Transcripts For CSPAN Homeland Security Officials On Weapons Of Mass Destruction 20220720

Order. Id like to thank our witnesses for joining us here today and for your continued service to the American People. Todays hearing will examine our nations readiness to respond to weapons of mass destruction and Health Security threats. The goal of this hearing is to assess the countering weapons of Mass Destruction Office housed within dhs and its ability to combat these threats. We will also discuss the newly established office of Health Security, which will be tasked with streamlining the health and Safety Operations of Department Personnel and overseeing medical and Public Health matters all across the department of Homeland Security. Chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological materials, sometimes shortened to cbrn or seabourn, is an umbrella term to describe hazardous agents that can be weaponized and can cause everything from mass casualties and incapacitation to agricultural destruction. For example, in april of 2019, a technician was arrested after stealing three radioactive devices from his workplace in arizona. According to a court filing, the technician intended to release the radioactive materials at a shopping mall, the local police and the fbi arrested him before he could do so. Similarly, biological weapons such as anthrax and racing have been used by terrorists and attempted attacks against civilians including elected officials. As technology has advanced. The threats posed by these weapons only continued to grow and give malicious actors more opportunities to cause significant harm. The countering weapons of Mass Destruction Office was established to detect mitigate and deter the Significant National Security Threats. Initially, the office faced serious setbacks after its creation, including unsteady leadership, low morale and high staff turnover among other challenges. Despite these initial setbacks, we have recently seen promising signs of the offices improvements, including better morale and feedback from stakeholders indicated by a recent gao report. So, i remain optimistic that the forthcoming structural changes in the office and increased coordination between Law Enforcement and state, local, tribal and territorial partners will dramatically bolster the offices ability to tackle these challenges headon. Last month, Ranking Member portman and i introduced Bipartisan Legislation to significantly enhance the federal governments ability to detect, recognize and evaluate chemical, biological, radioactive and Nuclear Threats. The offices of countering weapons of mass destruction and Health Security act reauthorizes the cw, md. Office, which is set to expire next year and authorizes the new office of Health Security. Our Bipartisan Legislation more clearly defines the cwmds offices responsibilities eliminating ineffective or duplicative functions. Institute a number of accountability and oversight measures and appoints the chief medical officer to lead the office of Health Security, serving as a dual appointment as the assistant secretary for Health Security and reporting to the secretary of the department of Homeland Security. All of these changes will ensure that our nation can develop a comprehensive National Strategy to protect all of our communities from these dangerous materials and Public Health threats that can have absolutely catastrophic effects. In addition to strengthening our Homeland Security and our preparedness. These changes will also make these offices more accountable to congress and to the American People today. Today im pleased to welcome a panel of experts witnesses who can discuss whether dhs is equipped with the necessary tools and the resources to prevent possible attacks and to ensure that our nation is prepared to respond to and recover from them. I look forward to a comprehensive and insightful discussion. My Ranking Member, senator portman is at another Committee Hearing right now. He will be joining us shortly so i will immediately move to swearing in witnesses. It is the practice of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee to swear in witnesses. So, if each of you would please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you god . You may be seated. Todays first witness is gary rasicot, acting assistant secretary for the countering weapons of Mass Destruction Office at the department of Homeland Security. Previously, mr. Rasicot served as chief of operations at the Safety Security administration as well as several senior roles at the Us Coast Guard including as director of marine transportation systems, director of the Global Maritime operational threat response and his deputy commandant for mission support. Deputy for personal readiness. Mr. Rasicot was also an active duty coast guard officer for more than 24 years. Welcome to our committee, sir. You may proceed with your opening remarks. Mr. Rasicot chairman peters, Ranking Member portman, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak to you today about the reauthorization of the department of Homeland Securitys countering a weapons Mass Destruction Office known as cwmd. Ive had the privilege of leading this office twice, most recently since january 2021 and previously from october 2019 through through july of 2020. The 2018 cwmd act authorized the merger of two legacy offices with Different Missions and cultures as a means to elevate and streamline the departments efforts to safeguard the homeland from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear known as cbrn threats. While the implementation of this merger, like all mergers of this type, has seen its share of peaks and valleys with the assistance and guidance of this committee, the gao state and local stakeholders and most importantly the dedicated cwm d office. I believe that we have made Great Strides in maturing this Critical Organization over the past three years. Today, i am proud to ask you to reauthorize a fully functional unified office with a clear focus strategic intent and strong Forward Momentum that makes the nation safer and meets congresss original goal. I am confident that cwmd is the right office at the right time to face to face the threats emerging in this mission space. I would like to thank the committee and your staff for the exceptional collaborative bipartisan effort towards the introduction of s4465 and for the strong working relationship that we have. Readiness for cbrn threats require specialized expertise, skills and equipment. Within dhs, the wmd remains a dedicated focus to make sure we do not lose sight of core responsibility among the issues dhs faces every day. Our mission is to make sure that federal, state, local and territorial and frontline responders have the capabilities to protect against them. Indeed, our working relationships with state and local partners are among our most tickled. Through flagship programs including fire watching securing the cities, we provide detection equipment, training and exercise support to help front line operators detect see brn threats early and take quick action to save lives. Last fall, i issued the first ever see wmd state and local engagement strategy in recognition of the key role our state and local partners play in countering see brn threats. With covid restrictions we have recently reiterated reenergized our engagements with these partners. In june, our partners from ohio heard directly how we can best support their efforts. At cwmd, our workforce is truly our greatest asset. It remains focused on continuing to strengthen Employee Engagement. We have more work to do. I was pleased to see the improvement in Employee Engagement scores in the see wmds most recent survey results which now are above the dhs average. We look forward to continuing our working relationship with our colleagues in the office of security as they provide expert medical guidance to all of our got. Governments. We are grateful to the committee for the bill to reauthorize cwmd. Given the potentially devastating nature of see brn events, reauthorization is vital to ensure continuity while supporting frontline operators in local communities. It is key to the morale of the high skilled and in demand workforce. Chairman peters, wrecking member portman, tasting wished members, thank you again for your attention to this Important Mission and for the opportunity to talk about cwmds work. