Transcripts For CSPAN Discussion On Nuclear Framework Agreements 20160329

Plan of action with iran. And japan was obviously important as a key element in the overall regional structure. And then ultimately, as a state, it was going to be vital to implementing the agreement, especially the light water reactors. It is less obvious in the issue with Irans Nuclear program, but japan and iran have had a longstanding and uniquely positive relationship that existed prior to the uranium revolution, but also existed after the revolution, so japan is an especially important country in irans practice, and there are also a number of business and commercial relationships to be had between japan and iran, so japan is an important country both from the standpoint of the u. S. , but also the standpoint of iran going forward, so its another reason to have this discussion today and to think about incentives for maintaining compliance. We are honored to have many distinguished presenters and panelists today. Jim will introduce the first panel, but i would like to make a special mention of thanks to two of our colleagues who came all the way from tokyo to be part of this discussion. One will be in the first panel and the other will be in the second panel. Its a long way to come, so we really appreciate it, although we hope you got to see Cherry Blossoms are will before tomorrow. With that, i will get out of the way in let jim takeover. Jim thank you very much, george. And we are going to keep you involved in the first panel, so we will speak to you in a moment. Good afternoon, everyone. I am a senior associate here at the Carnegie Endowment for peace. It has been a lot of fun putting together this prologue series, because it has kind of given me free license to wander farther afield on a variety of foreignpolicy issues that directly or indirectly impact the u. S. And our alliances. We have looked at u. S. Korea relations, we have looked at south korea. We have looked at robotics issues. And now we are venturing further afield to the middle east and nuclear nonproliferation. I wanted to add up front that this is more than an academic exercise. The case we are looking at, the north korean case, is not just an example of an attempt to develop a nuclear deal in 1990 and implement it, it is a growing danger in northeast asia today and poses a lot of nonproliferation challenges and security challenges, Foreign Policy challenges with Nuclear Missile development. Clearly, our efforts to stop north korea from acquiring Nuclear Weapons have not worked. Our present case is one of the most complex and consequential nonproliferation initiatives ever attempted, and i think it really brings into question whether Nuclear Proliferation is a political issue or a technical one. There was an article that made me think about that issue, and i think it is a theme we may revisit throughout the course of this afternoon. Two of the three most complex verification challenges for the iaea have been north korea and iran, and i think the u. S. , Japan Alliance is a central asset in this process. And i think the question today is to what extent and how do we leverage this package. We have two sessions today, and i will beam moderating both. The first will discuss incentives and technical issues. Strengths and weaknesses from the japanese and u. S. Perspectives, and considers how the lessons may be applicable, or not, to the iran situation, and a look at what the head what ahead in the present day and how japan might deal with north korea in the future. Our second session, after a brief break, will be a facilitated discussion about National Interests and an examination of the u. S. And other nations strategies. At the conclusion of the second panel today, we will have a reception downstairs, so feel free to join us afterward for some networking and informal discussion of these issues. So i want to introduce our panelists. To my right, a professor at the graduate school of law in tokyo where he worked on Nuclear Disarmament and international security. He spent his career teaching, but he has been active in policy circles with professional appointments with a variety of governmental consultation groups and Atomic Energy and Nuclear Regulatory commissions. And he was a delegate to the nonproliferation treaty review conference. Dr. Robert on the far left is a distinguished professor at georgetown university. He previously served as the president of the john d and Catherine T Macarthur foundation. He began his Foreign Affairs career in 1974 and later served on the policy planning staff at the state department. He was one of the chief negotiators of north korea during the years leading up to the framework. And of course george, our own Vice President of studies here carnegie, and the leader of our policy program, who works on strategy and nonproliferation issues and is a member of the National Academy of sciences, the committee of arms control, and a number of other a copy ands. We have a great panel to dive into north korea and talk a little bit about iran as well, but let me begin. I want to start off looking at the agreement framework. Thank you very much. I would like to thank you for inviting me to washington. I asked my driver all the way from the airport to stop by, and we stopped for a moment because of a traffic jam. I enjoyed the Cherry Blossoms. I also enjoy them blooming in tokyo. Im here to talk about that the lessons from the framework with north korea and implications for iran. I took this precisely. I mostly focused on the 1990s and early 2000s, and how the agreed framework was filled and the role that japan play during the negotiation. So there is some small hint of the framework, but my time is very much limited, so i may have to go very quickly. When we discuss the success or failure of the nuclear deals, i look at the state level, the national level, and the regional level. Nonproliferation at the state level is containing Nuclear Weaponization capabilities. At least for the time being. At the state level, the security concern is, for example, north korea. From our perspective, do we really seek the collapse of the regime or regime change, or transporting the regime into a more cooperative and non transforming the regime into a more cooperative nonthreatening regime. On the security side, through the nuclear deal, we got to see a more stable, strategic environment. Please think about the situation in east asia. These four different objectives, are they really achievable . This is a very rough sketch of why the agreed framework failed on two sites. There is an obvious gap between the North Koreans and others on the goals for the deal. I think north korea failed to have a sense of security. North korea was able to trust the u. S. I think the north Korean People are suffering from a sense of insecurity. So then, north korea had a complaint about other incentives, and it is very much to do with u. S. Politics, lack of consensus, and the north korean question of providing incentives or strong support outside of the government. In i think they are reluctant to provide that. From the other perspective, the biggest problem is north koreas commitment to the d nuclear is a nation the nuclearization program. To me, there is an unclear sequence. What are the conditions for the incentives . There is a clear contrast between