Transcripts For CSPAN3 Carolyn 20240704

And welcome to todays session of the washington history seminar. Historical perspectives on and national affairs. This afternoon, we focus on a new book by carolyn wood isenberg entitled fire and rain nixon and the wars in Southeast Asia, published by Oxford University press just ten days ago. Our discussants afternoon are Pierre Asselin of San Diego State university and frederick log of all of harvard. Im eric arneson from George Washington university, cochair of the washington seminar. Along with my colleague of the Woodrow Wilson center, the washington history seminars, a collaborative and nonpartisan venture of the Woodrow Wilson Centers History and Public Policy program, and the american historical association. And for over the past decade, the seminar has been meeting weekly in precovid, in person at the Wilson Center and since the pandemic and postpandemic era here in the virtual realm, a few phrases before we get started. First, todays session is sponsored by the Wilson Center, cosponsored by the Wilson Centers asia program. And we ask you to take note that next session will be on monday, the 6th of march, and focus on a recent book by claire riddell, our scientist, americas philosopher john locke in the American Intellectual life. Third, as always, like to recognize two people whos behind the scenes efforts . Make the seminars possible. Pete pierce decker of the Wilson Center and Rachel Wheatley of the h. And then finally on the logistics, please note that todays session, as always, is being recorded and can soon be found on our institutions websites. And when we get the question and answer section of the webinar, we ask those of you with questions. Use the raise hand function or the q a function on zoom and well call on as many folks we can with those preliminaries out of the way. I turn the screen over to my cochair, christian ostermann, who will be moderating todays session. Kristen, all yours. Thanks, eric. Delighted to introduce our featured speaker speaker carolyn isenberg. Carolyn rusty is a professor of u. S. History and American Foreign policy at hofstra university. Her previous book drawing the line the american decision to divide germany. 1944 to 1959 won, restored burnetts book prize and the Herbert Hoover Library Prize and was a finalist for my a. L. Book award. Her book fire and rain, as eric just mentioned, fire and rain, nixon in the wars in Southeast Asia was published by University Press just a few days ago. Carolyn has lectured widely published articles on issues of war, peace, and she was a consultant. The New York Historical society, for their exhibition on vietnam, as well as to visiting historians from interested in using american. She has also, i should note for the Wilson Center. She has also worked with several congressional offices on, Foreign Policy issues and is present later has been engaged and served as legislative coordinator for historians, for peace and rest. A warm welcome to the washington history seminar. The zoom room is all yours. Okay, thank you so much. Kristen and i want to just thank the staff at the Wilson Center for their help with setting this up and and fred and pierre and eric as well for inviting me. Its really an honor to be doing this presentation. Ive been reading book for a long time, admittedly now and over many years people ask me periodically. Oh, hear youre writing a book. Well, thats interesting. What is it about . And then i say, nixon and the wars in and the vietnam war. And then its often this sort of awkward silence, which doesnt necessarily dissipate when i add relations with, russia and china, with varying degrees of tact, comes the follow up question. Either already a lot of on this subject is yours really different. So given experience, i had to answer question at least for myself many times. Why am i writing this . One easy answer pertains to the volume of declassified. Well never have such complete information. The policy making of any administrator again certainly, the thousands of president ial tapes from 1971 on and the thousands of transcripts of Henry Kissinger. His telephone calls are an extraordinary resource and from the specific features of administration, theres much to be learned about larger patterns of u. S. Decision making at the highest levels in writing book, i wanted to illuminate certain matters which had been relatively neglected, and im just going to briefly state what they were and then try to turn to the substance of my discovery. So let me mention these. I especially want to highlight the impact of policy actual people. What was happening on the ground in and South Vietnam, laos and cambodia. How decisions that were being made in washington affecting peoples lives. I was also interested in the role the Antiwar Movement which i was part. It was hardly news. Such a movement existed, but was this vast declassified, now available . Could we more learn about how the Peace Movement affected Administration Policy . Then the question of china and the soviet union . Many historians and journalists at the time forever after had noted irony that while brutal warfare was occurring in Southeast Asia at the same time, nixon and kissinger were being wined and dined in moscow and beijing, apparently having a fun time. Was this simple coincidence . Unlikely. But how exactly did these developments connect with each other . Much the existing leaders trade focused on an exclusively on nixon and kissinger themselves and their Colorful People in some ultimate sense were the deciders. But were not empowered to act alone. They were operating within the framework of Large National security bureaucracies. So how did their practices and decisions fit with those long standing powerful institutions and then looming over this entire story is, of course, the issue that historians, notably fred larger, are have wrestled with for over decade. Why did this flawed, costly ill fated, tragic vietnam continue over so many years . I should say from the outset that none of these questions were pulled out a hat. They came directly from my teaching and the issues that emerged in class discussion. 25 years ago, a student raised hand and said, i dont get it. If Richard Nixon was such a brilliant politician, why didnt he just blame his predecessor for vietnam . Mess and get out . And this time a lot. I want to cover a few points, but what was happening on the ground in constructing my i tried to identify experience as a particular people that illuminated important aspects of the war and i wanted to give names those people for potential readers of my book. I wanted to learn real ity to the consequences of policy decisions reached in washington in making that effort, i also found a partial answer. My last question, which is how why did this war go on . An important feature of the situation was the extraordinary detachment of the principals from the suffering by their decisions. When house emissaries went a Fact Finding Missions, they avoided places and sources who could clarify the damage for them by the end, al haig became the observer nixon and kissinger most trusted. But his Fact Finding Mission were limited to allied officials, to other military personnel. Overarching these practices is something so basic easily ignore it, which is life in the national bureaucracy entailed emotional disconnection. You can read through thousands of pages of government transcripts, which i did and find minimal upset or concern about costs to actual people not even americans. Privately, there had been an array of it may have been an array of unexpected and press feelings and presumably there were but the norms of Decision Making required silence. Their famous exceptions, for example the people at Henry Kissinger staff who quit protest over the invasion cambodia. It is one of these men, roger morris. Well, there was four staff members. The pernicious of discussing outrageous official policies in the cool, bloodless language of cost effectiveness and manliness. The culture of government seemed to demand. Not for the first or last time. Apollo in indian indochina. That to warrant screaming. Was to gently oppose. According to the declassified tokens on november 23rd, 1969, kissinger called secretary of defense laird me. Why the wanted to make sure he said that laird had a game plan. Whats game plan . Laird respond did. Didnt kissinger the pictures. He wanted to know. He didnt. The secretary asked kissinger, would you like to look at them . And kiss . Kissinger says, well, do you think i should . Theyre emeritus. You met. You might as well not. Theyre pretty terrible. Millions people around the country had already seen these terrific photos in life magazine. But kissinger is questioning he should open the pages. I assume he finally did. Look, and this example is perhaps apocryphal, but the moral indifference is stunning. My lai is a Public Relations problem, not a human tragedy. What made this and other news of atrocities a a