I am glad you had the opportunity to ask some questions of him. Now we are going to move on to our First Panel Discussion this morning. Our topic is the mission to protect assets in space. Space is a contested domain, it is no longer peaceful. Our adversaries are contesting that using all means available not just kinetic which is perhaps the most worrisome but nonkinetic as well. Its important to recognize we didnt choose this vector, our adversaries did. But we have to respond. What that demands is that the u. S. Space community particularly United StatesSpace Command and space force consider new operational concept and associated technologies. What this panel is going to do is provide insights regarding what sort of Technological Solutions might be the most helpful and how this ties back to core mission imperatives. , especially in an era where our adversary is not just waiting, but they are accelerating their activities to compound the challenges that we have to face. I am tickled pink to have the folks we have on stage. To my left is dave rockefeller. I go back to way back with everybody. Rock is that director of training operation. Stationed in headquarters United States space for space in colorado. Next to rock is ms. Stacy kubicek, the Vice President for Mission Solutions at lockheed martin. Thank you stacy for joining us. You all are familiar with general chilton, inc. For him to joining us on this panel. To put everyone in perspective historically. Everyone in this room, i do not see any youngsters here. It was not that long ago you cannot say space and offense in the same sentence together. I have to share a story. Im at the air force academy, giving a lecture to a group of cadets who are focused on space force. At the end of my comments, one of the cadets asked a question about. Do you envision there being war in space. Immediately, i went of course. One of, i will not have to say, but in a former astronaut is sitting in the back of the room and as a mentor and he jumps up and goes you cannot say that. Sure i can. It is an Academic Institution and a second we will fight in space. That happened down dish that is how everyone was from a policy perspective to not talk like this. We do not want to see conflict in space. Like a said, we are where we are at with respect or adversaries. Let me kick this off with the question to above rock and general chilton. They openly testified that certain chinese capabilities are causing us concern. Not go through a long list. You know they are. China is not the only active. The russians are out there. Theyre going the semi. What do oc as the most serious threat to our space asset . There is obviously the a sats. There are other elements too. Where is your thoughts . Thank you for the opportunity. It is good to see you again. [laughter] i was remembering the discussion you asked when youre talking about general chilton gave you a check ride. I got my Weapon School instructors sitting there. I have mark in my head right now. I speak in a more deliberate pace because i do not want to hear that. I will answer that question this way. When u. S. Space command thinks about protection and defense, we think about it as a twoparty problem. Protection and defense of u. S. And required allied and commercial Space Systems is a primary task requirement for us, laid out an unified command plan , the president give us that command. All of us have a mission to defend the joint force. I will insert 2 ways. There is hopefully no single threat factor that warrants preparation, planning Capability Development and where needed test demonstration and operational demonstration over one another. I will highlight a few concerns on the protection and defense of u. S. Allied and commercial systems. The cso we are illuminated the awareness of the cyber threat victor demonstrated by the russians. Ew threat vectors, which we have been aware for some time. You seem prominently discussed openly, a new thing Russian Federation leaders focused on commercial and not just u. S. Systems. This represented concern. Those are things we work through planter. Some of your companys plan in detail with. To ensure we have an ability to respond. The direct dissent is a big concern. It is the most, from my instructor of capability standpoint is the most disconcerting over the past few years. Incredibly responsible, reckless to the point where we come of United States government are waking up russian astronauts to get to the safe escape with the space station. Irresponsible on many levels. We concern because as the chief said, 1500 pieces of debris. We are tracking more that overtime. He continues to be a problem and represents a challenge sustainability of the domain. If a u. S. Aircrafts shutdown, we have to shoot done on other aircraft, immediate results on the ground. Eliminated from the battle space. These will last for years, depending on the orbit they will last on decades. We will have to contend with them. I thought the highlight of the maneuvers the iss has to take, in conjunction concerns we had was noteworthy. That is a big concern. Not the only vector though. I recommend everyone look at. We wring our hands about Intelligence Community and challenge of classification. Look at the dia security challenges report. It is very thorough and a fact all document of what we assess our adversaries in the prc, particularly the pla and Russian Federation for capability. If you keep reading on to the next page the threat for space my second answer is intuition from space, we have a responsibility as a Space Force Guardian and Space Command to prepare for threats to the joint force. The threat to the joint force is concerning. If you look at the document, it is reflecting national defense. If you look at the prc has built in their see for us it is built to find, fix and kill maritime and air force. We can after resilience you want. That will do nothing about that problem. If you