Looking ahead, expected paid in the senate on the syrian resolution this coming week, a possible vote to move forward can be scheduled as early as wednesday. Live coverage of the senate on our companion network, cspan2. It is possible we will see debate in the house, as well. Nothing has been scheduled or announced their. He will have house floor debate here on cspan. Secretary hagel and secretary kerry appeared before the House Foreign Affairs committee this past week. They testified on what they know about the situation in syria. Tomorrow. Ow that here are some of what they had to say. If we do nothing, what is the in your judgment that the share all assad will use that bashars assad will use chemical weapons to turn the tides of war . I believe the likelihood is high. Mr. Secretary . I agree completely, i might even put down 100 . You should go check the intel on it, i think i will be convinced. Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, if you are right, we will see these weapons used routinely in this civil war to turn the tide if we do nothing. What is the probability that such weapons will get in the hands of has below . Of hezbollah . Are our three principle supporters of assad and the rest of the world is in and there are three principle supporters of assad and the rest of the world is in horror. Are iran and hezbollah allowed to see him stay in power, as well as do so with the use of chemical weapons, that is extraordinarily dangerous for jordan, israel, lebanon, and our interest. Look of how that vote might break down, any vote in the house underneath u. S. Military strikes in a house military strikes. 100 37 leading toward a no vote and 92 saying they are undecided. At accounts for 305 members of the house. 217 are needed to pass. Taking a look at a map of syria, this is the area outside of damascus where a European Union that for the european and where the European Union agrees that a chemical weapons attack did occur. German newspapers are reporting the United Nations may have some initial findings that could be released by the end of next week. Germany has just signed on to a Statement Issued by yes issued yesterday by 11 of the 20 countries that blame syria for the chemical attack. More now on syria and how it might react if the u. S. Were to launch a military strike there. More with state department officials. It ran about an hour and a half. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. My name is frederic hof and on behalf of fred kemp, the president of the Atlantic Council and michelle done, the director of the center for the middle east, i would like to welcome you all to todays program. This is a joint production of the Hariri Center and the Atlantic Council. Over the past two weeks, we have witnessed a truly extraordinary chain of events that began on the 21st of august with a chemical attack in a suburb of damascus. In the fullness of time, i think we will probably know for sure what motivated the assad regime to take this step and what it was actually thinking. In terms of trying to get away with it. What is objectively clear at this point is that this was a criminal attack on defenseless civilians. It was a clear violation of international prohibitions against the use of chemical weapons. And it was a direct challenge to the credibility of president obama and the United States. Particularly, in the wake of warnings about red lines and game changers. One striking feature of this chain of events sorry, has been the manner in which the Obama Administration has reacted to the key event itself. For well over a week, the burden of articulating outrage and making the case for a powerful response fell mainly to secretary of state john kerry. When the president and the secretary of defense chuck hagel spoke, their combined effect at times was to blur somewhat the clarity of secretary kerrys message. All of this changed last weekend when president obama announced he had come to a decision on the use of force, and would Seek Congress and authorizing resolution, to use the armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in connection with the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the conflict in syria. In order to one, to prevent or deter the use and proliferation within, to or from syria of any weapons of mass destruction. Including chemical or biological weapons or components or materials used in such weapons. Two, to protect the United States and its allies and partners against the threat posed by such weapons. Congress is now actively engaged in hearing from the administration about the National Security objectives and strategy in which likely Cruise Missile attacks on syrian targets will be embedded. This is of critical importance. Much of the syria related work in 2013 has centered on the need for an objectivesbased u. S. Strategy towards syria. Clearly, president obama believes contrary to the assad regime and its orders that there is no military solution to the syrian crisis. Obviously, he would like to see a diplomatic solution consistent with what was agreed to by p5 in geneva in 2012. Although it is obvious that the president wants military strikes to bring about the deterrence and prevention results mentioned, clearly there must be a syria related National Security set of objectives that transcends the response to the horrible events of august 21. Prior to that date, the assad regime had already killed tens of thousands of syrians using mostly conventional munitions in a campaign of mass terror, one that has produced over 2 million refugees and nearly 5 million internally displaced persons. A campaign having enormously negative affect on American Allies and friends in the region. Prior to that date, the assad regime had already established itself as a palpable threat to the peace in the region. Prior to that date, the United States needed an objectives based strategy for syria. The need for one now as military action is contemplated is manifest. Our focus today, however, is on what is directly in front of us. The prospect of u. S. Military strikes in syria and congresss debate over whether or not to authorize the president to move forward. We have three excellent speakers who will tackle this subject from three different perspectives. First, barry pavel is an Atlantic CouncilVice President and director of the center on interNational Security. For nearly 18 years, he served as a senior official in the office of the undersecretary of defense policy and the department of defense, after which he served on the white house staff as a special assistant to the president , working for both president george w. Bush and barack obama. He brings to the table a wealth of experience on u. S. Defense policy and strategy, all of which is extraordinarily relevant to the situation we are facing in syria. Dr. Elizabeth obagy is a Research Analyst at the institute of the study of war where she studies syrian politics and security. She is also involved in humanitarian work as the political director of the Syrian Emergency Task force. Her major reports on the Syrian Opposition include, the free syrian army, jihad and syria, and syrias political opposition. She is widely acknowledged as an expert on the Syrian Armed Opposition and has done extensive fieldwork. As the u. S. President and the public agonizing over what is to be done and its impact of United States, elizabeth will bring what you needed focus on the alternatives that exist. Finally, faysal itani is a fellow with the rafik Hariri Center. He is a relatively new and very welcome addition to the center. Faysal is a middle east analyst whose focus is transition in the arab world with an emphasis before working on the council, he worked as a risk analysis analyst advising International Organizations on political, economic and Security Affairs in the region. Faisal will help us shape the discussion of potential