discuss about of 702 to inr and state department, provide examples of how 702 information has enabled use diplomacy, and describe the safeguards we have in place to protect privacy and Civil Liberties. Now before describing a section 702 supports u. S. Diplomacy, support or its import i what section of the two doesnt does not permit. First, 7 a to focus solely on forms threats. It allows designated elements of the Intelligence Community to compel u. S. Electronic Communication Service providers to share the data of nonu. S. Persons located outside the United States who have defined types of foreign intelligence information. Second, 702 does not permit the targeting of u. S. Persons or anyone located in the United States. Also prohibit socalled reverse targeting, meaning the ic cannot target the communications of a nonu. S. Persons abroad if the ultimate person, purpose is to collect on u. S. Person or so located in the United States. Now, while 702 explicitly prohibits targeting u. S. Persons, like many of the forms of intelligence collection, the ice he times obtained the communications of u. S. Persons incidentally while collecting against a foreign target. And inr when he is person stayed appears in Intelligence Report that we receive, this can happen when foreign targets communicate with or about americans. That data is massed in the report to protect the individuals privacy. As a consumer of Intelligence Reporting, inr does not have access to the raw underlying intelligence. And inr officer needs the request the identity of that use person commits a a complaint process we follow to demonstrate and document a valid need to know. And the overall number of unmasked u. S. Persons are provided to the public annually as part of the dnis annual statistical transparency report. Third, 702 is not a bulk Collection Program. Its a targeted tailored Collection Program focused on individual foreign targets located outside the United States for communicating about specific topics of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has reviewed and approved. So i do hope this provides some context for the scope of the 702 program. Throughout my career and National Security weather at the cia, the pentagon or the white house, ive had a firsthand perspective on how section 702 supports the Intelligence Community, the war fighter and the policymaker. But i admit until june at the state department about 20 months ago i was unaware of the Critical Role that 702 plays in supporting u. S. Foreign policy. So let me share a few observations that underscored the importance of 702 for the state department. In inr it is hard to overstate the centrality of 702 collection to providing the secretary of state and u. S. Diplomats with objective, timely intelligence analysis and information. From assessments on russia, china, iran and north korea, foreign influence and Cyber Threats come 702 reporting provides our analyst with unique insights, that when combined with other sources of information, make our policymakers better informed about the issues so they can make better decisions. In 2022 a loan and loan and a large percentage of inrs finished analytic products included 702 reporting, oftentimes 702 data was a most valuable source underpinning these assessments. As one my managers put it, inr would not be able to fill its mandate to use intelligence to empower diplomacy without 702 derived reporting. Another way that inr and the state department have benefited from 702 is by sharing downgraded or classified intelligence with partners and ellis, a critical tool to strengthen u. S. Leverage at the negotiating table, expose this information come for galvanized partners and allies. U. S. Diplomats abroad routinely rely on 702 data for formal the marshes come to pass threat information, or to gauge counterparts on sensitive matters. Last committee of the request by u. S. Diplomats, diplomats that inr process downgrade or classified whistlers for 702 information. Finally come section 702 has helped the state Department Monitor and evaluate russian atrocities in ukraine and take actions to hold them accountable. As the Deputy Attorney general testified last month, section 702 has helped uncover gruesome atrocities committed by russia in ukraine, including the murder of noncombatants, the forced relocation of children from russian occupied ukraine, to the Russian Federation as well as the dissension of refugees fleeing violence by russian personnel. This and other information have helped u. S. Government to galvanized galvanize accountability efforts related to ukraine by confidently and accurately speaking to the American People and the International Community about russias atrocities. So whether its providing u. S. Diplomats with strategic intelligence assessment, downgrading or declassifying intelligence to share with foreign partners or taking action against those who commit atrocities, 702 is invaluable to the departments diplomatic efforts. While i hope this general overview is useful, those of us and National Security also understand that you preserve the tool the government must do a better job demonstrating its value to the congress and the American People. And thats why we have worked closely with our ic counterparts in recent weeks to classify new realworld examples that i am pleased to share with you today. Let me start with an example regarding treaty monitoring and compliance. Without 702 