Public Relations . What made this a Public Relations policy problem was, of course, the power of the antiwar. From day one, nixon had clearly in mind the fate of lyndon johnson, who was mortally damaged by this dissenter and from the outset, he and kissinger viewed the Peace Movement as dangerous. Within that context, they regard negative news. Stories like me lie as something to be discounted and. Nevertheless, Peace Movement had a profound effect policy in ways that many of fail to appreciate at the time. The most important effect was the removal of u. S. Troops from vietnam. Nixon had begun this process in summer of 1969, taking our troops out in increments of 30, 40, 50,000. Everyone know in the Peace Movement said this is a trick. Hes expanding the war. Hes accelerating the bombing. What hes doing in cambodia, laos, vietnamization nothing great about changing the color, the corpses, and certainly there was merit in these claims. But was the fact that by the fall of 1972, the had almost no combat in South Vietnam. And since both nixon and kissinger viewed arvin the South Vietnamese military as lacking in effectiveness. This created a necessity for administration to make a rapid Peace Agreement. I also one add here that kissinger recognized the danger troops withdrawals from the outset, as did the u. S. In saigon, and also. But this was one line nixon power. He believed that these withdrawals were absolutely to counteract the piecemeal and convince the country he ending the war were one step ahead of the share was the nixon phrase. And by this he meant congress, moderate groups. The Antiwar Movement had concentrated on political action, building candidacy of George Mcgovern for president in 72 and seeking to elect more antiwar people to the house and the senate. The more radical antiwar groups viewed this as wasted energy. Members of congress kept making speeches introducing resolutions that never pass. And then election day. George mcgovern was defeated by a landslide. However, when you look at the record this point of view seems myopic in his concession, mcgovern had uttered words more apt than he realized, quote, there can be no question at all that we have pushed this country in the direction of and if we have shortened the vietnam war, even by days, every minute, every hour, bone crushing effort in this campaign was worth it. Indeed, one comparable accomplishment of the mcgovern candidacy was to move the Democratic Party into antiwar position. And this mattered in congress where antiwar resolutions were gathering. And that goes back to the of troop withdrawals as grumpy as he was about taking thousands of troops out. Nixon believed it was a political necessity to defeat those antiwar resolutions he needed to keep preempting the peace advocates by taking more men out. Also buried under mcgovern landslide was the fact that antiwar candidates elected to congress with the result that in the weeks following the 1972 election, three of nixons strongest allies, senators stennis and goldwater, plus gerald ford, paid him a visit, say once the new congress came into session they would no longer have sufficient votes to pass appropriate actions for vietnam unless a peace was signed. Therefore, the message kissinger was to get this done regardless of the conflicts he had with the north and South Vietnamese, he needed to close the deal and give american troops and prisoners home. And so he did. Will go to his grave, insisting that domestic forces undermined his diploma. And because of his habit of lying those claims that often ignored. But they contain important truth that he was not free to handle negotiations vietnam in the way he would. For example in, december 1972. He wanted to extend the christmas bombing for an additional six months. Nixon was politically astute enough to say no, but the fallacy in and in kissingers repeated is in believe in that absent antiwar pressure that the United States would have won vietnam. But theres no reason think its true. It was limitations of time not able to diplomacy with the soviet union and russia except to say that many of the declassified transcripts are remarkable. Along with the detailed reports, Russian Ambassador dobrynin to his superiors in moscow. What is apparent from those dark events which neither brezhnev nor zhou enlai could miss, was the desperation of Nixon Kissinger to get their help and pressuring North Vietnam to accept u. S. Terms and in burnishing nixons message image as a man of peace. And to that end, you see kissinger making concessions on arms control and taiwan that were largely hidden at the time. What is the significance of that . From the outset, u. S. Military intervention in Southeast Asia had been justified by the need to demonstrate credibility to. The communist superpower, soviet union and china for of americans this was a worthy and tens of thousands had their sons off to war believing that the reason perhaps to at the beginning. But by 1972 this was no longer the case. Were not displaying strength to moscow and beijing. If anything, the opposite was true. And while news commentators may not have noticed the administrations rhetoric about credibility had so subtly shifted, instead of demonstrating credibility to the communist superpowers, the relevant audience was our allies, showing them the United States will be reliable in defending their interests. So why did this devastating project go on for four more years . Theres no answer to that question. A variety of factors converged, including the distinctive personalities and early allergy of nixon and kissinger. But that only takes its up a point. One simple point is the desire better than to avoid a joe biden moment. Except they didnt know about the budget. Joe biden moment. But theres like what just happened in the fear that a precipitous would have the enemy pouring into saigon was largely domestic. That would occur in that sense. This enterprises about domestic credibility than international concerns. Also significant was indifference to human cost which which among other made them oblivious to how the suffering they were caused was undermining the effectiveness of their policies. Theres a familiar college dichotomy that we see all the time in which morality and pragmatism counter posed as obstacles, as opposites inside. But in this instance, they coincide, not wanting to hear or credit the anguish of others nurtured a dangerous ignorance. Yet in explaining this ongoing vietnamese war, perhaps most important factor was the military nature of the National Security state. The dominance of the courier in Decision Making, the ideological commitment to military supremacy, the unwillingness accept the loss no matter the price paid by others with regard to the views of the joint chiefs of staff and of mafia in saigon weighed heavily as they entered office, nixon and kissinger did did a survey of Government Agencies and their attitudes towards the war. While there were varying and outlooks, nobody withdrawal or anything. It. It is certainly true. Nixon and kissinger were outsized who left their stamp on events. But its worth remembering that they were operating within an instant frame in which the killing of people, soldiers and civilians had been normalized and. Concluding, i want to say why i did this project. I decided i really know various people and why it seems even more meaningful today for many people. My generation. The vietnam war was a moral catastrophe, so shocking in its impact and in varying ways, it reshaped the rest of our lives. And of course, hating Richard Nixon was part of that orientation. But the time and decades thereafter, my conversations with students left me feeling it was too much about that experience. So i didnt really. And that led me a fresh study and to a great deal of time in the archives. But now in the present, this effort more important as far as i can tell. Were in the era of the great oration. Were all horrific interventions. Vietnam cambodia, laos, libya, iraq are blacked out in the demonizing of putin and rush. To be clear, the russian invasion of ukraine is an appalling development which should be recognized and opposed in some fashion. But is their behavior something you need a moral outrage unprecedented in Human History . Have we really been living until now in a rule based international order, suddenly by putin or, his crimes against humanity so much ignorant that the United States cannot make efforts to encourage a negotiated patience or engage in diplomacy with the resurrection of the cold war in europe and accelerating with china. We cannot afford to confront these developments without some recognition. Our own troubled history. Im hoping my book will be modest contribution to a necessary dialog. Thank you. Thanks so much. Youve put a lot on the plate here, so a lot to to talk about before. I introduce our first commentator. Let me remind our viewers that you can participate. We hope that you will participate in this discussion a little