Transcripts For CSPAN Key Capitol Hill Hearings 20151107

Thinking of some of you might be in retail or restaurant saint unemployment is 5 do i need to theres a halfmillion people up there that say they want to job but maybe have looked maybe i can tap into that the new be willing to take the 10 and our job as opposed to me having to go to 11 i can get the worker from the restaurant next door. Steve is calling from texas. I steve. I started working in 72. I worked for over 20 years before i ever had to file for unemployment. That was a nearly 90s. I will work probably another 10 years after that before i had to get into unemployment again. Why calling in and out or anything but when these construction on the boilermaker. The Union Boilermaker that. Is a war on ial think the war on anyone that does work for a living and these numbers i think they need out of four of five and that five. So many people are so discouraged. Hearing crockett theres a pipeline. The come in in great jobs. Thats 600 employees of their own. Its a small town theres no industry oil pipelines. Theyre bringing workers from out of state from around the state and i will say this, most of them i will say are illegal immigrants. Host we will leave it there steve. His point that there should be up for a five in front of 5 number. Are there ways of measuring employment that come up with different statistics . Absolutely. When we put out the Employment Situation every month we have the full press release with thousands of numbers and it. We find it helpful to have my number and that seems to show Unemployment Rate which is the most common. However, for different questions you might prefer different measures. We publish six of them every month and the most inclusive is the one we call you six. It includes all of the discouraged workers and everybody who has a parttime job would prefer to have a is measured in the unemployed or underutilized category. That number is higher and this month it came down to 9. 8 . If thats the number you would prefer to follow you can do that in the statistics we provide. Has about the same pattern over time as the official Unemployment Rate but because its mark loses it is higher. Its another way of measuring distress and labor market. Beinghe talks about unemployed and taking unemployment. The traffic came out with. Guest every month when we people ple, with determined by their prescriptions to unemployed we asked them how long theyve been searching for work so we can divide up our pool of Unemployed People by the duration of unemployment. This chart shows you those buckets. Recession caused a tremendous spike in longterm unemployment shown in bowls. Bikets on the mend this has down. Its not back down to where was the more that it has come down hugely. There is still a disproportionate number of longterm unemployed but we made a tremendous amount of progress. It has been declining for four years. Caller 5 when i was in college back in the late 60s was almost unemployment but i would hardly consider todays economy to be anywhere near the second the parttime employees . When you spoke earlier about them like restaurants and retail are rising thats probably because beginning of the christmas and all that. Is that parttime in 5 or so different chart as well . You first. Another centheres number that includes parttime that would like to have fulltime work. 5 if you have a parttime job you are employed. I hear you saying from some of the other thegs were talking about lower level of labor force suggests that you have a 5 number today. Look to the number of links that have been longterm there been a lot of folks that run employed for more than 27 weeks. Some of them left the labor force and taken different have. Thats the amount of people that could potentially be workers. Your answer . Guest hes absolutely right that people who are working parttime but would prefer time jobs are considered to be employed but when we go to the other number i was talking about then they are counted as underutilized. We do have measures of host im going to take this chart will show in voluntary parttime workers. 500 5,000,700 67000 and is the figure you have listed here. This is the total number of people a parttime jobs who would prefer to have a fulltime job. This number spiked dramatically during a recession and has been coming down ever since. It is still elevated everywhere was before, only have here is two kinds of ways you may be involuntarily parttime employed. One is that its normally a fulltime job at your employer is cut your hours. The other is all you found was a parttime job. And you could have fulltime one. Right someone who are he has a job is going to be considered a better worker than someone who has been out of work for six months or more. All of these numbers i think retailtant business early spike around the holidays. These numbers are comparable from monthtomonth. In voluntary, you added an actual figure. Unemployment, only people does that translate into . Guest i do have that figure. Host we will take a call from texas. Mark twain said there lies dam lies and statistics. Your program is underscoring. Ways i couldnt even explain to someone who doesnt understand statistics. Host the question . Caller first of all the way statistics are measured, sometimes gives you the result that you want and the 5 Unemployment Rate is a false positive. As the civilian labor he goes down and employment rates go marginally you will have a lower Unemployment Rate. Rate is a narrow section of what is really going on in this country. Eric . The civilian labor force expanded so that wasnt the case. I will say in general that the Statistic Bureau is considered the Gold Standard across the certainly people use the numbers i will dispute that. Inill say you can have a that these monitors are what they say they are. Its been measured that way for decades. Are you a political point to your civilian . I am a president ial appointee, but i can i have a term appointment. I dont service pleasure of the president. The number. How many people in a 5 s are what does that translate to . Guest 7. 9 million unemployed. 7. 9 unemployed 5. 8 or so who are parttime or underemployed. These are the headlines in here once more as the chart from this month. 207 1000 jobs. Who knows how i feel in the morning. I thought maybe it will give him the most later. Spot to be able to pull off the goofiness i will do it. Q a ericay night and the crossover between religion and politics. There are people that have done that and they are worshiping the godll rather than who would cause them to care for the poor. I think its a fine line. I think of something to talk about fairly often. Next, the Health Hearing on tsa security then a Senate Hearing on online can the reviews and companies trying to censor them. After that the president s announcement concerning keystone pipeline. On tuesday tsa security and the gao testified at the House Oversight hearing on tsa security. A recent report found tsa is not as secure as it should be. As two hours and 45 minutes. The 9 11 commission concluded in their report, the most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of their threat. A better job for security threats they can only copy imagine. Theyre coming up with creative ways to circumvent these and testing security measures. Battle for Aviation Security is caught by the thousands of men and women who serve in the tsa were worse. There is also a human component and other methods are used throughout the world that we should be paying attention to implement ourselves. The passenger screening process including luggage and carry on must be working in concert. Dois a vital part of all we to protect this nation. And thats the hearing today. I would like now see of time to the former chairman of the transportation committee. You heard what i just commented on. Confirmst this week every area of operation we will hear in a few minutes from the Inspector General. Three is a summary he our most recent covert testing in september 2015 the failures included failures and Technology Failures and tsa procedure. Without layers of security simply missing. That is very alarming. That is very alarming. This report is very alarming. From,we are coming information leaked. From usa todayng that screeners failed 75 of the time and finding dangerous materials. We are now at 46,000 screeners and the failure rate have been time i think we need a complete overhaul. 