Unacceptable behavior in cyber space. We clearly are not where we want to be nor where we need to be in this regard. We continue to make investments in technologies and capabilities to improve detection of malicious cyber activities and make it more difficult for malicious cyber actors intending to do us harm. Combating Cyber Threats takes more than technology. It takes talented, motivated people. We are investing more than ever in the recruitment and retention of a Skilled Workforce that is knowledgeable, passionate, and dedicated to protecting the nation and the safety of our citizens, friends, and allies around the world. We need to invigorate the Cyber Workforce to think creatively. This remains a key driver and a key challenge as we look to the future. Cyber command is well along in building our Cyber Mission force, deploying teams to defend the Vital Networks that support dod operations, to support Combatant Commanders in their missions worldwide, and to bolster dods capacity and capabilities to defend the nation against Cyber Attacks of significant consequence. The organizations i lead, u. S. Cyber command and the National Security agency, have provided intelligence, expert advice, and tailored options to the nations decisionmakers in response to recent events. Much of their activity can only be discussed in classified channels. But i must say im proud of what both organizations have accomplished and will accomplish, even as we acknowledge we have to do more. I look forward to your questions. And finally, on one personal note, i apologize to all of you, i have an ongoing back issue. If i have to stand up in the course of this time period, please dont take that as a sign of disrespect in any way, i guess im just getting older. Thats all i have for you, sir. I know how you feel. [ laughter ] director, i just have to general clapper, i just have to mention the name mr. Assange has popped up. I believe that he is one who is responsible for publishing names of individuals who work for us that put their lives in direct danger; is that correct . Yes, he has. And do you think that theres any credibility we should attach to this individual, given his record of not in my view. Admiral rogers . I second those comments. Thank you. For the record, on october 7th, the Homeland Security office of the director of National Intelligence, their assessment was that u. S. Intelligence community is confident that the russian government directed the recent compromise of emails from u. S. Persons and institutions, including from u. S. Political organizations. It goes on to say, these steps and disclosures are intended to interfere with the u. S. Election process, quote, such activity is not new to moscow, russians have used similar tactics and techniques across europe and eurasia. Quote, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts that only russias senior most officials could have authorized these activities. General clapper, those are still operable and correct statements . Yes, chairman mccain, they are. As i indicated in my statement, we stand actually more resolutely on the strength of that statement that we made on the 7th of october. I thank you. And so really what were talking about is, if they succeeded in changed the results of an election which none of us believe they were, that would have to constitute an attack on the United States of america because of the effects if they had succeeded. Would you agree with that . First, we cannot say they did not change any vote tallies or anything of that sort. Im just talking about we have no way of gauging the impact that certainly the Intelligence Community cant gauge the impact it had on choices that the electorate made. There is no way for us to gauge that. Whether or not that constitutes an act of war i think is a very heavy policy call that i dont believe the Intelligence Community should make. But its certainly would carry in my view great gravity. Thank you. Admiral rogers, have you seen this problem in your position getting worse or better . In other words, its my information that their techniques have improved, their capabilities have improved, the degree of success has improved. Is that your assessment . So i have publicly said before that the russians are a competitor in cyber. If you look broadly beyond the russians to cyber writ large, the level of capability of nation state actors around the world continue to improve. I cant think of a single actor out there who is decreasing, getting worse in their capability or in any way backing away from significant investments in cyber. With all due respect to you, mr. Secretary, i have not seen a policy. In other words, i dont think any of our intelligence people know what to do if there is an attack besides report it. I dont think that any of our people know, if they see an attack coming, what specific actions should be taken. Maybe im missing something, but ive asked time after time, what do you do in the case of an attack . And theres not been an answer. Theres not been an answer. And i believe that unless we have specific instructions to these wonderful men and women who are doing all this work, then were going to bing to be be bystanders and observers. Mr. Chairman, youre right, we have a lot more work to do to put the right framework and response in place in cyber. This is somewhat a new domain of operations and in some cases warfare. In my personal opinion, the next administration would be wellserved to focus very early on those questions of continuing to develop our overarching policy, comprehensive approach, and an increasingly robust and refined deterrence framework. Thank