Legitimate tool, at least this how its perceived by the majority of people in the region, then whatever progress can aim at, as i said, will be short lived. At usip, we are trying to include this element in our interventions. Example, ind, for 2012, in a region between the shabac andand the basically at that time what we told them in the first place is better way to address the issue of coinciding dates than dealing or it. Ting violence to solve thatot only we told them violence is not going to help them and to address this issue but we also helped them to find to celebrateound both christmas and commemorate during the same week while avoiding, while preventing from both groups and the aftermath of the massacre, we also explained to sunni and shia tribes that resorting to violence will not advance the judicial process and end in a perpetual cycle of violence, it will prevent the return of idps and will not will not keep any of the so we or the shia safe adopted a similar approach in conflictsler scale when we facilitated dialogue of local public work contractors and the or more recently in kurds andyria between arabs. So basically what were trying to do is to demonstrate to the people or to the communities there are alternatives to whereby they can achieve what they want without going into unacceptable compromises. Tried to demonstrate the high cost of violence and by doing so as i said we aim at a process of social transformation whereby violence is not considered any more as a legitimate tool but as something that is counter productive in most of the cases. At firstt look trivial but my assessment makes me isfident that this work essential and should be an of any intervention in the region. Involves policy decisions at the level of the International Community to dimension in the involvesbut it also and as the report highlights, the role of the local actors thisding Civil Society in kind of work, because at the end day, the agents of changes have to be local. International community can support but the change has to indigenous actors so the initial question for this and for the report was that if Good Governance can militancy,upport to my point is that the answer to yes, if sois, its a conditional yes on whether an element of social transformation is built into the interventions will address the governance issues. Thank you for your attention and forward for comments and questions. Thank you, dr. Elie. I was curious if the panelists have comments on each others remarks. I would welcome followup. I encourage discussion between the panelists and also the same way we engage with the audience. One thing you said that was very interesting, two things. One was demonstrating the cost of violence and there is not this link between poverty and support for extremism. Something we see very clearly in researchears of survey across pakistan in all parts of the country. Not an arab country but suffering tremendous amounts of political violence. It is the poor who are most negative toward extremist groups. We see a little bit of that in the survey data from iraq. Although not as strong. The other thing we see here is if you share information with people about the cost of violence in the country you have a strong effect on driving support for militant groups and this is across all kinds of milton groups and that effect is strongest among the poor. Out in very borne large scale surveys across a number of years. Thank you. Some of the Key Takeaways from this conversation is that i like the question underneath the research which talks about how Good Governance can diminish support for isis and sectarian militias. It highlights that the violence coming from a point of belief, from a point of religious belief that you have to do this. Second it gives hope that there is possibility that you can diminish that and Good Governance is allowed to do that. Civil society is a good partner that could be worked with and i think this is one of the success imposed 2003. Q it is important, a paradigm shift for governments because for government to have another partner on the scene to the an active governance player is an important one and to see acceptability by the government and by the people more so to be is an important one. I would like to get back to the issue of violence. Their support for violent groups as an organized group and then there is the other thing that we talked about. Resorting to violence, it may not become an Armed Organization but whether it is a demonstration that turns into violence or that government that may have resorted to violence as a means to respond to societal demands. And then also the perception that whether it was occurs, [indiscernible]span. Org the response was violence. This is a question for the panel. After the bloody conflicts we have seen, do you see it all any level at the policymaker or the people level especially looking at the south because looking at the demonstrations where close to breaking into violence. Do you feel that there is any change at a policy maker level, at a Community Level that resorting to violence may not be the way to address those differences . Differences will stay. A will be part of humanity. The question is how do that you deal with them . We mentioned some examples but observations from conversations you have had. Just a couple of points. Two things that resonated with reflecting on research. First of all this whole idea poverty and the lack of Job Opportunities would drive young people into the hands of arms of extremist groups. In a previous piece of research which is collected in this report, which is available also here. What young people in somalia and columbia and afghanistan told our researchers was basically that it is not poverty, it is not a lack of Job Opportunities. Driver in terms of sympathy or lack of sympathy for armed extremist groups. Extmist groups. It was their own sense of marginalization. All of these things layer over each other and interplay. The and people themselves, they felt excluded, they felt marginalized. Their own society and government was not responsive. Was what drove them to either support or not support violent armed groups. Again that is reflected in the research that we conducted in iraq. Sectarian identity is not the prime driver for sympathy for armed Opposition Groups. Support your own comments. Secondly to go back to the issue of the constructive role of iraqi Civil Society and in improvingvernance is which is true. It is not proven but what do we see and what does the research see us about how iraqis Civil Society and this addresses your own point. , we witnessed as Civil Societyng