the north korean case and the iran case. I think there is a much better sequence between verification and incentives. Secondly, there are differences in perception among the major stakeholders. And there are loopholes in the imitation of sanctions. North korea kept exploring arms. We kept questioning the thoroughness of the chinese implementation of the other sanctions. I think im going to skip this. Threat how we see the from north korea and the differences among the major players. The difference in approaches and the differences. Japan japans talks is in fact dominated by the issue. Other than nuclear nonproliferation. Japans perception in the 1990s against north korea was mostly on the possible insurgency or terroristlike attacks by the , and alsoan troops Human Rights Violations against japanese citizens, the abduction issues. Threat was notar clear until north korea literally conducted Missile Launch tests in 1998. Because of the domestic politics which was dominated, the commitments is very much over set out by such a political priority. For northrategy, korea in particular, in the early 2000s is twofold. Achieve stability through normalization with north korea. Secondly, supporting u. S. Security action at the global scale. Someone made a reference to the potential deal between japans support of the u. S. In the iraq conflict on the solution of retribution and the abduction issue. Pursue its own strategy for the region. The normalization talks. Because ofgo well some programs on the north korean side had a failure to meet our expect patience. Our expectations. Be we expect is too much expected to much. Issue prevails throughout the process. That is unfortunate, the of this element of japans commitment to the disparity talks. Level isymaker actually public was not so much concerned about it. , the talk about the comparison between north korea and the u. N. For the Nuclear Talks to be successful, we have to and ifbout the element, you compare cases we see some differences. One, with regard to the theework of dialogue in case of north korea, the major stakeholders are included in the talks. The framework talks. That is why it was difficult to make an agreement because of the diversity of the priorities. In the case of iran, the major regional stakeholders outside of areregime, the major powers able to agree, but the outstanding question remains of how to engage the regional for a more longstanding stabilization of the region . Also, if you can pair the level of engagement in the International Market and international economy, the level of iranian commitment in the mucht, it is potentially higher than north korea. North koreas economy is turkey and a dependency on the single exporter which is china. Successfully able to provide sanctions and political incentives, that will be more successful in the case of iran than north korea. That iranl system, has a Supreme Leader, but under the Supreme Leader it is more plural than in north korea. The political equality of iran is more open to public opinion, which is expected for the economy to recover after moving sanctions. That is a strong incentive for the government to pursue nonproliferation. Can pair the level of commitment and association with the regime, in the case of north korea they are always searching to leave the regime. In the case of iran, they kept saying they are staying in the regime. They are keeping the commitment of the regime. Their intention to leave from the regime is very small. That is also a difference. Key strategy objectives, in the case of north said, arey, as i worried about survival with the regime against u. S. Pressure. Upre most likely not to give the Nuclear Option until the very end of the program. In the case of iran, the United States is not certain to threaten the survival of the regime. Their priority is not to ensure the survival, but more about seeking power in the environment. What can the u. S. japan do . What can we learn from other nuclear deals, in particular with reference to the ongoing escalation of the north Korean Nuclear crisis . Between allies, i think that we have shown key things. Closer countries need communications and security consent from both sides. The need to share a common vision. Shape the major stakeholders in the region . And the early 2000s, the Chinese Concern in north korea is not the north Korean Nuclear capabilities themselves, but more about the north korean case japanese and South Koreans to go nuclear. That Regional Security concern between allies we have to share the same objectives in the region. Also, for that, we need to reaffirm a commitment to both sides. Not only the u. S. Commitment, but what does japan need to do u. S. Strategy objectives . On the side of diplomacy, a quarter nation is 2 key things. Coordinate the hayes grier for the United Security council in which japan is a prominent member. For, working together export controls. In order to make the sanction effective, export control is key. A further key is to improve the implementation by other states, not only japan and the united. Tates, but other countries you have to provide support to Asian Countries or other states involved in trade. Finally, showing sanctions need to work is to remind stakeholders to keep the implementing sanctions. Thank you, very much. [applause] thank you. You have given us a great head start on this discussion. I would like to turn to bob gallucci. He was close to when it came about and its implementation. Prof. Gallucci thank you, james. We were in another session before coming here in which one of us said that the north korean deal looks much harder than the iran deal. Im not sure about that. I think the north korea deal was much simpler than the iran deal. I do not know if it was harder or easier, but if you look at it at the complexity, the links, the detail that the iran deal has when we started the , theiations in the spring late spring, of 1993 we had, by my recollection, very simple goals. I was told to get the North Koreans to agree to come back into the nonproliferation treaty. They had announced their attention their intentions to leave the treaty. And that given their formal notice. Second was to get them to accept political safeguards, which are npt, and for the political safeguards agreement 153 four special inspections. Youre old enough to remember 23 years ago, that phrase may resonate. They say they wanted special inspections to look at the sites. When we first met the North Koreans at the u. S. Mission, that is what was on my mind. Get them back into the npt and him to accept special inspections. What were the special inspections about . They had lied to the iea about how much plutonium they had separated. Whether it was a gram or more, when the iea did their inspections, they were able to figure out that there were more , and there was stuff to be found there. The real truth of what the North Koreans could be done could be discerned by going to the site, which the United States told the iea they should ask to see. That is how the crisis began. It is less important than the first point very limited objectives. Get them back into the npt and to accept political safeguards, including inspections. How many special inspections has the iea done . None . This was going to be hard. To talk to the North Koreans about this stuff, it was clear that we did not