Transcripts For CSPAN Fmr. U.K. Ambassador On U.K.-North Korea Relations 20220906

Relations with countries in europe. This follows the prior Webinar Series on north koreas relations with countries in the global south. The north korea in the world project is a joint initiative of the mk and the Eastwest Center that includes the north korea in the world website, which curates information and data on north koreas external economic and diplomatic relations through the world. My Eastwest Center colleague ross tokola is moderator for todays event. Ross is executive associate to the director of the Eastwest Center in washington. He gives advice and support to the director on ongoing nearterm and longterm strategic projects and programs and helps monitor progress and ensure effective coordination with eastwest enter in washington, its staff, and stakeholders. Previously he was a Program Officer at the Side Institute for policy studies. Asan institute for policy studies during his years in seoul. In addition to studying the korean language at hogan university in seoul, he holds a first class honors ba and ma and plus a fee from heythrop college, university of london, and a masters of philosophy in International Relations from the university of cambridge. Ross, over to you. Ross keith, thank you. On behalf of the Eastwest Center, it is a pleasure to work with you and your team at ncnk on the website and this series. Thank you so much. Thank you to everyone who is tuned in. We appreciate your interest, we look forward to your questions. Before return to general discussion, we will have for marks from ambassador Alastair Morgan, followed by brief discussions between him and i, and open it up to audience participation. And buster Alastair Morgan ambassador Alastair Morgan, it is a pleasure and privilege to have you here. I will give you a brief introduction. Ambassador Alastair Morgan is a visiting Senior Research fellow in the department of war studies at the center for science and Security Studies at Kings College london and a Tokyo College ushioda fellow of the university of tokyo, affiliated with tokyo universitys graduate school of Public Policy. Ambassador morgan was the British Ambassador to the dprk from december 2015 to december 2018. He was British Consul general in guangzhou from 2010 to 2014 and director of trade and investment at the British Embassy in beijing from 2007 to 2010. Prior to that, he was counselor for trade policy and director of inward investment at the British Embassy in tokyo from 2002 to 2006, following a year during which he was on loan to the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and industry from 2001 to 2002. He started working the British Government service at the department of trade and industry in 1985. He was Regional Security expert and coordinator of the u. N. Resolution 1874 panel of experts on dprk sanctions from 2019 to 2021. From 1985 he was,from 1983 to 1983 he was a lecturer at Gakushuin University in tokyo. He is a graduate of cambridge university. Absolute pleasure. I turn it over to for opening remarks. Amb. Morgan thank you very much, and thanks also to keep for your very kind and generous introductions. It is an honor come it is a privilege to be joining the Eastwest Center and and see mk ncnk for this event, and i hope i can contribute to your series. Im conscious of the value of an exambassador diminishes over time, and it is a few years since i left pyongyang and i have had two successors. But i shall do my best. I know that your interest is really in the present and i guess even in the future of u. K. Dprk relations and the general issue of relations with the dprk, but i thought i would start by looking back at a little bit of history, and if you will excuse me, i will go back to two of the conferences of leaders that took place during the second world war. The first one i want to refer to is the cairo conference, which took place in november 1943 between roosevelt, churchill, and chang kaishek. It is a reminder that even the commonest party of china wasnt present at the creek communist party of china wasnt present at the creation of the postwar institutions, the republic of china was and there was chinese involvement. When i want to draw from that conference is the statement in the cairo declaration that in due course, korea shall become free and independent. You find it there an acknowledgment that korea will not immediately become free and independent at the end of the war. I think you could say looking at that that while this may be just a recognition of practicalities, to some extent the u. K. Had a degree of responsibility for the postwar disposition that resulted eventually in the division of the korean peninsula. The second conference i wanted to refer to was the yorkshire conference between roosevelt, churchill, and stalin, where roosevelt proposed trusteeship of korea consisting of the u. S. , the u. K. , the soviet union, and the republic of well, there was no formaland the republic of china. Well, there was no formal agreement, but you can see yet one time it was envisaged that the u. K. Would have more of involvement in the establishment of korea then turned out to be the case. The situation changed really with the soviet Union Declaration of war on japan in august 1945 in the immediate action by u. S. Officials to define u. S. Occupation zone in korea, the peninsula at the 38th parallel, accepted by the soviet union. This was followed up by a u. S. General order number one draft, which set out where surrender of japan would take place within korea. The role of the United Kingdom was minimized, and actually, i believe i would be happy to be corrected about this i believe