regional implications of whatever it is the United States is about to do in syria. I will ask each of the speakers to frame the key issues as they see them and to do so within about eight minutes each. We will then turn to questions. Which, given the size of the audience, will need to be tightly focused. I will attempt to do a brief wrapup at the end and we will make every effort to adjourn promptly at 2 00 p. M. I would ask you to switch off cell phones, and with that i will turn to barry. Thanks very much, fred. Thanks, everybody for coming. I am going to be really brief, partly in the interest of time to hear from you. Partly because of lot of what i have said has already been in print. I will be brief and a little provocative and then we can discuss it. I always start with conversations about the u. S. Role in the conflict in terms of its military role, what are the Mission Objectives . I will outline four or five. I did this before some of the leaks came out that described it. It is sort of a ladder. You can see increasing levels of ambition, the u. S. Is increasingly involved for good or for ill and that depends on your opinion. The first objective would be to deter further chemical weapons use and we will talk about the military manifestations of these Mission Objectives. The second is to more comprehensively takeout Assads Air Force and ground force units, many of which are the delivery vehicles for chemical weapons. They also serve other regime aims. Third would be to increase the quantity and quality of weapons going to the rebel groups. This gets a more involved on the ground. This gets us more obviously picking sides on a political military bases. Fourth would be the establishment and enforcement of a nofly zone so that we take away assads use of air power completely. This is a more sustained operation and would involve much more of an investment in terms of our military ownership of aspects of the conflict. Fifth, and we heard this from general jones on piers morgan last thursday, another objective would be the establishment of safe areas in some portion of syria on the ground that would have to be protected and managed by some forces on the ground, because proxies or direct forces from a coalition. I think about that ladder and for me that drives the rest of our applications as a military role in it. At this point, i emphasize that, it looks like the operation is definitely focused on objective one which is deterring further use of chemical weapons by the assad regime. I say there is a little bit of two and three in there also. I would love to hear from our panelists as well. I think there will be some targets of the eventual military campaign that would address air force units, air force bases, ground force units, ground force bases, associated military command and control and communications facilities, etc. We heard from senator mccain after he met with president obama outside of the west wing, that there is also a plan to increase the quantity and quality of the weapons that the United States will be providing to vetted rebel groups. The more ambitious that one goes up this ladder, there are more implications of military conflict. We will hear some of that from faysal. Increased danger of u. S. Entanglement. It increases the probability of syria in retaliation and potentially Iranian Military involvement. If assad thinks we are only going after objective one, i think most of the interests he would be thinking about would be, i will treat this like a hurricane. I will hunker down in my bunker. When the storm is over, i will do everything again. Probably with a little more freedom. If it is more, i am going to hurt core assets that are valuable to assad and the military, then you start making the price too high for them. That is the framework i use to thing about this. There is broader consideration beyond syria as well. I wouldnt under emphasize these. The syrian part is really important. I think i am a former math major so i did the math. Over 4000 people, has been roughly the average of being killed. When you think about the two and a half week delay between when we thought the operation was going to strike and the earliest Time Congress can vote the next week that is a shame. We are talking 2500 People Killed while we go through this process that we are going through. In terms of broader considerations, there is a classical theory of deterrence that is relevant here. The president established a policy that chemical weapons use would cross his red line putting the United States security commitments on the line. There are two elements of deterrence that are relevant. Deterrence is threatening some sort of cost or punishment on an adversary that crosses the line. There are two aspects of that. It should be swift and very effective. Second, the exact nature of that punishment should be uncertain in the eyes of the adversary. Thomas shelley called it a threat that leaves something to chance. You dont want the adversary to know exactly what youre going to do, because he can play out more precisely and get a better estimate of his cost, of his retaliation, etc. You want them to know that something really big, really harmful and really swift is coming their way and you dont want them to know exactly what it is going to be. With those graduate school 101 deterrence tenets, i would say the Obama Administration has succeeded in violating both of them fully and frontally with the leaks that were let out about the timing, expected timing of the operation, the objectives, the numbers of targets, the types of targets. More detail than i had when i was doing planning in the pentagon. Assad as a result now has a wonderful amount of time to prepare fully for what he thinks is coming and what we think is coming. As i tweeted a few minutes after the president s announcement, i said certainly assad will be moving in with her units into civilian neighborhoods. That is what i would do. And moving civilians into military areas. I think we have seen some reporting of that since then. I think the ideal effect i think about this what do you want assad to take away from this operation when it is done . You want him hunkering down in his bunker, bombs all over the place for a sustained terrifying period of time. The reason you want that is so it will never think about doing it again. You want him coming away not even thinking about the possibility of resorting to weapons of mass destruction again. At this point, from what we understand, he probably knows, i have nothing to fear. I am just going to hunker down and when this is over, i am going to come back out. My view is, lets keep the purpose of this operation as a political military purpose. Just because general dempsey told the president we can strike anytime, time does matter. For these reasons, i have dubbed this operation slow motion pinprick. The attributes of that are the opposite of what i would say the United States should be doing. A broader point that is really important to me and i think to you the united dates, u. S. Allies have been watching this stream of the vents very closely as have some partners. These are allies that have a Legal Defense treaty commitment with the United States and who have relied on the United States in some cases for 60 years to come to their defense when they feel threatened. In many cases, from wmd armed adversaries like iran, north korea or threatening allies like south korea, japan, and our gulf allies. They are already scared about u. S. Defense budgets, about sequestration, about the reduced capacity of the military to they are already scared about sequestration. They are also a little scared, i say, of the resolve and the will of the American People and of this president to come to their defense. N such contingencies for reasons i think all of you know very well, because this ad mrlings has administration has rightfully