want the North Koreans to reprocess. Separate plutonium from their reactor they were operating. So, stopping the processing, too. They meaning washington. , no talk about enrichment. If they accepted the north south declaration on deep nuclear station on dean nuclear is learization denuc there would be no Nuclear Material on the peninsula. Too. Was rolled in briefing book is that things like we can make north korea part of the asian economic miracle. I had no idea what that meant, neither did they. I could tell them that if the South Koreans agreed, the North Koreans could visit american bases in south korea and confirm there were no Nuclear Weapons there. I also looked at me quizzically who said we wanted to do that . We disfigured that you might. There wasnt a lot going on here, but we were able to get through the new york stages of the talks to get to the geneva stages next month. There comes the breakthrough, which there is much disagreement over how it happened, but the North Koreans said they would give up their graphite reactors, all of them. That meant one operating five megawatt reactor, a 50 megawatt gas graphite reactors. Moderated by graphite. Wonderful plutonium reactors for weapons. None of them connected to the greater of mankind. Our Intelligence Community estimated it would produce 150 kilograms of plutonium each year, a enough for 30 Nuclear Weapons. By the end of the decade that would be what we would be looking at. The idea was to do something about that. All right. The North Koreans said they would give up all this stuff, if we helped them to get 2 modern water reactors like they built all over the world. Ff we went the negotiations went on for another year as the how that would happen. There is a little complexity in the frameworks about the staging. Here are three stages the first stage, the nuclear activity, the spent fuel, we liaison offices. There are things both sides do you agree moving sanctions. The second phase, they start dismantling stuff. We start delivering real nuclear equipment. Everything ise, dismantled and they have 2 operating reactors. Of the deallness was lost on washington. Notington, in my field, are decisionmakers who spend a lot. F time on Nuclear Energy what i call them, very excited, to tell the north korea will give up their reactors, i got so what . 2 big things paid you cannot give them to give up their processing if you have graphite reactors, because that is in drupal to the fuel cycle is tegral to the in fuel cycle. He gave us a basis with which to insist that there be no reprocessing. If you knew a little bit, it was a real breakthrough. To herse, the react plutonium production reactors. Reactors to produce plutonium, but it is a lot safer for nonproliferation. The deal with the North Koreans was a little complicated, not as complicated as the iran deal. It had the North Koreans doing things we wanted them to do. Compared to not doing a deal and looking at 30 weapons a year production with no production, this looks pretty good. Asterix. Of little one is in the middle of this when im going to the hill to explain the wonderfulness of the deal, the Intelligence Community comes out with a judgment, which they had not yet gone public with, that north korea more likely than not has produced one or two Nuclear Weapons. Since the whole deal was designed to stop them from producing Nuclear Weapons, for the Intelligence Community to announce they already had them come it took wind out of our sails. I convinced th Intelligence Community to say they did not know if north korea had Nuclear Weapons are not. At that point, we did not know. If you look at the slides, youll notice a very painful slide my colleague put up. It said reasons why the agreed framework failed. I do not think it failed, i think the policy failed. Fine,k the framework was the North Koreans cheated. When did they start cheating . Did . Id they win they i dont know the answer. I did not know when i was sitting opposite for those lunches and dinners in geneva if they were cheating then. We caught them in the late 1990s. Doing ask why they were that, depending on when they started, you may have one answer which puts responsibility on us and another that puts responsibility on the north. If they started late, my theory of the negotiation may still be true. My theory of the negotiation was that they were prepared to genuinely you have their plutoniumbased Nuclear Program and maybe not pursue an they got aprogram if relationship with the United States that made the u. S. Launching a policy of regime change entirely inappropriate. They were looking for a political settlement. They did not get a political settlement. They got frozen out after we did the deal. I went on to do other things. Theid establish on peninsula, but we did not tend to the u. S. North korean relationship, upon which i would say the the rest of the deal was based. Agree it the north would to give up Nuclear Weapons when everyone seemed to say it was impossible to conceive they would give up the Nuclear Weapons. It requires that they have a relationship with us that anyone else will not do. It has to be with us. Please dont ask the chinese to offer security for the North Koreans. Let me say one or two other things. Actually, about japan, which im supposed to Say Something about. The japanese understand this deal was bilateral. The United States met with the North Koreans afterwards. Every time that we met with the North Koreans in geneva, afterwards we met with a small delegation from the republic of korea and japan. Genevare in residence in. I. D. Briefed them on what had happened during the day. Very often those sessions of debriefing were very difficult with representatives from the republic of korea, who were suspicious that we americans were selling them out. A you remember, that was theme for the president of south korea at the time, which made things difficult for us. The only person who really enjoyed the way the South Koreans were torturing us that was doing the negotiations who would not hesitate to pull my string when we got into a meeting about how her allies were commenting. I understood that, because we were negotiating over something vital to south koreas security. I did not think it was an appropriate they were deeply interested. The japanese were much more relaxed about the negotiations and the South Koreans. The one point where they were , when the North Koreans asked for insurance of what they were getting out of the deal to give up their wear lightpon still water reactors they wanted insurance from the United States the reactorsat is were not delivered by whatever ternational insulation we may create the United States of america would commit to building the reactors. I brought that to washington where they laughed. Ive said, i need the president to write something. As you may know, the United States Congress Appropriates money, not the president. The president could write Something Like this, but it was contingent on execution to congress holding the money. The willingness of the president to to this depended on us having a Financial Plan for how this. Ould be it turned out that everyone wanted to build these reactors in north korea, the russians, the germans, everyone. No one wanted to pay for them. The South Koreans said they would pay for the lion share, but they wanted help from