Transcripts For CSPAN3 Discussion 20240703

If people could take a sheet, please. Our second panel, the unofficial view, with us is eric, formerly of the office of trade representatives. The associate director of the managing foundation, this afternoon, so thank you for that. It is a great pleasure to work with you. And the fellow and director of Academic Affairs and my colleague here at ke i. The first panel, made each of you could give a description of what you were saying is the most important thing for people to know about the camp david meeting. Eric, do you want to start . Eric happy to. First of all, i want to thank kei and mansfield for allowing me to participate in this very timely discussion, and i really appreciated the first panel as well. I think our government colleagues probably do not want to brag as much as they should about what was a, during the trilateral summit, but i do think it was remarkable, both a symbolic and a substantive standpoint. I think people dont necessarily appreciate just how difficult it is to reach all of these agreements, to enter socialized cooperation across the security and economic agenda of important issues, for the three countries, in the context of all the challenges, particularly in the japankorea relationship which are well understood and which we began to delve into in the q a in the previous panel. I think it was remarkable what has been accomplished over the past several years, and particularly over the past year with the leadership and courage in tokyo and seoul enabling this kind of collaboration to even being realistic. Yet if i want to make a little of institutionalization that has been accomplished in this meeting. We now have commitment from great countries from the three countries to have annual lateral summit between the leaders and annual trilateral cabinet level meetings among all of the major security and economic officials of the three countries. Im frightened the amount of work for folks in government who have to staff all of these trilateral initiatives, but it is all worth the investment of effort from the three countries, and i think the joint statements really reflected the increasing scope of the multi dimensional cooperation that is so important to all three countries, so i look forward to the discussion. Mr. Tokola that is a good point. The press conference was about the fact that the president and the secretary of state and defense, but this will be very interesting. What is your take away . Yeah. Can you hear me . Great. So first of all, the Mansfield Foundation is happy to jointly host this event with kei. It has been great working with you, mark, and your team. Dear question, thats to your question, i went to committed to your question, i want to commend the leaders. The meeting is unprecedented and it was really unthinkable just two years ago. I think there have been many effort, as we heard from the previous panel, efforts behind it here in the last couple of years in each country, but i think leader really stepped up and took some action to really seize the unparalleled opportunity that is described in the spirit of camp david at the right time to make this summit happen. First of all, i think this is historic. It is all great news. I think it is important to note that the scope of this summit goes beyond the korean peninsula. It goes beyond the immediate pressing 30 cents in the region. This was not only about discussing these regional concerns but it was about creating an important precedent. It was a Trilateral Partnership, elevating it to a broader level. It was an effort to individualize this partnership and to establish some kinda of initial, strong, and durable framework. And it was an effort to make it last beyond the current administrations, as the word forever, and others, for generations to come, were heard. I want to add the timing of the summit were also significant, emphasized by the commitment to consult. This explicitly underscores the importance for the United States to work with allies. As opposed to walking away from them which would make the u. S. The current so i think this would them which, would make the u. S. Weaker. Mr. Tokola President Biden use that word forever, too, which is a very serious commission. Thank you also to the Mansfield Foundation for partnering with kei. I dont think i would disagree with my fellow panelists, but i want to pump the brakes a little bit. There has been a superlative soup, new ever, new chapter. Nobody said end of history, im glad. [laughter] i dont think there is a reason to bill it as that, for the reasons that have been mentioned, which i will not who, but i do think we have to be careful, though, about setting up Unrealistic Expectations paid i think expectation management moving forward is going to be really. I get this is not a onetoone comparison, but we were engaged in historic diplomacy with pyongyang years ago. Where did we stand today . It cannot be more different, and it is unique, i get it, but im highlighting it to say that two years ago, this would not be possible, because leadership changed, conditions changed. Leadership is going to change again, and additions are going to change again. So, you know, we have, of course, we have our own election, and a possible multiple fell excuse me, alleged multiple fell in, who openly decries elizas, and i think a second term would lean more into that narrative,. But i think the Biden Administration is trying their best to move this forward, so it