from the hudson institute, this is just under one hour. >> good afternoon, i am mike durand of the hudson institute and i'm joined today by might stay was college, brian clark, l schneider and peter, all who are senior fellows at the institute. we are here to talk about breaking the blockade on ukraine . breaking the naval blockade. i think to get started i will return to l schneider and ask him -- bill schneider and asked him to describe the scale of the problem we face right now. can you help us out? bill: thanks, mike. this is a classic come medieval dimension of this campaign. there are roughly 49 million people, according to most recent estimates, that faced starvation as a consequence of their inability to access the grain that is normally shipped from ukraine in the middle east and africa. the russians seek to leverage their ability to blockade the ports on the black sea coast to compel the eu and the u.s. and its allies to abandon the sanctions that have imposed on the russian economy. despite the non-favorable response to russia's respect, they are helping themselves to the ukrainian green. they have brought in supply ships to the sea from the internal canal network of russia and have moved the grain to favor russian allies such as syria. it is a combination of theft and an effort to extract a settlement from the u.s. and its allies. the russians have a formidable capability in the black sea fleet, even though the convention prevents them from augmenting that fleet very much. the division has six frigates and a corvette. the fourth independent summer integrated has approved many submarines. the 41st missile brigade has seven corvettes and they have several smaller craft that are equipped with missiles that would collectively give them a formidable ability to suppress any merchant ships that attempt to escape from the ports. the blockade is powerfully enforced by the black sea fleet. i will stop there. >> thanks very much, bill. brian, can i now turn to you? you're of course the leading defense analyst at the hudson institute and one of the leading defense endless in the country. could you give us a better understanding of the military challenge the united states and its allies face in trying to break the blockade? >> yeah, thanks mike. thank you for moderating discussion. the distance is about 300 miles and the and allies are given some missiles that might help ukraine protect their ships some distance away, but they have a range of about 60 to 80 miles depending what how you use them. ms. got one -- they got a couple hundred miles of water were there is no way for the gradients to protect their shipping. they have shown no compunction against shooting ukrainian ships. they have already caught and signed a couple of ukrainian ships as it is. so the fleet, even though it is composed mostly of smaller ships and submarines, it has dominance in the region. so they have the largest force in the black sea. to try to solve this problem, you got to give ukraine either a long-range weapon from shore like the naval strike missile which has a 200 mile range, or the ability to do things from the air, which is a big solution. have got to give ukraine the ability to use the air to go after the russian surface fleet in particular. so air crying -- aircraft, the reaper aircraft which provide rain the targeting for their land-based missiles and the others can be used to attack ships. even with smaller missiles, which are sufficient for these smaller ships, so you don't need a sophisticated ability to think of these ships, they just need the rich to do it. bigger problem is the summary fleet. i have been on the submarines. they are starting, reliable and not too sophisticated but they are very quiet and stay for weeks at a time. so unless there is an anti-submarine warfare threat, they will be free to use the submarines as well. they use an q nine -- mq9s to destabilize the region, or there's ones out of romania. those aircraft have sonar, radar and torpedoes. they can use those directly to go against the submarines. boss thing is, the option that has been thrown out to maybe escort ukrainian ships out has a lot of problems associated with it. for one, it will put nato ships indirect conflict with russian ships. the one thing president biden wants to avoid is going to be caused by that action. because guaranteed the russians will contest the ability of ukraine ships to leave. trying to escort them out is sure to cause confrontation and probably combat at sea, which will cause casualties on both sides. so better to use the air, perhaps and do this anymore targeted way that may be pushes russia back without resulting in the kind of confrontation that naval battle is likely to introduce. >> thanks, bryan. for a move on to peter, let me ask one more military question. i have read a lot of articles that talk about mining of this. how do you counter that problem? >> the mining in place right now has been put in place by the gradients in an effort to protect their harvests from russian amphibious assaults. the part of lifting the blockade from russia's perspective is removing those minds because -- and russia would prefer that because it gives them the opportunity to threaten ukraine. but from ukraine's perspective they want to keep those in place until they are sure they can leave court and be part of that -- so that is in contention but the mine threat was introduced the worriedly dutch deliberately by ukraine to pick themselves. >> great, thank you. peter, you have just written an article in foreign policy about how the germans after their much wanted ship -- shift toward a more aggressive policy toward russia are kind of reverting to their old policy of being more torrential -- deferential to putin. could you