tokyo. We said, we will pay for the heavy fuel well. Then, i was after to tokyo to get the japanese to fill in whatever was left after the lion provided his share. Hat was very uncomfortable the senior japanese commander that was present said at a forum like this that i was beyond rude in pressing japan to come up with this commitment. He was absolutely right. I was panicked. If i could not get the japanese to pay their part, i could not get the South Koreans, i could not get the president to sign the letter. Off. Ually, rudeness paid i got a deal putting those things together. Off we went. That little bit of diplomacy stands out as unusual. It is wrap up and say never the modality for these talks that has been important in my mind. Provided consultations are closed and continue on. When you have talks and there are 100 people in the room not much gets done. If you have bilateral talks, as long as the consultations with i think thatccur will work. And thethe iran deal north korean deal are political deals. Have a lot of technical bells and whistles, but they are political. Do not takenments proper care to mind the politics, which i do not think we did in the middle 1990s after the agreed framework was pray thed, and i Implementation Team will stay on the case in respect to iran, there will be trouble. Thoughdes expect, even on the iran deal they are not looking for a broader political settlement, they are looking for political performance. We need to be careful. Thank you. James that is a useful and interesting story. I asked george if he would be willing to discuss and add his thoughts on the agreed framework. Into thee bridge us issues we are dealing with today. George thanks, jim. I think the two presentations were very good. Brief and say that there is a lot of value in thinking and talking about the agreed framework in relation to the iran nuclear deal. I do not think we would have this discussion just about the framework when we talk about the challenges we faced. There is this thing to compare it with, the joint conference plan of action. It is worthwhile. Throughout the negotiation of the iran deal, and afterward, a of people rot of the dprk a lot of people brought up the dprk experience. Usually negatively. I think having this discussion remains useful. Wrote a paper last year that talked about the similarities and differences between the agreed framework, and what was looking to be an agreement with iran. I do not want to go through those other than to say, and you andd it in a sense, Nobumasa Akiyama has a good slide that summarizes the differences there are differences in the deals length, andin text, detail. There are differences between the countries. And iran. Their sense of identity, confidence, where they stand in the region, the world. The natures of their qualities. It are wrong, the peoples expectations iran has elections. At differentctions levels, but the president ial elections always ends in a surprise, which is kind of interesting when you think about the elections that the d prk has. For example, in china, russia, or other places, even though iran is a terrible place in politicsdiscourse, matters and i think that has an influence on their willingness to negotiate and how this place through. Ishink the u. S. Different now than it was in 1994 but also similar in ways that want to elaborate on because this is a big problem. And maydiscourse in may be somewhat tokyo as well, we tend to focus on the bad guys, the people that have the Nuclear Program that was the problem whether it was dpr k or iran. We do not focus much on the reliability of the u. S. As the lead negotiator. And morepacity importantly its willingness over time to fulfill its obligation. The is a longterm commitments. Nuclear that is a major problem will have some major longterm implications. Bob talked about the agreed framework. What the North Koreans had to dismantle could be dismantled relatively quickly, but then there is ongoing verification and monitoring. Construction of reactors, which is part of the deal, no matter what the vendor tells you , theyre probably going to double it. Thats inevitably a longerterm process. With the iran deal, it turns. Tself the medium ones go between 1020 years, and some of irans commitments are indefinite. Is just needs to be understood and assessed more honestly in the u. S. Then we tend to do. The reliability of the u. S. System in delivering what is supposed to be promised. We have already alluded to with the agreed framework what a struggle that was to get congress to appropriate funds. Bob used to run around not quite frankly but desperately tried to do this. It was quite unbecoming of the worlds sole superpower that one had to do it this way. Then there was a relatively undefined process of normalization. If that have been defined and you started to deliver on it, that best storm in washington over what that would have would haveat if a been enormous. And he couldve question how long we would have implemented these terms. The way, with the other party is supposed to be interpreting about whether they should keep complying or whether they should start hedging. I think the same thing is goes on an iranian mines for very good reason. It has been at the forefront there. Will the u. S. Deliver . That is one of the reasons iran insisted on getting sanctions relief up front. They won to have a payoff obviously, which theyre not quite getting in the way they thought they would. They also wanted to test the u. S. Commitment. Theres a lot of reason to question whether we will be able to sustain that kind of commitment. I am sure that we will do the president ial campaign. Whether we will after the results of the campaign, i dont know. We dont know what the new congress is going to look like. I hope i will be retired. I might be dead by the time the expires, but who can predict what the american body politic is going to be like . There are still deliverables and ther in there. This is something we dont Pay Attention to. You go to other countries and they say, we would need it in a treaty. You would say why . Because we do not think the u. S. s commitments are worth anything. We watched what happens in congress and we won a treaty. I said why the one in a treaty why do you want it in a treaty . They say its harder to do with a treaty. You have to apologize and say there are no more treaties because no one can get 67 votes to ratify a treaty on anything. You have to take an executive agreement. Has become very difficult when we have seen it on Climate Change recently in other things. About wasas talking just the sort a short slice and time about the d prk and we will have the implementation of the iran agreement as well. That is an alliance relation too. Our allies are wondering about our constancy as well as iran it what it means to them in five years and 10 years. Aboute talking earlier japanese banks because its a problem now with the iran deal, which is that even though sanctions are supposed to be ,elieved, a lot of actors president to these and others around the world, are not seeking business in iran because theyre worried about either how the thing will be interpreted or whether there will be new sanctions imposed by congress. No one wants to get in trouble in the cost of compliance is too high, so they say forget it. Added the iranian market. Its