Transcripts For CSPAN Hearing On Russian Arms Control 20151206

Away from the criminal justice system. I do have concerns based on the data we share here in terms of marijuana use, what the implications of both street realization and legalization mean for the people of the United States. I been doing Public Health work for a long time, there is a disproportionate help impact. Support those that is when it comes to children. Mr. Kelly, we will give you some latitude to make that less comment. I want to bring your record, i but the would certainly invite you i spoke to the director coming down here that this is a prevalent issue, i would invite you that he would be will to speak you anytime if you wish. I also have with me a threat assessment that was done in this very area and a number of recommendations which i would be glad to share with you that was washingtony the Baltimore Heider and they are looking working very closely with the chief of police who sits on the board to address these very issues. Of like to thank all of you for your testimony, your intelligence, it has been a very insightful hearing. Itemse a number of to do for the director to get back. It is critical because as we look for reauthorization as we get back into a normal budgeting process, a normal appropriations process, some of these have been appropriated without reauthorizing as you know. Are growing fewer in number, so it is more critical that we look at reauthorization, but look at meaningful budget numbers. I am extremely troubled base material testimony today that your request is to cut a program. If its not working, cut it all out, but that is not what i heard from you, yet we are taking a program what my local officers say works, is a critical tool, and we are wanting to somehow give greater flexibility. It appears we want to shift the money into prevention and treatment and do away with heide. You will meet great resistance in a bipartisan way if that is truly the direction and i dont want to put words in your mouth. You were very eloquent. I want to say thank you for your time. I think we can make Good Progress here working through. If there is no further business without objection, subcommittee stands adjourned. Next, a hearing on russias violation of a 1987 to fear treaty. Live at 7 00, your calls and comments on washington journal. On newsmakers, virginia congressman Judiciary Committee air comments on gun violence and some of the issues before his committee, including immigration and sentencing reform legislation. Of 5akers, today at 10 a. M. And 6 00 p. M. On cspan at the clock a. M. , and 6 00 p. M. A. M. , and at 10 00 6 00 p. M. On cspan. We ask for the history and literary culture of monterey, california, it served as inspiration for author, john steinbeck. The capital of all the, california under both spain and mexico before coming part of the u. S. After the mexicanamerican war. The nationale tour steinbeck center. Next, some of warner, author of howards really words, aviation firsts, then we join stephen for lumbee, author of the death and life of monterey bay of revival as he shows us the bay and talk about talks about its recovery from a polluted body of water to one that is teaming with sea life, today. 80 years ago, this is a place you would not want to be standing doing anything. The water was polluted, the air was fouled. The seals were gone, the otters were gone. The sardines eventually were all taken. All of that was happening 80 years ago. The difference is that monterey bay got better. American history tv, we will visit the customhouse and learn about the importance this Historic Building had to trading and california and mexico. Next, we go to the Carmel Mission or if youre about the mission, founded by rinses can priest other an evoke this era. Primarily to bring the catholics safe to the people. Californias First Constitutional Convention was held in 18 he nine, historian Dennis Copeland chairs significance of this historic call, along with items related to mention to the convention. We have original documents from the Constitutional Convention on display, and this is the registration sheet for all of the delegates. It is a great source of information. This lists every delegate, where they are from, what state or country. Edited how old they are, and which district of california they are from. What cspans cities to her on cspan3. The cspan cities to her, working with our cable abilities affiliates and visiting cities across the country. 0 the Obama Administration has achieved accused the russian government of violating in an and seven treaty which eliminates intermediate range Nuclear Missiles as well as ground launched ballistic and Cruise Missiles. Russia has denied the allegation. Testifying before this joint house subcommittee are officials from the state and defense departments. It is an hour and 20 minutes. On russian arms control cheating, violating that treaty and the ministrations response one year later. Testifying today are the following witnesses. Thele rose got miller honorable rose gottemoeller. This is an update to last years hearing with these witnesses and we are eager to learn what the administration has been doing since we met in sessions on this topic last december. Congress has not been sitting idle. A direction of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chief of staff again the research and develop a military responses Response Options to russias violations. Inf is not the only treaty in our agreement that russia is violating. We learned during last years hearing that on eight of 12 treaties, and agreements, russia is not in alignment or in outright violation. Inf has earned a lot of attention, the open skies treaty. We are less concerned about chemical or biological weapons that can be used against the u. S. Than intermediaterange missiles that cannot. This hearing is also the first opportunity for many members to ask the administration about the recent russian disclosure of a Nuclear Powered warhead that occurred during a review of their Nuclear Forces that included its president. According to the russian translations of what was disclosed, this weapon would provide them with a new thebility to damage important components of the adversaries economy and coastal area and inflicting acceptable damage to the countries countrys territory by creating areas of white radioactive widemination of radioactive contamination. What does that say about a weapon a country that feels Nuclear Weapons are such an important part of their military . What does it say about a country that would invest resources in such a weapon . The only time the president talks about Nuclear Weapons is when he wants to rose reducing them propose reducing them. The world is paying attention. We have a lot to talk about today and im looking forward to learning what the administration has been up to in the last year. With that, i would like to turn things over to the chairman for his opening statement. Last year, we held a hearing on this same topic in december. It seems like it is groundhog day, here we are again and will agree that russia violated the treaty, but we are still talking about what the appropriate response should be. Russia is not someone that is our friend or outline. We cannot take them for their word. They invaded a sovereign country, georgia. Ive seen their tanks on the hills. Seven years later, they still occupy a third of that nation. Last year, Vladimir Putin was at it again. Russia is conducting strikes in syria to prop up a dictator that has murdered thousands of