that u. K. Engagement outside of the human wiof the u. N. With the dprk or outside the decision taken the dprk was rather limited from the foundation of the dprk in 1948 up until the advent of the korean war, where of course the 25th of june, 1950, the decision by kim ilsung to invade or attack the south of the country, south korea, completely change the situation. Obviously, the u. K. Was involved in the Security Council decisions responding to that, and the u. K. Dispatched into the korean war into the United Nations command Something Like 82,000 they deployed 82,000 troops overall. You can find different numbers, and those numbers may include servicemen like my father, indeed, who served in korea after the armistice in 1953 when there was still a peacekeeping force in korea. But there is a large number. It is actually larger than the current size of the fulltime servicemen in the british army present. In addition to the deployment of forces of troops, there was a large naval deployment with carriers and so on. In the korean war, some 1,106 british nationals were killed in action. That is more than twice the number of greater servicemen british servicemen who died in afghanistan over 20 years there. 2,674 were wounded. Another 1000 were missing or taken prisoner. But in addition to the impact that had on the consciousness, and the importance of military engagement, i would like to bring out just a few other points. The first is that the u. K. Was very concerned in 1950 about the course that the war might take. U. K. Was not alone in this. In december 1950, the uk Prime Minister of the time went to meet president truman really to emphasize the need for continued support for nato in europe, concerned that europe might be overlooked. Also concerns about escalation. U. K. Took a slightly different view of the peoples republic of china than the United States, and the way to handle china, and concerned about the possible use of Nuclear Weapons. And in the event Nuclear Weapons were not used. I think this is indicative of the relationship between the u. K. And the u. S. At the time. The u. K. Very much a smaller partner in this engagement, though with a sizable contribution second only to the u. S. On the human command side. But still seeking to influence and if you like to give advice to the United States. There was a major influence on u. K. From the war and that the government committed to be armament at a time of austerity committed to rearmament at a time of austerity, and the physical consequences continued into the 60s and 70s and the decisions that had to be taken subsequently about British Armed forces deployment. Lets just go to the armistice in 1953. I would say that the u. K. Continues to have a role in the United Nations command. It sends a small number of serving officers to the United Nations command in korea. You could say if it continues to have obligations arising out of the armistice agreement, it does not have an automatic commitment to enter conflict or to dispatch troops and it does not have a treaty relationship to defend the republic of korea. Important to remember the context that the u. K. Obligations are somewhat different from the u. S. Obligations. And then to move quickly over the following years, when there was limited contact between the u. K. And the dprk, until 1991, when the republic and the dprk separately entered the United Nations when the u. K. Recognizes the dprk as a state. And also in 1991 come as a consequence of that, the dprk sends a mission, Permanent Mission to the International Maritime organization my ammo, is based in london the imo, which is based in london. It is small, but from that time on their are dprk diplomats in london, though with an International Organization rather than covering bilateral organizations. Things change after 1997, when kim daejung is elected president of the republic of korea and you see the launch of the sunshine policy leading up to the dprkrok summit. It is up to that time, as keith has alluded to, that the British Government decides to establish an embassy in pyongyang and establish work towards ambassadoriallevel relations, which were established in 2002. The u. K. Has its embassy in pyongyang in the dprk has its embassy in london, an area of london not very far from my house quite convenient when i went to collect my visa in 2015. Keith mentioned the first tristate affair, jim hall. Jim has written extensively about the establishment of the embassy and many other aspects of u. K. Korean relations and international diplomacy. I would commend jims writings on establishing the embassies. Good read. In another ambassador, one of my predecessors, who i know keith has also met, he wrote a book called only beautiful please about his time as British Ambassador in pyongyang and i would recommend that forgiving a very good flavor of what it is that the British Ambassador does, can do, cannot do, or at least how it was at the time he was there. I think in the discussion we can talk more about the role of the British Embassy. The British Embassy is unusual in pyongyang and that it is within the compound of the German Embassy, the former east German Embassy in pyongyang, and the premises are shared between germany, the United Kingdom, and the French Cooperation Office at the moment they are closed. I will come back to that later. Also in pyongyang, and you have heard about this in other sessions, other europeans represented, not all at the ambassadorial level, but all with missions in country romania, bulgaria, and the czech republic. And most european Member States have relations but nonresident ambassadors. At the moment no European Mission is present in the country. I