continue reading to the last page. It talks about research and testing of the prc, focus on spacebased kinetics. That is delivery from space to the ground. The example provided, that you remember from 18 months ago. Fractional orbital bombardment that the prc did. Those concerned me greatly. Our joint force say we are thoroughly integrated in the joint force from space perspective in a decade. People do not realize how fundamental the integration is. The joint force is reliant on space capability. The ability to change the coming of the marine corps made relies on the ability to mass, deliver present precision fires, find targets before the adversary finds you, not of it can get done without space. It is a 2 piece problem for protection and defense. Im worried we focus on. Protection defense of allied systems. Im concerned about the protection and defense of the joint force from a pernicious incapable prc and Russian Federation. General on your thoughts. Threats to space capability. The chinese spent the 90s studying how we fight wars. Youre one of the people they study for sure and how you planned operations for desert storm directive freedom. One of the things you targeted early on was the Communications Capability of strategic level, talk to operational level and tactical level of our adversaries. Disconnected those, which left the tactical level wondering what they should do next and operational level blind. The chinese said we cannot take on the u. S. Force on force. We will go after that ability to do Operational Command and control down tactical. If i within today, with the capabilities they have, in a conflict i would want to blind u. S. Commanders by taking away anything they can get from a reconnaissance aspect. I would make them unable to communicate with their operational level command and tactical forces. Blind and mute. All u. S. Air, land and naval forces. In the area of operation. I think that extends to hawaii and western pacific. I would want immediate feedback before i took my next step as to whether or not i was successful. Or if i fail. Before he took the next step in my operation. Cyber is important, but cyber is hard to test and prove it will work. A cyber effort can be used by our adversaries, but i do not think they will rely on them to cross the street. More likely, they will use them to break the american will at home to support the defense of taiwan. By making life uncomfortable for the citizen. Today, groundbased directed energy or however we apply directed energy from the chinese, however they might do it. Does not prevent key capabilities to geosynchronous orbit. They can disrupt. I do not know if they can destroy it, but they can make things difficult and our consultations. If im going in blind and make mute u. S. Forces, im going to rely on direct a sets and coat orbiting a sets to go after those keynotes. While i am doing a cyber attack to disrupt commandandcontrol elements in the terrestrial domain. And then i would do that because i need immediate feedback on whether im successful before proceed. I would rate direct ascent, coorbital as the most serious threat, followed by directed energy and cyber attack. That is very good and leads to a followon discussion in the context of how do we counter that which rapidly gets us into a discussion of preemptive attack means to negate this physical means. Perhaps using nonlethal, which gets us to the cyber discussion. Which is interesting because to take what you said, if i understand it right, what can be assured of measuring is lethal direct ascent. We talked about before, if you go against an adversary and you are going into adversary acts, and you are physical force is reliant upon the success of a cyber up, you have to have feedback. Either that or a hell of a lot of trust before you put your body in the threat space. For commanders to have confidence the effects will be achieved. I do not see much of that happening on either side. There is a deterrent piece here. We ought to think about. I would suggest we have we as a nation and as a military have been too quick to dismiss lethal options, which just gives aid and comfort to our adversaries. As opposed to increasing uncertainty in our adversaries mind, that we might. That is another discussion. Inks those insights and getting the thought process going. Kind of a followon, but all of what is important about what we were discussing his notion of Space Situational Awareness. General salzman talked about it in his see no. What are some key areas we need to focus energy and resources onto realize the Space Situational Awareness necessary to assure us we have a good handle on whats going on . It is a good question. They mentioned eloquently about it. I need to be simple in my view. My boss, the commander of u. S. Space command has made it number one priority for closing gaps. The reason is a straightforward. There used to be a phrase that 90 of saa snowing whats going on. I will be honest that the network we built, it is entirely rearward looking was the term used by the cso. It is based off of observations in the past to protect orbital destination the future. That is why everything comes back with the element associated with that. Uncertainty volume associated. A lot can happen. As a result, i am reminded that when chilton was air force base commander. There are three things when we put space surveillance at the time. There are 3 things that drive. The first is custody. We do not have the level of custody we need to provide a level of accuracy associated with indications, warning, threat determination, hostile intent and ability to target. We are largely based on the next step, which is capability relying on systems based off 2 principal phenomenon. 