Morning. It is being filmed live. When we come to the q and a, state your name clearly so the world knows who you are. So your aunt and uncles can refer to the recording. The subject today is highly relevant. Iran sanctions and the nuclear deal. We heard a lot about iran during the election campaign. Particularly from the president. But i think there is some confusion as to what the actual policy is, given that we have a nuclear deal with iran which no one seems eager to tear up, even though the president says it is the worst deal ever negotiated. Secondly, we have a major fight with the Islamic State or isis, which the president claims is one of our Top Priorities in Foreign Policy, and yet ironically, one of the countries at are going to rely on to be isis will be iran. There is great pressure on capitol hill for more sanctions against iran, not for the nuclear deal but because of its behavior in the gulf, support for insurgents in yemen, and the human rights record. To discuss this, we have an extremely talented duo before us. It, i forgot to announce you i am. Cap kemp, the senior director for Regional Security programs here at the center for the national interest. And the first speaker i will turn to is dennis ross and then i will turn to mark fitzpatrick. Dennis ross has a distinguished record in this town. Served several president s as a key negotiator for arabisraeli peace. He has a distinguished fellow at the washington institute. He has written numerous books, the last of which is a must read on the relationship between success with israeli governments and american president s and interesting background material which i think is quite new. Mark fitzpatrick has lived for the last 1015 years in london, working at the International Institute for strategic studies as the chief spokesperson of asian onfloor for nonproliferation, but he is an american. But he served in the state department, doing what he is doing now. He has now moved back to washington and is the executive director of iss america. In that capacity, he runs the office they have here in town. And they hold meetings just like this and there are publications just like we do. But marks real prominence in this town has to do with his extraordinary knowledge of the iran nuclear component, in the status of the iran nuclear deal. This will start out by giving ,id broader picture particularly talking about these broader conundrums that ive mentioned, including in the as really ambivalence towards the iran deal. And then mark will talk about the actual deal in itself. Where it is succeeding and where it has weaknesses. And what new sanctions may mean for the iran deal even if they are not directly earmarked against it. With that in mind, they will both have about 13 minutes to open up and then we will be free to question. Dennis . Dennis ross thank you. I want to talk a little bit about what i think the Trump Administration confronts. I will not try to explain what the policy is because i think the policy is something that is still being developed. But i want to look at this from the standpoint of the kind of things they might do. So let me start by sort of noting two things to begin with. One is that obviously, as jeff said, the president of the United States referred to this as the worst deal ever negotiated. And that reflects, i think, the view of what the negotiations produced but an inherent sense that the deal itself has within it producing a number of full or number of vulnerabilities. And i want to address some of that. There is a second dimension, obviously, and that is if you listen to the general, he said iran has become much more aggressive in the region since the joint comprehensive plan of action. And if you think about it, the administration is confronting as what they see as the vulnerability flowing from the deal in the nuclear dimension, but also, is dealing with or thinks it must deal with, what are the implications of the region itself. I think the first question to ask is, so what do they do with the joint comprehensive plan of action . The secretary of defense during his confirmation hearings made it clear that he thought that even though it wasnt a good deal, we had to live up to it. And i would suggest that it makes sense. If we were to be the ones to rip it up because it wasnt a bilateral arrangement, we would make ourselves the issue, not irans behavior or bad behavior. If, in fact, what the administration wants to do is find a way to increase leverage on iran to affect its behavior, then one of the things that it is important for the administration to do is to make it clear that the focus should be on what iran is doing. We shouldnt be making ourselves the issue. In other words dont isolate the United States. Think about how you can do more with the spotlight on irans behavior and what is wrong with irans behavior. And here i think there is something that can be effectively done. One thing the Obama Administration didnt do effectively, and i will come back to this later, and a sense, the Obama Administration became defensive about the issue of iran not getting the economic benefits from the deal. And the iranians, my colleague who is here, wrote a piece with two other members of the washington institute, which i think effectively focused on iran having created a narrative about how iran was living up to the deal and we werent. And one of the reasons iran isnt doing nearly as well as it might in terms of the economic benefits from the deal is that iran, when it comes to creating transparency in its Banking System and fulfilling the standards that the Financial Action task force has required with regard to Money Laundering and terrorist financing, iran doesnt meet the standards. Is one of the reasons therefore it becomes difficult or banks are hesitant to do the kind of financing that would be necessary for some of the bigger deals is that they worry about the consequences of being slapped with big fines because they might be dealing with someone who is connected with Money Laundering or terrorist financing. So if iran isnt getting a lot of the benefits economically from the deal, that is because iran is continuing not to meet the standard that everyone else is supposed to meet with her to their banking requirements. And it would be effective, i think, to try to focus on that but also on what they are doing in the region. When the general says that iran has become more aggressive in the region, well, that is a good thing to remind everyone. And the sanctions that existed under the Obama Administration, they were very clear that we would continue with this on Human Rights Violations and on terrorism. They exist because again, this is because of irans behavior. Not because we are dreaming these things up. So there is