later on and you can start getting ready for that. Right now, our preferred way for you to join us is by you using the raised hand function when we can bring you at least voice directly into the conversation or you can use the q a function. Then i will post put your question or comment to our panelists. And you can do you can queue up for both. Starting now, it gives me great pleasure to introduce our first commentator, frederick logue about the lawrence the belfer professor of International Affairs at harvard at Harvards Kennedy school, professor of history at harvard a specialist on u. S. Relations history and modern international history. Fred was previously the ambinder professor of history at cornell and also served as vice provost and director of the Mario Einaudi center for international studies. Dr. Lugovoi is of course the author of a of books. Many you will be familiar with them. Ten books altogether i think. Right up to now most recently jfk coming of age in the American Century 1917 to 1936. His book embers of war the fall of an empire and the making of americas vietnam won the 2013 Pulitzer Prize for history and the 2013 Francis Parkman prize as well as the American Library in paris book award and the arthur ross book award from the Council Foreign relations. Other recent works include americas cold war, the politics of insecurity published with campbell, craig and the College Level textbook people and the nation, a history of the United States. A native of stockholm sweden, fred holds a ph. D. In history from yale university. Hes a past president of the society of historians of American Foreign relations. Fred, a warm welcome to the washington history seminar. The room, its all yours yours. Why, thank you, christian. Im just so pleased to be with all of you and to have a to talk about rustys terrific book. Let me say a few words about why think this book is such an important contribution. And then i have a few questions for for rusty for professor eisenberg that maybe we can and we can discuss as she herself graciously said at the start, its a book that was long in long in the making. And i would like to say a much anticipated, much awaited study. Ive been familiar with this project for probably maybe a decade or so. And so im just delighted that its now between two covers and you know its interesting to hear people say to you, rusty, that dont we already have a large number of books on this to which i would say that in fact no in the one of the reasons i think this book is so important is that i think that we have some important on this latter phase of war, including by pierre, whos, of course, on the screen with us today. I think this period, i think were still sort of in the of important work in this that youve just told us so much about so i reject the subtext i think that the question i think that you know the period after americanization so. 66 and 67 excuse me have a cough is another area in which we need to work but so is this period of that lets call it the nixon years. So i think its its highly that we have the book delighted to have it its right here those you havent seen it. This is what it looks. And you need to get your hands on the book quickly. One of the things i really like about the book is that you you contact julius which is hard to do i think its incumbent upon of us as historians to do that but you you you contextualize in particular us Decision Making for some of the reasons that youve already laid out in your remarks. I dont think i need to say more about that here, but i think its highly important and you do it. And i think for me, maybe this is something we can pursue. I think you demonstrate great. Just how vital that may be. The first two years or say 16 9 to 71. Just how important years are. Thats what comes, i think in the book. I part of your narrative concern. Those three years demonstrate for me just how important they are and i have a question about it in just a second. I also like the close attention that you give to domestic politics. Ken hughes and others, of course, have written about the domestic political dimension here and how much it matters in terms u. S. Decision making. I think thats a and your book and maybe thats something we can also discuss in my own work, this has been a theme with respect to vietnam Decision Making under johnson. And now of course, im looking at in this regard when second volume of my biography but also with respect to nixon and so that that foreign domestic nexus and the degree to which concerns about domestic imperatives drive this or at least help drive it i think is underscored in the in in the manuscript much more i could say here to to to to talk about the importance of this work. But again, urge those of you who have not gotten your hands on the book do so. So i guess the question maybe this is a question that we can discuss a little bit concerns. I have several will see how many i have time for but the first would be this and. Its about 1969. Rusty rusty, you write a couple of at least couple of times early in the book that nixon and kissinger lacked a Clear Strategy and it seems to me this is a vital so the is is the strategy the extent that they have won is it is it simply that by upping the level of violence they can gain concessions and negotiations somehow theyre not quite sure how theyre going to get those concessions, but they can. Is that the essence of. If so, it seems to me theres a kind of contradiction buried in this because you also show it seems to me that theres pessimism in keeping, by the way, and with the kennedy and johnson administrations, thats something we can pursue. But pessimism behind closed doors that saigon can survive, coupled with determination to prevail. Talk a little bit, if you could, about the strategy they have, as you understand it. I im sure my muted. Yes. Respond to that. Well i think at the beginning theres a lack of clarity on their part. You know, there was this idea that was very present in that 1968 which is idea that somehow or other you really could negotiate with hanoi and get hanoi to make enough can sessions that it would look as though the prior act was coming to an end. A reasonably favorable and that idea that you could get a good deal from if you just sort of talked the right way, you know, i mean, thats to some degree in the antiwar of the Democratic Party. So one of the things theres some of them out there discovery here that kissinger, when he starts out having these talks, you know, has the idea that he, you know, can really convince the enemy to make deal and that somehow or other you actually could end up a situation where, you know there would the the North Vietnamese would take troops out. The u. S. Troops, you know, the u. S. Would take their troops out. That somehow or other, the saigon regime could stay there, but there would be a procedure that would enable, you know, the u. S. To leave with some optimism. So, i mean, i think very murky in terms what the exact idea was. But i do think there was some hope for a successful negotiated you know, then they were, of course, at that point in 69, you know, there were continuing u. S. Military activity. And the other piece thats very. Is really the bombing of cambodia in that you write that secret bombing the spring of 69, actually very not just because its secret, which is what people ultimately decide. And it isnt because theyre just being gratuitous. Violent. I mean, one thing is that a lot of you know, which is frankly, what i saw at the time and what did they do . You know, whenever i found out like, why are they doing this . Its absurd but actually i mean there were a amount of North Vietnamese troops in cambodia, right at that at the point did they do the bombing and that is a serious very much promoted by the military right to to attack north troops there. And its much easier to kill them or also to push them back. So they have kind of an amorphous idea that or other by being in skillful negotiator on the one hand and upping the violence to some degree on the other that they could get an edge early on. Hmm. But as youre moving into thats sort of going away. And, you know, one of the things that then happens is they just about to be a pbs about this is their thinking that if theyre not getting anything, that on november they are planning to signify gently escalate the violence to perhaps bombing hanoi again or whatever they have all sorts of plans and, then that gets unsettled by the moratorium. So that leaves them, you know, in a place they didnt want to be. But its one of the most stressful examples of where antiwar activity really stops something that they absolutely intended, is that theyre going to try to really make it clear to hanoi and to the russians that the u. S. Is very serious, was prepared. So interesting i would love to pursue that that line a little further. But let me let me ask about about about mel laird, because one of the things you bring out in the book is how important he