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, mr. Rasicot for your opening statement. Our next witness is mr. Gandhi, chief medical officer of the department of Homeland Security. Dr gandhi is responsible for dhss medical and Public Health response on all Health Security issues including Border Health migration, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological acts of terrorism, natural and manmade disasters and threats to the nations food and agricultural system. Prior to his current role, dr. Gandhi was the associate chief medical officer and director of adult medicine at Peoples Community clinic. Dr. Gandhi has experienced in multiple sectors including food system infrastructure, micro finance, Early Childhood education and health informatics. Dr. Gandhi, welcome to the committee. You may proceed with your opening remarks. Chairman peters, Ranking Member portman, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The very first week of this new office of Health Security. It is truly an honor. I have submitted written testimony for the record these past two years. The department of Homeland Security in our nation have faced several unprecedented challenges from terror attacks to an enduring global pandemic, a global migration surge to Cyber Attacks directed at Critical Infrastructure sectors including healthcare, multiple disease outbreaks worldwide and engagements with afghanistan and ukraine. The breath of the dhs portfolio has been truly stunning. And as much as each of these events have had a Homeland Security nexus, these events have also all been bound by the indelible linkage to our nations Health Security. Perhaps no mission over the past 18 months demonstrates this relationship more than operation allies welcome. Last august, as operation allies welcome was underway, our medical team gathered at Dulles Airport to begin coordinating the domestic Health Response for the mission. The gentleman right behind me, dr. Herbert wolf, my deputy whose storied career spans three decades of public service, commanded the early Public Health response at dulles. Multiple additional members from our team deployed to Philadelphia Airport and safe havens across the country and as welcome allies refuge, transition to operationalize welcome. Dhs was named lead federal agency and our team continued to lead and still leads the Public Health response. Over this 11 month mission, we have worked together with the Public Health and medical experts from hhs, including the centers for Disease Control and prevention, the u. S. Health service, aspirin and the departments of defense and state to coordinate a dynamic nimble federal Public Health response rooted in clinical best practices to safeguard the health and well being of the American People in the health and well being of our afghan guests. We held countless briefings with state and local Public Health, met with hospital leadership in all safe haven states and had daily medical briefings with the Clinical Experts across the federal government. This was truly an all of nation Public Health and medical effort and one that reflects the very best of what a coordinated federal Public Health response should look like. I stand in awe. And im humbled by the commitment of my colleagues who on a moments notice left their families and their loved ones for weeks on end as a part of this mission and so many others. During the last 18 months, ive had the privilege to lead these same individuals as we mobilize in partnership with the v. A. To vaccinate the dhs workforce to stand up our domestic Public Health measures in response to the to the Ukraine Russia conflict. To deploy to the southwest border to provide technical Public Health assistance to ensure we have optimized Mental Health and Wellness Resources for our workforce during these challenging times. And to assist our agent emts and paramedics on missions around the United States and so much more. The dogged dedication of our staff and our earnest response to these challenges reflects the hope and vision of this new office. A Central Office that serves as the principal medical, Public Health and Workforce Health and Safety Authority for dhs and one that is grounded in agility, technical excellence and deep relationships with our state and local partners. And a fierce commitment to protect the physical and Mental Health of our workforce, those in our care and custody and our nation. Chairman peters, Ranking Member ortman, and the members here today on behalf of the incredibly talented and dedicated individuals who work within the office of Health Security at the intersection of Health Security and Homeland Security. Thank you for your support and i look forward to our conversation. Thank you, dr. Gandhi. Todays final witness is tina sherman, director of Homeland Security and justice at the Government Accountability office. Ins joining the gao in 2002, dr. Sherman has led review of telecommunications and transportation issues in the physical Infrastructure Team and served in various roles at the department of defense. Previously, dr. Sherman contributed to agency wide efforts on Hurricane Katrina along with gaos annual duplication and cost savings report and biannual high risk update. Prior to gao, dr. Sherman worked at the new america foundation, a nonpartisan think tank that focuses on a range of Public Policy issues including National Security studies. Dr. Sherman, welcome to our committee. You may proceed with your opening remarks. Chairman peters, Ranking Member portman, distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the reauthorization of the department of Homeland Securitys countering weapons of Mass Destruction Office alongside acting assistant secretary rasicot and chief medical officer gandhi. Cwmds mission to support its domestic and International Partners in safeguarding our nation against chemical, biological, radiological and Nuclear Threats is a most critical one. As we have all witnessed, responding to even a single one of these threats can be a significant challenge. An effective and coordinated effort is needed to combat the Threat Landscape that has become increasingly complex, highly dynamic and potentially more catastrophic. Given the importance of cwmds mission, my agency gao has been studying the office and its predecessors for over a decade on topics such as bio surveillance, Chemical Defense, Nuclear Terrorism and more. This past april, we reported on the status of functions transferred to cwmd from the former Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the office of Health Affairs. To conduct that work, we spoke with state and local partners from across the country involved in key cwmd such as biowatch and securing the cities and the former Chemical Defense demonstration cities initiative. We heard from Public Safety officials and Public Health experts about their satisfaction with the offices support while at the same time, their desire to see increased communication and coordination from cwmd and with their partners. We also heard from the department of defense and the department of Homeland Securitys component officials. That capability gap analysis in the radiological and Nuclear Space are unique and of great value but no longer conducted by cwmd. In addition, we revisited the low employee morale the office has faced since its establishment five years ago. This type of change takes time and sustained attention to effectively manage it. We understand from acting assistant secretary rasicot that the office is actively working on implementing the recommendations from our april report to strengthen its efforts. The legislation this committee recently introduced to reauthorize cwmd should promise to help address these and other issues gao has previously identified. Specifically, the emphasis placed on clarifying Mission Responsibilities and building in greater accountability are positive steps forward. We also hope that this legislation, along with cwmds need continued efforts will increase the level of engagement and with Greater Mission understanding by its employees. Finally, with yesterdays establishment of the office of Health Security, we asked dr gandhi and his team to consider gaos leading practices for organizational transformation which weve highlighted to this committee in the past as a resource for setting up this new office. Thank you for holding this hearing today and for inviting me to participate in this conversation. Thank you, dr. Sherman. Ranking member portman, you are recognized for your opening comments. Thank you, chairman. Dr. Sherman, thank you for the work youve done on this and in particular, some of the concerns you have raised, which well go over again today. And we did in our last hearing. And chairman peters, i think, thank you for holding this hearing and more importantly for your work on this issue and and our Work Together to try to come up with legislation that deals with some of the concerns that have been raised. Combating these cwmd threats is very complex. They can be naturally occurring, accidental and certainly human made. The department of Homeland Securitys counter weapons of counter weapons of Mass Destruction Office, the cwmd, which has talked about has a Critical Role in our nations ability to detect to prevent and to safeguard the American People from these threats. In addition to developing and implementing counter wmd capability, cwmd is responsible for coordinating of course with federal, state, local tribal and territorial partners to ensure that they have the expertise and the tools needed to detect and prevent threats. In our february Committee Hearing which was called addressing the