focused on dealing with a lot of our domestic issues. It would be wonderful if the world would wait for a lot of us to get our own domestic house in order in terms of defense policy. Obviously thats not the case. I this is it is really important for global purposes, and the stability of key regions like asia pacific and the persian gulf that the u. S. Respond to this violation of a declared u. S. Threshold be met in the most effective way possible. Im confident the president has his eye on iran in formulating the broader Strategic Response to this course of to these developments. So thats sort of something we should keep very clear. I know he considers it one of the foremost challenges in his second term in terms of the security threats United States and u. S. Interests. One big caveat on everything i have said, we are going on leaks. We are going on reporting. We havent seen the leaks play out yet. For all we know it could be an operation that meets the requirements that i just talked about. Boy, would i love to be happy when operation whatever its called is going to come out and do zpactly what most observers who have very high stakes in the u. S. Response will be looking for. Im hopeful thats the case. I think ill end my remark on that basis. Barry, thank you very much. I can only hope that the question period will present an opportunity for you to say what you really think about this subject. [laughter] i think it is important to keep in mind the two questions im hearing frequently and seem to be on peoples minds, the first is, what will be the reaction, both by the regime and the opposition. The other being, u. S. Opposition. I hate to say two years into a conflict were still asking this question, but we are. D there seems to be a meta narrative thats surrounding the discussion that cat good morning, americaly discusses a radical movement that has been so radicalized that they are now with the alqaeda interest groups. My comments today will be discussing the possible or likely reactions by the regime and the opposition, and maybe take a more nuanced look at the various opposition forces, and how these ideas have changed over the course of these two years to the point we are at now. So first starting with the reaction about the regime, i think a lot of this will go back to the exact objectives over time to achieve the strikes. This has been a punitive measure noord in order to send a message to the regime. Ou could, in fact, be an empowered assad, who comes out and says the americans have passed us and we have still survived. In a sense, spinning the narrative to a position of power. It could have a potentially debilitating psychological impact on both the opposition and the civilian pop racial legislation population. It does seem there has been considerable thought given to the psychological atack this psychological impact an attack will have. Again we have been tracking very closely the position of assets with the hopes of framing ossible u. S. Action. There is the concern that an ttack, there could be a chance for a retaliation or escalation. I think there could be retaliation if the strikeds are punitive. Or there could be strikes against our allies. There is a large u. S. Embassy in raq. I think that is why it is important to consider retaliation effect from the opposition. Moving a little away from the opposition, but the civilians mostly believe there should be a response to chemical weapons. They are very disappointed that the Syrian Government has been allowed to use chemical weapons, and they are seeing no International Response to that breach. They are beginning to see some ratifying that is a result of chemical weapons being used and no one there to stop it. From the opposition standpoint, there were a lot of xpectations. Many of the groups went all the way to actually plan operations for redistribute resources in order to account for strikes. I think in that degree they have been a little offset, and there is confusion about the potential of a u. S. Strike, what that impact would have, and how the opposition should respond to it. I think that explains a lot of nformation coming from the opposition. There is confusion given the promises that were made, given the expectations that they had. I also, again, going back to this idea that the opposition very much is weary of a limited or punitive strike. To the degree you see commanders coming out and openly saying, if you are just going to give assad a slap on the wrist, please dont do it. Instead, it needs to be something that degrades military capability, prevents atrocities, and helps empower the opposition. To that degree, i think they should focus on a more comprehensive strategy instead of a smaller attack. My personal opinion is that even if punitive strikes, at this point, could have an important psychological impact on the civilian population. Again, the radical behavior has actually stopped over time, and it is now starting up again as chemical weapons are being used and there has been no response. My own personal opinion is, if there is nothing else and i do not agree with a limited strike but if nothing else, the psyche lofpblg cal impact of even sending a message is important at this point. Moving quickly through the opposition, who is the opposition. Let me say, circumstances in syria are very fluid. I have traveled there frequently, and things change frequently. When you travel who is empowered visavis who is impacted, frankly i think there is a very real threat coming from iraq and some of the more alqaeda allied groups moving to the north. This has forced the more moderate regime to come together. They are feeling the force from the new extremists to the extent that my most recent trip in early august, i witnessed much more cohesive organization, much more cohesive alliance than i have seen in the past, to the degree that they are actually planning joint operations. Where they have active communication to attempt to come to agreement on a joint strategy, and actually are together working on the ground provinces, which is huge. We do see organization, but not at the national level. Now we are seeing the foundations of that National Strategy come together. Again, i think it is a direct response to this early threat moving in to some of the extremist groups. Part of this is also this program thats underway. I cannot emphasize enough the impact that support come coming from us u. S. Halize has had in stablizing forces. We are able to see, especially hrough the very well known funded c. I. A. Programs that are moving through the south, we have seen what funding and resource support can do for creating and empowering modern opposition. To the degree where they are not only much more effective, but they are able to marginalize extremist forces but they are able to come together and together in a way they have not previously been able to do. And they are able to marginalize more extremist groups. And one of the breens reasons you have seen these groups is because of the population. The civilian population has not necessarily been welcoming to these extremist groups, but since they are controlling humanitarian aid, they have access to resources and fund, and they have leverage that gives them a more dominant position than they would otherwise. Once you are able to see the more moderate civilian population participate at that level, you are seeing a positive impact on the ground because of that. Briefly, because i think it is important to define moderate. Dont like using the term secularist because i dont think the way people identify religiously is necessarily indicative of our own understanding of what these terms mean. When i say moderate im who have out people only talked about that im talking about people that have struggled with the local administration to ensure that there is a vibrant Civil Society initiative taking root that has