90 of people still have no out off differentiating the screening business. They will never be able to retrain, retain. They will never be able to manage but what they should be able to do is set to the standards. Our dod facilities and other facilities and we let the private sector do what it does best and we audit and make the changes because, again, i dont care what i hear today, i am convinced cannot fix the system that will continue to fail. I yield back. I think the administrator along with the thousands of people serving. When problems arise, you must be able to tend to it swiftly and appropriately. We ask they act an appropriate way prior to getting on an airplane. I look forward to the hearing testimony today. We now recognize mr. Cummings of maryland. Much. Thank you very againood to have you here on this very critical issue. I would also like to thank mrs. Rover. I want to welcome the administrator. When i served at the subcommittee as a admiredttee chairman, i the Technical Expertise and the steady, determined leadership. Theuding dealing with Deepwater Horizon Oil spill. Ivesure he remembers called the coast guard back again and again to ensure accountability and every time, you were up to the task and i am so glad that you have been chosen for this task. I think him for his decades of service and i have fought president obamas decision to appoint him this critical position. When comes to the security of , we must always wish to stay ahead of the terrorists and anyone else who would do us harm. We must take nothing for granted. We must put the lessons we learned into urgent action. I have often said that so often, we spend a lot of time talking about testing and how things will work when we have an emergency. So often, what happens and we saw this to some degree and deepwater horizon there will come a time when we will see it worse. When that moment comes, so often we discover there is no road. Above all, we must never become complacent. We must treat every single day as if the urgency of our act as if they require the urgency of our actions. Routine thatlmost the Senior Leaders received supports of security gaps in the air passenger screening operation. These reports came from the Inspector General and pecialized specialized. They described an additional round of testing revealing more gaps. The question today i believe is whether tsa and the department of Homeland Security are thisnding with the urgency situation demands and as the president often says, are they responding what the urgency of now . Based on their actions over the last several months, i believe they are. But their work is far from complete and its incumbent on both the agency and this committee to continue our oversight efforts in order to ensure improvements are put into place. Last spring, secretary johnson ordered a comprehensive, top to bottom review of all tsas procedures to understand why agencies performed falling short of its own standards. He required Senior Leaders to report to him every two weeks about the root causes of these pitfalls and the solutions being implemented. Over the summer, tsa developed and begin implementing a 10 ofnt plan for all aspects processes. Its clear the agency has been aggressively working to change its culture. Tsa has taken the date. In the, we are early process. This agency has more than 42,000 employees responsible when securing about 450 airports, making comprehensive effort in an agency is not easy and ensuring these changes are effective and efficient and improving the agencies database performance requires longterm efforts. We must ensure tsa establishes in your business with clear metrics to measure performance. Administrator, i think you know. Hat i am about to say just like in the coast guard subcommittee, you should get used to seeing us on a regular basis. This committees job is to oversee the implementation of tsas transformation. We will be inviting you back because the American People are depending on us to get it right. Finally, let me close by noting the airlines also play a Critical Role in securing our security. We need to take a look at the decisions by the Airline Industry that are making the tsa is a job more difficult. The new feesed airlines are charging to check bags are causing use increases in the volume of carryon luggage. Although this may result in significant new revenue for airlines, its also putting significant strains on our screening operations and i hope he will address that. I hope we will have an opportunity to discuss these issues in more detail today and had hearings before the committee. I have full confidence we will get this right. We have no choice. I think you and yield back. We hold this open for five days for the administrators who would like to recognize this. Administrator the of the Transportation Security Administration at the u. S. Department of Homeland Security. Honorablened by the john ross, Inspector General of the u. S. Department of Homeland Security and mrs. Jennifer grover, director of Homeland Security. We welcome you all. All witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. If you will please rise and raise your right hand. Do solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you are about to get will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth . Thank you and let the record reflect the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. We would appreciate if you limit your verbal testimonies to five minutes. You written statement will be entered as part of the record. Good morning, chairman. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on my vision for evolving the Transportation Security Administration will stop my perspective is a shape to administration. Approach is a my welldefined statement of admission, clear standards of performance, training and resourcing, appropriate measures of effectiveness, and an unwavering pursuit of excellent and accountability. I want to thank the Inspector General for the oversight provided to the tsa. The direction is a reflection of my vision on how we approach the continuing evolution. I am four month into the job and have traveled to dozens of airports and visited our European Partners in the u. K. , france, the netherlands, and met with stakeholders. I have engaged service stakeholders in Passenger Rail and light rail across the country and in europe. Ive been thoroughly impressed with the professionals and equally impressed with the collaboration across the transportation enterprise. These complex systems require we examined on and consider them as a whole and integrate the wide range of public and private capabilities to close gaps, reduce abilities. However, as ive stated in previous hearings, my immediate priority has been to pursue solutions to the Inspector Generals recent testing findings. We are making significant progress in doing so. Element focused on an of the Aviation Security system, specifically Imaging Technology capability within checkpoint. It identified areas for improvement. The system as a whole remains effective and has only gotten stronger. In response, tsa have lamented an immediate action plan to ensure accountability, increase strengthenss, and procedures. Weve also responded vigorously by and lamenting the pen point plan. To ensure we dont repeat concern liketmost determining root causes of the problem, our conclusion is a screening effectiveness challenges were not merely a. Erformance problem the ait has enhanced our ability to detect nonmetallic threats. Ande look at the people technology, strong drivers of the problem include leadership focus, environmental influences, and gaps in the system. There analysis revealed our officers did not fully understand the capabilities of the equipment and several procedures were inadequate. We train our officers to understand and use equipment properly. Solutions require a renewed focus on security, revised procedures, investments in technology, training, a new balance between effectiveness and efficiency, and support for frontline officers. We continue to partner with the airlines to identify solutions ands solutions that can reduce stress on the checkpoints. I can report we have a principle approach in place designed to correct immediate challenges while ensuring this problem doesnt happen again. Our training conducted in august and september with every frontline officer has reset our focus on Security Effectiveness. Longerterm, our selfexamination has given insight into how we must evolve. We face a critical turning point and tsa and begin our investment in a more strategic approach to ensuring the transportation sector. Measure is what our officers will Pay Attention to. Our approach needs to be adapt and and riskbased. Feelst be able to rapidly new ways of operating. Our adversaries remain intent on attacking the transportation ting. R are inves we must deliver an effective system and the confidence of the traveling public. I conveyed these standards to our workforce and i committed we will pursue these objectives. I went to assure you tsa is an Intelligence Driven Counterterrorism Organization and were up to the challenges we face. We are on the frontlines of a critical fight and our workforce is willing and able to do the job. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. Inspector general roth. Thank you. Good morning. If you could just bring the microphone straight up. My apologies. Good morning. Thank you for inviting me here to testify today. Throughout this year, i had testified for this committee and others regarding my concern. Bout tsas ability to execute to testify these challenges were in almost every area of the operations is problematic. Its control over access to secure areas, including management of access that program, its management of the workforce integrity program, oversight of maintenance and screening equipment, and other thees weve discovered in course of over 100 inspection reports. We may be in a different place now then we were when i last testified about this before this committee. I believe the administrator bullet brings with him and your attitude about oversight. Ensuring safety is a massive and complex program. It will take a sustained and disciplined effort. The first step to extend the problem is having the courage to radically assess the efficiencies. Creating a culture change within tsa and giving the workforce the ability to identify and address the risk will be the administrators most challenging task. I believe the department and leadership has begun the process earn auation and position to address some of those issues. In september, we distributed our report on our most recent over testing. While i cannot speak about the specifics, im able to say we conducted the audit with efficient rigor to satisfy our professional auditing standards and the tests were conducted by our auditors without any specified knowledge or training and the results were troubling. We run multiple tests at eight different airports of different across the country and tested airports who were using private screeners. Results were can distance across every airport. Our testing was designed to test checkpoint operations in wearable conditions. Kelly was included technology, human heirs. The departments response has been swift. Within 24 hours of receiving preliminary results, the secretary summoned senior tsa leadership and directed that an tsadiate plan of action for has put forward a plan consistent with our recommendations to improve checkpoint quality in three areas technology, personnel, procedures. The checkpoint must be considered as a single system. The most Effective Technology used without the right personnel and personnel needed to be euided by appropriat procedures. We will be monitoring tsas efforts and will continue to conduct covert testing. We will report our results to this committee and others. Believe this episode serves as an illustration of the values of the office of the Inspector General when coupled with Department Leadership that understands and appreciates independent oversight. This review was possible only because my office and auditors had unfettered access to information we needed. Speak for the entire community and expressing my gratitude to this committee for the legislation tending in the house. Pending in the house. This would fix the misguided attempt to restrict access to records. This legislation would improve and streamline the way we do business. I written testimony gives an example of a powerful results we can obtain from data matching, which the legislation streamlined. Concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any questions. Thank you. Director grover, please to have you here. You are recognized for five minutes. Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss how tsa can improve the effectiveness of Airport Passenger screenings. Jo haspast six years, made 80 recognitions recommendations. Tsa has fully implemented more than three quarters. Yet, every year our reports continue to find vulnerabilities in this system, many related to questions of Security Effectiveness. Why is that . Work over the past several years is tsa has consistently fallen short and basic Program Management in several aspects. Bash shortcomings stand in out. First, failing to evaluating effectiveness of new technologies and programs. Second, not establishing Performance Measures that reflect Program Goals and third, failing to use program data to identify areas for improvement. There are many reports that in eachte shortfalls area. I will provide one example for each. Should fully evaluate effectiveness prior to adoption to insure acquisitions and to make sure money is well spent. Ofone example, in a review the body scanning technology, we found tsa evaluated the system in the laboratory for effectiveness but had not addressed how airport screeners were using the system. If airport screeners dont carry properly and we know this is an ongoing challenge the effectiveness of the overall screening is diminished. When tsa issue is designing studies of effectiveness, its critical they follow established study designed practices to make sure the results they get at the end of the day are valid. Tsa has struggled with this. A da juste we found study of behavioral detection indicators did not demonstrate their effectiveness because of limitations including the use of unreliable data. My second point is that tsa should adopt Performance Measures that reflect Program Goals to make sure programs are operating as intended. In 2014, we found tsa did not have Performance Measures to the passengers were identified on the no fly and watch lists. That tsapoint is should put systems in place to monitor the data it collected in order to identify areas for 2013 ent or step in improvement. In 2013, officials collected data on the effectiveness of their canine problem but were only considered. Tsa was missing the opportunity to determine if there were specific search areas or types of explosives to which the canines were more or less affected and identify training needed. Responsiveistently to our recommendations and tsa has addressed to some degree most of the examples ive mentioned. Its ait testing to more fully evaluate effectiveness and implemented new procedures to analyze canine testing data. They are in the process of testing behavior detection activity and developing new secure flight Performance Measures. By, addressing findings one one will not solve the underlying problem of an Organizational Culture that has allowed programs to be stood up without sufficient evidence of their effectiveness. It is critical that tsa systematically addresses the weaknesses i just described. Through welldesigned evaluations of their programs continuingtions and reliance on appropriate Performance Measures that allow them to monitor key Program Goals over time. Tsa would be well positioned to achieve longstanding improvements in Aviation Security effectiveness and other operations. Statement. Des my i look forward to your questions. Thank you. We will move to the question portion. We recognize the gentleman from florida. Thank you. Pleased to have you aboard. You come aboard when there has been unprecedented amount of criticism and findings of failure with your agency. Intent ire very had a chance to speak with you on trying to improve things. Again, looking at this over 14 years our objective is to keep the American People safe. Screenedtatement, you 600 million passengers. Percentage of those folks actually pose a risk . Its got to be less than 1 , would you agree . A very small percentage. But most of our resources are spent on building a bureaucracy. Billion on tsa. 3 bureaucracy to manage the 46,000 screeners congress has put a cap on. Weve seen a failure rate is closed publicly disclosed publicly. You stated in your testimony there are a number of actions that have been completed, including requiring screening leadership at each airport oversight and training and thankful i got and thanks like that. You when you get this done, have created a system that doesnt address the risk. Your chances of failure are almost 100 with the Current System even with the training you employ. Thwart the ait machines. Place andt we had in under the threat was there for explosives and it still there tried to put in different programs to make up for the layers that fail. Behavior detection, 1 billion spent on behavior detection. Thousands of officers heres a report here. It says 50,000 travelers have been flagged. Zero of them are terrorists. 60 known terrorist past through 20 occasions. The point here is you need to get out of the personnel business and back into the security business. Turning tsa back into the things , intelligence us gathering, setting parameters for someone else. Youre not a good personnel. Gency nor will you be the recruitment, the training, retention is horrible. Matter what you do, if you dont address the risk and put our resources we should put our resources every instance in which we have stopped them has been first to the public. That morningince they found out on flight 93 they attacked a terrorist and took them down. It was the crew and passengers that stopped him. The liquid bombers they woke me up in texas and told me about that. That was british and Israeli Intelligence but it has to be our intelligence that saves the day. Of theu to get you out personnel business and back into the security business. We still dont have that right according to some of the folks who have testified the evidence i have seen. I dont mean to give you a hard time but please consider this. When we devised this system i told you this story a , whenmsecurity facility you go into those come you get body cavity searches. Which were not going to do with 659 million Americans Still stuffy gets through. Again, i look forward to your response. You dont have to give it today but i think if we change that into the security business, thats the best use of our resources. I would like to put this report and the record if i may. Reedom to travel failures i think its very enlightening if you would. If you would like that request. The gentleman from virginia. Welcome. Welcome your ascension to this office. My confidence in you was reinforced when i read your. Estimony on the root causes he said the underlying screening effects of this and technology you said a disproportionate focus in the past has been on screening rather thanficiency Security Effectiveness, which is the mission. Would you expand on that . Thank you. , we look at root causes and you really have to look at root causes and determine why we saw the same failures repeatedly. Operating agency that observes the same thing over and over, it tells me you havent figured out what the problem is. Just would it goes beyond whatever happens at the check point. Daysu recall in the early of tsa, there was concern about the wait times. There was a great