gaps in americas biosecurity preparedness members. This Committee Heard from the witnesses in the panel, a lot of concerns about the cwmd, about the office ranging from employee morale as we just talked about to effectiveness of programs such as bio watch. These findings are concerning. And the purpose of todays hearing is to discuss how to address these issues as part of the cwmd to that end. We did introduce legislation. Senator peters myself that will reauthorize and strengthen the cwmd office with updated requirements, standards and Accountability Measures to address these concerns and more importantly, to ensure countries properly safeguard it from chemical, biological, radiological and Nuclear Threats legislation. By the way, also authorizes the dhs chief medical officer as the head of the new office of Health Security. Dhs has made some news on that in the last 24 hours. This change will bolster oversight efforts of all medical, Public Health and workforce safety of the department while also performing a pivotal role in all Health Matters relating to dhss Broad Mission set. So i look forward to discussing the Strategic Vision of this new office of Health Security and actions that will take to coordinate with cwmd on wmd Health Matters and want to make sure that were lining up well with the authorization. The reauthorization and the actions that the department has taken over the last the last 24 hours. The authorities of the cw md office are set to expire late next year. And again, as this Committee Considers reauthorization legislation that weve introduced. I look forward to hearing all the witnesses assessment as we just did on the current wmd Threat Landscape. And our Bipartisan Legislation will help strengthen our nations level of preparedness. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you for that comment. Chemical biological, radiological and Nuclear Weapons commonly referred to as seabourn weapons are certainly among the most fatal and disruptive potential attacks that our our nation faces. Recent examples of seabourn agents used by nefarious actors include the use of an advanced nerve agent in an assassination attempt by russians in the united kingdom. And it certainly demonstrates the need for an increased ability to prevent to detect and respond to these types of weapons in the future. Mr. Rasicot, as someone who works on these threats each and every day. Okay. Id like to know what keeps shop at night, but the committee know that and why is the existence of a cwmd office is so important to counter these threats . Mr. Rasicot thanks for the question, senator. And i think you kind of hit hit the answer right up in your opening of that question is i think the chemical pieces uh is one that we need to continue to address. And we were working very hard on that. In 2018, we were funding that at about 800,000 a year. Were up to 6. 1 million a year. Now as we try to get more information out to our state and local state and local stakeholders as to what, how to recognize chemical threats and then how to take immediate action to avoid injury. The other piece of that is, i really aint that think that cwmd is the right place because as i said in my opening statement, countering wmd takes specialized skills training and equipment. You cant get that overnight, you need to invest in that, you need to stay current in it. The threat is continuously evolving. The Department Needs an office whose sole focus is to maintain this, this capability within the department and share that knowledge and capability with our state and local First Responders. I believe cwmd is the right office to do that. I believe that we have the expertise, we have the skills, we have the capacity and we have the knowledge and we are getting much better. I will admit, we stumbled a little bit on as we transition in the merger on our state and local engagement, but we are getting much better at that. We are doing a lot more outreach. We have refined many of our products so they speak to the end user. And i think, the gao is telling you that our our stakeholders are responding to that. Thank you. On june 23rd of this year, senator portman and i introduced s4465, the offices of countering weapons of mass destruction and Health Security act. The bill reauthorizes the cwmd office and formally authorizes the newly created office of Health Security at the department of Homeland Security. It clarifies roles and responsibilities for both offices and adds important accountability and oversight measures. My question is for you, mr. Rasicot and dr. Gandhi, can you, well start with you dr gandhi. Can you briefly discuss how this legislation will help you achieve your mission to protect the homeland against weapons of mass destruction and Health Threats . Senator, thank you. For the last 18 months, our team has served as a nerve center for everything Public Health and medical that the department has had to face ranging from operation allies welcome, uniting for ukraine, the medical and Public Health implications of both of those efforts. The implications of what were seeing at the southwest border, thinking critically about how we ensure our Workforce Health and safety in the midst of a pandemic. Seemingly every critical issue that dhs has engaged in over the last couple of years has had this strong Public Health and medical this. Medical nexus. Yet our responses, while strong and robust in many respects were ad hoc because we were working in a system that wasnt designed for the kinds of threats that we have faced over the last couple of years. The benefit of having faced those threats and dealt with them head on is that there are a slew of Lessons Learned and the hope is to institutionalize those Lessons Learned so that we can one, pioneer the best in class workforce, health and safety programs that we need to to focus deeply on how we do. Coordination and oversight and standardization accountability all across the Department Three ensure that were centralizing the medical and public Health Safety data and public and Public Health data. And lastly, continue what has been a full scale engagement with our state and local partners. Our ability to do all of that to be engaged and have a strong ground game locally. To do the coordination and standardization thats required and to lead on policy is predicated on having a strong Central Office that can speak with one voice. And so i think theres an opportunity here where we institutionalize the Lessons Learned from the last a couple of years and and move forward. Mr. Rasicot . Mr. Rasicot thank you, mr. Chairman. We want to thank you for the exceptional bipartisan effort to put the bill together. We we have no recommended changes to it and i think it really starts to strengthen the office. One of the key ways to strengthen the offices, it really clarifies our roles in the chemical and biological threat spaces. It also helps that its permanent. Its very hard to get out and do all this partnership with both our federal family as well as the state and locals without that permanence to the office. These these people are very busy people. They want to invest in the right people. I think we are the right people. I think we can help them. But i just want to make sure that they know that this is an enduring relationship. And lastly, i really like the collaboration parts of it that , the Advisory Council thats in bill. Because we have done this on an ad hoc basis and i think a lot of thats based on my personality. But i think we need to institutionalize that outreach to stakeholders and make it a requirement. Thank you. Dr. Sherman, i believe that youve had a chance to review the legislation that senator portman and i have introduced. Id like you to comment on the potential impact of the Accountability Measures including included in that legislation on the cwmd and the office of Health Security. Thank you. I think the Accountability Measures and mechanisms that are in place and the bill that was introduced are, as i mentioned, in my opening statement, quite positive steps forward and can have a great impact ensuring that the steps that cwmd has taken and will take in the future will be aligned with its mission and with ensuring that among other things that engagement with state and local partners continues. So the Advisory Council uh that mr. Rasicot mentioned, in addition to some specific requirements for the office itself, a role that gao and play. And taking a look at several different issues as well as the National Academies and the support that they would provide in the biological and chemical space we think is all really reassuring. And very beneficial. Thank you, dr. Sherman. Senator portman, you are recognized for your questions. First of all thanks for the , help on the pre authorization bill. You all seem to like it in part because you gave us a lot of input in writing it. So i guess thats the way it should work. I do think that we need to look at it critically and be sure that it is keeping up with the times. And we did just again have you all