Good morning to everyone assembled here and those watching online and tuned into cspan one. We are delighted to be able to host this one hour session today and the release of the review. We are doing this today under the auspices of the csi says csis special thanks to my colleagues at csis. Special thanks to the csis Production Team putting this together. From dod, special thanks to jennifer nicholson. There has been a lot of support from dod in putting this together. The biodefense posture review a few minutes ago, we published here csis at csis, my colleague and i published a critical questions piece on the release of the bpr. Week my colleague and i also released a piece and it began by impacting unpacking many factors that feeds the pessimism that they will be little sustained against future path again eight pathogenic threats. And makes the case that there is reason for optimism and hope based on several factors, survey work that shows strong support for active American Government engagement in this area. The appointment of a new Senior Leadership team at the white house and the cdc and elsewhere, new capacities at the department of state at the white house and cdc and elsewhere. And the defect though bipartisan consensus despite the rancor and noise in the country to better protect americans in by investing in new technology. Most importantly, in our deliberations today and in the paper that michaela and i published, we made the case that the wheels of government continued to turn in generating new Security Strategies and new analyses like the bpr for improving the performance of the u. S. Government. This lays down a new hardwiring the budgetary needs and the oversight to ensure accountability. Special congratulations to assistant secretary Deborah Rosenblum and her colleagues who worked hard to generate this work. An urgency surround strengthen biodefense but it did take 21 months to complete the ppr b pr. This reflects the desire to achieve consensus across the institutions, the inevitable conflicts in a bureaucratic policies but it is out and the moment has arrived to accelerate implementation, the review is driven by the consensus we are here that the world of biodefense has changed profoundly and dod has to change accordingly. The bpr lays down a new paradigm around bio threats from note many directions. From accelerating changes in science itself and it creates new opportunities and acute dangers. We will hear more in this discussion around china and the question of what exactly is the threat that is posed, the bpr is careful in how it captures this and i think we will expect greater clarification as we move into the future as to visiting compliance is it in compliance or not, is it engaged in bio weapons programs. There are questions that emerge out of this that we have to think about which is, chinas larger environment is one where there is lots of active Research Partnerships between american universities and industry and others that are important in the life sciences. What becomes of them and what about our Bilateral Dialogue between the u. S. And china between the future threats . Is there facebook is there space for that . The bpr creates a new biodefense counsel. That institution is to bring about greater accountability, unity and ever and it begins its group its work and a the next coming days and is charged with preparing at action plan in the next 12 months, the speed and quality of its performance will be a critical task and longterm value of the bpr. Whether it becomes authoritarian authoritative, not just for new money of 812 million. There is a down payment in scaling the response and it will require a bipartisan consensus and action from congress and i believe that it is all possible. Dods biodefense activities continue to enjoy strong bipartisan support. They have not become overly politicized. It is my honor to introduce assistant secretary Deborah Rosenblum to open the discussion. She has a longstanding friend and colleague, a generous support and wisdom and expertise across many fields and has made a commitment to strengthening americas defenses and she serves as the assistant secretary of defense defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. She was the executive Vice President for the Nuclear Threat initiative and after we hear from her and her remarks, our moderator will moderate a roundtable with deborah and others and he will introduce him them. We will have time to hear from the audience here. Lets get moving, please join me in welcoming assistant secretary Deborah Rosenblum. [applause] deborah the morning thank you very much for that introduction. I want to thank creative v. Elenis for i want to think thank csis or hosting us today. I also want to thank csis for your collective teams patients. 24 months, it wasnt quite 24 months but 24 months later, we are here to discuss the results of the bio posture review and how our work at the Department Also fits well into the work of the National Security council and the white house under previously beth cameron and other doctors who are who is with us today in updating the National Find biodefense strategy as well as developing the Implementation Plan where dod played a significant role. As we begin our discussion of the bio posture review, i want to share with you my memory of the deputy secretary of defense asking me and my policy colleagues on day two following my confirmation to take on this daunting task. I was never alone in completing this task. I had wonderful partners through the department of defense within the military department along with the joint staff where dr. Friedrich was with a different hat on. We owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the individuals who are here today who let the bioposture review on a daily basis. Along with a doctor who is not with us this morning. I want to give a shout out to many of you here in the room as well as joining us virtually, your intellectual work you are doing as well as the intellectual capital that you brought to the discussions that were hosted by Johns Hopkins center for Health Security as well as m. I. T. Lincoln lab were instrumental in the beginning phases of our bioposture review in helping us to shape what were the key urgent issues we needed to get after as well as providing us insights and perspective of how to look at these things from a different way. When you read the following words in a better bpr report and you hear us repeating them often now only in today but the days to come, the department of defense and the nation are at a Pivotal Moment in biodefense. As we face a unprecedented number of complex threats, as outlined in the National Defense strategy and the National Biodefense strategy. The secretary of defense charge the department charged the department with being prepared to operate in a biological threat environment and to support the national bio biodefense enterprise both at home as well as abroad. Dod must implement the significant reforms outlined in the bioposture review to enable an resilient a resilient total force that determines the use of bio weapons, response nafta rapidly to natural outbreaks and maximizes biosafety and bio security for laboratories globally. We have no choice if we are to effectively government the National Security strategy and the National Defense strategy. The National Defense strategy speaks of the growing risks of chemical and biological threats in the context of the strategic competition with near peer competitors but we are not only concerned with china and russia. He must remain focused on the potential impact of existing and emerging biotechnologies that could be incorporated into any biological Warfare Program for purposes inconsistent with obligations under the biological weapons Convection Convention as well as action from nonstate actors. The National Defense strategy also highlights significant transboundary challenges associated with pandemics and naturally occurring diseases. These threats impact the readiness and the resilience of our military forces. Biodefense is no longer something that is the purview of just specialized units will have been traditionally worried about these threats. Integrated deterrence requires a combat credible force. Two b combat credible, the whole force must be capable of fighting through biothreats from being resilient. And being resilient. The bpr along with the National Biodefense strategy but it was also greatly informed by a number of Lessons Learned from covid19 pandemic response. The bpr outlines reform initiatives along four key lines of effort which i expect our panel to discuss today. The first, enhancing Early Warning and our understanding of emerging biothreats. What we call understand. Second, improving the preparedness of the total force, otherwise known as prepare and protect. Third, speeding the response to mitigate the impact on dod missions and the total force, otherwise labeled as mitigate. Final life finally, improving strategic coronation and collaboration to enhance biodefense. I very much want to emphasize the coordination and collaboration of effort. Collaboration line of effort. While i am relinquishing my title as coleader of the bpr, i am assuming a new one as steve mentioned as the executive secretary of the Biodefense Council, chaired by my boss, dr. Bill laplant. The Biodefense Council is charged with implementing key bpr key bpr performed and empowering be department to take a bilateral porch approach to biodefense stop we must biodefense. Integrating numerous roles and responsibilities through the Department Without it supplanting existing authorities. To serve as much more than an implementation committee. Even after the doctors exhaustive 18 months, we know there are significant topics that still need that we still need to continue to delve into, such as the medical readiness of the force. Although focused internally, the Biodefense Council mustve felt must facilitate better communication and work with all u. S. Advocate for biodefense, whether it is interagency, in academia, industry or among think takes tanks. We are at a Pivotal Point at biodefense. We must maintain our momentum to prepare for complex potential biological threat. At dod, this means continuing our biodefense efforts to support the National Defense strategy with its three primary focuses on integrated deterrence, campaigning and building enduring advantages. We must maintain this focus. We owe it to our total force and to continue to advocate and defend the Critical Resources that the department is requesting. We also need to collaborate on improvement across the National Biodefense enterprise. This work is fundamental and critical to the National Defense and National Security. With that, i want to think csis thank csis for this wonderful opportunity not only today but with continued cooperation and with that, i look forward to the panel discussion. [applause] good morning and thank you for the opening comments. It is my pleasure to invite our panelists this morning. The executive director of the Bipartisan Commission of the biodefense. Among their many distinguished commissioners are former congresswoman susan brooks and peggy hamberg, former fda commissioner who is a commissioner at csis. They used to be a senior before she worked with the House Committee of homeland security. She was a servicemember in the