not a violation of the agreement, but it feels like a th betrayal. This judgment depends somewhat on the sense of constancy and the reliability of the critical process. If you are advising one of those banks, go now and do not worry about the president ial election and what might happen next january, nothing will change. You cannot make that. It has effects on the behaviors. Thank you, george. Im going to facilitate a little and thenn up here around 3 15 p. M. , open it up to public question. I want to start off with this issue of and i believe this goes to bob a little bit. When i started researching for this event, the impression i had was that we took a tougher line, a firmer line in terms of what we were willing to allow visavis reprocessing or other kind of elements of the north Korean Nuclear capability. In the case of iran, we are now talking about widening this gap or opening up a longer time horizon where irans substantially pursue a weaponize program. Complete verifiable disarmament in the context. Listening to your discussion, it sounds at the beginning at least that it was necessary. North koreans were kind of willing to offer it. It was really in the context of the political side. That wefair to say almost did not have to be or you do not have to have debates about how firms or principled the agreement had to be or was there an element of that . I think it was a simpler time. [laughter] this was the first time we had actually done Something Like this. And i think capbased lens was the key question that is at base now what people talk about our policy with north korea and we just experience that in the room. If i asked for a show of hands, how many people do you think believe the North Koreans would give up their Nuclear Weapons in a sort of omnibus deal . 1, 2, 3 people . I rest my case. At that point, there was a lot of skepticism between the. Ntelligence community i believe then that we could do a deal. There was some talk, by the way, that we could do this deal provided the deal was based on the assumption that the regime would collapse before too long. That come away to minute, we not doing the deal on that basis. Is reason i can say that that senator mccain, who i have great respect, says i hate this , but i can support this is that was the basis of the deal. I said thats not the basis of the deal. And then he said, i hated no one support it. [laughter] we could be in the same situation now. Its just the productions of the demise of north korea are constant. Remember the soft landing, hard landing . The North Koreans did not plan on landing. They were just want to keep flying. Going to keep flying. I think the deal was based for both of us the ideal that they would give up their Nuclear Weapons program. It is possible it was not for them. I do not know when they started their negotiations with the or that Johnny Appleseed guy. If we knew for sure that was the only basis on which they did the deal, then ok, they would never play to give it up, but i dont know that. Deale, this is still a that went to fundamentally our objectives which were pretty simple. Morede them a little complicated by insisting that reprocessing or enrichment, although you cannot find the word enrichment in the agreed framework. It prohibits enrichment with great knowledge or forethought because we thought that would open up another three years of discussion. James schoff thank you. Let me direct this a little bit to you, but anyone can comment on it. Missiles for example we had separate negotiations with the North Koreans on their missile capabilities with their program. Linkeds not specifically to the agreed framework. There are other aspects of the deal. I want to ask you to think back to that time. , wastokyos perspective tokyo looking at this is kind of unsatisfactory or did not go far enough because it did not capture all these different pieces or was there general satisfaction with the accomplishment that it was just this idea afterwards of the fact that japan got recruited into andg a part of this eventually putting half 1 billion ultimately is what they were in for . I think the South Koreans put about a billion in are so towards the program. The viewu recollect from tokyo at the time, especially in the context of what was in and what was out of the deal . Nobumasa akiyama im out of government so i did not have insider information. My observation is from the outside. Was to addresson the issue of abduction. Of theminds me prioritization within the japanese government. The Nuclear Threat posed by north korea at that time was not really a minute. Imminent. There was no credible weaponization capabilities with north korea and theres no sort of sense of urgency on the side of japan. Abduction issue, that was for the government to deal with. Government ese also i would like to remind that the japanese government was very fragile at that time. I think we need to sort of mobilize face issues. Issue is so much of that consensus out in the public. The context would prevent the japanese government from sort of dealing with the Nuclear North Korea as a top priority. That is one thing. Ask aally want to question of mr. Gallucci. In your analysis, what was the real key program for north korea not complying or implementing the agreed framework . Of oil ore failure the failure of providing security guarantees . Someone maycci wish to correct me, but we did not fail to deliver, but we failed to deliver it on the schedule we said we would deliver it on. We just did not do it because as george points out, i was running around with my hat in hand trying to get money for various places in our budget to pay for this. It was hard work. We did not meet the schedule. I do not think the deal would have failed because we were not delivering heavy fuel oil quickly enough. On the other issue about if we looksurances, at the agreed framework, it says we will offer essentially negative security assurances. Well be had in mind was Something Like the mpt negative security assurance. Maybe moderated a little bit. After all, if you go back in time, we have just lived with ukraine and we had in mind Something Like that. But we never got there. They never said we need security assurance. You ays, we still ou security issue. Stayed away from the ukraine language and stick to the mpt language. Absent the policy is correct, but if you are drawing implications from that ,obert gallucci ive got you but its not us that should be whacked for the ukraine language. Its the russians. Say,ught you were going to where they unhappy about delivering that because that was also going more slowly. That is probably true, but i cannot imagine that the fundamental north korean decision to material from my perspective, to materially breach and violate the framework was because of either of those. I think it was because they never intended to give up the because theyam or did intend to but they expected much more clinically from us than they ever got. I would like to believe in b because hope springs eternal. James schoff if we take that to today where we are with north korea, with all the water that has floated under the bridge and skepticism that has built up,he advancement of the program if i can ask all of you to think a little bit, if we were to try to enter into a discussion with the North Koreans about denuclearization or somehow