Want to thank the commentators and everyone for assembling this deeply honor especially to be giving the William Roger lewis in the flesh. We were on the state Department Committee suffering through a lot of bows and arrows back in the decade prior, and i got to know him well and i feel really honored to give a lecture that is in his name. This book came about and so many of you, my friends, have heard this origin story. This came about because lewis liked the review i had done and mentioned the series that helen was doing that would use my biography to teach history that would pick biographical topics or would use a representative biography to get a broader subject of history. They had just published their first volume. It was on pocahontas. And issues regarding native American History, they were looking for somebody to do something on foreign relations, he offered me the opportunity to put together the perspectives. These were supposed to be short and concise books, that was the idea that, and the topic i debateds and consulted with some people about which biographical figure might serve that purpose of the american context, and i kept coming back to Henry Kissinger. Such a long career in foreign relations. Even though im not born in the u. S. , his career really represent something about 20th century american power. When i did get the chance to tell kissinger that this was the goal of the series, a short and concise book, using him as a prism to look through foreign relations, he looked at me and said, but you will leave things out. I do leave things out. I dont cover everything in the book but it is not a short and concise as i had hoped. It got longer. It was even longer when i submitted the manuscript and had to cut 25 . There are lot of things that be left out. I think another question that i have heard, there are two other kissinger books that have been published this year, why another book on him . That is a legitimate question. To the extent i make a scholarly contribution, i am trying to write the book to reach a broader audience and reach scholars, the central argument is to look at kissinger in any way. Most accounts, most look at him as a Foreign Policy intellectual whose advocacy helped the u. S. A realistic Foreign Policy and that was geared towards the promotion of American Security and interests, and interests are defined narrowly. That is the usual approach to kissinger. I do not think that is incorrect but it is incomplete. What my book seeks to do is to look at kissinger as a political act, a politician. This was an insight that i got from a comment from the French Foreign minister who commented that he thought kissinger was far more of a politician then he acted the. I think the basis of this is to understand, this is the way in which history of american Foreign Policy we have to understand that it is fundamentally determined by the struggles and battles of domestic politics. Germans would call it this is the goal that i want to. Convey in looking at kendrick kissinger always portrayed himself some of you may have seen the interview he gave to mike wallace when he was talking about his book, even then he portrayed himself as someone above politics, independent and not be partisan. There was a original source of studying kissinger at it recorded the 1972 Republican National convention. At one point during the national convention, dan rather comes up to kissinger, asked him about the vietnam peace settlement in august of 1972, whether it will help president nixons chances in an election. Kissinger said, the president never talks to me about politics. We know this is nonsense. They understood political importance of Foreign Policy. The tapes combined the television material and other material, it gives insight into how nixon and kissinger approach Foreign Policy. The book is essentially although there is one chapter that tries to give the essentials of kissingers career and to talk about his connection to political ideas and thoughts before he becomes National Security advisor the book is essentially about his governmental career lasting from january of 1969 to january of 1977. In the second chapter, after a sloppy start, i entitle you cant lose them all. Things did not go well the early period of the nixon presidency. They organize what they call the trifecta or trifecta. They talked with the soviet union, the paris Peace Agreement and vietnam. Ultimately it would help contribute to the landslide electoral victory of Richard Nixon in 1972. There is a wonderful tape of a conversation when nixon calls kissinger up after kissinger has given his piece of hand press conference in october of 1972. Nixon calls kissinger up and says, henry has notice on all three networks. They were watching the Television News as well. He remarked, on all three networks there is an interesting story. Kissinger says, we have wiped mcgovern out. There is this political sensibility about their understanding of Foreign Policy that i think is something that i think is a large part of the first nixon term. Not to say that there arent other considerations, but it comes up in the discussion. It certainly is there. The next part of the book gets into, you might say, the happy period of nixon, but