syrians. Time we recognize them for what they are doing, a are being aggressive. It is no surprise that they are breaking its word when it comes to assigned arms control treaties. Between the treaty United States, which places limits on ground launched ballistic and is missiles which with ranges between 2500 and 5500 kilometers. We have held up our bargain and the russians have not. Reports, itss appears they have tested a Ground Launched Cruise Missile. There responded this is a seabased missile, that is nonsense. The administration seems to have known about the violations back in 2008 at took three years for them to report concerns about it to congress. This year, the state department repeated its findings that the russians are in violation of this treaty. Have made several attempts appeals about this issue, candidly, the responses weve been get weve been getting back is lead me to believe we are not taking the issue as seriously as we should. We have so far made no substantial progress in bringing the russians back into compliance after seven years, there have been no consequences for the violation of the treaty. We told the russians our concerns and their response, they debt they deny they are violating the treaty. What i like to know is what i asked last year, what are our next steps, how do we convince them we mean business if we do . What is the administration going to do to hold the russians accountable . There are some who want to go easy on the russians in that they want to ignore the situation. I dont believe that is an appropriate response. I look forward to what the benesses have to say, to upfront, candid, blunt about what is the strategy, what are we doing, what is the United States and our allies doing . Rogue nations are developing similar weapons that we and the russians have supposedly agreed not to develop, that would be iran and pakistan. What is the United States response going to be . I yield back. Recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee for any statement you may have. I that we would like to welcome our colleagues from the Foreign Affairs committee and hope they will treat us kindly when it comes to spent sequential referrals. Else a hope that our friends from Foreign Affairs can join us in the classified section to follow this hearing. It would be good if the public portion were kept as short as possible so we can learn as much as possible in the classified section. Everybody knows that wimer. And does not conduct his himness in public, why give an advantage by displaying our deliberations . Two very distinguished Public Service before us today, i look forward to hearing the testimony. Colleagues will keep in mind that International Relations are not black and white, particularly when it comes to russia. We depend on quite heavily for u. S. Assured access to space. Thingmazing in throughout the perils of the cold war, weve always had a reliable supply of those rockets. Nothing or nothing is black or white. Nobody is defending Vladimir Putin. We are outraged by their taking over of crimea. Meat ofportant that the this hearing be held in the classified section. I look forward to seeing all my colleagues upstairs in a few minutes. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you for conducting this hearing. I would also like to thank our two witnesses for being here to discuss inter intermediate range Nuclear Forces treaty, but in this hearing and later run in the classified briefings follow briefing to follow. I know there is a limit to what you can say in disclosed disclosed in this disclose in this session, but i think its important for the public to know, but not necessarily details that will advantage the russians. 28 years after the inf treaty was signed, it remains one of the most important Nuclear Treaties that the u. S. Has ever signed with russia. State department and numerous observers have stated that russias developed, produced and flight tested a Ground Launched Cruise Missile in violation of the inf treaty. A russian violation of the treaty, with the violation of any treaty, would be a serious matter. A look forward to further details regarding the russian weapons system at issue and a discussion of what is the point that would mean for russia in terms of its military strategy and how it would impact the security in europe and in asia. If russia has found noncompliant with a treaty, the u. S. In conjunction with our allies, should use the tools at our disposal to pressure the russians into ending these offending activities. While the question of noncompliance by russia must squarely in seriously be dealt with, it is critical the u. S. For the time being continue to observe the treaty. Would only allow russia to legally pursue testing and violation of the treating of the treaty. I look forward to the panel this afternoon. With that, i yield back. Recognizes thew secretary for five minutes. Sec. Gottemoeller thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you for hosting this hearing and having me here today. The subject is one which i previously briefed this same committee, including last year around this time as was already indicated. To permit time for a good discussion with your permission, i would like to abbreviate my remarks and submit medical testimony for the record. Without objection. Sec. Gottemoeller let me begin by saying the u. S. Is not under anundertake arms control as end that unto itself, nor do we look at disarmament in isolation from the terrorism and the general strategic environment, including the changing security environment in europe. Arms control and deterrence helped to create the conditions for a more honorable and protectable form of strategic stability. Frameworks are one available and important instrument in our foreignpolicy toolkit to advance global stability and the security of the United States, our allies and partners. This has been true for over four decades for both republican and democratic administrations for a wide variety of nuclear conventional safety we have worked closely with our allies to develop the arms control framework we have today, and we continue to seek enormous value in these agreements. Over the last three decades, there have been compliance in instrumentation issues with the soviets, then the russians on a variety of agreements. Former officials of both republican and democratic administrations and their colleagues in congress for or to grapple with many of the same problems we face today. How do we resolve violations denials . D by blatant how we work with allies and partners on the challenges to ensure a unified and proportionate response . These are not easy questions to answer. The Administration Takes compliance with all arms control agreements very seriously. Worked hardson, we to produce a Compliance Report in july of 2010. Congress delivered to after a fiveyear lapse and has produced one every year sense as required by statute. The focus of todays hearing is russias violation of the inf treaty, so i would like my remaining remarks on that topic. Of ouronse to some opening comments, i wanted to say that we had no information or indication in 2008 that the Russian Federation was violating the treating the treaty. That information surfaced in 2011. I wanted to put that out at the beginning. Year, the u. S. Repeated its determination that russia is in violation of it inf treaty obligations. Since 2013, we of rates of serious concerns regarding conduct we ultimately determined to be a violation of the i and inf treaty and upheld senior and technical level bilateral