hope that in the exchanges that follow we can talk more about the embassy and the role of the ambassador. But i would like to draw your attention to three areas of work. The first is incountry. The second stance operating as investor in dprk are quite different from many other places, there were in countries essentially similar to the role of the ambassador in any other United Nations member state. You lead your team. It is a small team. When i was there there were five diplomats and a varying number of local staff, 46 local staff whose functions were quite limited, which meant that the Diplomatic Team handled a lot of its own management, which in other places might be handled by local staff. You sought to travel as much as possible within the country and see as much and meet where you could commit dprk nationals and others operating in the country, in particular the u. N. Staff and the nongovernmental organizations, none of whom are there at the moment. And you would meet dprk ministers where you could, vice ministers and officials, to represent the view of the own government. We followed, as did other European Missions, policy of Critical Engagement in which is to say that we believe that being there and engaging meeting and talking to the dprk, showing them that there is scope for rational discussions, there were opportunities as well as sets outside their borders was useful, but it was necessary to be critical, and being critical in particular in country and out of country. About human rights and about the nuclear program. We would report to london and would analyze media that was published, things we saw roundabout, giving some assessment, and this statement to analysis that was conducted elsewhere. We were also involved very strongly in Contingency Planning during my time there in 2016 and 2017, because i was there during the fourth and sixth Nuclear Tests and the progress in Ballistic Missiles through the launch of intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in 2017, and we really were concerned that we might need to close the mission. No, we didnt. We had a consular role, and we can talk about that as a responsibility british nationals, of whom there were a small number visiting with residents in the dprk, but also for some other nationals as well. But addition to that incountry role, i had a role as ambassador in my capital. Gone are the days when a mission was overseas and out of touch with its capital. I would be involved and my team would be involved in drawing up policy papers, decisions were taken in london, drafts finalized in london, but we had our input. And i would sometimes attend meetings, including meetings of the national Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister. And that i had another role, which was in third countries. We talk a lot more about this, so i wont do so now where because the other countries, the United States, australia, canada, new zealand, were not represented in the dprk, and nor were japan, nor was the rok in pyongyang, they had great interest in hearing from me in their capitals. I also traveled to other places, including beijing, where at least in 2016 there was considerable interest in hearing my views. And i traveled to new york, where i met senior officials in the u. N. And spoke to the 1718 committee. Although we were planning for closure in 2016 and 2017, we avoided that. But im afraid to say that the British Council program which had been the main Engagement Program we had of british teachers training teachers in north korean universities, using british materials, which really threw a light on the outside world i am afraid that close in 2017 because we couldnt guarantee their safety, and it had not reopen. That is a program that ran from before the establishment of the embassy from 2000 to 2017. Im afraid also that all of the small incountry grants that we give to humanitarian projects also came to an end. You could say that by the end of 2017, the Critical Engagement policy had ended except in the sense that we were there and we were engaging. We were still critical. But the other elements of the program had fallen away. I want to put in context of the embassy and its work very briefly, because as a former ambassador, there is a tendency for me to concentrate on it, and because of a lot of the tension between the British Embassy and pyongyang. But first and foremost want to look at britains role in the United Nations as a member of the Security Council involved in the formulation of the unanimously approved sanctions resolutions from 26 onwards, but also active in the General Assembly and in the human rights council, drawing attention to the failures of human rights in the dprk, about which i can say more. I would also say that the u. K. Acted in the United Nations in the humanitarian area quite frequently the head of the office of coordination of humanitarian affairs, under secretary general, has been british. And while britain has small bilateral aid to the dprk, it is a leading contributor to you and two u. N. Programs, unicef central fund which meant that actually although the decisions on the dprk have been taken by the u. N. , the u. K. Has supported those. U. K. Is very active in sanctions enforcement, not just in terms of the passage of the resolution, but initially working within europe on the european sanctions regulations and then after breaks it after brexit on the independent british regime. It continues to have staff on the u. N. Command. It has a Global Network of posts. In consideration of dprk issues is facilitated and my work and my work in pyongyang was facilitated by the links i was able to have with washington, seoul, tokyo, and other