is very vocal and active and organized. Of that is the level activity, that has driven changes in perceptions among iraqis and what they see in Civil Society and the usefulness of nonviolent ways of solving grievances and issues. When the first was carried out only 39 of iraqis expressed a view of that kind of broader that can resolve issues. , thee time the 2015 survey head increased to 50 . They saw Civil Society as a force for good and saw Civil Society as able to Broker Solutions around their own issues and perceptions of governance and justice. It would like to open it up i would like to open it up to the audience for questions. Raise your hand and the microphone will be brought to you. Wait for the microphone. Please state your name and your affiliation. For those who may have walked in , this event is being live streamed and carried live through cspan. Thank you. I suppose you are thinking , whetherountabilities they are doing right. [indiscernible] and what do they have to change. Whether they have accountability, whether they are corruption, i suppose and [indiscernible] when you look around may be more reliable but when youre looking time isata another [indiscernible] if you want to say blame on financial institution, whether they take peoples property, is this what you mean by changer governance and that makes people feel better. What the Iraq Research shows is that when people had a next dictation of improved governance, that really had a strong and powerful effect in terms of their own perceptions of using violence to solve problems. Their expectations of government performance, expectations of basic Service Delivery. Practical examples on the ground in the last couple of years in iraq, Civil Society groups making government more accountable whether that is the federal government or at the government level. Within the surveys, the vast majority of respondents still see perceive the government to be corrupt. They still see the government to be ineffective and not representative. When you look at what is happening on the ground, that can change. Whether it is Civil Society group like the iraqi center for confident management and negotiation skills moderating to iraqibout support for Civil Servants have been affected by the isis takeover of muzzle, that group was able to play a key role in changing policy that Civil Servants and that is a real tangible result. Wasn a Civil Society group able to come together and change the way that the local government authorities were approaching the commodity of electricity division. That electricity provision which is pretty final in iraq during summer. Have civil site he groups gotten their own local governments to help with the budget making process. These are tangible gains that show that Civil Society can have a powerful role to play in making government more accountable. The kind of brokering that conversation between the citizen and the government authorities. One of the striking things you see in the data for this this disconnect between the general changes for expectations of government. Beliefs about corruption are increasingly increasing dramatically throughout the sample and expectations of how effectively government will perform increased dramatically. There is not a sense in the survey to go to that question that corruption is incompatible with government performance. Thaturvey seems to suggest a set of changes going around in society where expectations about corruptions are going up but people are expecting more of their government. They may be some kind of tolerance for the inefficiencies or problems caused by corruption. Those two things at least in the western context you would not think about them together. There needs to be some tolerance that is different from what we might expect. A question in the back. I wonder if you could answer and nuts and bolts question about the surveys. Tell me about the differences and methodology between the three, there seem to be some implied differences from the slight you showed and how you think this might have affected the results. There were some areas that you could not sample. The results are not very sensitive to how you treat that. Those areas did not move to medically differently. Gastro medically differently. Data hardoke at the and try to control for the , therential politics results also seem quite stable. It does not seem like there is a lot going on. The composition of the sample will drive the results. I am a project erector but i want to be a grumpy academic for second. I first question is about the relationship between Political Attitudes and political behaviors. My understanding in iraq which is limited is that it is not sectarian violence and not Political Attitudes but it is. Ribal or family obligations question isrief strong support and the idea that ation of a valoriz violence and a lot of responsibility comes with local media. I am curious about an intersection of cicero a Civil Society and media for this. We know that it really turns kids on and i would love to see it in an enhanced role or call on responsibility for local media. Thank you. Just to pick up the point in terms of what does the survey tell us about support for the specific group like isis. The concept of serving [indiscernible] support for isis along the among the local population. What the survey tells us about that specific group. I do not the surveys did not. Ull the interaction this research does not speak to your specific [indiscernible] this whole question about violence turns young people on and is a driver for their recruitment into extremist groups, if you look at what the iraq report tells us that what the youth and consequences report is telling us, the indicators are that is not the case it is not the overweening factor. From what young people tell us it is their own sense of injustice towards him that would make them feel more sympathetic Foreign Armed extremist or Opposition Group which is often like an alternative solution in terms of correcting what they see as being injustice. Rather than the violence itself. Important point about the disconnect between behavior and attitudes. It is important to think about this in terms of what happens at the end of the day in terms of violence. Malicious attitudes are as much as not as much of a problem bythey are not accompanied malicious behavior. One way to think about the results of the survey is is is not the case that you are getting a sample result on attitudes toward violence. That is the right estimate of that for the population that might engage in violence. But it is important because youre getting the estimate for the