1 is optical, which is measuring light reflected off a satellite in get a lot of information from that. I do not want to diminish it. The second is radar. , which you get a more accurate position state factor of where it is. Where that primary focus of my network has been derived from his dual Mission Systems largely built around the network to defend the United States. The optical sites we have because we sometimes do people too many favors by publishing too much. We are in a place where it can be difficult for them to get the information they need. The capability is the second one. An optical signature of metric data does not provide the capability i need to determine threat indications to intent and ability to target for disruption. You have to improve the capability. The last piece, in terms of the three css capacity. We are in the process of shifting from, and im excited to hear about the success of this development agencies. Were shifting from a permissive force design. That is what i grew up on to a war fighting force. We are not there. Were getting there. As a result, capacity was not the principal force determined. The ability to fight in the domain that was not the principal determinant. It was based off efficiency. What is the capability we can build, to cover on the missions with the least in possible . Those decisions when were made, when you looked at them this winning architecture, there were 2 more radars that covered the seven seven hemisphere. Theres were shut down because of costs. When you Start Talking about capacity, i have to have enough to survive in conflict and deliver the indications, warning and targeting and capabilities. That capacity is something we are focused on. Those have coherence about her management. Right now, the tools we have do not talk about decisionsupport age. They do not provide Battle Management at the right levels to effectively assess those things and develop options to face adversary. Im with the general on this, i am not interested in the name, it needs to be delivered. If deliver the first three with about her management, he did not give me much, because i did not use it. I think those are the 4 cs i focus on on space demand awareness, integrated capabilities docket is more nuanced. Those are the things i focused on. We need to get right fast. A quick followon. The budget says 18 million for commercial space. This is for data for space domain awareness. Can you comment on the relevance . We rely on and have a joint commercial operations underneath u. S. Space command that relies on and integrates many of the systems that some of the audience is put together. It is a competition based off of the needs we have a cover gaps for location if youre using terrestrial base sensors, location matters. It highlights performance and capability to get offer it after it. I get updates on my cell phone on interests im concerned about from that center. We are able to measure those against what we have on the classified room to make assessments of what that is. Obviously, coherence can bring those together. And produce 1 solution at various levels of classification to deliver it not just information of what, but what next. That is what Battle Management delivers we need to get to. We will know it is not just 18 million for commercial. Space force gets after this. If you get custody, you show the same thing. . In orbit to maintain custody. You have to have a system for orbit. We are in the process for geosynchronous space situation is awareness. We will get ready to get fielded at the engineer for launch. For position at some of that information we talked about. Things like deep space radar capability will provide a level of capability. I do not want to make it sound like it is not getting attention. I am simply saying is the service, air chief used to say im building the air force for 4 from now. The general is building the space force in three or four chiefs. My boss is next year or two. Im not interested in how hard it is, i am interested in results. Clicks cocom there. Cocom there. Let me bring you into the conversation. We heard Space Situational Awareness has got demands on data. Can you talk about how Software Solutions may be assisting in some of the challenges that they face . We start thinking about data. The exciting thing for me is not about the different assets and that the general. It has to be a holistic picture and and and. That is where data starts coming into play. There is a lot of data coming in. We are talking about 18 million going towards commercial data alone. Data is only is only as good as what you. The health and created. If you have data from it, and we are not able to do in does not make us better. It does not allow us to defend against the threat and increasing threats. It does not allow us to operate. It does not help us. Software is a critical component for that. How can software be critical component . Theres so many ways. One of the biggest things that ai and ml cannot be underestimated in what it can help provide. I am going to caffe caveat that they cannot do it with everything. There is critical component for humans. Our resources are not unlimited. Along software to do some of the things that can help to get some of that information to the war fighter quicker, or we can is a good aspect. Another thing is from a reactionary standpoint. I think about the different operations sites what they need to make this quickly into that effectively without them having to go to site with all that data. You flipped out, how can we get ahead of the threat . That is where software can be critical when we think about Predictive Modeling. We do a lot of things with digital points. When you start thinking we were talking about ms. Warnicks and capabilities. Those are legacy systems. When we are modernizing systems, how can we use Predictive Modeling to say what is the threat going to look like in one year, 2 your, 3 year or six months. Hackable use those tools to prepare war fighters for what they need to do and make decisions effectively. Very good. Wonderful insights. Separate but related topics. When i things general