posts. I should Say Something about brexit. I already mentioned the fact that the u. K. Needed to establish its own sanctions legislation, which it did in 2019. Although the u. K. Is no longer a participant in the eu common defense and Security Policys, in practice, coordination in relation to sanctions with the commission and with Member States of the European Union has continued, and there is an enormous amount of Common Ground in terms of British Defense and Security Policy in relation to the dprk with other european Member States. I think that brexit has actually not undermined that. In country, because the missions are not there, this is apparently not being tested. In other countries, the fact that britain has had to withdraw from eu discussions has been, i think, an impediment. In the dprk, where there is no eu ambassador, to the best of my knowledge, while the missions are still there, discussions between the eu commissions continued with the United Kingdom, and in any case it is a small place and the exchanges left continued. The exchanges will have continued. While the British Mission in pyongyang closed in may 2020 because of the dprk decision not to allow entry into the dprk, officials could leave but they could not reenter, so it became impossible to rotate staff and there was concern about continued resources and so on, some missions have continued there. China, russia continues there. The russian ambassador, my counterpart at the time, continues to serve in the post. But there were no European Missions opened with international staff. The dprk mission in london remains open, and contact between the current British Ambassador, david ellis, dr. David ellis, is now based in london with the embassies cordial, certainly diplomatic. This contacts do those contacts do continue, and david makes clear that it is the view the wish of the British Government to reopen the British Embassy in pyongyang when conditions allow. The question is when will conditions allow . I think you have to look at more than one factor there. First of all, the dprk will needed to allow entry as well as exit of diplomats. It is also necessary to look at the ease of Movement Across china and restrictions on that, because it is necessary to go through china to get into and out of the dprk, and if it is necessary to bring in visitors or equipment, that has to come through china as well. And also a decision will be needed by the British Government on whether and when it is safe to return, which will be based partly on assessment of covid19, but on other factors as well, including what is the state of the buildings that have been dated as well as access to medical care and so on. I think the british policy has been consistent. There have been changes in that reflected the changes made by the dprk. So really the decline in engagement outside diplomatic contacts in 2017 was a response to actions by the dprk, the close of the embassy, and the removal of that important, t hough by no means able to be the only channel of communication with the dprk, but that channel of communication has closed. And this is the result of dprk actions, to which the British Government felt it is needed to respond. Policy at the moment is very much focused on the Security Threat posed by the developing nuclear program. You should look at that, and we can discuss this further, really in the context of britains overall defense and Security Policy as set out in march 2021 in the integrated review that the u. K. Published called Global Britain in a competitive age. Of course, since march 2021, problems have become far more acute, with the invasion of ukraine, the Energy Crisis and other crises that have followed. But both of these and Energy Security are covered in that review, and i dont believe that the actions in ukraine and the Energy Crisis, the costofliving crisis, the fiscal burden imposed by covid actually undermines the tilt to the indo pacific that was set out in the review of which you could say the policy toward the is a part toward the dprk is a part. There are questions about budget. The indo pacific was set out in very moderate terms, building on engagement with the indo pacific. But anyway, i dont think that the dprk is likely to be quite at the top of our newfound Prime Ministers mind and agenda today as she returns to to cover role. But we know her views and we know that she attaches importance to dprk denuclearization and human rights. And really, the overall policy of the United Kingdom is summarized by the integrative review by saying that the u. K. , which is to remain the most engaged nonregional partner on denuclearization and on sanctions enforcement. And it also makes quite clear that alongside russia and iran, north korean actions are seen as one of the key factors in the deterioration of the security environment and the weakening of the international order. Perhaps rather longer than you would hope for, but i will stop there. It is very cursory, but please criticize, elaborate, question as you like. Im very happy to answer with any points he like to take up. Thank you so much for that broad and comprehensive history of u. K. Relations and the u. K. Role at the embassy in pyongyang. You coordinated with International Allies and friends and especially where your assessment of u. K. Policy with respect to north korea. It is a lot to work with. I do want to turn over to the audience for their questions. Please, put your questions and the q a in the chat and i will be happy to read them off. First of all, i want to follow your lead and discuss more about the British Embassys role in the dprk. First off, how you prepared for your and your expectations, your impressions. The