helped develop a society based on democratic processes, and not defined in our country. I think the moderate forces make up a huge percentage of the opposition, especially the opposition fighting on the frontlines and really taking part in the primary battle against the Syrian Government. To the degree that weve tually ive actually been seeing more extremist groups and leading to more liberated areas where they can start working on patterns of affording control and actually creating the frame work of a safe haven. That being said, the social zation on creating safe hafe yeps on establishing areas of governance have lead led to a military record. They claim credit for a lot of operations that in fact on the ground they are not participating in these perations. It is actually their more blutal implementation of these harsh brutal implementation of these harsh circumstances. I saw pushing back against these more extreme measures they are trying to implement. I think this extremist threat is having an impact on the oppositions ability to come together and forcing us to Work Together in the ways they havent in the past. And finally, i think ill end on this note about who the leadership is and whether they who they are alied with. I think there is a force that can represent a majority of the opposition. If empowered, it could serve as a reliable governing partner that would not only be aligned with u. S. Strategic interest in the region, but would actually govenancegovernans system inside of syria but would also, again, help serve some of these more strategic interests. Elizabeth, thank you very much. Your report is an interesting one on many levels. But for me it really contrasts significantly with the message of the assad regime, which is to say, remove us and the alternative alqaeda. A message that has actually grown roots in certain quarters at the United States congress. And elsewhere. The floor is yours. Thank you, elizabeth, and my olleagues, for joining us. Newt radical about nutralizing the conflict. I think we will agree it is a regional conflict. So the possible backlash or reactions of whatever u. S. Action is taken, i think it is useful to because we dont know exactly whats going to happen to think of possible military scenarios and see how these different regions would react. The key ingredient to me are these actors involved in the region. The actors involved are really pretty weak and constrained in what they can and cannot do. I think that improves the process expect for an escalation on the one hand if the u. S. Intervenes substantially. The first scenario on one extreme of this spectrum is that the u. S. Would shift the balance into civil war. I dont think the operation is like thri likely to start with that in mind, but i do see it could escalate to that down the line. Looking at iran, which is, i think, on most of our minds. Iran has struck me as highly risk averse. Good politicians, despite their fervan ideology and their rhetoric. Their greatest asset is their military capability in the region. If they perceive the regime is in decline or in danger of being defeated further down the line, i think hezbollah would be the first thing they would activate. Would they do this against the israelis . I believe so. Even though hezbollah right now is very overstretched, fighting in syria, trying to cover their backs in lebanon, and certainly not looking for a war with the israelis. This is one of the scenarios i would imagine they would be compelled by their own interests as well as by irans to fight a war. And simply that would raise the cost of the u. S. And u. S. Allies with an active defense against the regime. The other concern is carrying ut these attacks in other u. S. Allied areas, for hezbollah. They do have the capability to do this, and it has been proven. They have been hesitant to use those sorts of tools, but i think it is one in their arsenal that they can employ and execute. Syria itself, i believe, is, despite all the bluster, you know, fairly able to up the fight at home, and ernl certainly not capable of retaliating in a significant way against u. S. Interests. What they can do is further destablize lebanon. That is a tool they have used effectively in the past. They do have strong Intelligence Networks there. In fact, over the past couple weeks, there were large scale bombings in lebanon which were quite mysterious. One targeted hezbollah and the city a suni mosque in the of tripoli. It is likely that arsons aligned with the Syrian Regime were behind them. I think that is a way of extracting the price for their involvement within the syrian conflict from lebanon and also due to lebanese president s increasingly harsh tone toward syrian behavior in lebanese territory. That could very well be escalating. As for the use of weapons of mass destruction in syria, i think in the face of an allout war with the United States, they might choose to use them quite liberally in the domestic conflict. Certainly the use of chemical weapons. I think sort of the day after conflict, and im sure in this is planned, is an insurgency action. If you like, a mirror of whats been happening already, whereby it is something they have practiced to good effect in iraq. They would conduct a slow campaign to degrade rebel assets nside syria. I do think there is a positive here, which is that the stores in the region would rally which would reininvigorate prou. S. Reblets which are moderate. Whether or not this likely outcome is a good question, of course. Within lebanon, i would think there would be an escalation in violence, simply because hezbollah has been quite successful so far at determining their domestic sunni riflals rivals. But i think they would emboldened to challenge hezbollah. As a result of that, you could ee a real direct result of the unnishia conflict in lebanon. It is clear to me what the regional resources would be. I think the iranians would calculate u. S. Red lines can be crossed with relative impunity, so long as the u. S. Has acted to resore superficial effect of its credibility. I dont think they calculate, quite rightly, they are not compelled to make significant concessions over a nuclear program, and still less over syria, where i think they would almost certainly double their efforts behind the regime. As part of the regime itself, i think it would clarify what the rules are, and they will be rightly punished if they break those rules. I suspect in the immediate aftermath, that they would stay away from using weapons of mass destruction and stick to conventional means, at least until they were testing how committed the u. S. Was to shifting the balance in syria. I do think one of the things they might do, as well, in conjunction with the iranians, is work with hezbollah in greater depth. They werent actually significantly involved in taking alassad from the rebels. It is not clear how thetch been in the rest of syria. I think not quite as much. There is i think more capacity they can take away from lebanon to fight conventional wars in syria, and i imagine this would apply in eastern damascus as well. Of the area part that the regime felt compelled to use chemical weapons against. I think turkey and jordan would vindicated. I think the jordanians have been risk averse precisely because i hink they see the uses u. S. Commitment as faultering and weak. I can only imagine this would deepen their sense of vulnerability. I could also imagine this would deepen their commitment to what interests their own in syria. Im not sure in the aftermass of u. S. Weakness that cohesion would hold. Im confident that would have dire results for rebels. He opposition would be discredited on their previous u. S. Backing, and that would be to their own detriment. That seems nothing more than a total undermining of what the United States stated objectives are in syria. So in summary, i think the pinprick