has not been is visualized yet. That will take time. I think, frankly, decades. But i think seth was right to point out National Security advisor sullivans expression of this is Building Momentum and potentially inertia. I added potentially myself. I think those are keywords, because they denote movement and access. Inertia of course you against forces that challenge the arrangement. So i think that is very clear right from i think that is where the language is good and can help, but i think it is also important to remember, and i will stop after this remark, is that, i guess the joint fact sheet that maybe some of the other documents, but im still parsing over, mentioned, they were this did not occur in a vacuum. There are existing relationships, existing as additions. They are building on these, and they said they affirmed excuse me, reaffirmed existing understandings and affirmed new ones. So, again, they are building on an architecture that exists, but it will, you know, and counter rocky soles in the future. Mr. Tokola i want to clarify, kei is an independent, nonpartisan organization. I would like to say, at the matter among privatesector friends, i would like to be a conversation, so be sure to talk to each other, too, and interrupt. Sayuri that i will. [laughter] i said this is an attempt. Mr. Tokola ok. Eric, most of the press conference out of camp david, the you think the economic parts were underreported . Eric thanks for the question. I do think, and many ways, the reporting was accurate, as with all highlevel me like this, they always have limited bandwidth. In a former life and i was the director for asi Economic Affairs ata the National Security counciln and was involved in planning and preparing for a variety of the president s participation in different agent summits asian summits, and it is a brutal process to tell all of the agencies which are critical deliverables left on the cutting room floor before meetings of this kind. So i think it is unsurprising that the focus was on a cooperation initiatives with a major focus on the National Security agendas, the commitment to consult, the rule association the institutionalization of trilateral organizations, including these joint military exercises, the creation of new dialogue, regular highlevel dialogue channels, focusing on these National Security issues. All that i think is unsurprising and appropriate. But there was some discussion of Economic Issues and some elevation and institutionalization of discussions of the economic agenda. It should be said that much of this economic agenda was characterized by the merging of economic and Security Priorities into the sort of broad Economic Security policy basket. So a lot of the discussion, supply chain security, ensuring the safeguarding of critical and emerging technologies, together to create Early Warning mechanisms to identify threats to critical supply chains, enhancing cooperation to respond to those threats, including potentially to economic coercion. And the subtext of all of this is an effort to trilateral eyes cooperation on export controls and other potential mechanisms to deal with technology leakage that could undermine National Security. There was no less than action of up in investment reviews, which of course the u. S. Has just issued the executive order, beginning the establishment of a upend investment reviews, which i think the topic was discussed among officials. The significance of these issues, albeit largely through the framing of Economic Security as opposed to what many of us use to work on it Economic Issues in the u. S. Government, which was trade and investment, liberalization and promotion, after which there was, again, not surprisingly, relatively little discussion. Mr. Tokola asking about the difference in why do we need the policy. In the trump administration, everything is bilateral. Under the Biden Administration, everything is multilateral. Is that a return to normal, or is multilateral something new . Eric well, i think it is, in many ways, part of a longstanding evolution of u. S. Policy, particularly policies intended to strengthen our ability to affect outcomes in the indo pacific, as we now refer to it, and also to respond to the challenges proposed by china. I think there is a growing understanding that it requires broad coalitions and broad partnerships to address the sort of multifaceted security challenges in the region. So trilateral initiatives with key partners like japan and korea is very much a natural effort. Of course, the Biden Administration had a particular motivation, to focus on both bilateral and multilateral alliance, maintenance activities, because of the trump administration, which was, in most ways, quite hostile to multilateralism, with the exception of a few things, like the quad. But i do think it is a return to an existing trajectory but an important augmentation of an effort. Clint just very briefly, i want to give my colleague credit for these, because he talks about the speed when we talk about these mechanisms that were rightly mentioned, they really cannot be effectuated without european participation, so it really does, the nature of the issues go beyond the trilateral, right . Which i think is helpful, too, to remind ourselves of. Mr. Tokola the press conference after the summit, they talked about security. I dont recall hearing much of anything about Climate Change. Does that because theres already so much cooperation on Climate Change . Sayuri in a press