discussions with the aim of returning russia to verifiable compliance. Throughout the course of this year, we have raised this issue with russian officials on repeated occasions and at various levels in various departments within the russian government in order to resolve u. S. Concerns. We have made very clear that this is not a technicality, a oneoff exempt or a case of mistaken identity. The notion ofed this being a sea launched Cruise Missile. We have devoted a great deal of attention in 2015 to consulting with our allies and partners in the interest of pursuing a coordinated response to the russian violation. Our allies have made clear their interest in preserving the inf treaty and their continued wished that the u. S. Remain in the treaty and seek to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance. Russia continues to be unwilling to a delicate violation, or address our concerns. We have shared more than enough information with russian officials for them to look through their own records and identify the relevant program. And counters accusations clearly attempt to deflect attention from their own violation. To worke, we continue closely with allies on a series of diplomatic, economic and military measures to protect the interests of the u. S. And around wise. I know my colleague will want to say more about the military aspect. I assure you that the Obama Administration is committed to bringing russia back into compliance. While diplomacy has yet to lead to russia returning to compliance, how are of russias violation and reaffirmation of two new u. S. Commitment to the treaty as imposed significant costs on russia. Its Covert Program has been exposed and moscow is not free to pursue this effort unconstrained, as this would confirm that russia has been violating an agreement that has been a key instrument of stability and security for nearly three decades. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you. Chairman rogers, members of the committee, i appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. Ill not labor the point youre that you already know, the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the inf treaty. Since making this determination, our objective has been to preserve the viability of the treaty by convincing rush to come back into compliance. We believe it is in our National Security interest and our allys interests that russia remains a compliance. Cease theirhey must noncompliant activity and eliminate all inf treaty inhibitive missiles in a verifiable manner. Equally important, our focus is it is focused doing so will ensure that our efforts to bring russia back into compliance will not come at the expense of our security or that of our allies. As a result of their actions in 2014, the joint stuck in the could a military assessment of the threat posed by russia if they were to deploy and i have this assessment tells us the department of such a system when increase the risk to our lives and impose indirect threat to the u. S. By joint staff colleague can address this more closely in the closed session. This led to us reviewing a broad view do broad range of convincingtions in the russian leadership to return to compliance. This assessment occurred the ame time we are conducting new strategy in europe, a russian that is the serpent thelizing european russia that is actively seeking to undermine nato. Has raisedclear questions about their commitment to strategic stability. Reality,of this new the administration determine we need to consider russian actions with regard to the inf treaty in the context of its overall behavior that clouds International Norms and destabilizes order. Infia is not violating the in isolation from its overall aggressive behavior. Our response cannot focus solely on the treaty. Controlnot just an arms issue, but it represents a broader challenge to transatlantic security. We are developing a response to their military actions and are committing to investments now that we make irrespective of their decision to return to compliance with the inf treaty. While we do not seek to make russia an enemy and we will walk rate where it is in our interest to do so, the president has made clear we will a cold uphold our obligation under the north atlantic treaty. Objectiver core remains the same. We believe the overall efforts to prepare the defense of europe can achieve this goal. As we consider the change interesting environment in europe, we are factoring in russias increased Cruise Missile capabilities, including it inf violation, and to our planning. A broad range of efforts within the department, bilaterally with the allies and partners and with it within the nato alliance. Forwe have focused on which congress generously provided nearly 1 billion in fiscal 15, we have maintained a persistent rotational air, land and sea presence of u. S. Forces in the baltics and central europe. To be also transforming more responsive in the 21st century. American Rotational Forces need to move more quickly. That is why we are repositioning isvs and othery, equipment to rapidly response to crises and provocation. Agreedtes in europe have to host company to be tiein sized elements, which would be moved around for training exercises. We are focused on planning and shaping our future military activities in europe. We have energized planning and resourcing efforts in response to the change and security environment in and around europe. We are working to improve our defensive measures to deny russian offensive capabilities by modifying expanding their defense systems, including a just addressing the difficult challenge posed by Cruise Missiles. We are investing in the technology that would be most relevant to russias provocations, developing new unmanned systems, a longrange bomber, and a number of innovative technologies. We are leading the enough alliance to prepare for the new challenges posed by russia. Implement agreements and to plan for the next summit of leaders in warsaw next july. Natohave organized the response, and established a joint Readiness Task force. Invest more in defense, and focus on new capabilities. We look for ways to improve Alliance Capabilities and decisionmaking. In regard to our lives, they remain committed to the foundational element of natos defense posture. We should have complete Operational Testing in 2024. D6112 is onthe schedule to meet the goal. We will take a strong and balanced approach. To the cold war playbook by having hundreds of thousands of forces in europe. We know that we do not need to return to a world where we match every russian reaction with a mirrored reaction. We will use a highimpact rotational presence and and a great planning between space, and conventional forces. In some, we will build the posture and plans to return destabilizing presence. Bese efforts will challenging under a constrained budget. We will undertake these efforts. Our security, and that of our nato allies, requires an effective strategy. We reiterate that it remains in the interest of post the united hopes and russia, and we russia will remember why the soviet union signed to the treaty in the first place. Both countries benefited from removing weapons that posed a real and immediate threat. We will Petition Congress for these issues, and keep you informed. He appreciate the opportunity to be here. I will recognize myself for a series of questions. I was listening to your opening statement. You made the point that you did not realize that russia was violating the inf treaty until 2011. I am looking at an interview from two