talk about the german attitude toward these questions, and even perhaps about the high politics in general? what are the other european powers saying and how are you reading the washington policy on these questions? >> thanks, mike and thinks all three of you for having me on the panel today. i want to start this by saying that in part because of the germans, there is no black sea strategy within nato. there was a detour, you might appreciate this, mike. nato -- if you read cold war literature, there are terms and nuclear weapons and exchanges. it has been about protecting the industrial heartland of europe in the ride river valley. so while nato has been focused on the north, it is underappreciated russia's interest in the south. a lot of russia's modern-day historical memories connect with the battle of stalingrad on the river to the south. and there was favorite -- famously georgian cruiseship that was in the ukrainian mines, i think he married a ukrainian. and boudin has talked about his attitude about ukraine in that article he published about the unity of the people. interestingly enough, i think because of this german dominance and with the united states has done defending the north, now belarus as part of a security fear, in response to the annexation of crimea and russia's meddling and the donbass and the beginning of that operation and attacking the south, we had a response to mission in the north and the baltic states. i supported that mission because the baltic states are a big responsibility as newer numbers dates and they are quite vulnerable. but i think it is telling that essentially the western european core has been hesitant about supporting any pushback or maritime mission in the baltic sea so long as they were trying to develop european security architecture with russia and there were balance of power to turn questions that were traditionally dominated. and -- these were rather far away facing the baltics and not the german states. the second i would add, and you know more about this than i, but the states, of which three are nato members, turkey, romania and bulgaria, as well as other states, georgia, have the brunt of russian power over the past decade or two. so while from the regular german attitude russia is a problem that is far away and they can afford to the russians and build security architecture, i think president macron has moved into this area. they have added to that they have to accommodate because they are bearing down on russian pressure in syria, armenia and now the northern black sea region. so they with the germans have been skeptical in part because they consider it something if a turkish -- but they're dealing with the realities of russian power and i think that alignment of german turkish attitudes in particular has led to the needle pulling back a bit in their black sea posture. in 2010, a strategic document from nato called for -- alexi is mentioned. the document will be updated this month, june 29, and the strategic conference is being finalized. but i think it shows has the world has changed and the attitudes of back then no longer hold. to give an example of how this german-turkish alignment, which is supported in large part by washington, describes themselves in the black sea, we were watching those russian ships change phosphors into the war zone, they were photographed from the banks is oval, as i was taking place, the match -- the last nato ally ship left in january, a french ship from the black sea. the last u.s. major ally ship was in december and the major nato powers, they have not been there since the summer when the company queen elizabeth used made a detour to the lexie. and the defender of crimea within international waters and the russians really combined with fighter jets and live fire near by and they captured a lot of that. but it really showed the 200 days of presence the u.s. navy did. but out of 60 days, last year -- russia reach 178, 80 days. but russia laid out dozens of ships while nato has not been there. i think the attitude in europe, and part reinforced by the united states, has been focused on the defense posture of russia and they would like the black sea, to dismay of the romanians and the georgians and they were seeing a rise of russian power. >> thanks, peter. bill, turning back to you, i have two major reactions to what we just heard from peter. one, i think it is very obvious that we need -- sooner rather than later -- to come up with a black sea strategy. obviously the russians are exploiting a weakness there. but my second reaction is that it's vladimir putin, when is war started there were so many setbacks to the russians that i think some of us thought the sweeps going to end a lot sooner than it has, and it turns out that as far as the long-term is concerned, putin has more cards to play than i realized when this began. is that your reaction, and what kind of ideas do you have about how we might respond? >> they are very pertinent questions and i think it is probably constructive to have our discussion of the black sea strategy and the larger setting of boudin's ambitions as reflected in the risk and -- risky mirror and the russian world that encompasses a lot of the pre-world war i territory, in poland for example. it's and prudent has used the term existential, associated with the need to acquire ukraine not as a colonial fees -- feet, -- feat, but as a territory that would be incorporated into russia as part of a russian world vision. but when you look at it in that context, this is likely to be a protracted conflict and he does have more cards to play. the ability to call up prior service reserve is an option that will vastly increase the manpower, which has been one of the critical limitations on their result on