u. S. Army. Brandi band is the principal for nuclear, defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. She has held many leadership positions. She was awarded for her innovations in contact detecting contaminated battlefield. Next is richard johnson, the deputy policy, he was at the new beer Threat Initiative and also at the state department where he was the deputy lead coronary coordinator for rand nucleated or nuclear coordination. Welcome to all of you. Deborah, thank you for your opening comments. Lets take the history back and you mentioned that the u. S. Has been involved in conflict operations in every declared pandemic in the 20th and 21st century. Thus go back to 9 11, the anthrax attacks in broadened the spectrum of attacks in the u. S. Between that anthrax attacks the anthrax attacks and the covert outbreak, georges commission started the csis are strengthening americas Health Security, we were looking at what would happen in the United States should there be an out flake an outbreak of a disease. Covert happen and relative to dod, an Aircraft Carrier that was taken out of service in guam, there is exercises were counseled. Operation warp speed, the Successful Ground that brought vaccines to the four were heavily supported by dod access, not only in the science world but in the logistics world. The military support civilian activities with logistics and medical support in hospitals and Vaccination Centers across the country, and a large support of civilian effort and military labs were supporting other labs in diagnosing and finding out what was going on. A lot of work in the military and supporting our civilian colleagues. The question is, the title of the paper is prescient. The worst is over, now what . How do we keep the momentum going . What is next and in your paper, you said you are going to assess the biothreats to our country through 2035, taking a good look at that, we have looked at the threats from other countries. We will talk about that. We want to get into the areas of what is new and you mentioned a Tipping Point and i have to believe that some of those Tipping Points have to do with the advances in bioengineering, the advances in artificial intelligence. Let me say to you, what would you like to add from your opening comments about why now for the bpr . What caused secretary carson to write a memo saying we need to look we we need to look at what we are doing within dod . Sec. Rosenblum let me make a few take off and then turned to my colleague and i would like to hear from dr. George and all of the work the Bipartisan Commission has been doing. When secretary austin put out his memo, but we had just lived through from a pandemic perspective was vivid and front in center and center in everyones minds. While that was a critical piece, we were at a point where we could have learned the long wrong lessons. We could have learned the lessons come up from a dod perspective, are forcibly standing the difficulties, it was ok. The readiness did not go down but what it was happening at the same time was the development and the publishing of the National Defense strategy, where, as i talked about with a focus on the near peer competitors but with those in the biodefense enterprise, we are compensated of the ongoing and accelerating pace of revolutionary technologies in science as well as convergence in bringing other disciplines into this area. It led us to fundamentally relook what types of threats our forces could encounter and how prepared are we against those. That is what the secretary of defense was asking. We know what we have done out of covid but what does this mean for us over the next 1015 years and required us to take a sober look at that as part of the review. Dr. Cullison you commented on your near peer competitors as you put it. What are the threats outside of dod from other countries and are the organizations . We know from the state Department Part five verification and Compliance Report that russia and north korea are have active defense programs and china and iran have programs of concern. I would say also, it would be foolish for us to think that just these four countries have decided they are getting involved and that is it. That makes sense from a proliferation standpoint in terms of the floor of a region of weapons and proliferation of peer. Fear. Once people set of these programs and the word gets out, surrounding countries Pay Attention and we would hope that they would say, we need to establish defense of programs cannot be sure that they are going to i would tell you that we have to be concerned about other countries jumping in and trying to develop or obtain biological weapons as well so i think that is one thing and the other is we have talked about force protection and enabling our war fighters to be able to operate in a contaminated battlefield. It is not just war fighters standing there with legs surrounding them. It is a complicated situation. Youre talking about ppe and people covered from head to toe and filters that wear out after a couple weeks but we need to we think we need to keep them in those set for longer than that and there is logistical pieces behind that md at enemy fact and the enemy is aware of this. Behind that and the enemy is aware of this. Taking advantage of the perceived or real vulnerabilities is a threat that is specific to the biological threat and the third thing i would say, we have multiple things going on in the world at once, we have 10 plus pandemics affecting the u. S. All by itself got to mention everyone else. Not to mention everyone else. We have accidents occurring with releases from facilities and we have the biological weapons program. All of them