rather unhappy time for nixon but a successful time for Henry Kissinger. Nixon wanted to keep kissinger doing the same thing for the second term, the watergate would destroy his political credibility and power, and effectively reverse the roles, kissinger became the indispensable man. In 19731974, he was the most admired american, particularly for his role in the middle east, where he would play a role for settling the yom kippur war, but also in developing and negotiating the first agreements between israel and egypt and israel and syria. He was pursuing his own goals. Richard nixon had his own views, but kissinger could manipulate and avoid what nixon was talking about as he negotiated this engagement. Kissinger would become, after the syrian agreement went into newsweek, and they put him in a superman outfit. Of course what goes up must come down. Kissinger had a much more difficult final few years and the administration dealing with a much more Hostile Congress and investigation. Certain events and not go very well. Frustrations in the middle east, the soviet involvement. Questions about the frustrations with the peace treaty. Much of this also led kissinger into thinking and arguing that Foreign Policy needed the domestic Foreign Policy needed to be different. A quote from him in 1975. When he argued, in history we can either escape from the world we are dominated. We must conduct with flexibility, imagination in pursuit of our interest. We must be thoughtful and be prepared for the contingency. We must pursue limited objectives simultaneously. Kissinger, in some ways, in 1970 was attacked from the right and the left. From the right it was for insufficient anticommunism. From the left, insufficient attention to human rights issues. Kissinger by the end of the time in office is talking about the limit of what the United States can do and the necessity to recognize that. At the same time it was in kissingers on makeup. In his role as secretary of state he is pursuing initiatives for certain powers of the United States and the world. Henry, for all of the sensible limits, having to assert that power. I have a last chapter, which talks about kissingers retirement. At all think anyone thought that 53yearold Henry Kissinger would not be back in power in some form. There was the fear of president s, that he would outshine them or preempt their own authority, as he seemed to have done with gerald ford. The interesting thing about that chapter is i cannot really use the types of sources a historian would like to. I had a moment when my copy editor said, a there is another book you know there is another book in the slapped in this last chapter. Kissinger i dont think anyone thought in 1977 that kissinger would not be back and forth power in some form. And some form. And somehow they would preempt their own authority, he had done seemed to done that with general gerald ford, but i think also the interesting thing about that chapter is, i cant really have this to the sources as a historian would like to. I have a funny moment when my editor said you know theres another book in this last chapter. I felt like saying that maybe, but there will be a book that somebody from 50 years from now will write that when those materials are available. Kissinger did become, in the seventies and eighties and even into the 90s, the commentator on american Foreign Policy. He became almost a symbol, and an exercise or of american power. In the sense that side where i think i want to close here. Thanks very much tom, and we know have were fortunate to have a distinguished panel of experts and scholars, and colleagues and friends to provide some initial comments and some questions for tom and we want to set this up into actively, so i have asked our commentators to be short on praise and to really focus on a couple of key questions that will draw tom out some more, on the main arguments of the book. And we will start with, professor barbara keys the chair of the u. S. International history, in the university at the uk, she received her ph. D. From harvard, and author or editor of three books, including reclaiming american virtues. It was published by harvard in 2014. Dozens of articles and book chapters, including one entitled, Henry Kissinger the emotional statesman. Another one, the diplomats two minds. Constructing a Foreign Policy. Also diplomatic history, after finishing a book manuscript on torture and pains, since 1945, she is writing a book currently currently, on Henry Kissinger and. She has recent president , of the society of historians on american revelations. We are excited to have her with us. Barbara you have the floor. Thank you for having me, and we congratulate tom, on his major chief meant. And it occurred to me last night that for the field of u. S. Foreign relations history, writing a book about Henry Kissinger is a bit like climbing mount everest. There is a small but sizable number of people who, undertake the challenge and part because it is such a challenge. And one of the things that makes is a challenge is that there is such a large body of scholarship, and basically on kissinger. So among the various things that tom contributes to that literature, i want to briefly touched on