you. Finally, director and admiral, would it make your job easier if you couldnt have to report to seven different committees . Chairman mccain, my hands have been slapped before when i ventured into the delicate area of congressional jurisdiction. Even in the last for the remaining 15 days im in office, i dont think im going to speak to that. Afterwards might be different. Well look forward to calling you back. [ laughter ] admiral rogers . Shall i second the comments of the director of intelligence . It does make it difficult, its not exactly stovepiping, but overlapping jurisdictions makes your job harder, doesnt it, in all candor, admiral . The way i would phrase it is, i think clearly an integrated approach is a key component of our ability to move ahead here. I would say in the government, in the private sector, theres no particular one slice where thats not applicable. Thank you. Senator reed. Thank you very much, mr. Chairman. General clapper, you responded to the chairman that in october you and the director of Homeland Security concluded that the russian government intervened in the election. Admiral rogers seconded that view. That is also today the view, for the record, of the fbi and the Central Intelligence agency, in fact all of the Intelligence Community; is that correct . Yes. The forthcoming report is done essentially by those three agency, cia, fbi, and nsa. And the same conclusion with respect to the involvement of high levels of russian authorities is shared by these agencies . Yes. The chairman has noticed the legislative come part meantzati mentization. If you detect something that is an obvious disruption, something that is patently wrong, you can communicate to the fbi or law enforcement, but there is no mechanism to make things happen administratively; is that fair . There is certainly a process, and in fact there have been several instances in the last 18 months where weve run through the exact same scenario. Intelligence, as in many other domains, will detect incoming activity of concern. We, nsa, will partner with fbi, department of Homeland Security, u. S. Cyber command, to ensure the broader government, the department of defense, and the fbi and its relationship with the private sector. The biggest frustration to me is speed, speed, speed. We have to be faster and more a agile. Im constantly asking, how can we be faster, how do we organize ourselves, whats the construct that makes the most sense. We cant be bound by history and tradition. We have to be willing to look at alternatives. Thank you. General clapper, one of the aspects of this russian hacking was not just disseminating information they had exploited from computers but also the allegations of fake news sites, fake news stories that were propagated. Is that an accurate or is that one aspect of this problem . Yes. I dont want to get too far in front of the headlights of our rollout next week to the congress. This was a multifaceted campaign. So the hacking was only one part of it. And it also entailed classical propaganda, disinformation, fake news. Does that continue . Yes. The russians particularly are very astute at covering up their tracks. It appears that they werent quite as diligent or let me ask the question, do you believe that they made little attempts to cover up what they were doing as a way to make a point politically . Again, without preempting the report, thats classical tradecraft that the russians have long, long used to particularly when theyre promulgating socalled disinformation, theyll often try to hide the source of that, or mask it to deliberately mask the source. Let me just ask one more time, in this situation, though, was there attempts to mask their involvement very elaborate and very, very sophisticated, or just enough to have plausible deniability . Sir, i would rather not get into that. That kind of edges into the sources and methods, and i would rather not speak to that publicly. Fair enough. These activities are ongoing now in europe, as europe prepares for elections, is that a fair assumption . It is. Thank you. Yesterday the wall street journal indicated that the president elect is considering changes to the Intelligence Community. Have you at all, as the experts in this field, been engaged in any of these discussions, deliberations, advice . No, we have not. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I heard this morning that a lot of the news media was characterizing this as a hearing on russian hacking, and actually its on foreign Cyber Threats to the United States. I would like to cover a couple of the other ones. First of all, i received something this morning, and director clapper, that i was very glad to read. Ive often said the threats were facing today are greater. I look wistfully back at the days of the cold war. Your statement that was in print this morning said sometimes all this makes me long for the cold war, when the world essentially had two large mutually exclusive and so forth. You know, i think its important that we talk about this, because the general public is not aware that the nature of the threats that are out there that have not been out there before. Admiral, director clapper, weve had a lot of most damaging Cyber Attacks perpetrated against the American People. When the chairman gave his Opening Statement he singled out three or four, one of them was the opm incident, that was 201415. Office of personnel management. It was a breach of personal information, birth dates, home addresses, Social Security numbers of over 22 million individuals. I would like to ask you, what action was taken after that, and what