ukraine. but i think it is also constructive to come as brian resorted to layout, some of this does not work. brian described the difficulties of trying to set up naval escorts to bring the ships safely through the sea. i know it is built on the exercises in the 90's and, but that is not dutch and the gulf, but that is not the more recent suggestion -- the administration proposal to build grain silos on the ukrainian polish order and moving the green by rail to the baltic and poland. the difficulties of movement of -- because of different rail futures has been estimated by the eu to mean that only about 20% of the brain that ukraine has available would be able to be exported. so that's not going to work either. by a process of subtraction, i think the kinetic solution, probably that is the only way we can enable this the grain to be exported, we will be able to hold russia's surface ships at risk and perhaps with a strike to the u.n. resolution or some other international organization to have humanitarian export of the great dutch grain, it could justify more involvement by the u.s., the u.k. and other countries in assuring that the threat posed by the submarines are not used to prevent the export of the greens. so i think there are some difficult not impossible diplomatic approaches that could enable this back by the connecticut authority -- kinetic authority to track and locate russian surface ships and if necessary, sink them. >> brian, i was struck in your opening remarks by the elegance of your solution. because clearly there are redlines the united states and its nato allies have about use of their own forces or imperiling their own forces, including avoiding the risk of any kind of conflict with russia. and as bill just mentioned, you really have to answer the russians in a military fashion. so your solution is to provide the ukrainians with weapon systems that would allow them to protect their own shipping. can you talk to us, what you said was a logical and so elegant, and yet we are not doing it. can you describe a little what you perceive to be the thinking in washington about this option and why it has not been exercised? quick cr, so there are couple of roadblocks people throw up. what are the systems, like the one we are promised to deliver to ukraine, there's one that is sufficient we sophisticated to operate so to transmit to fly those is not trivial. it could be operated by a contractor and those are used by countries around the world where the government of ukraine buys or is given the vehicle and contractors from somewhere, whether the supplier or somebody, they actually operate the aircraft under the guidance and direction of an officer. that is used elsewhere. that could be used here to circumvent the training challenge that might come up. the other issue is to what degree can be -- can they be used offensively, that would constitute a threat to russia, but would make russia upset that we've given them capability and i would argue we've given the plenty of ability. we have artillery that can reach into russia. so it is not -- it is a distinct dutch distinction without a difference when it comes to giving them this, to be able to conduct counter maritime operations. and we are not talking that giving them the crown jewels, were talking about probably short range weapons, gravity bombs that would be useful and damaging and threatening ship. so you give the russians enough to think about that they don't want to maybe wrist one of their ships have a moscow like incident. so i want to avoid those confrontations if they can. so present during dutch presenting ukraine with that would allow those shipments come through and as something more is needed, we could rent that up giving gradients different weapons to go with aircraft, or that may be at the time when nato needs to get involved for the purpose of preventing a global food crisis. but going back to first principles, there's a great point that nato does not have the strategy for the black sea. the russians have taken advantage of that over the years and they have concentrated their efforts in the north sea fleet, the black sea fleet and they have taken some forces out of this one. so they have gotten out of the idea of short range and the waters, russia sees that is their strength and they have building around etc. ideas. they have been retiring and not placing ships like the larger cruisers that constitute their cold war capabilities. so this is an example of russian strategy and action. we need to meet them where they are and start pushing back on this threat they are trying to constitute. >> if i could stay with you for a moment, i think i understood you clearly, just for our viewers, i want to make sure that i got the full -- i got through taking it in full. with regard to the -- giving them drones, they would have to be, i guess we say, unmanned aerial systems. giving them unmanned aerial systems that have to be operated by contractors, that is a redline to the white house because that means they're going to be americans, even if they are not american servicemen, this is a question i'm asking, they're going to be americans on the ground working for the ukrainian military, operating those systems and that would be seen by russia as an escalation by nato. is that the thinking? >> that is one of the concerns why they have not moved forward with this governor own contractor operated model. it is not really valid because there are plenty of americans already in ukraine doing various jobs on behalf of the ukrainian government so this would not be a big stretch to say you've got americans working for a company the ukrainians have hired to help with this. and there are already contractors on the ground helping with training and other