weeks ago, on the 13 of november. You stated that russia tested starting in 2008 a ground the Cruise Missile that lies to ned by the treaty. If you did not know until 2000 11, how do we reconcile that statement with what you said a minute ago . Sec. Gottemoeller sir, we saw that they were trying to test a Cruise Missile during that time. Where it wasuation only over time did we accumulate the information it was a ground launch Cruise Missile. The testing series, and this is something we can talk about in more detail, the testing series only in 2008, but it was later that we did see it was a ground launch Cruise Missile. I was not aware of how the denver post had put that information together, but that was not correct in the way that they quoted the information. Ok, but you do recognize that disparity. It raises concerns that it took us three years to realize that they were violating the ranges that were permitted under the inf treaty. Sec. Gottemoeller it is worth bearing down on this point, under the inf treaty sea launch and air launch whose muscles are permitted. There is no reason the russians could not have been developing during that time a new c want her air launch Cruise Missile. Launch or air want Cruise Missile. We did not know later until it was a ground launch missile. At thatot understand point in time, and i would like to talk about this further in the closed session, but we did not know that it was not a sea launch or air launch a system and therefore in accord with the inf treaty. Chariman rogers we were told last year in our hearing on this topic that there were a range of responses that had been prepared and were ready for consideration at the principal level. Ote ommittee then wr these joint committees then wrote a letter of the range of responses, and i will introduce that later for the record. Did the principles ever consider those responses, if so when and what did they decide . If not, why not . Sec. Mckeon i will start sec. Gottemoeller i will start. We had a series of meetings on this matter up to the senior level of principles. Pick up on what is next. Mr. Chairman, some of the things i have described and theening statement decisions that we are undertaking, i can say more in closed sessions on matters that involve the nato alliance. I do want tors pursue it in closed session, my guess is that you were going to tell me you could not say it anyway. I am interested in knowing when and how you are going to proceed, and if we need to do any reprogramming in fy 16 or fy 17 to accommodate those measures. Look at the as we imf issue, we were confronting the broader russia challenge and how to respond to it. We did not think it was appropriate to respond specifically to the possibility of a new ground launch Cruise Missile in europe, but a broader challenge to european security. Many of the things that are outlined are a response to broader russian behavior, including the inf violation. Fear is thatrs my this set of responses that were prepared a year ago for consideration will blend into the new challenges we face, and we will get no actions on the violations of the imf treaty. That is a longstanding violation that needs and anropriate that needs appropriate response and should not be blended with any concerns we have with russias new act committee. New activity. Toit in americas interest comply with the treaties when russia is not doing so . Sec. Mckeon we suggested this is our National Security interest. This is a bilateral treaty. All of the cluster states of the soviet union are signatories of this treaty. It is a significant treaty duration. Treaty in it stabilizes in asia and europe, in their National Security interest as well. I will say that. Why the way, we judge that russia in some ways has had itself brought up short by our calling them out on this violation of the treaty. Chariman rogers i would love to know how. Mrs. Gottemoeller they have regularly anduite publicly, that they are in compliance with the inf treaty, and that they are not repairing to withdraw from the treaty, which i think is good. It allows us to continue to drive forward pursuing them diplomatically, as well as with other responses and countermeasures. They aret know why trying to withdraw. Theyre not complying anyway. We are in compliance, and i think it is foolhardy. With that we will turn to chairman pope. I agree with the chairmans comments that we are the only ones complying. Lets talk about the specific type of vessels and a broader scale. The United States, russia, and the former soviet republics have agreed to limit the number of missiles, is that correct . Mrs. Gottemoeller yes, that is correct. Chairman pope other countries are pursuing these very specific types of missiles. Such as iran, pakistan, north korea, china, possibly. To your knowledge, either one of you, are those four countries, and may be others, pursuing the development of these types of missiles . It is commonller knowledge, sir. Indeed, the russians have said publicly that there are other countries developing intermediate range nuclear and ballistic, and Cruise Missiles. They do talk about that publicly as being a reason to why they have a debate in the Russian Federation about the treaty. Chairman pope it is not a gotcha question. Im looking at the global situation. The United States has said we will limit the number of missiles we have. We are working with the russians and the former soviet republic. Out there in the world, you have probably some rogue countries like north korea, iran, pakistan and then you have the chinese, who are not bound by this treaty or any other treaty to limit these types of missiles. Is that a concern of the United States . Mrs. Gottemoeller let me recollect, for a moment, then i ckeon for whatr. M he would like to add. The reason we entered the treaty in 19 88 in the first place was that these types of missiles represent a very short flight time to target. Pose a threaty do of short warning of attacks on important targets. That is a concern for our allies in both europe and asia, for that reason we continue to believe that it is important to an on thehis b Russian Federation. We have other means of responding to intermediate range Nuclear Missiles being developed elsewhere, or conventional missiles for that matter. I will now turn to mr. Mckeon. Iairman pope i dont know if understood your answer. Does that concern us that north southcould to them to korea, china could send them to russia. There are different scenarios on the short range capabilities of these missiles. Does that fact alone concern us as a nation . Mr. Chairman, if i could first address part of your question. Controlonly bans ground missiles. We have an ample supply of sea launched missiles. We are not limited for those capabilities. Iran has a Missile Program which we are quite concerned about. A medium range program that they have a gauge for testing, and they have ambitions for a longer range system, that is part of the reason for the adaptive approach in europe. We are concerned about north koreas Missile Program. It is why we have made investments in the Homeland Defense program in the last few years. I am not suggesting we should get out of the treaty. I am suggesting that we are bound by a treaty to limit certain types of missiles. Russia is the only other country, and the former soviet republics, are the only entities bound by this. That is my question. Does that concern us as a nation . Our mckeon as a matter of ability to protect the United States and our allies, as i noted, the russian capability does pose a