Transcripts For CSPAN3 Post-World 20240703

History at the university of california at los angeles. He specializes in korea and also in northeast asia. He teaches a wide variety of courses u. S. Politics and diplomacy, the cold war, the global cold war, decolonization and dissent. The history of capitalism and much more. Kevin has written numerous essays and articles for some of the leading pop culture and scholarly journals, including diplomatic history, the nation and the village voice, his a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at stanford university. There it is again that stanford university, where hes completing a new book with the tentative title, worlds unseen, Henry Wallace, Herbert Hoover and the making of cold war america. No doubt kevin will be talking on that subject right now. Kevin, all yours. Well, thank you, burt, for the kind introduction. Thank you. Also, too, as everyone else has said to to the Thomas Schwartz for leading this charge into a revision, is am i also like shawn feel the same way about it . Were all revisionists. Its just name calling. After a while, but its a matter of what kind of revision you like. Today. My talk is going to be titled as i have here. Herbert hoover in the long cold war and i hope today in my talk to sort of explain what i mean by this. It comes today from the book project, which burt mentioned, which examines how two Major Political figures, Henry Wallace and Herbert Hoover, although won the title, actually put Herbert Hoover first. It makes sense. He first he sets a lot of the precedents, as youll see anyway how these two figures produce the United States is most influential Foreign Policy alternatives and political movements against u. S. Cold war policy. In the case of wallace, this was the progressive party, a third party that he launched in the cold war. And the case of hoover, this was the Republican Party, particularly its conservative wing, challenging wallace his image as a naive liberal and hoovers as an old reactionary. Im trying to foreground Wallace Hoover and the Many Americans associated with them together. What im arguing they made cold war america a more contested and diverse place than we usually take it to be. But as im standing here at the hoover library, ill be focusing on hoovers side of the story. As my other panelists suggest, theyre really interesting. Talks show thats more than enough for for several talks. My main point is that hoover and the cold war are best understood within a long, cold war. Now, for hoover, as for many people, the cold war, by which we mean if you want to be really specific, the bipolar confrontation between the u. S. And soviet union from 1945 to 1991, you can argue about numbers, but its a pretty good start. Of course, the cold war itself was long, really important, and unique, but the cold war drew from long running issues, problems which preceded it persisted after it, in short, existed beyond the cold war in ways that reflected, but also transcended the cold war problems of war and peace were already greatly affecting the u. S. And worlds politics societies, economies and cultures across a long chronology that defies our tidy periods. We usually used to understand history. And i think my my panelists speak to us. To put it in an overly simple, but i think revealing way. The cold war was part of a longer story, the growing interconnectedness, this yet still instability of the world order since the high noon of Industrial Capital and in the early 20th century across the century, as you see here, time and other magazines put hoover on their cover many times. Usually some major domestic event was e hook. T beneath hoovers prominence from his rise to the presidency since world war one, to his revival as a cold war elder statesman, was always his global experiences and prowess is what made hoover influential was his grasp of the centuries issues which played out both at home in the United States and abroad, and often at the same time as few did. Hoover saw and shaped the United States in a world of powerful which were shifting over the century toward a post imperial, a world equally fragile of fledgling International Organizations like the United Nations and states. Few more consequential than the u. S. Itself. If in the end, as we all know well, cold war militarism became the answer. An imperfect, expedient, but frustratingly persistent answer. U. S. Officials, after president truman himself valued military power more than hoover did. But even they shied from its full embrace until the korean war. Hoover, along with my books, other subject, Henry Wallace, fought valiantly against this well told of cold war containment. In hoovers case, this was his enduring vision of what im strategic restraint and ill get into what i mean by that now to. Be clear right from the outset, neither hoover nor anyone associated him or anyone really would have probably a utopian world peace. No one had the golden bullet. All were personally flawed and proposed flawed solutions, rife with all kinds of improbabilities and tensions and contradictions of their own. But hoover pointed to other possibilities, other americas and worlds with different, perhaps enlightened patterns of conflict and cooperation. But short of his full aspiration, which was to revolutionize the u. S. Policy, hoover and his collaborators did achieve modest success, at least changing at times bending u. S. Policy in restraints, direction ultimately, hoovers cold war should alter not just how we look at hoover, but at cold war in america. These were places only superficially dominated, i argue, by cold war consensus. It was a consensus us which marked which masked, diverse ideas, movements and people who were always coursing beneath it today, hoover, who most still associate his supposedly wretched leadership in the great depression, seems an unlikely vehicle for the story of dematha organizing the cold war. But in my view in my long time spent here at the hoover y, i think hes exactly right. He was one of the most challenging voices in a vibrant u. S. Political landscape obscured by official cold war because of his Exceptional Business background, his intellect, and his political connections. Hoovers ideas and personality were unique, powerful in themselves. But even more. Hoover had ways of projecting, of operationalizing his views across the u. S. Government, military and society, helping fuel the process, the Republican Party and conservatism revival with that broad reach straddling, the public and private sectors. Hoovers did make its mark, though in ways he tried but can never fully control now. These maps arent as good a chance. I dont have a i dont have a, you know, professional collaborator. And i cant remember how i made this, i think was my a late night in grad school or something. But it is a world map i made and put efforts to make. And i think its a great place to start to try to understand this story. Now there are three main colors in the map. The blue indicates countries that Henry Wallace, my other main character, traveled exclusively, and hoover and i keep them here, though im here to talk about hoover because it shows something surprising to a lot. Hoovers contemporaries, how welltraveled hoover, was hoover had the edge over wallace and globetrotting liberals of his age. The red indicates countries that hoover went, not wallace and the orange that countries that both went to from these connections. Hoover forge views on empire, the nation, war and Humans Society which i see is fueling his rtraint and what remains stunning. Hotialgeral i think every time you read it, its well known, i thin to of you in the room hoover went from being a quak orphan,trg across decent relatives and oddjob to a multinational sissman with operations on every continent. He became one of amecs most successful industrial managers, hailed as the public face of americaemergence as alol economic power. At the turn of the century. But hoovs bding fortune was built on empire. Like Many Americans, hoover worked within the sinews of u. S. , european and japanese empire as a hungry man on the make a far cry from the restraint that hed later show you. Hoover was young and brash, and he sometimes showed it. He sometimes felt that u. S. Imperial power was not aggressive enough for his needs. As a young businessman. And as he told the New York Times. After surviving chinas famed boxer