kind of effect that might have had on the behavior of the chinese. Well, the major action we took of course was remediation in terms of advising people of what the potential risks were. And of course there was a lot of work done. Nsa was deeply involved in this, enhancing or improving the Cyber Security posture of opm. And admiral rogers might speak to that. I would say that this was espionage. It was not an attack per se. And of course im sorry always a bit reticent, people in glass houses shouldnt throw too many rocks. So there is a difference between an act of espionage which we conduct as well as and other nations do, versus an attack. Just as a broader point, i think the opm issue highlights that massive data concentrations increasingly have value all their own. I can remember ten years ago, thinking to myself, large databases like opm are so large, the ability of an intruder, an external actor to access, fully extract, and bore their way through millions upon millions of millions of records would be difficult. But with the power of big data analytics, large data concentrations now become increasingly attractive targets, because the ability to mine that data for insight, which is what we think drove this action in the first place, becomes more and more easily done. Okay. I appreciate that very much. In your joint statement, and by the way, i like the idea of joint statements, it makes our questioning a lot easier, you talk about you end up stating through one of your paragraphs, in short, cyber threat cannot be eliminated. Rather, cyber threat must be managed. Its interesting that in the Edison Electric institute, its a publication that came in this morning, they say exactly the same thing. It seems to be one of the rare cases where we have government and industry working together. Their statement was the electric Power Industry recognizes it cannot protect all assets from all threats and instead must manage risk. Now, they go on to describe working together with government, and they say the industrys Security Strategies constantly evolve and are closely coordinated with the federal government through a partnership called the electricity subsector coordinating council, the escc. Is that something, that comment, are we looking at getting some success out of that . I think its emblematic of a lot of work that the Intelligence Community has done, the department of Homeland Security, in engaging with each of the i think 16 key infrastructure sectors in this country, and providing what we have embarked on is provided them, tailored to each one of those sector, intelligence estimates of what the threats ad vulnerabilities are in order to help them take measures to enhance their Cyber Security. I think the major point here is that if there is any connection whatsoever with the internet, there is an inherent security vulnerability. And we have to manage that, the risk that is generated accordingly with full knowledge of that fact. If theres an internet connection, theres always going to be a vulnerability. Mike . I would echo that. I think part of our challenge is, our defensive strategy must be twopronged. We have to spend time making it difficult for people to gain access. But we must acknowledge that despite our best efforts there is a probability that they are still going to get in. What do you do . A guy who defends networks on the Cyber Command side, theres a whole different thought process, prioritization and risk approach in dealing with someone who is already in your Network Versus trying to keep them out in the first place. I appreciate that. My time has expired. I have one last question just for the record. You can not answer it at this time. A year ago, a year and two months ago, i think it was, admiral rogers, you made an estima statement before this committee, quote, we have peer competitors in cyber space and some of them have already hinted they hold the power to cripple our infrastructure and set back our standard of living if they choose. I would like you for the record to outline which of our peer competitors might be the closest to choosing to use their power. As i have publicly said before, the russians are the peer competitor to us. But i look at other nations. You look at china, for example, the level of capability and investment theyre making. Im watching their abilities rise significantly. Iran, north korea currently at a moderate level. Clearly the level of investment, the capability were seeing, and their willingness to employ cyber in some very aggressive ways that would be way beyond our normal risk calculus is a concern. I think it is the general assumption that you all have said that our systems can be invaded, that has the American People, we as policymakers, concerned. But the average american concerned that there is no privacy anymore. General, do you think in the report next week that you all will ascribe a motivation to putin for the election attempt . Yes, we will ascribe a motivation. I would rather not, again, preempt the report. Understood. Well, then will you discuss, after the report, what is sufficient in the future to impose enough cost to make them stop this kind of activity . No, we wont if were going to speak to that, that would be separate from the report. What the report will include, per the president s tasking, was a section contributed by the department of Homeland Security and nist, i believe, on best practices for defending. But it does not speak to that which is really out of our lane. Thats a policy call. So were now talking about deterrence. And as one of you said in your testimony, its not like the Nuclear Standoff of