alleviating the risk for the , in thef the program iranian case, they have arguably not gotten as far as north korea is now, but in the most recent iea declaration about past activities, one could argue that they were relatively forgiving or at least did not demand or oneccounting of criticism ive read about the program is that theyve not accounted for all activity uptodate. They are primarily focused on , on creatingrd this wider gap to alleviate the pressure on this issue. To take a similar approach with north korea and say, you know what . We are going to be more forgiving on everything that is has taken place today, but we are really going to illuminate the program now and the means by which it could deliver more Nuclear Programs, etc. Im not necessarily advocating that. Is there an opportunity there or are we so far gone from the north Korean Program or the regime is today that there is no opportunity to do this . George perkovich my sense is part of what the agreed framework is is what you have argued. Between 1992 and 1994, there was this tension. The iaea and other purist were saying they have to allow the inspections to fully account for what they had done in the past. Part of the spirit of the agreed framework is that it would be great to get to that, but the vital thing is to first stop them from going forward. In the sense the logic that you were talking about was already. Ried with the North Koreans with iran, its a bit more therecated in so far as are those who would argue the us not the past and let let that trip up the implementation of the deal and so on. There are still moments where the iaea has to offer its conclusion about irans program and whether it is purely in order to provide some the deliverables to iran. Answersaea can get the to those questions, we will have a much more difficult time making conclusions. That story has not been fundamentally Robert Gallucci imagine this with me. The reality is as follows. 12 advocatings Nuclear Weapons. It has a stockpile of fissile 30erial that is composed of kilograms of plutonium and 50 kilograms. I would say that is reality. We do not know that though. The North Koreans know that. Could you do a deal in which the North Koreans say we will and our Nuclear Weapons program . So there will be no reprocessing plants. Plutonium be no production reactors on a grid. There will be no uranium enrichment facilities none. They have no need for that right now. No enrichment facilities. They commit to know fissile material. Plutonium, but in the future enriched uranium. They turn in their weapons and Nuclear Material and give a six us six Nuclear Weapons and a bunch of plutonium in a rich uranium, but not all of it. We do not know that they only give us a portion of their stocks, but we certainly can monitor, probably, the programming. Is that a deal you would take . Well, since i do not know they are lying, yeah. T i ever be able to verify what i ever be able to verify down to single digit Nuclear Weapons hidden in some place in north korea . Not a chance. What about fissile material . Not a chance. We are sitting here talking about a hope chest. So there is your deal. James schoff do you want to react to this . I have a final question for you before we open it up. Nobumasa akiyama a quick footnote. This reminds me of the thoroughness and the completeness of this. If the project of verification is impossible, should we keep up the object of reduction . Probably no. I think we have to cover the politicalme sort of deal of confidence. Yearsare able to buy 10 for the context building and the reduction by political means, for that maybe we may have to make a compromise on our side in terms of the gulf that we have to achieve goal that we have to achieve. There is no 100 denuclearization, but it some element with a security assurance that we have to provide. In return, we have to get more thorough acceptance of the safeguard arrangement with the iaea. The lastoff this is question i want to ask you. He talked about the context of the agreed framework of the 1990s that the perception from perceivedthat the threat from north korean Nuclear Weapons was relatively low, at least on a scale of other issues in the two countries. Today. Uch higher now between the missiles and the Nuclear Weapons is the threshold from tokyo now different than the threshold in washington . Is there a situation where we have to be careful where washington may become willing to accept something that would be now unacceptable from just a purely Security Threat perspective . Nobumasa akiyama thank you. My answer is that contrary to what ive said just a moment ago. Moment, the perception of the Nuclear Capability of north korea is much higher than in the past. That is kind of a common perception within security clearances. I think the problem is the gap of the perception between public and government. Public perception is still dominated by the issue of abduction. Willingkers are more in the United States, but i think the local environment may be enough for the government to pursue this. James schoff let me give people in the audience a chance to ask our panel some questions about north korea and north koreas relation with iran and the two countries. We will start with this woman. We have a microphone that will come to you. Let us know for the sake of the video who you are and where youre from. Stephanie cook with Nuclear Intelligence weekly. I had to sort of slightly separate questions or comments. It seems to me that im really interested with what bob said pointnorth korea at some crossed over a line. Either it was always intending to or something happened inside of the regime and it crossed over. Know may have we not got that far. If you get a deal and it works , have that point occurs you kept them on the safe side of this equation . And if you dont, as obviously happened with the case of north korea, has it gone too far . Should they be sitting around a disarmament table rather than a nonproliferation context and negotiation . I just want to ask you that because i think once a Weapons Program takes hold it is like a virus. The military side of the government has basically one over the nuclear establishment. It is very hard to go back from that point. The second question i wanted to ask is especially the view from japan about the statement i donald trump that he thinks we should let south korea and japan go nuclear and we should not pay for the nuclear shield. Is there any relationship pressure,at and u. S. More public statements about japans reprocessing program . James schoff should we take the first one first . Robert gallucci i may not be right on point, but i would say knowniran had a well Nuclear Program to get a triggering package to the work to develop that triggering to anticipate a delivery system. They had a program to do all that. Knowledge, of our they did not get the fissile material and they may or may not have done enough of the other stuff. Fact,atter of at one point they concluded they stopped doing the other stuff. I dont know if it was because they were done or they wanted the impact. It seems now to be in cryogenic arrest for some time. Know dontorean where the Iranian Program is, we haveublic literature stopped short of. Stopped the North Koreans short of. I dont think they actually had. I think they were wrong about the Nuclear Weapons. I