rebellion toward turn of the century with his newlywed wife, lou henry hoover, he sounded like a lot of westerners at the time, saying to the times, quote, diplomacy with an asiatic is of no use to do business. You must talk with a gun in your hand and talk with a gun. He reportedly did. You have to stress the word reportedly right, but he reportedly did to help secure the lucrative chinese mines, which he to help launch his business. There was a softer side to hoover, too, one which would grow in the coming years as he blossomed into a scholar statesman while living nearly two years in china. Hoover took the study of chinese language to aid him in his business dealings as his everyday workings and living alongside workers and his servants and other chinese. I find this to be one of the most honest pictures in american political history, because hoover looks totally dazed and confused as as as no doubt many of us would. Trying to learn a language difficult and different as chinese, i say that myself im korean, but i wasnt born with radiographs in my mouth. His wife, lou, was reportedly much better it. But the moment captured here speaks to something also crucial. I think hoovers commitment to to language to let through learning ideas and words tools of and persuasion which harvard political scientist joseph nye is famously called. Im sure youve heard the term soft power, something which hoover would deploy time again across his long, cold war. Now, world war one cut. Hoover swashbuckling imperialism beneath him, is hard today, i think, remembering how devastating that this original world war was. But it was called the great war the original world war without a one or two to it for a reason. It was, by any measure, a global apocalypse, a conflict which did llunder and punish millions. Course surpassed it. Rld war the First World War gave birth to tustrial violence, the atrocities and the torturous globitics which World War Two and the cold in a way only continued. More than most hoover came to know the war as the charnel of horrors that you see pictured here in this famous painting by the german artist otto dix. Its a painting which the nazis, ironically banned because it portrayed implied that war was hell. It bad and futile, accomplished nothing, which didnt exactly jive with the nazi agenda as legendary head of allied food relief back in world war one, though, hoover would cross the wars front lines. He would conference with generals and he famine trench warfare and other horrors from this first total war. Now, the way hoover is usually portrayed over this period, i think is a lot of truth. That, of course, is a lot of importance. But its, of course, as great humanitarian who saved the world from starvation. But that that depiction obscures this deeper process of geopolitical thinking that im trying to pay attention, trying to draw attention to that is justly celebrated humanitarian reputation. But hoovers great food mission for the allies which is seen in this official hung m was keenness in the wars collapsing empires, e where most of his risky emerging market ventures were located, including inussia itself. He lost some of his most precious holdingthe, and theyre appropriate in the way that shaun put so colorfully but accurately in the map. These are the da regions, the right which after the war became, new nation states out of the rubble of the austriahungy d hungarian, russian and ottoman empires which are colored here in blue, yellow and purple. Now, im not arguing here in some really crude, you know, even marxist way that hoover became a humanitarian and politician because he lost his business before war. Hoover was already pondering a career change. He was already showing signs. He was getting tired of the great that he was doing so well in his only so time. I suppose for some you could live in a really palatial mansion in london and start to pined to live somewhere more simple and small throughout his life. I think after well, after these events could easily return to a lucrative business like a lot of political and military figures did. His Close Investment advisors, even in the cold war, ive found some evidence of often really frustrated at how indifferent hoover was to his own money. But what im arguing here something more subtle that world war i, world wars, cataclysms which he shockingly saw obliterate his business empire, converted hoover into this deeply sincere practitioner of what im calling strategic. Today. Restraint is, a subject of keen debate among scholars and policymakers and for criti like general mcmaster, pictured here, the left, and advocates colonel bacevich on the right, who are both pieces of history. So its why i picked them and, partly why they kn a bit of what theyre talking for, for for many in the debate, it has really high stakes you can imagine for advocates, restraint is a promising strategy that eschews the nations traditional globalism for retrenched, but according to them, more focused and effective posture, focusing on our nations geopolitical advantages. You know, its technological and financial prowess. For one, our navy and air power, for our geographic isolation in the western hemisphere, relying on those things, restraint relies on various tactics. You can name a bunch that scholars have used from surprising places from chicago to harvard, offshore balancing deterrence, foreign aid, but all in behalf of a more limited but genuine internationalism. For mcmaster and other critics. However, however wellintentioned restraint might and i overhear might have some good ideas to it. In the end, it poses as a new isolationism, an overly cautious, inward looking approach which erodes u. S. Security, our values and interests, both really as well as that of peoples around the world. Of course, for historians with a chronic sense of deja vu, this debate is very familiar. It echoes several great debates in our nations history from the spanishamerican war. You could go that far, that far back through the both world wars and the cold war. As citizens, we have to be concerned with these debates. But as historians, we must see restraint less as concepts and political positions as important as they are. But as something that is a fluid changing set of ideas and practices best understood clos the context of their place in time. Now, its ing to have such a debate today in a postcold war world w. S. Global supremacy not as absolute, and the world moripolar and relatively free. And i do stress the world relatively of conflict. But its another thing to push restraint. Hoover did. When u. S. Power was ascending incredibly so, and the world seemed so threatened by fascism, communism and other foes. But hoover did precisely that philosophy. Hoovers restraint led him to see the wild world was indeed interconnected and promising in that way. It still was marked by profound social, political and cultural differences. U. S. Power in his best promoted the global good by strictly defining u. S. And global interests in ways that respected these promoting world order bottom up more so through peace, trade and international society. Not so much the blunter, top down methods of war, power, politics and empire. Now what helped hoover before . World war two, at least, was restraints, broader acceptability. Before that important war. Neither hoover nor anyone explicitly identify with the term restraint, but it cropped up time and again in his most important policy speeches as president. Weve heard the term, too, a couple of times in talk, and i think thats a coincidence. Moreover few could operationalize restraint. Whatever called at such high levels as u. S. Commerce secretary and president. Under hoover and other leading republican u. S. Foreign policy in the twenties strove for restraint in several areas. First, antiimperialism as in the political cartoon over here of a latina. Hoover was calling for a Good Neighbor policy era latin erica consciously, breaking with wilson and his other ents predeceas more aggressive approaches. You know,amous dollar diplomacy that we heard Teddy Roosevelts talk softly, but carry a big stick, though, of course, hoover incorporated some of these things to. Second. Hoover pursued an act of peace and this is a term he actually did use and flag emphasize and he did through wellknown things Like International conflict resolution and all sorts of bilateral conflicts, especially in latin america