mutually assured destruction, because we dont have a particular deterrence now. Would you discuss that. The point i was trying to make is that in the case of nuclear deterrence, there are instruments, you can see, feel, touch, measure weaponry. Weve had demonstration a long time ago of the impact of nuclear weaponry. And that is what creates both the physical substance of deterrence as well as the psychology. And the problem with the cyber domain, it is not it doesnt have those physical dimensions that you can measure, see, feel, and touch, as we do with nuclear deterrence. So let me give you an example. Help us understand. Had the supposed invasion into the Vermont Utility been in fact an invasion by a foreign power, and ascribed to that was shutting it down, if that had been the case, what would be some of the options that we would do . Well, again, this would be, as i understand it, by the way, it was not, but had it been, from the malware planted by a foreign power, i think thats something that would be very situationaldependent, as to what to do about it. As i indicated in my remarks, perhaps a Cyber Reaction to a cyber act may not be the best course of action. Some other form of national power, sanctions is what we have traditionally used. As i also indicated, the problem, at least for me, is, and ill ask others to speak if they want to, is not knowing, if you do retaliate in a cyber context, not knowing exactly what counterretaliation youll get back. We go through all kinds of exquisite thought processes on deciding how to react. We try to be very surgical, very precise, try to gauge what the second order or unintended consequences might be. I dont think others are similarly disposed to consider such precision and such exactness when they respond. So theres always that issue of counterretaliation, ergo my brief mention that its in my view best to consider all instruments of national power. And i think thats whats concerning us. Could we, the United States, do we have the ability that we could make it so tough on north korea with a cyber attack that it would deter them from some of their strange behavior . Not necessarily via a direct Cyber Reaction, given the difficulty of gaining access to their cyber networks. Thank you. Director clapper, youre pretty far along on the report that will be released next week, obviously. How far along are you . What do you lack, and how will this be released . Will it be in a classified format . Will you be willing to testify in an open hearing like this or will we need to go down to the scif . Whats planned is a series of briefings in the congress. I think i have four more hearings to do, first with our oversight committees, which will be closed hearings, i believe. And then will that be all house, all Senate Hearings i believe next week as we roll out a version of the report. To be followed by an unclassified version. I see. So the public will not hear sources and methods, but you think it will be fairly convincing . I assure you, i intend to push the envelope as much as i can, particularly on the unclassified version, because i think the public should know as much about this as possible. Thats why i felt so strongly about the statement we made in october. So well be as forthcoming as we can. But there are some sensitive and fragile sources and methods here, which is why were hesitant to talk about it in this setting. Youve said that, and i expect youll be challenged with some very talented questioners up and down the dais here today. I would have to support what senator nelson has said. As regrettable and reprehensible as the hacking of Political Parties is, i do think senator nelson has touched on really the larger issue, which really is the subject matter of this hearing, and thats what the real threats are. And it concerns me that we really dont know what the deterrence ought to be. And i wonder, at what level are conversations taking place within the administration or within the Intelligence Community about what is appropriate in terms of a response. You mentioned countering cyber with cyber is not necessarily the number one solution. The secretary mentioned we should impose costs. And perhaps after you answer, i can ask him to expound on that also. We have had many discussions in the white house situation room, deputies committee, principals committee, nsc meetings, about what to do when we have these attacks. I think the sony attack by the North Koreans is a case in point. And there you get into the complexities of, if you launch a countercyb countercyberattack, and i have to be careful here, but you have to use some other nations infrastructure in order to mount that attack. Well, that gets into, as i learned, complex legal issues involving international law. And so the judgment was to impose some other cost other than a direct cyber retaliation. Did you recommend the president s sanctions, were his actions in response to the russian hacking part of your recommendation . Or did that come from someone else . That was well, without going into internal decisionmaking, i think that was you know, it was a consensus interagency view. Secretary, what about imposing costs, what did you mean by that . Well, as part of an approach to deterrence that takes each case as it comes up, case by case, we need to look at ways to respond, first deter and then respond to attacks at a time and a place of our choosing, that favors advantageous that we have as we use all of the instruments available. So we look to deny objectives and impose costs, as you indicated, senator. Imposing costs can come from things like were announced last week with the