two things than posed to questions. So the two things that stand up for me, about toms book are, first it really is quite brief. It may not look very brief, but he manages to cover the next years in about 200 pages. And that brevity is a hard thing to do well, to condense such a complicated and event filled period when there is so much going on. In so many different parts of the world, and to do it without over simplifying and losing nuance, its a terrific achievement. The second thing i think is useful about toms work, is that the last chapter he mentioned on kissinger, after 1977, and tom covers that extensively more so than other works and i can only think of one of the recent work that does that at all. And i think its really an important part of kissingers career. And i just want to say as an aside, one of the things that puzzles me is why it is that no enterprising journalist has as yet undertaken to write a book about kissinger, after 1977. There is so much say and even the sources are hard to find, i think they are there. Its not just that he was a media talking head, or an unofficial policy advisor but he was a businessman. The fact that we know so little about him as a businessman in the last 40 plus years, as the head of Kissinger Associates is s amiss in the understanding of our u. S. Negotiations. Particularly when it comes to china. But not explicitly. I have two questions for tom, they are both big pitcher questions, and i will say them both and then let tom respond. So the first is, obvious question its about the relationship between nixon and kissinger. Of course the big question for anybody who writes about kissinger, is the fact that when we assess his role we have to acknowledge that it was nixon, who was the president. Who made the ultimate decisions. In your conclusion tom, you write that kissinger was a dutiful agent, of nixon. And you suggest that kissingers role is really important both in providing intellectual framework, and the realist framework and in selling nixons policies, and i think you did a terrific job at outlining how well and how definitely kissinger cultivated the press to sell those policies. That suggests to me that your position is close to what john articulated 1994 when nixon reconsidered that she wrote that kissinger was a geopolitical follower than a leader. And its a contrast to jeremys assessment and jeremys book, that kissinger was im quoting a genius as a strategist. So tom, you portray him more as a tactician so i want to press you on this point in relation to the specific episodes that you cover and how you present them. I think there are a number of interesting points you make. Where you suggest that kissinger triggered nixons reactions in ways that kissinger, would then later regret. And kissinger played on nixons anxieties. Often to enhance his own power. So will take for example, the invasion of laos, but the south yet dummies forces, where kissinger played a key role and rogers, the secretary of state who i dont think anyone has ever written a single book, on rodgers. But rogers opposed in very present ways and is one example of the many times that kissinger pushed nixon in certain directions and typically, in many cases towards these force. So let me ask this question, is it not the case of policy makers that are never just dutiful agents, but rather advisers whose perspectives an analysis and support for opposition, to various policy sometimes also gives them causal responsibility for those policies. And particularly at certain moments, are there not times when kissinger does have a high degree of personal responsibility, and was in fact the decisive person. Or may have been the decisive factor. And i think you walked up to this conclusion a couple of times, and then always had a cabinet. Like there was also a National Security reason, for what kissinger was pushing. So my second question, is also a very big picture and im sure you fielded many questions along these lines over the years tom, and its about morality. And i think a lot about this quote, that jeremy pulled out during one of he pulled out for his book, Henry Kissinger and the american century. So what are your core moral principles . Kissinger answer to this i am not prepared to share that yet. Which is pretty remarkable considering that he is very happy to share opinions about pretty much anything so in your conclusion, you do fault kissinger for working against democracy in chile which you say undermined National Interest in 1970 to 1973 and you describe it as ignorant about argentinas dirty war. You also defend the bombing of cambodia and even were default kissinger in the case of argentina, your language is tepid. You say its hard to justify. The defense that you offer seems to be in part that everyone did what nixon and kissinger did, kennedy, eisenhower, wishing that america stayed in the cold war. But you also said that the claim that everything is justified because it was a cold war necessity, which is the argument ferguson makes it he said the argument is not very persuasive. Im not suggesting that what you needed to do to satisfy me here is not to offer a more vigorous condemnation of kissinger or a more robust defense, i can understand that you are