salts argues for his Space Force Needs to deny first mover advantage on orbit. So far, went away space force decided to proliferate and disaggregate Future Systems is the manner in which he is going to approach the challenge i am interested in their thoughts about how the disaggregation and ability to maneuver and deters our adversaries. It is an important part of strategy, disaggregation and proliferation. I also like the fact it promises, and general refers to this, there is a promise it could flip the cost of opposing equation. If you have enough low expensive satellite spread out and orbit, and resilient architecture, it will take a lot of capability to take it out. It is good to have it be more expensive to defeat you then cheap to treat you. That is a big plus. Really the idea proliferation and disaggregation as a defensive part of deterrence equation. History teaches that is never enough. Witness the maginot line. It is part of the deterrence strategy, but that also needs to have the offensive threat signal to the adversary to deter them from attacking. To effectively deter and when deterrence fails. The adversary has to deal can effectively take out all the capabilities that our joint force relies on to conduct operations in the space. They hat is the next thing you will, it couldnt think that, to there Space Architecture they depend on. To maintain their forces in the first and Second Island chain. To threaten carrier battle groups as they sortie from eastern pacific to the left press. Two defeat their ability to attack our air, land and naval bases in area of operation. They have to believe we will go after them and take that away. Whether we will not, is a choice of president and commanders will make. From a deterrence perspective, they need to know and this is what we will go after, and if they are counting on that to effectively win a conflict in western pacific. It will not be there. I was very good. Do you want to chime in . Great job sir. Ill add 1 point. The challenge for these adversaries. See, lasher or whomever p. R. C. , russia, or whomever. This will be a u. S. Militarys counsel, not just faceless. U. S. Military response, not just space force. We have to think 2 weeks ago, i saw a feed on twitter, he was telling me it looks like the geo six was accepted. Why are we telling our adversaries . There is a reason it is called geo six. You know why . It is the sixth one. The reason i bring that up is disclose it. If you count on one hand for assets, you are not ready to fight. It is fundamentally build resilience into the, Critical Mission sets the military and allies will Missile Warning and tracking is similar. We should not tell you, and we are putting up there. It is good we proliferate to the extent we demonstrate we can take a bunch. Think about history. Particularly about regimes about unsure about escalation. Signaling early with wet testing the will of the adversary is important. If we cannot fight to that salvo and demonstration is in demonstrate resilience we will not just take it but respond. It is not credible. It is not a combat Critical Force presentation. I would say that your joint voices after this. Earlier in the fall, we spend 3 hours and every threestar in the joint force focused on a wargame, and particular on space and how we protect and defend and deliver capabilities out brief to the chairman and entirety the services. That never happened before. Every cocom had to show up ready to talk about what the rule was and how they integrated into this. Any Solutions Operations plans we develop. To disservice to the space force to only talk to the space force. We love cyber command. I spend more time with cyber, and so, than almost any other. It is because of the partnerships develop. We will take, at the time of our choosing, whatever response we think appropriate. It is not something we are on our hands four. Alan to assure, we are getting after it. We are in a transition from a permissive force design to a work vetting force design. When we transition, as we transition, those plans will evolve. They are appropriate for where we are, and im trying to pull cocom capability to the left and ask now. That is my job. All it takes is money right . Let me put on that string more. With respect to proliferated satellite constellations. They may remove the vulnerability of a handful of juicy targets. The chinese embraced the whole notion of systemsbased warfare. What is there for all of you. Let me give stacey the opportunity to jump in. What else should we are looking at in the context of systems to harden as we look to prepare ourselves to go against the threat that has a variety of different avenues they may attack us on. Thank you for that question. I will flip a little bit. Youre talking about the importance of resiliency in space. I am going to pull the ground side of it, from that perspective for where i say we need to focus. Several senior leaders. We talked about the general making concerns on ground and importance of resilience on the ground and how we protect that. That brings to light as we continue to add things, it is made from a resilient and point. Not just space, air, land, sea, cyber, they are all becoming part of a bigger network. Everything is becoming a note on that network. However we hardening those pieces . Everything from a data standpoint its getting passed down through ground in different avenues. We have Different Levels of cloud environments. Those are the capabilities that we are going to trust the data and operate quickly with the data. Need to harden that. Hardening comes at a price. New Start Talking about cyber and want to harden at every level, you are adding weight see. We cannot afford latency. It is a prioritization as well of where and what we want to harden. I think the ground as a critical component we need to focus on. All the space lane, the system. The two parts of would add to that. In ground, we talk about