sanctions that were applied in the case of the russian hacking situation. But they can go more broadly from that. M from the militarys perspective, were concerned not just about russias cyber hacking but also a range of aggressive actions by russia across multiple regions of the globe. So we look to impose costs on russia by a range of measures across multiple regions in partnership with our allies through nato where we can to push back on russian actions and deter future aggressive actions. So thats a bit of what we mean by imposing costs here. Thank you. It seems every attack is handled on a casebycase basis. Thats not a strategy. Senator mccaskill. Thank you. I know this is parole will confuse you a little bit, general clapper, but review again how long youve been working in intelligence. I started in 1963, so and you enlisted in 63, correct . No, i enlisted in the marine corps in 1961. And transferred to the air force . Right. You flew combat missions in vietnam . I did two tours in southeast ar aasia, one in vietnam, stationed in thailand flying Reconnaissance Missions in 1970 and 71. Would y would you say that your experience in the military, and especially your service for the government has always been for either Political Party and apolitical in terms of your mission and your job . Absolutely. I have served, i toiled in the trenches in intelligence for every president since president kennedy. I have served as a political appointee and both republican and democratic administrations. Would you say i am apolitical. By the way, there are without getting into classified information, there are thousands of men and women who are working in the Intelligence Community right now, general clapper, correct . Absolutely. And would you say that theytheir experience in many instances mirrors yours in terms of military experience, many of them being either active military or retired military . Eyes. A large part of the Intelligence Community workforce are former military. There are of course many former military, either those who completed full careers or those who served enlistments or briefly, and then came to the Intelligence Community as civilians. Would you think it any less important that we maintain the Intelligence Community as a foundational, apolitical bloc of our country in terms of its protection . I could not feel stronger about exactly that. I think its hugely important that the Intelligence Community conduct itself and be seen as independent, providing unvarnished, untainted, objective, accurate, and timely, relevant intelligence support to all policymakers, commanders, diplomats, et cetera. Do in fact the Intelligence Community, members of the Intelligence Community, engage in lifethreatening and very Dangerous Missions every day, particularly as it relates to the war on terror . You only need to walk in the lobby of the cia and look at the stars on the wall or the front lobby of nsa, and the number of intelligence people that have paid the ultimate price in the service of their country. Lets talk about who benefits from a president elect trashing the Intelligence Community. Who benefits from that, director clapper . The American People, them losing confidence in the Intelligence Community and the work of the Intelligence Community . Who actually is the benefactor of someone who is about to beam commander in chief trashing the Intelligence Community . I think there is an important distinction here between healthy skepticism, which policymakers, to include policymaker number one, should always have for intelligence. But i think there is a difference between skepticism and disparagement. And i assume that the biggest benefactors of the American People having less confidence in the Intelligence Community are in fact the actors you have named today. Iran, north korea, china, russia, and isis. The Intelligence Community is not perfect. We are an organization of human beings and were prone sometimes to make errors. I dont think the Intelligence Community gets the credit its due for what it does day in and day out to keep this nation safe and secure and the number of plots, just one example, terrorist plots that have been thwarted, both those focused on this country and other countries. I want to thank the chairman, and i want to thank senator graham and others, there have been others, i can count on maybe a little bit more than one hand, who have stood up in a nonpolitical way to defend the Intelligence Community over the last few weeks. The notion that the soonelected leader of this country would put Julian Assange on a pedestal compared to the men and women of the Intelligence Community and the military that is so deeply embedded in the Intelligence Community, i think it should bring about an hue and cry, no matter whether youre a republican or democrat, there should be howls. And mark my word, if the roles were reversed, there would be howls from the republican side of the aisle. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you for that nonpartisan comment. Director clapper, how would you subscri describe mr. Assange . How would i describe mr. Assange. Well, hes holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in london because hes under indictment, i believe, by the swedish government for a sexual crime. He has, in the interests of ostensibly openness and transparency, exposed, in his prior exposures, put people at risk by his doing that. So i dont think the Intelligence Community has a whole lot of respect for him. Admiral . I would echo those comments. Thank you. Senator . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I do thank you for your service. Gentlemen, as you all know, about a year ago Congress Passed the Cyber Security information sharing act. And director clapper, could you comment on what steps have been taken to implement the act . In particular, to provide cyber threat information from the government to nongovernment entities. Theres been a lot of work done, and this is principally through both the fbi and the department of Homeland Security, to share more broadly with the private sector. This is prior to the enactment of this act, i think this has been a theme that we have all worked hard, certainly one of the reasons for the creation of the office of director of National Intelligence was to assume a domestic role as well and to promote sharing as much as we can. I think a lot of improvement has been made, as i look back over the last 15 years. Theres more work to do. So we have done a lot of work with, for example, Fusion Centers, the 76 or so Fusion Centers that exist throughout the country to convey more information to them. I have a network of 12 domestic dni reps, director of National Intelligence representatives, which are fbi special a little bit agents in charge. We work with them to convey information particularly on Cyber Threats to the private to state and local officials as well as the private sector. Thank you, sir. Admiral rogers, what is your assessment of the current state of information sharing between the government and private sector especially regarding Cyber Security threats, and more importantly, what is the appropriate level of expectation to have with respect to that information sharing . So in some ways i characterize it as uneven. Some sector relationships, as you heard general clapper talk about, the 16 sectors within the Critical Infrastructure of our nation, some sectors, the relationships, the information tends to flow very regularly. Other sectors its not quite asthma tour. The Positive Side is the legislation, weve developed a framework. On the government side, im not entirely comfortable that the products that i am generating are optimized to achieve outcomes for our private counterparts. Our success needs to be defined by the customer, not what we think is the right format or the right things to share. Do you think theres any additional legislation that is going to be required that i guess im asking, what do you need . Do you think theres proper authorities already in place, or do we need new legislation, or do you guys need to improve on your execution of it . Probably all of the above, to be very honest. I look at, were going to need collectively to create the workforce of the future. The current structure, i work in the dod, in an intel framework, but i would argue this is universal, it doesnt matter where youre working. Whats the structure, whats the recruitment and the benefit process that we need to retain and attract a workforce. Im curious, with the new administration coming in, their broad view of roles and responsibilities, are they comfortable with the current structure, will their view be that we need to fundamentally look at something different. Ill be the first to acknowledge, as i previously said this morning, weve got to get faster. We have got to get faster. Youve talked about case by and the ad hoc nature of our policies when it comes to cyber space before this committee, many, many times. And thats been an issue that this committee and the etc subcommittee in particular has tried to address by requiring strategies so that we can deter these hostile actors and delegations of authority, a definition of what an act of war in cyber space is. We can go on and on. The chairman just mentioned, we dont have a strategy. Some of us just dont feel theres a strategy thats laid out there. When you talk about speed and dealing with Cyber Attacks, i assume youre just referring to our agencies in responding to an attack that is directly upon us. Do you think there needs to be any kind of consensus building on the International Stage with our allies in order to increase speed . Or would that delay it even more, trying to run this through channels and trying to respond quickly . Do we reach do we reach out to allies . Or do we perform our first duty in protecting this country . So we routinely do that now. You clearly have highlighted, its a bit of a doubleedged sword. But it goes to the point, from my perspective, cyber just doesnt recognize many of these boundaries. So when youre trying to deal with an incident, is this something that is truly totally domestic or has it originated from something external, what kind of infrastructure did it pass through. Theres a whole lot of complexity to this. So i apologize, its not a simple binary choice there. Even as i acknowledge, there are tradeoffs. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chair. Thanks, mr. Chairman. I want to join senator mccaskill in expressing my appreciation for the service of our Intelligence Community and to you, mr. Chairman, for your very strong and courageous statements in support of the work of this committee to give credit and credibility to that Intelligence Community and to your statements also about the importance of cyber warfare. Its not the first time weve been here on this topic and you have been resolute and steadfast in seeking to elevated Public Awareness and public consciousness about the importance of Cyber Attacks on this country and the threat of cyber warfare. I want to explore a little bit why these very demeaning and dismissive comments about our Intelligence Community are so dangerous to our nation. Is it not true, mr. Clapper, that public support for robust responses