population in which those people are embedded. Those communities can take a lot of action to stop people from acting. It is still quite important even if you do not have that direct link between all of all respondents. Anything about the attitude ard isis it is a shame they have been doing the best opinion work and to paraphrase that it is generally the support for isis that is quite low. It was dropping and just the last few months they have done some surveys in muzzle which suggest it is taking up a little in mosul. And want to follow up on that. I want to followup on that. If you can comment on how that their vulnerability in being prone to violence. The point is before getting into this i would like to make a very brief comment on Political Attitudes and behavior. If you talk to the majority of people in the region you would see that there is a dual standard approach. People deny violence but when they are prompted to act [indiscernible] sectarianism,out about corruption you will see the same issue. People deny they endorse corruption but when they want to do something for themselves they do not hesitate to bribe someone to get something done or whatever. This should be something that needs to be taken into account. Back to the issue of the youth. I made comments about the vulnerability of youth 12 orally those who are 13 years old so they were born in 2003. They live off their life in the context of conflict and violence. Many of these youth have seen their dads, uncles, are other people from their family die. The increased risk on this group today is the heavy militarization of the community. The number of groups in iraq is scary. The way these groups are structured, the line of commands and their affiliation, sometimes to local partners is also very dangerous. My question is always and this is something i tried to bring up in my discussions with iraqi officials when i meet them is what is the plan to handle the caseload of the 60,000 to 100,000 fighters who are today on the ground. When the conflict ends. These people have been outside the civilian life or well now. Even as the conflict and stood a there is a political settlement. What will happen to 62 100,000 young people who are outside the School System or who have been fighting for a five years now or not more than this. This is another scary question that comes across my mind. It highlights the need for thateport makes the point addressing those issues is a multiyear thing. You have to stay with it. There was questions the back. If i am following the hypothesis it is that civil vehicle toa proxy see improvements in governance. As opposed to tackling government headon. That aserpreting accountability. My question is it is a reinterpretation of the first question. What does the data say about who within Civil Society which is huge, it is massive and very heterogeneous, who and what element of Civil Society is most effective in changing what particular aspect of government be more granular about tying those two together. That is what will guide us in the right direction. If it Civil Society groups that are calling for budgetary transparency or is it religious leaders who are calling for the decrying of violence. Within political actors. Can the penalties apart who within Civil Society is targeting what within governance and what the data says about that. Thanks. Let me add a little bit to it. The Civil Society and activism we have seen in the recent demonstrations of the last month , the grand ayatollah was not so strongly vocal on the issues of corruption and governance with Civil Society at the same level of success or do you think there thea higher chance of government or other actors have responded to them more harshly. Questions a [indiscernible] this the data itself will not tell us which specific groups are the most effective. When we refer to Civil Society we refer specifically to Civil Society organizations but we are talking about formal Civil Society. The quantitative data itself allowot really point you to do comparative analysis between different types of Civil Society actors to say type a is effective, type b is left less effective. What the Qualitative Research does in the form of interviews engagement with these more structured formal Civil Society organizations shows you that across every area of iraq whether it is down in baghdad. Basra or be effectivele to in changing the paradigm of governance. They might be engaging with a local government body about transparency but they might be engaging about a very tangible good like electricity provision during summer in iraq which sparked a lot of protests last year. They have effected change. They have made government more transparent. They made government more accountable to its citizens. They make government change. It was determined to pursue before that organization broker. Hat conversation my data does not necessarily tell you what is the most effective form of Civil Society but qualitative experience shows that the more structured it asians can be pretty effective, and delivering real change. That is about as far as we can go right now. Question here in the middle. Oil prices have been down for a year. 50 a barrel oil. The Iraqi Government has cut back on its reconstruction investment. There is talk that subsidies will be reduced for electricity and water. Will this be a strain that Civil Society will not be able to take . Thank you. Could you elaborate on that a little more . How do you see Civil Societys role in dealing with those issues . If the pie is growing it is one thing to argue about dividing the part you pie evenly. When it is shrinking that will put a strain on the formal and informal parts of the Iraqi Government. I am thinking the government has been the employer of first resort. Those days are over. Especiallyt growing, among the university educated, that will put tremendous strain on the society. Thank you. I had a brief comment about this. I think this crisis despite all the negative aspect is an opportunity for government and Civil Society to think about many aspects that were left forgotten over the last 10 years. Governmente of the took seriously into diversifying the economy instead of relying on the oil sector. To end up withis the situation of having the government be the first employer in iraq. At the same time the Civil Society can use this crisis as well. Of some the direction Public Policies that are much needed in iraq today. I think it will put some strain on the Civil Society but if i were an iraqi activist i would see it as an opportunity as well. I was hoping as i work on this conflict that as oil went down