and also the league nations. And this was of an era, when you think about it, such things seem more possible and feasible because it was an era where the league was existing. And you also had things like the colombian pact renouncing war last. And finally, hoover promoted global trade communications and culture. Now, the specifics of hoovers ideas in these areas vary. There are so many, its hard to keep up with them, even though one has the benefit of time. In hindsight, its still often really daunting. But some various ideas, which i found very interesting in my research, that he had an idea to ban air bombing after world war one because he saw how horrible could be the sort of atrocities that could lead to killing civilians in world war one. And he also had an for an International Student exchange program, a lot like the Fulbright Program today to help promote global understanding among nations. Now, regardless of the specifics, the various ideas he came up with and others did what is important, i think we need to underline and think about is hoovers underlying outlook restraint, which he went on to carry across long cold war. Now, where are my stories . Other protagonist, Henry Wallace in the cold war left with decline at home and abroad. The course of the of the cold war. Hoovers right wing and centrist coalition growing success. The same man, president harry truman fdr successor, kicked wallace out, of course, in that famous story and he brought hoover into u. S. Government service after years of humiliation as the alleged villain of the depression, hoover again became an admired public figure. He built new relationships with cold war figures. John mccloy, who is pictured here. He was a top official in occupied germanynd the world bank, one of the socalled wise men of the u. S. Establishment in the cold war. And hoovers following would spread from its old wright bas to the new right. The fellow westerner and future new right darling u. S. Barry goldwater began courting hoover as a mentor in the forties and fifties. Hoovers ties thickened conservative businessmen and media figures, too, which we shouldnt forget. Like the utility executive bill melander here on the bottom left and, the journalist Suzanne Lafollette doing such connections. Hoovers cold war influence would grow through the fifties and sixties. Globally. Hoovers reach was a bit more mixed. I think the picture is. In a world upset by World War Two and the cold war restraint, difficult to impose. Hoover strongest connections were with the republic of chinas Chiang Kai Shek and other conservative and moderate anticommunist elites and citizens. Through his new ties, the u. S. State congress, private lobbies like the china and japan, lobbies. Hoover, though, did work to influence u. S. Policy, as he did in europe during the Marshall Plan negotiations, which he did after hisams trip to postwar europe, which is pictured here in the bottom left. As f the dizing third world and the communist world, however, hwas modest in then, in his early days, though never entirely as, he endorsed ted aid and contact such as food aid to india. Gandhi here and mes he had grander, like his proposal to totally reorganize the United Nations. But importantly, without communist membership as it was for the west and the communist bloc for hoover, the korean war was the key turning point from a but easing cold war primarily in europe, toward a global militarized cold war. Today, korea think its still accurate to say, remains the forgotten war, but at the time, of course, it wasnt. As scholars and observers, it served as a kind of a pearl harbor for the cold war. Shocking the u. S. Out of complacency, sparking narrow and spreading the cold war across asia, africa and the middle east everywhere. It sparked fears and more than one actual public declaration of world war three. Ironic line, as is often the case in history, historians find few actually saw the korean war coming, except those koreans were closest to it. But of course, even them. Who knew . Right after the berlin crisis, europe had seemed one tipping a bit into the wests favor as we now know. Neither stalin nor mao really pushed initiated the war. Of course. Of course. They were in on the initial planning. They came around to supporting the eager north koreans. But for reasons always of their own. In retrospect its not hard to understand the indifference to korea by all sides. Korea was one of many hotbeds of social unrest, revolution and an end and conflict. After decades of empire and war. Understandably, hoover, like most observers, was more focused on france, germany, japan and other major nations. What is harder to understand sometimes is how korea provoked such a vigorous response immediately from the u. S. Government response actually surprised many on both sides of the iron curtain. What is also surprising is how Many Americans, too, and i mean the government outside of elite circles saw this war initially, least not in classic cold terms, but as a more unsung peripheral war. Early polls found half of ordinary americans felt that the war was what historians have been arguing for years. Again, revisionists, right. Weve come around to say as if it were something new, that the korean war was nothing but a civil and colonial war and wasnt invented by revisionists, but something ordinary americans felt initially. And it was pretty spot on. And in many respects. Only 15 bought the official cold war line about communism. Minorities, especially felt the wars third world ness for a lot of reasons can imagine because of their race and their and their marginalization. The United States, as a columnist for the African American chicago defender, said the, quote right here. Korea smethe start of a gigantic color war by communists and asians who seembe seeking a new world order. In this context, a fluidity hoover would make his last stand of restraint trying to shape the war and what was what i see as sort of the climax of his efforts. For hoover, the korean war was shocking, too. Not so much the third world and korea per se, but the u. S. And how unrestrained u. S. Power seemed to be coming and how it needed to be tamed and channeled in sounder directions directions. From his days as a mining engineer in korea and americans and koreans, we kept revolving through his waldorf suite hoover new korea. His view of korea like that of many was that was that of an immature unstable place and people having gained a divided cold war nationhood, as did many nations through the centuries, overeager geopolitics. His response had three phases. Its lot to unfurl in the time remaining. Ill sketch them, but im happy to say more about this and other things in which i look forward to in phase one. As americans, wereooking at the end of World War Two. The war was and they began thinking about the world would look le ter that war. Whveproposed in the book pictured here problems of lasting peace, a gradual, decentralized approach to korea and other small and large nations. And he knew. He just imagined. And it wasnt hard. It was rig tre. When you looked at what happened after world war one with the collapsing empires, the nations as i mentioned and, precipitating that period of turmoil and. He thought that it wouldnt be wise to immediately set up a formal United Nations, which would immediately have to guarantee. When you think it borders and sovereignty and all sorts of things which maybe were better left out to the to the transition period which he and ambassador gibson proposed and said they called it a period, a period in which the United States and other leading powers, including pointedly the soviet union, would instead oversee loosely a transition period where if you had to really get past the pc ness of the title, various local local populations such as in poland, would be left to settle their own scores and settle the worlds borders. Before united could come into being and rule what was there to govern. For . Hoover lessons of world war one. Were very much on his mind. He was he was had seen what selfdetermination as a slogan and the and the league of nations universalism had done its good and its bad after that war showing. His emphasis though on great Power Cooperation and sort of all out reform and war, especially in areas marginal to the u. S. Like korea. Hoover had a specific for korea, too. Toward the end of the war, which shawn mentioned, i