deal of pressure on tsa to get people through the screening check points faster and theres a reason for that. You have to be very careful when inject a concern like that because what you measure is what you are going to get for performance. I believe over time, a great deal of effort to ensure wait times were kept to a minimum that puts pressure on the screeners to clear passengers versus resolving the alarms they present. Difference, it can change they effort you put into looking for that. Itsmportant important, the point you were making. We have improved efficiency but thats not the goal. Thats a means towards reaching the goal and keeping ones eye on the mission, making the main thing the main thing is really important. Or miss grover, there have been more than 25 specific reports over the last 25 years. Your agency conducted a proper screening process. What did you find from that operation . The specific results are classified but what we found in a series of tests that took place across the country at different airports using a variety of concealment methods by people withallies training is a by people with no special training is a disappointing performance. We look at the entire screening checkpoint. Would it be fair to say that without compromising security that some significant breaches occurred . Yes. Very troubling. You are aware of those findings. Has the agency taking corrective steps to address what mr. Rock and his team discovered so early . One of the first things i did when this became public during , i had amation process chance to meet with mr. Rock and i met with him again after swearing in. I wanted to understand the exact nature of the failures that occurred so we can begin to address the root causes. We have put a tremendous amount of effort into not just determining the instant failures but reaching back through the organization to figure out what systemically was going on that brought this. We have had other discoveries of failures in the past. It be useful to have may be useful to have a classified briefing on that. Racef the problems you that had raised that has charging for baggage forces passengers by bringing an overhead luggage as much as possible. This affects your business and mission. Can you just address that . Theres a lot more baggage coming through the checkpoint now than there used to be and its much more packed with gear than it used to be. This is a challenge for anybody screening. I know the airlines have been one plus enforce their one rule but sometimes that doesnt take place until you get to the loading gate and multiple backs have come through the checkpoint. We have in working closely with the industry to see what we can do to reduce that stress but its a fact of modern life. Theres more stuff arriving at the checkpoint been used to. Thank you. Recognize the gentleman from michigan. Thank you. Onesnt here in congress tsa wasnt 20 essay was instituted. I dont have a lot of the answers to how you do it. I just know when i entered an airport in detroit, i go through multiple contacts with multiple agents, including tsa. To say weso hasten have to deal with his problems and overwhelmingly, i have been treated well by tsa, even when they didnt know i was a member of congress. The fact of the matter is during only two instances i can i was not treated well. That says for the most part, their personnel is doing a job i wouldnt want to do are at least attempting to work with i want to applaud you for that. I think theres something to say about having this job. Fortunately since 9 11, as a efforts, we have not had a downed plane and we want that to continue. I do want to ask you some questions. In our hearing today, you pledged to fix some things. Other administrators have pledged to fix things. What will be different this time . It really goes to what i was saying earlier, and that is i have been an operator my entire career. In the u. S. Ears coast guard. A lot of similarities between the coast guard and tsa. Both our missionbased organizations. They both have missions that have a no fail quality to them at a distributed frontline workforce responsible for carrying out the mission. What makes operating agencies exciting is you have something you have to do every day. That tyranny of the right now when we need you to simply address the problem in its presentation by that i mean you have a failure at a checkpoint, you work with the team at that checkpoint, that airport, say this is how you failed and dont do it again. The may seem like it fixes problem but it doesnt over time. Typically if you have failures like that in a dedicated , it meansworkforce you have something more systemic going on and if hard at times for an operating agencies to take the time to do that. How do you monitor that . It starts by recognizing there is a bigger picture. Anytime you have multiple overres that look the same time, Something Else is going on stop and lookg to at the entire approach to the organization. How will have where ticket would that mission in terms of what it needs to succeed. How will have we deployed the equipment that addresses that need, how well have we trained our people to work that equipment and what kind of processes have we given them . Tasksnd there were 3100 we expected a screener to memorize. Thats impossible. Say ife to step back and this is about the mission, its about the performance of that mission in an environment in which we have so much at stake. You have to look at whats already been done by thirdparty independent auditors. Value the work of the aigs office because they get me a thirdparty independent assessment of what those challenges are and i can use that to begin to dig into the deeper issues. What mr. Add on to connolly started with. It goes to this idea of a bigger picture. How will you work with airports, Airlines Come others who can have the size who can emphasize . All of the Major Airlines in the u. S. I have met with and their associations. It starts by recognizing this is an interactive system. Tsa doesnt work alone inside the aviation system. Everyone has a role to play. Its not simply a handoff. Its a continuous interaction. That requires they be aware of the challenges their system imposes upon our responsibility. We have to be aware of the challenges imposed on them. They have been very receptive to that. Theres a lot more work we can do to connect more effectively. Ive established a number of regular meetings now with my counterparts in the private sector and across the system. We begin to address these longstanding come overarching issues that have been attended to. Now recognize mr. Cummings for five minutes. Thank you. Director, when you were talking about the problem, i wrote two wordsand i wrote the coulter gap. I think from just listening to you, a culture has been established and i think that it is in part and i want you to comment on this. The chairman will tell you that when we deal with the secret service, one of the things we worried about was a culture of complacency. Not the people are not good people but you get used to nobody jumping over the fence at the white house. Everything is going to be all right. Is there is ans lull in the culture. Thathen when you combine with this thing about making sure you get the people through quickly and you put the , ickness over the mission think you have a combination for problems. I think those kinds of problems are very difficult to address. I am trying to figure out first of all, would you comment on that . Thank you for the opportunity. Tsa was originally stood up in a culture of crisis where they had to be responsive fast. But at this point, its time to transition to a culture of accountability for effectiveness. Tsa definitely is aware of the importance of ensuring their programs are effective and i appreciate the administrators remarks about enhancing that culture throughout the workforce. At the end of the day, it comes down to a very simple question, which is, does the program work and how do you know . No matter how much of the staff are educated in the current , no matter retrained how much there is an emphasis on new sops, there has to be measurement and a have to have a systematic process to follow through to make sure the programs work and thats what lies beneath a strong culture of accountability for effectiveness. You dont know what you just said. You just hit the nail quite well. They started with a culture of emergency so everybody had to make sure we protect ourselves. Then when the emergency seems to ne, we can move into the culture of complacency but now we have to change our entire dynamic and create a new normal and thats a new normal of accountability. You have a plan, right . Yes, sir. Byits been implemented march 2016 . There are a number of steps there. What will the status of the screening process be at that date . Will it be what you envision or will it still be in the process of improving mode . Me say i think you always have to be in a Continuous Improvement mode. Otherwise, you do get complacent. The day you think you have the security process right is the day you will be the fetid. This is a continuous focus on the mission and continuous evaluation. Done to address immediate challenges . Retraiained the entire frontline workforce. I know that sounds easy to say but let me explain what it means. We call it mission essentials. Its about reminding people we have a Mission First and foremost. And to reactivate that