collection the state departments ability told nations accountable for adhering to International Obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction would be significantly degraded. For example, 702 information was a critical input and provided some of the most meaningful reporting in the classified portion of the 2023 annual report on compliance with the chemical weapons convention. When it comes to defending human rights which President Biden has called the fundamental challenge of our time section 702 has helped state Department Shine a light on those who seek to silence dissent and opposition. In 2021, information derived from section 702 enabled u. S. Diplomats to demarche a middle eastern country over its efforts to monitor and track dissidents abroad as well as dissident writer in the United States. In another example section 702 data helped expose effort by foreign powers including the prc to coerce nations to oppose International Responses to human rights violations. This reporting enabled u. S. Diplomats to assist countries from coercion and influence from these actors. And find 702 reporting has allowed the state department and other agencies to notify partners and allies about illicit north korean activities. In 2022 section 702 section 702 data was vital in enabling as to warn the International Community, the private sector and the public about efforts by the dprk to deploy Information Technology workers to commit fraud against the global industry, including against u. S. Businesses to generate revenue for its nuclear program. So in sum, 702 has been a key enabler for use diplomacy. Heres the thing. Americas diplomats are not going to stop engaging with the world if they lose access to a key string of intelligence like a 702. They will advocating for u. S. Interests come serving american citizens abroad, and working to build a more free, prosperous, and secure world. But make no mistake, a future without 702 or a much diminished 702 program, will have significant costs for u. S. Diplomacy. Having said all that, we appreciate the power and potential for abuse of 702 authorities without proper safeguards and controls. Critics are right to question whether the program has the appropriate oversight and privacy measures in place given mistakes in the past. Effective oversight by congress and questions and Civil Liberties advocates have helped highlight the need for many of the recent reforms undertaken by doj and the ic. Now as i said at the outset, the state department is only a consumer of intelligence derived from 702 collection of semicult at doj and office of the director of National Intelligence our best place to address potential reform to the program. However, i do want to describe the state department on the internal safeguards and compliance measures. And here is worth expanding on inrs role as a consumer of 702 picks its many ic agencies in fact, occupy a similar role. As an agency without any operational authorities tied to the 702 program, inr as a said before does not have access to an evaluated rolf i minimize 702 data. Period. Moreover, since we cant access the data, we cant perform targeted queries on it. Inr and most agencies are not just prohibited from accessing raw 702 director data, email exchanges, call transcript, chat records et cetera come we dont have the capability to access it even if we wanted to. In fact, when authorized and Trained Personnel at a small number of agencies, National Security agency, cia, fbi, the National National encounters an agency, have access to subsets of 702 data. Instead at inr our offices only receive access to disseminated, serialized reporting that contains 702 data. So what does this refer to . It means the rod david has been reviewed for valid intelligence information by authorized personnel at the Collection Agency, sanitized of u. S. Person information and then formally published in a report thats made available to the product Intelligence Community who are cleared for that information. Once the report is published, oftentimes by the nsa, inr analysts can then use to inform their own strategic assessments or to support policymakers. Like other agencies inr nevertheless, has a robust internal complaints and oversight mechanism for intelligence programs like 702. First we have department of state guidelines for intelligence activities approved by the attorney general which among other things govern how inr retains and uses any information concerning u. S. Persons. Second, we have established control processes and procedures for inr analysts to submit requests to unmask the identity of a u. S. Person in a report derived from 702 data if the analyst can demonstrate a valid need to know. For example, if they named u. S. Person state Department Employee in a 702 report is a target of a physical threat, and inr analyst may request to unmask the persons identity so the bureau of Diplomatic Security can take appropriate action to protect their safety. All such requests are formally documented reviewed and approved by senior officials. Third we have Civil Liberties privacy and transparency officer who helps oversee and advise an internal compliance with these activities. And finally like other agencies in the Intelligence Community inr is working to limit the enhance privacy and Civil Liberties safeguards for u. S. Signals intelligence activities that President Biden directed last year as part of the executive