is. And theres a forthcoming book by david prentice, maybe you know, about davids it to it shows it seems to me in unprecedented detail both how interesting larry it is and this and much he is ultimately going to shape in a sense what happens. Can you just talk a few sentences about laird and where he fits into the point a lot of sense is about laird but just give a few ideas. You know, secretary of defense at the time, you know, he didnt seem any different from the rest of them, you know, at least in the outer world. And he always defended the administration. But the thing about, larry, thats really important is to keep in mind that he is unlike the rest of them. He is a man of the congress. He gets picked by nixon because of his ability to operate it successfully on capitol hill. And thats who his friends are. People in congress. So in some sense, hes his behavior doesnt just reflect the imperatives of the National Security state. It reflects his friends even in the republican party, who are often more antiwar than we actually realize at the time. And the basic thing that laird does, which i it is documented throughout book, is he insists on troop and he is insisting that from the summer of 1960 not and he never changes and he also makes it clear to nixon lest he must list nixon noticed that they have to do this in order to maintain their to maintain the support of the public that if you want the public believe that you are serious about getting peace in vietnam and youre not in the isnt over, youre going to show them thousand men coming out, 50,000 coming out in you know, in these increments. So by that know, by the time you get into the fall of 72, there actually are combat troops left, which i have to say the Antiwar Movement included, never bothered to notice. Right people but but that was layers cast and theme partly what he did i think about him is like singular is that he tried it. In other words nixon a variety of policy decisions including in bombing cambodia, going into war that was secret for going into cambodia you know etc. And numbers of and a very silly ultimately devastating program for laos and lehrer doesnt agree with the latter but he sees a lot of its very unwise. But what he does for nixon is he will go to congress and know loudly you know, defend what the president has done and, what the administration has done. And he does that right up until the last days of the First Administration and the right. And he does that. But the trade is and its almost its extraordinary to say. Nixon well, okay, remember we were going to get 30,000 troops out. Remember, we were going to get those 40,000 out. Now over and over. And i actually interviewed laird by phone twice. And he didnt know me from a hole in the wall, but almost in the first 5 minutes of our conversation one of the things he said and im interested in that quote but was Something Like do you know how many kids i get of that war . I wrote that that for him was the singular contribution. And i also think and i dont know if apprentice goes into it, i couldnt you know, theres question of his family. His kids are protesting during this Time University of wisconsin, which is where hes from, is exploding all during that time. And hes channeling all that with his republican friends in congress, again, many of whom are very with the policy, but arent saying it publicly so that unknown but thats a little bit of his Reference Group or those of those were this its really interesting. Christine do i have time for . One more. Axl. And then well bring it on. Then we can go to then well go to pier. I guess i. Guess ill choose the following question then and maybe we can come back to some others later than i have. But this one, rusty, is, is perhaps the sort of inevitable that youre going to get a lot, maybe you are already getting it. I sense ill preface it with whether a sense that i have in the in the narrative you can you can correct in the in the process of answering my question, you can correct me if im wrong but i sense a certain degree of empathy for for the decision makers. So and so i guess, i guess thats a two part question. Did in the course of working on this for for a great number of years to change your position on nixon and kissinger, the policies they had followed and that you became, though youre still critical. I think ultimately u. S. Policy. Theres a certain degree, a certain degree. And i think this is welcome in the narrative in which youre able put yourself in their shoes and see see things from their perspective, which is which is empathy. So thats sort of the i guess the subtext of the question question is in the context of its own time. So not hindsight, but in the context of 69, seven in particular. Was an alternative policy made available to them, is to say a more precipitous us disengagement from the war. Taking what you can get, a kind of fig leaf settlement that they know is going to result in hanoi, take over, though not for certain. Maybe theres a certain decent that you can you can get in that negotiation. Does that in the context, the time or or not . Well, those are very questions. Let me just speak for a moment about my attitude towards this nixon and kissinger. I have to say that through my research, i actually got less empathetic about Henry Kissinger than when i started. I felt like, you know, his knee to be the most important person in nixons world. His glorying, the publicity that he had that made him extremely ordinarily indifferent to what was actually happening to the people. He didnt project that outward. In other words, in his with members of the press, he had a relationship it was kate graham and others. You know, he always presented to as a very sensitive anguished person and which is his favorite word. But in when you look at the decision process, especially we look at those tapes that are now published. I mean, that his his real indifference to the of things is very is very strident. I think i got worse and i hated this. But i think by towards nixon at the end is affected more by donald trump than anything because certain qualities of that i had not paid that much attention to became more obvious. What were they . One, is he actually worked. He who worked really hard. When you look through those documents, you know, he you know, hell give transcripts that go on for 30 pages and hes reading as if hes like a ph. D. Guy. You know . And hes like that little comments on the margins somewhat, you know. So, i mean, he actually did understand that he had a real job that it wasnt just, you know, getting on television, yelling at people. So i certainly i thought, wow, well, thats great. You have a president that wants to work. All right. Thats good. And the other thing that i think, again, became apparent to me, you know, later is that whatever else was true that he wanted to be a great president. He wanted to have some record of accomplishment that was really serious he understood that being in the white house entailed certain responsibilities. So as horrifying as his actual decisions were i mean, of people died because of these terrible decision. Nevertheless, it is really true that he to accomplish something and you know, you see it very clearly with his trips to to moscow and then to beijing and that its quite important to him that hed be perceived as a man of peace. So its ridiculous in a way. Hes in moscow, you know, talking about leningrad, you know, and meanwhile in new york, you know, american planes are like tasting the place. People are dying all over. He doesnt even connect to that. So you have to notice that split. But it remains the case. He at least had some aspirations for the office to do something which again my notice sat out chops up your other question which im evading is much harder to write is in that context of that time could he have done Something Different than what he did right. Could any of them have done Something Different . And thats a really hard question to answer because you raised that when you think about joe biden and what happened with afghanistan and you imagine now that Richard Nixon comes in and you know suddenly pulls the troops out and, you know, maybe not immediately, but in a while the enemy takes over, would have been politically costly. So in that sense, youre right. On the other hand, they ended up the same way. Right . In the end, you know, they ended up with probably what they could have got. And truthfully, they could gotten and maybe would have even been in a better situation if they had done this in 1969 than if they did it 1972. And, of course the critical thing that doesnt get figured right is, again, is destruction is how many people are going to die because you dont want to get the american public, you know, to be alienated from. I mean, thats happens. And again, think i would really emphasize is that they end up with anything better than they could have had really at the beginning. Yeah, it would seem and im going to stop after this because thats