infrastructure to do it, never mind for a pandemic. infrastructure to do it, never mind fora pandemic. so, first infrastructure to do it, never mind for a pandemic. so, first of all, there wasn't the capability. second, we were told, even if we had the capability it would only delay things by a relatively trivial amount and third, of course, people at that time, the reaction from a lot of people was closing the borders is ray cysts, you wren when the supermodel cap price said why aren't we closing the border, a lot of people mocked her as if she was an idiot. that was the prevailing wisdom from the public health system and was reflected, the dismissal of caprice i would say was reflected in number ten by the public health system. of course if you are going for a single, for a single wave herd immunity by september fundingal strategy, then, faffing round at the borders wasn't regarded as relevant or coherent with such a strategy. bi; or coherent with such a strategy. by that do you mean if the strategy of the government was to accept that by mitigating the worse severity of that first wave of the virus, and there by allowing a proportion of there by allowing a proportion of the population to become infected nevertheless, there was no point in trying to shut our borders, because part of that strategy entailed allowed part of the population to become infected, is that rights. that is what the prime minister and i were told, and yeah. but that is what the prime minister and i were told, and yeah.— i were told, and yeah. but sage advised the _ i were told, and yeah. but sage advised the government - i were told, and yeah. but sage advised the government against border screening because they took the view that it would be ineffective. you can't test in the absence of a testing system for asymptomatic patient, you can conceal your symptoms of, you may become infected on a plane and no symptoms will show until after you have arrived, so did the government not appreciate that in practical terms, such a step would be extremely difficult to put into practise? extremely difficult to put into ractise? ~ , , ., , practise? well, yes, not sure ifi have misunderstood, _ practise? well, yes, not sure ifi have misunderstood, one - practise? well, yes, not sure ifi have misunderstood, one of - practise? well, yes, not sure ifi have misunderstood, one of us i practise? well, yes, not sure if i i have misunderstood, one of us has misunderstood. we were told that it was impossible, we were told the british state couldn't do it in january, we didn't have the infrastructure to do it, they didn't have the tests to do it, didn't have any of the things you needed to do it, to control the border, but at the same time it wasn't regarded as a big problem given people didn't want to control the border any way. is that fair, mr cummings? sage and nervtag presented papers to the government which you presumably saw, setting out why in practise, screening, restrictions, or even an elemental quarantine system would not work in practise, it wasn't a doctrinal position was it'll? think that obviously _ doctrinal position was it'll? think that obviously if _ doctrinal position was it'll? think that obviously if you _ doctrinal position was it'll? think that obviously if you are - doctrinal position was it'll? think that obviously if you are just - that obviously if you are just saying do you create, do you control the borderers, does that solve the problem? of course the answer is no, if you are looking at the specific issue of what the effective controlling the borders would be, then of course the answer is clear and what sage oussama assaidi makes sense, but that is obviously not the real question, the real question is should you have the capability like singapore, ortaiwan, to combine actual serious border control, with actual serious border control, with a domestic test and trace regime. and the data to support it and all the other things you need to support it and roll out mass testing, you had the capability to do that, which i strongly suggest this country ought to acquire, then, obviously, controlling the borders is a critical issue. mr cummings, without a scaled up isolate system, shutting the borders, will not suffice. correct. so the problem _ borders, will not suffice. correct. so the problem here, _ borders, will not suffice. correct. so the problem here, was- borders, will not suffice. correct. so the problem here, was not. borders, will not suffice. correct. i so the problem here, was not there was a decision not to consider shutting the borders, it was that in practise it would do no good and without a test trace contact isolate system, and there was none, it would never work, system, and there was none, it would neverwork, is system, and there was none, it would never work, is that the nub of the issue. it never work, is that the nub of the issue. . ., never work, is that the nub of the issue. , ., ., , ., issue. it is half of the nub of the issue. it is half of the nub of the issue but the _ issue. it is half of the nub of the issue but the other _ issue. it is half of the nub of the issue but the other half - issue. it is half of the nub of the issue but the other half the - issue. it is half of the nub of the issue but the other half the nub| issue. it is half of the nub of the i issue but the other half the nub is, that if you regard the whole thing in a fatalistic way any way, which the cabinet office and sage did in the cabinet office and sage did in the beginning and you think there is no effective altern toy to herd immunityf no effective altern toy to herd immunity f you say at the conception level there is shape a curve towards herd immunity or try to build your way out the problem, the entire system in january, way out the problem, the entire system injanuary, february, early march thought that the only plausible approach to this was to shape the curve of herd immunity, known thought it was practical to build our way out of the problem, the fundamental u—turn we shifted to, was to try and build our way out instead of accepting. the material shows that you spent a great deal of time in in april, may, june trying to get on top of the the test problem. june