strikes change nothing, except to perhaps temporarily postpone the use of congressmen wall cal weapons, and at worse they might change the regional situation in a way that is debt to u. S. Detrimental interests in the long run. If this is accompanied by a genuine, fullfledged effort to help the opposition. Im heartened by the fact you are saying this is taking place on a significant level. I think more needs to be done, it is safe to say. But i think this is the elephant in the room. The burning question to me, watching all the congressional debates, is what anyone asking me why we found ourselves in this situation, and to me that is directly liveraged to the failure to support u. S. Stated object siffs. I may add, the supporting liberal movement has a support. That to me is the only way to sue resore u. S. Credibility, and whatever military action is taken otherwise is probably futile at best. At worst, downright harmful. I would have to come down and say that actually playing this card and military action, after such a situation with domestic policies, without strategic aims, is worse than nothing. Thank you. Thank you, faysal. I will get the ball rolling with three questions, and then we can answer in the order of the speakers. Barry, the question for you is, deterrence nteds is the objective, can this help if the stockpile is not effective and delivery means remain in place . Elizabeth, my question for you is, the profile of the opposition, so far, is rather low in all of this. Perhaps thats understandable given the political controversy in the United States. But is the opposition considering any kind of information outreach to the Syrian People either before, during, or in the immediate wake of any american operation . And faysal, i guess my question to you, returning to the terrents, is it possible the regime is effectively deterred now on the Chemical Warfare front given the nature of the crisis that has erupted in the wake of august 21 . In other words, is it remotely possible that a key lesson has lready been learned. Barry, why dont you go first. You depafe me a softball. The question of deterrents, if they can be helpful, and my understanding is, you cant actually destroy you cant mill tarle take care of the chemical weapons themselves unless you are going to put soldiers on the ground. While there are some technologies in some of our munitions that i have read about that can defeat the agents, i cant believe the president has the confidence to unleash those and use those in a comprehensive enough fashion without causing civilian casualty. That struck me as a huge risk that is not worth running. But if you execute the type of operation that i talked about with the attributes that i discussed leaving the effect on the Decision Maker that i suggested, shower deterrents can work. There are lots of cases in history where desernts have worked. He essence of deserns deterrence is threatening to impose such cost on the Decision Maker that they are not worth any potential benefits he could ain. If there is opposition to him, be it armed people or innocent people, i think because he has other means to do so, if this operation is done the way it should be done, i think deternts can deterrents can work really well. Do you have an idea of the scope of the operation . How it should go, or how we think it is going to go . Lets assume your prescription for what it would ake to make deterrents operationally effective. There are ai lot of ways to a lot of ways to shape military targets, but at a really rough public level discussion, i would say a weeklong be intensive campaign that comprehensively strikes as many military units and structures as possible, command control and communication sites as possible. Those not near civilian neighborhoods so that you dont end up with civilian casualties. Now that assad has had time to move people around, that will be much more difficult than i would have expected. Elizabeth, where is the opposition in all of this . Frankly, i think the opposition needs a really, really good p. R. Campaign. They could use some help from some Public Relations firms and whatnot. In fact, i can tell the problem with our understanding part of the problem of the understanding of the opposition, is they dont speak with a unified voice. You do again, going back, in response to the delay in u. S. Actions, you see a plethora of opinions coming out from various opposition figures that dont always agree with each other. To that degree it is getting the opposition on a united page here seeking reform is the point. Despite these minor details, they do agree on specific principles, and to that extent they have been attempting to reach another out not only internalally to the Syrian People themselves, but people within the communities, and even regimerolled areas, but more importantly they are attempting to reach out to the American Public and make their case as to why congress should authorize military action in syria and really come together to finally kind of put a unified voice behind the opposition in ways that could potentially be much more rallying for any sort of u. S. Support that happened in the past. Thank you. Faysal, is it remotely possible that u. S. Deterrents have already happened . The assad regime used these beaps weapons because they felt it was tactically useful and that they could get away with doing so unpunished. They are a cautious bunch. They dont take risks. They dont have to. Even the way they fought this war, has shown me they have escalated gradually. At each step probably poking the limits to what the seams are and seeing how the world would react. I sense at this stage, they probably already feel they have overstepped the bounts, that somebody miscalculated, and that nkly figuring out who does that it probably wasnt worth that risk and that there is probably no reason to use it in the future. At least not the near future, unless they are existentially on the ropes. If at to that point, their reason was to delay the opposition until the next president ial election, perhaps they have been deterred. I am not sure how that changes the picture in terms of broader u. S. Strategic interests, of course the interests of the people of syria. But we should not be slow in charging ahead. What i would urge you to do yourselves in terms of name, affiliation, state your question as suss sinkly as possible, and please identify the person to whom the person is irected. My question is to you and barry. In this discussion there were two countries not mentioned russia and iraq. The day after, what is the reaction . What will iraq say . To me, iraq has a strategic position in terms of its closeness to syria. They have influence on iraq. Why dont we take these in groups of three. Right here. Good afternoon. My name is mohammed alsalaam. You mentioned the mistakes that president obama made. Why do you think that happened . My question is to barry. Not that i think it is naive, but the implication is president obama was forced to do this or he doesnt want to do it or hes giving hints to the Syrian Regime. Honestly, the thrust of the confidence. It is not re is that related to the fact that the opposition cannot fill the vacuum . Oh, ter obama does this, gosh, the opposition cannot do this if we get assad out. And my question is, are the ountries causing a lot of supporting the opposition would equire uniting the sawedies audis. Would this happen . Straight back. My question is ad decembered addressed to barry. You talked about the possibility that if syrian action takes out more vital aspects of the that if the u. S. Takes out more vital aspects of the regime, there could be more retaliation. I am thinking about when the israelis took out the nuclear reactor, and still syria did nothing. Then israel three times took out missiles by the regime on the way to hezbollah. So what brings you to the conclusion