order 14086 to implement the European Union u. S. Data privacy framework. The reality is that taken together, the compliance and reporting requirement from 702 program and the improved to safeguards for signals intelligence activities in the executive order represent an oversight and Compliance Regime that is unmatched in the world in terms of the protection and transparency that it sorts. U. S. Citizens and nonu. S. Citizens alike come at a time when digital authoritarianism is on the rise, the framework and safeguards established by the United States can serve as a model for how to conduct legitimate intelligence activities in a manner consistent with privacy, Civil Liberties and transparency imperatives. Looking ahead i am confident working with congress we will find a way to preserve these vital authorities while addressing legitimate privacy and oversight concerns. As the director of National Intelligence and the attorney general had said, the administration is committed to working with an Engaging Congress on potential improvements to the authority that fully preserve its efficacy. For inr and state department, and indispensable part of that efficacy is the advantage that 702 information provides for american diplomacy. From advancing human rights and climate security to counting authoritarianism, american diplomats are on the frontlines of every major threat and opportunity that we face in the world. But to sustain their efforts, to give our diplomats information advantage, they will continue to need every tool at our disposal. Especially section 702 information. Thank you very much. [applause] well, thank you so much for that really terrific overview and getting into some detail on a bunch of things. I think i would like, im sure you spend more time getting into detail on some of these we have only a little less than about 40 minutes or so. What we will do is i will chat with you about some of the points you raised and go into some greater detail on them, and then we will take some ideas questions both here in the room as well as online. So where to start . Actually before we dig into 702 can it take a step back and just talk about inr, which you talk, jamaican it is 77 that must make one of the oldest towns of the ic is not the oldest are the oldest, exactly. Your inr and agency i used to work for nsa both share a common route in some way going back to actually world war i and the beer which is an entity funded by the state department and the u. S. Army department of the army, which try to help inform america during world war i and its immediate aftermath. It was famously shipped by buy secretary of state stimson who as you know said gentlemen do not read other gentleman emails, male, not email, mail at the time. We shouldnt read other persons meal. He changed it might around world war ii and begin advocate for certain type of surveillance on behalf of the National Security but there is that connection. How does i inr trace its roots to that . What led to it . Can you tell us a little more about, you touched on the low that were about how the bureau operates within the state Department Self works it is found just by the departments of, not the ic, quick view of a dawdling to the Intelligence Committee . Correct. So look to history as you mentioned dates back to world war ii. It was a research and Analysis Branch of the office of Strategic Services which was comprised of a bunch of social scientists who are expert on the culture, language, the histories of the nations that we were engage with and world war ii. And they were provided access to all source of information to identify strategic vulnerability of these access powers. And 1945 os as was disbanded, the cia was one of the creations come your special Operations Command as it is now known was the other and then the bureau of intelligence and research, inr, predecessor was kind of the third entity. President truman i think recognize the value of keeping and intelligence function in the state department to make sure that we could provide diplomats with the latest information they need to a form Foreign Policy choices and decisions. For 77 years thats what inr has done. We have relied on deep expertise on issues to provide strategic assessment to support our diplomats both at home and abroad. You are right. Now, today where both of you in the state department and one of the 18 intelligence agencies, and that means we have the benefit of and advantage of the reporting jointly to the secretary of state and dni. But we take our priorities similar to other agencies. First and foremost the National Intelligence priority framework which is established for the entire Intelligence Community. Is this something you contribute to or is that, or the state have its own intelligence priorities or your subsumed under the water executive branches approach to the overall intelligence . How does that sort of . We have her own interim management priorities but when it comes to the Strategic Issues that we will provide assessment on or support our policymakers on those are all director of National Intelligence framework which is established by the dni to serve the entire executive branch. But we also then take into consideration in terms of forming our own priorities the National Security strategy of the administration, and then the priorities of the secretary of state. In this case secretary blinken modernization agenda are really