think he told president truman three months before the atomic bombing of japan. So you have to think about the exact time this is happening. This is may 1945. This is before the soviet union has entered the war although everyones imagining its going to happen, perhaps at this exact juncture when when truman first reaches out to hoover in a grand gesture, really political compromise and conciliation, as roosevelt said, always shut the door on hoover. In this first meeting, or one of the first meetings with truman, hoover had a specific about japan and what he told was, let japan keep korea, which was a colony, of course, for decades. Let japan keep formosa or taiwan and as its now called, such things would be short of the Unconditional Surrender which the Truman Administration saw it. But the merits were that it could end the war sooner. It could endear japan, a future ally, and it could help a globally overcommitted u. S. Counter soviet power in asia. Now, theres a lot to unpack there. And hoover spelled out a lot of his logic, the conversations in the memos there. Countering the soviets, though i think, to hoover and to many was course partly in anticipation of post potentially cold war possibility. But as he also knew, this was always japans traditional role in asia to help counter russian and then soviet power in the region and also british power. Right. Of course, we always have to remember there were always in the room than the United States and the soviets in many places, including korea. Five years later and phase two of koreas of hoovers korean restraint after what seemed a lifetime of famous cold war events, we can rattle them off one after another. Hoover did publicly approve of swift dispatch of u. S. Troops to korea after the north the south in june 1950. But privately, he was ctil, and he w vy clear and candid about this. To those who listened, to those who were closest to him. Hoover sided with politicians, military figures, citizens who felt that the u. S. Should not have relied so immediately on manpower, u. S. Manpower, but an air and power. Native korean troops, which, of course, we had south korean troops. The south korean army was not insignificant. And some u. N. Diplomacy see in the first and not in the first instance, u. S. Manpower finally faced three. In many ways, the most famous one for a lot of reasons. After the u. S. Expanded the war, after defeating the north in the south and deciding to roll back and to move and try to conquer the north as well. And they were racing to the to the yalu river border, which, of course, was china. Manchuria, of course. Important area as weve learned. This was, of course, general macarthurs famed no substitute for victory offensive. And during this these events, hoover tried to restrain truman and his foer aide, douglas macarthur, after the peoples republic of china. China ented the war. At this juncture in a stunning, surprising offensive against u. S. Tros before and this is a key point mysteriously retreating as quick as they came. Now, we now know the outcome of what happened. And later, after some hesitation, macarthur and truman advanced. And i think its important to say both macarthur and truman, we could talk more about that later in response to that new advance of the u. S. Army. The prc this time poured again decisively and for the long haul, and the cold war metastasized and into the seemingly inevitable dark conflict that we know so well from movies like the manchurian candidate or dr. Strangelove. The u. S. And prc would cut off contact for decades, no recognition. Mccarthyism took over u. S. Society and culture and fears of world war three. Of course were heard again and amplified and a Global Global rearmament drive gripped the world. Times garish cover here of mao zedong, the leader of the prc gives us some sense of the atmosphere as does the famed u. S. Strategic document, nsc 68 on the right, ich, of course, was a blueprint circulating in the u. S. Bureaucracy and was calling a Program Just Like this, but gained trumans approval. He actually hit it in a safe because he thought it was too extreme, but it finally gained approval after this. Prc u. S. Confrontation in korea. Against this in his last famous. Im sorry that i wait. I think i want to. Off to. There we go. In his last famous speech calling, the u. S. , the gibraltar of western civilization, hoover offered, his final vision of restraint in the speech, hoover outlined a new National Strategy instead of containment based on air and navy power, a streamlined geography, avoiding peripheries like korea and greater efforts from allies. It caused an earthquake in u. S. And Public Opinion. It sparked a new great debate, the first major one since World War Two. In congress the media, town halls and living rooms across the country, americans sided with hoover and theanvoices amplifying his cause. It madeccarthys famous homecoming pictured reportedly new york citysst parade, eventual. The uproarootheruman white house down and with it, tw decades of Democratic Party rule. Now historians have interpreted this public backlash which ended with the newly declared republican and war hero, dwight eisenhower. Of course, in our white house, theyve interpreted as driven by partizan and public rancor. Thats usually been the interpretation classically speaking. And of course such feelings were their partizanship and rancor were always part of politics. Its part of everyday life. I find. But hoover and conservative publicans who orchestrated this backlash lot more than we realize. Ive been finding in the archives they also had high motives for what they were doing for their public and their private forms of diplomacy. It was noisy. It was ugly. But it was a successful operation. In many ways, again, using soft power, using the u. S. Public sentiment to restrain u. S. Foreign policy and a u. S. State led by democrats for two really profound decades. Mccarthyism which really did reach its height because of korea wasnt just about rooting out spies or whipping public hysteria. Although of course spies were a key part of it. And it was something hoover supported. It was about many ways killing cold war liberalism. Liberals knew it, and they were beside themselves about it. As one of the gops few respectable conservative international figures, hoover gives us a really valuable vantage into this story. Now, the u. S. And world, of course, moved beyond korea in what was a new cold war since the fifties and into the fifties and the sixties. Hoovers a strain, as it does become less active. Its felt, publicly speaking, hardly at all. It seemed by youthful new rights led by one of hoovers admired newest admirers, barry goldwater. But as always, appearance belies realities as historians are finding today, hawkish echoes of mccarthys substitute for cty did not entirely define new right. Nservatism. So too, im finding that less sensationalized voices reinventing restraint in the late cold war age of chronic interventionism. Hoover was, of course, a beloved Republican Party figure until his death in 1964. He was constantly being asked to give the keynote at rnc, Republican National conventions, but he never offered restraint or. Any other doctrine as a defining aspect of his career. True to his engineering spirit, hoover wasnt one for doctrinaire purity, although i guess we could argue debate about that, sunshine said. Or just as said, its a really important thing to have a doctrine. But he adjusted, too. He got accommodated for some close to him who were the most privy and sympathetic to efforts behind the scenes as well as in the limelight. Sometimes it was too much. This was the opinion of of his former world war one aide, bill melander. But hoover was too kind, compromising and an understanding, while hoover was as disappointed, as landau was in the refusal, some cold war era conservatives to to cut down the gigantic cold war state, which hollander and many sources dating back to the new deal. Hoover was more philosophical about about that the failure of most conservatives and most americans to see the problems, to diagnose the painful solutions. Landau regretted this too, to another third party and told him that this is what hoover said. This is in the sixties and early sixties. A year or two before hoover passed away, hoover told landau there were too few people who knew as much and seen as much as he and marlon dawsons. One can