threat, but it continues to be our view in the department that we have sufficient capabilities to meet that in the presence. Chairman pope what about our allies like south korea . Sec. Mckeon i work in south korea is an ongoing project. They are doing well. We are having conversations with them about certain capabilities. They are worried more about short range missiles, not mediumrange missiles. Even if this treaty affected the koreans, it would not affect the short range missiles. Testimonyve in your you said that there was a fiveyear lapse in reporting that the state department had to congress. There were no reports between 2005 and 2010. Then reporting was resumed. Yes, sir,moeller that is correct. I will underscore that, the annual Compliance Report is an interagency effort. It is not just the department of state that carries it out, although the department of state is responsible for leading the effort. Between 2005eriod and 2010 when it was not published on an annual basis. Since 2010, the reports have been made annually . Mrs. Gottemoeller that is correct. The intermediate Nuclear Force treaty is a primary benefit to our allies, for example in nato and asia. What is their reaction from your diplomatic experience . Do they want us to stay members of this treaty . Are they urgent russian compliance . What is their attitude . Mrs. Gottemoeller they have been keen to ensure that the inf treaty remains in force. They have been keen to see rush of reenter into full compliance with the inf treaty. They have really been very eager to work with us in that regard. You refresh my memory, sent to have been on duty at the state department how many times you have briefed congress, or informed us what is going on in this area . I think some of my colleagues have the mistaken impression uninformede been. Can you refresh my memory . Mrs. Gottemoeller we went back and looked it over. In my experience, we have not briefed any issue more than this particular issue. It is not me alone, but colleagues at the expert level and a number of briefings, hearings, it amounts to about 60. Like 6 0 . That is quite a member. Quite a number. For this issue to have received disproportionate attention seems to indicate that ukraine, syria, crimea, other issues like Russian Military doctrine talking about dominance, the free and of Nuclear Weapons, wet would be a topic that should give as much attention to as this. Thereottemoeller sir, are many troubling issues with the Russian Federation. This is among an issue of very troubling issues, i will only say that. Ofi yield back the balance my time and look forward to the classified session. Chariman rogers i would agree that this has received a lot of talk and no action. The chair recognizes esther keating. Keating russia has an enormous stockpile of Nuclear Weapons already. Im just trying to think of a good reason why this is so strategically important to them. Im curious what your thinking might be, what is russias real is giving its stockpile and other assets at their disposal already . Mrs. Gottemoeller all of the potential targets around the eurasian periphery, for intermediate range, crews are ballistic systems, could be central strategic forces. They have been developing capable Cruise Missiles, both. Irlaunch and sealaunched if you are puzzled as to why they need a groundlaunched Cruise Missile that is in violation of this important treaty, because we see, in our view, they have adequate capabilities to cover these tourists with other systems at their disposal that are in accord with the inf treaty. In terms ofny asia, japan, south korea, china are they worried at all . Those countries are advancing somehow and getting a strategic edge. Is that part of what the thinking might be . I know it is hard to get inside of putins had. Head. Mrs. Gottemoeller mr. Putin said that he is concerned about the emergence of mediumrange Missile Systems in china, india, and pakistan, and iran. That there is that concern that has been, perhaps, present in the kremlin and moscow, but i am only speculating based on what he had to say publicly. It is very tricky with a hearing dealing with verification issues. It is clear that the evidence is there. They can deny it and seek more information. In doing so, we might be giving our sources a means of intelligence that we do not want to be giving them, indirectly. Setting up an mediumrange special verification committee, is provided for in the inf treaty . Mrs. Gottemoeller if we had some inkling that the russians would acknowledge dismissal and agage productively in discussion to resolve the concerns we would be happy to convene a session. Recognizing the complexities of earlier that this is a multilateral treaty is a number of countries that are now members of the treaty from across the former soviet union. We have some inkling if we had some inkling it would help, we would be delighted to convene an fcc session. Sec. Keating that will be the subject matter in a classified setting. I yield back. Chariman rogers the chair recognizes the gentleman from oklahoma. Mr. Bernstein mr. B ridenstine. Rep. Bridenstine it is emblematic of many issues the committee is appropriately bringing up. One is a question that i have about the open skies treaty. The commander of the u. S. Theegic command stated treaty has become a critical component of rushs intelligent capability directed toward the United States. Russian open skies fight can overfly and collect on dod and National Critical infrastructure. The vulnerabilities exposed by exploitation of this data and cost of medication are increasingly difficult to characterize. Do you agree with admirable that russia can use open skies to survey National Critical infrastructure . Mrs. Gottemoeller the open designed foris overflight of other territory. We overfly the Russian Federation in the same way. We find it useful to overfly their rail lines, for example. I would to stress that one of the advantages of the open skies treaty is that information, imagery that is taken, is shared openly among all of the treaty parties. One of the advantages of the open skies treaty is that we know exactly what the russians are imaging, because they must share the imaging with us. That is an advantage over the National Technical means of the Russian Federation or we are not sure exactly what they are imaging. Are theyenstine imaging National Critical infrastructure that has nothing to do with defense . Mrs. Gottemoeller i can say, based on again the open skies treaty regime is producing imagery that is open to all. They have imaged a number of sites around the country. Does possiblene surveillance of u. S. Critical infrastructure system with russias war fighting doctrine . Mrs. Gottemoeller under the open skies treaty, we are all basically opening of our territory so that the other countries can have a chance to overfly and observe what is going on in the country. That was the original idea the hind president eisenhowers proposal of the treaty in the late 1950s that it would predict predictability and confidence building. It has been very valuable. Rep. Bridenstine a letter Technological Advancements has happened since eisenhower. Will the Administration Permit russia to fly over the United States with a new advanced digital Electro Optical sensor . Mrs. Gottemoeller the digital sensors that are permitted under the open skies treaty are permitted to all parties to the treaty. Rep. Bridenstine will the Administration Permit russia to fly over the United States with a new advanced digital sensor . Mrs. Gottemoeller digital sensors