the three key inputs that allows to determine what of it going to focus and substantively at the what of it going to focus on from a a business perspectiven terms of driving management reforms in the bureau. Jamaican oversight. Is oversight undertaken by and you mentioned do you also have a sort of guideline to the intelligence communities on the hill . So i have the pleasure of being overseen by both our formulation and our Intelligence Committees. It has been, weve had really great interactions and engagements with both of those, and both of the committees are very kind to focus on intelligence issues and the role that inr plays both in supporting the the departmen sporting the Intelligence Community. Okay. And then one more sort of personal question before we dig into more of 702. How did you wind up heading this diabetes bureau . You have a rich background in intelligence but is this something you aspire to, came serendipitously or whatever . And then maybe if you could share a little bit about what was it like to walk into this bureau where the Prior Administration with that making a political point had a different approach to things and you are obviously having a different agenda, different approach, different management style from the Prior Administration. Any light you want to shut on that . Sure. In my career when i was at cia i had worked very closely with inr substantively as an analyst, and then as a policymaker at the white house i was a Consumer Reports that inr would publish and engage quickly with inr. I always had a tremendous amount of respect for their expertise on issues and for the people who work there, and but i never imagined come never imagined i would have an opportunity to lead what is truly a historic kind of iconic institution, right . But when i received the call in early 2021 asking if i would be interested, it was probably the easiest career decision ive ever made. The ability to work on the most interesting issues and the world. Secondly, for me to return to my roots in the Intelligence Committee. I started in the ic so after many years later now had an opportunity to go back. And then finally the people both in inr with who id worked previously but also to serve with and for dni haines and secretary blinken two people for whom i have always set to commence amount of personal professional respect. It was an easy decision to say, yes, i will proceed with being considered for the role. When you walk in what you do find . Look, i thought, look, walked in after come took me a little while to get confirm come wasnt until september of 21. There were some delays on the hill but nevertheless, i was excited to be confirmed in september. Look, were still in the midst of covid. But to my surprise i found an institution at inr that it largely survived mostly unscathed of some of the other i think impacts that other peers in the department suffered over the last four years. But having said that, in the midst of covid plus just a hangover of some of the experiences of the prior four years, you know, we had a need to i think revitalize some a processes that are so important to making good intelligence increase staff. With with increased staff a little bit. I think the main things weve done is really tried to focus on heres a message secretary blinken has kenneth implored upon all of the senior team, which is think about ways you can leave the department a little bit better than when you found it. And so i have chosen building on a really Strong Institution at inr that includes modernizing how we do intelligence support to the plums and we have rolled out new product lines. We have got a new product daily brief with the secretary of state thats in his book of the morning. At the investing in our digital transformation, investing in cybersecurity and investing in our people, both to increase the diversity of the type of people and backgrounds we are recruiting but also the experiences theyve had an expertise and a half. Theres been a really fun part of the job is helping to make him an Extraordinary Bureau even better. Sure. So lets get into a little more 702. So you talk a little bit about some of the procedures. That you just mentioned theres this Daily Briefing book. I presume the secretary of state gets a version of the pbb, president s daily brief, which is administration recently said as a very, very significant part of a a trace back to 702. You said your bureau gets finished reports reporty nsa on section 702 but, derivd from section 702. Do you enrich that yourself with your own diplomatic sources . Because obviously theres both not only covert peace but theres a pure overt collection because diplomats around the world have as their function the collection of information in a very beneficial way, reporting back to washington as a function of one of our embassies. How does that information thats coming in from all these embassies get into your puerile and yet synthesized with a classified piece which is coming from 702, how do you package it and get that out to policymaker . Sure. So inr is one of the three all source analogies agencies in the Intelligence Community along with cia and the Defense Intelligence agency. So what that means is we are reviewing all sources information, so 702 information, imagery, human intelligence, diplomatic reporting, open sources, a lot of open source increase in her, that and our analysts are poring over all that data to