set up this medical office that i think you know is entirely consistent with what we would like to authorize. But we need to be sure that thats the case, we have time to do that. This new office of Health Security is going to perform a really important medical function for dhs but also should continue to play a Critical Role as it relates to these full range of wmd threats. I guess my major question is not so much about the reauthorization because youve answered those and thank you. But its about whats happened since our last hearing as regard to biosecurity. Remember that last hearing, we had some very disturbing information about what was going on with regard to the Biowatch Program. The need for an updated bio detection capability. Our nations biosecurity preparedness was one of the things that stood out for me and i think other colleagues as as n area for more work. My question mr. Rasicot would be to you, given that the bow defense for the 21st century, the bt 21 acquisition and the deployment of an updated bio detection capability is still at least a few years away. And i and i want to hear from you, what is the timing on that . What actions is the cwmd Office Taking right now to address the shortcomings of the bio watch program . Mr. Rasicot thank you for that question. Senator, bio watch provides over 30 u. S. Jurisdictions with the capability to detect a bio logical terrorist attack in time to save lives. The Technology Uses proven its reliable, the coordination exercises that we do with the state and locals often serve to help improve the coordination of their response. In january, i initiated a Strategic Review of all of our bio surveillance programs and in part based on the, you know, we hear the feedback and we understand that and and we we want to be do the job as well as we can do it. Part of that is a some some near term improvements in bio watch. The first of three of those improvements is a greater emphasis on stakeholder engagement. And visiting with our by local biowatch coordinators. I think you have read in the gao report that they get, you know, our people in the field, meet with them all the time, but they were not hearing from the Headquarters Level where the program is going and how were going to support them. In the fall last year i signed out the first cwmd state and local engagement strategy. And in pursuit of the objectives outlined in that strategy, weve begun our local visits again and i was just visiting in columbus, ohio. Visiting with cincinnati, cleveland and the columbus bio watch coordinators, the state lab there, just to see how were doing in a post covid environment. If we can say that, but as we move through covid, how theyre doing and how our support is. The other pieces were working with the our federal partners as well as the National Labs to validate. Are we looking for the right agents given the emerging threats . And lastly, and this is really based on based on all the feedback weve received from the stakeholders. Im exploring ways that i can um give more Financial Support to the exercise program and bio watch. The state and locals are picking up a lot of the tab on that, i think we can do better. So were looking at that on the bt 21 side. As part of that sort of Strategic Review. We have, we are working with our partners at dhs science and Technology Directorate to do a capabilities assessment of all current and planned capabilities that will address this sort of ever changing mission and threat when it comes to bio threats. And bd 21 is part of that effort and that that that effort, as you, as youre aware, seeks to shorten the timeline to detection through use of technology. A concept of operations that continuously monitors the air in search of anomalies. In january, i notified the undersecretary for management who oversees all of our major acquisitions that we were doing this comprehensive analysis in june. He directed the bd 21 program to focus only on agent agnostic Detector Solutions and to pursue technology maturation. And he also deferred all of our acquisition milestones until we complete that capability assessment. So thats a lot of words. But what it means is were on hold there until we understand what the technology can provide , what other capabilities are out there. We are investing in the current biowatch to ensure that it stays dynamic and responsive to emerging threats. And the last piece i want to thank the committee again for including the Advisory Commission and the instructions to interact with the National Academy of sciences on bio surveillance because i think both of these interactions will be very helpful in charting our way forward. Well, let me let me just follow briefly on that. And i want to ask dr. Gandhi a question. On the bd 21 acquisition, you are basically saying youre on hold so you dont have a time frame of a few years or even several years because you dont know. And i understand you want to have the right technology and you want to be able to respond to the ever changing bio threats. But it seems to me its important for us to expand beyond those existing sites. And that was what we decided after the last hearing that we needed to move forward with the acquisition of this more comprehensive system. So id love to hear more perhaps if you could respond in writing to what the time frame is. If we dont set a time frame, it seems to me were going to were continue to have evolving technology and evolving threats. And again, improving our Current System is important. Im glad youre doing that. So that that would be my my response to your your your comments with regard to dr. Gandhi. One thing you said earlier that caught my attention, you said at the southwest border, youve been busy. You have lots of responsibilities and one of them of course is were talking about today, the wmd responsibility. Were you suggesting that at the southwest border that you have been engaged in those activities or was that with regard to other Health Concerns at the border . The overwhelming majority of our work at the border has been related to Border Health issues, Public Health issues, Infectious Disease issues. We have not been involved on the wmd side at the southwest border. Okay. I appreciate that. As you know, weve had a large increase, relatively speaking of the number of people who we find on the terror watch list, who are coming across our southwest border. Already in this fiscal year, its over 50 individuals as an example, whereas in past years its been single digits. Its so i do think we have an enhanced Security Threat to the southwest border from terrorist groups, some of whom might want to use some of this wmd weaponry. And so its it is something that unfortunately we have to be more cognizant of. Are you doing any activities along the southwest border in relationship for instance, to the bio threat . We have done a number of things on the southwest border to be engaged with our local partners as it relates to bio threats. What weve learned over the last couple of years is that and you know, this is a recurring theme that our best foot forward is to provide clinical expertise uh to our local partners. So that one, they are aware of what they need to be looking for as it relates to detection. And then clinical expertise to two, our partners in the field at cbp and elsewhere in cwmd so that we can further enhance their response. We have engaged in that by expanding our regional footprint. When i first started, we had two doctors out in the field. We are now moving forward the plan to align Clinical Experts in seabourn and other Public Health matters to regions across the country. Because what weve realized and you know what well have a chance to talk about this is that some of the biggest Lessons Learned from this pandemic is that our response is entirely predicated on our ability to stand that up at the local level. My time is expired. So i have to move on here. But i would like to follow up with you on this specific issue of the border. Our are your regional offices providing some of that expertise to these border communities and and to your own cpp. Because cpp has to deal with us on the border with regard to the potential threats of wmd. Thank you. Chairman, thank you. Senator carper . Thanks, mr. Chairman. Everybody already had a chance to say hello to our witnesses before the hearing began. But were delighted that youre here grateful to you for your service and i am grateful that youre that youre youre here today. Let me just say mr. Rasicot . How do you pronounce your name . Have you ever met the governor . Former governor, former attorney general of montana. His name is rasicot and he spells it almost exactly the same way. One of you is wrong. [laughter] well, well come back to that for another day. He is a great guy. You would love meeting him. Ok, mr. Rasicot, you state that the countering weapons for destruction office was established to consolidate the department of Homeland Securitys efforts to counter threats from biological, from chemical, from radiological and Nuclear