Loss, departments and agencies that carry out the policies. It was not always the case. Trumane 1952 president wanted to bring into the white house both the republican and democratic essential nominees to meet with his cabinet and white house staff members, he met with a partisan divide. He had wanted them to come in because he found when he came into office, he was unprepared. He came in january of 1945. Roosevelt died in april, and truman knew nothing of the atomic bomb. Seared by that experience, he wanted to bring people in so they would understand what was ahead of them. Adelaide stephenson accepted, but general eisenhower turned down trumans invitation, in large part because he said he was running against the administrations programs and from the public would be coming into the white house when he was running against it. Truman was very upset. He sent a handwritten note, which she would sometimes do because he could slip by staff, and they would not see it and stop him. So he had a handwritten note to eisenhower commenting on his own way of looking at the turned on by the general. He wrote i am extremely sorry that you have allowed a bunch of touples t of screwballs come between us. [laughter] you have made a grave mistake and i hope it will not injure this public. This handoff no longer distinguishes between one the successor our 5 panelists today are in shape to discuss the transition, as each of our officials has gone through one or more of them at a senior planning level. Additionally they are all involved in current efforts to fortify the transition process, and find areas of agreement that will ensure a president ial transition in a bipartisan seven, which is the theme of our conference. Our conference is one of three that we were told at texas president ial libraries. The other two will be at the lbj library september 22 and 23 dealing with National Security. 10 october 18 at the george h. W. Bush library on crisis management, with two scenarios, a financial, and National Security crisis. Theme of thed this importance of bipartisanship in transition. We are going to begin with two chiefs of staff who know the beginnings and the ends of both administrations. Mclarty came in at the end of the Clinton Administration as chief of staff. Josh bolten was chief of staff at the end of the Bush Administration. The transit vision of office out of george w. Bush changed the tone and actions during the transition period. In 2008, president bush led to the most determined transition out of office we have experienced. He began the transition cycle in 2007 in discussions with his chief of staff josh bolten. Bolten, in turn, closed the circle that truman proposed to structure by having representatives of the incoming and outgoing chief executive meet well before the election. Togetherd representatives in july, almost two months prior to the 2008 party convention. Clay johnson, who led the transition as executive director for president bush into office in 2001, was the deputy for management at the office of management and budgets, and let the department and Agency Planning gathering information. Panel. Be on her second equally important and the 2008 transition was interest in making use of those administration preparations by those leading the transition effort for senator and then president elect obama. Executive director of the early transition planning effort for senator obama was in those july meetings, and worked with bol ten and his deputy on the bush team. Keith is now the deputy secretary in the department of labor, and involved in the transition out of office of president obama. Codirector of Agency Review for obama, also began work in july assembling teams to go through the departments and agencies to collect information on programs, staff positions, and upcoming schedules and budgets. President bush and his team willingly lead a transition ofort, whose results president elect obama was eager to use. All of our panelists are solidifyin efforts to the gains in transition planning, and find ways to expand areas of agreement, such as the president ial appointments process. Mclartyarty mack along with clay johnson has been leading the Aspen Institute for this process. Lisa brown was part of a congressional and Obama Administration appointment reform effort. They are knowledgeable and well set to talk about the transition. Our Program Comes about through the work of many institutions and individuals. Our catalyst have come up for me distance to speak analysts have come to speak. We thank them for coming here to talk about this subject. Thank you alan for the support of the moody foundation, and for your interest in our product. We appreciate it, and also the work you are doing in the president ial Leadership Program you support. Next, the george w. Bush president ial center has provided our space, as well as significant logistical support. We thank you holly, as well as your colleague brian and his director of operations justine, director of events. The director for Public Policy is our partner who we are coordinating with on the white house transition project. Finally we thank the staff of the white house transition project, who have worked for our conference and on our analytical programs. So now lets begin with josh bolten and mack mclarty, who know transitions through their work as chief of staff. This will be followed by a program on the president ial appointments process, and a discussion of the administrations transition out of office. Thank you. [applause] sit wherever you like. I am sitting here. [laughter] you can tell who is in charge. Host the 2008 transition was viewed by old size as the best by all sides as the best that we have had. You outlined a tension that has not previously been the case. I wonder if you can talk about the elements that you see that were important in that transition. Good . S it so you for thenk recognition of the work of the Bush Administration, and that the president did himself. That is my answer to your question. It comes from the president. Mack knows this better than anybody that so much in a president ial term and in the executives agenda comes from what the president says he, or eventually she is interested in. That was certainly true of the 2008 president ial transition, w bush directed me more than a year before the transition. You mentioned late 2007 when the first time the president spoke to me as chief of staff. He talked about how important he thought this president ial transition would be. Because it was the first president ial transition in our modern history during which our homeland was under threat. 