trying to get on top of the the test problem-— june trying to get on top of the the test problem. yes. at what happen oint in test problem. yes. at what happen point in january. — test problem. yes at what happen point injanuary, february or even march did the penny drop in the government, that the absence of a scaled up or significant test and trace system meant there was no means of controlling the virus once it had reached the united kingdom. until the week of the 9th march the entire system was rolling along the single piece. there were conversations and references before that week, we have got to do more testing, but that wasn't in the really in the, that was more just, we need more tests for the nhs and maybe a few thousand, it wasn't, it wasn't conceived, testing wasn't conceived at the end of february, beginning of march in the context that it would be seen as, in april, mayjune, ie scaling to hundreds thousands, then millions then potentially tens of millions, i think what really brought it home, certainly to me and the pm, was when we were suddenly told in that week of the 9th and it was one of the things that involved pennies dropping, that essentially testing had been stopped. 12th march? if you sa so. so had been stopped. 12th march? if you say so- 50 we — had been stopped. 12th march? if you say so- 50 we can _ had been stopped. 12th march? if you say so. so we can understand - had been stopped. 12th march? if you say so. so we can understand the - say so. so we can understand the importance _ say so. so we can understand the importance of— say so. so we can understand the importance of this _ say so. so we can understand the importance of this issue, - say so. so we can understand the importance of this issue, is - say so. so we can understand the importance of this issue, is it - say so. so we can understand the| importance of this issue, is it your position if there had been a sophisticated competent system for test, trace, isolate in existence, or brought into existence, in january, feb, march, and other countries, the inquiries where it did precisely that, south korea is a good example, it may not have been necessary to go the whole hog and demand the imposition of a national lockdown, the means of controlling the virus would have been at hand with the test and trace system and no need to control wit a lockdown. my no need to control wit a lockdown. my view what ought to have happened is the first reports came at the end of december, on roughly new year's eve 2019, we should have immediately closed down flights to china, we should immediately have had a very very hard—core should immediately have had a very very ha rd—core system should immediately have had a very very hard—core system at the airports and borders and there should have been a whole massive testing infrastructure ramping up both for test and trace, in a kind of conventional senses, but also, a manufacturing and industrial capacity system, to manufacture the rapid tests at scale, i mean, massive scale, scale of tens of millions a week, i think if you are had had the combination of serious border gloel this country for the first time controlling its borders and taking it seriously, with test and taking it seriously, with test and trace, and then a kind of out of the box here is how you massively scale rapid testing, and you put all of those thing together, brackets arguably with trials on vaccines closed bracket, in retrospect thank is clearly the, would have been a much better approach, notjust in terms of deaths, but also, in terms of us being able to keep open the economy, you know, to a massively greater extent than we were ability to. �* , ., , greater extent than we were ability to. �* ., greater extent than we were ability to. ., ~ to. and you say... you say mr cummings. — to. and you say... you say mr cummings. in — to. and you say. .. you say mr cummings, in represent- to. and you say... you say mr - cummings, in represent spectrum, no—one, not even you, with your keenness to ensure that the government system could be made to work, efficiently, appreciated in february, march, that without such a scaled up test and trace system the options for the government would be extremely limited indeed. i options for the government would be extremely limited indeed.— extremely limited indeed. i wouldn't . uite extremely limited indeed. i wouldn't ruite ut it extremely limited indeed. i wouldn't quite put it like _ extremely limited indeed. i wouldn't quite put it like that, _ extremely limited indeed. i wouldn't quite put it like that, we _ extremely limited indeed. i wouldn't quite put it like that, we did - quite put it like that, we did appreciate we didn't have these things and adds you can see the references from me what in multiple groups and whatnot, and people like mark warner were saying why is this fatalism on the subject? silas? mark warner were saying why is this fatalism on the subject? fatalism on the sub'ect? slow down. so we fatalism on the sub'ect? slow down. so we were _ fatalism on the sub'ect? slow down. so we were aware _ fatalism on the subject? slow down. so we were aware of _ fatalism on the subject? slow down. so we were aware of it... _ fatalism on the subject? slow down. so we were aware of it... but - so we were aware of it... but nothin: so we were aware of it... but nothing could _ so we were aware of it... but nothing could be _ so we were aware of it... but nothing could be done but i so we were aware of it... but nothing could be done but it| so we were aware of it... but. nothing could be done but it was so we were aware of it... but - nothing could be done but it was too late. you nothing could be done but it was too late- you can't _ nothing could be done but it was too late. you can't pull _ nothing could be done but it was too late. you can't pull the _ nothing could be done but it was too late. you can't pull the system - nothing could be done but it was too late. you can't pull the system like l late. you can't pull the system like this out of thin air in a few days. conceptually dock treenly, the british government's position in february, the early part of march had been viruses come in waves, in order to ensure that the first wave doesn't strike us, during the winter month, the best policy is to mill gate it, to take the top off, delaet, so it is closer to the summer, and that way we will avoid the risk of that wave, if it is completely suppressed, recoiling like an uncoiled spring earlier in the year with a devastating second wave. plain a. why was it not appreciated that such a test and trace system would avoid the risk of a second devastating wave? think trace system would avoid the risk of a second devastating wave?