July 26, 2021
One of the most distinguished historians of religion is Philip Jenkins, professor of history and director of the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University, whose prolific and influential writings have probed a wide variety of topics. Books such as his highly influential
The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (2002, and now in its third edition) probe how world Christianity was decidedly shifting to the global south and would look very different from the north.
Now Jenkins argues that there is a “direct relationship” that exists between fertility rates and “that society’s degree of religious fervor and commitment” (3). These changes are historically unprecedented. In the 1960s, there was widespread fear about the overpopulation of the planet (19). Yet in the intervening time, especially from 1965 to 1985, the amount of such change is “almost inconceivable” with huge shifts in cultural perceptions about contraception, divorce, abortion, and homosexuality (63). The reasons behind this fertility decline are complex and include dropping rates of infant mortality, social and ideological factors, new ideological attitudes, levels of wealth, and even developments in technology and medicine. In turn, these complex and powerful forces have contributed to significant declines in birth rates, with corresponding profound implications for religious life and behavior. For example, when a society falls below a replacement rate (typically 2.1 births per woman or what is known as the Total Fertility Rate [TFR]), it is “likely to face a steep decline in institutional religious forms, and often of religiosity more generally” (12).