trying to do either. To the extent that you wade into the debate, i was left uncertain about your position. Let me frame this in terms of this question. Do you think that kissinger had a moral compass . And if he did not, or if it was not well articulated, shouldnt we expect statesmen to health to have well articulated moral principles. Thank you for your excellent questions, that also draw that geographical setting up toms books. Excuse me. Im sorry. Still have a landline. These are hard questions, needless to say, and i guess i expect that. The Nixon Kissinger relationship, i do use the term dutiful follower. In that sense i do think the Foreign Policy in the first nixon years was nixons Foreign Policy. I think kissinger, to borrow the argument, i think he tuned himself into nixon and it advocates more forceful measures as he did on the korean shoot down of an american spy plane in 1969. I do think that is something about, particularly in the first years, in which kissinger did and often times to read nixon as a part of enhancing his own prestige and importance. Unlike the secretary of state it was a constituent of one president and i think kissinger was very aware of that. To a certain extent he did advocate policies that played into some of nixons own inclinations towards the use of force. Specifically on laos, i do think that was one where kissinger was persuaded that some type of use of force could strengthen the negotiating situation that was still and his memoirs was for that. How much responsibility . I think its there. I think that kissingers role on a number of these issues does give him a certain level of responsibility. Kissinger learned not to doubt himself. Kissinger loved to use the analogy of his life. Kissinger learned to follow that and also came to enjoy greater prestige and a better relationship with nixon because of that, i think kissinger had a moral compass. The older i get, the more reluctant i get. I am probably more reluctant to make that case. I think he did in some measure. I think it was one that he could ignore at times, but i think his larger one of the things that i think that did drive him was this notion of keeping United States from nuclear destruction, and that one way that would be achieved would be a Foreign Policy. Preventing disasters that could lead to a situation where the United States might engage in such aggressive behavior. I think this meant that he was willing to make calculations about decisions such as chile and argentina that were wrong, and that ended up causing greater harm in cold war calculations. I think it was one of the things that would lead to destruction. That was one of the things that he did advocate and keep. Trying to balance judgment on Henry Kissinger is tough. The calousness sometimes he could express. Sometimes his macabre wit is what he said about chile, its so irresponsible to vote for a marxist. I think it brings out the greater hostility toward him among writers and analysts. I think trying to build on kissinger is essential. I think people who built this over time and it is one thing very much around 2020 and im sure in 50 years it might strike a different balance. Nevertheless i do think he had a moral compass and had a place that he tried to adhere to. Thank you. I am not surprised he would not tell journey that, on the other hand i wish she had. We will now turn to dr. Diane, who is the executive director of the center for adopption policy for children and adoption and family issues at duke university. Dr. Diane has worked with centers for disease control. She was the architect for the humanitarian parole project, which brought over thousands of children to the adoptive parents after the 2010 earthquake. She also helped the help haiti act of 2010, which granted u. S. Citizenship to these adopted children. After practicing law in her career she went on to study the economic history of oxford and yale university. She went on to teach their and since 2010 has been in various capacities at duke universitys. While at yale she worked extensively on 20thcentury history and wrote prize winning books. We are delighted to have her now to provide some comments and questions to tom. You have the floor. Thank you, so much. Its wonderful to be here. Especially in terms of both congratulating tom, but the connection with William Archer lewis. Roger invited me to my first seminar at the Wilson Center in 1988. It was so important in helping me with my historical work on the middle east. I am indebted, as i think we all are, tom, its a wonderful book. I was told not to say how much about how good the book is. What i was particularly struck by was the grace and humanity with which you wrote. This is an extraordinary hard achievement, given the word kissinger, the name kissinger, and the name nixon. I say this because i was struck by one article that was written 10 years ago. The first line was, Richard Nixon is our kreuger. This is our set of terms, yet you have not done that. You have written a book with a sense of Historical Context of research, but also understanding that kissinger knew what he knew of what we dont know now. That is a second great wonderful thing about your book. These views you have gone hindsight i was