a context that i think the administration can try to draw on. If i were advising the administration, what else would i advise them to do . I would just say, by the way, i am not advising the administration but if i were advising the administration, there would be a number of things i would focus on. And they go back to concerns that i myself had about the joint comprehensive plan of action. One of the Major Concerns i have is that because at the end of 15 years there are not limitations on the size or quality of the Nuclear Infrastructure that the iranians could have, the gap i worry that down the road that threshold to Nuclear Status would be such that the gap between that and having a weapon could be sick differently small and iran might at some point be tempted to go for a weapon. And i always say this is one of the key things that i wanted the Obama Administration to do that they didnt do and that the Trump Administration could do was to bolster deterrence. There is a number of things the ministration could do to bolster the deterrence. One thing would be to change our declaratory policy. The fact is within the joint comprehensive plan of action, the iranians make a commitment to never seek or acquire or develop Nuclear Weapons. And if we see them doing that, iranians understand that, it would be too late to impose new sanctions. Our declaratory policy would be to use force to deal with the Nuclear Infrastructure, not sanctions. Secondly, after 15 years, the iranian there is nothing in this arrangement that prevents iranians from producing uranium. That too is something the administration could establish under the kind of principle that if they do that, it would be a trigger. The third thing, something i i favored for a while, the Obama Administration was able to restrain its enthusiasm over this proposal that i was in favor of at some point giving the israelis the ordinance penetrator. Bomb which000 pound is a conventional device that could actually deal with being built into a mountain. And we should give that to the israelis, least the b2 can they dont have a plane to carry it and the reason to do that would be twofold. One, even if we change it declaratory policy, maybe the iranians wouldnt believe it but if the israelis have this capability, they would likely believe that the israelis would act on it. And moreover, it would signal that we would be prepared to support the israelis under those circumstances. A fourth thing i would like to see happen. One of the concerns i have is that the iranians were almost bound to cheat along the margins. If for no other reason than to test how good the verification revisions were within the joint comprehensive plan of action. Again, if youre going to bolster deterrence, you have to establish that for every transgression, no matter how small, there is a price. For smaller transgression, the price should be proportional , but there should still be a price. There is a joint commission, it is something that obviously brings together the five plus one who negotiated it but we have rdc the negotiations the produced but an inherent sense that the deal itself has within it producing a number of full or abilities. And i want to address some of that. There is a second dimension, obviously, and that is if you listen to the general, he said iran has become much more aggressive in the region since the joint company has a plan of action. The point is we should have some we have flagged things the arabians should not be doing. They should see their are consequences. You establish a pattern over time that when you transgress or violate, there is a consequence. They get used to the idea and it becomes clear if there is a big violation there will be consequences. That is a way to bolster deterrence. The fifth area where i would deterrence bolstered and i think the new administration can do something useful would be to track to see, are the iranians providing more material assistance to hezbollah than they were before. Increase. Be a price one thing i think the Obama Administration was hesitant to do was there was a fear it would fall into the hands of the hard liners. There was a kind of an analysis that the Obama Administration did which was that one of the important things that was potentially changing and around was that you could empower run any doing some of the things. It would empower some of the pragmatic constituency within the iranian hierarchy. Anything that would be seen as provocative would hurt them. By the way, that was exactly the opposite of the logic used in the first term in approaching the iranians on the Nuclear Issue. It was to build the pressure but leave a way out. That is still a logic i think should apply. If you really want to and hands the strength of the right medic types, it seems one of the things to do was to show it costs. It does not benefit. If you want the iranians to see that engaging to weaken the regime is something that actually works against iranian interest there should be a price for it. Should we be doing more to interdict arms they should not be providing any way to hezbollah or to the cooties . Yes. Should we look for ways to increase the cost . Yes. One of the things they have not been shy about, they have been very clear that the nuclear deal does not prevent them from doing anything they want to do in the rest of the region. I dont know why we cant respond in kind. I will wrap up i send the following you raised the issue of the iranian elections. Way to that it is a think about the elections and what we might do and it is not a simple thing. But there are very few people that predicted he would win the last election. We would govern our behavior and what would affect the elections is kind of not as good as thinking you could predict what would happen in our elections. We should be humble about thinking we would be able to affect the iranian elections. Right now i think the iranians at this point, whatever the criticism, there seems to be a kind of cautious posture towards the Trump Administration. In no small part because they are not quite sure what the tomp administration is going do. They also see potentially they could create divisions between us and other members of the five bus one. Five plus one. So i would say we shouldnt be overly preoccupied with trying to gain the iranian election, we should be doing what we think is the right thing to do. And i would simply remind everybody here that the iranian said to us that as long as there were sections they would not negotiate on the Nuclear Issue. We tremendously increased the sanctions at that time. The first time. He came and they did negotiate. Im not arguing for a big increase in sanctions. But i am arguing for not being shy about designating where there is a need to