are occurring at the same time and they overlap. On top of all of that and throughout that, we have dod, the united it is incredibly complicated and not at all the same as other spreads. It is not the same as nuclear. It is not the same as chemical. It is not the same as the explosive thread. On top of that, we had a session yesterday which focused on biosafety and bio security. The comment was made that it bio security goals were going to be rude read, china needs to be part of the answer. How do we say china is a pacing threat when we worry about those things they might do to us, but yet we need to Work Together with china and other areas . How do we manage that . Absolutely. First of all, thank you for having us here. It is an important moment. I think one of the key outcomes of the bpr was this escutcheon that was said, this is not an issue just for the United States deal with it is an issue for all of us deal with locally. Certainly, with our allies and partners. Frankly, with those who are not our allies and partners. The p. R. C. The administration has been clear at the outset that we are prepared to and want to cooperate with the p. R. C. In areas where it is in our joint interest, and that is on things like the pandemic preparedness, so, we have started which that door open, and i think security visors has spoken about this in the context of art control and tjx stability and putting guardrails on the relationship between the United States and the prc did i would put these issues in that pocket. Certainly, we continue to be interested in having a dialogue with beijing on the issues and make sure we understand where we are coming from. Unfortunately, the response we have gotten to the release of this posture review was basically an influx of this and misinformation about what the United States is doing. On bio issues. I will repeat them because they are not true, but just to say, we have heard this for. We are focused on exactly what the document says which is to prevent and protect and mitigate against impacts around the world and to understand what the threat is. We want to have a discussion based on the fact, and based upon reality. We also have robust discussions and need to have more of that with our allies and partners this reminds us, we talked about covid and anthrax, but countries like russia have also reminded us globally that these threats have not gone away and are still there and are growing, so arson work you and are growing, so arn work you rain in terms of making sure we have pbe, or the ability to downgrade intelligence to their concerns about false flag operations, all of these figures are from the beginning of the conflict, and we have an example that they did the policy which is outdated to reflect these threats. We are pleased to see the u. K. Has released a new bio defenserelated. Meant as we are doing this is that we do dialogues that i lead with our allies in south korea. So, this is something we know we need to do more of in the United States did as you said we need to do it through things like the health and security agenda. We want to talk about this. We will talk to many other nations as well. Something that you need to remember is that as technology is advancing the barrier to entry to do unique bio experimentation, bio develop met, it also means we are seeing a increased risk read with the rise of laboratories doing highrisk life science research, we really also need to look at biosafety and security worldwide how the department, the u. S. Can shape those conversations to protect not only from those accidents occurring, but broadly the global Health Security. Those are things we also need to make sure we are having broad conversations about what is bio Risk Management look like, and how do we affect lee address i have safe the empires 30. Lets give ahead to how we do that. The Reduction Agency has a program, and one of the goals is to do exactly that read with earners around the world. How does that work . How does the trt p trt increase safety and add to the bio surveillance efforts we have to figure this out . I will start. There is btr. And there is more. There is a policy related to our Reduction Program which many of you know is sits outside the lobby. It is appropriate that we talk about that. And, that program really has grown over three decades of experience. Many of you think of the program as thinking about the former soviet state, concerned about Nuclear Weapons, missiles, chemical weapons, missiles, chemical weapons. But really, in terms of the second phase, after 9 11, expanded globally, now you conduct a Strategic Review which we are informally calling 3. 0. It really is focused on the return and concerns of global competitors and actors. But also, more crosscutting concerns about things like pandemics. Things like cyber. We bio data that is more a concern that we need to think about. And making sure that we havent even more global scope around the world to address these issues. I came back from a week on the continent of africa, and a couple of other places in south africa and kenya, and ethiopia where bp already is doing this work. We are providing support for bio security, biosafety, and that is not just making sure you have gates and guns, but also how you do cybersecurity. How you take sure you are focused on being trained. This is surprising to folks. You look at the title, you go to africa. It is important because you have a lot of these labs around the world, and you want to have no axonal releases that they are speaking of. The last thing i will say is we are looking at how to disband our scope expand our scope broadly, but this is only one piece of the puzzle. There are other