to Cyber Attacks on our nation depends on the credibility of our Intelligence Community and dismissing the conclusions, very credible and significant conclusions about the russian attack undermines public support for actions that the president must take to deter and punish these kinds of actions . I do think that public trust and confidence in the Intelligence Community is crucial. And both in this country and i think the dependence that other countries, other nations have on the u. S. Intelligence community. And ive received many expressions of concern from foreign counterparts about, you know, the disparagement of the u. S. Intelligence community or i should say what has been interpreted as disparagement of the u. S. Intelligence community. Well, theres no question about the disparagement, theres no question about the dismissing and demeaning of the Intelligence Community, entirely unmerited. In light of you saying you are even more resolute now in your conclusion about russian involvement in this hacking, that comparing it to the judgment made about weapons of mass destruction in the iraq situation is totally a red herring, totally wrong . I yes, i agree with that. My fingerprints were on that National Intelligence estimate. I was in the community then. That was 13 years ago. We have done many, many things to improve our processes, particularly with respect to National Intelligence estimates, in order to prevent that from happening again. Whatever else you want to say about the Intelligence Community, it is a learning organization. And we do try to learn lessons. Its a very difficult business. And getting harder all the time. There will be mistakes. But what we do try to do, as we did after the nie from october of 2002 on weapons of mass destruction in iraq was to learn and make change. Our posture, particularly with respect to a very important document, the apex of our product line, the National Intelligence estimates, its a difference of night and day. I appreciate the extraordinary humility of that statement, especially in light of the excellence and expertise that your organization and you personally have brought to this very, very difficult endeavor to provide, and im quoting you, i think, unvarnished, untainted, timely, Accurate Information to the most critical National Security decisions that this nation makes. And i want to express my appreciation for it and say that i think some of the disparagement has been a terrible disservice to our nation and to the very brave and courageous men and women who put their lives at risk so that this nation can be better informed in using our military and other force. So i hope that we will see a change. And also i join the chairman in saying that we need better policies on what constitutes a cyber attack on this nation and provide a more robust response, for example, against the russians, not necessarily in cyber, but to impose stronger sanctions on their oil exports, on their use of foreign exchange. The response to Cyber Attacks need not be one in the cyber domain and in fact might be even more effective if it hits their economy and their pocketbook and their livelihoods. So mr. Undersecretary, i appreciate your comments in that regard. I dont know whether you want to comment in response to that ive said. And im out of time. So maybe we can get that in writing. Senator blumenthal, i want to thank you on behalf of all the women and men in the Intelligence Community, i want to thank you for that. Thank you. Thank you all for appearing before us. Mr. Secretary, director clapper, since this is your final appearance, i know you hope, thank you very much for your many years of service. Director clapper particularly, ill add my voice to senators blumenthal and mccaskill in my admiration of the men and women in our intelligence agencies. Ive had a chance to meet them here, at hearings, in their headquarters around the world. They dont get the credit they often deserve. The troops we help provide for in this community usually do because they wear uniforms and are known in public. But Intelligence Officers dont wear uniforms and are frequently undercover. Interto respect my admiration and deepest respect and gratitude for what they do. Weve heard a lot of imprecise language here today, and its been in the media as well, phrases like hacked the election, undermined democracy, i want to be more precise here. Director clapper, lets go to the october 7th statement. That says, quote, the recent compromises of emails from u. S. Persons and institutions, including from u. S. Political organizations was directed by the russian government. Are we talking there specifically about the hack of the dnc and the hack of John Podestas emails . Yes. Are we talking about anything else . That was essentially at the time what we were talking about. At the time then, it says that the recent disclosures through websites like dcleaks and wikileaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of russiandirected efforts. The dcleaks were in july, is that what the statement is talking about there . I believe so. Mr. Podestas emails i believe were not leaked until that very day on october 7th. Was the statement referring to that yet or was that not intended to be included . I would have to research the exact chronoloscrollinchronolog podestas emails were compromised. But i think, though, that that bears on my statement that our assessment now is even more result than it was with that statement on the 7th of october. Thank you. Admiral rogers, in november at the wall street Journal Forum you stated, quote, this was a conscious effort by a nation state to