- a second devastating wave? think it was appreciated. _ a second devastating wave? think it was appreciated. i— a second devastating wave? think it was appreciated. i wrote _ a second devastating wave? think it was appreciated. i wrote it - a second devastating wave? think it was appreciated. i wrote it on - a second devastating wave? think it was appreciated. i wrote it on white | was appreciated. i wrote it on white boards on 13th 14st march as part of shifting to plan b, so, people in department of health and elsewhere were building up testing but we were not, they were not thinking about test and trace that the time. once he made this flip, around about the 13th to the 15th, i talked to the pm on it and valance and talked about it on sunday 15th march as part of this different concept you'll approach of building our way out of the problem. you approach of building our way out of the problem-— approach of building our way out of the roblem. ., , , ., the problem. you misunderstand me. durinr that the problem. you misunderstand me. during that first _ the problem. you misunderstand me. during that first stage, _ the problem. you misunderstand me. during that first stage, with _ the problem. you misunderstand me. during that first stage, with plan - during that first stage, with plan a. during that first stage, with plan a, with mitigation. the argument being put against suppression, was it will recoil like an uncoiled spring with a devastating second wave. if you push it down it will spring back. wave. if you push it down it will spring back-— wave. if you push it down it will spring back.- so _ wave. if you push it down it will spring back. yes. so before the chance spring back. yes. so before the change in _ spring back. yes. so before the change in rat — spring back. yes. so before the change in rat eye _ spring back. yes so before the change in rat eye why was it not understand? don't worry. we will deal with the first wave but by the time the second comes along, if it does uncoil we can deal with it like a proper test and trace system. why wasn't that debate had when the government was in the first strategic response? if government was in the first strategic response?- government was in the first strategic response? if you are askinr strategic response? if you are asking why — strategic response? if you are asking why were _ strategic response? if you are asking why were we _ strategic response? if you are asking why were we were - strategic response? if you are asking why were we were not| strategic response? if you are - asking why were we were not talking about test and trace before 13th march, the answer is because no—one, before the, remember, in the first time that there was no plan for lockdown at all, in the week of the 9th, the plans for lockdown only came after we started to change, so, there was no, the whole point of the was the whole system thought there was the whole system thought there was no way you could possibly do a lockdown in britain. it was thought of as the completely crazy idea. so of as the completely crazy idea. so of course people were not thinking, well, let us do lockdown and build test and trace, people thought we can't do lockdown and lockdown is mad because it will all come back. but they were thinking about and they were advocating suppression, thatis they were advocating suppression, that is to say the squashing down completely of a first wave. iugilm that is to say the squashing down completely of a first wave. who do ou think completely of a first wave. who do you think was _ completely of a first wave. who do you think was argue _ completely of a first wave. who do you think was argue nearing? - completely of a first wave. who do you think was argue nearing? the | completely of a first wave. who do i you think was argue nearing? the one wave strategy — you think was argue nearing? the one wave strategy mr _ you think was argue nearing? the one wave strategy mr couple, _ you think was argue nearing? the one wave strategy mr couple, envisage i wave strategy mr couple, envisage admit investigation and then this argument arose as to whether or not argument arose as to whether or not a accept presentation strategy which allowed to wave to recoil, the spring to uncoil, would result in a second devastating wave, so why was there not a debate about what could be done to prevent that second wave? why was it not thought about? i am not, why was it not thought about? i am not. possibly _ why was it not thought about? i am not. possibly i _ why was it not thought about? i am not, possibly i am _ why was it not thought about? i —n not, possibly i am confused by your language, i am not, possibly i am confused by your language, iam not not, possibly i am confused by your language, i am not quite understanding your question, but, i will try and put it this way. up to and including the week of the 9th, the assumption was, you are suggesting there was some great debate. the point is there wasn't. there was an assumption across government, across the cabinet office department of health and sage, that lockdown was impossible in a western country, any way we didn't have the all of tinges that you needed in place to actual will do it, you didn't have test and trace and what not you would need to have afterwards, that vaccines were almost definitely not going to have any impact at least in 2020 and possibly never, so the whole point was, that up to and including the week of the 9th, the debate you keep referring to, there wasn't a debate, that was the whole problem, there wasn't a debate about the fundamental assumptions underlying plan a, there wasn't a debate until me and others started to i saying hang on a second, if you actually