they might actually retaliate now . Ok. Well go with those three. Ill start with the issue of russia. Ok. I think i will actually defer to faysal on iraq. This administration has made a major outreach to the Russian Federation on this issue from the beginning. Secretary of state john kerry in particular really, really led with his chin on this back in may when he went to his counterpart, ser gay levrov and said, what we really need to do is reconvene the geneva format and get to a negotiated exclusion here. Unfortunately, what i think the secretary of state ran into was a real unwillingness on the part of a regime that thought it was winning on the ground to engage in that kind of a dialogue, and strong reluctance on the part of the opposition which found it was losing on the ground and really wanted some upfront guaranteees about the status of assad which were not part of the geneva format. I suspect, and i think it is very difficult to answer, i suspect at this point Vladimir Putin and his colleagues probably know the truth of what happened in the huutah on august 21. I think just from a real politic point of view, they understand. They dont like it. They will certainly try to dissuade the president , but they understand that the United States has no choice but to strike, and strike hard here. And i think that understanding, i think their understanding of the facts, regardless of what they are saying publicly, will probably minimize their reaction to whatever it is we do. I will say in fairness, though, that the potential of various russian reactions is something that has to be taken into careful consideration by the administration. Among other things. Pipe of our in is through russia. So i think it is important. Rather than thinking of iraq discrete geopolitical player, think of it as a economy that has a strong robust military apparatus. Thats how i would read their reactions and how they would likely react in a dayafter scenario. I think they see this through a sectarian prism. Their primey concern would be to react in the area where the sunnis can be weakened, particularly if there is still a strong rebel presence. I think they would focus on that. He prog broader regional ability they have is through a sectarian prism. I think they would have to go along with their strategy. Whether they would be direct participants or not, probably not. They would mob probably be focused on what is going on at home. D they be able to supply bring supplies to the regime through iraq, i suspect so. Ok, barry. On the question of leaks, and i think this relates to the russia question as well. I think there are two im speculating there are two main factors. In e is one, normal discipline from the pentagon. I was in the white house right when the Obama Administration began, and we were developing the new strategy for iraq and afghanistan, and i remember the moment when the first major leak came out of Central Command at the time on what, you know, what plans the u. S. Had for various options for president. I was on air force ii at the time and immediately raised it to senior white house people and said, if you dont deal with this now with some serious messaging to the pentagon, you will have a bigger problem on your hands. Not that it is ever possible to control it. But that was my lame naive attempt to do it at the time. There is an in discipline part, but there is also deliberate debate from the white house on some of these things. In that case, i think, their intent was trying to send messages to various audiences. I would say there are three audiences that are important. One is syria, assad. Were doing this limited operation. Were not going after your head. So chill out, let us do it, and you can keep doing what youve been doing, because we really dont want to get involved anyway. The second audience is russia. Here the question was, i think, we dont want to risk world war iii here. We know that assad has been a client and an ally of yours for decades, so were not going to take him out. Why dont you not send too many ships to the mediterranean and just chill out until weve done this, and this isnt something risking a major u. S. Russian military confrontation. And i think the third audience was the congress and the American People. Here i think the president has t wielded the inherent power of the presidency in a way that easily doable. Communicator od when he sets his mind to it. There is a thing called president ial leadership. You can go to the people. You can talk to them. You can form a public debate. You can mount a campaign and actually convince stakeholders this is the right thing to do. Say that ats to the opposition, and not just that were all war weary. The 1 of the population, the military families that have borne the brunt of the last 12 years of operation, not to say that they are not war weary. The question is, is this worth u. S. Interests to do . And the types of assets more over that would be mostly engaged, were talking naval and air, are the least stressed. Although, they are still stressed, but lesser stressed than ground force units. But the bigger question is, it is a question of president ial leadership. So rather than leaking this will be a pinprick, woy go with the more outward use of the office of the presidency that has so much it can bring to bear. The other question about israels strike on syrias Nuclear Capabilities and on syrian missiles in 2007 and more recently, i think the reason syria has not retaliated, israel has a pretty darn good reputation for deterrence. They dont mess around. They are fast, hard, and very clear. So i think the question of deterrents against israel, i think the reason it was in retaliation, was they knew that the retaliation against the retaliation would be a heck of a lot worse than anything that weve done beforehand. Whereas the u. S. , i think it is at least conceiveable that syria could do things, be more aggressive in lebanon. If ran was somehow stimulated to get involved to use its global net network of terrorist capables and of other capabilities, et cetera, if it itself had sufficient interests at stake, and if it might also think about retaliating, because i think it has a sense that the u. S. Doesnt exactly mean what it says after the last several ars of u. S. Policy and relative perception that were withdrawing from the region. Elizabeth . Very briefly, i think this issue of funding is very important. Ecifically to date disparate funding has had a debilitating effect on the opposition. To the effect that there are different groups sending in different funding with specific objectives about what is expected from this funding. To the extent it has kept the opposition from coming together and have a unified support that would eventually help promote a reliable chain of command, which we havent seen develop yet. That being said, this is where the u. S. Could play a key role in terms of its leadership. And in absolutely rallying all of our allies, the people involved in syria and have a vested interest in syria, and getting them on the stage same page, and forcing allies to Work Together and achieving that single unified channel of support. This is something i think could be done with limited uses of u. S. Resources and assets and profound lly have a impact on not only empowering the opposition but also creating the mechanism for cohesive coordination that could be very well the framework for a reliable government partner. Thank you. Faysal, was there anything else hanging out there with your responsibility . Ok. How about anybody on this side of the room . Ok. Yes, sir. I have a question for you, elizabeth. You noted that extremist groups in particular are leaving the frontlines and learning to consolidate power across the country. Im wondering if you can be more specific in some of the areas that you see these he extremist groups believing they have