designate. When they engaged for example in Ballistic Missile testing, we shouldnt did with the white house did. 2231 calls on the iranians not to test Ballistic Missiles. They can say that since they dont intend to have Ballistic Missiles, anything they test is not subject to that. Well, look at these lipstick missiles. Look at the range they have. Look at the payload they have. Ballistic missiles. Look at the range they have. By the way, they could carry Nuclear Weapons. There is no reason why the administration shouldnt be going to other members of the five plus one and say that we told them not to do this and they are doing it anyway. So we should be implementing the sanctions that we have. We should be where iranian behavior justifies doing more, we should do more. Especially with the other members of the five plus one. We should look at ways of having an agreement on if they violate, what the price will be, at least with the europeans. And we should look for ways to raise the cost to the iranians for what they are doing in the region. Because what is applied on the Nuclear Issue should be applied on their regional behavior. Host thank you very much dennis. Very clear, very provocative. Raises a lot of interesting questions to discuss, hopefully. After mark has made his mark. Mark fitzpatrick we probably all agree that iran presents problems in several areas. One area where they dont present an immediate problem is in the nuclear area. Because they are no longer marching had fast towards having a capability to producing Nuclear Weapons in a short amount of time. The ddpoe locked them from having that. And since they dont have that capability, we are not talking about going to war over these issues. So the region is more peaceful than it might have been otherwise. But iran continues to enrage and, in many ways, is problematic. And i agree with the proposition that the United States should be willing to sanction iran for these other areas in a nonnuclear field when warranted. And lets talk for a minute about what when warranted means. When sanctions can be more effective policy tools in changing the behavior in question. Sanctions tend to be the policy of first choice. But a hammer isnt the only tool in the toolbox. Warranted also means that applying sanctions in other areas doesnt violate u. S. Obligations, whether intentionally or inadvertently. And undermining the sanctions relief that iran was promised under the deal would violate it. I agree up with the washington institute, a very good report and i agree with several of the recommendations. Three in particular stood out. One is that the United States should not appear to be suspending the sanctions relief promised. A second was that the United States should avoid the rhetoric such as talking about the chilling impact sanctions could have on investment in iran or the uncertainty new sanctions would introduce. You know, as dennis mentioned, there are many reasons why Foreign Companies are disinterested in engaging in investing in iran. We shouldnt reinforce the iranian narrative that the United States is to blame for this lack of interest. A third recommendation was that the United States should avoid discussing the jcp away altogether when referencing resolutions on weapons. I want to say main point is the United States needs to prioritize its objectives. The deal that blocks all iranian pass to a Nuclear Weapon is the first order objective, because only with Nuclear Weapons would iran pose a direct National Security threat to the United States. Impairing irans Ballistic Missile program is the second objective. It is important but it isnt on par with stopping weapons from being developed. And stopping iran shipments to yemen is the third problem. The real issue in yemen is the internal political solution that is needed. Means whennted also sanctions can be effective. More sanctions wont cause iran to buckle and renegotiate under u. S. Terms, as some who want to scrap the deal have argued. And it is important to realize that sanctions alone werent responsible for the jcpoa. Bringing important in negotiation table in but it was only when the Obama Administration agreed on a major concession that they agreed to protocol. So it was in sentence and disincentives. Some say that obamas decision to allow enrichment was the original sin. I guess so. Without sex they were not going to give birth to a deal. It wasnt going to be a virgin birth, a unicorn deal that only benefited the United States. It is too important to their national defense. Their air force is so decrepit that they rely on Ballistic Missiles for their defense. It doesnt mean sanctions are but if we really want to achieve a solution to the missile issue, it will require a broader arms control agreement. Involves others, i dont see iran excepting missile agreements that apply to itself but if they apply to others through multinational deal or separate deals, maybe we have a possibility. We need enhanced export controls using the procurement channel. The german report about procurement wasnt specific as to whether irans ongoing procurement was in the nuclear or missile field. It kind of mixed those two together. Mostly it was probably in the missile field. Civil defense measures are another tool you can use to deal with the missile threat. Some of the iran sanctions bill under consideration and congress seem to be drafted explicitly for that purpose of undermining the jcpoa. Hr566, theexample, terrorfree skies act seems to rescind iran air as a specially resonated by the u. S. Treasury which would make it unlikely that would be licensed which means it is an explicit violation. This and other sanctions bills are designed to go to he ran into being the one that kills the jcpoa. Some advocates of these specific sanctions are pretty clear that goal. Ir in talking with iranians, i dont think they will be easily goaded. I think they will take a lot that we dish out at them because they dont want to be the ones to be seen as the party responsible for killing the deal. As is written last week, even of the trump team has maintained that it will abide by the deal, the global there to this already being set that if the Trump Administration that the Trump Administration is the unreasonable actor. Collapses, iran wont be at fault. My dealings with europeans and others suggest that is the narrative and that means our partners are not going to join us in reopposing any sanctions. One other example of an idea that was put out there in new sanctions designating the Iran Revolutionary guard corps as a terrorist organization. It seems designed to warn against doing any business with iran, given the pervasive role of the enterprise plays in the iranian economy. But that would be the letter. Thatll be the