desire they exhibited when they raised their hands and said i swear to support and defend the constitution. How do you do that . First, you say it out loud. It starts by the top of the organization saying what to do is critically important and i will make sure everything i do is designed to make sure you succeed at remission at your mission. I start with the junior most person in this organization on a screening line and i think about what it means for that individual to do their job effectively and what i do need to be focused on two take that happen. This isnt about me as an individual, making myself look good. Its about all of us remembering we serve a higher order. That is surprisingly important for a frontline workforce to hear. It may seem simple but thats the most powerful thing you can tell somebody is what to do is important and its so important i will spend every waking moment paying attention to getting that done. I hope that you took note of and inrector grover said your sessions with your staff that you remind them about what she said. At one time, a culture about emergency and now its about accountability. That makes a lot of sense. Thank you. Recognizes gentleman from south carolina. Thank you. We are all kind of creatures of our own personal experience. Most of us travel on a regular basis. , i have that i use never had anything other than professional encounters with tsa. Theres not a single instance where i can think of where it wasnt a plus in terms of professionalism. And i dont wear a member pin. Dont think its because they what i do for a living so i dont think it was for that reason. Without progressing into a broader conversation, it has become toss in the last couple years to be in Law Enforcement. The last couple years to be in Law Enforcement. Where are your applicants coming from . What is the source of the poor more out morale . If there is a tsa agent involved who doesng or something wrong, thats when you make the news but you dont make the news for simple professionalism so whats the rale issues ando what is your plan on bolstering it . Thank you for your question and did words about our workforce. I think the majority of the tsa workforce are truly dedicated, responsible come and patriotic americans. These are people who took the old to do a job many people in this country would not want to do. What is the source of morale . Its a Clear Mission of importance. I think we have a Clear Mission. I dont know if we have always clearly defined that to our workforce. Its reconnecting them with the desire they had to join, to become a part of something important. Thats what the military is all about and thats what my experience tells me. Then it is having clear and unequivocal standards of importance. Highi mean is what causes is at people who know they are held to a High Standard , you have to be consistent across the organization. Then you have to train them appropriately. You have to train them and how to gauge the system, how it works. Discoveredthings we in the analysis is that we had not explained what can the machines do and what cant they do . Inone ever did that to me the military, they never handed me a piece of equipment and said, a correct it out. And we never asked their opinion on the challenges of working the checkpoint. You need feedback from your frontline. This is not a oneway transition. You have to engage. Is importance of more out the clear and important mission, support for the mission, training to accomplish mission, understanding of the equipment, and engaging you and getting feedback and letting you be part of the solution that goes forward. There is no one who knows that better than the people conducting it every day. Those are the things we are putting into place. It is going to take time to see the results. I see lots of opportunity on those points to reengage the workforce in a much more effective way, and actually activate that which brought them to the job in the first place. With respect to recruiting, we currently use a thirdparty contractor to help screen recruits, but we recruit from all over the country and all walks of life. Theastonishing thing is talent that exists in the workforce. I have people with phds who are frontline screeners, who are retired and come back. I have people with the music degrees, all walks of life. As you might expect in a workforce of 44,000 screeners, there is a broad range of people at all ages. One last question. If we were to interview 100 folks who had left, not for calls, but just left, what would be the dominant reason they decided either their expectations were not met gore they lost interest or they lost interest . Why do people leave . Administrator neffenger i will give you some thoughts i have, because i have not done those interviews myself. I think its probably a combination of factors. You always have people who decide it is not the job for them and they move on. Lets address some of those concerns with morale. I think it is not feeling like you are doing a mission you thought you were going to be hired to do. I think if im a screener and its about effectiveness of screening properly and im being told to move people through more effectively, i will probably cause me to say im not sure this organization cares about the things they said they did. I get the proper training, do i get the proper training, do i have advancement opportunities, do i get Continuous Development over the course of my career . All of those are the things that go into deciding whether or not you are with an employee or you would like to they went or you want to move on and looked rather opportunities. We now recognize mr. Lynch from massachusetts for five minutes. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you to the palace panelists. Thank you for your help. I think you have been very honest in your testimony, both on the strength and failures. Mr. Garysp on question, have you ever thought bountyffering a bonus or for a screener that actually get somebody with a gun coming through the checkpoint . Or with malicious intent . Administrator neffenger we have looked at all sorts of new incentive protection programs. Im a big fan of incentivizing. This is such a target rich environment where we have so many problems. Classsize meeting with the chairman and ranking member. General roth has used disappointing and troubling, i would use the word pathetic in looking at the number of times people got through with guns or bombs. These covert testing exercises, it was pathetic. When i say that come i mean pitiful, the number of times people got through. I fly a lot, my family flies a lot, and just thinking about the breaches, it is very thick. Horrific. One of the things we can do is be honest about the degree of the breaches in the scope. I think you have looked at the cultural problems here and what we have to get at, and i appreciate that. Im supporting you, not just criticizing. Im supporting you in your changes. But the nature of the threat has evolved as well. For loneve isis asking , which probably presents a greater vulnerability to Passenger Rail security than it does to the airlines, perhaps. Im just wondering about what way of doing, to evolve with that threat. The other big gap i see in terms of people with credentials in we ares, insecure areas, having major gaps there. We are letting people in that have connections with terrorism. They are getting through the screening process and getting into secure areas of the airport, and being awarded credentials. I think we had 73 instances of that. And also ig this, would like Inspector General roth to speak to that issue. I know you have been relentless in very good about this. In the past, there has been denial. I dont think we are hearing that from you mr. Deat neffenger, but in the past there is a culture of denial. Disaster on a major a commercial airline or train and we are not going to be able people will say, we did not see that coming, but we did. We had and we see it now. I wonder what our response is going to be to address that issue. Let metrator neffenger see if i can address a couple of the points you made with what we are doing. The last point on the insider people withrn, badges in airports. There has been some concerned that security of the bad population. It should be a trusted population. How do you determine whether they are to be trusted . What safeguards do you put in place, inc. Think there is work to be done there. Im encouraged by secretary johnsons reach, earlier this year prior to my confirmation, he asked the Aviation Security thatory Committee Members advised the department and the administrator, they took a hard look and came up with 28 recommendations, with which tsa is fully concurrent, and they are looking for an implementation plan. That said, it was a challenge. Having realtime access to the appropriate databases to screen people. That against the terrorist database. It taking off a lot of time to give me a little answer. Administrator neffenger the 73 members, 69 discrete individuals were not actually on the terrorist watch list. In what had incomplete is called a terrorist information data environment. That information was not sufficient to raise the known or suspected terrorist data. It is clear they were not we dont make those determinations, that is the fbi. With respect to ensuring we Pay Attention to the evolving threat, i am directly connected to my counterparts across the intelligence community. I