conference, there was no mention of that, but the Climate Crisis was mentioned in the joint statement and in the camp david principles , there was a joint Commission Commitment to cooperating and addressing Climate Change. I think it is good that it was there, but there was no elaboration, no further elaboration on how nations would be collaborating on that front. And i think the Biden Administration, especially in the last two years, has made some important progress, to work more closely bilaterally with japan and was north korea to address Climate Change. But we have yet to see how these three countries will need to be will include this area in this trilateral framework. And it will be interesting to see how japan and south korea will be working together on that front. Of course, all three countries have shared interest in Energy Security, especially promoting alternative sources of energy, generation use of natural gas, so the discourse around Energy Security is definitely linked to Climate Change policy, but at the end of the day, i think the specific summit was an effort to establish a first record of trilateral cooperation on a much broader level, and a higher level, Prime Minister kishida repeated multiple times, multilayer cooperation, so i am interested to see what the bilateral initiative we will see develop in the coming years. Also, how do they align their Climate Change targets . And especially how to consult for any joint messaging on that. Mr. Tokola ok. This lends to your expertise to answer a question a lot of people are asking, and japansouth korea relations, does meeting change relations, or is it a point in a cycle of up and down relations . Sayuri definitely the latter, a high point in a cycle of up and down relations. I think the historical relations are here to stay. They are lingering, they are not going away anytime soon, or ever. I think it will be really, really difficult for historical issues to be resolved. And i think the legal questions regarding forced laborers that has been the media really hinted at that this solved it, but actually it is not solved. It is still partial. There is still so much to talk about. And bilateral relations are the weak link here. I think the biggest threat to sustaining this japansouth Korea Partnership is the domestic public in each of the countries, including the u. S. , for the trilateral part of this discourse. Of course, the Position Party and south korea is very vocal about anything that president yoon does and they are describing president yoon, as a way to suppress korean independence and getting closer to the u. S. And japan. So theres a lot a very loud discourse in south korea and i think in japan as well. Prime minister kishida, his Approval Rating they are is 50 , very low. I mean come in his Approval Ratings i mean, his Approval Ratings are very high. People in japan are probably not thinking that much about Foreign Policy. So it will depend on domestic, public, public and polarized politics in all three countries, i think, and especially in japan and korea. Mr. Tokola people say that these issues are generational, that they will soften with time. History stays with you. It does not fade with generations. Saying the past is never dead it is not even past. Sayuri yeah. I think it is good that history stays with us, but i the same time, there is so much polarization politicization on all sides. They hit an emotional chord in the public. Clint can i just jump in . I think it was proven, and you mentioned in the press conference afterwards, that they are trying to create a bridge between the legal issues in the court cases and the higher level sorted diplomatic agreements. But to sayuris point, and is maybe what you were alluding to, there are still lots of cases and korean courts that are working their way up. Some will get to the supreme court. This is not going away in peoples minds. They are going to be pertinent legal questions that have outcomes that have to be dealt with. And you have the leadership this is before the trilateral summit of the opPosition Party in south korea that said that yoon is moving the country one step closer not an exact quote, but the flag once again flying over sovereign and korean territories. It gets politicized, and that is not going away. Sayuri that is what i was alluding to. [laughter] you are right. There will be, after this meeting, the summit, after the summit, there will be some news about that. Clint theyve already spoken. Sayuri right. Yeah. So many levels of the court in korea. They are always trying to emerge, and they are not going away. Eric if i just jump in on that point again, i unfortunately have to agree with all of those cautionary comments, but i do think there is value in the institutionalization of the highlevel dialogue mechanisms, because it increases the costs, the diplomatic costs for korea for undertaking a particular policy shift. I would think that it should have at least some mild impact in the sort of decisionmaking process of the relevant government officials, the korean court, and the public and other stakeholders, in thinking about all of the disruption that is caused when there is a breakdown in relations caused by the handling of these particular types of cases. And i can say that, having spent some time in seoul and tokyo, as im sure my colleagues have during the downturn, it was really terrible. The lack of trust and the inability to move forward with a host of ongoing cooperation, either