the center, got to have that harden. The threats and rescue see where with terminals. The vulnerability they have as well. We cannot talk about the joint force have a pacing lead for the deployment of capability from a terminal. Space force will take that and disseminate to joint force as quickly as we want. You have to have this infrastructure hardening down to the terminal to receive the data or does not begin to all they communicate all and whatever the warning, surveillance, targeting information is. If we cannot get it to the user, it is for not. The last piece for hardening is, the resilience piece is the number. What is more important, one of the lessons you take out of the observation from ukraine. The capability of people, particularly the will of ukrainians to develop new approaches to defend that were not written. Theyre getting trained on capabilities that outpace how quickly we train our. I think this is something that we have to keep focused on. A mindset and culture, not just a capability. As you develop the ttps, as you are powering down cq from operational level to tactically empowering those work orders work fighters to talk to the user at the same time and have accountability to the partner they are protecting, defending or whatever. It is part of that. The csos is focused on training infrastructure for a reason. If you think we will have a, numbers are enough, it never works that way. Defense along, when things everybody should be taking out of this conflict is relevance. These defense only approaches will culminate at some point. You cannot. Blows against a persistent adversary, it must overcome. Yep to shift rapidly and find exploitation. We have to harden our war fighters and guardians. That to be thinking and training so Second Nature not something first idea, when the adversaries in your face. I agree with everything brock said. The ground infrastructure is capable critical. You need to take a hard look at where we single string. Probably backup this capabilities . We will be attacked by cyber or kinetic. The new clinic turn system is a model. When the president gives an order, to use a nuclear weapon. There is not just one path for that order to go. There are multiple paths on different capabilities. Some hardline, and some we cannot talk about. The important thing is there is no point or if you like me to cannot and prevent that message. That is the ultimate extreme. Somewhere between single string and there is where our Space Force Needs to be, think about how we will operate in a degraded ground infrastructures. The last point i would make. I have not heard it mentioned, and none of this matters if the services do not by the user equipment. Space was to stop by the user equipment. The services by. Army, navy, air force and marines. They need updated software flexible. And capabilities in the future so it does formally. We can change the software, change the crypto. We get the messages through. That is responsibility of the other services and they need to make sure they are the proper es devlin or capabilities are for not. Lots more questions here, but i want to conserve sometime for the audience to jump in. It would shift to that phase. Any questions from the audience for our panel . I think we have microphones floating around please identify who you are first. Steve jordan from the aerospace association. Question about commercial protection of commercial Space Systems. His Space Command today postured if directed to protect commercial Space Systems . Along the length, what his Space Command doing to deepen ties with industry yes. [laughter] i know we are. We consider as part of the challenge were given get into my boss boss from the president. Making sure if directed we are it will be do these things. Not only something red to prepare for, something left to demonstrate. A number of things. The command in space force has a rule has released commercial Integration Strategy to build in options and availability for not Just Protection but partnership from the ground up. We understand what they can offer. Similarly, have a path that is established flip host and nominal for the provision of indications and warning if there is a consummate have. Our main venue is out of the combined forces of the commercial line appreciation revision of that. That is the focus in left field. We see no matter how they should except for fourth design from the csos said services are working on. There will be a rule and necessity for us to have commercial partners as part of our forces. What we are trying to get away from is a crisis happens, that is the first time someone has called. Make sure they are there. I will say, and some commercial partners want to be more clear about the participation than others. They participate in exercises and peer sees cleared. Within the capabilities we have. I think we are the postured come by the secretary to take that. I think at the same time, we are trying to build in more left of the crisis. So we have normalized that partnership and established worldly can search and. Have the intellect as part of their planning and operational concept. One in the center over here. Can i ask you a question . I will ask you to speak of all of industry. What is your expectation of the space force and command. You expect them to defend your satellites . I think it is partnership. We need to also, as industry to take a step back and reflect and help. Meet halfway. I do not think it is all or nothing, to be honest. How can we hardening our system, what can we drive protection in our system to provide intelligence and meet halfway . If we depend on one or another, we will knock at their in speed. We will not get there in speed by doing that. It is a partnership will we look to innovative ways we can insert things line were taking responsibility when we do that. It is a 2 way street. It is a good thing to call. There are level of protection. There are