imagine a world where one an earlier over such a long time, and the implication being its hard for others to really understand all these issues were talking about. One might imagine hoover in early years of americas vietnam war involvement, staring across his long cold war towards all these overseas issues and threats weve been talking about today as well as americas own response since the 1900s, as that exchange suggests for hoover. As for Many Americans made cold war, america and the world, its consensus was never static or satisfactory. Beneath the surface of official policy and rhetoric coursed paths not taken. Moving events in ways that weve yet to understand and rather focusing as we usually do on simplistic definitions of success and failure headlines and the outward outcomes. Of course, those things all matter. But hoover story challenges us to view those things in u. S. Foreign policy as contingent, not inevitable, and as complex and diverse and. Not monolithic. Second, hoovers restraint is a reminder that domestic u. S. Political history really matters. If we are to understand global history, but only if we break with old myths, embrace new methods, new questions, new actors, be beyond u. S. Officialdom, rather than take cold war Foreign Policy as a given. We must see u. S. Power as multi vocal questioning, constantly being made and remade. The question behind hoovers restraint, of course, the same every nations Foreign Policy. What shaped what a nations power take in the world . How did domestic and International Politics overlap and conflict, especially in the case remote superpower like the United States. Whose power was overwhelming. Yet distant not only from foreign lands, but sometimes from americans in whose name it was exercised. Finally, hoovers story emphasizes the tangled connections between the u. S. And an world. As a cold war historian, attorney west had said, the cold war was about how america became the third worlds problem. But as turned that phrase over its head and say while the third that the that also became the third world also became americas problem. Neither for u. S. Nor the third world or anyone for that matter. Did two world wars save the world from war or empire . But to tell the story, we should look not only at the world, which is incredibly important, but also at americans again, like hoover, who imagined and used our nations power ways that we have yet to fully understand. Thank you. Okay. Well, last card, three speakers to come up to the stage. The stage and will do q a. There must be question if we can get the are we going to put it . Oh, aaron, is going to get the event slide up there. Yeah, actually we can, we can move these out. Okay. Right. Here. Okay. So were going to open it up to questions and im actually going to exercise the moderators prerogative and ask the first question. And its actually for, um, for two of the speakers is for justice and sean and its inspired by the something sean said at the very beginning of his talk and that is the sort of the contest between Herbert Hoover as president and fdr whos who wants his job. The controversy about whether to grant diplomatic recognition to the ussr. And as sean says, whoever is against. But as soon as he leaves the white house, the way is cleared for us formal diplomatic recognition of the ussr and i immediately thought i remembered that is in 1934. Am i right, sean that the soviets actually entered the league of nations . And thats related, of course, to be you know, maybe we dont call it collective security as them, but security has to be in some way to what happened in germ the year before. So 1933, the nazis stormed to power. And thats a big change. Its a big look, new look here. And i just wonder for you know, because im also thinking that the the the manchuria crisis still playing out. And i wonder our justice if it ridges if it shows up as an influence toward the end of that debate and sean whether it figured into the recognition question. I dont think it really played that much of a role because by 1933, the focus the nation was elsewhere on mateship remained curious. Basically taken over by the japanese and well, thats about all i have to say on that. Fair. Well, as far as the election i wouldnt say i did a real deep dive into how important the issue was. The election campaign. It figured at times my my reading is it was certainly not a prominent Campaign Issue its an important part of my i suppose that i tell the broader story. U. S. Foreign policy vis a vis the soviet union in the far japan figures in maybe just in the broader sense that some of the advocates of recognize the soviet union are who are advising roosevelt think this might be a way of of exercising some influence on japan, that is to say, pressuring japan on on manchuria. They had a lot comes comes out from that. Your other question, though, about league of nations is i think an interesting in the way that it plays out in 33 and 34, theres not perfect symmetry. You know, the u. S. Does not unrecognized nazi germany when she recognizes soviets. However, nazi germany effectively withdraws from the league of nations. And then on the strength of u. S. Recognition in some french lobbying because the french have concerns about about hitler after he comes to power the soviets are brought in and and certainly soviets hope they dont something out of that whether from the u. S. Or from france is. The only other interesting sidelight id add from four is the johnson act, and that is when, you know, effectively although it does limit roosevelts ability to extend loans to either or the british, because the british were in default by then as well, we shouldnt forget that. That also to some extent ices. I think the financial question at least for the time being this this is the act which forbids u. S. Banks from loaning money to countries in default. And by then britain was in default too. And that actually plays a large role in this story to come. Anyway, it was that was litvinov brought in in 34 and a major way to oversee this i think thats i think thats right. Let me turn that shown for a second to what degree this wrecking nation of what degree to market play as far as recognition and otherwise if we recognize the soviet the marvelous world of prosperity will be over, perhaps reopen to us, because such eager buyers. Well that the roosevelt argument thats what he seemed to believe and its interesting it actually plays in a recent movie i dont know how many people have seen mr. Jones and once seen it get very poorly timed this production it came out of the pandemic here which pretty much killed off moviegoing but whats amazing about this movie is it actually treats the holodomor in the ukrainian seriously. It tells the story of gareth jones, the welsh who along with Malcolm Muggeridge first broke the story and they really go overboard almost in pushing this idea that walter durante, the famous New York Times journalist who would whitewash the famine and his reports and even really lied about it quite egregiously, that he did a play a role. This part, the movie does get right. He played a role in also supporting recognize mission and the way the movie portrays both him and roosevelt viewing this is that yes, the soviets need America Capital and this is whats going to open the floodgates. In fact, i dont think it really does play much of a role because, i mean, after all, investment money will go where it goes and the lack of recognition had not really prevented any of the western firms from investing in the soviet. I mean, perhaps that gave them a bit more confidence that the soviets wouldnt default, but not necessarily the soviets defaulted on many occasions. Theyd even against some of the german firms involved in the apollo business. They were not exactly known for financial probity. Okay, were going to open it up. We have microphone cards on each side. If you have a question, if you want to just walk right up to that, be brave and walk right to that microphone. I think. Well, actually, its for the tv audience as well. Smile now. Question for dr. And yellow two can pipe in lets bring it is current times with russias aggression in ukraine if president was still with us what would say and his reaction thereof. Yes actually if i can just repeat that question and for future i was supposed to remind to put put your face right up to that microphone. The question is, russias