struck by this. You are talking about the fact that they were so obsessed with the 1972 election. You are saying, but why are you obsessed, you won every state. You dont have that sense. Its almost a suspense book to read. Whats going to happen . What i am going to do is ask a number of some bigger, but some smaller questions and let you respond. The first one was, i did a poll of young students, law students, Young Professionals and i said, tell me the first three things you think about when you think about kissingers Foreign Policy . What i got was cambodia, chile, argentina and indochina. No one mentioned china, no one mentioned russia, no one mentioned the middle east. This is strange. One question for you is that your book goes very hard to limiting this and says that these things you know about in the Younger Generation are within a much larger context, but i wonder how you would explain the lack of this larger picture and what you would say to students if you are talking to them about this, to give them the framework that the end of the cold war being 30 years ago as obviously robbed from the way that all of us saw history. In the second point that we all alluded to is the question about small countries. Thats what people remember, chile, the human rights violations. Is it just that he sees them as, they get in the way of my china relations, i better not let it distract me, or does he have a broader picture . As you say kissinger wrote 4000 pages and your book is but a tiny thing compared to that. You cant talk about the secondary issues, but you could address that. I guess i will start with two more. One is morality. Jeremy brought it up in his book and i was struck by something else, because i am writing diplomatic and economic history and international adoption. I have been immersed among other things, in the 1975 vietnam baby lift. Kissinger plays a very Important Role in these events. Also the evacuation of south vietnamese people who worked with United States government. And this is fighting continuously with congress, the secretary of defense, he uses the word moral all the time and he says, it is our moral obligation to help the people who helped us. I wonder how much we can look back and say there is a connection between his moral sense of our allies in that context and what he experienced growing up in his own life. And finally, because i cannot resist, ive got this picture here. I dont know that we can see that, here is Henry Kissinger in 1960 something, and this is truly a cultural question of interest. The fact of the matter is, and those of us who remember this and read about it, he was the man about town. I just cannot think of alexander hayes, george shultz, mike pompeo in any of those terms. I wonder if you have any thoughts about his prominence in American Culture at that time. Think you so much. Congratulations again. Thank you and briefly, so yes i see i do think that the end of the cold war like many things in history when a larger context, and successfully. Historians are not really good at successes and triumph, we dont like that we have a disdain for any kind of triumphalism. But the end of the cold war, which was not great in many respects the result is that it needs or leads to a second guessing about some of the steps that were taken during that time. Even world war ii, subsequently people looked at some of the measures undertaken during world war ii and the criticism and i think that some of the emphasis on some of the issues that you mentioned, like cambodia and chile and argentina, it has to do with this you might say the, ends justify the means. As elements of the cold war. And i have no doubt about that, and i think that they are also very dramatic, and quite emotional and some of them are very gripping and i found the documentation on cambodia actually very powerful and i do think that its part of the reason that those are the things that are remembered and emphasized and i think that on the small countries, i think that kissinger there was a tendency to disparage the smaller countries, and kissinger did have something of that and i heard that i told this joke, when i went down to australia to lecture there that kissinger is, once asked why did you come to australia, and he said next time i have something in antarctica i will stop there. He was disdainful, about an ally that way, and i think to a certain extent, some of the decisions that he made, and some of the calculations in those smaller countries to reflect some of that larger thinking he had about the United States, and around the world and again it went back even to the nuclear, and then to the challenge of the communist world. But its very interesting you brought up this issue of morality, because he did Start Talking about the morality of the south vietnamese. And the ironic thing is, kissinger had sort of expected self vietnam to fall, but i think his expectation was that it would not happen, quickly and it would happen in a military undertaking, it would happen slowly, through subversion. Even elections of some sort, that would lead to the communist taking power. And he did feel strongly that we had that obligation but he was just tarred and feathered in the press, and even for