dimensions of the war as well. so began, the distinction without really a difference and the white house has to probably be willing to push back on russia, trying to characterize it as a massive escalation. they have to be willing to stand up for the principal of helping ukraine defend itself and restore this. >> bill, do you want to get in here? >> yeah, just a couple of additional points. the u.s. personnel did not need to be in ukraine to operate these. these are operated through satellite communications on sites in the u.s.. so the ukrainian officers who make the decision on launching a missile or releasing munition would be in charge. there would be no engagement by the u.s., but i think it gets to an important point that we should begin to be joined from this experience. we need to better understand the coupling between connecticut threats and deterrence. the dependence the u.s. government invested in the ability of the threat of economic and trade sanctions to deter the invasion has spectacularly failed. the connecticut threat to the russian black sea fleet can be part of efforts to deter the russian aspiration to block the export of this grain, which clearly is serving a humanitarian end. it may be very constructive to integrate these proposals into how we would use the connecticut threat to deter threats to the exporter of the ukraine grain. >> thanks. peter, help me understand the thinking in washington and nato capitals. i listened to mr. clark tell me they're making a distinction without a difference with regards to the provision of this weaponry. and i watched as this conflict has unfolded, the failure of our deterrence as builders mentioned. but i've also noticed how the united states keeps shifting the goalpost, keeps shifting the criteria on what is acceptable with regard to arming the ukrainians. so we learned on monday that we can provide intelligent support because that would be an unwarranted escalation and the lawyers refused to let us do it. on tuesday we learned ok, we decided that is no longer a factor and were going to provide that in terms of support. we were not going to provide the unmanned aerial systems now. wait are going to provide them. so the criteria keeps shifting and i can't figure out what the dynamic is inside nato and the white house. what is the thinking? is there any grand strategic concept about reaching an agreement with putin? are we really just being entirely reactive as events are unfolding? >> i will react to your last question or comments. i think we need to expand the scope of our imagination because the extent that we talk about the scope of these and talking about the rising commodity prices to torches, energy spikes, both of those are directly correlated to the desire for europe to find an offramp, what is seen as -- 3.0. one of the fears about the european delegation and give now, the french, german, romanian and italian delegation, they would come to political terms. this was the potential pause by both militaries exhausting themselves, europe will see an even greater opportunity to codify whatever operational pause there is due to a semipermanent cease fire. i am sure military conflict will resume at some point, but it would see that as an opportunity. so while we talk about breaking a blockade through these means, the europeans see that and say we can make it -- break it through diplomatic means. and the way they try to align the question of being a strong ally -- >> i am sergeant rob. let me just clarify something you just said. you said while we talked about breaking the blockade -- yeah. it is not we the americans. >> know, while we are discussing this the way the europeans do that and think we have to find a diplomatic offramp because that is frightening and scary and a bridge too far. >> is the white house thinking, is the president thinking in keeping with the europeans or does he have a different view? click whitney finished previous thought -- like >> let me finish my previous thought. hungary, bulgaria, slovakia, they were happy to be part of it because of the balkans and there's a lot of work that needs to be done in securing the military flank. that is one question. actually supporting some big we are discussing, europe is in a different place. as for the magician, as much as they have fed themselves for thinking there was going to be an invasion, they thought it would be over in 72 hours or so. so the famous quote is one ski -- zelenskyy gave -- the evidence substantiates that. but this was hugely embarrassing -- it would be hugely embarrassing to the white house if ukraine were to collapse altogether. so they are doing enough to keep ukraine afloat. but it is almost like they have to suffer a military setback or take it serious defeat before a new class of weapons is sent to the ukrainians. so there are 600 to 1000 killed every day, five to 600 wounded on top of that. those numbers have increased according to ukrainian forces. so the rocket systems mentioned earlier, the conditions attached to those -- but it shows there are calculations high the military support. we sort of handcuffed or are prepared to get it. so the considerations from the white house, one, we don't want give to collapse. second, anything that would make this go away on commodity prices and other issues would be great which is why it's not with europeans or for, and i do think there is some concern from the president about escalation and not involving the u.s. into war with nato. i think that would be part of the situation, given that general milley said russia -- it's going to do the rest of the donbass and there's the war with nato so we can be more than we have been. but there are considerations driving the states. in europe, the eastern europeans in particular