the could have the but alsoative effect the competition over the resources may bring other challenges and bring it down to the provincial level as iraq decentralize is. The iraqipe was as revenue is going down i hope that the different actors, iraqi actorsisis whether whichever political angle you take that the cost of the conflict will be so high that they will lose interest in spending so much on the weapons and fighting and the need for reconstruction. So far, i have not seen an influences the that influences the key actors to take it in a different direction. That is offset because of the regional interventions which i will come back to. And wanted to roll down a decouplingher to the you suggested between corruption and governance. I am listening to what youre saying about the report but it seems as though you have got perceptions of increasing corruption or negative perceptions of corruption. Expectations of government at a certain point but not necessarily increasing perceptions of actual government delivery. I would like to probe a little further as to whether this decoupling between corruption and governance that is actually fair. Its as like given the words that youre using which have to do with transparency, justice,elivery, effective delivery the things that the government is supposed to do. All of those things corruption is anathema to all those things. What i am suggesting is perhaps what we are looking at is after the election the expectations of a better and a cleaner government rose but were not yet of in terms of perception the outcome. Is that a fair alternate reason potentially . Thiswould have to defer on. What happens in 2015 as far as not expectations of government but reports of government performance. What you have, extremely dramatically in the 2014 wave is expectation of governments go up. Not hugely. They go up most strongly when it comes to the performance of the police services. Treatment. Negative for is once you control characteristics that is the massive jump which is consistent with the perceptions of the government. It is not like there is the sunnis, the expected all of a sudden Service Delivery in all other areas to dramatically improve. It was this narrow thing. Rememberknow if you the 2015 results more specifically. I would completely agree. If you have to the report on page 19, you will see a graphic, not just perceptions of corruption but perceptions of services are worsening from 2013 220 15. That trend is consistent. When we look just at perceptions of expectations of Service Delivery after the resignation, those expectations did rise to i think your interpretation is correct. Thank you. I wanted to piggyback on sarahs question because the classic conundrum is often change happens, expectations rise, and change does not happen fast enough and you have got a very which todow within make the kind of change that is sustaining whatever positive reaction there is. Is there anything in the data, anything in the survey that suggests how durable apostate positive perception is and what might happen is if a body continues to not be able to institute a meaningful reform program. In reforms that will be perceived. I will make a very general point about getting that kind of analysis and turn it over to mark. This is for people in the room who might have some influence over funding. It is almost impossible to answer that question credibly with these kinds of surveys where youre not going back to the same people every time. Peoplet to get the same at multiple points in time several years apart to see how their individual perceptions are changing. The thing that can happen if you do not is people who are happy can be more willing to respond on certain questions around the survey. Result, not attitudes create that is what killed the Romney Campaign in 2012. They had encountered this. Usaid finished a program where they went to 20,000 people and did a panel survey in 2013 and late 2015 and the got 90 of the people in 50 wheremedicine counties there was conflict in 2013. They went back and found 90 in the followup. You can absolutely do that kind of research. It is expensive. Good afternoon. Question for professor shapiro. Looking the way forward. All these surveys have been put in place. I am a former member of imf and the world bank and work in a very [indiscernible] as part of the contractor under usaid. I remember working so hard on these issues around transparency , transparency and oversight. We went to a lot of similar surveys at the Grassroots Level and we put a lot [indiscernible] , you have ton is be consulted through other i dps. A try to encourage Capacity Building on the Grassroots Level, even working at the village level. I was a trainer on something we called public financial management, in accounting and treasury. We spent a lot of time and i remember [indiscernible] with all these changes going on with the new regime. Is this there any kind of blueprint that is being discussed in spite of all these other efforts . A Super Committee [indiscernible] all these issues around transparency and oversight [indiscernible] and the way forward. Thank you. I do not know. I would be curious to hear what those kindss is and of programs. Is there a blueprint . I hesitate to say there is a blueprint because that sounds so concrete and fixed. There are certainly those conversations going on. They go on between the iraqi authorities and key institutional donors and Civil Society groups. And iraqi organizations. If you take the example of how do you program most effectively to stabilize areas that have recently been retaken from isis, for example. Within those conversations all are looking at this issue seriously and developing their own strategies for engagement. I think one of the kind of key messages of this research is within that conversation and within that roadmapping and blueprinting. The necessityet bignvesting equally as evidence and Civil Societys role in governments as you might invest in infrastructure. Very output heavy in the sense we will repair the water system and we will rebuild a certain number of schools. What people in the service tell us is it is not necessarily the most important factor for them. The most important factor is they feel their voices are listened to and things change when they vocalize those needs. Would appear that one of the ast effective is supporting very active and Civil Society and within that two key factors. Of organization, able to build the level of professionalism and focusing we are talking about. If you look at what a lot of said this is the most important Civil Society assessment. Thank you