make conclusions about whats happening in the world, what opportunities there may be, what risks there are for the United States and their packaging that into a formal intelligence product come some of which some of our products going to the president s daily brief so that included not only in the secretaries book of the morning but the president spoke every morning. Some of them are the spoke analytic products that we create just for the secretary. So for instance, he oversees that he is overseas right now and but before hes departed on the foreign trip we will do tell the products of providing background in the countries is the think of people is meeting with, issues and make them up et cetera so we will provide things that are just for him. President secretary chao top to clients. Source got his own little tailored Intel Service here. But then also we will use 702 information as a said in the remarks from the on the analytic site of things. Diplomat overseas they come in with request to say look we saw this in finished nsa reporting to be very helpful if we could try to get that information downgraded to demarche a particular country over policy difference we have or an egregious violations of human rights that when you stand up for. Inr will work with our diplomats come work with our policy clients in the state department to facilitate through the appropriate channels within Intelligence Committee can request a downgrade in some places to declassify 702 information to support the diplomatic engagement. So in addition to this process of enriching information do you also serve as a little bit of coordinator switchboard for the department or traffic cop for information come from embassies works so its entirely possible that intimacy make it a trick report from nsa directly, and if they want to do and unmasking to find out more information about let us say a u. S. Person who is named there who is a target of a a foreign operation of whatever, and set request that could come to you . How to get involved in knowing what other recipients of information are doing . Is are some coordination function or whatever . In inr we have an office whose policy sharing and Coordination Office who sole purpose is to be a Service Provider for the rest of the department to facilitate requests with in this case nsa for 702 information to downgrade or to classify that reporting so that diplomats can use it. In that case it is something that comes in, theres a formal process to go through. There is a form have to fill it. There has befouled need to know. It has to be approved and that he goes to the Intelligence Community, the nsa. Theyre the ones up to make the decision about risk sources they either approve it as written or they will oftentimes come back with modifications to say yes, but only with the significant edits to your text so it doesnt reveal sourcing. And then we will provide that back to our diplomatic customers, if you will, so they can use in their engagement. Thats hundreds of times a year. One of the embassies of said we would like to get more intelligence on a particular point thats relevant to our host country and learn more about that come with that request come to you and then you could present that to the ic to learn more information . Sure. Oftentimes that is what that might lead to targeting decision by nsa down the road. It could. It depends on the urgency of the bad and if its really urgent issue yes, that will come into us. Will help address those with the call collection requirements with the reporting agency if its seventh information will help address that with nsa. Or if its more general strategic in nature hey, we would really like to know more about these topics and future, its helping to support Public Diplomacy effort that we are doing in the field, we will feed that into the National Intelligence party framework, that overall intelligence collection process you mention upfront. And what about sharing with allies and friends works obvious extended information is highly important to u. S. But also is potentially relevant to some of our allies and obviously we have an important relationship with the five eyes. Can you talk about intelligence sharing . I assume that mosby court needed to inr as opposed to other elements of the department . It is. Similar process again if our requests from the field to shove information will go through us. We will help facilitate the request get downgraded declassified. One of the ways at least in inr which will regularly use 70 information and share with partisan allies even if our partners and allies dont always know that that information is derived from 702, is through analytic exchanges that we have with a range of foreign partners in support of intelligence and diplomacy. There are number of engagements that ive had over the last year with our European Union counterparts, russia, ukraine and prc issues et cetera that some of the talking points and substantive analysis is derived from some of the 702 reported. Thats useful because it gives our partners and allies an opportunity to respond to her own assessments to help us identify blind spots in our analysis, understand what theyre worried about, what youre not pick so its very useful. Downgrading the class but in general is useful is a big part of that in terms of the work that we do. I imagine some of that must be very relevant with, during the beginning of entering the course of ukraine conflict about which you mentioned during the remarks. Can you tell us a little more about the process of declassifying and how you alluded to an example of how 702 has been relevant in the ukraine context . Can you elaborate on that . And also if you want to share any for the classic against every promise that you tell anybody . Ill pass on that, thank you for that opportunity. Look him in the run up obvious he to russias further engagement, further invasion of ukraine, intelligence in general as it was almost critical important help partners and allies, expose russian disinformation and an ultimate portly to warn ukrainians about the impending assault. 