purpose of that. And there is no economic purpose designated. Iran has Authority Designated as a country as a state sponsor of terrorism for good reason. But if it is to be designated, and i think it is coming, i think it would be wise until west mosul falls. Because irgsupported militia is involved in the attack on isis in western mosul. And it would be counterproductive to sanction their sponsor, it would create difficulty in continuing to press that battle. And it would increase danger for forces in iraq. If we classify one of the de facto partners as a terrorist group. Any potential Diplomatic Solutions to regional issues in which they are involved. If theyre part of the solution, it will be difficult as a terrorist group. And it will be 10 amount to an unofficial declaration of war on iran. He exaggerates. He exaggerates. But there are a lot of iranians who would see it that way. So we create an emotional response in iran. We have to ask whether more pressure on iran would be a good idea would turn the population against the government. We get it wrong so often that we cant determine who will be the winner or loser in iran. There is probably nothing we could do to be certain to help. I have a feeling there is a lot we could do to hurt him that would benefit a hardliner like or loser in iran. One he turns out to be the candidate of the hardliners. I think you have to admit he is a far better partner than some would be. If the objective of the exercise is to prolong enmity for another generation, we should keep doing things that get the goat of the iranian people, like forbidding all of them from entering the United States under the terms of the visa ban. Such acts reinforce the conservative narrative that the United States cannot be trusted and is irreconcilably antiiran. Last point, im giving a talk on north korea this weekend have been thinking about parallels. We saw and the north korean case how abandoning a diplomatic deal that limited north Koreas Nuclear program, abandoning it has contributed very much to what seems now to be an insurmountable problem. The 1994 agreement with north korea was not perfect. The North Koreans cheated, if they did, but the deal significantly rolled back their Weapons Program for a significant time. Similarly in the iranian case, it is far better to implement faithfully an incomplete but effective agreement than it is to scrap it in hopes of achieving the best outcome but end up with the worst. I thank you. Thank you very much for excellent and provocative presentations. We will open this up to discussion. I have quick questions for speakers. Dennis, could you say a little about how you think the netanyahu government now sees the nuclear deal . Readingmy judgement lines is while they like it or do not like it, they tearituper in a mode but rather a mode. Makesureitworks if that is the case, then presumably that would have great resonance on the administration. And mark, you sort of alluded to the Upcoming Elections and you mentioned the ban on travelers from several countries. It does seem to me that this was a case of hitting ourselves in the face, particularly given the fact the iranians were banned. I have no ideas where this stands right now, but were like. E know and mark i think within israel, there was a view within the establishment that there were flaws in the deal and concerns about the deal, but the deal bought time and rather than scrapping it, the smart thing to do was to ensure it would be enforced and figure out ways to take advantage of the time. If you are buying, and depending it, someu have heard view it as 15 years that you are buying. Others say as little as eight years. They feel the prospect of the iranians walking away after it goes up, terminated as opposed to suspended. It then might increase. Others worry more about when puttingians can start the advanced centrifuges starting in the year 10, but in any case, the basic view was you are buying time, what can you do within the region, what can you do within the United States to maximize the impact of the time . Netanyahus view was similar except in one area. He has been riveting all along on the endpoint and the concern that iran is being legitimized as a nuclear state. Iran will find a way to become a Nuclear Weapons state. There will be a focus on serious enforcement, but i think there will be some push to find a way to renegotiate that. I suspect some will make the argument showing you will not scrap a deal that youre are open to be tougher on the iranians and might get other members of the five plus one to feel that, lets keep the Trump Administration on the reservation, and if this is a way to keep them on, maybe you go back and talk to the iranians. I dont think there is much interest in renegotiating the deal. No quite certain theres interest on the part of the iranians on renegotiating the deal. The travel ban is one of the dumbest ideas to come out of the white house in the last month and it applies disproportionately to iran because it has the largest population of the seven countries, probably more than the other six combined. It is a well educated, middleclass population. Much more likely to visit their one million relatives in the United States. It hits the iranians hardest. There is no prospect for iranians to get out of the box because there is no way to abide easily the assurances. It was a bad idea. Barbara, i will start with you here. You have got microphones in every direction. Program on i run a council. He atlantic i think what has been missing, although mark touched on it a little bit, is what is the context for the iranian policy . Madeleine albright put it well. When you make policies, when you hit a ball in one direction, it may not go where you want to go. I would like dennis and mark to talk about what is the context of this. Iran,put more pressure on suggested, how will that impact the policy dealing with isis, syria, yemen . Should we be encouraging saudis to be more aggressive and even less swelling to talk to iranians about the region . Do you think the Trump White House even has a clue of how to put that together . There are a lot of moving parts to be sure. Let me take the second part first and then i will address the first part. I think the policy is being formulated. But if you have a secretary of defense who came out, you now have someone who also has a lot of experience in both of them have experience and one thing you should be, it is worth keeping in mind, they have a lot of experience losing american soldiers to shia militias in iraq that were armed and financed and trained by these iranians. That weighs heavily on them. I do think it will inform they way they approach iran in the region. There is a focus on iran in the region in some ways not only