one victory. the ukrainians want to double those goods because they see that as essential for their defense. there's shelter behind macron she's himself as launching a grant initiative and because ukrainian security or territorial integrity has never been a priority, he talks about ensuring there is an offramp and putin is initiated and so forth. russia is ready and quite frankly, when we look at the battle for kyiv as a moment that caught our attention and now that is final, the russians are saying we are not at one decisive point, there are matters of attrition. i think in that campaign they tie into something. there are forces in germany talking out the importance of giving putin and op ramp -- offramp. >> went to qa from what you just said is that if there was to be an operational pause, we could expect the white house to celebrate that, present it as a victory against putin and work together with the europeans to turn that operational pause into a permanent cease-fire, even if it leaves russia in a much more advantageous position that it was, these are the ukraine before conflicts. is that right? >> the russians need to refill their own source for sure. the ukrainians by 6000 because there is raw and edition. but the russian war effort depends on russia. there are tools that make it difficult to gain access to key technologies but it is up to the russians. the entire war strategy depends on the united states and the west. so the danger is that pruden will push for normalization in return for acknowledgment of his gains. and there's a big trade-off that will be attractive for a lot of europeans and americans. >> did you want to jump in here? >> yeah. the idea of territory being given to russia in exchange for lifting the blockade is not very attractive, probably for ukraine and the sanctions in exchange for not attacking odessa seems like an unattractive proposition. the issue though is also that the sea is arguably where russia has been most successful. it is their most successful gambits must bar a huge point of leverage. -- thus far and a huge point of leverage. so they have a cease-fire, they alleviate a blockade and allow access the black sea, they can turn it back on whenever they want so it gives pruden his ability to turn off and on the flow of manufacturing goods and grain out of ukraine. whenever he is unhappy with the situation. so they forced the west into those continuous concession given to keep putin happen -- happy, unless you demonstrate the ability to prevent that from being successful. >> brian, i totally agree with you. but in terms of reading the tea leaves, after i listened to peter, i came to the conclusion that it is unlikely the white house is going to agree with you. as i your vehicle? >> i agree. i think the white house is unlikely to give ukraine the give ability to break the blockade. they will give them enough to do surveillance and targeting, but they won't give them the weapons necessary to do this beyond the ground-based missiles. so it essentially is a russian lake at this point. >> wow. bill, if i read my colleagues correctly here, none i think the only logical prediction we can make is that this war is likely to end with territorial advancement brian russia and western aqua answers -- western acquiescence in the russian threat to the shipping of ukraine. therefore, more likelihood that ukraine will become if not a failed state, a state that is dependent on the russians, and be, our allies in the region, particularly i'm thinking of turkey, are going to be more inclined to hedge in the direction of the russians rather than against them. the beginning of the conflict we were talking about the possibility that this war would forced turkey to end all hedging behavior and line-up solidly with the united states against the russians. but that does not look like what is in the cards. do you agree with that analysis, and do you have alternative suggestions? >> yes, i do. i was disappointed to see in secretary blinken's announcement yesterday of the additional $1 million worth of arms that would be shipped, including missiles. that he coupled it to facilitating ukraine's ability to negotiate a settlement and that is the first time the u.s. has been defective conditioning transfers on the ukraine, using this to come up with some sort of settlement, cease-fire or whatever, which of course is aligned with russian strategy. they don't have the power to take over the entire territory, as was the case with georgia and ukraine after they took crimea and tried to take a bigger bite out of eastern ukraine, they will refit and come back again in some reasonable period because we know that putin's aspirations go far beyond ukraine. they declared the russian pseudo-state independent, which gives them an opportunity to put more forces on the moldova border, another state they seek to exploit. so i do think that we should revisit, the administration should revisit the opportunity for putting the airborne capability in place. as we discussed, it does not require any u.s. presence in ukraine. there have been 42 air that have been identified in ukraine that could -- where these aircraft could be operated, the special operations command has 16 that it wants to change out and it would be very well-suited to this mission. i think materially it would contribute to deterrence of russian attack after exporting the grain, the problem we are trying to solve. >> peter, do you have any final thoughts you would like to offer? we are coming up to the end of our time, here. any interventions you have or any summations? >> may make this point, but if that analysis is correct, territorial aggrandizement ends up being the result of the war, and he does not have what it takes to go for odessa, they're