programs that dod and other countries agencies oversee in this regard, and maybe we want to speak to that. The Services Also have a lot of laboratory overseas. Through the cooperation, as partner with our allies, partners with our regions, with those laboratories existing, it is opening a conversation to how we can effectively partner with those countries and how we can talk about laboratory safety, appropriate research, and understand the potential risk of exploring certain types of areas , unique or highrisk life science work. We recognize from the standpoint that we need to enhance the conversation. We need to utilize those opportunities, and those Research Cells we have across the globe. To generate more of that conversation worldwide. It also is part of our program. Our r d programs to engage with our allies and partners to talk about what is the appropriate type of research to do, and how we ensure safety and security in terms of the dod and proliferate a discussion. There is a challenge here. That is even in our own country, we have a perception that dod has trillions of dollars at its disposal, and it can do everything and he can do everything or everybody. In this arena, in particular, it has to be that dod comes to help. Somehow, it empowers these countries and these facilities to do this on their own. It cant be that the United States is just there, constantly in those laboratories, ensuring biosafety and bio security. I think thats a huge challenge. It is a lot to require. State departments, health and human services, whoever else has to be part of that team. To allow for that. They have to be able to operate on their own, eventually. Unless actually speak to the broader posture of you, whether be related to laboratory security, research and element, advanced about meant, and whatnot. The question the secretary of defense asked was very particular to the department of defense. But we were very cognizant of the Important Role the department has in supporting national efforts, it was really saying, what is it that we need to be doing for our forces, recognizing the global responsibilities that those forces have. I think that is an important piece because so much of the interagency dialogue broadly at work in this area, and we certainly saw this with regards to covid, was that overwhelmed and all of that in the scope and scale. That is fundamentally something the department of defense will always do. We may gripe ingrown and say that someone elses job, but at the end of the day, the department of defense is there for the u. S. Public, and it will support the public. This was an opportunity to say, given the responsibility from a war fighting perspective, abroad, and in partnership with our allies in a war fighting scenario, what is it that we need for them to be prepared for to be able to detect early on what is in the environment to be able to continue their mission and that was a singular focus that we had throughout the bpr review. Like i like to bring it back to second to the formation of the bpr. And the council. If you could expand a little bit on how the council was put together, who is on it, and why. The perception is that the dod as an incredible skill and just about any area you want to mention in the biological world, and medication. And in epidemiology. You name it, they got it. If you and the deity to do something, they have the capability but everyone has a day job. Dod has a lot of silos. That is complicated by the unclassified bridge, the wall between those. The way i take it is part of secretary austen statement is silos are no longer tolerated. We get all of these things working together, so we can have the war fighter more effective. And we do it we can be better at it and not impact ourselves at the same time with quite as much. Is that a fair statement . As im going on that, you have the authorities in need. You can expand on that. How does the council form . Who is on and why . U. S. For money. The two are interrelated. I appreciate the question. Early on, in the review, we knew that we wanted to preference in the review anything that the Department Might need to be built in the fy 23 budget. That is why with the existent budget in law, you can see a billiondollar increase across the fiveyear this go program for the department for the Bio Defense Program. We knew very early on without a review that there would be significant pieces of work that need to be done, particularly coming out of covid, largely related to the medical architecture and changing the approach on that front. The one of the things that became evident very early on in the review was that the department had a fundamental governance problem. As youve just articulated, there a lot of very good work being done across them, and i call them so stovepipe centers of excellence where the department is doing very good work, but as you move up into the Senior Leadership, there is not an awareness, nor an ability to make a decision across the department. It is a fundamental problem when the first place is the deputy secretary of defense. Early on, with the check ins of the deputy secretary of defense as well as the vice chairman, without asking how it is going, we say want to flag that it is coming back with a recommendation of new governance. That is not a shock to the secretary as you can imagine. Then, it really helped us to understand as we found issues that formed the basis for the recommendations that we could not go back to a world where whether it was personnel and readiness, acquisition and sustainment, here is a gap. These go fix it. We would then say, i hope it turns out well. There needed to be an ability to govern across the department to