government to government or disruptions to business and commercial relationships, it is really significant. So i think anything that can be done to try and create a buffer but also to make explicit the cost of handling this issue in a way that causes another major disruption in the relationship. And i think the other aspect that, you know, everyone should consider is the state of feeling to have the timed, coordinated security responses to the challenges faced, north koreas challenge with the continuing provocations from the dprk, with a Missile Program and Ongoing Nuclear weapons program. But many of the serious issues in the region more generally, including those relating to chinas activities in the South China Sea and the taiwan straits. These are important issues to all three countries, and theres a lot that can be lost when the wheels come off. The bilateral and now the Trilateral Partnership going forward. Mr. Tokola very high level right now. Theres a mutual attraction between korea and japan, a complex relationship. Lets turn to indo pacific variable geometry, to use that term, aipac and other things, how does the koreachina arrangement fit into that . Eric um, i think in your initial questions, you phrased it as developing relations, which is the right way to put it. Aipac, of course, is the oldest. This also points to the academic in me. Longstanding historical studies about how institutionalized it is in the atlantic and how uninstitutionalized the asiapacific, what we now refer to as the indo pacific. There are various reasons for this, but the difference different institutions you mentioned, on one hand, a genuine effort to create this sort of latticework of institutions that do have overlap in some ways but also quite distinct in other areas, to uphold a degree of order and normalcy in the region. But i think it is also a clear indication of how much the International Order has eroded. It is not just the latest indication of the under institutionalization in the region. His art about. It is part that. But i think it is an intense, focused effort to build is insufficient, because the norms they are trying to hold are very much under challenge. Obviously, the trilateral arrangement as to these, but, you know, i would say, there are issues, information sharing, and other things, and we looked at when it was announced, there were lots of editorials, lots of praise, but then i got down to the brass tacks of implementation, and they are having trouble. I dont think they are having trouble actualizing it. They probably will. I say this, mark, bringing the lens down just to the bilateral peace. So on the level of architecture and military exercises could when you look at the u. S. South korea alliance, there has been a real evolving alphabet soup of complicated measurements of the alliance of the most recent establishment, and each of those mechanisms was billed as addressing and affirming commitments to certain issues, that would tight region moving forward. That would tighten cooperation moving forward. Within we needed no mechanisms, because the previous ones were not doing the trick. That doesnt mean this is halting progress, i think it means they there are fits and starts. You have the existing trilateral talks. Those were established in 2008 4 2009, if im not mistaken. This continued even for the nadi of relationsr and 2018, 2019. They existed, conditions changed, they reenergized these things, maybe they added new architectures above them. I would expect the new dialogue that comes out of this. When it comes to military exercises, they can deepen cooperation, coordination. A lot of people will talk about the alliance as the most combined and operable alliance in the world. More study this claim, the more i noticed a lot of gaps. Even some that do not necessarily talk to one another, depending on how they utilize that. Even so, that combined alliance is for more combined than the u. S. Force in japan, that is not combined at all, it is a parallel structure. Now we are talking about tightening between the three when there are still gaps in the bilateral pieces. So it is a parallel effort, right . They need to strengthen on both sides, bilateral. But there are real even technical barriers to deepening cooperation, sort of Realtime Data share. Think about this in broad terms. They are doing it, now we have momentum and are agreeing to do it. But there are existing challenges that, you know, getting into the weeds, which i will not going to do here, to realize. It you start to see where the vulnerabilities are. And of course to patch those up. Very longwinded. The supply chains are part of the dialogue of the National Security also. These organizations all play unique and hopeful roles or are they competing . Sayuri i think i agree with you , clint feared every Multilateral Partnership is a different. Every multilateral relationship has different purposes. I think the most recent by promoted by the Biden Administration comes from the fn came into power wanting to show alliances are in interest of the u. S. They need to prioritize that potential. I think this is going to be a key trilateral form that is going to add for the other multilateral. I think japan in recent years has really worked very hard to create more partnerships that go beyond the u. S. Japan alliance. With europe, eu, a whole other set of countries because japan now realizes throughout the administration that japan can be more powerful if it expands this relationship. It