are permitted to all treaty parties. United states, our european allies, all treaty partners. Good theynstine target that infrastructure with a russian Cruise Missile, for example . Mrs. Gottemoeller in this oftext, what increment information the Russian Federation receives from the open skies treaty to all of the other sources of information they had rep. Bridenstine youre suggesting maybe we do not need it anymore . That it is not of value . Mrs. Gottemoeller you need to look at the incremental value of the treaty in settings. It has been viable over eastern crisis. In the and to make a good calculation risks, particular predictability, and openness have for National Security, we judge that this treaty does not pose such risks to our National Security. Rep. Bridenstine regarding our allies, to the extent that allies value the imagery that they collect from open skies, has the administration assessed what commercial imagery the United States could provide to allies without exposing us to the risk of russian aircraft with russian sensors being allowed to overfly the United States . We provide our allies using other sources and other methods to our allies that do not include us having to give up overflight rights of the United States . Mrs. Gottemoeller it is a good point to underscore that a lot is available on commercial imagery to everyone, every country. Whether it is the Russian Federation, our allies, our partners. What is valuable is that every image is taken by any airplane any party is that all parties have it available to them. For that reason, we know exactly what is being gained by overflights of our territory. Rep. Bridenstine have you asked the National Intelligence agency for their analysis on this . Mrs. Gottemoeller sir, i think that this is the kind of discussion that would be good to have if you wish to pursue it, in the closed session. Rep. Bridenstine thank you, mr. Chairman. Gentlemanogers the from california. Rep. Garamendi 60 times we have gone through this, and i do not think we recognize the history dating back to Ronald Reagan. Of question of enforcement the treaty. We have gone back and forth. It has been a titfortat over these almost 40 years. The significant progress has been made and a significant reduction in Nuclear Weapons, warheads and delivery systems. While the inf issue is a big one, it is not the only one. Keon, i am taken by your testimony. Sec. Mckeon in a good way, i hope. Rep. Garamendi it says that we are going to go about this in a very aggressive way. Russia does here at not obtain a significant military advantage from the inf violation. Then you go on to discuss how we can do that. What you like to elaborate on ensure thatd be they do not have a significant military advantage from their inf violation . Explained inas i my opening statement, and there is a longer statement for the record, we are looking at the challenge posed by russias military modernization and its activities in europe. Including the inf violation as a whole. Department into what investments we are already making, the investments we will need to make in the coming years to come to grips with that challenge. Characterize it as aggressive, but putin planing in response to what we see, in terms of russian capability, such an intense rep. Garamendi this is from your testimony. Neil unmanned system, new standoff Cruise Missile, a number of innovations, including the b61 bomb, life extension programs, and so on. We have a disadvantage visaviss russia with our military standing today . Sec. Mckeon we still have the most Capable Military on the planet. Rep. Garamendi and these additional investments would make us even more so . Sec. Mckeon we need to keep pace with the modernization of. Oth russia and china the militaries of both countries, as we look around the globe, those are the 2 peer or. Ear peer competitors we see capability on the part of russia that is growing, as well as the chinese. It is hard to measure president putins intent, but we have seen some of his actions in europe. Rep. Garamendi russia thinks that we have violated the inf. Can you quickly tell us what russia thinks that we have done that violates it . Sec. Mckeon when we met with them in moscow a year ago in september, we went through this in some detail. A couple of things that they raised. They complained about our armed unmanned aerial vehicles, saying that they violated the terms of the treaty. Secondly, they claimed that our capability under the european the one inach romania is essentially nearing completion. It will reach Operational Capability later this year and year. Xt poland is a couple of years away. Rep. Garamendi that is an antimissile system. How can that be considered to be anything but . Sec. Mckeon they say it is a tomahawk Cruise Missile system that is on land and can be postured to fire Cruise Missiles in their direction. They are not right. Rep. Garamendi why . Sec. Mckeon it does not have the same capabilities and fire control system that you see on a tomahawk set up on a navy ship. Rep. Garamendi how long did it take Ronald Reagan to get the b bm . To get russia back in compliance with the abm . Sec. Mckeon it was sometime in the middle 80s that we recognized the violation. It was worked through to the end of the Reagan Administration and into the first rush Administration First bush administration. Before the soviet union collapsed, it was 1989 conversations between the foreign minister rep. Garamendi when did the United States sign off on the abm treaty . Sec. Mckeon 2001 or 2002. Rep. Garamendi it was a unilateral withdrawal . Sec. Mckeon yes. About a year ago we had a very similar hearing to this one. You enumerated through the course of the conversation that we came to an understanding of the alleged violations. At that time, i think that we realized or confirmed that it took years. The administration knew that years had passed. At that point that the violations had been made, but we had not been made aware of them. At that time i asked specifically what would be done, the options that might be available to us. Reserved thate for an executive session. Im wondering, at this point, it is my understanding that the chairman that the chairman of the joint chiefs has offered options to bring russia back into compliance. Is there any plan to implement any of them . If there is a plan, is it available to be heard in open session . Sec. Mckeon i laid out in my opening statement. Is there a plan to implement . I know there are options. Is there a plan to implement it with a timeline . The administration seems to be happy to give our adversaries timelines when we will withdraw from countries and combat. Is there a timeline for russia to expect implementation of this plan . Sec. Mckeon there are number of capabilities we are investing in, some already on the books, some new, an increase in the fy 17 budget built into the future program. It will be a continuing effort to respond to what weve see, in terms of russias growing military modernization, and its capabilities, and behavior. Including the inf violations. There will not be a specific point where you will say everything is in place. We are working to counter what we see as a threat posed by russias activities. We do not have milestones to measure their accountability or compliance . Milestones . Sec. Mckeon i am outlining for you what the department of defense is going to be doing over the coming year and into thefuture of administration, assuming that the plans are carried forward. We continue to have a separate conversation with russia