think that was wrong in 1994. Obviously, after we discovered it was part of an axis of went ahead with their program and produced Nuclear Weapons. Different circumstances, different timing. If we did a deal now we would have to be dealing with Nuclear Weapons, which is why i put that scenario on the table. Trying to persuade some of you you should not walk away because you do not know how to verify it. From the general when he was testifying and the marines inrted to accept draftees vietnam, are you lowering your draftees . To accept he said the United States marine corps will never lower its standards, however, we no longer meet them. I am of the same view. You will not lower your standards, but you will have to pick your reality. Prof. Gallucci before we get to the trump question and the japan peace, i think donald trump fails to understand how much japan contributes to the cost the and it would United States more to bring them back from japan then to leave them deployed there. Not to mention, the disadvantages of having Nuclear Proliferation in the region. Sensei . First, i have to say that i would pay my own money to have you explain that trump. George it could be a new reality. We are very much in very much possibleed to have a president of the United States to think about Nuclear Options. Two reasons. The Mainstream Security people understand the Nuclear Option is not the best option for japan. Secondly come the u. S. Japan is beyond the defensive publicbut more playing goods for the stability of east asia. Feeling is, is the United States really giving up the world leadership option . Happens,eally naturally, that will lead to losing the position against china, russia, and it undermines what he is trying to pursue with a strong United States. The implementation of japans choice on the fuel cycle also has a strong connection. The one thing i could say is japanese relationship of the fuel cycle program, the history of getting the freedom of policy choice from the United States. If you look at the details in the 1970s and 1980s, the negotiation between the and nine japan was harsh. Not likeabout north korea and the United States but there was tension between the two countries. Japan hopes the United States will respect japans decisions no pressure on the japanese which would make it harder for them to decide on the nuclear fuel cycle. Thank you. Other questions . I will go to this gentleman, then over there. Let us know who you are. I represent advanced hospitality. Am a student of history the question is, especially, robert, who has the perspective is our own errant security reasons in the israeli iran, in ron in. Ndia, a couple of years back it happened in pakistans case. [inaudible] it happened in south africa. It was in brazil many years ago, the program. A couple of years back. Is it because of that . My question is to robert because he has a more historical perspective. Prof. Gallucci and i am older. I heard you say lets give it to the old guy. As you know in academia theres a lot of literature as to why Nuclear Weapons are acquired by countries. These decisions are driven by will beon that security enhanced by the acquisition of Nuclear Weapons. Inindia, the first test was 1994. It is hard to make that a security argument because they did not do anything after the test. There are other factors that go to prestige, internal issues, bureaucratic issues but, fundamentally, you are right. Is a security issue. Not so much argentina, but certainly pakistan looking at an asymmetric balance. The North Koreans told me during the first week of negotiations we want Nuclear Weapons because we saw what you could do in ir aq with regime change. They were stunned by what we had done. It is true for israel, who was was looking at the soviet union at the time. Having said that, one of the things that popped into my mind was when you say what you said, i want to say yeah. What does that mean . It is most often security driven, but that does not mean there is no replacement. That there are other ways of meeting security needs. That is what we thought we were doing in the case of north korea. In other cases, it was not security. With south korea we had an alliance and were able to use the alliance to lever the South Koreans away. Similarly with taiwan. If persuaded them they did not want to do that. Deterrent is important to countries calculating if they want Nuclear Weapons. In some cases we will not have a deterrent. Pakistan asked specifically if we would extend a deterrent. We said no. I would discourage you from thinking when you settle on the reason for a country wanting to acquire Nuclear Weapons you have an irresistible force. I dont think so. I have two questions. Chinaited states and prepared a nuclear deal with iran. Coordinationg the will Work Together to take pull back north korea to the negotiation table for talks. , whichnd question which oneions can cause more threat to International Nuclear security . Thank you. James thank you. Think i will i respond to the first question about how the United States and china could bring north korea back to negotiation. To an extent china is able to. Mplement the sanctions key north korea has been relying on supplies and imported items, including oil, from china. I do not think it is wise to stop the supply of oil from china because it could lead to the collapse of the regime. China prolongfrom the life of the regime. Continues,the supply they are able to manage the situation. If at all possible we may want to have crippling sanctions which were imposed ,gainst iran, policy leaders and branches in north korea. I think it would be difficult in the case of iran. , they aree, china serious about bringing north korea back to negotiations. China is a key player. Which is a greater threat . State actors or nonstate actors . George state actors for a bunch of reasons. One is the material that terrorists would need to make Nuclear Weapons is produced by states and in the possession of states. In all likelihood, that is what would be feasible. It will be states that will make theakes without having right policies or implementing the right policies that will enable the terrorists to get Nuclear Weapons in the first place. Question in the back . Name is michael. My question is about how does fadeonguns procession into how north korea sees their Nuclear Weapons . They claimed to have Nuclear Weapons before the death of kim jongil, so this is his legacy and giving up Nuclear Weapons would be tantamount to giving up on his legacy. James so you mean to kim jongun, not the next . [inaudible] prof. Gallucci i wish that was all we had to worry about. I understand the question. If they decided it was in their jongun decided if it was in his interest or the regimes interest he would find a way to reconcile that with the policy of his father. Thought, the, we negotiations in 1994. Hand was kim jongun. I would agree. If you really wanted to, he could go back to statements where he was focused on d enuclearizing the korean peninsula. I have time for a couple more questions. We will take a couple. This is for Robert Gallucci. I am samara daniels. As to one orious two main reasons, given the scenario you presented that was a deal struck with north korea. Under what would that be accepted, and what was the strongest reason for accepting that . James and in