The Clinton Administration has no intention of developing and equip- ping the forces needed to defend America's global interests for the rest of the 20th century. Indeed, President Clinton will fall some $ 100 billion short in ffinding the level of military might he has determined is necessary over the next five years. I But in no armed service are the potential effects of the Clinton Administration's dis- mantling of America's defenses more vividly foretold than in the United States Army. The Clinton Administration's defense budget for the period of 1995 through 1999 leaves the Army with a Hobson's choice: it will either be too small to perform its mission of seizing enemy-held territory overseas, or it may be large enough, but lack modem weapons and not be combat-ready. General Sullivan, for good reason, is balking at having to make this choice at all. But his statement of "smaller is not better" suggests that he will re- sist ftulher force structure reductions beyond those that the Clinton Administration proposed in its comprehen- sive 1993 analysis of defense policy, known as the Bottom-Up Review. Hence, for the time being, General Sulli- van apparently hopes to preserve the Army's size, which risks creating a "hollow force" short of equipment, spare parts, and necessary training.