9 11 changed everything. The bush presidency, but also our country. He was determined that we not ofve unnecessary period vulnerability during the early months of the increment president s administration, regardless of the party. Wasnext president irrelevant to president bushs consideration when he gave me the direction to run the most effective and most complete transition, in american history. I had been on both ends of a transition already, both going out of bush 41 administration, and coming into the bush 43 administration. In a bipartisan way. It was something that did not attract a lot of attention. Not a question of ill will. Not a question of partisanship. Mack, i think you will agree. Mr. Mclarty i do agree. Mr. Bolten it was a question of, we dont need to do that. They will learn on the job and they have time to get their feet on the ground and run the place the way they want to run it. We dont need to spend a lot of time doing preparatory work for the next gang that probably isnt particularly welcome in the first place. So it was definitely a change of psychology. Wed in the 2008 transition, ultimately had a terrific partnership with a well organized obama team that will be represented on your next panel. Host directions did he give you . What directions did he give you . Mr. Bolten the truth is that i dont really remember. [laughter] but i do recall that it was not detailed instructions. Wasnt george w. Bushs style, to say i want to make sure i have all of their appointments in place, and that the briefing books are here anybody who does george w. Bush erows knows that he is a lead and a man of principle. He empowers people to do their jobs. He considered it my job and the job of staff, the job of clay johnson to figure out what the details were. What i do recall him saying very exclusively is, i want these people to be prepared as possible to deal with a crisis should one have it on the first day of the next administration. Order and a a tall major undertaking in any administration. Host in fact, there was a threat on the inauguration. Mr. Bolten there was. Concernedrticularly during terrorist attack the actual inauguration. It is a moment of really extraordinary peril in this ,ountry if you think about it because so much of the government actually moves. In other systems, a few people at the top move around, but most of the government remains in place. In our system, the top few thousand leaders in government are actually replaced in a transition, especially between parties. Basically everybody who used to be there is out all at the same moment. It is not like a slow process, you know, one month a few people come and and so on. It is noon on january 20 every four years that the people who have been in charge suddenly have no authority anymore. They are done, you are out, your badge doesnt work, you cant get back into your office. Nobody either expects to or should follow your instructions, of all the people that work for you. It is a very abrupt change in our system. I remember walking into the 2001. House on january 20, you kind of luck in to a blank office. There is nothing on the walls. There are a few supplies on the desks. There are computers, but nothing in the memory banks. You might know the phone numbers of a few of the people you might need to reach. But it is a very complete and abrupt transition. And for the country, that is a real period of vulnerability. I dont think it lasts all that long in the stark sense i am talking about. For those first few days in crisis, the people that need to make decisions might not even know how to reach the other people that they need to reach to take action. What we did in the transition was wein 2008 to 2009 did our best to prepare the incoming folks to work with each ther and also to pair up outcome in people with the incoming people. We held a tabletop exercise in early january in which we assembled cabinet officers who were relevant to a National Security crisis. Oldssembled in the executive office building. We had all the old officials from the Bush Administration that would have been involved in a National Security crisis. The secretary of Homeland Security, National Security health, the secretary of what we postulated was a chem bio attack in the united states. Had all of the right officials, who in the Outgoing Administration, knew each other and who did what in case of a crisis. We brought in their incoming counterparts. We went through the tabletop exercise with the old people sitting next to the incoming people. I dont know i dont know how much you can learn in a threehour tabletop exercise about how to act in a crisis, but the main thing was that they laid eyes on the other people with whom they would need to communicate. And i will bet for most of the people in the upcoming obama cabinet, that was the first time they had met the fbi director, who transitions across the ministrations because of his position. And he would be a key person to know and communicate with in the event of a crisis. Mentionr thing i will that we did. We asked the Homeland Security whoetary michael chertoff, had planned a vacation with his one beginning at 1 00 p. M. January 20 [laughter] we asked him to stick around for a day. Wasng inauguration day, he in an offsite with the incoming secretary of Homeland Security, in a control center where they could monitor all of the threat information. We asked him, even though his authority would be eliminated as of noon january 20, we asked him to stick around, be there for