actively be managing and keeping track of are we filling the gaps we have. What new challenges are we encountering. And, that was the basis for and the reason for making a decision to establish a bio defense counsel and it was an exception that was made by the deputy secretary because when she came in, she said about how she and secretary austen were governing the department. It was, we are going through regular order. We are not going to establish new bodies. Rather, this is how were going to govern on a daytoday basis. But the need was so compelling for the department that in the area of bio defense, and bio defense enterprise, she said we need to be able to establish a body that is directly responsible to the deputy secretary to be looking at the range of reforms that are needed , and that decision also became very important to the back part of your question. How we came up with financially, what kind of investments were needed both in the bill as well as what is up with congress. By having the bio posture review operating as an early rendition of the fire defense counsel, we were able to Work Together collaboratively on what is the full scope of those investments whether it be for training and exercises. Early warning and bio surveillance. We came up with what we believe is a very defensible request. 800 million in fy 24. With something that we spent a lot of time with congress, we discussed and have had a good amount of support in congress, with a very important partner. Overall, in moving that forward. That was our experience with the bio posture review that will now migrate permanently into the bio defense counsel. Earlier on in this discussion, the Nuclear Posture, it was mentioned as a model. It is there. It is part of the National Defense strategy. Do you see this having life or legs like Nuclear Posture . It was mentioned at the worst is over. The thing we worry about is everyone will shrug, sank over covid is over. We dont worry about this. How do we keep the emphasis Going Forward . Wax i agree with you. We dont have to rely on a system where every four years, or every eight years, the department of defense reviews what is doing, on Nuclear Issues or biological issues. Your reference of nuclear made us think very early on that the Nuclear Weapons council which is a similar body in that case, statutorily requires, and it has all the key senior decisionmakers from throughout this department. They are working on Nuclear Issues. The undersecretary for policy, the undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment. As well as military services. Departments. The vice vice chairman. We thought we saw a similar model that made a lot of sense for the bio defense counsel. The work that was done throughout the posture review by all of those organizations, the council needs to have those under secretaries on the council to make sure the make the most decisions. The composition would be the undersecretarys at the ost level, as well as Service Representatives as well as representatives from Northern Command because of their singular responsibility for pandemic preparedness and civil authorities as well as special operations command. They have responsibility as a coordinating authority for wmd related activities, so, its not just an osc body. It is very much one that we hope we have not met yet, but we will have active participation from the services, from the combatant command, so they have that element of hearing from all parts of the department where there are challenges and what is needed to get them. Like most bodies, there are lower working groups that will feed into this on a regular basis and be meeting more often. When i asked richard to talk to that. Just to briefly say, as someone who has cochaired Nuclear Posture, i think my colleagues and we served as the daytoday cochair working group for the bpr, and i think she has been sick and tire of this when we made all these comparisons through the Nuclear Posture review. But as was noted, i think there were some value there in one of the outcomes and the mpr. As we do npr and plantation, a lot of those issues were identified to have a body to go back to to be the lead for implementation for there was a Nuclear Weapons counsel on the case of policy or something else. As we were going through the process, we realized just the value of getting the collective group of people and officials into the same room on a weekly basis. To have these discussions and dialogues, and identify gaps in themes seams where they may be. We recognize, we probably should have change this. And i always laugh at people winced when i say this because it did take us a while to do, but just as with a Nuclear Posture review, i would hope this is not going to be the first and last bio defense posture review. I think there will be a regular review of this, which again, that is the value of the council existing to determine and i am not saying it has to be every president ial term or administration, but that may be up to the council to decide. There should be a regular relook at this, and in stride, if issues are identified or need to be adjusted, that is why the council exist. What things we talk about in the charter for the council was if we have a major issue, pandemic of some sort, how do we mobilize and respond, and i know, i see the doctor in the audience who lifted this before i was there, but i know there was a lot of scramble at the beginning of covid to figure out who are the right people, what is the right venue, what is the right body. How do you bring us together . Guess what. We have a council that is basically all of those people. It allows us to work in collaboration with a policy to do these