get a Daily Briefing that is the synthesis of what everyone is seeing. Im very concerned about how complex and dynamic threat environment is, in some respect it is the most complex we have seen since 9 11. Silt makes groups like i particularly concerning his they are intending to inspire, and the intent and operation phase is compressing. Can i ask the Inspector General at it he could give his version . I still think we have a problem and im still worried about it, and im not hearing Decisive Action being taken. We are well over time, but if the Inspector General will care to comment. Thank you for your indulgence, mr. Chairman. Inspector gen. Roth this goes what i call beyond the checkpoint. Our focus is in the check point but there is a lot of Security Risk the on the checkpoint. Aviation worker vetting is one of them. We did an audit of tsas job as a regulator, in other words the airports have the duty to manage the restricted access badges. And adjudicate criminal histories of those workers. What we found in a recent audit as a regulator, tsa only examines perhaps 1 of all the adjudications that the airports do. Anytime you have an issue or the airports have part of the responsibility and tsa has part of the responsibility, you have seams. That is what worries me. I think we will be paying more attention to that as time goes on. Thank you. Thank you mr. Chairman. I recognize myself for five minutes. Administrator, quick answers if we could. To bring a gun threat checkpoint and you get caught, what happens to that person . Administrator neffenger depends on the airport. But its turned over to local Law Enforcement. Do they we had a study under way right now. We have annual exams they have to pass in order to keep her jobs. There are requirements for retraining if there are errors. What about maybe the Inspector General the behavior profiling, is it part of the program, can you comment on that, on how well that is being implement it. Ed. This is 200 million a year and it is for behavioral detection activities and the premise is the officers will be able to spot individuals who pose a threat. Does it work . Tsa doesnt have evidence it is sufficient. So we dont know. We dont know. Inspector general, have you looked at this at all . We look at this may of 2013. We found there were no metrics that tsa has provided as far as what success looks like in the program. They had very poor data collection. Insufficient training of the videoes. S. The whole idea is you will be able to take this population and figure out who it is who is the greatest risk. Are they putting too many people into the tsa . That was our concern and based on several audits we did in the spring of this year, we believe the administrator had taken fairly drastic action to reduce the number of individuals in the precheck. We made a number of recommendations. The prior administrator rejected those recommendations. There has been a change as the whether or not those recommendations are adopted. This is my concern here. The behavior profiling is an important part of what we are doing but how to train and implement that is a critical component. Im big fan of the k9 team. There are perceptions they are able to detect things that would make somebody very nervous. The presence of the canine in conjunction with the profiling will be much more effective and proficient. It is what the military came to the conclusion of doing. I think we need to Pay Attention to that. My time is expired. I now recognize ms. Kelly for five minutes. Good morning. Screening being designated at preacher claims are available at more than 150 airports. Travelers who go through such lanes receive expedited screening. There are several ways travelers can assess the precheck lanes. Under one procedure, they apply to the program, provide data on themselves and undergo background checks. If an applicant is determined to be low risk, they are enrolled in the program. Currently, tsa has been directing travelers to the expedited precheck line even if they do not enroll in the program. Specifically, travelers can be directed to the precheck lanes through procedures that are called managed inclusion one and two. Administrator, in your testimony you wrote they have practice known as managed inclusion two. Can you discuss with this program was and why it ended and what have been the impacts on passenger volume . Yes, the program he referred to was a term given to the practice of randomly assigning people that were in a standard screening lane to get to the screening lane. These are people that have not been through any precheck vetting. There were things that we had the to lowdown the risk of risk o individuals. It was in my opinion that when i took over that was an intangible risk. As of september 12, it was eliminated completely. We had to ramp it down slowly that we eliminated completely. How long did it go one . It was about a year and a half that was run. There is another form of moving of people expedited screening numbers. Oft it really is is the use passenger sniffing canines to frommly assign some people regular screening into the exit that its raining lanes expedited screening lanes. A very small percentage. Im a big fan and proponent of a fully vetted population in the next updated screening lane. Expedited screening lane. I really want to know as much as i can about an individual traveling as they come through given the vast majority people are safe to do so. The goal is to expand the truly vetted population over the coming months and to completely eliminate the random assignment of anyone in the present land not already vetted. Do you feel more people are going to the Precheck Program so they are, they can go through the faster lines . It seems like the last couple of times i have traveled, there are many more people in the precheck line. We are seeing a huge spike in enrollment over the past couple of months. We were averaging 50,000 enrollments a month right now which is encouraging. That is before the response to our recent requests and proposals to expand the marketing opportunities of the three additional private sector vendors to look for more retail opportunities to enroll in precheck. I talked with the airlines and travel industry, they are advertising if you are flown recently, you may have seen on the inflight screeds advertisement for projects. The industry is working really hard to increase enrollment. Thank you. Inspector general, you wrote you were pleased to report we made significant progress in getting current compliance with recommendations. The Generals Office has made regarding prethat tsa is continuing to use some Risk Assessment tools. It is recommended that they discontinue. Discuss recommendations the officers made to the tsa regarding access to expedited screening process is. The tsa has not acted on at this point. Overlay, we had a number of recommendations that tsa did not agree with and those are set forth starting at about age 20. One of the things of wanted to do was highlight those that have changed in the last six months. It is significant. Theres almost no disagreement between the tsa and Inspector General for wendys to be done. There is a fairly narrow point, unfortunately because this is an open setting, it is not possible to discuss it. There is a certain profile, a type of passenger we should not be in we do not believe should be in expedited screening. These are goodfaith discussions as to what is an appropriate level of risk and im confident we will get to a place that will protect the American People and passengers in expedited way. People and passengers in expedited way. I yield back. The gentleman from north carolina, mr. Meadows. Five minutes. I thank each of you for your testimony. Inspector general roth, im glad to hear you say a lot of the disagreement has disappeared. Previously, that was a major the aig making recommendations and tsa somehow believe they had had on and they were figuring out what to anticipate. Continuedcourage that partnership. Speaking of partnerships, i want to focus on the partnership for public service. To lowcally with regards employee morale. We have held hearings in this very room about some of the worst basis to work places to work, which perhaps that title was not the best to pick. But we have also found that there is a tremendous opportunity in terms of employee morale on how to encourage the workforce. Consistently,s lets just say it is not something you would try to attain. Do i have your commitment to date to reach out to some of those agencies that get good marks on that survey to i doubt the best actresses that they have practices that they have . Nasa and particular gets high marks. Do i have your commitment . Administrator neffenger yes sir, and so does the workforce. Director grover, let me go to you. It you could briefly summarize your concerns as it relates to the ait machines and procurement thereof, and some of the challenges we have had their. Re. Director grover thats a really important issue, because it is one of the main technologies tsa relies on for screening passengers. What we originally found was tsa had consider the effectiveness of the technology in a laboratory, but had not consider the broader picture of employees who use them in the airport environment, and they have taken steps to address that in the procurement of the next version of the aip system. Ait system. They have started measuring the effectiveness of the entire system and