attempt to achieve a specific effect, end quote. By that did you also refer to the hack of the dnc, the hackpo like an of those emails . Yes. Did you refer to anything else . I dont remember the specifics of that one 30minute engagement, but what you outlined was part of my thought process. Further in the statement, director clapper, quote, it would be extremely difficult for someone including a nation state actor to alter actual ballot counts or Election Results by cyber attack and intrusion, end quote. You stated that earlier today as well, that we have no evidence that vote tallies were altered or manipulated in any way. Thats correct. Okay. So thats what happened. Lets discuss why, director clapper, in response to senator nelson, you stated that the report soon to be released will discuss the motive. Would you care to give any kind of preview today . I would rather not. I didnt think so. There are actually more than one motive. That will be described in the report. In your 53 years of intelligence, is ascertaining the motives, plans, and intentions of foreign leaders among the hardest tasks that we ask our Intelligence Services to perform . It always has been. Theres a widespread assumption, this has been expressed by secretary clinton herself since the election, that Vladimir Putin favored donald trump in this election. Donald trump has proposed to increase our Defense Budget to accelerate nuclear modernization, to accelerate Ballistic Missile defenses and to expand and accelerate oil and Gas Production which would obviously harm russias economy. Hillary clinton opposed or at least was not as enthusiastic about all those measures. Would each of those put the United States in a stronger strategic position against russia . Currently anything we do to enhance our military capabilities, absolutely. There is some temporary evidence, despite what the media speculates, that perhaps donald trump is not the best candidate for russia. Okay. So thats what happened. Thats why it happened, or at least a preview that were going to know why it happened. Lets move on to the impact. Director clapper, you said to senator mccain earlier, quotes, the Intelligence Community cannot gauge the impact, unquote, on the election. Is that because that kind of electoral analyses is not a task within the task, traditional responsibility and skill sets of the Intelligence Services . Thats correct. Thats something more suited for nate silver, michael barone, analysts who have written by the election . It certainly isnt in the purview of the Intelligence Community. Thank you. Thank you, chairman. Since this will likely be the last hearing that some of you will attend in front of this committee, i just want to thank you all for your service and that anything all the men and women who work for you. I want to say a special note of gratitude to director clapper for 50 years of Incredible Service to this country. I think what makes America Great has been our ability to elect leaders through a fair, through a peaceful, and a transparent process without fear of rigging or interference in elections. Unfortunately, in this past election, we know that interference occurred. When i say interference, i want to be specific. Its not about someone physically stuffing ballot boxes or someone hacking our electronic Voting Machines to give one candidate more votes than the other. Its about selectively and deliberately releasing damaging information in hopes of furthering ones strategic objectives, in this case russias strategic objectives. I believe this is going to happen again unless there is a price to be paid. This interference impacts the foundation of our democracy, our elections, which is why i welcome the sanctions against russia announced by the president , and why i believe we need to be evaluating additional russian sanctions. Its simply too important for both parties and the future of our country. Given the need for deference in this atmosphere, which you said is not always achieved by a cyber response, how important are tools like sanctions to imposing the kind of clear costs that you articulated . Sanctions are a very useful tool in that toolkit. And i think in the case of the Current Situation that we find ourselves in, it would be prudent to continue to look at other options to impose more sanctions on russian actors as the facts continue to develop. I would agree with that estimate and i hope that folks on both sides of the aisle will be looking at those additional tools. For any of you who want to answer this, i would like to know, how is the president elects at least in r inferred dismissive attitude towards the Intelligence Community broadly impacted morale in your agencies . Well, i havent done a climate survey, but i hardly think it helps it. Does anyone want to add to that . I dont want to lose good motivated people who want to help serve this nation because they feel theyre not generating value to help that nation. Im the first to acknowledge, there is room for a wide range of opinions on the results we generate. We dont question that for one minute. Every intelligence professional knows that. Ive had plenty of times in my career when i have presented by intelligence analysis to commanders and policymakers and theyve just looked at me and said, mike, thanks, but thats not the way i see it or youre going to have to sell me on this. That doesnt bother any of us. What we do i think is relevant. We realize that what we do is in no small part driven in part by the confidence of our leaders in what we do. And without that confidence, i just dont want a situation where our workforce decides to walk. I th