Weapons. He also stated that i think in your testimony, that the the office has brought together expertise from i think four or five distinct department of Homeland Security components into one single office. Could you please take a moment for with all of us to explain how the countering weapons Mass Destruction Office has streamlined what was previously a fragmented approach to addressing chemical, biological, nuclear and other relevant threats. Thats one part of my question and what is working and what needs improvement . Okay, so like three questions all in one. You want to give them to you again. No, i got it so good. Alright, thanks for the question , senator. I think the we streamline things by bringing it all together. And i think if you, i know youve worked with the department for a long time, you remember the legacy offices of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the office of Health Secure office of Health Affairs. I wasnt here for the merger, but i think what the merger actually was able to do was to bring some of the discipline and the definitive engineering processes that dndo used in the Nuclear World to some of the very innovative thinking that was over in the office of Health Affairs as they address the evolving Health Threats. And as we merge those two things together, we have got a center of gravity of experts working on chemical, biological and Nuclear Threats whose synergies serve to make the department better. But more importantly, we have people whose only job it is to focus on those threats. When this was spread across components, like many other components, they are pulled in a million ways by all the things they have to deal with. At cwmd, our sole focus is on countering weapons of destruction. As i stated in my opening remarks, that wires requires specialized skills, training and mid equipment. You cant get that overnight. I firmly believe this office is the right office to address this threat within dhs and really come up with some of our efforts across the government. We have done what we set out to do. You havent answered my question, focus on what needs improvement and how can i help . Mr. Rasicot what needed improvement was the clear definitions, especially when it came to our chemical and biological roles and responsibilities. And the bill does that wonderfully. So i appreciate the bipartisan effort and really the level of knowledge shown as it was put together. If you read the cwmd act of 2018, its a little bit confusing as to where we go outside the nuclear realm. It is Crystal Clear now, sir, its clear to my own staff, its clear to the department, its clear to our partners and its clear to state and locals. I guess the other thing is that youre covering with the bill which we really need is permanence. We expire in 2023. We aspire to long lasting relationships at the state and local level when they dont know if youre coming next year. Because they got to invest time in us just like we invest in them. We have stuff we can give them thats valuable to keep their people safe. They need to invest in us. But they need to know im gonna. Okay. Good, good good morale issues. Thank you very much for that. Dr. Sherman do you feel up to , respond to the question of morale . The focus on this committee know certainly, and i suspect all of you know, to the department of Homeland Security has struggled with employee and engagement uh morale issues for many years. This is an issue that that i care deeply about this, an issue that we care deeply about. Unfortunately, the countering weapons of Mass Destruction Office ranked the lowest, im told the lowest of all dhs components in 2019 with regard to Employee Engagement. And while improvements have been made since 2019, employee morale and engagement issues persist. Dr. Sherman, in your testimony, you stated that the Government Accountability office has found that it takes oftentimes multiple years to see real change in employee morale. As we seek to reauthorize this office, what steps can leadership at the department of homeland take to ensure that employee morale remains a focus and that it actually continues to improve . Thank you. As part of the cwmds implementation plan, there are four Guiding Principles that actually speak to and help highlight in part some of these issues related to employee morale including ensuring that , theres the building of a collaborative, an inclusive environment and also working to ensure the empowerment of employees within the office. And those specific Guiding Principles actually align very nicely with drivers of Employee Engagement that do come out of the federal Employee Viewpoint survey which weve been discussing this morning. We feel that cwmd, the office has really taken steps to continue that focus. Yes, it does take time, but having conversations to identify root causes of that lack of and its something that the office has done also thinking about how to connect mission to Employee Engagement. We think that thats really important and the office has done that as well. But wed like them to to continue to further engage , provide support, and incorporate Employee Viewpoints in in perspectives into their activities, to better, again bring the mission with the focus , on employees closer so that they feel more satisfaction, they feel as if they are, they can see the line of sight with the work that theyre carrying out. And ultimately, feel more engaged with the work overall that they are providing. Good. Thank you for that. I will close with this. I go home almost every night delaware. And like to go home and come back the next morning. I do Business Customer calls all the time to businesses, to schools, to nonprofits in delaware. And i love asking people with this question what gives you joy in your work . What gives you joy in your work . You know what people say . Helping people. One of the things that i think is important that we do a better job as folks working in this area as part of the department of Homeland Security is connect how theyre actually helping people and making a difference in the lives of people. Anything that would make them feel better about the work that they do. Thank you very much, mr. Chairman. Senator, you organize for your questions. Thank you, very much. Thanks to all the witnesses for being here. I want to ask about one of the most potent drugs that is crossing our border and is flooding into my state and unfortunately just about every state in our country, fentanyl. In 2021, c. P. B. Saw more than 10,000 seizures of the bill in missouri where i am from. The number of missourians who have overdosed on fentanyl or related opioids has risen 40 in the last two years. A number of members of congress have called for designating fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction. Senator markey, congressman ryan of ohio, congresswoman boebert has talked about it, the Florida Attorney general just yesterday urged the administration to declare fentanyl in w. M. D. I am wondering if you have a fentanyl as a weapon of mass view on designating fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction. Asked for the question. Dhs recognizes the lethality of fentanyl. Also recognizes the potential for it to be weaponized with devastating consequences from a cwmd perspective we address the risks of a weaponized fentanyl any weaponized from in our broader efforts. We work on Chemical Warfare agents. That said, any declaration of fentanyl as a wmd i think you have to carefully consider that, because there are legitimate medical uses for fentanyl. In regards to illicit fentanyl, i think you have to proceed with caution there as well, because what i think you want to avoid is creating an overlapping jurisdiction or even diverting limited wmd resources into a counter narcotics arena. We just have to think that through. I yield to the doctor perhaps on some of the medical issues associated with fentanyl. Doctor, go ahead, and then i want to go back to the weaponization of what fentanyl. Go ahead. Fentanyl is absolutely lethal, as we know. Ive seen it in my clinical practice. We have a significant role to play at dhs on the significant knowledge gaps that exist with our front workforce who have to engage with it all the time. What we have done to that end is deploy our Regional Medical officers to do training and education with our cbp officers so that they are up to date on this topic. And of course to engage with , local state and Public Health on it. I have, in a couple of weeks, i think we are doing a First Responder safety to fentanyl as a request from the pndcp. We have to do better there, because the knowledge gaps are still significant. Very good. Can you give me your assessment of, the possibility of terrorists or foreign nations weaponizing fentanyl. Can you speak to that issue . I would be happy to give you the assessment but it is more appropriately done in a different forum. I would like to followup with you on that. More generally National Security what are there any other threats to National Security that