the back . This is primarily for Robert Gallucci. You are talking as if the countrys concerned were unitary actors. About north korea, but i know about the United States and i have a fair amount of information about iran. They are not unitary actors. You describe the deal struck with iran as a deal struck between a government under siege in washington and another government under siege in tehran. Being these enough by people who did not want to see an agreement. People who saw the agreement as a precursor of a wider political agreement they would detest. I would imagine that at the time the framework was negotiated, there were suspicions and pyongyang that the United States did not mean what it was saying. That you meant what you were saying, but you did not have the backing of the u. S. Political system. Dont we need to evaluate the possibilities of reaching agreements, and the possibilities the agreements will stick in terms of a multiplicity of actors and each of the countries concerned . University of maryland have a question for professor Robert Gallucci. You said north korea might be able to give up its Nuclear Program if there was a settlement. Can you elaborate . You mean something outside of the literal deal . Thank you. So, i have three questions. What was i thinking when i proposed that scenario with the North Koreans holding on to a few Nuclear Weapons and material in the box . What i was trying to do was to ask you to think about the real world. If you make a deal with north korea, and it is comprehensive we will get everything. I am being realistic. How do you know . Now, do you think they are building Nuclear Weapons . I do. Do you think they have material to build Nuclear Weapons . I do. Do you think if we make a deal they will give us everything . I dont. The good news is you cannot verify to that level, you dont say you are, they get to have insurance. We say we have a comprehensive deal, and we do. Im trying to take the reality of the situation. You can do a deal. The second question, the unitary actors. A proposition with bureaucratic policies in the vietnam war. I was all into that. I think it is interesting putting in the political model on top of nuclear deals. All i can think of is our country. I know our country better. Maybe the situation has changed, but we could not have done a bureaucratic map of north korea. We say there is military, but norats, a party texture. It is not like we are talking about france. We have more texture, but im not sure how good we are. I am sympathetic with anyone negotiating with us and wondering about what the executive branch can accomplish. I think you have a good point. The person will do with the negotiations and they better have talking points on that or he will be staring for a while. It is hard. It came up specifically in the case i talked about in the case of the assurance from the president. I did not have to tell them the president was happy to sign this. They knew that. They knew that it depended on congress. They said the president s signature is not worth nothing. Other countries are aware. The only thing i would say is that it is far more demanding on the Intelligence Community as they produce that kind of political texture that is not there. They may be wonderful on technical issues, and not so good on political issues. The last question was what was the last question . James say it again . Prof. Gallucci yes. That not mean much by other than very soon after we did the deal in 1994 we were supposed to go to open liaison offices. You had the North Koreans here looking around the property that got lost. We said that we were going to the east german, which was now just german, and that made them unhappy as we would not take a lot of money. Manifestation of a political settlement. The opening of liaison offices. It never happened. That is one thing that never happened. They thought coldrolled exchange and cultural exchange, and we got a proposal for a synchronized Dancing Group of young girls to come to the United States of america. They brought it to me and i said, are you crazy . They will be on the Kennedy Center stage, and we will ask how did that happen . We did a deal with this country that takes young girls and puts them in this strange all i could see was there was no human rights component to the deal. We are in for a world of hurt. This is not a nice country, not a nice regime. I worry about everything falling apart. We had no political basis or engagement. I think they thought they would be a political relationship with the United States that would make it impossible for the United States to launch regime change. That we would be normal. They kept saying come you dont have to remove your troops. They had an image of her relationship with us which nobody in washington had. I think they were grossly disappointed. Breach. T a material im not equating this. I think that they expected more than they got. Any final thoughts . Onrge a quick question unitary actors and the bureaucratic model. Managing this with the United States, you have the north American Bureau which is working on the relationship and the ministry of defense. You have the asian bureau working with korea. Then you have a different context with iran and the whole new set of bureaucratic actors. Is there tension within the interagency system on the japan side, or not too bad . Democraticma other countries, japan always suffers from bureaucratic politics. In the case of the dealing with iran, there has always been conflict of interest between the and agencies that promote a relationship with iran in the context of Energy Security and business. Trying to strengthen the alliance and further tighten the pressure on iran. In the case of the oil fields in iran, which japan held the rights for exploration, there was a battle between the United States and japan. The japanese government was trying to retain the exploration rights of the oilfield. Eventually, they followed the decision by the Foreign Ministry to respect the alliance. After the sanctions it is always difficult Group Japanese political to balance the issues of the alliance and the community. James thank you. We will have an opportunity to get more deeply involved in the iranian issue in our next session. We will take a break until 4 00. Me in thankingn prof. Akiyama , in thanking Nobumasa Akiyama, Robert Gallucci, george perkovich. [applause] the Aspen Institute examines opportunities and challenges for people of color and the state of race in america. Watch at 9 00 a. M. Eastern on cspan two. Tonight on cspan, Supreme Court cases come to life with the series landmark cases if historic Supreme Court decisions. It expires the stories behind some of the most significant decisions in american history. He said this is different the constitution is a political document that sets up political structures, but it is also a law. If it is a lot we have the courts to tell us what it means. It is the ultimate antiprecedential case. Exactly what you do not want to do. The Supreme Court said it should make the decisions about those debates. Case that look at the denied black citizenship under the constitution and validated the missouri compromise, scott versus sandford. That is on cspan and cspan. Org. Cspan, washington journal is next. On11 00 a. 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