kinds of responses to quickly bring folks together and not just fight the bureaucratic but then to worry about what is needed to do response to get funding, etc. I think there, frankly, the conduct of doing this in the first place is useful in identifying that we need a regular rhythm among players. One word you left out was a coordinated way. That is going to be the key of the council whenever there is a response. The council will have all of the osc elements to engage in the joint staff combatant command and services. All of those components might play a part in a Global Response or targeted response. They will all come together in this counsel, moving word. The other thing i would like to highlight is you mentioned a working group. The Council Recognizes that in order to be able to address these evergreen issues that we are identifying with city of the environment and what was mentioned, policy challenge strategy challenged and ultimately how we appropriately your ties the efforts that we do, moving forward, we cannot do that by just dropping something on the council, so there will be bodies that are either ad hoc or evergreen that will help shape that environment across the department of defense in the enterprise of bio defense. That will be part of this effort. Just by way of example, a little deeper dive on this gaps in seams and research that dod, and protective stuff, and centers and biologics. How does the council look at that. How do you decide where the gaps are, where the overlaps are. Can you dive into choice how this works . First of all, what i will say from a bpr standpoint is we did not intentionally take a specific view on developing an rda pipeline or plan. We touch from a very broad sense to say that organizations primarily, the Bio Defense Program and Defense Health programs need to make sure that we are pivoting to looking at not just a current threat, but the threat of the future and how we after the ultimate resilience to action and understanding in the domain of the next 10 or 15 years. We will continue to have to do that. But we also recognize that multiple of those organizations are developing their own rda strategy. Their own development pipeline, so we want to highlight all of the amazing work that is being done within those organizations. To let them do that work from a bio defense counsel perspective. They will help to integrate and make sure that those organizations do research and develop manner and are doing it with communication effectively and collaborating in a way that is a multiplier for the department. And also, working with our Agency Partners to understand what is the broader defense portfolio so we can be additive to the work rather than try to duplicate. Go ahead. I think this is a good example. One of the things, and brandy spoke about this, but one of the things the bio posture reviewed did look at was where were those seams. Yes, there is already a. We have research and development on an various parts of the department, but the deputy secretary asked us, please make sure that we can say discreetly the program does ask where the Defense Industry does why. And while no one is it is while there will be at times things that are relevant, we want to make sure, particularly for our discussions in congress, they knew what was being funded where and what the Mission Space was for the discrete areas, coming out of the posture review, i believe that the department has a much clearer picture of who is doing what for what reason. That is a budget request. We are running a little low on time. We have interested and capable people in the audience. We like to give you a chance to ask any questions you have. There are microphones in the back if you would like to bring something up. You can go to the microphone to identify yourself read wax hollow. I am a senior associate here. This is a fascinating discussion. Obviously, the work that the posture of you did in the council was highly complex and involved a lot of different moving parts. Within the best department. What im interested in is to what extent will the council be able to draw on the insights and expertise of our allies and partners and other stakeholders within american society, and outside of the defense department. Academics are experts in this area, and there are obviously many stakeholders who have an interest in bio defense. To what extent will you be able to draw on those kinds of perspectives as well in the ongoing work . Thank you for the question. We hope that it will continue and now be even more based on our understanding of who is doing what throughout the department, and i think this goes back to your question on if the bio defense counsel is supported by regular work that is underway at the department. The answer to that is yes. Through all of the standing responsibilities that are there in the department of defense, those do not change. Work with allies, work with academia. Work with industry. All of that will continue and remain the same. What is exciting for us from a bio defense counsel perspective is that we can then share those insights with the leadership within the department of defense. Coming out of this working group that was with the u. K. Was with think tanks, etc. This is what the global experts are saying about these issues. It becomes a way to inform Senior Leadership that they currently do not have today, and that knowledge is stove like. I am from the Johns Hopkins berg school of Public Health and security. I have two quick questions. One, i was really congratulations. And second, i was really heartened to hear about you talk about partnerships, real partnerships with allies and working to boost biosafety and bio security. The