second question, also somewhat to do with the role of the embassy, you were the British Ambassador during a highprofile discussion around the debit ambassador to the u. K. From north korea. He defected with his family to south korea in 2016. I wonder if you could share your perspectives on what korea, how that unfolded what interactions were like with north korean officials. Whatever you are able to share would be fascinating. Thank you, sir. I will answer both of those questions. I think there are things i probably cant say about the second question, but i would certainly comment on it. In terms of how i prepared for my role in the dprk, i would say first of all that i applied for the role. It is common in the British Government service that you put an investigation for a role in your selected and you are selected. I did that while i was serving and i did so in large measure because i had regional experience first in japan, china , i had studied japanese and chinese and i wish to actually broaden out that regional experience. Also, i moved on from focusing exclusively at the start of my career on business regulation and trade and investment issues to a much more important issue, a role that involves more politics. Ironically, no trade in my time there, and i also wanted a leadership role. I prepared by being able to follow reporting on the dprk, some of which i would have seen anyway because reporting is actually shared so that you can always read what your colleagues are doing in post. Also being appointed by the front office but before i had gone to the process of obtaining , i had process access to normal breathing papers. In london, preparing before you become the head of the mission on Emergency Planning on various issues have to get right. And also on language training. Like chinese and japanese which i was immediately able to put into active in the post, my ability to do that was partly temperamental, but more limited when i came into the dprk. My successor actually made more of the opportunity, so i have to hold myself responsible. But the answer, it took a long time to prepare, long time to meet people, other heads of missions in the u. K. Not just in the front office, but in other government departments. Happy to say more about that in the activity once i got there. But the second question, which was about the perfection of the minister while i was in pyongyang, you may recall that he disappeared from the mission in london for some time before he reappeared in the republic of korea. And during that time, i called her in daily i called in daily. The official at that time was the director general responsible for your who eventually became vice minister responsible for europe, and i would go in with a colleague for a colleague would go in my place and we would hear the concerns and request, and i would relay it back to london, any points that were made to make. Made to me. In dealing with london, the defection was from london, it was not embassy business. Of course, there was travel communication, but any decisions to be made by the british. To some extent, that, i think, was successful. We continued to have contact there. I think the only thing i could for the say in addition is that the dprk were clearly concerned, but certainly the senior officials were clearly concerned , anxious and upset when he emerged and there was Public Comment in the. I think it is clear that they had hoped there would be somehow no Public Comment. I think the other infections or disparities which had phased out of the buckeye had been quite a long time. So that was a concern. I, for my part, had some concern about the safety of the dprk officials i was dealing with. I was concerned that they might be held responsible for the defection and that the consequences could be very severe to them. I have no way really of saying what happened, but i think that perhaps we do not so much any reason to be concerned about the other colleagues in london and certainly, the official i was dealing with, the senior official i was dealing with was promoted and flourished. Thank you very much. I will ask one last question i was reading the statements on the nights of june of this year shortly after the dprk had an unprecedented number of in one day. He was focusing on u. K. Policy. I will read it briefly. He said the u. K. Remains deeply concerned about the situation which is the result of the governments diversion of resources. After 15 years of two years of covid lockdowns, the condition is deteriorating. The call to provide access for workers to deliver urgent urgently required aid. I am concerned that the British Government is concerned about engagement within the country. Maybe you could say more about how the u. K. Strikes his balances between other factors in the critical in the area Critical Engagement policy especially given the role that the embassy has with so many other factors like the United Nations or lateral institutions. There are very many points one could make about james statements. The first point i will make is that he made it and it has been the consistent policy of the British Government shared by other european governments to comment on the statements. As far as being the practice of the United States under the biden administration, there was a time when short missile launches, which are a violation of the United Nations Security Council resolution, went, as it were, unremarked by the United States. It was very much a u. K. Concern that these should not just pass, that actually come anyway, they should not focus on violations. Obviously, the situation has become a bit more difficult in recent times and one could go into that. In relation to