levels of coordination that are important. Indications and warning cyber concern of one of our partners directly impacts the government in many ways. That may be 1 weight partnering. That is the purpose of expanding partnerships. Many more initial representatives and allies and partners. This is a weed problem, not any problem. I think our approach has been one of recognize the opportunities early, bake in the solutions and coordination so it is ready to go, and do not wait until the crisis occurs. It is not going to be star wars or star trek protection level. It is going to be something else. Last question. Good afternoon sarah, man, and gabrielle. Sir, man, gabrielle. We talked about fostering relations with commercial sector. I wonder how are we deepening these with other departments like the department of state. Space has become this new and niche exciting thing. I wonder what developments have been made by the space force in helping the department of state. Wise everybody looking at me . Why is everybody looking at me. Secretary frank rose worked to this problem part is i believe he was working in the state department. Try to get norms established and peopled to agree on norms. As mentioned, we are not there yet. It is a worthy effort to push that through. Once you have that, as someone mentioned, when someone violates it. You have the ability to throw to marshmallow. That is the state department sending message that you signed up to this, you violated this, and that diplomatic pressure matters. It really matters. I am a big fan of come to some level of consensus on rules of the road in peacetime. They go out the window in any conflict, once the balloon goes up. It is important to help deterrence by Holding Nations Accountable for their behavior. Enabling the state department to fulfill their capability to exercise the elements of national power. I went to great question you asked. Another piece i would like to speak about is international. You add in international capabilities. There is a lot of international focus. Even the ground capabilities, satellite. Getting back to the partnership. It is going to be a Bigger Picture that makes us more effective as we continue to move forward. Another component to think about. I know the general has to comment, i want to Say Something first. [laughter] i think it is good. Its are responsible for last month are a start. His are coordinated with the state department. At the opportunity to be at an event with u. N. And bestia. She tracks these personally. Ambassador, she tracks these personally. In the last three years, the space force in place, we have seen depending on independent service and an air force that has dedicated space are important command established in the partner nation. We are in the teams of nations and partners who are working through how they will organize in order to not just protect, but deliver capability to their forces as part of the unit. Every one of those pieces, we are partnered for access to space capability from the cocom present in the european theater. We have to work through nader to get that done and assistant secretary of state works ships for us, an addition to the ambassadors. We are getting to a place that is normalizing that. We have a political advisor who has an update back to the team to make sure we have the access we need with our allies and partners. The operations the coalition is strong. We have a multinational operation that we execute. That we are setting up for the future. From a cocom perspective, the integration is good. I think we are in place with, because of the responsibility behavior, the advocacy rereceived due to u. S. Leadership and establishment of services, you will see a bow wave of likeminded nations who recognize the shift that these nations, the prc and russians want to make the International Order and value of norms to preserving that order. It is not just about war fighting, it is about escalation management and preventing miscalculation. It is good, the service. One thing i will say is general is similar to dickens got his own department of political advisor. She is on staff and looking. That has been a great attitude to stop. Secondly, we have guardian and state department, looking these loans in behavior and engaging. In the third piece is the discussion of a working last week. We went to the cso to talk about the coalition outreach. State department was there for the and talked about the efforts they are working towards in norms and behavior. The u. K. Is leading those efforts in the United Nations on behalf of the likeminded nations that were there at shreveport. The great initiative. The chief said we set them in cocom, clear and calm. Yet that Security Cooperation in cocom with a case guardian working with the folks on the joint staff at each combat commands to do Security Cooperation for space and improve those norms for military sale. Any kind of operations or sharing agreement we have with other countries. I think your point, norms are important. How we get after involving yourself with state department and whole of government. This is a whole of military. State department is critical. We have gone a little bit long, but i want to conserve some time to refill your coffee and to do a human break if you need to. I want to thank you general chilton and station and rock for eliminating our audience. [applause] lets plan on being back at 1110. Thank you very much. Do not forget to turn your microphone. Reserve cho Jerome Powell gave an update on Interest Rates on what they mean for the economy with other Monetary Policy action. Watches News Conference tonight at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan. Cspan now, our free mobile video app or online at cspan. Org. Early saturday morning the coronation of king charles the third will take place. He became the king of the United Kingdom following the death of his mother Queen Elizabeth the second, the