about coming into compliance with the treaty. Theseill see activities, they will see it in our budget, and understand, we believe, that this response is not making them any more secure. All due respect, it seems to me that our response, years and years in the making without any forced compliance or repercussions to failure of compliance is just going to lead russia to believe that they can continue to be in noncompliance without any accountability. That is what i see what i learned a year ago. It does not see much has changed between now and then, with all due respect. I yield back. In your assessment, other than the inf treaty, is there any arms control obligations that russia is not complying with or is in violation with the treaty agreements to the United States . I would defer to other secretary gottenmoeller. Overve compliance concerns other treaties, including the open skies treaty. Sec. Gottemoeller i will only add that as far as the additional treaties, we have longstanding concerns about the Chemical Weapons Convention and the biological weapons convention. You cannot confirm a russian compliance because they have not provided full information or programst sovietera coming before the soviet union fell apart. Partners ind treaty the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are continuing to destroy tons of sovietera chemical weapons, and are doing so according to an agreed schedule. They are working with us in syria to bring to a final conclusion syrias destruction of elimination of the chemical weapons arsenal. Not aelly where they are good partners, what are we doing about that . Sec. Gottemoeller in my world, we are continuing to make sure that they are aware that they must come back into compliance with the inf treaty, specifically. That is in their interest and the rest of the international community. In the case of the other treaty retook took countermeasures within the treaty context and seized implementing the treaty with regards to the Russian Federation. It brings a lot of verdict ability and mutual confidence to other partners and signatories of the treaty, especially during this time of crisis, not only in ukraine, but in places like georgia. It is helpful to ensure that information is flowing, that inspections take place, and that notifications of activities are flowing. Rep. Kelly i yield back. The chairogers recognizes the gentleman from arizona. Rep. Franks i do stand ambassador graham is saying that they are looking to pursue a prohibition of Nuclear Testing through a Un Security Council resolution. I would probably recoil at any Security Council dictating American Defense policy. Can you ensure this committee the administration is not pursuing this idea . Sec. Gottemoeller ive been in constant battle with our ngo colleagues. We do not agree with this notion. I appreciate that. You ensure me that is not being pursued . Sec. Gottemoeller that is correct. Rep. Franks see, answers can happen. Three countries have broken the de facto comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban and tested Nuclear Weapons. Korea,. India pakistan, that each time with the testing moratorium complied with it in 2013. Is it correct now to ensure that no state last year conducted a Nuclear Weapons test that produced a nuclear yield . Sec. Gottemoeller within this century, the only state that has tested a Nuclear Weapon is in a way that produced a nuclear yield is north korea. Since the beginning of rep. Franks youre saying that and the and pakistan in 1998 did not occur . Sec. Gottemoeller since 2000. The only state that has tested to nuclear yield is north korea. Rep. Franks so no state tested that resulted in a nuclear yield . That is all of the questions. I yield back. The chairogers recognizes mr. Fleming. Fleming ivan like to ask you this question. You mentioned in your testimony the administration continues to reiterate to russia its need to come into compliance with the treaty. Specific details of actions taken by russia that russia intends to come into compliance with the inf, that the urgings are having any effect . The russianeller federation claims that it is in full compliance with the treaty. It does not acknowledge the violation that we have regularly expressed great concerns to about the ground lunch Cruise Missile. It is in compliance with the treaty, number one, and the commitment to continue for the present time to stay in the inf treaty. That is a position that we hear from the russians time and again. Rep. Fleming until you confront them with the data. How do you respond when they show when you show it to them . Sec. Gottemoeller they have received from a sufficient information to be able to determine which muscle we are talking about here they claim that they cannot tell which muscle we are talking about. Rep. Fleming do you feel it is their unwillingness to comply that it make it worse and continue in the wrong direction . Sec. Gottemoeller one benefit of calling them out on their violation of the inf treaty is that they are aware that the world is watching. Watching very closely. That we are watching very behaviorheir continued with regard to the intermediaterange Nuclear Forces treaty. I do believe that it is having an effect upon them. U. S. Fleming does the implemented any economic sanctions because of their failure to comply with inf . We have beenller working with our allies to consider economic sanctions. We have imposed a wide range of economic sanctions in complete agreement with the european theirto respond to incursion into crimea. Has been extorted nearly of effective. We continue to consider economic measures in regard to the inf treaty, but up until this point we have not rep. Fleming how do you know that is being effective . Sec. Gottemoeller i think that effective is in the case of economic sanctions, it is clear that it is having an economic impact. Rep. Fleming it is hurting the economy . Mostly in the oil and gas . Sec. Gottemoeller when you look across the range of sanctions, if youre a topic interested, deserves a separate briefing, but the range of sanctions undertaken with the eu, it is not only oil and gas, it is manufacturing, across the board, really. Rep. Fleming you mentioned last year that the dod is examining a range of military options to respond to russias inf violations. They have moved this along this year. It was just signed by the president last year and included language to Begin Development of a time of system that you development of a kind of system that you outlined in your testimony. What can you tell me about that . Sec. Mckeon we are aware of the reporting requirement and will endeavor to meet it on time, though i confess we are not always the best at being timely on our reporting. We have a lot of requirements. In terms of capabilities that we are looking at, i outlined them in some detail in my statement, and i will go into more in closed session, of some of the ideas we will pursue in europe. If theeming administrations urging to compliance is not changing behavior, we see it might have some effect on their economy but not their behavior. Russias behavior may be moving in the opposite direction. Why is the administration delaying other lines of effort that could have an effect on a diplomatic kind of effort . From either one of those . Sec. Mckeon i do not think we are delaying implementation of military measures. We can talk about that in the closed session. Some of the investments we will toe, we were not planning make two years or three years ago. They are in response, not only of the inf violation, but