napolitanosecretary as she takes the reins. It turned out to be important because there was a threat on inauguration day. It turned out to be a credible but not actual threat. Intelligencedible suggesting an attack at the inauguration itself, on the mal. Prepared. Perfectly we werent perfectly prepared. I imagine if that happens in 2017, we would be prepared a lot better than 2009. But we at least had thought about it, had talked with folks, and had our people as wellpositioned as we could under the circumstances have a smooth handoff. Host and i note of bipartisanship, napolitano and chertoff both worked as prosecutors and knew each other very well. It wasnt easy discussion between the two of them. Easy discussion between the two of them. Mack, can you talk about your transitions into office with president clinton . Mr. Mclarty i would be glad to. It is a great privilege to be here. Always great to be with chief bolten. Our transition was quite different. It was a different time and place. I think josh makes a key point about 9 11 changing the fundamental psyche of our country. Personal security became National Security and vice versa. I think it affected transitions. Hours was at a much earlier time. Ours was at a much earlier time. Governor clinton, like most president ial candidates before him, was very concerned if you have a serious effort of transition, it would be easy for the press to say well, such a show of arrogance here, measuring the proverbial grapes in the oval office. And indeed with president obama, there was a little talk about that with his transition efforts after 9 11. That was part of it for sure. From her timeers working with Vice President gore, unlike josh, i came into the transition late serving as a chief executive officer of the New York Stock Exchange gas company. You came in knowing some of the people, but not all. Positive side however, governor like most candidates, had laid out a clear agenda of what he wanted to accomplish in his first 2 years and 100 days of office. That laid out a roadmap of the policy for the administration. I think secondly during the transition, a high priority was placed on the selection of the. Of the cabinet. I think our work reflected that. Historians have talked about the loyalty and competency and engagement of the cape and it of the cabinet in the Clinton Administration. We spend a lot of time integrating the Vice President s office, which was clearly a priority of president elect clinton. President , the vice including president bush 31, had not been fully integrated into the presidency. Where we got behind the curve is on the selection of white house staff. I think that was a setback for us. Although on the policy side, we were able to move far with the economic plan. We were able to move forward with the cabinet. I like so much the theme of bipartisanship. We did receive good cooperation from the republican members of Senate Getting out cabinet members in place. Our cabinet members in place. As clay johnson and chris lu knows so well, that is only the start. You have to get assistant secretaries in place. That was our experience. On the National Security front, it was before 9 11, before the terrorists events we have been so troubled about. It was a different landscape, although there were vulnerabilities. I do think you had a very experienced team interNational Security that had worked during the campaign. They were able to make that transition. The final point that josh has to, the has alluded real two hallmarks of a transition, besides being prepared and starting early, which is not more which is now more understood and accepted. I was recently speaking with a governor at the National PressAssociation NationalGovernors Association this weekend. Transitionsal how are held it is that moment in a 77 day period where there is so much to be done, so many various stakeholders to respond to. It is a moment where it is essential to pivot from campaigning to governing. That is the hallmark of any successful transition. Host how do you make one of the aspects of moving from campaigning to government, there are different needs in a campaign. The rhythms of the campaign are different because you are trying day, that you have a policy agenda that is limited. But when you come in to govern, you need people that are less partisan in a sense, once with experience in the washington community. Because you are going to move from one issue to another, where you may have coalitions of then your in one, and enemies are your friends the ones afterwards. When you have Campaign People, their mindset is, your guy is good, your opponent is bad. How do you make that transition of personnel . Of bringing in people that are appropriate for government . And what do you do with the Campaign People that you want to reward . How does the president deal with that . Mr. Mclarty i am getting a headache just trying to remember all of these problems. [laughter] pointke the right professor, because you do have people in the campaign that have truly worked their hearts out for the candidate in that campaign. In many cases, made tremendous sacrifices. They have taken a leave of absence from their job or work. Austin, texas or wherever and spending a year plus of their lives to get george bush or bill clinton elected. I know the saying is well understood in texas, being a neighbor in arkansas. You do have to be pretty steely empathetic, but that you are moving into a different passage. There are different requirements. You have to have a blend of those in the campaign that are wellsuited to make that transition to government. There are usually a good number of those people in the policy realm. But you need new people, broader people. In our case, governor clinton knew other fellow governors that were natural selections. He with people in education. A number of people in the National Security area that was natural. That is how you make the transition. But you have to achieve that mounts and balance. There is one major factor that is difference. That is the balance of the congress