goes beyond the u. S. Japan alliance appeared i think japans International Order is multilateral inclusive. I think that is what japan is also trying to do. It used to be if you have International Organization you try to put together. All of these new organizations are freefloating. This is a part of it. Atlantic and in the end of Pacific Theater in the Atlantic Theater seems to be less true when you have the ukraine and places with china going on. A lack of intervention of trade promotion, which i think are asian in the Pacific Partners would like to see. It is not a replacement for the tpp, this trade becomes less relevant in this era. The Biden Administrations in in the pacific strategy. This is a painful question for me. I used to work at a time when we were very focused on a strengthening of the multilateral rulesbased trading system. But also pursuing a robust agenda with the partners around the world, including in the asiapacific. I do think it is a very serious challenge to the Biden Administration, but not just the Biden Administration. This is a challenge for the United States because of the deterioration of a bipartisan support for trade liberalization generally and for Free Trade Agreement as a mechanism to obtain new markets for u. S. Goods, to strengthening Global Trading rules and to create more enduring positive economic relationships with our partner. There was a strategic and diplomatic mandate for pursuing trade agreements in the past. Because of this, bipartisan deterioration and support for free trade, we can no longer utilize those mechanisms. I think that is a serious challenge. It manifested earlier with the wto. The two run aground many years earlier for multilateral trade liberalization. The failure of a general lack of energy for trade negotiations i think reflected failing support among key members of the International Trading system. I think the unique challenges posed by talent china as well. I think that was a serious issue. It is something that has metastasized to the enforcement agenda for wto. The wto is no monger functioning to enforce wto rules on its membership because of the and ability to perform and create a Firm Foundation for the wto litigation system. That i think is the second sort of failing of the wto system. There seems to be very little appetite, certainly in washington. I think there is sort of failing ambition globally to sort of save the wto, which puts pressure on all of the other mechanisms by which countries can create and trade rules, create level playing fields or address some of the negative externalities and also promoting liberalization with interested parties. The United States has a very robust trade and economic agenda , but is in the area of Economic Security as we discussed. I think we have a limited agenda with respect to promoting trade liberalization and therefore limited leverage to push for a seat at the table and a writing a whole host of trade rules that used to go with these fda negotiations where we offer a very substantial caret of improved access to the u. S. Market. When we do not offer that anymore it becomes difficult to incentivize your trading partners to agree to a set of rules that are not necessarily consistent with their domestic rules and seizures, procedures or necessarily in the interest of some of the key stakeholders. We lost that opportunity as exemplified by the decision by the trump administration. Enduring unwillingness by either party to meaningfully pursue a set of renewal trade Promotion Authority and a renewal of our fta agenda. I think it is a serious deficiency in u. S. Policy. It is one that both parties need to consider seriously, unfortunately not until our next election cycle. I notice President Biden, his last two statement addresses never used the word trade. The Biden Administration continued the trump administrations restrictions. It was the u. S. Pacific fleet commander. A audience asked during our q a what is your biggest concern. Just to chime in on that. It would probably have the opportunity to talk to senior u. S. Military leaders in the past to have said things like, for example, admiral layer, another commander who said, tpp and trade liberalization of that kind by the United States more effectively to our partners in the region are a key part of the way we compete with china. It has this strategic dimension that we are losing out on. We have paid much less of a price in terms of our competition with china for influence in the region that we might have for a variety of reasons. One of them being the way that china has behaved in terms of its turn towards an increasing state dominated role in the economy after a period of liberalization and market orientation. As well as some increased perception of risk in participating in the chinese economy, some of which we help create through our sanctions and weaker force labored protection acts which raise the compliance cost. If we are going to do business with chinese partners, some of it was chinas own policies creating vast uncertainty about what constitutes as National Security information that you can be prosecuted under the espionage act in china for what we would consider normal Market Research or commercial information gathering activities in china. China is in the midst of what appears to be a significant slowdown in the economy that could be sustained over some time. We have paid less of a price in terms of the relative appeal of economic collaboration with china versus