james point about the closure of the dprk borders, there are many things one could say. The first is that while it was an attempt, unsuccessful, ultimately, to prevent covid from coming into the country. If you like, and understandable Public Policy justification on the side. But there is a real concern, if you like, that the measure taken could be more damaging to the population than the action it was intended to prevent. I have no access to it myself, but it is very likely that the situation is dire in terms of Economic Activity within the dprk. Indeed, even if it is suggested as in the second half of the 1990s. Behind the statement, it was brought out in the point that you read, the, the priorities, the dprk continues to launch vessels, as we believe to prepare the capability of the Prime Minister. While under lockdown, which is a sign of where it is allocated its best resources, the money spent on Ballistic Missiles is money not spent on the World Wellbeing of the population. As a general assessment i am not there, i cant make the assessment but the impact of the closure and the increasing role of the state in the economy probably had an effect on markets, which will affect wellbeing. But it is not just, of course, the diplomats. It is the u. N. International staff. While they are not there, there may be some exception to this, but as far as i know, there can be no humanitarian aid project carried out in the dprk by the International Organizations. And there can be no International Monetary projects. So that is obviously unhelpful for the wellbeing of the dprk people. In terms of if the mc were there, we would be relating directly to the dprk in country which is more direct than speaking to officials at the embassy in london. Offers from the British Government, and that cannot be done at the moment. Obviously, we would be reporting what we saw on the ground and if there were more International Organizations carrying out activities, they would report back on what they saw. It is a lot of information, but it is just one aspect of the lines of communication, which is currently, i think, dprk policy. I am not saying that the dprk are blind to the u. K. Embassy, they didnt expel the position, they just created circumstances that the u. K. Decided it couldnt continue. But i am sure there are some, not all, who do not regret the absence of pyongyang with foreign diplomats observing. Thank you very much. Lots of q a from the audience already lined up and back and forth on the timeline somewhat. David is wondering if you have any thoughts about the reports this week saying that north korea is supplying russia with millions of artillery shells and rockets. How concerning a development is this, and what do you think we can expect from russia in return . Thank you. I have no way of verifying that. I am sure that in my previous role as coordinator of the u. N. Panel of experts, i would do my very best to seek information to enable the panel to perform its own independent assessment of what is actually happening. The dprk, of course, in the past has been a supplier of weaponry from small arms upwards and ceases to raise revenue by doing that. I do not know whether that story is correct. I have no independent information. I do know that the dprk has repeatedly received support for russia and ukraine, despite the fact that it has had relations with ukraine previously, and clearly, it wishes to remain on good terms with russia as it wishes to remain on good terms with china and i assume that that is in part because it wishes to frustrate any further action within the Security Council by having russia and china aligned in blocking any further action. If it could, i am quite sure that the dprk would sell arms to whoever would take them. Of course, that is a violation of the United Nations Security Council arms embargo. I believe they continue to dispatch overseas. It is also contrary to the sanctions resolutions. What it is doing, what it is able to do, i dont know. Thank you very much. I will start grouping some questions together. Firstly, what your impressions are of the Trump Administration policies. Coordinated with u. S. Officials as they are visiting pyongyang, as you met them and other capitals. While you are in country, kim jongun was pursuing a number of economic policies. Did you or your staff have discussions with dprk economic officials that shed any light on that . Especially as youre saying much of your work has been on top of politics. Thank you. Any conversations about u. S. Policy toward dprk while i was ambassador. Ive long forgotten the dates. My view will of course, i am a different state here, and in terms of the period at the escalation of rhetoric up to fire and fury, the could even see a rationale for some of it. But i think a number of people are concerned about what the consequences of the rhetoric might be, but more particularly, what the consequences might be if there were kinetic action taken following on from that. I dont recall any u. K. Policy paper at the time, but i dont recall any endorsing or supporting kinetic action. Certainly there were many public statements made by expecting concern about the risks of such action. In terms of president trumps decision to engage directly with kim jongun which led to the singapore summit, at the time, it is not right for me to criticize policy, it is for me to feed into my own government policy. I could offer observations from the ground, but policymaking by the u. S. Is for the u. S. I said to others that i didnt think it was wrong to seek to engage leader to leader. Rationale before that. What i do think is that unfortunate that it was proven impossible to dock a working level