fentanyl presents . Anybody on the panel one to respond to that . Mr. Chairman, i yield the balance of my time. Thank you, senator holly. Senator ossoff. Thank you all for your service. I would like to raise a matter that is of particular significance to my constituents in georgia, given that we host the port of savannah, the fourth largest deep water port in the country a vital Logistics Hub for the southeast United States. A 2022 gao report found significant issues and delays with the deployment of new radiation monitors that customs and Border Protection operates at ports like savannah. What impact might these delays and issues have on Port Operations . How can operators of ports like the port of savannah be confident that cwmd will take into account their specific needs and provide them with the tools needed to ensure cargo is scanned for radiological and other threats at the port of savannah . Thank you for that question, senator. We certainly appreciate gaos looking at the rpm program and we are taking all their recommendations to heart. I am raising the level of how we address these issues. I think we were sort of maybe stuck in a little bit of middle management on that, but i met with the Deputy Commissioner of customs, and we continue to meet to make sure we are aligned in no expectations. As you know, we provide those systems for cbp and they work in the port. We are in the middle of a modernization or recapitalization of the radiation portal monitors. We are providing 200 of the new ones to high volume ports and to try and reduce the nuisance alarms, which is what slows down the flow through the ports. Savannah is on the list to get those. I believe that theyre waiting until the ocean terminals finish before they actually do the deployment. We work closely with c. P. B. On that. We are very willing to facilitate any conversation between ourselves, c. P. B. , and your port officials. I can get you the name and we will get it going. The other piece of it is, even though we are not deploying the new units to savannah, we have been working through our transformational r d programs on Machine Learning and artificial intelligence. I dont named them. But it is a way to reduce the nuisance alarms. That technology is Going Forward in savannah. I would be happy to sit with your staff and give you a full brief or meet with your partners at make sure theyre up to speed with what is going on. I appreciate your commitment to communicate directly with port leadership and other relevant parties at the port to ensure that those lines of communication are open. Senator, we are really willing to do that. Will you commit to working with my office to expedite as possible and practical the deployment of those technologies , whether it is the Software Platforms or the new hardware as possible to ensure the port of savannah is secure the people of georgia are safe and National Security is protected . Yes. Thank you. I appreciate that commitment. Id like to ask you as well about dhs collaboration with the centers for Disease Control and prevention based in atlanta cdc has worked closely with your office in the past including to test air in public spaces for dangerous pathogens and cdc is part of the Biowatch Program , analyzing air filters for biological threats. How can you deepen your partnerships with the cdc, and what role does the cdc currently play any ongoing programs and activities . Through the covid pandemic, i would say we have become closer to the cdc than we have ever been before. We have worked handinglove with them and many of the travel and transportation issues that would had, be it airport screening and other things i. I talk nearly daily to the leadership of the cdc. I have worked with them on airline issues and cruise ships issues, bio detection issues. We are taking a new Strategic Direction in buyer surveillance in buyer surveillance, and they are a big partner with us along with the h. H. S. The other piece of that is we do bio surveillance. We put out reports on what is going on in the world in the bio threat arena. Cdc is creating complementary a similar, but complementary capability under the c. A. R. E. S. Act. We have people down there in the ground floor, helping them. We need another entity that does what they dont do. We are working handinglove to make sure that the government gets the most out of these two surveillance centers. I dont think our relationship with the cdc could be stronger. We just signed an agreement with them that will ease their support of our operations beat at airports or other ports of entry based on Lessons Learned through covid. And as i said, i talk to their leadership nearly daily. Thank you. Final question, and also for you, dr. Sherman, over the long run, what are the potential privacy or health for privacy implications of departments of these centers at scale, perhaps in some future scenarios beyond ports of entry . Have you given any thought to the privacy implications of the proliferation of biosensors across our economy . We could start with you, dr. Sherman. The issue of privacy related to biosensors is not something that we look closely as part of our review in april. If you would be willing, i would like to take that question back and provide a response to your office. Thank you. Certainly. And based on your experience and expertise, i would invite you, even if its not something that youve recently committed deep thought to, give the committee a sense of how you approach that issue and how you consider it. At the department and large, and you have heard secretary mayorkas say how important privacy is to all of us, it is one of our primary concerns whenever we put out any surveillance piece, and we consult regularly with our chief privacy officer on any of these issues, sir, so it is in the foreground of all of these discussions. The secretary is clear on how that works. These technologies are officially vital to National Security and Public Health, but with any system of sensors, as they become a more advanced and more prevalent, we do need to consider the potential longterm implications for privacy and civil liberties, so dr. Sherman, lets have my office and yours have a conversation about that. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator ossoff. Senator romney, you are recognized for your questions. Thank you, mr. Chairman. How do you avoid the failure of imagination that obviously was part of the experience from 9 11 . How do you have within your organization that the kind of creative, outofthebox thinking to imagine what possible threats might come our way . I appreciate that question, senator. It goes to the atmosphere that you set up in the office. I think that cwmd is an unheralded gem within d. H. S. , the best and brightest work there. They are so dedicated to the country and so willing to think outofthebox and think about what is going on. One of the things i always ask them, what should i have asked you that i did not think to ask you . What are you thinking about besides the question i am asking . We try to probe and think about, ok, maybe that is how we help always done it. But how is somebody else who may be isnt dedicated to the cause that we are, thinking about doing it. I am sure you are familiar with one of our predecessor offices, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, they had a process that we are pushing out, a nuclearrelated process called the global Nuclear Detection architecture, where they sort of mapped out from inspiration or aspiration to execution, what does a terrorist or that actor have to go through to execute . And then what, by policy or by screening or by whatever the we have been placed, and where are the gaps . That atrophied a little bit. We are reenergizing that thinking and were pushing it out across chemical and biological threat streams. It all comes down to human behavior, right . Technology is one thing, but if you know how the humans going to behave going across the spectrum of aspiration to execution you can find a way to stop well i. I would think as well that there would be some benefit to probing and listening to people outside of government. Absolutely. And having some of that, if you will, not but individuals of all kinds, suggesting the kinds of things you might need to look for and consider. I hope our eyes and ears are attuned to what people outside government are thinking about as potential threats or vulnerabilities. And senator thats why im so , pleased with the bill because it institutionalizes an Advisory Council. It mandates that we will consult with our peers in the government , outside the government, academia, industry, on a regular basis to understand what theyre seeing. We do that now. But my concern as it is a little bit personalitybased. It needs to be institutionalized so its done in a repeatable , reliable fashion. Now, i understand that Sensor Technology and capability to determine what kinds of attacks might occur, what types of attacks have occurred, is a big part of what you do. To what extent are you