that is very important. One recommendation we start open is tsa should pay close attention to its understanding rate offorce alarm weigh the machines. It has repercussions for Security Effectiveness because screeners are used to a high farc false alarm rate. It also has repercussions for financing, because every time that machine alarms, the person has to go pat down. If the false alarm rates would be reduced, it would have financial implications as well. That is something tsa is working on. They do not yet have systemwide understanding of the operational false alarm rates. Administrator, i see you shaking your head. You are willing to work with that and make sure we come out with a matrix . Heres one of the concerns i have. We want to work on it but we dont put parameters to judge whether we are successful or not. Thatork on a matrix satisfies gal as it relates to fox false marks. Administrator neffenger and not only death that we are working hard to restructure the process we use for this. I think director grover has raised important points, and they are the key challenges we face, but we can do it unless we change the way we do business. That has given us an opportunity to completely restructure the way we do business. When we talk about restructuring the way we do thatess, one of the things happens a lot is administrators come here and say, we need more money. In a bipartisan fashion, we are willing to give you the resources necessary to do it, if you are willing to look at not only the recommendations the ig and tao have looked at, but look at recreating the way you do a businessom standpoint. The chairman mentioned a k9 unit. Is there a plan to look at canines to bring them in during high peak, high times of travel . Not 1 00 in the morning, when two tsa tsa personnel. But to alleviate the backlog, are you willing to come up with a proposal and submit to the committee on how you can implement that . Administrator neffenger i will, and i thing to have a good story with respect to the canines. I looked at the current disposition of canines across the nation, and repositioning a number of those from small, lesser traveled airports to the large highvolume airports, we are bringing a number of new teams onboard. I will get you a full report for the committee because i think it is a good we are and it shows moving, i believe, in the right direction with respect to the system. That you havegree to take a systemic view. If you look at discrete elements all you do is look at discrete elements, and you will not think about how the internet interact for another. The entireng at Aviation Security and understanding all components interact and how effective they are. It speaks everything from false alarm rates to the proper use of canines, two other things. Im happy to provide a much fuller brief at the committees discussion on how we are doing that. Field that. We recognize the gentlewoman from the District Of Columbia for five minutes. Mr. Hank you very much chairman, this is an important hearing. Before i ask my question, administrator nothing your, this license. Of the we have had to have the administrator in, because it changes from washington dc, to saying District Of Columbia. This has befuddled screeners, and some of them have hassles the placeorts because where you are is not recognized. I want to provide you with a copy of this before you leave, so that periodic reminders can be made. I understand it was changed from washington dc. There was an attempt by the administrator, the deputy administrator works closely with me. I want to make sure this does not have to come up on your watch. Neffenger, i have set and seeing what is going on at the airport, for example at the r federal people who know something about the human mind and how it operates. You will always get that they in fact dont have bonds or pistols. Bombs or pistols. We need to learn more. We are getting the same results no matter where they are. Whether they are magnetometers or tsa. For example, for tsa, we have had people do bring bombs in shoes to try to detonate their shoes. Weve had a socalled underwear bomber. And its interesting to note that, with respect to those went throughhey multiple layers of security and, who, passengers, not tsa in fact, were called on to put peopleose very dangerous. This leads me to ask whether or equipped, forlly example, to discover we have this matter before the congress, these plastic handguns. If they cant find ordinary ands like bombs and pistols they are, as you can see, very inventive, what im wondering is, does tsa have access to the intelligence to meet their adopted next, they are adaptivenessheir in light of emerging threats . They are not going to do the same in that passengers did before. Do you have a intelligence, or do you have to depend on some other agency . If so, how do they relate to you what the emerging intelligence reveals . Neffenger think you for that question. Just to be clear, the underwear bomber and the shoe bomber, those were not screened by tsa because they came from overseas. It is one of the reasons that we became concerned about the nonmetallic threat. I do have access to intelligence. As i noted earlier, every morning, i get intelligence briefing. It is a compilation of thelligence from across intelligence community. I meet regularly with other members of the unity. We have people embedded in all of the major intelligence components, the National Counterterrorism center, the csa cia, nsa. Norton do your screen yourselves . Neffenger we do. And then continuous recurrent vetting of individuals who are in the trusted traveler programs. Norton is understand the screeners often pass their own tests when you do your own internal vetting. When someone has to stand in the same place, doing the same thing, seeing the same thing, dont they need to know more about the human brain operates, so that we can better equip screeners to do this, frankly, very boring job . R i think that is a key point. One of the things we look at is what are the repeated causes Holmes Norton who is looking at that . Neffenger it is the root cause analysis team. Now that i have found these causes, can we correct them ourselves . Rep. Holmes norton when you consider getting an outside study from people equipped would you consider getting an outside study from people who understand how the human brain works, so that we can get a hold of this . Neffenger i think it is important to look at human factors, so i would look at it. We now recognize the gentleman from georgia, mr. Carter. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today. I understand some of the information may be classified and, certainly, if i overstepped my downs if i bounds, iy understand. Would ask more detailed questions. It has been reported that the undercover investigators were what areas where they, specifically, looking at . Wasnt the typical area that a passenger goes through . The typical area that a passenger goes through . It is a typical area that a passenger goes through and tries to get items through the checkpoint. For example, if they were part of managed inclusion through no action of their own, but sent through a magnetometer, going through that way as well. They acted like normal passengers, except they had things hidden on them. R it did not look at where employees are going. It was typical passenger . Covertth we did some testing gws ago, trying testing two years ago, trying to get into those areas. The results were disappointing. Carter you mentioned the imaging machines. Were their guns or simulated bombs you were able to get through . Did they get through the imaging machine as well . I. G. Roth i cannot talk about the specifics unfortunately. We did test the machine. The results were disappointing. Carter as well as the xray machines . I. G. Roth correct. Carter earlier this year, you testified before the homeland committee. You said that your testing found layers of security something missing. And then you seemed to indicate. Hose results were expected is that true . I. G. Roth yes. The results were expected. The degree of the results were i think a bit surprising to us. We have done covert testing over the years with very similar results to the ones we did this year. And i would add that once we get the results this year, we discovered that tsa itself had done covert testing with very similar results. So everything had been consistently poor for a number of years, which, of course, was both exasperating and troubling to us. Neffenger, given these results and these findings, what do you plan to do to address what has been called missing layers of security . Neffenger first, it is a full system review. It started with understanding the nature of the failures that existed, to look at how those were similar to other andoveries in past years, as i mentioned before, to really figure out what is the systemic recent for this. Because if you assume you have a generally talented workforce that really wants to do a good job, but they are failing, then he tells me there is Something Else going on. And i do think we have a generally talented workforce that wants to do a good job, that once to come to work wants to come to work to protect this nation on a daily basis. So, there must be a reason for failures systemwide. It is recognizing it is a system that operates, not just a point of failure at a given airport were a number of airports. Second, it is looking back over the way in which you what is with theership organization, what are the environmental influences, so on and so forth, then beginning to core, essential mission facts. What is it we are supposed to do . Do we understand the mission the way we should . Carter all of that is good and fine, but what about specifics. Can you tell me something specifically, we changed this or that . Neffenger properties use of the technology. We dramatically changed the way people use that. We had not taught them how important it was to use it properly. Without getting into classified details, i would be happy to provide those in a closed session, i could tell you specifically why some of those failures existed. We fixed that. We told them how the equipment worked. That is something we had not done before. We streamlined the number of procedures that we expected them to memorize. I mentioned there were 3100 separate tasks and 88 different forms of pat down. No one can do that. We have now streamlined that down to about 25gauge quick quickse guide 25page response guide. We have significantly improved our ability. We trained specifically to do things very differently at the checkpoint. Carter my time has expired, mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman the chair recognizes mr. Cartwright from pennsylvania for five minutes. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Tsa is a frontline Counterterrorism Organization, and it is transportation and its transportation security officers, the tsos we have been talking about, they have to get it right every time. You forenger, thank being here. Do tsos receive annual review testing . Neffenger they do. Knowright do the tsos when they are going to be tested for their annual performance reviews . Neffenger typically, yes. Cartwright on average, how do they perform . Neffenger on average, they perform well. Cartwright but what we find out is the covert tests conducted by the Inspector General, jl, and your own internal teams , and yourgeneral, gao own internal teams, they bring their a game when they know the sot is coming, but not much at other times. Inspector general roth, would you say covert tests there out the concern covert tests bear out the concern im talking about . I. G. Roth yes. Majority havee been focused on wait times for passengers, rather than safety concerns. I want to ask all of our witnesses, including you, director grover, would you agree that, if tsa employees are being told they are being judged, at least in part on how expeditiously they move passengers through the system, this may signal to screeners that speed takes priority over other considerations . You are absolutely right. I could not agree with you more. Thats exactly what i found in the course of our analysis of the issue. Cartwright under tsas new plan, it appears to put the focus back on security. Am i correct . You are correct. Thewright responding to new safety before speed goals, was ts one tsa employee reported to be glad that the agency finally is going back to basics, emphasizing security over Customer Service and wait times, but another employee did doubt that the new plans would be implement it. He or she thought that management will still be very focused on wait times and throughput. I want to ask you, mr. Neffenger, how will you convince frontline employees that the metric on which they will be evaluated will be security . You have to get a little trust upfront. You teach them over time. I will assure you that one of the first things i did was to eliminate wait time as a primary measurement. It is not that wait time is not important. There are some issues associated with people packing up outside of a sterile area. But if effectiveness in security is a primary measure not just myid to leadership team, but everybody in the organization, through direct contact, through video messages, through weekly messages from me, i said, your number one job is to screen effectively. Managements responsibility to work with the airports and airlines and others to do queue management. We were putting that burden on the backs of the screeners. It is no surprise to me that if you hold them accountable for moving people more efficiently through the line, they are going to do just that. You get what you measure. You get what you emphasize. It is no surprise they do well on the performance test and do poorly in other areas, because that is about keeping their job. It tells me they are capable of doing the job well. We have to back them in that score 100 . Cartwright all right, fine. Let me ask you this, administrator, when will performance assessments using the new metrics against the used and will metrics begin to be used and will the performance evaluation process be changed to track performance over time rather than performance honesty will test . In other words, how will you and short tsos are at the top of their game every day, not just tsos are at the top of their game every day, not just when performance reviews are happening . Neffenger those changes have already been made and expand explained to the workforce. Cartwright how you balance increased wait times with a focus on security and ensure that security considerations dont give way when balanced against increased weight times increased wait times, particularly during times like the Holiday Season . Neffenger we are seeing times, notwait significant. Two things. I want to to grow the trusted traveler population in a smart way. We are working very hard with both the current vendor, who you may have seen some of the opportunities in the airports. We are looking to expand it considerably through a request for proposal that is out, also working with the industry itself to look for opportunities to market it more effectively. We are seeing a significant increase in enrollment. The second is to provide search staffing to the airports under the greatest pressure during the upcoming travel season. At the same time, not to put any of that burden on the backs of the screeners, but to move that into the management chain where it belongs. Cartwright im out of time. I yield back. You. Man thank the gentlemans time has expired. Hice thank you for being with us today. In my short time in congress, i have already seen and heard far too many reports, be it from the office of Inspector General or csaor wherever, detailing tsas prohibitively expensive technology. Either not working to properly screen passengers or the tsa thets not properly reading technology, one way or the other, in the various red test Red Team Tests that have taken place. As you well know, hartsfieldjackson, Atlanta International airport, hundreds of thousands of people flying out of there every day, one of the busiest airports in the world i fly in and out of there myself every week. I could not agree anymore with my colleagues here today that the recommendations that come is just vitally critical for these to be implemented. And you, mr. Neffenger, just being in this position four to you. Have hats off i thank you for your comments here today and your willingness to admit the problems you are facing and willingness to attack those headon. As some of the results have come back from some of the various tests, a word was used earlier describing those results as pathetic, and you yourself i think are fully aware of that. Earlierword that hit me is the word culture. It has been within tsa. And i believe inspector roth said that the culture is the most important issue that you saw that means to change immediately. So, that being said, what have to done to this point transform the culture at tsa in such a way that the vulnerabilities are adequately addressed . Neffenger mr. Hice, thank you for that question. That is a key point. As i looked at tsa, i tried to understand. I come from an agency with 225 years of culture, the coast guard. Thats a lot of time to build an identity and a sense of who you are. Tsa is still largely an amalgam of the places that everybody came from. It has not had time to grow a leadership core from within. So you have this combination of people. What do you do to jumpstart culture . There are a couple of key things that you can do from both the top and the bottom. Let me start with the bottom. First, i think one of the greatest challenges tsa has amongst its workforce is that we train on the job across 75 different job 75 different airports. If you hire into tsa right now, if you hire into atlanta, you just joined the Atlanta Hartsfield workforce. Its not. There is a real engagement with the broader sense of who you are part of. Havef the things i proposed for and asked for in the fy 2016 budget is to begin almost like the boot Camp Training at the federal Law Enforcement Training Center in glencoe, georgia, so that all new hire training is conducted there. Thats one way to connect to the Larger Organization and a sense of culture. Takes top level, it somebody at the very top of the organization, and thats mean right now, saying, this is important saying the word culture out loud and identifying where the culture is not connected, then identifying what you expect that culture to be. Im about to issue my administrators intent, in which i very clearly, in a very few sustain pages in a few succinct pages outline what our culture is, what i intended to be, and how we intend to work towards that. So, there is a series of efforts that i have planned over the coming months to begin to talk and training the culture that you expect top and train i