the u. S. It does not mean we are making a strategic era in the way we are engaging in this trade policy. Mr. Tokolo anytime we change the subject. Quick question before i turn to the audience. The chinese criticism of the trilateral arrangement. They say the u. S. Is moving to contain china. You can see those arrangements being made in the end of pacific. How do you see it, is it containing china . Clint i do not think containment is the right word. The world is not the late 40s anymore. There are blocks to a degree. There are different poles. The interconnections are too multivarious and deep to talk about containment in terms of there being a wall. There is no doubt that the u. S. Policy it has been happening over several years increasing of late a recognization there is a confrontation with the people of china. We are exclusive about this. I do not know what more to say about that. I think the Biden Administration isnt doing its best to try to put a floor under how bad things get, try to identify areas to collaborate cooperate. There is no doubt that this is the strategic rivalry confrontation use of our time. I do not see that changing in my lifetime. Mr. Tokolo if that is the case, wouldnt it be good to have countries who are not a part of the two blocks with bridges between them . It feels like people are being forced to choose between the u. S. And china. Sayuri about the comment of cold war mentality, that is something beijing has been saying for 20 years. They always react with the phrase. They are right. And its just like the cold war, this is cold war mentality. We should not condone. It is the same playbook we have been hearing for 20 years. Of course, i am not surprised. I feel like beijing, it is always very sensitive to these perceptions of other countries ganging up on china. I think it has been very vocal about it. From beijings point of view, i think it makes sense for them to frame it that way. I think japan and south korea have different concerns, security concerns throughout perceptions about china and japan, tokyo is really concerned about china as a main threat while korea is focused on the korean peninsula. I think last weeks joint statement was also an initial effort to show convergence in security concerns and Security Priorities. Which is reflected in the statements where the three countries jointly opposed any bilateral attempt to change the status quo without nominating china. I think it is a yes and a no for your question. I think you are exactly right. Clint the one novel think about the document, it did list specific chinese actions in their times claim. That language has appeared in u. S. Japan bilateral statements, but never before in trilateral statements. That is something to know. That is the first of my knowledge that the south korean government or any level has signed off on a statement that mention specific chinese actions, which are framed in the undermining these norms that we stand for. Mr. Tokolo i have a question rhetorically, i do not expect an answer. I do not take much for china to make a positive gesture. They would get a very good response. Most countries like to see some positive relationship with china. China does not make the effort. It is actually insulting. You see the world is being a g2 world. It does not matter what other countries think. Clint i think you can say the same thing with north korea too. Mr. Tokolo lets turn to the audience with questions. Thank you for this very interesting discussion. We talk a lot about the trilateral collaboration fits into the biden Foreign Policy in the region. I was wondering if any of the panelists have thoughts on how this trilateral formation fits into other regional groupings, specifically thinking about the china japan korea trilateral situation, which the administration said to hold some kind of meeting. I am also thinking about the things like. I was interested in the panels pops on this. Thoughts on this. Clint i will chime in on that one. I think japan and korea have an array of relationships that involve china, japan, korea ongoing summit process. The efforts to conclude the trilateral fta, cptt of course. China has expressed an interest in becoming a member. Both japan and korea has a tremendous equities in terms of their economic and diplomatic relationships with china. I think the willingness to deepen explicit security cooperation, including on a trilateral basis with the United States reflects a perception of china that goes back to some of the point you were raising about chinas behavior and how it has created a perception of threat in both seoul and tokyo. The view of the china is a growing market and opportunity to obtain economic benefit. It is worth whatever risks might be entailed through concluding binding trade agreements with china that lock you in to a particular trade and economic relationship with china. I think there has been a reevaluation of the repeal. It is not just the set of disruptions in the diplomatic relationships between korea and japan and china. It is also a reevaluation of what it means to have a deeper economic relationship with china and whether you want to make it more difficult to engage in the kind of the risking, that i think many of chinas trading partners are considering. This trilateral momentum with the United States is in a way up implicit assessment of the appeal of a is him or multilateralism trilateral is with china. Mr. Tokolo these relationships in the indo pacific are fluid. In