pure stern. But it would it would seem imperative to what they in fact, in their heart of hearts was possible if conclude out as Richard Nixon that this thing is probably not going to go well over the long term. That was so South Vietnam is not going to survive that. It seems to me. Fred logevall, incumbent upon as president of the United States, take whatever terms you can get and get out. By the way, i dont think its going kill your reelection chances. I dont think its to harm american credibility, not irretrievably, but enough for me. Thank you, rusty. Thank you. Thanks, fred, for very thoughtful comments and questions and also the good conversation. Pierre has been waiting patiently. Let me introduce him. Warm. Welcome to you, pierre. Its russian history seminar. Pierre asselin is the dwight is stanford, the American Foreign Relations Department of history at. Uc san diego is his area of primary expertise. The history American Foreign relations with a focus east and Southeast Asia a larger cold war context is a leading authority on. The vietnam war, and particularly interested, i think will make a great sort of additional perspective to our conversation, is particularly interested in decision after the vietnamese authorities in the. 1954 to 1975 is the author of a bitter peace. Washington in the making of the paris agreement, published in 2002, which the 2003 candidates kind of aldrich prize and hanois road to the vietnam. War 1954 to 1965, published in 2013 winner of the 2013 arthur a good sized book award third book vietnamese american war history was released in 2018 by Cambridge Service to the vietnamese experience during the vietnam vietnam war with a focus on how the vietnamese david succeeded in defeating the american goliath. Dr. Is coeditor of cambridge history of vietnam war volume ending and the forthcoming forthcoming and recently as recent work on his first book project is focused a history of the global vietnam war care. Welcome to the westminster see more on this years thanks thanks for this great introduction kristian. Im so envious you guys are sitting in your libraries and wife stuck me in the kitchen because shes our extra bedroom as her office. And so, so thank you for this. This, this this wonderful introduction. Id a real honor to be to be to be with you. With you today. Really, really happy to to take part in this carolyn as. You know, as fred said, i mean, the book is wonderful. I really enjoyed it. I really, really liked your your treatment of the louse invasion of 71. I mean you see it as a point in in in the war generally had never really occurred to me and i think build a really great case for that and i think thats bound to kind of force us to reconsider a lot of what we thought knew about vietnam. And i think thats thats i love this field so much. Is that in spite of all that we think know about the war. Right, that thinking on it is constantly evolving. So so you know, im a im a im a Vietnam Special and i study the war as christian intimate and mostly from the vietnamese side and and i kind of want to i want to focus on that in my in my comments. I dont know if its fair to you, carolyn, because this is clearly a book about nixon and kissinger. But at the same time, i think its really important to address important yet enemies realities, which i think very often go kind, ignored or neglect and and and and i think that you know, the story that the book presents as far as nixon and kissinger the americans generally is is again, truly, truly wonderful. But i think when it comes to vietnam, its it becomes a little problem ad hoc. And i just want to address of the issues. And and i really look to getting your thoughts on my on my comments, you know, that that that the war in vietnam was was fundamental to a civil war in which which in which the american imposed themselves starting in end in the 1950s, by supporting france. And then and then and after 65, by intervening directly. And i think thats really important if were going to make sense of, of, of vietnamese history and the 1945 period, its absolutely imperative to recognize that that as much as there was a very very meaningful and influential communist and movement in vietnam, there was also a very, very active noncommunist anticop nationalist opposition to that. And this this conflict between vietnamese communists and Vietnamese Nationalists really the course of vietnamese history after 1945, much more, i would argue, then then french involvement and american involvement in that period. In many ways, the french american wars in vietnam are condition by this existing vietnamese, vietnamese civil war. And i and you touch upon some of things in the book, carolyn, but generally speaking, you kind of gloss over this and, and and think and i think partly as a result that i think the book perpetuates some of the more traditional standard notions about about whats happening in vietnam so so you know, for example, you write that North Vietnam was powered by a fierce you mentioned that the north wanted to reunify the country and that North Vietnamese and jet fighters were, for their part, patria, who simply wanted reunify their country and and and again, thats thats the kind of the standard line. Right. But fundamental this is getting chomsky the vietnamese communist grand narrative. This is this is history as. The communists themselves have been have presenting it up and now we know on the basis of Research Done by those us who have been going to vietnam that that that grand narrative is is, is, is effectively a largely largely propaganda propaganda just taken in. And i think also the problem with that grand narrative is that is that it ends up validating some some really misguided about those who worked against homecoming and his comrades and the communist movement. You know at the time the communists their off their vietnamese opposition as lackeys of the french as puppets of the americans or as traitors to to the nation and and i in places killing. I feel like you kind of perpetuate some of these notions. Right . You talk about saigon as an american, as an authority area, an unpopular government and its armed forces, as and riddled with corruption and and incompetence. You do you write that american reasons protecting the South Vietnamese government lacked validity . You mentioned that the South Vietnamese army was incapable, fighting effectively against their their their northern enemies. And then. And then. Then you ask, you know, was the preservation a South Vietnamese dictatorship a cause worth dying for . And and the reality is for tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of people in vietnam . It absolutely was, if only because the southern dictatorship once was always so more preferable to. The dictatorship in in the north. And, you know consistent with this idea, caroline right. If if president chou in saigon was guilty of quote high handed despot ism, what what then do we call the the the exercise of absolute power by lazy, unassuming and other communist leaders above above the 17th parallel up, you know, theres a statement you make that that that really made an impression on. Me you you you mentioned write i think its in the intro how could anyone believe that these resourceful tunnel dwellers would be intimidated by American Military power and and if i if i read you correctly, part of this was informed by a visit that you made to could she tunnels outside of of saigon and that visit seemingly left a very deep impression on you. But you know i think the idea that anyone living fighting in those tunnels would not be intimidated by American Power is very problem that it as any vietnamese who ended up at the receiving of of america and bombs american shells or was involved in combat against against american and allied forces that the whole from beginning to end was not just intimidating it was absolutely terror. The men women who fight against against against the americans there theyre just like americans. Theyre taking orders from superior. Theyre not doing this organically, naturally because because they they want to and i think im going im to im going to conclude with this before i ask my question. And i think a lot of this is is related to this this very tendency. I actually wrote sick tendency in my notes, but im going to see problematic tendency that americans have when it comes to actual warfare. You know, for all that we we we in universities and colleges the say is wrong with war fundamentally american is generally look at warfare as something heroic, as something glorious even as something romantic and and and all of this is on full display when you look at how we looking the russian in ukraine right the suffering caused by the war is entirely lost on americans. This is this is a great fight fought by great people against an evil enemy in all death and suffering that goes into war. The war on the ground is lost on us. And and i really think that as long as we keep thinking that the vietnamese