negotiations in the runup, really, to the singapore summit and then more particularly, following the singapore summit in the runup to which i think made the outcome inevitable and regrettable. But whether the United States was there is plenty of evidence about this, trying to engage in levels below kim jongun, or anything the United States could have done to actually help succeed in that and ensure that there was ground fall, a second summit, i cant say. I do think that the decision that you see in the administration, although it has implementation to have a calibrated corrective approach is a better approach than trying for one particular outcome. We did have as much contact as we could with dprk officials about economic reform. We were approached about economic loans at the mission where i had been informed before having the meeting that if we had this meeting, it was not going to produce any British Investment and the request to have the meeting fell away. I do remember a meeting with economic officials in which i commented, as everybody knows, that the published statistics were really useless because they would tell you about a percentage change from a figure that wasnt given or some number from which you could deduce almost nothing. And the response of the official ive dealt with was look, we are not enemies, we will lose them against us. Because they keep making investment, it has made it frustrating to have a meeting with little report. I did have discussions around economics that are also around health policy. In other words, sometimes when we get a more useful set of answers. In 2018 for instance, the publication of the unicef statistic might indicate a survey with a real step forward in terms of the publication of information about the dprk. There was little positive to report from the information given to us. We raise it quite repeatedly, the german ambassador was particularly vocal on the subject. To be frank, by the end of 20, it was no real. That is the questions i want to raise before the end of our time. He mentioned you and he had discussions and that he had been able to maintain u. K. Medical facility over zoom. This question is when the for see u. K. Medical educators being allowed to pyongyang. Even food security. Thank you very much. I dont know if it would be possible to return to the delivery of medical aid in person. I mentioned that one of the considerations it is hasty and in 2017, took a slightly different view of the safety of those who had passports and those who didnt. It was for that reason that the British Council program had to close, because the exit from the country couldnt be guaranteed by the policies. Even after the restoration of diplomatic relations, that there was any change in the business government which of course is not mandatory, but i would be wise to follow it. In terms of medical programs, in the dprk, when the British Government sued the foreign office, gave small support to a couple of helpful medicalrelated programs. That they were not necessarily medical treatment as well as a wellbeing program to support for women in the menstrual cycle and their dignity. But there were others as well. I had considerable numbers of discussions with the World Health Organization in pyongyang, but also talking to london about the World Health Organization Health Programs and actually in new york, to some extent, as well. I supported the continuation of destination programs in which they can serve within the program which i thought was a misguided decision. But others are probably more up to speed on the current position in terms of vaccines into the dprk. There has been some, i believe, but i am to say that this has changed. But i think it has complicated everything. I am sure that is not as specific an answer as you would like, but it was a matter of great concern and important in our dealings with officials in the dprk. Thank you so much. That does bring us to the end of their time. Thank you to everyone who has tuned in via zoom, youtube. Please stay tuned for the next episodes of this series. Sign up for east one center and National Committee of north korea newsletters and social media to see the next episodes of the series and other activities from our institutions. Master morgan, it has been a privilege and a pleasure and good day to all. Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you to everybody who attended and asked questions. Announcer coming up shortly, the white house covid19 Response Team and other federal Public Officials will be holding a press briefing on the administrations response efforts. We will bring that to you live in just a couple of moments here on cspan. While we wait, we will show you a portion of washington journal. Host the Deputy Washington Bureau chief for insider, he is here with us to talk about members of congress and potential conflicts of interest, the stock act and what may be next in terms of Financial Guidance for members of congress. Dave, in terms of what are the current rules governing members of congress for financial trade like that. That is the stock act, effectively the rule of the road that covers itself as per congress about a decade ago. This is in response to scandals and situations that had taken place in the immediate years before lawmakers not necessarily dealing with their personal funds, what would be too many distressing the public interest. Number one, it addressed conflict of interest for lawmakers who had been investing their money in a way that could directly conflate or contrast in a not so great way with the public decisions that they are making extensively on behalf of the politics. Another one was Insider Trading where lawmakers