a certain stronghold. Thank you very much. Thank you. Right in front there. Im just curious, really to whatf the commentators, to extent do you think this gradual escalation in the middle east and north africa region. Of course we know of three or four other countries that are pretty vulnerable at the moment, is indicative for the declining respect of the word of america on the global stage. And to take that question a step further, whether it questions the deliverability of the strategic threat to the asiapacific region. Thank you. Well take one more. Barey, i think you correctly put the conversation where it needs to be on the question of jectives fment to objectives to where it needs to be. The question is to direct some of assads behaviors. Elizabeth, in some of your writings, bun of the most interesting points youve been making is that one of assads core tactics, the reasons why he uses these brutal tactics, not necessarily the chemical weapons, but since the war has begun, is not necessarily aimed at his adversaries, but within his own community. The point you have made is that he has to send a signal to his own community, im the only option youve got. And again, some of the brutality we have seen you have explained in a very interesting way. So my question to you is, what do you think the u. S. Should do in achieving this objective . If the u. S. Goes heavier, more than a pinprick, if it does not actually break the regime, does it not create the incentive not to cower, but in fact the opposite, to have him demonstrate his viability to his own people . Thank you very much. Thank you, edward. Elizabeth, why dont you take the two that were addressed to you specifically, the areas where extremist groups were making ad yuments, and edwards question. Specifically, looking at the growth of extremist groups in the north, we see this most prevalent in rafi and alufo. To the agree degree they have actually moved up northward to the border areas in order to control some of those Logistic Networks moving in and out of the country. This is where they have been establishing a parity to be able to dictate where items coming into the country have been distributed and where they are going to. Again, you really see a strong presence of alqaeda. A number of those even now, moving into parts of northern islet and now the coast. I think a lot of what weve seen, and actually it is remarkable when you talk to some of the people in these other groups, this really started in was april when the battle ramping up. At the time there was an assessment made that the opposition did not have the capability to defend their province if the regime consolidated. As the regime consolidated, you see these groups pull out, because they feel there is no way to win, so why lose their men and resources . So to that degree, we have been documenting since late april early may a huge rise in the extremists moving from the frontlines and going to areas where they can focus on governing and controlling resources and boosting their power from there. A lot of it is along the border areas, and a lot of it is he can focused a lot of it is focused on embedding themselves within the civilian population. In my article i talk about the geographic separation, which i think is vea very real, between the north and the south. But when you look at these areas, if you have a dominant presence, it becomes very difficult because they have embedded in the population and they are cooperating with some of the armed opposition and more moderate forces because of their control of resources and because they control the border areas. It makes it very difficult for the more moderate forces to operate independently of these groups. I am in no way underemphasizing the role they have in creating a safe haven and establishing reas of authority and control, but again, a lot of it is ttributable to resources and the civilian population. And they are trying to curtail some of their more extreme measures, trying to curtail some of their leadership and working to coming together with the team of civilian and armed opposition groups to try to push back. In regard to your question, and i think this is a really critical point and goes back to this idea that if it is a strike that does not significantly degrade the regimes capability, i think it could very well find assad in a way where he is victorious, where hes seen as having survived an american attack and lived to tell the tale, so to speak. This could be dangerous in terms of his escalation. Not only that he has survived the attack, but that he has that capacity to protect his community. We saw a number of athat occurred in the area between the coast and the inland province that were directly related to this idea that the opposition was threatening some of their strongholds and there was a need that he will go to all measures to protect them. I think the potential for escalation in that regard is very real. Again, that is why i think any u. S. Action needs to look at what the regime is likely to do domestically in order to shore up the support base and to also address them. Kind of, his means of retaliation. My own sense of that, frankly, in the context of an attack or a series of attacks, a campaign that is more or less along the lines of what barry is if the assads that regime feels strongly about the need to take additional certain measures in syria, and if it is able to do so without an air force, without air fields, without scud missiles, without a major piece of its artillery holdings, welcome to it. But i think that could be the situation were facing. Im going to turn to barry on the question of whether as a general rule respect for americas word is fading around the world. Im reminding the official cutoff time for this is actually 1 30. Anybody who feels obligated to leave, please do so, but well continue for a while longer, as long as we have some questions. Barry . Obviously a central question for u. S. Security policy, and ive been thinking about it a lot including when i was in the pentagon and the white house and im still thinking about it now, if you look at the sort of broader expanse of our recent history, i think iraq was perhaps the single most damaging activity by the United States for reducing our influence in the world. I thought president obama did a masterful job in 2009, and he did this deliberately, of reset resetting the tone. He gave a speech in prague about detainee policy in guantanamo. He did a speech in cairo that electric identified the muslim world. I think he did a masterful job of resetting the table and upsetting the conditioning for regaining and restoring u. S. Influence. Even amid some negative and contrary trends in raw power. Here im talk about the massive shift of Global Economic activity that were currently witnessing from the west back to the east after a few hundred years. Including the sort of debacle of the lack of u. S. Govern nance governance in washington where we looked somewhat inevent in managing our own policies and resources. Also, adding on top of that, our budget cuts that are coming in and which we cant stop even though we foisted them upon ourselves. All of this adds up. I travel the world. Ive been to asia in the last year. Ive been to the middle east and to europe. I hear in every region the same refrain where is the u. S. . Why are they withdrawing from the world . Even some of our asian friends are saying, i like that you are pivotting, but im afraid you are going to pivot away. Europe has their own internal problems as well i think president obama has gone too far since he reset the table in 2009. I agree, get out of iraq, although i dont think it was done in the most masterful way at the end game, and i agree with the general question of wrapping up wars that are, in ways that are effective for u. S. Interests. But this is going too far. And people are screaming