who fought the americans were acting on the basis of nationalist or patriotic convictions will keep denying and their humanity will will continue to simmer live by the great complex of vietnamese history in the modern period and and never really able to to to understand both the course and the outcome of of of the american war in in vietnam. So those are my comments my questions you carolyn theres two of them and they relate them. Right. Is it really fair to denounce the defense, South Vietnam as, just an act of support for a foreign dictatorship. I mean i mean and are more than their government i mean, why why we think of the South Vietnamese as more than then then theyre their government and then and then. Is it not problematic in light of how long the war lasts, in light of how many South Vietnamese died protecting the south, is it not problematic to suggest that hanoi North Vietnam and ho chi minh had a complete monopoly on Vietnamese National ism and vietnamese poetry . So im going to im going to here. Thank you. So thank you, pierre. And im just processing your your remarks and and to some degree i think youre actually assigning opinions that i dont really express in the book and which i dont believe in, dont and its not i dont think its there. For example, i deny in this book that communism was an important aspect certainly for the North Vietnamese government. I and certainly for many members of the provisional revolution, dont i . This im not that i you know, tried to make that separation. So i just want to make that clear to the other things that you read a number of quotes. And i think context is relevant because of the things that are in my that are negative about the saigon regime. Im, im an orphan and that my, you know, independent opinion on no military experience is what nixon and kissinger were saying i mean their contempt for the South Vietnamese is all over the. And you know they think i mean i didnt come equipped with all my quotes which are in the book but we you know they i think this moment which i think captures everything when i forget annoyed at the saigon regime and Henry Kissinger says to nixon lets face it president chou is a dope i or elsewhere where he says, you know, were in this thing because that son of a knows that he cant win a Fair Election and so getting stuck because hes afraid of being exposed to his own population. I mean these are judgments that nixon and kissinger made, not me. So i really want to emphasize that. I mean, i do think. Right, that if you want to say a biased biased, its point of view, which and i guess my primary point of view is obvious, which is what are we doing in that country . Why our troops there . Im not the expert on, you know, which vietnamese deserve to be the in charge of vietnam, what the border should be. But its really what is our role in vietnam and i think there its pretty clear and one thing again that really is dumb and then, you know, when you look over those four years except for maybe year one is is throwing contempt by the american officials for the army in South Vietnam. Its thats their contempt its not my contempt. I really want to emphasize. Thank thanks. Thanks, peter for your really penetrating comments and questions and rusty for your response. I hope youre apology i introduced him with the wrong University Just as was reading your introduction. A bunch of ring alerts came across my screen and i couldnt see anything anymore. So its San Diego State university that has honor and privilege of being your dean, your academic. Right now, wed like to bring in our audience into the conversation again, two ways to do this. Our preference is for you to use the race hand function and youll get put into a queue and ill call on you and well ask you to a mutual self where you can post your comments in the q a function and ill get to those if we have time lets go with that to our. Speaker steve brady. If you could please unmute yourselves. Steve brady. Okay. You can hear me. Yeah. Okay. So this has made extremely excited to read the book, which i have a copy of. Thanks very much. And i wrote an elegant question and now theres a cat on top of it. So ill try to make it as as possible. One of the things that really strikes me in my work is something that you started out with, professor, which is that the Antiwar Movement really has a sense. People in the Antiwar Movement really have the sense that they didnt accomplish much. And you can see that with the moratorium being such an important factor for the in the war still going years after that. But the perception on the part of people, whether its kissinger or know William Buckley or the current revisionists who say that this was a winnable war that was undercut by the antiwar. So i may question or simply could you say a little bit more that and that dynamic because ive talked to a couple people who are who are still around who are the Antiwar Movement, tom fox and that and they are convinced they didnt accomplish anything. So could you just say a little bit more about why that why you think that is is the question why did they and why do people feel that they werent accomplishing anything . Yeah. Even if im sorry, even after the even after the war, why do they why did they and why do they still have this perception . Well, i think i mean, its really a good question. I think youre also right that that of not accomplishment lingers, although you know, again, its mixed in terms how people look back on that experience. But i think the essential reason is because the war went on as long as it did, right. So as a historian, i can look back and say, wow, after the first year in office, nixon, kissinger, they had to was melvin laird pushing . And they to take out 100,000 troops. That was actually, absent the Antiwar Movement might, that might never happen. But if you are just looking at the situation not reading top secret documents, the relevant thing is not the 100,000 going out. Its all the people dying every day. Right. And that and and and if youre a particularly if youre somebody that is, you know, kind of turns your life upside down to try to oppose the war, that sense of not accomplishing is really, you know, goes on day after day and, you know, and about this because i was part of that, you know, im looking back, i feel this. I do feel a double thing, right. Which is on the one hand, i looking at the record, im more convinced than i certainly was at the time about how important that movement was inside. Only getting this war to an end. Because i truly think looking at the record is that outside pressure there, you know, they would have fought for more years with more dying people. They wouldnt have have won. So on the one hand, theres actually some reason feel satisfaction at the things that were done. On the other hand, 3 Million People died, 58,000 american dies. You know how many peoples you know how many soldiers came back in with physical injuries, mental problems, you know what . Go to vietnam and look what the land looks like in so many places. How generations are affected by agent orange. So its a very paradoxical thing, you know, which is on the one hand, we were accomplishing than we realized even George Mcgovern had accomplished a lot, even though people him retrospectively. On the other hand, this is a very tragic story in many ways. So i think that explaining what your what youre hearing, i would just follow up if i could to say that and maybe this is consistent rusty with what youre saying, which is that the movement and by the way, i would include congress here, too the movement, the options open to lbj in the last year and a half of his administration, because we know how aggressive he wanted to be. I think in 68, even his withdrawal speech limited the options, open to nixon. But as you also point out, its its its mixed at best. But thats a very good question from from steve. Thank. Yes. And pierre, fred, feel free to join in as fred just did as well. John mcfarland the next. High. Good. Good afternoon. Two quick rejoinders, pierre ignores, the fact that there wouldnt have been civil war had the u. S. Not created the government in the south and frustrate at the elections that would have reunified the country. In other words, if the u. S. Hadnt undermined the geneva agreement. I think the question of of the selfdoubt of the antiwar partially has to do with with effective and, of course, dog mubarak has to do with an Effective Campaign by the u. S. Government and by some sectors of the media to undermine its impact because they didnt want it be so powerful. But it also has to do with the radical realization of the movement of people who became despairing by the the daily death tolls and by the veterans stories as they came back, and that that radical zation under mind, that sense of what had been accomplished in the last part of the Antiwar Movement is when it did focus congress and did effectively make it impossible for the to continue. The only the other i wanted