and house and senate. You are not going to get your first 100 days moving in the right direction with your the legislation, as josh knows so well, in handling members of the and i think that the other part reach out early, but carefully and appropriately. You cant get ahead of yourself or that will create problems in in off itself. In our case, i dont think we did as good a job reaching out to the republican side as we could have in retrospect. I think we caught up with that, welfare to work and some other legislation later on in the administration, but that is absolutely key. As very different in campaign. Its a new constituency for sure. And finally, in our case, i know you will talk about this a little later. Plan to talk about it in our session. But you had 12 years of republicans being in the white house. That is quite a change when you have a Different Administration thea different party, into white house. Also, too, it is worth saying that her clinton only got 43 of the vote. That also had a difference in our dynamic in that campaign, in our transition. Josh, how did you establish your legislative relationship . You had left . George w. Came in with a landslide by comparison. We both had our respective challenges. [laughter] 571 votes intimate florida. Mclarty now you tell us. Go ahead. That was challenging. That gave the start of the administration a pretty rough a substantial portion of the country was pretty raw in a substantial portion felt that president s bush had not been that president bush had not been legitimately elected, it had been decided by the supreme court. We were keenly aware of that. The president was keenly aware that he needed to reach out at the beginning of his and make sure everybody understood that he intended to be the president of all the people, not just the folks that had voted for him. So, there were a number of outreach efforts at the start of the administration. , bush 43 when he was governor here in texas, as clay can does can describe well, had governed as a real uniter. And he had hoped it to be able to do the same in washington. To go toen intending washington as the education president and do that on a bipartisan basis, and so, the administration started out with an agenda that included tax cuts , which he had campaigned on, topeducation reform as the priorities and the education reform, his partners were democrat, democratic chairman George Miller in the house, democratic chairman ted kennedy said. They were his close working partners on what came the no child left behind act. Sadly for the country, that kind hard totum was very maintain, even in the aftermath of 9 11. Ms. Kumar why do you think that it was . Thats boy, thats the 64 trillion question. Why have we not been able to stitch together some substantial element of bipartisan last 20 or 30 the years . It seems to have degraded through each presidency. , you know, there are a lot of things to point to. Theres gerrymandering in the house, which makes the vast majority of house members safe in their seat, except for a challenge from the fringe of their own party. So, it tends to make house members much more responsive to right, to the extreme right in the republican party, extreme left in the democratic party. And makes them less inclined to be receptive to compromise. Of thes the influence dramatic change in where people get their news, the explosion of Media Outlets from which we all , which have been a tremendous and, in most respects, positive change in our society, also mean that people kind of pick the bias in their news and arent operating off a common set of facts that used to, i think, have a unifying effect in the country. There are so many factors involved. I dont think you can identify i think the can say biggest challenge for the coming generation of government leaders to try to bridge the divide. Certainly ms. Kumar certainly the transition has proven to be an area where democrats and republicans can Work Together, whether it is in congress or an administration. So, at least we have one area, and i guess there are a few others, but it is certainly hard to put that together. , what is theou all advantage of a fast start . And if you have trouble at the beginning of the administration, lose the way on that fast start, how do you get it back together . Well, First Impressions are important and all of us have heard the phrase in president ial history and campaign sent presidencies that the first 100 days, thats the goodwill coming off the election. Have ae an meek you unique window, whether it is 100 days or the First Six Months of a presidency. It is also, as you pointed out, professor, you are trying to get your team in place. Theink in our case, economic plan, deficit Reduction Plan were crucial, because the largely been about domestic issues and the economy. From a we not been able policy standpoint to develop an economic plan and move that to the congress and get it passed in the beginning of the toinistration, im not going go as far as to say you might have had a failed presidency, but i think certainly that would have been written about had you not been able to go forward with an economic plan. In theke josh alluded to elections, we passed about by one vote in the house, and Vice President gore broke the tie in the senate. Every time the Vice President voted for us, we won, breaking the tie for us. That was crucial, and that was just essential to the start, because you are also going to have, in most cases not all, but most cases some what i call ufos, unforeseen occurrences that will come in that you have to deal with, whether they are my grow , unsettlingo problems are major occurrences that come in. So you can have all of your plans and agendas laid out as purposefully as you would like him a but you will inevitably have to deal with an unexpected you leftis essential off. Again, i think where the real crucial element comes in play, many in the Business World here and that is what clay and i have been so adamant about been committed to youve got to get your team in place to deal with all