bringing up that subject on vietnam and given the policy of the administration pursued, he did get very far on that. But i think it reflected something of his notion that the people who were for, you do anything for them ultimately and youre willing to of course, you know i would say that at times he was at times willing to, throw people under the bus as he did with the kurds, and iran and other situation. That was not a universal principle, but i think he did a time show a genuine concern for those who assisted the United States and wanting to help them so im aware of that, but the simple thing is i think i actually do have an argument there that is beyond cup popular culture. Kissinger did exploit the medias fascination with the idea that he had this appeal, he was a charming man. He charmed a number of these actresses, he was very smart and could carry on a conversation, and also he showed an ability that was very appealing and he is known for the powers, or the ultimate aphrodisiac and i guess thats the in the metoo era has to mush sound but generally for the most part, all these people spoke very fondly of henry, and very much admired him. I think he had a certain fascination with the idea of the intellectualism as a sex symbol, and it was another part of kissingers ability, to deal with journalists, and with media figures and to take advantage of the things that appealed to them and would color his administration. He could be this unusual figure, and i cant tell you the number of times that he was commented on at times on some of the tv comments at the time. And it was a sex symbol, and its something that added to the allure of Henry Kissinger. He was part of that fascination, and ultimately it was part of his power. Okay thank you. Before we get to our next commentator, please note that once we get to the q as without a broader audience, please use the hand raising function in the chat function of zoom to get online so if you have a question please use that hand raising function and we will try to call on you if we have time. So that doctor keys, and doctor coons have asked quite a number and some very tough questions so another commentator might have a hard time that its but if theres one who can pull it off its jeremy and we are grateful for you to also have joined this power just panel jeremy, and great to see you the distinguished chair for leadership in Global Affairs at the university of texas and austin. And at stanford, and yale with a ph. D. From there. Hes a professor in the university,. And the Lyndon Johnson school of public affairs. Hes the author of ten books on contemporary politics and his most recent book, is the impossible presidency the rise and fall of americas highest office, and has been noted in this context and he offered his writings. Appear in blocks and print media and he has a weekly podcast. This is democracy available through his web page. Jeremy surrey dot neck and thank you for being here. Thank you and let me begin by congratulating tom and tom and diana ive known since i began my graduate student career and both of them have been really so important to my development and continue growth and learning as a scholar and its a pleasure to be part of this event its the first time ive been at the robert lewis center. And its a wonderful colleague and friend and its wonderful to be a part of this so let me jump right in the and i want to echo all the auditory lauded tory things theyve said about toms book, and i want to add one more to what others have said and i really enjoy this book, and i read it twice and i read it in page proofs, and i read in the final version. I enjoyed it because it made me think, its a book about kissinger that makes you think about american power. And using kissinger as an insight to this to those issues. And thats what all of us in this panel are doing already about those issues. And this book rests on a series of paradoxess the kissinger is a poly trope us. That he goes in all directions, at one time. He could be charming, and incredibly of noxious. He can be insightful, and superficial at times. He can be narcissistic, and he could understand negotiating framework, in which most narcissist arent able to do and something in this book it brings that really well and, tom is the only author i know who has run with kissinger as a political ally. I think it fits as tom self says in this first chapter with the anxiety of influence that kissinger has from the start. The desire for power for good for self interest and the trauma of having seen what happened when you dont have power. I think that something all of us have agreed on and looking at kissinger. So the three paradoxes stand out to me, i almost want to flag them. Then i want to ask a couple of questions about them, and i will try to do this quickly. So first, tom makes the case as he has, and makes it very persuasively, that but kissinger is a Political Animal. He also makes the case, and the books show this and he is a Political Animal who hates american politics. He hates congress, it has very little mention in the book. And congress is a nuisance for Henry Kissinger. Even before he is an office. He doesnt like elections. He likes celebrity activities. He doesnt like