to ask and maybe rusty go further into it is can the issues of cambo are not just the issues of the deaths, the attack on the vietnamese, but also the overthrow of sihanouk and bringing of the khmer rouge into power and i think the crime of having created that needs to be looked at traveling regularly to cambodia soon after the khmer rouge were chased out and just a month ago im constantly about the the fact that that moral judgment on all of us about how cambodia happened and how we dealt with the khmer rouge is not that. Thank you, rusty. Well, i mean, i basically agree with which on college set, i think that the sense of of not an accomplishment in the in the movement, you know then produced radicalization of some, you know, significant amount of people who were like watching this thing unfold, thinking about the damage that was being done. Feeling like theyre more, you know, moderate efforts were not really producing anything. So right. So, you know, it caused an acceleration of tactics which then i think proved to be damaging to the Antiwar Movement that, you know, that it created more enemies than was necessary. And again im just sort of alluding to the documentary thats coming of the movement in the mad man. But i one of the things thats really interesting is that you had these really mass events, which was specifically structured to enable a very wide diversity of people to participate, that that was really effective in terms of congress, even in stymieing the white house. But that, you know, think that, you know, had probably you know in hindsight it had more of us felt that things that we were doing were working and simply that we needed to expand those activities, not, you know, become you guerrilla war areas. You i think that that would have even been better in my you know gotten the war to you know earlier than it did. On the other just i mean i dont know what add about cambodia its a horrible tragedy. You know i have a fair amount of it in my book. When i was writing my book, i actually then began to learn, you know, much more about what was on the ground in cambodia. You know, after the things that we did know, all of the, you know, of the invasion. But then what you know, what was taking later on, you know again, just real quickly, you know, is that one of the things thats really interesting, which ive saying over and over again, is the lack of by people in high about information that might be unpleasant. And so one of the things thats in my is in my book which i learned i didnt even know about, was that there were three american reporters who, when they invasion of cambodia started these, reporters just got into a car, one of them spoke vietnamese and they just went across the border to out what was happening and their captured by the viet cong. And there there i think was 60 or 90 days. And theyre traveling the whole time through different parts of cambodia as prisoners for the the viet cong were trying to find out if there were really reporters or not. And then finally they they find out that they werent. But my point is that they saw tremendous amount in that in that time period where they were there and many things that nobody had really before about what was happening in cambodia. And, you know, these were mainstream requests and nobody wants to, in the nixon government to hear anything. Nobody said, oh, isnt great. We have these people that could tell us some things about whats going on. You know, that never happened. I mean, did not about cambodia that except how many planes gone to what places the not knowing about cambodia as vast human tragedy is unfolding is just stunning. And christiane, can i can i just say just just a few things, because you were talking about kind of perpetuating old archaic notions, right . And these are some them. So the u. S. Didnt create South Vietnam. Right. That the french in 49 and of course it satisfied their selfish interests but it also fulfilled the aspirations of of of of hundreds of thousands of vietnamese noncommunist nationalists. The elections in 56 which we all say how charming have won. If you look at the realities north and South Vietnam chances are if somehow you have free and Fair Elections in both the north and the south. Zm the south wins deal actions that the north is a basket in 56, whereas in the south is going right. The khmer rouge, hanoi literally created the cambodian communist movement, right . The u. S. Bombing radicalized it. But to say that the u. S. Bombing brigades, the genocidal khmer rouge, i mean, listen, the u. S. Bombed laos more heavily and, you know, louse doesnt produce a genocide. Right. So. So i think i think we have to america the agency is important here. But fundamentally, we have to start recognizing that. The local agency also matters that was a tragic war and the americans made dumb decisions. But so different parties in vietnam and cambodia, i mean, its possible its possible that that too not to try to adjudicate this, but its possible that both John Mcauliffe and pierre are correct. Certainly that there is civil strife. No question. Vietnam from an early. And that, i think would have been there absent a french war that would have been there, absent an american invasion. But you could also argue, and maybe this is the point that John Mcauliffe is making, is that abs and the dispatch large numbers of french troops and massive amounts of french firepower and absent the dispatch of american troops and american firepower, youre not going to have a bloody huge war that claims the kinds of, you know, hundreds of millions of lives that weve that that we saw so an absence soviet and chinese involvement no doubt flowing involvement intensifies everything but fundamentally right these are vietnamese reality is its not a cambodia in reality. Right. I mean the point that the United States intervenes in cambodia there how how is the khmer rouge that maybe 3000 people at the most . And i and i dont that theres any basis for saying editing United States had stayed out of cambodia yeah that things would have developed in the way that it did. It seems so clear that the american behavior in that country and and knew initially its secret bombing like i said the border right but as you know you know as that situation the United States bombing you know the of cambodia as well as you know the border areas with the North Vietnamese assert a presence. You know, if that hadnt happened, i think that cambodia pretty obviously would look anything like, you know. What the tragedy that it became but but thats the thing right if if North Vietnamese troops dead in cambodia, then none of this happened. But again, i think balance important here. Right. The americans dont just wake up and start bombing. They bomb because North Vietnam is essentially in regionalized a war. So i think, again, this is agency here that that that is very important. But the North Vietnamese have not penetrated far into cambodia and i dont think that theres a balance there think you have to take into consideration the relative power of the participants. The amount military power that the United States into cambodia, not just the invasion but bombing it essentially never stops in that country that is far more consequential than anything. You know that that was done by other actors of course the khmer rouge. You years later has become know vast the countrys a total and the khmer rouge is able to take over but i dont think that theres any equivalency here in terms of responsibility for for what happened to people. Thank you. When eric and i daydream about how wed like these seminar discussions to go this is it. So thank you for this really interesting and fascinating back and forth. Lets bring lets bring in mary jack mary. Please unmute yourself and welcome back. So great. This program is so great and thank you for letting me ask my question. Carolyn, i have the book. Im so excited to read it and wanted to just raise one key about you emphasized. The fact that this the Antiwar Movement had an impact and one of the reasons that thats so important when we think about the sort of longer course of forever war in, the United States, it shows that that the American People actually have an ability, whether or not they use it, to restrain u. S. War power. So i just wanted to drill down on that a little. You and fred both said that that the Antiwar Movement limited would lbj and nixons options and exactly now why . You know, could you could you say more about that and what how did it limit their options . Was it that they were worried about the issues. Was it that they were worried that about poll numbers or their legacy . Was it that that the the antiwar demonstrations sort of the air out of the room politically and undermines their ability to get other policies enacted . I mean, tell more about the dimensions of how the impact of that movement of enacted i thinking within both administration and such that they limited their military options but we probably would need. 