invasion of ukraine, what might in a question directed at kevin kim, what might Herbert Hoovers reaction to this have been . Thats a great question. And when i realized i started by thinking about especially this book comes to completion, i certainly will have a better answer. But i think my my first instinct would be because theres so much theres so much thats involved in that in what seems to be a simple question, but is really profound, like why putin is even doing what hes doing and all that intervening events that have occur to make putin do what he did in the united in the intervening periods the end of the cold war to the to the president of ukraine. But at least to take it at its simplest take, i think there would be things about it that he would approve of. I think that at least the fact i think he was not this is why i dont call him purely a realist, although or an antiinterventionist, but which which are really good terms for. Weve used up justice and others have used to analyze hoover and i owe a lot to them especially for the period i dont research as intensely. But hoover was for, you know, acts of collective security, acts of war intervention. If they could be done in ways which hewed to what i see as a broader way to understand what hes doing, which im calling restraint. It didnt didnt outlaw positive denying it dynamic action in behalf western values and security and think at the history train he would like the fact that ukrainians were really spearheading and pushing this this effort. I think he would be no friend of putin and he represents he would see a long lineage there both on the russian and u. S. Sides. And he would see the threat to europe and so i think he would have i think he would an ironic appreciation for the fine line that the germans and the americans and biden are trying to to to thread. There. So that would be my sort of initial reaction it and he wasnt totally unfriendly democrats i mean he he he actually it was had a really interesting relationship with jfk because of his close relationship with his dad and of course, he wasnt a heavy he was a partizan. Hoover but he always came from a nonpartisan background. So i think he could approve it that the domestic policies one thing, but at least as far as a Foreign Policy response, i think that he would see he would he would appreciate the general approach that were doing thats i think thats what i would say. If my my my guess is that he would be for Financial Aid perhaps military aid, but no Ground Troops and no binding commitment his reaction to lendlease which he opposed when it was proposed in february 1941 was give the british 1,000,000,000 loan. You know, but lendlease could lead to convoys. Convoys could lead to war. I like to think that that hoover might have the ukraine crisis, and i would actually bring it back to 2014, if not earlier, with some level of restraint and skepticism about foreign fascist depth of u. S. Involvement. That country, particularly in 2014, in the socalled year maiden revolution, where we have ambassadors and senators out parading in the streets with activists, boasting about spending 5 billion on various ngos and other organizations. And the Victoria Nuland hot mic moment and all the rest of it. I think he would have recoiled in some horror at the level of u. S. Interventionism, which had helped produce the tragedy. I think he might have been perhaps a more thoughtful and less bombastic version, you might say, of someone like trump, who is somewhat inarticulate, tried to articulate a a critique of the us policy vis a vis ukraine, russia. I do think that much like after pearl harbor he came on side, he probably would have responded to the invasion in february of 2022 by expressing his firm support of ukraine and perhaps also approving Financial Aid. But i also agree he he would have exercised far more restraint than the Current Administration shown in all kinds of ways, all kinds of ones, things once thought to be red lines that the us has frankly crossed quite aggressive and blatantly. I think some us should actually be, i know, unpopular there as it is to say this. I think we should be grateful for putins restraint in not responding the dozen or 20 odd us provocations since last february. We could be in an even worse situation than we are. One final thing i would add is that, of course, especially with the events in the last week or two, hoover would be very focused on the food issue in the coming. Oh, absolutely. That would be huge for Herbert Hoover. We have another question here. If you could step right up to that microphone and give it. Yeah. Hi. I know president hoovers his presidency was between the two world wars. This question kind of stems off of the previous question. Actually. I wanted to ask the election of 1912 and leading right into the world war one. And my understanding is that, of course, Woodrow Wilson was elected that year. Im a democrat. And he was not really interested in having the u. S. Fight in europe so much and so my understanding is had Teddy Roosevelt felt. Speaking of dr. Kim, you said paths not taken. My question is about how World War Two could could have never happened. So had Teddy Roosevelt won the election of 1912 of you had carry a big stick. Speak softly. So the flare up in europe that started world war one. Teddy roosevelt, had he been president , would have within a couple of years sent u. S. Troops over and put out all the fires over there and the lingering problems that caused World War Two would have never, never really happened. So i see a parallel tells of today as i do at that time. So you have a strong carry a big stick speaks softly in new yorker whether its Teddy Roosevelt or or trump where doesnt do anything because hes afraid and and so and and course now you have a democrat who said Woodrow Wilson is joe biden. So you a similarity his from the beginning of world war one to whats happening now. So my question is in your opinion had Teddy Roosevelt won the 1912 election and he was. From 1912 to 1914 or 1916, rather, do you think that world war would have never happened . Thanks. We have we have panelists who usually really love to leap into the counterfactual territory. Thats a major one. Just as help us. Let me say this about tr that he became increasingly outraged about the german invasion of belgium and the way the belgians were treated at first he said, well, this is great power politics. And he saw himself as very much a realpolitik man. I think we would have entered the war much sooner under tr its leadership, particularly the lusitania incident. He goes and he calls Woodrow Wilson pretty much a coward. And this is the reason why woodrow in part of the reason why Woodrow Wilson did not permit him to do what he always wanted to be a rough writer again and to lead a division in and was very interesting. I think he, theodore roosevelt, tried to clear route. He said, i told the id stake my life to lead a division and routed. Did you make that clear . Hmm. Well, i have written a lot about the First World War. This is not a counter factual. Ive particularly entertained very frequently, i suppose, in part because i find it hard to see a scenario where roosevelt wins the 1912 election. Its interesting idea that the us gets in the war sooner rather than later, and perhaps knocked sense into the germans or something. Although im somewhat wellknown for being skeptical, the usual arguments about german premeditation and war guilt and all the rest. Theres a more interesting to me that happens in the winter of 1916, 1917, after the next election. And that is when wilson effectively is elected. And hes not the last is something bob dole used to like to talk about. He was not the last democrat in the century be elected on the platform of i kept you out of the war shortly before entering the war. This happens again, of course, in 1940 with roosevelt. And i mean, even to some arguably 64 with johnson. But the interesting moment there and heres where i disagree a little about the idea that that u. S. Power could have played a decisive role in 1914 or even after the lusitania and in 1915, 1915 was not a good year for the western allies. The germans huge gains on the eastern front. Theyre in an extreme, strong position. The british get bogged horrifically at the dardanelles and gallipoli. The war is going abysmally for britain and france. Morale. The u. S. Intervention might have