of that. It starts at the cabinet level in the white house, senior level. You have got to fill out the remainder of the administration. You all had some lumps at the beginning as well. The economic part, that was part of your transition that was well formed when you came in mr. Mclarty the National Economic council. Ms. Kumar which continues today. And i think the president s council was created, too, and then your economic program. That was coupled with appointment. Mr. Mclarty we did, and josh, it would be interesting to get your perspective on this. I think most administrations have some view on appointments and confirmations. Theertainly had it on attorney general. Republicanthe leadership in the senate a lot of credit for this we got our cabinet in place save the attorney generals office, which, of course, is a critical position. We had cooperation from the senate in getting those approved. So, we actually got those in place. But we had other issues, gays in the military, for example, that came up that where distracting in our central messaging. I think what you have to look at is at the end of the day, most aesidencies will be judged by piece of which i would now say is also security in the homeland and prosperity. And that is the two goals that as have to keep before you youre developing your policies, whether it is the first 100 days or beyond. Getting your team and places something that everyone seems to recommend, and clinton has talked about how that is one thing mr. Mclarty that is the one thing, that is the lesson learned. We spent a lot of time on the cabinet, which paid big dividends. Not only did we have a theygial, cooperative, but were able to amplify and you know this from your time in the Obama Administration they were able to amplify the resident message, both in the country, internationally, but also on the hill and in congress. At i do think the real point about transitions, what david, you have been such a part of, have really gotten in an understanding way how critical it is to have early, developed, open, engaged transition efforts that are really on a separate transitionale campaign and that is key for getting a white house staff in place in addition to the other pieces of government. Ms. Kumar josh mr. Bolten can i underscore just said . That is crucially important, the environment, the legislation adopted as a result of your efforts has altered the mindset about president ial transition. It used to be that those candidates who were even focused on the transition were reluctant to admit that in any public sense because he would be immediately accused of measuring the drapes, getting ahead of yourself, being arrogant, and so in 2008, found even when i reached out to the of 2008t in the summer before the conventions, i reached out to the preservative thelted campaigns Obama Campaign and the Mccain Campaign the Obama Campaign got it. They were well organized. Team a terrific clip in place, led by john podesta and chris lu. The Mccain Campaign was very reticent to bey seen as having a plan, leadership with the transition and so on, precisely because they did not want to be accused of measuring the drapes and. Etting ahead of themselves so, there has been an important change in the environment in the last few cycles about the important and the necessity of making those preparations, and it is one of the ways in which operations like yours and terrys have made an important contribution to how we run our public life. If i may build on what josh has said in such a thoughtful and articulate manner, there are people in this movewho have helped to this. I also think administrations coming in have a different attitude. How much can i learn from this other group that is not smarter man or better than. I think you wrote about it in the book. Sharpf you have disagreements, there is a lot to learn from prior administrations sitting in that chair. I think there has been a change in that environment and mindset as well, building on the broader change that josh spoke about. Ms. Kumar one of the outcomes has been legislation that institutionalized many of the things you did. There was an executive order that created the council, as did president clinton and that is now in law. And you have legislation in 20 a in 2010, that create preelection transition effort, so that after you have the National Party nominating convention, the transition up by thers is opened General Services of the administration and provides by the candidate if they wish to use it. Mr. Bolten it is crucial. Its not just that you get some money. Improv a tour set people in office, let them start planning, and hopefully going forward, it will be just a natural thing for both candidates to engage in that important planning activity. And in 2016, i think it was march 28, president obama signed legislation that the president ial transition improvements act that is going to provide even more because the Transition Coordinating Council now has to meet there. And by law, and it has created six months before the election, and then there is an agency, transition Directors Council that has Career Civil Service people. So, there is a legislative impact on the kinds of work that you did. Mack, the conundrum, the conundrum i have discussed here, the transition is a time that has a maximum opportunity to change. Like, for example when you are coming into office is a good time to make organizational changes because the public is watching, they are willing to support and members of Congress Also are more willing because to public is more willing support you. But on the other hand, youre bringing in a team that is inexperienced, that does not know where the levers are. How do you deal with that . Who would like to start . [laughter] mr. Bolten it is a conundrum. It has not been fully ms. It is a mr. Mclarty conundrum. It has not been fully solved this point. It goes back to what i tried to say earlier. You have to do your best to blend, if you will, the organization of the campaign staff, many of whom have been deeply ingrained in policy as the