702 is a part of that. I wont get into details as i was a source of it. Decimating not my remarks one of the ways have just been very useful, i referenced the statement from the Deputy Attorney general recently about how the government in general but i know the state department in particular has used it for accountability purposes in terms of the atrocities that russian actors have committed in the context of ukraine. That will be its important now to be more important for accountability mechanisms in the future. Okay. You also alluded to european views on section 702. Of course here in the United States most of the debate thus far, which also commented on about concerns over section 702 come have been principally around the use of the authority by the federal bureau of investigation and its ability to query its collection centric you make in that. Thats been the focus of most of the discussion but theres been a steady drumbeat over the years on the part of principally europeans, although less so in asia, about how 702 authorities are used by the United States. Of course there was, going back to the famous facebook decision, some battles between the u. S. And eu over Privacy Shield come all about essentially a feeling on the part of europeans that their data wasnt sufficiently protected from what they perceived to be an appropriate u. S. Surveillance. Theres been some tension back and forth. Thats been ameliorated somewhat by a new euu. S. Of data privacy framework, the details of which are still being worked on. You mentioned the new executive order which i soon you had input in. Where do things stand in terms of lessig principally on the transatlantic site about concerns over section 702 . I know they have concerns over the authorities under 12333 but general surveillance authorities. Where does that stand . Could you comment on that, and a particular do you think that will have any effect on the ultimate decisions by congress to renew 7 a to . Do you think that would be part of an amendment package . Any thoughts . Let me two different ways. I will make a broad point to start with. The first is to acknowledge that the United States government is blessed with extraordinary signals intelligence capabilities as we know. But we also recognize that these capabilities mean that with great responsibilities to balance the protection of Civil Liberties and privacy while maintaining our security interests. And we welcome that. The United States has been the leader defending Human Dignity and personal privacy protections for people around the world for decades. So we recognize theres a special responsibility we have and we embrace that. And there are higher standard and we think there ought to be. Just as were focused on striking the right balance here at home, i think we recognize that our Global Engagement and leadership in world ins we do the same overseas. So that has in part formed, the second point i would make, is the new executive order as you mentioned the euu. S. Data privacy framework. That executive order was designed to be the basis to implement the framework. But in consultation with our european colleagues and friends and partners, look, there were a number of really important protections that were included in that. I wont need all of them. You can go read to them but a couple a few i think which are important, are desperate for some for most the executive order defines staff for all u. S. Signals intelligence activities which are not exclusive to 702 authorities but do include 702, they can only be conducted for specific defined legitimate National Security objectives. I wont need all of them. Counterterrorism, counterespionage, cybercom foreign interference, threats to u. S. Personnel overseas, hostagetaking, transnational criminal organizations, et cetera. So those are the only valid objectives for which 702 but also does intelligence activity can be conducted. Executive order i think also, it mandated handling requirements for a disease of the click and handle personal information. Collected persuade u. S. Signals intelligence activities, and an established, this is important, this multilayered mechanism for individuals from qualifying states to seek redress if they believe that their personal information has been collected or handled in a way, in violation of u. S. Law, the whole process they can seek redress. Thats unprecedented. Not just implement. Right. Some people who say why is it that eu citizens get it right the seemingly american citizens dont get . Right. Because signals intelligence activities pursuant are connected against foreign targets. In the u. S. Has the Fourth Amendment but the other thing is executive order, it has the privacy and Civil Liberties oversight board, pclob, told the