problem is, traditionally, that is hard to measure. As a result, it is easier to measure stuff like pieces of equipment that end up getting piled and broken and left in laboratories and under resourced parts of the world. How are you going to be able to provide real support and partnership to international and like that. And are you going to tap into the work to be done with looking this over. Are you going to tap into the defense science force and other kinds of sources for expertise . Thank you. I will start and i welcome others to chime in. You are right. These are difficult to quantify. I do think heres an example. This is not dealing program, but we have 30 years plus experience doing this, and as we mentioned, one of the things we focused on is not just the provision of helping to build a lab, helping to enhance security. Helping to do training. But the sustainment element. That is something weve talked about constantly. For example, a lot of these programs in training are not just training. They are training the trainers. That is, for example, in kenya, the folks there talked about how they are not just training the kenyan officials but the officials from all around different parts of the region and all the continents. That is the kind of sort of force multiplier to use an overused term that we want to see. I think that we have some existing dialogues and bodies where frankly we can bring in some of the knowledge and expertise that we learned and apply those to some of the partnerships and relationships. There is a specific body at nato that we can regularly which should be the oversight body. The cpr and defense policy. We build an Implementation Plan that says, you have a plan. What you going to do with it did the other thing that is important to do, and that we are doing more and more, is to go through allies and partners and actually call it tabletop exercises or the scenariobased discussions because these things are very hard to distill into a 90 minute panel. Or a paper. But when you go through what will happen in various scenarios, weathers deliberate or naturally occurring, that helps to eliminate for allies and partners who may not have thought as much about this, what they will be able to do in this regard. This is where i will turn to. More than i do. You can track the ppe. You have dialogues or regular exercises. These are important not just for the u. S. Forces but for the total force. For our allies and partners. Whether nato or south korea or japan etc. We have a request. Your question made me think about this. This does not relate to the allies, but very truly in terms of partnerships. We were greatly helped, as i mentioned, and certainly not as a throwaway comment by the consultation we had before i started the bpr. With john hopkins, and you all very nicely pulled together a range of experts. Randy and i went to boston to talk with some of the Biotech Companies up there. You know, with my request, please dont wait for us. To reach out and ask. Help us with that. We get inundated on a daytoday inbox to our detriment. If there is interesting work that you all are doing, please dont wait until is published. Please dont wait until the volumes come up. Please just call us up and i promise you i will meet with you. Having come from the nti and the think tank world, and the ngos, i know the breath, the debt and the very valuable work that is being done, so i am hungry and i know our team is as well. My request is to help us with that. To keep us current, to tell us what is on the mind. What are you worrying about . What are things that are foremost on your mind. You are closer to the lab then we are, necessarily. Please, help us with that. That is a plea. The last thing that i i want to say that in our chapter, talking about coordination and collaboration, we as a bio defense counsel for this recognize it can be discussed broadly that the dod, as amazing as we are with logistics and with r d and all the other areas of expertise, we cannot and should not do this on her own. We have to collaborate with our inner Agency Partners, with our allies, globally. But also, with industry and academia. We dont own the supply chain. We dont own the manufacturing for the most part. We are not doing the lion share of research and development in this work. We have to courtney and collaborate and expand the conversation beyond the walls of the department. Beyond the silos that weve broken down. Now, its about coordinating and collaborating more broadly. I will echo the plea. We are looking and we are hungry for those engagements and opportunities where we can have those conversations. This is a broad and wideranging and interesting discussion. We will continue this off the record, but thank you very much. You have any closing comments . No. Thank you very much two you. One of the things we have touched on a little bit in terms of investments and whatnot is that again, to reinforce how Critical Congress and the affectional professional where weve asked specifically for money, congress has been asking the department of defense for years now, how are you organized around this . How is it going . How can you be more effective . Covid hit rated then we came back and said can we hold off on answering some of these questions until we can complete the bio. Posture review. That is a partner in this theme of partnerships. We certainly owe a debt of gratitude not just to the support, financially, but also to the perspective of the Armed Services committee, from the appropriators in that whole piece. I want to make sure we touch on that as well. Thank you. Please join me in thanking our team. For coming here today and enlightening us. Thank you