were, in certain cases, had used information that they had information by being an elected official and taking that information and having it inform personal Financial Decisions buying stocks or other things. And the other thing was transparency. More details and all of that more quickly so that they could, we could see what lawmakers were doing. It is adding another layer of security, if you will to the process to make sure that voters have information to act on themselves when they went to the ballot box. For example if they didnt like the idea of a member of congress who sat on say the Services Committee purchasing stock in raytheon or one of the defense contractors that relies on government funding to do its business and the government funding can increase stock prices. So they would have that Information Available in a relatively quick amount of time. Host lets say if a members child or wife or brotherinlaw but the same sort of stock, would that be transparent to the public, to the media . Guest it addressed that too and not only the lawmaker is subject to these rules but dependent children, and spouse. If you look at the report from any member of congress, what they have to do is not only report their own personal stock trades but those of their spouses, those of their dependent children and it is sort of an extreme example of this that we see frequently right now is House Speaker nancy pelosi. She does not personally trade stocks, but her husband who is a capitalist not only has worked trade stocks but personally trades stocks in a way that would benefit him and benefit his spouse who happens to be the speaker of the house. He trades at tens of millions of dollars in Stock Options every year. We know that based on the reports in silly nancy pelosi certifies herself. Host what about the ramifications . What is the enforcement of the stock act . Guest its fairly strict that if you violate any of the provisions of the stock act, you consent before you can get sent before the committee which has the power to reprimand, center or in extreme situations kick a member out. Also, there is potential criminal liability that could come with this too or the department of justice could investigate if they were acting in illegal ways. Exchange commission could investigate and has in one notable incident involving senator richard burr. All of these things can happen simultaneously. The penalties over the past 10 years have been incredibly light. The investigations that have taken place are almost universally have led to nothing happening and some sort of concern that has been raised especially in the past many months is what good is the law if ultimately it doesnt have any teeth . Lawmakers may not be compelled to do the right thing or they may get involved in activity that is not going to be becoming of them. Host you opened the door therefore the weaknesses. A 10yearold law now, defined some of the other weaknesses that you think need to be addressed by congress. Guest one of the fundamental issues is the third column i just described which is the transparency aspect. If you dont know what a member is doing, you dont know how a representative is investing their personal finances. You cant tell if there is a conflict of interest. What we have found in our reporting along with other media organizations is 71 examples that we have found since last year of current members of congress who have violated the stock act disclosure provision. It is relatively minor, they may be a few days late of what is a 45 day deadline. Any sale, purchase, exchange of stock or related financial implement. But in some cases, it has been months or even years past the deadline. Congress has established for itself the rules of the road that congress created for congress. So when you have a situation like that and some situations involve hundreds of stock trades the months late and potentially millions or tens of millions of dollars in some cases. The yield entity for that which has come to bear is a 200 late filing fee. All of these cases that i just mentioned, that is basically the extent of the penalty that we found. The critics of this law who say the stock act is simply too weak , theyre just going to keep doing it. There are no ramifications if you can go and rob a bank into the Police Officer is not going to chase after you, my keep rubbing thanks. Banks. Host the organization has been relentless on reporting on this. One of the headlines 71 members of congress have violated a law designed to prevent Insider Trading and to stop conflicts of interest. We welcome your calls and comments. The lines are 202 7488000 for democrats. 202 7488001 the republicans and independents and others 202 7488002. Whats next . What has been proposed to fix it . Guest back in december we published an article. There are stories, investigations to try to make this real. Try to explain what conflicts of interest, or perceived conflicts of interest are in play. It has not engaged in the proper disclosure of their finances. We also have senior congressional staffers who are subject to the stock act and they too if they are very late or have failed to disclose their activity, we reported that as well. When that published, we asked nancy pelosi in a press conference, Brian Metzger he asked her what do you think of this . Announcer you can watch this program in its entirety on cspan. Org. Up next, the white house Response Team holding a press briefing on the administrations response to the pandemic. A major milestone. A major milestone we mark heading into the labor day weekend. The fda authorized and the cdc recommended new, updated covid19 vaccines for all americans 12 and above. This makes