2 hours for this issue. Your question there was just a couple of things and, fred. You know, from his work on the just years you may want to chime, i mean, first of all, which talk about lyndon johnson, i mean, the most obvious way of limited things was that after tet, there was an electoral challenge to lyndon johnson. And he ultimately out of the election altogether. Right because hes about to be defeated in basra, simply defeated. A primary in wisconsin by eugene mccarthy. But what that translates into in terms of policy is that johnson does, in fact, open up negotiations with north right and becomes willing to at least that theyre going to stop the bombing, which eventually of the north, which eventually happens. So that implicitly is very and again, i emphasize the book that that had hung over nixon. Johnsons fate really hung over nixon because johnson had been pretty popular. Its the president actually. And he you know, it seemed like opposing him was like a no brainer. But again, i really want to emphasize negotiations were very important at that point. The cessation of bombing in, addition to which just to transition a little bit from from johnson to nixon. The other thing, of course, is that general westmoreland has asked for 200,000 more troops in was as a sequel to ted. And that becomes really in and now partly were historians part Company Historians say well that happened because the wise man these important people in National Security people all got together and they told johnson you know 200,000 women its not like that cant happen. Right. But they didnt in a vacuum either. They have a country thats erupting politically they have their own children, no longer speak to them. So theres all of that. Then moving, some pushing on french territory. But moving back then to you know to nixon again, i think the single most important effect was the removal of troops that he had to keep taking those troops out and. Therefore, by september, october of 1972, there no more combat troops in the country. So thats a very powerful. Right. And and and and nixon and kissinger understand that while bombing has a certain function and maybe even can prevent the enemy from, you know, consolidating a victory, you cant just year after year keep and, you know, an enemy and think that this going to reach anything. So i think the important thing and then again i think theres an electoral consider and some of it is like two steps, right . So for example, when George Mcgovern was running through all those primaries in the Democratic Party, right . And suddenly you know, humphrey and muskie and all these kind of centrist people, the war now has to face mcgovern and his, you know, his movement, you know, said this pushes the whole party into an antiwar stance to some extent that what has happened just because party hates Richard Nixon. Right. But thats true. But its also true. All that Popular Mobilization ation behind the mcgovern really has a very large impact. And again i would emphasize that it is a power factor for nixon that he doesnt think hes going to have the votes in congress to the war. You really that way and hes extreme maybe frustrated that the South Vietnamese government or the top officials in that government dont understand how the american system works. Imagine he has a freedom of action that he no longer has. So i dont know if id quite answer the question, but bob, to be in the ballpark, one of the things ive said somewhere, mary in print, cant remember where, but said that for all of the five president who dealt with vietnam in a serious way, the outcome vietnam mattered principally in terms of the damage it could do to their domestic position. I was being deliberately provoked. So its maybe a little overstated, but i think in broad outline, i would defend statement. And so it, i think goes with what rusty has just explained about the degree to which these gentlemen, Lyndon Baines johnson, Richard Milhous nixon, see all of their options on vietnam through lens of their domestic position. And as rusty says, their reelection. Thank you, David Anderson and, if we can keep it to both two questions and answers succinct, then we might be able to get to a couple more. David thank very much. Thank you very much. I appreciate great this session very much and ill be brief. Rusty, congratulations. The great book. I started reading it. Im looking forward to getting to the russia china toward the end. But i have a very specific question about decent interval. Youve been living with nixon and kissinger for a while now and when i did my work on my vietnam book, i found a space between the two men on decent interval. I felt like kissinger was cynically that way quite for quite a while. Nixon was holding out some hope. Maybe there was some other outcome for. Saigon im just your your take on whole decent interval notion i dont you im very ambivalent about it i think youre right in a general way i think that kissinger, you know, was more cynical. All of it. And so he you know, he thought this this government was very weak. He thought friend was incompetent. So you know, he took more seriously. I think the nixon did that when the u. S. Pulled out that it would you know ultimately know would would result in the defeat the of the south. So i think there is that difference but you know part of the problem is for a historian reading these transcripts you know its at a different moments. People say different things. So i saw, you know, theres moments when theyre very realistic and you have these with nixon also these moments of clarity, you know, and so, yes, a decent way of thinking is relevant. Know. Then other times he deludes himself a while, you know, then he comes, you know, which is really a lesson in research because its so tempting, you know, just take one sentence out of context and the real challenge is to sort of look at the overall art. I think the general point is that neither nixon nor kissinger very optimistic at the point the paris Peace Agreement was being signed. They neither of them really had much hope that the South Vietnamese government was going to survive, although the issue was how long would it take before it fell . And you can clamor if you could play, some of it yourself can you go go now . You disarm it yourself. You still muted. What do want . Cant hear you. Okay. All right. Okay. Yeah. Sorry for the delay. Thanks, christian. I wanted to go back to cambodia for just a moment with carolyn. I have have i have thought that one of the great and power i have thought that the that kissinger refusal to negotiate sihanouk, who had been overthrown by the north, of course. Yes. His his failure is lack of interest in negotiating with sihanouk was extremely important bringing about the rise of the khmer rouge. He only only very late in the game he allow americans to talk with sihanouk. I just if that was something you got into something you about i didnt get into it in detail but i agree with you. Right . I mean but again i you know, the level cynicism about the situation in, you know, in is really just startling and know the question there are many number of points at which whether if would have been possible to bring sihanouk back, where there might have been that opportunity. There was very little interest in it happen. I wish it really fast. You know, when sense that i have, which i know is different and some other critical historians actually is, i think that kissinger with and probably nixon was surprised when sihanouk was overthrown. You know i know that there are historians see it as a little orchestrated washington. I dont think that that was i think so on the record they actually seem to be genuinely surprised. I, you know i wouldnt discount the possibility that there were people on the ground who were conspiring in that way. But think they were, you know, even kissinger was ambivalent about what the consequence of that overthrow would really be and thinking maybe that wouldnt so advantageous for the United States. Thank you. Thats fred and pierre. You have any final words im afraid we, have to bring this session to an end lots more questions in the q a and even more comments as well. Well try to capture those for for rusty. So terrific session. Thank you, carolyn. Fred care of course eric and its over to eric for final works my thanks to everyone as well. Please join us on monday, march 6th for the next session. The washington history seminar that will explore claire are saying this is america because philosopher john locke an American Intellectual life would discuss. Leslie butler and holly brewer on the following week. Take note march 13th, the seminar, a new book by Melvin Leffler confronting saddam hussein. George bush and the invasion of iraq and for those of you who are in the washington d. C. Area, we will be in person and would love to see you at the Wilson Center itself. But for those of you not in washington, well have a hybrid option for to watch online. Until then, stay safe. Good