government to account. I think those are very important. And look, the final thing i would say is refer back to what is it in the remarks which is that again if you think, if you collectively you take the executive order 14086 plus the all of the transparency and compliance and oversight requirements, the overall framework for 702, together these are unprecedented in terms of the level of protections that are afforded to u. S. And on u. S. Citizens alike especially for european citizens. I think its a model for the future in the age of Ubiquitous Communications and a rapidly evolving indications Technology Environment for other nations to follow in terms of how do you conduct legitimate intelligence activities again consistent with these transparency and privacy imperatives. Good point. One of the things i was having a discussion with an eu privacy advocate recently about section 702 and their concerns about it, they asked what would happen if section 702 section 702 wasnt reauthorized by congress . Of course the authority would lapse, but in some ways that isnt necessarily a better outcome for the eu because then, then they are left on their viewpoint being subject to the surveillance authorities under executive order 12333 which doesnt have a lot of the safeguards and guardrails and built in structure 702 does. 702 is focused on u. S. Service providers and theres a difference because far targets of use communication elements, it does as you say have all sorts of protections and guardrails about, around it that the other surveillance not subject to the Fourth Amendment concerns. Theres obvious intention there which congress is going to have to work through. Why do we take a couple questions from audience . I have a bunch of questions are from online which are still coming in. Let me see if theres any questions here in the audience. In the back there and then this lady in the middle. Thank you. If you could stand up. [inaudible] okay, yeah. Those of the questions are already . My mistake. I didnt realize it. Then lets see. Okay. Heres one thats a little technical and we were to do something else, which is i did realize these questions were already written down, im sorry. Can you go into more detail about the unmasking process . What percent of the time and under what circumstances are americans information unmasked . Is there any revelation of americans involved in illegal activity abroad . Look, i can speak fred unmasking process works in inr and the state department. The overall numbers provided for the government are in the dni annual transparency report. But for inr and the state department again if there is an analyst comes across acre of disseminated reporting that references a u. S. Person, u. S. Entity generally, and they believe that that expert need to understand basically to unmask the identity to up either in form the analysis of a particular situation, or if its some sort threat scenario whether its a cybertek and physical threat, espionage et cetera, they will submit a request that is documented, go through a process in truly multiple levels within inr. Ultimately either myself or another seemed individual are the ones that ultimately say yes or no that i can go forward to the Collection Agency to seek the unmasking. And then that agency ultimately makes the decision. Either they believe it is a valid purpose, that is necessary for in this case inr or the state department to perform or they say no, and we get a denial of response. But it is all well documented and then there have been a number of requests i dont approve but fortunately overall its a small because our analyst recognize this is extremely sensitive matter to seek these unmasking requests. Okay. I know when i was at nsa and there was some controversy over on masking was i so know the procedures at nsa were quite rigorous, required information and, of course, the point we always made we sort of got lost a little bit was that the unmasking was a voluntary policy decision on the part of nsa, in this case that every agency basks information. But because of the fact that could be collection of americans and the only time an americans name would be even mention in an Intelligence Report was relevant to fork intelligence, not just gratuitous information so it had to be relevant to the report otherwise why put in report. Also to protect the mechanism and very often when i i was aa we get requests from agencies to learn information, and just only i could just recall a handful of times where we felt it was inappropriate, i cant even come i can just recall one which i think turned out to be a tactical air so to speak. But substantively i think its come with their spouse about it, i a think people should recognize its protective device. So okay so we have a couple questions that all sort of seemed to do with the recent discussions about the fbi and revelations in fisa, this convenient for said about abuses. I know thats not state departments concerned but it is covering the whole debate about potential, about abuses undertaken by the fbi in the past. Thereve there been somes not give any comment . I know is that state department but it is as is it affecting the discussion and we think thats going to come out . In particular one of these questions is that do you think, would it hurt the state department if the fbi had a warrant requirement associate with its queries . Thats one of the questions here. Look, on the