helped a little bit, but as we know, it took the u. S. Almost a year really to get boots on the ground, even when the u. S. Finally did intervene in 1917. At the time, the u. S. Finally goes in, though, all really does is prolong the war. I mean, here is the thing is, wilson says will make the world safe for democracy and effectively by knocking out German Imperial power in Eastern Europe, we make it safe for communism. Thats effectively what happens when the germans go under, largely because of not exclusively because of. I have some british historians who dont. The idea that the u. S. Was quite so decisive on the western front, obviously, in terms of morale, they play a big role. But in effectively what that does, the bolsheviks, their first year in power being propped up by the German Imperial army. German power disintegrates. Communism endures. So we should always bear in mind the unintended consequences of u. S. Abroad. But note that wilson says the world should be safe for democracy. It doesnt. We should impose democracy. True on other nation, its true. We have time for another question. And here he comes, the questioner, if you could, right up to the microphone there. Hello. My question in is for professor kim or dr. Kim and its about the other subject of your book, Henry Wallace and its another counterfactual of sorts. So you might have an idea now where this is going. So now i dont actually dont could be. So as you know, it. 1944 at the democratic convention, Henry Wallace was removed from the ticket. The sitting Vice President , and replaced with harry truman. Well, if Henry Wallace had not been sort abandoned by the Democratic Party and president roosevelt in 44, and he had been renominated and lets say roosevelt still died in 1945 and wallace became president , do you how different do you think history would have been in the cold war and all like pretty much everything that happened because i mean. Wallace, for my understanding was arguably, one might say prosoviet or at least pro conciliation with the soviet union. I mean, he visited and had good things to say about it, though he was kind of shown a potemkin as my understanding. But. Like a for one, i imagine he would not have dropped the atomic bombs on japan, though. Oh, let you answer that. And also in korea, i imagine his reaction probably would have been different if he were still president at that time, like truman was, if he were reelected in 48, say. And yeah, i just. Would there even have been a cold war that like its like if wallace had been president instead of truman. Thats. Yeah. Im wondering. Thank you for. That. Thank you for that question. Well, theres a reason why historians and political scientists out the states are start. You know, theres a truism we always say we can predict past a lot better than the future. But predicting the future and past are both hard, equally hard part of the same skill. So the question is welcome. And i think about that a lot. I think there are two there are two big things you have to think about when wallace or anyone is president and what that might have done on the world stage. And you have that on the one hand, you to think domestically, you have to think, well, what, Henry Wallace, his ability been to remain president , to remain in control of a very powerful u. S. War state at that point. And when considering all the bureaucrats and Political Forces within the government who are largely new and strong and and also congress and also Civil Society as well, which often comes at the short end of the state because its weaker. But as i try to show, it can be decisive at times and big moments. And when you think about that i think its harder it becomes more to think, how could wallace go on to push and to prevent the cold war because theres a lot of domestic Political Capital so but could he have lasted i think maybe enough to at least definitely pursue as you mentioned a more conciliatory policy towards 17. There be no question that he would have done that, i think. But i think what that would have looked like isnt just exactly what we might imagine. So if you were you know, it was a it was fdr policy as the other panelists kind of. And if you study wallace carefully was really trying his best. No one really could completely follow fdr because he was a master of deception to his own family, his own wife, his own you know, no, no one could really know what he would do next, even if he promised you will i will do this. But. But wallace did his best to follow. He would his Foreign Policy little that that roosevelt wrote before wallace was sent to china and siberia for example. And so he really tried to follow and he was a genuine adherent to his policy of cooperation. Soviet union. But what would that have meant . I think with things like the Marshall Plan, yeah, that wouldve made a huge difference. I think he would have pushed harder for he would seen a necessity for some kind of economic aid to the europe right. Who wouldnt . But he have done it in a way which might have been more considerate of the soviet unions considering asians. But what the atomic bomb i mean actually. Wallace was attempting to think that he would have been taken a stronger stand against things like that. But the best evidence we could have about that is wallace his own words. And he said when he was about this in oral history, what do you what did you think about hiroshima . He knew it was there. He knew that the atomic bomb was in the bureaucracy and would you have not used it because someone asked him that same thing. Right. Years later. And wallace, i think, honestly said, im not sure i would not have used it by that point. We were so numb to to the to all the bombings that was happening. You know, we think the firebombing tokyo in germany dresden, it was dwarfed in many ways happened in hiroshima, at least on a, you know, quality of quantity of scale. So he said we were just, oh, now so numb from all this happening that im not sure i would have stopped that. So. So you what i think that speaks to is that globally he might have pushed for a more conciliatory policy probably domestically and probably also globally. He would have found that impossible to uphold purely and consistently, even even even even him. So how long would he last for the American People . Thats one question. What he changed his tune slightly with with stalin. I think he would have to if he lasted long enough to find out. But then again, what would stalin and mao, how they react to . Wallace thats also really an interesting of the story because stalin and, you know, at this point, you know, i really buy the argument of one of our colleagues, norman newmark, until 47 or 48, stalin is pursuing sort of a more hes definitely penetrating, trying to spread influence in europe and elsewhere, but especially western europe, because what matters the most to him, Eastern Europe, especially. But, you know, he he is interested in. Wallace and whats going on there as mao and they are hopeful that that wallace is rise as improbable as it might be might be a of a different kind of policy from the west, from the u. S. Led west. So who knows . Right. I think they still would have had some kind of cold war. They would have still been there. Absolutely. Still would have been some war and conflict, as i was saying. But it could be it could have been a different pattern, but to really spell it out for you and to tell self. It would be better or worse than what we got thats thats where ill ask the political scientist or maybe maybe my fellow panelists or a best. Wallace is a visionary at worst who was politically naive. And someone once said about him, i dont know whether hes going to preach a sermon or what his part. I cant follow. I have no yes. And because we dont want to end on that note, lets go to our host, tom schwartz. Ask a question here here. So we know hoover was very clear eyed about communism and Central Government and their weakness was. We also know that during world war one, his successful efforts at feeding noncombatants in an occupied area, and then after war, fighting to feed civilian where western powers disagreed with the i mean, france, britain. Wilson wanted to punish for the war. And hoover said, you know, you dont take that out on on the civilian population and push to get food there and then even the russian famine as much as he disliked liked the bolsheviks, he was willing