because their own experience, what they see from traditional partners in the region, and the fears they have, but an interesting way, it is easier to deal with than the jcpoa. If you are not going to jcpoa, which i think they conclude you should not tear it up because of the reasons, they understand from talking to europeans and others, it becomes natural to focus more on the region. Now you come back to the priority on isis. At the end of the day, if you will defeat isis, you have to have a plan for what comes after isis. Mark, you raise to the role of the militia, more outside mosul been in it, but some militias in iraq, when they have places most of the young sunni males disappear. That deepens sectarianism. It does not make the prospect you dont face the son of isis later on any less likely. Part of the challenge is if youre going to have a strategy for dealing with isis, it is trying to discredit it, having a plan for sunni inclusion, it is having a plan for governance, and it is not clear exactly how the iranians help in that regard. Patterns, ifof the you look at the story in iraq, they have not been helpful in that regard. You get into, if youre really going to approach the region, you need the sunnis with you. Today trying to draw the sunnis in with you to play a bigger role dealing with isis, it is not made more likely if it looks like you will partner with the iranians. It is made less likely. Again, using your pool analogy, the cue ball hits the eight ball and they can careen in different directions. Fundamentally, youre going to need the sunnis with you. Question becomes is there a way to bring the sunnis with you if you dont have a strategy that looks like you will counter iran. If you have a strategy that looks like you will counter what iran is doing in the region, does that then put you in a better position to say, maybe you do not have to do as much . When president obama gave the interview with Jeff Goldberg and said the saudis need to learn to share the region with iranians and he said this before he went to the gcc summit, it did not exactly endear him to them. He was the one foreign leader the king chose not to meet at the airport. There was an article written the day after the summit. It said the president had come and asked the leaders to acquiesce. Obviously he did not come to ask that but that is what they heard. It is a complicated region. If you will have a strategy toward isis, you have to have a strategy toward iranians that i think is effective in countering them. Coming back the logic of what i was saying, mark, where you and i may differ is my basic approach to the iranians is built the pressure on them but leave them a way out. If you dont build the pressure on them i do not show what he does comes with a cost, they will continue to engage in more active use of shia militias and that only ends up deepening sectarianism. David, were you next . Thank you. I want to ask both speakers about the possibility of a small scale but direct skirmish between iranian and u. S. Forces somewhere. Maybe inside iraq, i dont know. In the gulf. How likely do you think that is, what do you think would happen, and what do you think would be the effect if any on the Nuclear Agreement . It is a good question. Mark i hope iranians are paying attention and hearing what Administration Officials are saying about the harassment of u. S. Ships and the next time that it happens, they will be sank. I suspect they would be. Here is the case where the United States has put out a rhetorical position. And i think it will act as a deterrent. If it happens, which it might, and you cannot be certain the boat wont have gotten the word, there will be a flare up. Then the question is, do the Communication Channels in the Obama Administration work to overcome the flareup . I think those channels are working at lower levels but there is no one answering the phone in the state department yet. I would hope that rhouhani would see to it that it did not flareup because he knows he would lose. He is not in charge of the original operation but he can have an impact on it. It is obviously a tough issue for a lot of different reasons. If you look at the iranian behavior right now, they look to me to be somewhat more cautious. Interesting, when Michael Flynn said we are putting the iranians on notice, and the predator the president backs it up with a tweet, i found that not the equivalent of the obama redline, but when you say on notice, you raise expectations about what you will do. Does it mean more designations . Does put on notice mean you will act militarily . If you are on the iranian side, you should be more cautious. I think the potential for the very thing you identified in your question is higher than it was not because the iranians did not take notice of it. I think they did. If we look back during the iraniraq war, they acted quite independently of what decisionmakers were saying. Is there a risk that we could have that incident, yes. I think it is pretty high. Again, you look at the secretary of defense with his experience, and i think the potential is pretty agh of us destroying such boat. My guess is the response is more rhetorical but if i were doing what i used to do, we might see it express itself in places like iraq. Analogy of the pool player, i think when you make policy, you have to be a chess player and not a checkers player. You have to be thinking three or four moves ahead. The answer to your question was not, what is the immediate not so much vertical escalation but a horizontal escalation, there is a risk of that. Let me go through who i noticed, and i do not know all your names, the lady here, the gentleman in the white suit, and the lady next to david right there. That is four. Stephen . Ok. Yes. Deputy managing editor of the weekly standard. The travel ban, it seemed especially silly. Im guessing they are a lot of iranians who want to come lot are coming here a friendlier to us than those who dont. I want to ask, i think the idea that he is a moderate is debatable. I might agree with you he is someone we would rather deal with, but is it true he doesnt have influence and do we think that whomever is president of iran, that is where the buck stops and that is who we are dealing with and who needs to sign off on any issue . Clearly, iran is not led by the president. The Supreme Leader has a lot more power. The political nature is one of consensusbased decisionmaking among various groups in the elite. That is the only election they have, for the president at this point. I did not say rouhani is a moderate, but he is far better than a hardliner. The question about context, context under obama was that it was a transactional deal and we got limits on the program and there was a hope that it might