fisc Court Opinions that you mentioned, i think i was like a lot of us it was disturbing and unfortunate. But the fact that those came to light was because of the reporting and the transparency requirements that have been instituted by the director of National Intelligence. So in some respects it shows that the oversight process is ultimately working to help expose practices that obviously need to be addressed. I wont speak for the fbi but i know in this case a number of the noncompliant queries that were referenced in some of the recent reporting did occur before several other remediation mentioned that they put in place since then in 21 and 2022 that would have in any event prevented some of these noncompliant queries and passed. Now look, in terms of the impact it would have on the state department, if there were requirement for either a title i fisa court order or a ward, i will focus on title i fisa court order because thats generally haslett was a connection to the foreign intelligence side of things. Look, it is, i dont want to speculate. Again its hard to kind of understand in hypotheticals but i would just say that anything that diminishes the amount and the value of the intelligence that we currently receive at the state department from 7 a to drive reporting, anything that would diminish that would have a negative impact on the work of our analyst who produce of their assessments and to support the we provide to our diplomats. That is just the fact that were starting baseline was really proud of information we receive as well, protected with the tennessees guards, we are consumers of it. So we want more of it because its incredibly valuable for our folks. So anything less than that or if the value is diminished it is going to impact our mission. Two of the areas that my sense is that would be particularly susceptible to being negatively affected in this area would be cybersecurity where the bureau in particular has a very active role in recovering ransom payments, going after crypto currency, helping to locate the ransomware gains overseas, et cetera. Thats a key function. Of course speed and notification of victims or target so that is one area where speed is essential and, therefore, the process of getting a warrant i can have an effect or the other is an area relevant to state which is a counterintelligence function and people going after foreign spies, going after our diplomats and embassy personal et cetera where again we may not have probable cause to get a port of what to do something about it. Those two areas being potentially once a greater concern. Right. Look, i would say look, state department we do not have any operation authorities tied to the program. And so really the fbi, doj and the office correct of National Intelligence at the white house are the best place to talk about potential reforms. I would just put back to what the dni and the attorney general said early this year which is the administration is open to potential improvements to the program that preserve the efficacy. And again for us at the state department that is the key point is look, congress has an incredibly Important Role to play here in overseeing this program. And lets just go back in history a little bit come 1978, the beginning of fisa grew out of congressional investigations and of Intelligence Committee and visas. The church committee. Like that is why this whole architecture was established in the first place. So its incredibly important. The Administration Oversight is important or congress is only going to have to get comfortable with reporting and oversight controls that give them confidence that the program is operating as intended in compliance with the law, and are asked as we preserve those really important capabilities to continue to generate the intelligence, for intelligence derived from this program. So thats a good pointer into him. Were coming up to the end of the out and if one question which is just follows onto your last point, which is given what you just said, how is inr and state going to be involved in the discussion with congress on the reauthorization . Odyssey i see that as being led by both the white house and odni director haines, but how are you and state going to get involved in that final discussion . Look, we have taken a step today where we are trying to share more realworld examples, classified examples of a savage information supports diplomacy. There are some that as hard as we pushed is going to be difficult some of common example is declassified because ultimately we do not want to jeopardize valuable sources. Behind closed doors with the cards will provide we are grateful for your time. [applause] [indistinct chatter] Nonfiction Book lovers, cspan has a number of podcasts for you. Listen to nonfiction authors and interviewers on the afterwords podcasts. Listen to conversations with authors and others who are making things happen. Plus a weekly hourlong conversation that regularly features conversations about a variety of topics. And behind the scenes of the Nonfiction Book Publishing Industry with interviews, and best sellers lists. Download the free cspan now app. Available wherever you get your podcast. Or on our website, cspan. Org podcasts. Cspan is your unfiltered view of government. We are funded by these Television Companies and more including vox her syndrome is extremely rare. 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