campaign, on domestic and Foreign Policy issues, but with experienced hands from washingtons seen. Pastor came inr as the head of legislative affairs. Howard had a longstanding relationship in washington. So, he was wellsuited on the have ative front to number of relationships already established. A little bit later on, as you recall, we reached out to dave who served 81 no, not 81 president s, but the number of president s, and i was a strong advocate because i wanted to get someone, frankly from the republican side who could help us build those bridges. Those are the types of things we do. I think the only point that we have maybe not emphasized enough for cspan viewers and so forth is just the magnitude of what is transition. A 77 day you have so much work to get done in such a short time. And there are so many stakeholders. The appointment process, getting governors on the world stage, meeting other leaders. Establishing relationships with congress, all of whom think that they are pretty important in the process. Just a multiplicity of stakeholders that have to be engaged in a very short time as you are lifting off that first 100 days. Ms. Kumar josh, how did you deal with that conundrum . Know, we had a blessing at the outset of the bush 43 administration and in the campaign, and the blessing was that a large portion of the w. Ntry thought that george bush was stupid. The reality is he is an exceptionally bright policy person. I have spent my career in w. Vernment policy, and george bush is one of the sharpest policy mines i have ever encountered in decades in this business. But that was not the reputation he had. So, we had a political necessity to run a campaign that was chockfull of substance. W. T would have been george bushs instinct anyway. We had a campaign that was disciplined. There were speeches that went with that. Towards the end of the campaign we published a 300page book of Campaign Speeches and policy that were the governing agenda for the first 100 days k was talking about. That made the conundrum period you were talking about much easier for our crowd. We had the agenda in a 300 page book that people had internalized, those who had worked with the campaign and so on, political and policy people, so we had the game plan set out for us. The reason i say that was a blessing, that we were blessed in having had to run that kind of campaign, it may be Bush Administration, i think, unusually well prepared to govern, and the sad development now lot of our campaigning is the policy does not seem to and i thinkrtant, what we need to find is a way. Ack i dont think it particularly helps if the country thinks a candidate is not writes, but we need to find our way back to a mode of campaigning and politics where the candidates with the meatiest agendas and with the agendas that suggested to people that what they will do in that first 100 days is what the country wants don, i think that is going to be critical for our pilot country once done, i think that is going to be critical for our politics going forward. Way, you would say the most important thing you could do for a transition is to have an articulated policy agenda as you come into office, developing it at this point so that you know what youre going to do and then organizationally that you can put it together . Mr. Bolten both, both. That is two sides together. Its a much better way of saying what i attempted to say. In a longer and potentially disastrous fashion. [laughter] ms. Kumar well, there are when you have the same party transition youre going from democrat to democrat and republican to republican and that change of already transition. Both of you all were involved in change of party. How did you see, because you bushn the george h. W. Administration. That was one where from reagan you hade h. W. Bush same party. Differences between the two parties and how should the two candidates, Hillary Clinton and donald trump, think about the differences and the type of transitions and how they should prepare . Ack, do you want to begin that . Mr. Mclarty i will mr. Mclarty i will take a first stab at that. I think the fundamental point i made aake is one we have couple times in our discussion so far. Both the Clinton Campaign and the Trump Campaign have already established transition efforts in place. I think that reflects the environment we have talked about this morning. Obviously as chris and others know with john podesta being the chairman of secretary clintons campaign, he chaired the transition and worked with the first Clinton White house. The trump people have also atablished, i think, creditable a credible effort. I think, martha, going through a change of party is, that is a very different dynamic. It will be very interesting. Chris can speak to it probably ,ore knowledgeably than anyone if secretary clinton is elected, how that takes place with the Obama Administration. That will be one in the same parties. In our case, you are clearly going to have a significant change, not only in terms of policy and direction and style, but in terms of personnel. That was understood, agreed upon, and so forth. I would hearken back to a Central Point you already made. This is one of the areas of cooperation. San as governor mike leavitt says, when the combatants truly put down their swords and cooperate for the good of the country in terms of the transition. Regardlesst happens of whether it is party to party or a different party. Its a very different dynamic. I think the change is more dramatic, martha, or significant than you would think when you rathermocrat to democrat than democrat to republican. Josh and others can speak to it. I think it is sometimes more complicated in tedious sometimes when you have one party transitioning to the same party. We will see if that takes place this time depending on how the election turns out. Ms. Kumar howd you like to take a swing at that . Mr. Bolten it is bound to be better than the last swing. [laughter] mean, i was a incomingpointee in the bush 41 administration and there were a lot of rough spots there, when