elections, he doesnt like congress, and i say if you dont like elections you dont like congress. And youre not a Political Animal in the american context. So how do we make sense of that. There is attention there. Thats not a question not just putting out that there. I found that fascinating. Second paradox, he sees the weakness of democracy, and tom has some thoughtful passengers on where the kissinger sees the weaknesses of democratic procedures. Look at the same time toms entire book, is how kissinger exploits those procedures. He exploits the spaghetti like nature of american institutions. Look he turns into this little white house. And then into sort of a little shop in which you can make policy on his own. These he has exploited the weaknesses, and one way to read toms book, is that kissinger could not have been a political successful animal in any other society. Because the things he does, are so but to the nature of interlocking checks and balances and the power at the white house and that it has. And the opportunity the United States has to use that up that power. So its the weaknesses of democracy, but exploiting those weaknesses as a show of his own strength. Theres a third paradox, which is what i think all this on this panel has written about, and tom brings this out. Kissinger is a decline, us hes acutely aware, he has the longest seat thesis at harvard about this, about how empires rise and fall. And where in the fall stage. But yet he believes he can extend the american economics at this time. And his urge for him is to extend power, not to conserve it. That is also a paradox there. That comes i think through very well in toms book. Here are my questions, and these are questions impart inspired by the moment where in. I wont talk about donald trump, but as with Everything Else his own hair is hanging over us, and he you are there right now i guess he would be close to us because of the walls around the white house but it, he still close to us. And these questions come from the strength of this book. I think theyre questions i would like to think about deeply, because of the incredible work that tom has done. So abuse of power by the executive kissingers right there. In the belly of the beast. In the prior example, we would point to before the one were in right now. Tom is clear that he does not believe. He says this a few times, he doesnt believe that kissinger didnt know about the. He finds it hard to believe, but he doesnt believe that kissinger was responsible for watergate. What is his role in this in so far that he extends executive power in ways that no other nsa adviser did. And as thomas is one of his chapters, the essence of the Foreign Policy president. Lets going to the point of raising the nuclear alert. Without even consulting the president in 1973. So to what extent are the abuses of power, that we see, thereafter and are they connected to kissinger. How much of his story, its a story of the abuse of executive power. I asked him that once, and he was very very angry. So i hope tom will not be as angry in answering this as he was. So second, for Political Animal, in a Democratic Political context, why does he love dictator so much . It doesnt negate the argument that he might be a Political Animal but again thats not what you would expect its not what you would expect and Ronald Reagan at time, who is ready to work with dictators, had this belief that other societies were eventually going to reform and become more democratic. He had a connection he believes to what he believed would happen as societies changed in his mind and progressed towards democracy. Kissinger has none of that look hes someone who also saw the horrors of dictatorship. And i struggled this when i was writing about it. And he finds himself, very comfortable in that framework. You showed that so well tom. And then third, and really most interesting to me, is why is it that someone who is such a Political Animal, and as you show the chapter, does such a good job to keep himself in the game, at the same time how can he be so unwilling to take on self criticism . Politicians flipflop all the time. Just like professors to. We have to. Our students change, we have to say different things. The world changes and i teach reconstruction differently now from how i taught it five years ago. Part of it is being in texas, but part of seeing that you know less was accomplished than i thought five years ago as i look around activities in our society. We change right. Even though he has managed as a celebrity two main connected to figures he seemed, so unwilling, so unwilling to play the game that other politicians do, but i think robert back to merited brilliantly is to apologize, express regret and blame someone else. His argument is, terrible things happen in vietnam, i feel horrible about it and it is Lyndon Johnsons fault. Why isnt kissinger doing that . Why can he not let go . I think that is significant to us because i think one of the real challenges we face as a country, how do we love our country, how do we express our own self criticism . How can we look out into the world, obama struggled with this, honestly. How can we see and admit to our mistakes . And actually turn that to our advantage