also involved in thinking about how to respond to or mediate the conditions, the Health Conditions for instance, if if , an event were to occur whether its Nuclear Biological Chemical , did your Organization Get an involved in actually thinking about how to protect the public in the event of that nature. Actually, senator, if you dont mind, i would like to defer that question to a dr. Gandhi, because that really is the focus of the office of Health Security. Alright, dr. Gandhi. Thank you. We are very focused on ensuring that we are expanding the Clinical Experts in our office who can provide counsel to cwmd and work handinhand with our partners across the federal government to deal with that response. So, whether it is our partners at hhs, or our partners with fema, we have Clinical Experts now who have expertise in chemical response, biological response, rad nuke respons,e the gentleman behind me is skilled in bio defense. Our role is to provide that counsel not just to our federal partners if and when one of those attacks happen, but also to our state and local partners. We participate in exercises across the country, preparedness exercises with our partners, and those across the federal family. Are there any lessons you have learned from our response to covid19, for instance, that inform your own planning and have adjusted your own planning as a result of what we learned from that ongoing pandemic . Sure. Senator, perhaps the two most important lessons are one that the local ground game matters i. I think you have heard often that there is, at times, little you can do with a screwdriver from washington to whats happening at the local level you. We spent, at last year i spent nearly three months on the road. And i realized in that process that if we do not equip our local and state partners with data, information, resources, and best practices, we are doing a disservice. And so, we are forwardleaning now, in ensuring that as we build our regional apparatus, we have got those experts in the field and were delivering a product to our local and state partners. That product may either be our expertise, it may be our ability to integrate data and share that with our partners, but there is a need for that and that is what we are focused on doing moving forward. The second part of that is that this pandemic has showed us that we have to absolutely be agile. In medicine we always talk about doing qa work. When we see a problem we can improve, we do a plan, do, study , act, approach. We planned something, execute, study the results and if that doesnt work, we repeat. This pandemic has ingrained in us the importance of having that Quality Improvement, the land, do, study, act mentality so that we never get stuck or or too ingrained in our practices because the pandemic is dynamic , threats to our homeland are dynamic, and our responses need to be dynamic moving forward. We are hoping to institutionalize that in the thought process of this office. Thank you. Mr. Chairman . Thank you, senator romney. Senator rosen, you are recognized for your questions. Thank you. I appreciate you all be here today and for the work you are doing. I want to build a little bit about upon whats already been discussed. And specifically on monitoring and detecting our biological threats, because las vegas is the entertainment capital of the world, we each are worldclass hotels, fine dining, live entertainment, lots of special events, conventions, we are about to have a super bowl in a few years. Those things attract tens of thousands and sometimes hundreds of thousands of people in our town. It is our strength, but it makes us a target for bad actors, including those who really like to use biological weapons which if unleashed could have devastating impact on the large concentration of people closely clustered on these sites just on and off the las vegas strip. So, assistant secretary r asicot, as you know, biological attacks remain a significant threat as terrorist groups continue to bolster their biological weapons capabilities. Through the program cwmd, you do , lead the effort to effectively prepare for detect and respond to those bioterrorism threats to the homeland. However gao has questioned , cwmds ability to implement biowatch effectively to detect aerosol attacks. So, specifically in 2021, the ig report says buy a watch on the monitors and detects 16 of the 14 biological agents known to be threats. Only six of the 14, excludes me, not 16. So, what are you doing to expand the cap abilities to monitor and detect all 14 agents known to be threats, and help us protect against these aerosol attacks, and what is your estimated timeline to do that . Senator, thank you for the question. As you know, by a biowatch provides over the 30 u. S. Jurisdictions with the capability to detect a biological attack. The technology is reliable. It exercise and Training Program is proven. Our exercise and Training Program provides and enhances the work with state and local partners on this training. We provide training, we provide exercises through local, 30 local jurisdictions. In january, we initiated a Strategic Review of our entire biosurveillance program, and part of that was a hard look at biowatch, where we are and where we need to go. We things, one, we are enhancing state and local coordination. Covid was a little bit to do with it, but it is more than that. We are out there. In the fall i issued the first ever cwmd state and local engagement strategy in support of those objectives. We met with all of the biowatch coordinators from across the country in april, explained to them what the Program Direction was for the rest of the year solicited their input as to what , they needed in a precovid environment to continue monitoring. Specific to your question, we are partnering with hhs, fbi, and other federal partners, as well as the National Labs to validate the current agent list and see where we need to go with regard to emerging threats now. Now, there is a couple of schools of thoughts on emergency threats. That is why we are bringing in people from outside our own organization to make sure we get the full picture. Lastly based on the stakeholder , input ive received were exploring some options as to whether we can provide state and locals more funding for the training and exercises. We hear a lot of that. I think there is some opportunities there, but we are working on that right now. Thank you. I want to move on to you, dr. Gandhi. Last week, i know that you are not the creation of the office of Health Security. As the covid19 pandemic has demonstrated, as mr. Rasicot just alluded to, we have to have a whole of government approach with our state and locals and everyone involved to tackle these Health Emergencies and when it comes to chemical and biological threats specifically , i know you will partner closely with them. Can you talk about the collaboration with d. H. S. , cdc and other health agencies, how the ark collaborating together, our federal, medical response infrastructure, including the Strategic National stockpile. What role does dhs play in determining the quantities and types of medicines, vaccines, medical supplies that we might need to protect us from an attack . And i will just ask you to tag onto that if you will, what lessons we have learned from the covid pandemic that is informing your decisions about the Strategic National stockpile as it relates to a and biological weapons. Senator, thank you. Dh has has a clear role to play here. We participate on a collaboration led by the Public Health medical countermeasures group. We sit on the Advisory Board of that group. What the group does over time is provide advice and counsel as it relates to how we deploy our Strategic National stock for. In the process is clear, if there are questions that arise or issues that require further investigations or study, they reach back out to dhss and dhs does a material threat determination and we decide to move forward. We are very tied with the recordings. The broader question, in the last 18 months, we have operated as the nerve center for everything Public Health and medical that this department has faced. All these major issues covid, afghanistan, ukraine, the southwest border have clear , public out linkages. In that process, what we learned have learned how to engage at a high level with our colleagues at cdc with our colleagues at asper, the Public Health service, and so our responses are actually all of government responses. And then we leave those went ahead dhs equities. As it relates with engagement with state and locals, at the federal level we have partnerships. At the state level, we lead in every other week call with Public Health and medical officials across the entirety of the southwest border. A couple of weeks ago we presented on a highly pathogenic avian flu to all 50 state health leads. We are all in on that. As it relates to covid and the Lessons Learned, the most important lessons here are twofold. One, we are focused on our ability to be agile. These threats