in other russian activity. If we continue down this course, the measures that we are taking lead to russian compliance, we can always assess whether to take other measures. Sec. Gottemoeller in addition mckeonpoints that mr. I do believe that it is important to back diplomacy up with strong action in these other areas. I need clarification on something that you just talked about. Just required to report, arent you supposed to start carrying out your responses . Studied it i am not closely, i will read it when i go back to the department. I am generally unaware of the requirements, but i confess that i have not read them closely. You were very prepared with the questions from the Ranking Members about how many times you have been here, and i appreciated the quantification of the number of times that you and people from your offices have made themselves available. Yous not how many times have appeared before us, it is what you say. What you say, there are two categories that are important. Action. That is what most of our questions to both of you today have the bitten. What are we doing, and what is going to happen as a result in the change of the circumstances in the world, or what our nonallies, what russia, is doing. The second is information. What do you tell us . If you come before us and you are not telling us the whole story, it does not matter if you are here what hundred 70 times. If we do not get the whole story, it is a worthless exchange of dialogue. We know there is considerable thisernation the between administration and this committee on the fact that the administration knew intelligence information of russias violation in 2000 eight and waited until 2014 to announce the violation publicly. As we are going through the critical negotiations of a new treaty, that information was important. Action and information. My first question is about information. Admitted totly has the disclosure of the existence of a nuclear armed, Nuclear Powered undersea delivery system. Not necessarily a missile, because it is not coming off of a submarine or ship. It is its own undersea delivery system. It is not an icbm because it is not in the air, but it is only traveling under the water. But to our two concerns, were you aware of the existence of this system when you are in negotiations of the new treaty . , if iottemoeller sir may, i would just like to say the answer to that question is an unequivocal bull no and unequivocal no. If you would like to get into this, i would be happy to do this in a closed session. Rep. Turner it is always more convenient for us to talk behind closed doors, because the accountability is not as difficult for you. Is this something that has been openly discussed . I did not hear about it from a classified briefing. It is in the news. Issia is admitting that it developing the system. , ifou say unequivocably no you did know, shouldnt have been included in the treaty . Is this a problem when you look at the overall balance that you were trying to accomplish in the new treaty . Sec. Gottemoeller i think that it will have to be considered in the context of where the russians go with the system. Rep. Turner their intention is to go here, maam. Lets be clear. They are not going from one area of russia to another, their intent is to go here. Sec. Gottemoeller of course we are concerned about it as a threat to the United States, but if it turns into a system that is widely put into Operational Deployment one wouldr probably be significantly troubling. We have had this conversation over 60 times, action. It is in the public, it is not like no one knows it is occurring. What has the state department done in communicating to russia concerning the system . Assurettemoeller i can you sir i never hesitate to raise issues of concern, including about this system, with my russian counterparts. Rep. Turner what did you do . Sec. Gottemoeller i never hesitate to raise issues of concern. Rep. Turner what does raise mean . Hey, i saw this in the news . Sec. Gottemoeller it makes it clear to them that it is an official concern of the United States of america. Rep. Turner i think you did not need to tell them that. They understood it was a concern. Did you tell them what our official policy was, what actions we might be taking, what consequences might occur because this is a threat to the United States . Sec. Gottemoeller i will talk to you about this in close session. Rep. Turner im looking forward to that. Chariman rogers the gentleman from colorado for five minutes. Thank you both for being here. Bitnt to dwell a little more on what we knew about the russialating violating the inf treaty. Before 2011. You said just now that that is when you knew for sure that they were in violation. Before 2011,cions didnt you . Sec. Gottemoeller no, sir. As i said, the system could be sealaunched or airlaunched. It is perhaps worthwhile to say , we hadrting in 2011 the opportunity to talk to the hill about it, but we have informationkept any that about this system, at all. I want to assure these 2 committees of that mattered. We have been very up front and have come here repeatedly to inform you when we knew about the system. The not in compliance with the inf treaty. Rep. Lamborn when did you first time suspicions . Sec. Gottemoeller sir, i have said it was the end of 2011 when we first had indications this was a missile of concern. Sure thatrn im not that is my recollection of what we are talked about in earlier hearings. Suspicions even have for 2011 . Sec. Gottemoeller no, sir. Let me visit another subject. You stated recently that the russians have been pretty good partners over the year, frankly. The you have also said that russians are cheating, or not in compliance with the inf treaty, convention, weapons the biological weapons convention, the treaty on conventional forces in europe, the open skies treaty, the budapest memorandum, and other agreements. How cant track record, you say that they have been frankly pretty good partners over the years . Sec. Gottemoeller i think it makes sense to look at specifically where the partnership has been affect the has been affected. The list you have just read has been a attached to certain nuances. They are it out right relation of the conventional forces in Europe Treaty and the inf treaty. In the open skies treaty we have what we call compliance confirmed. That is natural in any compliance environment. They are discussed in the implementation body in the treaties, we work to resolve them. That is why there are differences. In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the biological weapons convention, we have never been able to the holdings. They have never provided information. In that context, they have been a good partner in the Chemical Weapons Convention. They have worked with us to get 1300 tons of chemical weapons out of syria, which i am glad in syria at this moment. We no longer have concerns we still have concerns about what syria is doing with weapons and we will continue to have that concern. It is in that context that russia has been a good partner. Rep. Lamborn mr. Chairman, i yield back. Chariman rogers the chair would point out that we have been called for vote. I apologize, they did not ask me. We will recess, temporarily while we go vote, then reconvene immediately after vote in room 2216. We now stand in recess. Announcer next, your calls and comments on washington journal. With the chairs of the Judiciary Committee. After that, secretary kerry on u. S. Israeli relations. 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