for u. S. Leadership, including on syria. And it hasnt been happening. We are not in good shape, we are in worst shape than we were in 2009. Ill end on a positive note. This is reversible. The u. S. Has the basic natural resources. No one should count the United States out in terms of restoring its leadership. I believe it was the singapore president that gave the speech at communist Head Quarters and it was released in public. E basically told them, you better watch your own rhetoric at your own hands. You are one budget deal about being back. I believe this is possible because we still have the basic ability to lead in the world. We just need to regenerate the will, and i think it is easily done. Thank you. Yes, sir. Thank you. Center for national policy. This is a question for elizabeth. Given that the aid we have given two rebel groups is extremely limited, reportedly not including anything more than light mortars, what is the perception among rebel groups of what it is we are trying to do . Clearly, it is short of either supplying or promoting supplied by others of gamechanging levels of support that are capable of overthrowing assad. So what is the perception what does the u. S. Gain in the alliance of the rebels, and to what extent do they consider we are behind those supplies that exceed our minimal levels in terms of any tank weapons or other heavier stuff . Take you for that. Yes, sir. From the Atlantic Council. One, the considering deterring the use of chemical weapons in the future, is a u. S. Strike against syria and the assad regime have to include specific targeting of assad himself in order to be effective, or to be sufficiently severe that it clearly leads to his nearterm downfall . I wonder if he is able to survive this, that level has not been reached, it will not be an effective act that deters future use of chemical weapons. The second question would be, what happens if you do get assad in a strike, either intentionally or unintentionally . What is going to be the Immediate Impact on the ground in terms of the relationship to the moderates in the opposition and the more extremists that we have less of a preference for . Thanks. One more. Michelle, from the Atlantic Council. It seems that the president s motivations regarding actions in syria spring from issues other than syria, right, from the iran issue and the credibility of u. S. Red lines, and another thing i think he had in mind at an early stage was the stability of jordan, a major regional ally that has not come up in this conversation. I was wondering if any of the panelists could Say Something about the situation on the border with jordan. I know there has been a significant increase in flow of refugees toward their, and assuming strikes take ways in the southern part of syria, what is going to happen with the flow of refugees toward jordan . Ok, three excellent questions. Elizabeth, what do rebel groups think we are up to and what are we actually up to . To be frank, for a long time there has been especially theories floating around on the ground in syria that the u. S. Is supportive of the assad regime. In many respect those have been now confirmed with the delay of any sort of u. S. Response to chemical weapons, and i have spoken to people who are now absolutely convinced that the u. S. Government is supporting the assad regime, would prefer to keep peace with the government in power as it stands now, and are in no way committed to helping the opposition. Frankly, i kind of agree with them at this point, given our actions. It seems to me that we are, we do seem to have a preference care for keeping the Syrian Government in power despite our rhetoric, our actions on the ground not having met that rhetoric. That being said, i travel frequently in syria and i get a lot of questions about what how do people receive me as an american researcher who is known to work in close relations with various Government Agencies and officials, and i can say i am very well received, and despite people feeling much abandoned by the u. S. And feeling very sad that the u. S. Has not stood up for the principles that it claims to stand for, including democracy, pluralism, and a free syria which many in the opposition still continues to fight for, people still this is not something that can be changed. There are still enough opinion on the ground that if the u. S. Did something, people would be very respected for that, would have a positive outlook of the u. S. Engagement, and would be very much happy that the u. S. Was getting involved to the degree that, like i said, i am well received on the ground and people are very willing to engage with me even as an american among even if they see me as someone who works with the government, even though i do not. That is often their perception. [indiscernible] right, usually that is what it is. But i think this is a critical point. We are at the threshold in which we have to do something. Chemical weapons have been used. The population, not only the opposition, but the population as a whole is expecting a response to the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population. If we do nothing, it will be severely radicalizing on the population as a whole, and it is very important, the psychological impact of any sort of response to this. I think the other question of what happens if assad is taken out, this is a question i myself have asked any times because i am not sure if our target set should include assad himself or if it should be more directed at evening out the parity between military forces and help shift the balance of power across this negotiation. It is our objective to create an environment in which negotiations are actually possible, because right now they are not. That being said, one of the things that is not mentioned, even less so than the opposition, that is actually the rise of and this is something that is very significant, not only in terms of iranian funded militias, hezbollahtrade relations, but the empowerment of what are known as the alouite communities that are acting on behalf of the Syrian Government that are not related to the chain of command. This is i think a very untenable situation in which if the government is and assad himself is removed from power, you could see a disbursement of these various proregime militia groups that are then engaging on an insurgency basis. If this were to happen, i do not think we have empowered the opposition as yet to severely take over a governance role. That is why i believe anything we do needs to be part of a more conference of strategy that does in fact empower a moderate force that could serve as a reliable governing partner. If today assad is gone, i am not sure we are there. The other question is whether assad should be part of anybodys target center. John kerry made a rather elegant turn of phrase yesterday when he suggested even though the mission would be one of the terms and prevention, there could be certain downstream effects. Barry, do you think one of those effects should be key members of the regime actually caring for their physical existence . I think that is an excellent question, a very controversial and radioactive question. In this case i think you are playing with fire a little bit if you announce to the world that you have objectives x minus 100 and you end up going after x, and the system would go tilt in the sense that recall russias reaction after libya, they signed up to a u. N. Security Council Resolution that enabled a natoled coalition. That natoled coalition ended up essentially killing or providing Close Air Support to kill assad gaddafi. Gaddafi, i mean. Your starters are careful that these are geopolitical stakes youre targeting it. I would turn to the latin roots of the word deterrence, which means to cause terror. If you leave that key shakers shaken that what they value most could be taken away in a