be transformative, that iran over time would change in ways that would be better in all the policy areas where we have concern for iran. That hope is still out there. Given the demographics of iran, it is fair to hope that it someday can and we can affect how that evolves negatively or positively. We cannot finetune an election outcome for continuing to chastise iranians i dont think works to our benefit. Inchanging hearts and minds iran. What you think of the refusal to take a stand on the Green Movement . You are talking about demographics of iran changing. Do you think the United States needs to be more supportive of freedom movements in iran . I do not think the Green Movement has much standing in iran. It is a moot question really. A question for you. You talk about the importance of showing iranians there is a price to pay for transgressions. What is the appropriate price if they have metric tons what in a practical sense would you have wanted to see the administration do in that circumstance and more broadly, i dont mean to raise a trivial question but i think it is a genuine question. Can you explain in more granular detail the kinds of ways you try to raise the questions on iranians if you do see things they are doing that you dont want to see . This goes back to barbaras question. How do you do that . Will a blizzard of designations going to change their behavior or not . How do you do that when they continue to punish you in so many horizontal ways, whether it is yemen or iraq or syria . It is not a simple answer to the question where, if they are exceeding by a small amount of heavy water, what should be the price. The point i had is if you sit and talk and say, lets come up with these consequences or penalties, for their engaging in what would be small amounts of violations or infractions, the idea that they can engage in behaviors not consistent to the deal, it does not make sense to me if what you want to do is the idea that for a transfer action violation, there will be a price. There can be limited kinds imposed but that ought to be something you discuss and work out in advance. That is the point i was getting at. As for the idea that because they can hurt you in a number of ways, you should be self deterred, well, they can read that. It is not like they are constraining themselves in terms of what they are doing right now. It is not like they are holding back. Tok at the weapons going hezbollah. It is not like they are holding back. Would i try to do more, yes. I will try to do that. They are not supposed to be under the terms of the resolution as it is. It is not like we are in the wrong about this. I think it is true you have to think through every move you make. It is also true that if every time you are afraid that when they engage in behaviors they they should not be engaging in, that you cannot do anything, that message is clear to them. It is not like their involvement in some places in the region are so popular with the iranian public. The fact they spent a lot of money on the outside is not something so welcome at home. I would do a lot more to expose that so the public would be aware. When i say to raise the price, there are different ways to, including shining a spotlight on that. Shining a spotlight, one might add that iran has one of the worst environmental crises in the middle east thanks to water shortages and mismanagement and that is hurting a lot of people. Next. Governor of virginia. Here is my question. First of all, a quick observation. It sounds to me like the panel believes that weve already improved the ability to deter iran by the statement of the president to general flynn. So actually our Foreign Policy has improved already. Here is my question. Everything we said today is all about handling iran, the Nuclear Program, export controls, how to handle it. I dont mean to be naive but can i get a clear statement of what iranians are trying to do . Are they trying to create a shiite caliphate . Are they trying to protect their own regime . What are we trying to stop them from doing in the first place . Dennis first of all let me say, i am more of a Nuclear Specialist so when i try to offer a suggestion of what iranians are trying to do, i may be 100 wrong. Most of the states in which iran is involved are on their periphery, many of them involve shiite populations that they see themselves as a natural leader of a probably part of it is protection of the state by defending neighboring states and part of it is defending neighboring states and part of them are coreligionists. Im sure that is a shallow answer and dennis could do better. Dennis i think iranians have a self image that they are the dominant culture and they have a tendency to look down on many neighbors. I think they feel that by right, they should be able to dominate the region. They have offensive and defensive reasons because they think they have the right and defensive because this is a way to protect the regime. So, they think they should be the dominant power within the region. It is true there is a periphery but there is also lebanon and you look at the effort, the investment they have made to back assad. The argument that they would like to have a corridor basically from iran through iraq to syria and the mediterranean, i think is probably not wrong. They can rationalize that in defensive terms, but others see it in offensive terms. The fact that they were clearly interested at one point in trying to open up through syria, they might argue, i know how israelis see that, you know, the fact that they have given over hezbollah. Kets to again, theyly have a huge stake. Is one place where they have a huge stake in that and it helps to explain the level of investment made in syria. One thing that their use of hezbollah in particular, it has really been like the shock troops in lebanon. The reason there has been an importation of shia militia and the huge numbers are there, very large numbers, it is because the actual numbers of forces available to the regime have declined as much as they have. They need the militia to hold territories. Anyway, one last observation on this. I, for a long time, before the conflict in syria began, i always looked at hezbollah as being a Lebanese Organization first and basically an instrument of the iranian second. Given the way they were employed in syria in a way that was not in hezbollahs lebanese interest, it became clear to me they were basically an instrument of iran. Would you say iran regards itself as an exceptional power . It does, absolutely. Absolutely. My question, Obamas Administration did not have a with the gcc. Hip now, what does the trump iran,stration want with finally on that issue, because when he sees the change, i would like your analysis on that. I