fact, the u. S. Are meeting all the time and talking all the time. No one uses that word. That seems to exist also. There is a lot of variable geometry. Yes. I have two questions. The media mention about a third person at the summit, like american side in a sec. And south korean site it is the advisor. There is no mention about a third person at the summit. Is there any implement implementations about the third person in the summit . Clint i am not sure if i truly followed. The third person. They are different. All of them are not secretary advisor. Theres a secretary advisor for the south korea side. Is there any implications or signal . Clint i have no idea why certain individuals were chosen protocol lies. I think it does reflect annual lysing these meetings. Analyzing these meetings. It is a degree to make a more systematic framework. This is happening more regularly. I do not know if that answers your question. My short answer to your question is i do not know. Eric i do not think one should overrate the participation, delegations from each country. This is a leader summit. It was a short discussion between leaders. The outcome sort of created formal dialogue channels among the relevant senior officials from the three countries. I do nothing in particular agency is getting short drift in the trilateral. I think it is primarily specific reasons why the delegations were constituted the way that they were. I do not think it reflects. There is no secret meaning to the future of trilateral cooperation based on those participants i do not think. Mr. Tokolo my interpretation is the secretary of commerce was there because that was set up. She was there to try to help move that along to help put it in place. Back of the room. My question for anyone on the panel. My general question is, the results of the summit present creative opportunities for people to people Relationship Building and outside of Government Agencies Relationship Building . Clint yes. I actually think that bash. I think that a sum of the lowest hanging fruit. I think that is some of the lowest hanging fruit. It is easiest to achieve and easiest to sustain. That cohorts trilateral overtime in multiple different sectors. I think my colleague pointed out to me in the joint fact sheet, which i have not seen until this morning. They talked about working with the Johns Hopkins and other sort of nextgeneration programs. I think these are the sort of things that are opportunities there appeared at think that is where a lot of investments should go. We talked about the future as i talked about the future, the trilateral relationship is going to encounter, the more you lean into building generational relationships. The whole constituencies in these alliances in both countries that go back generations. When these relationships encounter difficulties, which they do, these are the groups that talk about these things. That talk to their folks in japan and korea. Justified two may be a doubtful u. S. Public specifically about why we need the relationships. This is why we need them and why they are important. Those are critical. Government elections happen. They come and go. Those ties, that is what handles relationships. Sayuri i was actually see that there was the decision after the summit, i mean in the summit to hold to strengthen ties between future generations for the three countries, leadership summit, womens Empowerment Initiative as well. This is a really good thing. This is something we all can work on. There should be i think it should be promoted and sponsored much more. We all sing with covid what happened with the interruption of travel of exchanges. Japan suffered immensely. The u. S. As well. I think that is why we need to work a lot about on this. This is what our community has. I think it is already a easy thing to do. It is also really fundamental to promote these trilateral initiatives. Eric i am constantly runningo people who have been mansfield fellows and had time to use in japan. These are the kinds of programs that build enduring ties and help build Mutual Understanding when times are difficult. I think doing that on a trilateral basis is very valuable. I think there will be many more examples of initiatives to promote people to people ties among the three countries that will emerge from these other dialogue mechanisms that were launched at the summit. I would endorse greater investment in all of those kinds of things. Thank you. I was struck in the press conference by the reference to Exchange Programs among National Laboratory spirit laboratories. My question [indiscernible] who has the most to gain from this summit. What is the most important benefit for correia korea. The one good thing that came out of the recent polls in south korea is that the country that koreans dislike the most is china and not japan anymore which i guess is a good thing for japan and korea relations. This debate about protocol and rivalry is something that matters especially in korea, but in japan as well among the japanese public. That is here to stay and we are going to have to deal with that drama. There is a lot of politicalization about all of that small details about that protocol and who the United States likes more. This is here to stay. Protocol is not idiotic. I did not mean it that way. I understand. Thank you all for joining us. Time has run out. The next event will be on august 30. You can find details on our website on kei. Org. Please join me in thinking everybody. [applause]