there is a thesition in the same Party Political appointees of the incumbent 10 to think they are welcome to stay. So, there is an important element of expectations management that needs to be done , largely by the outgoing president. To let everybody know, you know, you dont automatically get to stay. Bebe some of you will invited to stay, but it will be in sufferance of the new president. This is not a third reagan term, if secretary clinton wins, it is not a third obama term. It will be the first Hillary Clinton term. So, it is important for the outgoing president to set expectations properly and probably to direct that everybody send to the president their resignation now mr. Mclarty thats right. Mr. Bolten and let the president , let the incoming president decide whether to accept them. There is a benefit to same party transition, and that is although an incoming president will almost certainly want to change over all or almost all of the cabinet and the senior white house staff and so on, there are positionsf subcabinet that are pretty technical in nature, and for which it will take time to get your own good people in place, and you can keep the years of government running much more smoothly and aggressively if you can keep a number of this people in place. Expectationses management for the incoming president of the same party, which i assume given the very experienced people involved in the Clinton Campaign is well on their minds. You were very helpful when you set the letter to political appointees, letting them know their term was up. Provided a sampled letter. A sampled letter. Mr. Bolten well, it wasnt really a suggestion. [laughter] ms. Kumar but it is the press fault that we have one president at a time. Does this 2008 transition seem to be not quite so clear . Because there were certain things that happened, particularly with the financial that you all, and the obama people and had to Work Together during this time of the president elect, and can you tell us something about that . Yeah, sure. Planningl of this postulating a National Security crisis. We were actually having a financial crisis at the time. And the same kind of planning applied. Interactiond of between the outgoing and the incoming applied. For the most part, it went smoothly. Entirely smoothly. Involvingan episode the bailout of the Auto Industry in which the Bush Administration against thed political wisdom of most of the republicans in the congress that the federal government didnt need to do something to step in to support the Auto Industry. Lest there be major bankruptcies there that would have a cascading effect on the economy. With thed hoped support of the incoming clinton same, to a point in auto ms. Kumar the obama team. Mr. Bolten im sorry. Freudian slip. The incoming obama team that we would in cooperation with them, we would name and auto czar that was acceptable to the Bush Administration but was really the Obama Administrations auto we could set in motion the process of rescuing the Auto Industry, but the Auto Industry would understand that they couldnt game the system. [ringtone] mr. Bolten is that president bush . [laughter] ms. Kumar i think so. Mr. Bolten im really concerned. Mr. Mclarty it is secretary clinton calling it to thank you for that endorsement. [laughter] mr. Bolten anyway, the Auto Industry, that we had wanted to so theconsistent policy Auto Industry would know what to ask backed, no they couldnt game the system and we from our side were trying to ensure they survived well into the beginning of the Obama Administration. It also wanted to ensure that we very toughe some strictures on the federal support that would require the Auto Industry to take some difficult steps to make the Auto Industry competitive going into the future so it was not money down the drain. Ultimately that is what happened, but the Obama Administration was reluctant to be seen cooperating in the with the Bush Administration. So they never took us up on the offer of this straddling auto czar and we basically had to put it in place ourselves. It worked out ok in the end, but that is an example of where it the notion of the incoming cooperating with the outgoing where the incoming had just run against and defeated was a bridge too far. It was not an eisenhower and truman moment of the kind you referenced in your opening remarks. Indicator there were limits to the number of ya momentsd kumba politically at the time. Between the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration in the midst of the financial crisis was financialo the wellbeing of the entire planet, and the steps that president bush took at the end of his administration to start the crisis were largely picked up by the Obama Administration and extended so that there wasnt an abrupt shift in policy. It is interesting that the person who president obama picked to be his first treasury secretary and was really the navigator of the course was tim aithner, who had been democratic treasury appointee but wasin his career, the president of the new york fed. So, he was part of the triumvirate of hate policy, hank paulson, ben bernanke, and the new york fed president tim geithner. That triumvirate was the one that really charted out the course for responding to the president d on whom bush relied. Onre was unusual continuity the stewardship of the response to the crisis and i think it has to be regarded as one of the most effective government history ofn the economic policymaking. I think to underscore that, josh in his typically modest way has not stated it as starkly as i think it was. Martha, you make such a key point about one president at a time. Economicase, with the crisis, not a security crisis, i think our country truly looked into the abyss of what likely would have been a depression had that transition not been handled that he just outlined. It was seamless, it was appropriate. It may not have had full agreement on every issue, but it was absolutely crucial at the time to avoid in my judgment what would have been a depression to restore stability and