rather than trying to cover them up. It does strike me that perhaps after november, certainly i hope after november, we will be in that position as a country. How are we going to do that . How can we learn in that sense from what kissinger has not done . Again, these topics come out of just the depth of the work you have done here, tom. It is wonderful book i want to encourage everyone to read it by multiple copies. I know that will make tom very happy. Thank you, jeremy. Great questions. Wow, those are some excellent points and i appreciate very much what he said about the book intense it is probably the highest praise you can give an author, that you got them to think about something. I know it is one of the things i hope to do in the books is get people to think about the subject. On the abuse of power by the executive, well, yes. It kissinger is one of these figures that in a way is his own concern about leaks, thats one of his driving net that encouraged Richard Nixon on a path he probably wouldve gone on anyway, to get the plummers, and kissinger had a connection through some of the people that worked on his staff. One of them has written a fascinating dissertation, i encourage people to look at up. I think, i think kissinger, it is where kissinger both being political and non political paid off. In a way, the image and shape, the president doesnt talk about domestic politics, was something that the media was more than happy to belief. And very happy to buy into and give him a pass. There is a wonderful line from Walter Cronkite at his birthday and was asked what they gave him, and he said, we gave him a pardon. Walter conk right is a Network Person saying this that he might have known these things, but we dont care. He is like them. Kissinger, this is one of his genius in some ways of keeping a certain distance from politics that suggested a paradox but also play to his favor. The and it seems to serve a role and that would save his presidency. Kissinger was annoyed by congress, no question. He didnt believe Congress Deserves the role it was trying to lets face it, in American History we have gone back and forth in this. We have had a period of time when congress is a tough institution, we have admired more president s that have directed Foreign Policy. I think we admire george w. Bush who led Foreign Policy in some ways. And he came close to defining congress in the gulf or, i think on this question of where the separation of power lies and Foreign Policy, i go back to the old line, it is an invitation to struggle. It is a struggle that has gone on through American History. I think this question, his responsibility for the abuse has to be put into that context. Why do we love dictators . You can make deals with dictators, that was the perception he had, and the best contrast, and the unsavory once in latin america are not a good example, but the best context is saddam, omar sadat could bring him around and change for the to kissinger this was a huge change, it changes the whole dynamics in the middle east. At the same time, it drove him crazy because israeli political system, and its tendency to pound him down on every concession, every debate. It is ironic that in retrospect he is someone who is defending but at the time he was discouraged by many israelis. I think that is probably the answer in many respects, that the is the you know, we have president s that like dictators. Contemporary right now we have seems to have an abnormal fondness for them. But its not terribly surprising that dictators have a certain appeal. Jimmy carter, one of the most moral men ever made deals. This gives some idea. Finally, your last point about his unwillingness to take self criticism. You know, i take your point thats in many ways on a mutual level on self criticism is a great thing, to teach. I am not so sure it works politically. Maybe in the context of academia, but it is costly to me to acknowledge your mistakes, the bill clinton apologies that come to be. There is, i think americans are torn on that issue. On the one hand i think there is an inclination to like someone who says, the hell with you, i am sticking to my guns sort of thing. Versus the more empathetic and willingness to acknowledge the sinks. I think that mcnamaras apology got hammered by the new york times. I think kissinger had a certain awareness, you cant apologize. In a way, you will be hammered one way or another, whichever way you choose. It may be a reflection, it may be the depth of his consider thoughts. But i watched, just to get back in the frame of mind, i watch the documentary that Neil Ferguson did of kissinger, basically said i wouldve done the same things. It was painful, but i think you are right that he doesnt seem to have that particular characteristic. But im not so sure it is politically advantageous or even politically as appealing as it might seem right now when we face that issue in a four few months. Thank you. Next on American History tv, nancy Authority Like green spandex but her book atomic spy, the dark dark lives of klaus fuchs. The Leon Levy Center for biography hosted this event and provided the video. She explains how she discovered klaus fuchs while researching her previous book. A screen