to feed a population. So to that extent, i mean, was this idea in world two to feed poland and finland crazy . And then in the postwar old world, when truman reached out, pulled them back. I mean, it seemed that it was hoovers reputation and that carried the most weight with civilian populations and Eastern Europe and in other areas. So, you know, to what extent we weigh that against kind of the harsh realities of people like, stalin and mao that are pretty cold creatures, i a comment i mean if i could start i mean i think its useful to be reminded that his plan to aid occupied europe, lets say, in 1939 and 1940, was of course, adamantly opposed by the british. Its important to be reminded of its important to be reminded of of role and to some extent helping, shall we say, urge, midwife the us into the war in a way that that hoover probably was was, i think, rightfully concerned about. I mean, frankly, if you even look, the origins of the uss so effectively it was a british operation. I mean a lot of their greatest concoctions the the famous map showing hitlers plans to conquer the western hemisphere was just you know, drawn up by a couple of british bohemian spies, was an utter fabrication. You know, i think hoover and he struck these notes in his own book, the magnum opus. And i think its important to be reminded. I think its one of the reasons why it is such an book. We do need to reconsider these things that we have thought are sacred. And again, i know its not popular to question the special relationship and the sacred nexus. And roosevelt and churchill and all of these sacred cows that i take such delight in poking. And i often annoy people when i do so. But its important to reconsider, revisit all these things. I think all of the i think hoovers approach, it was strategic restraint or focusing on the humanitarian needs and interests. This is a great story that i uncovered relating to wild bill donovan, founder of the ss, was sent on one of these kind of rogue missions effectively. He was supposedly working for roosevelt, but it was the british, you know, the British Secret service, the british navy and air force that had flying him around in this tour of the mediterranean. And theres a whole story and over briefly alludes to it where he goes to greece and then he goes up to yugoslavia and he more or less sucks yugoslavia into war with these kind of vague promises that at some point the us will look favorably on you if you stand up to hitler now and course german troops are next door and and theres a coup basically engineered by the british and the americans and yugoslavia gets crushed. I mean, i think countries like i talked to, i talked to a number of poles in an event at the National Press club, a few years ago. And i was to some extent felt bad because they have this kind of sacred clause that theyre always talking about first to fight, first to fight, first to resist. And i pointed out. Well, thats very admirable. And you can admire the honor and the courage but sometimes statesmanship requires different virtues, different kinds of skepticism. And you should have looked with the colder eye at what france and britain were actually you versus what they were willing to do for you. Yes, it sounds great. The us will support you after the war, but whats happening now . In 1941 with german troops next door . I think hoover would have exercised far restraint and in all of these case. So so the comment was sorry, this is and he wants to get permission to visit vichy france and the french and ankaras uncovered him saying something about how he would gladly starve out all the people of france rather than submit to hitler and this is when france had a vichy government and the u. S. Had relations with frances vichy government. We forget this, too. And they denied him a visa once they had heard that donovan was willing to starve every last willing french man, woman and child for the interests of u. S. Strategy and geopolitics, etc. Hoover always kept those things in mind. And i think i think thats important and underrated quality and statesman, you know, to think through the real and the potential consequences of any of these decisions. You making promises faraway countries that we dont have the capacity to protect. I think ukraine is unfortunately a tragic case of this junk. John maynard made a comment after the paris peace conference. Hoover is the only person that left the conference with an enhanced reputation. But hoover realized one thing, and that is important food is in preventing the spread of bolshevik ism. And he was very careful in the allocation of food and they said we told the bolsheviks quickly when they were thinking of taking over austria that food shipments will depend on the democratic government. Theyre going to pipe in a word about that, at part of your question time, when dealing with the occupied europe idea, i mean, its was something that i mean, had domestic dimensions as well as Global Dimensions for for hoover. I mean, fdr immediately rejected the idea too it was the british they were important partizans reminding us because of course they would breach the blockade of germany, which was their main strategy for dealing with nazi before they landed troops. But it also from fdr point of view, i dont think it took it took a genius to say well if hoovers idea to happens and it works well, it elevates hoover suddenly and makes the rest of us look like, you know, hawkish you know, uncaring machiavellian types. So but the hoover argument, at least, that he could replicate what happened in world war one, right, in belgium and, elsewhere, that they could put enough controls the ground to ensure, of course, anticipated some slippage would happen, that the germans would get some of the food. But at least you know the documents ive been and the accounts that they had a they could somehow repeat what they did in world war one as far as befriending some german generals and and getting them to admit even sometimes their own atrocities that were unrelated to humanitarianism. But whether such a thing would be possible again in World War Two, nazi germany, nazi germany, i think thats a really another interesting counterfactual. Could germany in world war you know that that area was not the same germany as in the 19 tens. And so this is this is why so so this is where i think its really worth trying to think. I think it was a effort by hoover. I think he might have had results. But i think its important as historians to try to always remember how to think how feasible it might be. And im of always trying to square and think, well, hoover is also really hes kind of credit to for being a naive politician, not a really good one, but he had a lot experience and he learned as he went over time. As someone told me once, even about some of the biggest arguments im making with members about korea and japan, he said, look, hoover has all the ideas you have. Youre about remember, hes also a creature of washington. He understands how the bureaucracy works and he understands how politics works. So when hes pushing for causes, he always has an eye to on on on on the battle for Public Opinion and his own reputation. So, so so he would sometimes one has to think how how sincere is he even in this advice hes giving with these crusades . Hes pushing. But i think hes sincere enough. I said for me least i see, but i do see sometimes there is a machiavellian side to what hoover does as well. So i will add a footnote and it will be and in note, which is that were talking about were talking about and thought about in poland and in finland were talking. But theres also greece, right . So in 1942, greeces occupied by germany and starvation looms and its a group of ox, mostly teachers, professors, oxford dons who get together and they begin to discuss the british can do about this. And they what we today call oxfam the Oxford Committee for famine relief and their inspiration and in part their model for this is the commission for relief. Belgium Herbert Hoover crb. So that you didnt know that were going to end there. I want to thank you all for hanging in and i thank our panelists pso today were goinge moving from the colonial era which weve been talking about into talking about the praeli in any way to the revolution, the tensions that come out of the colonial wars more than the colonial wars. And so this is a sort of transition class period. Were