order. I really commend you. I do think though there is a real respect between anyone who has had that sacred inponsibility as president the Oval Office Occupancy of the one president at a time. We certainly experienced that. It was not as dramatic with president bush 41 and the Clinton Administration, but aarly, you have to respect relationship that i think served our country and our democracy well. Ms. Kumar thank you. Now, we will go to a question. Pleaseody has a western, raise your hand. Just really quick, can you talk about 2004 in terms of transition planning . I would think it would be more difficult when a president is running for reelection to start yet, on planning, and if the other person were to win, so just a quick word about 2004 . Yeah, that is a great question. The answer is very little. The nature of an incumbent administration to even contemplate that they might have to transition out. Even as great as president bushs leadership wasnt transition 2008 you should pose the same question to chris lu who was the cabinet secretary in 2012. Is the significant problem, but that may just all into the bridge too far category. The incumbent doing a lot of preparation to permit the person who just beat them to come in smoothly. And here is where i think organizations like the partnership for public service, the white house transmission process and so on play a crucial role because they are institutionalizing the mechanics and the wisdom of residential transitioning. So, when you cant rely on the white house to be as worth coming as he would like, there are these outside entities that can do precisely that. In addition, there is legislation that in effect covers it. The 28 legislation on transition the 2010 on transition provided a president may provide a coordinating council and the transition directing council, but nothing having happened in 2012, and having learned from that experience, the 2016 legislation says the president createake action, shall six months before hand the Transition Coordinating Council and the Agency Transition directors counsel, and that 8 and may 6, may friday. The president issued an executive order that carried into effect that legislation, and the legislation calls for the transition Directors Council. That one has to meet at least once a year. That is a continuing body of preparation. You make a good point. Foroptics of running reelection and preparing for your successor, people are going to think, they know they are going to lose, so that is a good point. Mr. Bolten what is worse than measuring the drapes is taking them down. [laughter] ms. Kumar other questions . Since president bush [indiscernible] did it change what they did in the 77 days which turned out to be not that many days. Mr. Bolten yeah, we did not have semiseven days. We had, i think 30. Clay was the transition director and he remembers every minute. So, clay, i hope you will have to addressa chance the first 39 days of the transition, it was uncertain who was going to be the president. Clay had gone to work on preparing the stuff, but the focus of everybody was down in florida. Not everybody, but almost everybody who was involved in the bush operation, most people were down in florida trying to make sure the true president was recognized. In the same was happening on the gore side. Yeah, so it was a difficult thing. Think, clay, you would agree it worked out ok. 7 days is a very short time not a whole lot shorter than 77 in this context. I think if you are well doneized enough, it can be. I think it has more to do with who is involved, what is their whattion, is there a plan, is their program. It is more to do with that in exactly how many days you have. Another question . Our last question. I would just say i worked in bush office and the transition was amazing. How the administration wanted to care about the next generation coming in. I had to put together a plan. I had to write that down and mrs. Obamas team coming in and just having that open dialogue. , because if you hear stories of coming in and it was not like that for us. You have to call other administrations and ask, how did you do Different Things . I believe president bush really left that place better than he found it and really prepared for comingstration in. I just wanted to say thank you for that leadership. Are underscoring that the tone gets set from the top. President and mrs. Bush say that is the way we want it, that is the way it is going to be. I have a lot of confidence that president and mrs. Obama have not only said the right things, but will communicate the right. Hings to their folks however the election turns out there will be a good experience for the incoming administration. Mr. Mclarty the only thing i would add you talked about not taking the drapes down, but obviously the 92 campaign was a difficult time for president bush 41. While we may not have had as well organized a transition as we might have liked, i really want to underscore the cooperation we received from jim baker, bob, again, directly at the request of president bush 41 , could not have been better. It allowed us to play catchup, if you well, so much more effectively than would have otherwise been the case. It that was the case where was a difficult time, a different time than certainly had been anticipated, and yet you have an effective, positive, smooth transition of power, the hallmark of democracy. You are refining that process and moving it forward in a much more serious way where the transition planning and i give a lot of credit to the people in the room, it is now just becoming an increasingly understood part of a critical time in our democracy and our country. Ms. Kumar thank you very much. Ts think josh bolten and mack mclarty. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] Anita Mcbride recently outlined the role of an aministration in ensuring smooth transition. Here is a portion of her remarks. Mcbride the role of an Outgoing Administration is setting the tone. Its really important that a president do that and do that well, and by extensiha