taking place out of other areas and they have to refit and rebuild, he does not give up his goal of cracking the rest of the coastline, but the one for example in the early stages of the war, though just recently, 2009, 10 or 11, part of in international court of justice case for the ukrainians and these are almost humanitarian waters and if russia does not succeed, they will hold the river basin. the second-biggest river in europe, it flows through nine or 10 countries, germany, austria, hungary, lafayette, croatia, bulgaria, meridia -- romania, this is a major waterway, not open to ocean shipping but it could be helpful. but there would be a friction between article five, frontline nato states and our russian presence across the border. that is not a good outcome for nato. does not inspire confidence and poland, which after belarus is just a jump, hop and skip away from what amounts to -- it is despite the admission or obsession of sweden for the alliance, it is not necessarily a positive outcome, to say nothing of the damage itself. as we sum up here, can we come up with -- i would like to ask each of you, what your definition of victory would be. we obviously -- obviously there is not going to be total victory over russia. there will have to be a negotiated settlement at some point. can i just ask you to give us a sense of what is the minimum from an american national security point of view, the minimum that we need in order to end this war without the russians being in a more advantageous position with respect to nato than they were in before it began? let's start with you, brian. >> yeah. i think we want russia to be negotiating from a position of weakness or vulnerability when it comes to the negotiating table. so put them in a position of having to withdraw a little from the front lines. they would be losing some of the donbass so if ukraine was better equipped to have existing promises of the equipment, it would be made more fully -- it would let them push back on russian gains. -- fundamentally you got to eliminate the blockade or reduce the threat of the blockade because that is russia's main point average going to negotiation. they can always say we have got this way to keep the world hostage and use food warfare to improve our negotiating position. so that is what we need to do, be able to lift the blockade and put russia on its back but in these so when negotiations start, whatever territorial concessions go to russia will be reduced somewhat from what they are going to have a think just because where they are now. >> left the blockade and provide ukraine with the capabilities it needs to ensure that the blockade cannot be reimposed at russia's well. >> >>. >> i assume you agree with him and do you have any additional thoughts? >> maybe embellishments rather than change of direction, but soften the blockade is important not only for the conduct of the conflict, but also for global humanitarian purposes. we really need to be able to separate that issue from the conduct of the war itself. if we are successful in persuading the u.s. government to provide unmanned aerial systems to ukraine to contribute to the campaign as well and provide in that capacity to change the direction of the campaign where the military capabilities that are being provided are imposing or enabling the russians to successfully push ukraine out of its own territory, the russians have increased their share of ukraine territory 7% on edward 23rd to 20% on -- in the middle of june. so they clearly have gained. we have to change the direction of the campaign and ends the blockade to be able to have a basis for some sort of cease-fire or other forms of suspension of a conflict. >> david, i give you the last word, do you have anything to add to what your colleagues have said? >> i do, i do think ukraine has to win back a substantial amount of territory to show the world they still cannot pay and that alone that is for proliferation purposes. if the u.s. is being deterred by an offense of nuclear posture by russia and deterred in this conflict, secondly that crane was wrong -- if all that is taken away it could be disastrous and bleak. they will push over the edge so that is a big concern. and the second, this is more process than substance, but the ukrainians should be allowed to fight as long as they want to write and we should outfit them as long as they would like to fight. it is easy to say you are prepared to sacrifice, but the ukrainians are the ones volunteering. they would like to be on the defensive and take back their own territory. i think we should be supportive of that goal. >> well, thank you gentlemen. you helped me to understand not just this question of the blockade, but i think i have come away with a much better understanding of the role that ukraine and the conflict plays in western defense strategy. >> has a look at what's coming up tonight on c-span. next the discussion on the history of juneteenth and the significance of it being recognized as a federal holiday. then we hear from illinois governor and labor secretary marty walsh at the new hampshire democratic party's 2022 convention. and later, a hearing on efforts to support european energy security amid the russian invasion of ukraine. >> the january 6 committee holds her next public hearing tuesday to examine alleged efforts by donald trump to pressure state election officials and use alternative electorates to block the certification of the 2020 election results. georgia secretary of state brad raffensperger and his deputy are expected to testify as well as arizona's house speaker rusty bowers. we will have live coverage at 1:00 p.m. eastern on c-span three. you can also stream the hearing on our free video app, c-span now or online at c-span.org.