change daily. Our team works 24 hours, seven days a week. In the pandemic has showed that we have to be agile. We are building into our office and institutionalizing a Quality Improvement mantra of acting when we see something. We plan what were going to do about it, execute on that, study the results and then move forward. We are focused on that as one lesson. The other lesson is, as you have so rightly pointed out, our ability to be successful in that face of chemical, biological, Nuclear Threats is only as good as the capacity in preparedness of our state and local partners. If we fail them in not providing appropriate data and resources and Lesson Learned and expertise, we are doing a disservice. So, we are very focused on ensuring that we have a strong and True Partnership with our state and local partners across the country. Thank you. I appreciate that thoughtful answer. I understand how dynamic it is. I hope in the resources, you include what you think we will need in the Strategic National stockpile so we can be sure it is there. Thank you. Thank you, senator rosen. Senator scott, you are recognized. I want to thank cheer peters for holding a hearing on this important topic. Each of you have a very important job, to deal with. Do you guys go to the Office Every Day . What percentage of you how many people work for you and what percentage go to work everyday day in the office, or are people still working at home . So, i go to the office most every day, sir, we have a lot of classified work so we have to for that. Right now we have 229 people out of 265 authorized positions. About 86 percent fill rate. We are very focused on hiring, but it is a tough market. We have hired 18 people this year. What gives me heart in that regard is that our last two major solicitations for applicants, we put out a solicitation for a chief Financial Officer and we had 50 applications and a solicitation for deputy chief of staff and regard 100 50 applications. So, we have a blend of telework and ianpolice work. What i did about a year and a half ago was ask the staff to really classify the positions as to whether they needed to be on site, you have to be here, or whether there was an opportunity for telework or whether it could be remote work. Some of our work is just that. Some of our acquisitions. We have a blend going on. We recently just moved. We were on vermont avenue. We moved our entire staff, about 400 when you add to the contractors in, over to saint elizabeth. That was a big event for us in the springtime, but i think people are adjusting to the new environment. The surges in covid offer more challenge to make sure you get everybody in because we wanted to make sure we have Award Ceremony and it turned out the entire team some of them came up positive covid. So i think like the rest of the government, we are moving forward as best we can. There are fits and starts, but i think were getting back to normal . So what percentage are coming in in a daily basis . 30 , probably. Senator, we have a bit of a distributive workforce. Workforce based in california and texas and the midwest and in, as a response to the theme i have talked about, which is that we have got to be local, right now we have 80 staff or so. 30 or so vacancies. Those vacancies are reflective of growth over the past year as it relates to our expanding mission set. That is our current status. How many of them go to the office . For our regional staff, we dont have offices yet. But we are working on that. As we expand our regional president s, we will work with our partners at dhs to find where we want to put folks so right now our regional staff are mostly at their home office. For our staff here, i dont have the numbers right now, but i can certainly get that information for you. So do you go in . I do not go in, i am based in texas. I spent nearly two or three months on the border last year. I am based out of texas, travel a lot, visit the southwest border, northwest, cdc and everywhere else. So you dont know what percentage of your. Could hazard a guess, but i would be reticent to do so. I will certainly discuss with our team and get that information to you after the hearing. We are an agency of approximately 3000 individuals, and the return to work has been slow to date. We have individuals who come in on a regular basis, similar to mr. Rasicot, to take care of classified work and work on classified issues. Our other efforts that require them to be present and to be in the office. One thing that we have steadily increased in, i would say the past six months or more, is a growth in travel to be able to go to locations and carry out our work, to be able to talk to, for example, state and local officials about a range of issues including the ones that we are discussing today to get a , better understanding of the work that theyre carrying out i. I dont have a specific number i can give you. It is something i can come back to you with, in terms of how many individuals on a regular basis are coming in. Do you go in the Office Every Day . Not every day, only as needed. The workforce has petitioned to, as something comes up, they do go in. There is no barrier to be able to come in and work out of the office space. I think we have got that process , it is very well laid out. So as issues arise or if needs arise, those that i work with and team members come in as needed. So you dont have the number that comes in . That is something i would need to get back to your office on. So, how do you all measure productivity if you dont see people . How do you know you are getting something accomplished . I am happy to hop in. Sir, we are absolutely a missionfocused office. As we look at the last 18 months and engage on where we have been, ukraine, afghanistan, the southwest border, what were doing with medical countermeasures, all of our programs require a a profound dedication to the work and real deliverables. If those deliverables are not met and we are not meeting our metrics, our Key Performance metrics, we know. We follow those closely, so we have laid out a clear approach to what people are working on, when that work is due, what the reporting mechanisms, look like and how we hold people accountable on a regular basis. We dont have the option of failure, given the nerve center approach we have to take. We are very aware and engaged, all day, every day, every week. You know, in some ways, i believe, senator, that were more productive now than we were prior to covid. I see that in the work product, in the things we get done. I saw it in the height of the pandemic, in watching Conference Calls go on at 8 00 and 9 00 p. M. At night. I am, like, guys, lets take a break. I know it is important work, but we need to work the core hours we work in the office, i cannot have you burning out, and i think this thing will last longer than anybody thought, right . But i have seen higher productivity within our office based on products, our instructions, written products, the things that we do and provide, the field. I think that productivity is higher because, i dont think there is a lot of time wasting. People are working there hours. There is not a lot of time wasted commuting. People are working there hours. You missed my comment earlier, but the cwmd workforce is one of the unsung gems within the government. It is the best and brightest. These people are dedicated to what they do. Ill try to go quickly, i see my team members on a regular basis. In terms of productivity, we have individual Performance Measures that we revisit on a regular basis within the agency and then we also have agencywide Performance Measures that we publicly report on every year. And well i think that 2020 was very challenging, the productivity levels of the reports that we issue the , the briefing assistance that we provide, subparts two committees, including this one, testifying at hearings, we report out on those numbers every year and they have remained relatively consistent. So i would say that the productivity levels are something that we are constantly focus on and are measuring to ensure that we are providing the service to congress that it needs. Thank you. Thank you, senator scott. Well, i would like to take this opportunity to thank our witnesses for joining us here today. And for your testimony. Congress must do its part to ensure that we are better prepared for weapons of mass destruction and Health Security threats, including by passing the legislation that Ranking Member portman and i introduced authorizes the cwmd office and , that the office of Health Security, as mentioned earlier, we plan to mark up this important legislation. To all our witnesses, we look forward to continue to Work Together to improve the federal governments ability to prevent, detect, respond to these types of threats. The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days until 5 00 p. M. On august 30, 2022 for the submission of statements and questions for the record. This hearing is now adjourned. [chairman bangs gavel] [indistinct conversations]