dont represent the Trump Administration and do not want to be in a position to say that i know what their policy will be. I might not express it very well. But i think at least drawing from the press conference, it does seem the president has an interest in broadening the circle and creating a regional approach, at least on the israeliaarab issue. And it is not a simple thing to do. And i do think, both the saudis at this point are hopeful they view, fairly or not, that the Obama Administration saw the iranians as part of a solution to the problem, not the source of the problem, and they therefore became deeply distrustful of the administration. I think when the administration put iran on notice, i think they liked that. I think the language toward iran is generally reassuring to them but i think they will have to see what the policies will be. It is not just what is being said. It is actually what is being done. Mattis is someone they know very well. I think that is a source of reassurance and there is an expectation within the region. An interesting thing is they are not keen on having this ripped up either. But this has always been a distinction between israelis and the key gulf states in particular. The israeli view of iran was in a nuclear lens. Which they read in existential terms. The saudi view was through what iran is doing on the ground in the region, with a saw. They were more concerned about obama doing a deal on the Nuclear Issue because they saw that as a suggestion the deal would come at their expense. They were worried basically if iran can cause all sorts of problems when theyre under sanctions, they imagined the kinds of problems when they no longer that was kind of the perception of the gulf states and they have annexed dictation of what will be done, but it remains to be seen what that means in practice. Could you say your name . I am a reporter for the washington post. I would put this to both of you. We used to hear a lot about americans held in iran and what role they played in potential diplomacy or dealmaking or sanctions involving the United States and iran. And really since the release of jason and the nuclear deal, we have heard a lot less about that. And probablyll two more that i am not aware of, but at least two americans held there. Do you expect that to return as an issue, a front burner issue, and if so, how, and do you think the travel ban will influence the thinking or behavior with regard to the likelihood . Thank you. It is a very good question and tomorrow marks the oneyear hostageary of the taking. It should very much be on our minds. How we deal with it and what tools can be used, it is a tricky set of issues. The answer to your question about whether this will continue as an issue, i think it is yes. Waysse it is one of the that the revolutionary guards hit back in a nonnuclear way. They do not want to kill the nuclear deal. They will sanction the United States you understand what i mean . There are various ways the iranians can hit back, taking the dual citizens, there are more british dual citizens in jail right now that americans, it is one of the tools that they half. They have. One person whose name never seems to get mentioned is robert levinson, who has been held for a very long time, who the iranians have not been straightforward on in terms of his status. They seemingly has views his status at different points to try and affect the administration. I agree with mark that this has been a practice of the iranians. Here is where you see the competition within the regime as well. I know for my own time in the Obama Administration, when we were trying to get this back, we when we were trying to get the hikers back. Clearly got indications of, there would be times when it looked more promising and then suddenly, it all changed. Then the judiciary is entering into this. I see it also in terms of the competition within the elite and kind of the interplay with those forces. It should be on the agenda, just because of the fundamental humanity of it. Again, it gets back to, we are in the early stages of an administration whose policy has not really been articulated yet. I think we need to have a better sense of what that will be so we understand more of the priorities and what they really are. Ok. Three more on the list and then we will call it a day. Steve. Know it was president obama in his npr interview who said after about breakout irans time, it was reduced to zero. That has been the fundamental flaw with the agreement. It is not that it does not provide protections between now and your 10, 12, 13, it is what happens of longterm and where do we find ourselves in the future. Under the agreement, we are basically agreeing today that a lot of things that were sanctioned and prohibited in the past will become perfectly permissible and something we agreed iran will have the right to do starting in the year 2010. He said an area of particular concern is higher enriched uranium. On how much and to what level iran can produce highly enriched uranium. Really critical, would you want to worry about breakout time, the more highly enriched uranium can have, the quicker they produce not just one but many very quickly, so you throughout the healthy suggestion that we just tell the iranians that if they exercise this right that president obama and others agree they should have, we will use military force to take out their capability. It is a fine idea, they says whatme though youre threatening to do is use military force the iranians will have a completely founded claim, the deal was they would have an unfettered ability to produce as much uranium at whatever level they wanted at the future and you are saying, if you do that, we will bomb you. That is essentially what i heard you say and i guess my question is, do you think the Trump Administration gets that support . If not, do you think it should be seen as credible by the iranians, and we ask whether you agree with that suggestion and if you dont, what is your solution, you know, lets be clear, they could come up with legally plausible explanations, we have all we decide we need a nuclear navy and you americans use highly enriched uranium for yours, so we are anticipating when we have one, you know, it might be a completely phony explanation but as a legal matter, i think they could put it forward. If they do that, what is your proposal . I heard you say we could relax because iranians are out of the Nuclear Weapons business. I would like to know what you think we should do if you do not agree with the proposal to just bomb them. Two terrific questions. I want to follow up directly on that point. As i understand it, the rights that iran has 10 years from now, under the agreement for 15 years, they are limited to 3. 67 . After, there is no limitation on the enrichment. My point is the Trump Administration may be in office for four years or eight years. It is not likely to be in office for 15. So to what extent does a position like this taken by an Administration Today have credibility with tehran . For the questions for both of you, we are running short so keep it up. So quick and to the point. The way i would do this, i would not just announce this right now. What i would like to see the Trump Administration do is go to the other members of five plus one and say we should at a minimum agree amongst ourselves that they should not be allowed to produce highly enriched uranium. The Energy Secretary did come out and say they would have no justifiable reason for producing h. E. U. But they did not take it further than that, and i would like to go to the other members and say, lets have an agreement among us that we will communicate to them that this is not acceptable, and that we will read that as an indication of them in fact wanting to put themselves in a position to have a Nuclear Weapon. At least try in private to see it, and ifill accept it is not accepted by the others, still be prepared to communicated at least in private and at some point, say it publicly. It does not necessarily bind any future administration. Just like when i say i want to change on the clear toward policies, you want to begin to condition the environment and get everyone used to the idea that iranians should understand they should not be tempted to move in that direction. My big fear that you are also noting is i am worried that they think we have deferred having a weapon but we have not given up the option. I do not want them to be tempted and i think we need to think about what we can do to make it less likely they would be tempted. After 15 years, if iran abides by all the limits and the inspections do not turn up violations, is that iran would have a Nuclear Program that is a socalled normal Nuclear Program and would follow the same limits applied to others and the ability to enrich as much as they want would be a right, but there are also other limits that exporting countries can put through Nuclear Suppliers group or other norms or political restrictions. Countries can decide collectively that we do not want anybody to have h. E. U. That is not legitimate for any purpose, especially if it had a past with Nuclear Weapons development. I do not go along with the idea of saying we will bomb them, but i think the policy is a reasonable one. How we will enforce it might be a matter for future administrations. How iran is judged to be a normal Nuclear Country is aea inspectioni process of, if they abide by all of the rules, and there are no outstanding questions about the Nuclear Program, then they will be eligible to get the socalled broader conclusion of all of the Nuclear Material for all peaceful purposes. If there is any reason for suspicion at all, im pretty sure the Trump Administration would make that known and we would not draw that conclusion that all activities are for peaceful purposes. If after year eight iran has not been able to reach the standard required for additional protocol, i think the country concerned about iran would probably want to renegotiate the deal at that point because they would have legitimate concerns that something is still amiss and iran is not behaving like a normal country and we do not want those limits to come off and that would be my approach. Thank you. Wait a second. Sandy specter with the James Martin Center for nonproliferation studies. I just wanted to go back to two different points dennis ross made. The first is the idea of somehow providing deterrent strategy. The bunker buster weapon and the bomber to release it, that would be quite something, a Delivery System in use with Nuclear Weapons. I say it raises a number of issues above and beyond the ability to attack a single site. We are seeing other countries were advanced suppliers are offering Nuclear Weapon platforms. Other issues are involved here. The procurement channel, i dont find it to be quite such a troubling aspect. They have so many extra unused centrifuges that to cannibalize 15 or 20 years, to keep the existing level going, so they dont need to going to the marketplace for that purpose, the iraq reactor which they will be building, still in the early design phases. It is not really a surprise they are not in the market looking for Replacement Parts or whatever it might be. First of all, we use the b2 for conventional purposes. We have been using it now for conventional purposes. The last person i had on the list is talking to sandy right now. List,e you still on my madam . Ok. My question is about sanctions, and what that would mean internationally. If sanctions are imposed, how would they be received by your and russia and china given the broader state of turbulent relations with the Trump Administration, and is there a way to structure a sanctions will that would make it more effective in terms of convincing partners to go along . Does it have something to do with structuring of ownership, and the need to be transparent as a shareholder, at what level . I dont see much appetite today in europe for such a designation. If the irgc had been involved in activities of a particular interest to europeans, like Human Rights Violations, they would be more willing to go along with the designation. I dont think that is the purpose for the designation. The purpose seems to be the idea to inflict punishment on the iranian economy. Europeans arent going to go along with that. The sanctions should be smart directed at behavior that is egregious. They should not violate and we should be certain we should have a good idea the sanctions are more effective in changing behavior than other possible tools. Ok. Dennis . I basically agree with him on that designation. I do not think you should actually require that. Thank you very much. Thank you for being an enlightened and provocative audience. Thank you, cspan, and we wish you good day. Thank you. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] i think a lot of these kids look at these huge ideas, twitter, uber, airbnb, they seem like conversationally a seinfeld episode. Alexander wolf looks at the world of startups in silicon valley. The young people who have ventured there with the hopes of becoming the next big Success Story in her book valley of the gods. And lots of them felt like the rush of hollywood actresses to l. A. They ended up being a waitress and wait for the big day. It is harder to be elon musk than tom cruise. The people running them, they did not just have a lucky break. The stories were years and years of coding of engineering. They have a application i cannot even imagine